Академический Документы
Профессиональный Документы
Культура Документы
by
Wolfgang Breuer* and Benjamin Quinten**
01 July 2009
Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Breuer, Chair of Business Administration and Finance, RWTH Univer-
sity, Templergraben 64, 52056 Aachen, Germany. Tel.: +49 241 8093539, Email: wolfgang.breuer@bfw.rwth-aachen.de.
**
Dipl.-Kfm. Benjamin Quinten, Chair of Business Administration and Finance, RWTH Uni-
versity, Templergraben 64, 52056 Aachen, Germany. Tel: +49 241 8093670, Email: benjamin.quinten@bfw.rwth-aachen.de
Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (German Research Foundation) is gratefully acknowledged.
Cultural Finance
Abstract: Against the backdrop of a Europe that is continuing to grow together economically,
and in times of striking globalization, an emphasis on culture as an explanatory determinant in
the context of economic issues would seem particularly attractive. This study intends to pursue this line of thought and to proclaim a new, autonomous discipline: Cultural Finance. This
discipline aims to integrate cultural aspects into the analysis of financial questions. To this
end, the importance of cultural values in financial decision-making is demonstrated on the
basis of methods taken from game theory and institutional economics. Additionally, existing
weak points in this research field are uncovered by a systematic overview of the current literature, and some future developments are indicated. Finally, this study shows that Cultural Finance can close the literature gap between the neighbouring disciplines of Law and Finance
and Behavioural Finance.
Keywords: national culture, cultural value, finance, institutional economics
1. Introduction
Nowadays, a fundamental phenomenon is the growing interdependence between countries,
peoples and cultures of the world, which is developing in very different sectors (such as economics, politics, media, science and education) and is commonly described as globalization.
Regarding the consequences of this process, two core theses can be found in the literature:
First, the so-called theory of convergence1 asserts that the process of globalization has led to
homogenization at many levels in terms of a transnational standardization, and that this will
continue in the future. According to this theory, via the globalization process the economic
environment will be extensively harmonized, so that people, too, will converge in both their
attitudes and behaviour at many levels. Second, in complete contrast, there is the theory of
divergence2, according to which there are many areas of social life which have displayed regional differences over a long time period and which continue to exist now or have even
grown in intensity owing to the pressure of globalization. Huntingtons (1994) controversially
debated forecast of the Clash of Civilizations may be mentioned here as an example if
rather an extreme one.
Consistent with the basic concept of the theory of divergence, empirical observations suggest
that many financial issues differ strongly according to country and region, even though there
is a tightly interdependent globalized capital market, whose existence and influence is continually being emphasized. As an example, one may think in this context of the different characteristics of national financial systems or the diverging relative significance of debt and equity financing. These empirically relevant differences in financial practice continue to throw
up hitherto unanswered questions for the predominant neoclassical finance models as well as
for the information economics approaches, which are also based on neoclassical ideas. However, an interesting starting point for explaining these differences might be offered by a young
field of research that includes cultural aspects in the analysis of financial problems.
It is the intention of this paper to describe the scientific relevance, areas of research, and future development potentials of Cultural Finance, covering all aspects of traditional Finance,
such as Portfolio Management or Corporate Finance. To this end, key terms used in the cultural sciences, and which are important for financial analysis, will be determined in Section 2.
Section 3 deals with the economic relevance of cultural factors. Section 4 attempts to survey
the literature published so far, which considers culture in the field of Business Studies and,
1
2
particularly, in Finance research. Section 5 follows up with the positioning and definition in
the literature of an autonomous research field termed Cultural Finance. Concluding in Section 6, the previous achievements of the presented literature are evaluated in order to indicate
future research directions which can build on and develop from their weak points.
6
7
behaviour of its members and is therefore an output factor on the one hand. On the other hand,
culture impacts on these factors as a framework concept in the sense of a collective programming of the mind8 and influences as an input factor behavioural patterns, so that an (indirect) relationship between culture and behaviour can be established.
<<< Insert Figure 1 about here >>>
For the context of this paper, culture can be defined as follows:9
Culture may be understood as a complex entity of cognitions, shared by the members
of a social group. The focal point of the cognitions is (core) values, which are assumed
to steer individual behaviour.
In line with the above perception, a possibility arises for empirically capturing the construct of
culture, which has always been so difficult to measure. A method for implementing this and
quantitatively measuring cultural aspects is offered by the so-called culture models, which
different researchers have developed in various forms on the basis of sociological, psychological and anthropological fundamentals. Usually, culture models consist basically of several
(cultural) dimensions, which serve to characterize and classify cultures. These cultural dimensions are usually bipolar, and designed with two extremes, enabling cultures to be grouped
along corresponding scales.
Table 1, which demonstrates the long tradition and popularity which culture models have in
science, includes the most important of these:
<<< Insert Table 1 about here >>>
Hofstedes culture model with its later extensions10 is generally considered to be the most
popular approach for describing cultural conditions and therefore finds wide application in
research and practice.11 However, recently, the culture model of Schwartz (1992, 1994) has
gained in popularity because it can overcome several methodological weaknesses inherent in
Hofstedes model, which have become apparent over time.12 What both models have in common is that the cultural impact chain described above is regarded as given.13 The respective
value systems serve to characterize and distinguish attributes of the culture under consideration and are therefore central components and the primary scientific objective of both culture
models. In particular, the Schwartz model is often referred to as value theory.14
Schwartz (1994, 1999) implemented his studies between 1998 and 2005. These were preceded
by an extensive, theoretical development of a basic cultural values concept. Samples from 93
ethnic groups in 73 countries were collected. Schwartz determined the following 7 universal
value types, or cultural dimensions, which can be operationalized by 45 basic values and
which span the Schwartz culture model as constitutive pillars:15
Conservatism refers to the preservation of existing orders and traditions. Close social
relationships and identification with the community place the pursuit of collective interests at the focal point of a persons life. The basic values especially connected with
this value type are: maintenance of the status quo, respect for tradition, family and national security, wisdom, adaptation.
Autonomy describes to what extent personal interests and desires are pursued in the
community. The self-reference of the individual is predominant. Due to the comparatively high heterogeneity of the basic values in this value type, the latter can be split
up further to gain a more precise description:
Intellectual Autonomy strengthens the pursuit of individual ideas and individual ways of thinking, and encourages intellectual independence. Supporting
basic values are: curiosity, creativity and broadmindedness.
Affective Autonomy on the other hand focuses on the significance of an individual seeking to express his or her feelings in order to have a fulfilled life.
Underlying basic values are: enjoyment and an exciting and varied life.
Hierarchy demonstrates the degree of the acceptance of the hierarchical structure of a
society and the resulting allocation of roles and resources. The question of the legitimization of unequal power distribution is a central feature. Among other things, important basic values are: social power, authority, humility and wealth.
Mastery emphasizes the active mastership of the social environment by use of selfassertion. An active and committed meeting of aims and challenges is aspired to via
basic values such as ambition, success, daring and competence.
14
15
16
will be accused together but they will only receive an 8-year prison sentence, since their confessions will result in extenuating circumstances. If one confesses and the other denies, the
one who confesses will be released after a short period of time, according to the leniency policy, whilst the other will receive the maximum 10-year prison penalty.
In order to illustrate the mechanism of values in this story, three following game situations are
distinguished:
1) The classical prisoners dilemma: If each criminal acts to maximize his/her own
benefit in a rational and context-independent manner like economic man confessing is the obvious dominant strategy for each of them. The optimum, i.e. denial
on both sides, is not achieved, resulting in a welfare loss relating to society as a whole
(here: from the view point of both criminals as one unit).
2) Formal institutional regulation: Again, both suspects act in a purely opportunistic
manner, but have to accept certain institutional regulations in this game situation. In
the prisoners dilemma, for instance, one can think of the Mafia institution Omert,
according to which silence at all costs is to be adhered to, and drastic physical
measures implemented should this not be the case (but also the prospect of welfare in
the case of remaining silent). Both criminals are led to relinquish their dominant strategy and to deny the crime, on account of the arranged incentive and control system.
Consequently, the institutional regulation admittedly acts as a microeconomic restriction; but for society as a whole, the optimum of the game situation can be achieved.
Nevertheless, welfare losses are incurred in the form of transaction costs, caused for
example by the implementation and controlling costs of the institutional regulation. In
the case above, the criminal organization would take sanctions if a suspect were to
confess to the crime (incurring costs). Detached from this specific context, the effectiveness of formal laws can be likewise interpreted.
3) Cultural ties: Here, the validity of culturally based values is postulated. Invoking
Schwartzs culture model, a high importance attached to the value egalitarianism
within a society (in this case: for both crooks) could ensure that neither of them acts
opportunistically during interrogation, but in a more altruistic manner. In order to
avoid harming the accomplice, both deny the crime and get away with a 2-year sentence each.
As in 2), the macro-level optimum is achieved in this version of the game, but with
the difference that this value-oriented behaviour does not incur transaction costs in the
form of, for instance, implementation and controlling costs, such as in the case of formal institutional regulation.
Doubtlessly it could be argued here that free rider problems could offset the transaction costs: Each single individual might regard cultural aspects, similarly to a formal
institutional regulation, as a restriction on his or her decision-making freedom. Thus,
the incentive might arise to trust in the value-oriented behaviour of the other but to act
contrarily oneself. In this case, a suspect admitting his or her guilt and an accomplice
who remains unwavering, could get away with a one-year sentence. However, this argument may be weakened by the intrinsically motivated creation of values: behaviour
which is consistent with cultural values gains its own intrinsic value for the actor, so
that the welfare increasing consequences of cultural values stem from two sources:
first from a directly perceived benefit via the value-oriented action as an end in itself17,
second, from an indirectly perceived benefit via enhanced coordination possibilities of
all participants behaviour.
An observation of these three game versions of the prisoners dilemma demonstrates the relevance of values for human decision-making: Value-oriented behaviour is the efficient solution
to the game situation in the prisoners dilemma. If such values hold a different significance in
different groups, and thus develop divergent impacts as known from cultural research (see
Section 2), it follows that cultural aspects are relevant for situations involving human decision-making interaction, and thus for economics.
Moreover, all three game situations above can be analyzed by means of cultural value theories, so that it seems appropriate to propose culture models as comprehensive analyzing tools
for economic interactions. For example, observing Schwartzs (1994) culture model, the behavioural patterns of the criminals in each respective game situation can be easily interpreted
on the basis of the different significance of the individual cultural dimensions. In game situation 1, where the behaviour is characterized by unbounded opportunism, those values of
autonomy may be valid, which involve a concentrated pursuit of individual interests. A high
significance of values in the categories conservatism or hierarchy indicates a strong interest of a society in formal institutional regulations, which would explain situation 2. A potential connection between game version 3 and the value category in egalitarianism has already
been mentioned above.
17
For the utility endowing impact of internalized culture, cf., e.g., Weise (2004).
The culture-oriented approach generally demonstrates a connection to ethical and moral issues. Breuer, Quinten and Korte (2008) show, with the help of a similarly constructed prisoners dilemma, that the effect of ethical aspects in the economy operates analogously to that
of cultural values. This is not surprising, considering that ethical aspects, such as morals or
customs, are likewise elements of culture according to the above definition. The essential difference between ethical and cultural values is only that different value systems prevail in different cultures. These systems determine different comprehensions of ethical behaviour. In
this respect, a culture-oriented approach is also more general than business-ethical approaches.
Another possibility to demonstrate the economic relevance and generality of culture is given
by the economic institutions model of Williamson (2000), illustrated in figure 2. Williamson
distinguishes four interdependent levels of analysis, where a higher level functions as a restricting and initializing development frame for the respective following level (continuous
arrows). The dashed arrows symbolize, in contrast, a feedback process from a lower to a nexthigher level, although (as a rule) on account of the very large time horizons of the process,
this can be abstracted from.
Level 1 covers all the informal institutions such as values, religion, traditions or customs that
could be understood as culture in the sense of the definition above and is basically analyzed
by the social sciences.18 According to the relationships between the levels, culture influences
the development of the more specific formal institutions of the second level (constitutional
environment), such as of property rights or law and order, by providing the frame of development. On this basis, governance structures in the form of specific contractual agreements
are determined (level 3), which for their part finally lead to specific incentive alignments for
the individual behaviour (level 4).
<<< Insert Figure 2 about here >>>
Owing to the initializing and restrictive role that culture plays for other areas of economic
analysis, its influence on the amount of incurred transaction costs can again be explained: the
attributes of cultural values presented above as stable, unspecific and shared by a social
group, serve to form relatively homogeneous ideas about the adequate form of the derived
institutions of levels 2 to 4. This means that the transaction costs for development and imple
18
North (1994) distinguishes between informal and formal institutions and similar interdependent relationships
in his well known institutional axiomatic.
10
mentation of these institutions can be kept comparatively low, provided that these do not conflict with level 1.
The thesis that culture can be used as a comprehensive method of analysis for economic interactions is also demonstrated by the Williamson model: Owing to the top-down relations between the individual analysis levels, culture influences other institutional dimensions, such as
formal institutional regulations (level 2 and 3) or (opportunistic) incentive alignments (level
4) and thus enables us to analyze, for instance, perceptions of transaction costs theory (game
version 2 in the prisoners dilemma) or neoclassical economics or information economics
perceptions (game version 1 in the prisoners dilemma).
Summing up, it can be said that the economic relevance of cultural values results on the one
hand from the fact that these values are reflected in the (formal) institutions of a society, such
as in a specific financial system as a consequence of the underlying constitutional environment and the corresponding corporate governance system. On the other hand, cultural factors
having their own intrinsic values, they may exert influence on preferences of individual decision-makers. Thus, culture can influence the economic behaviour of individuals both indirectly via formal institutions of a society, and directly via cultural values as an end in themselves.
11
rialism, culture was only granted the function of an exogenously given constraint in economic optimization calculations. Jones (1995, p.269) quite rightly speaks of cultural nullity
in this context. Owing to the neoclassical concept of equilibrium and perfect competition,
there was simply no room for the multifarious impacts of cultural factors in such an autonomous economy. Certainly, the methodological difficulties in quantifying culture have contributed to this situation, because it meant that cultural aspects could not be easily transferred
into models.
Roughly since the 1990s, the interest in culture as an explanatory determinant has constantly
been growing on the part of business and economics. The key reason for this may be the limits, which have been experienced by the Neoclassical Economics and Information Economics
models in explaining real behaviour and empirical results. The integration of social science
findings into economics has been and still is claimed to be a solution to this problem. As a
result, in addition to social psychological findings, such as in Behavioural Economics, findings from cultural science have also become interesting for economists. A second reason may
be seen in the development of sophisticated culture models, especially that of Hofstede
(1980). On account of improved empirical measurability of cultural factors, these could not
only be analyzed more precisely, but could be more easily modelled for other sciences, such
as economics. Thus, testable hypotheses were put forward to empirically examine the influence of culture on economics.
Hofstedes work Cultures Consequences in 1980 has probably been the major impulse behind the intensification of the interdisciplinary research between the cultural and economic
sciences, particularly in the domain of Business Studies. Since then, interest in explaining
intentionally diverging phenomena by means of cultural aspects has increased in many areas
related to Business Studies. Table 1 provides a systematizing overview of selected (empirical)
studies.
<<< Insert Table 2 about here >>>
The work of Hofstede (1980) facilitates an explanation of the systematic methodology of the
overview. In his study relating to the area of Strategy Management, he pinpoints cultural aspects by means of his culture model (column 3) and tries to investigate globally (column 4)
their effect on management.19 This enables him to arrive at the central finding (column 2)
19
Global means that more than three of the cultural regions mentioned above are included.
12
that management practices may not be seen as having universal validity, but that, if these are
to be successfully implemented, cultural aspects must be taken into consideration.
22
An introduction to this field can be found in Iqbal/Mirakhor (2007) and Breuer/Quinten (2008).
13
particular circumstances, which would not necessarily exist in such intensity in other cultures,
it does provide an example of how a certain cultural environment may exert substantial influence on the field of Finance. Furthermore, the domain of Islamic Finance indicates the direction which Cultural Finance, accordingly developed, might take. If implementation orientation
is regarded as the ultimate goal of Business Studies, aiming to provide practitioners with recommendations, there ought to exist, for instance, Western European Finance or AngloSaxon Finance when Cultural Finance has realized its full development. On the basis of theoretical deliberations, financial, culturally dependent recommendations should be elaborated
for implementation in financial practice. However, on the path to this ultimate goal, the findings of the above studies have to be examined. Three criteria, content, epistemological
methodology and argumentation lend themselves well to this purpose:
Content: Observing the studies listed in Table 3 with regard to content, it could be said
that particularly in the field of Corporate Finance as well as in Portfolio Management,
several studies have contributed to the explanation of empirically derived international
behaviour differences. Cultural aspects are capable of acting as an explanatory determinant for internationally diverging behaviour in Corporate Finance practice, for example, with regard to capital structure or dividend policy. Culture also promises a solution to dealing with the different types of corporate governance systems. Furthermore, in the portfolio management and risk management literature, successful attempts have been made to provide explanations for country-specific investor behaviour, as well as to give culturally oriented recommendations concerning asset allocation. Only issues relating to performance measurement in portfolio management have
not been investigated in Cultural Finance up to now. Also, approaches to the third
subdomain of Finance Capital Budgeting do, to our best knowledge, not exist.
14
Finance sometimes display model-theoretical content, too, when dealing with the issue
of Islamic Financial Engineering, as in Iqbal and Khan (2005).
23
15
all countries.27 Cultural Finance could, therefore, successfully close the research gap concerning the question of how international divergence and culturally conditioned rationality defects
impact on financial issues. Thus, Cultural Finance could greatly enrich the findings of Behavioural Finance.
More points of contact with other Finance research fields arise from the objective of Cultural
Finance, namely the explaining of different international financial practices. The same objective is pursued by the research field of Law and Finance, which considers legal differences
as explanatory determinants. The studies by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Schleifer and Vishny
doubtlessly rank among the most influential papers on this approach, having produced some
remarkable empirical evidence during the last decade.28 The starting point for these authors is
that legal investor protection of a given country is dependent on the respective underlying
common law or civil law legal traditions. Since, in addition, enhanced protection of minority
shareholders is an important determinant of stock market development in any country, several
international financial phenomena can thus be explained.29
Stulz and Williamson (2003) have, however, reservations about any profound explanatory
power of legal differences, and pose the question of why legal differences between countries
cannot simply be eliminated if, for example, improved investor protection were to bring about
an enhanced development of the stock market. The Economic Institutions model of Williamson (2000) presented above may provide an answer: legal regulations may be found at level 2
and are influenced in so far by level 1, and are accordingly, in a general sense, part of the culture. Laws should, then, be suited to the underlying cultural values if they are to be efficient
and effective in the long-run.
Even though legal differences may provide a good, descriptive contribution to the analysis of
country-specific characteristics, and can certainly represent the culture of a society in part,
their sole consideration would neglect key determinants with deeper roots in a society.30 Cultural Finance might be in a position to guarantee a deeper approach and thus sustainably enrich the approach already taken by Law and Finance in explaining internationally divergent
financial issues.
27
16
17
As this contribution has demonstrated, as of yet, published studies in the domain of Cultural
Finance have given rise to the hope of generating a considerable increase in findings in the
31
18
area of modern Finance. The resulting improvements in understanding the relevance of cultural values for financial decision-making should finally enable the derivation of action guidelines for corporate decision-makers under explicit consideration of cultural aspects. The particular actuality of this topic with regard to the numerous debates about the consequence of
globalization suggests that Cultural Finance will be a fast expanding research area, the development of which will be regarded with some excitement.
19
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26
Culture
Values
Attitudes
Behaviour
27
Culture Models
Parsons/Shils (1951)
Kluckhohn/Strodtbeck (1961)
Hall (1976)
Hofstede (1980)
Trompenaars (1993)
Schwartz (1994)
Inglehart/Baker (2000)
Cultural Dimensions
20
28
Culture
(informal institutions):
Values, religion, traditions,
customs
-------------------Social theory
Level 1
Constitutional environment:
Formal rules in the shape of law
and order
-------------------Economics of property rights,
political theory
Level 2
Governance structure:
Formal regulations in shape of
specific contractual agreements
-------------------Transaction cost economics
Level 3
Incentive mechanism:
Individual incentives of
optimizing resource allocation
-------------------Agency theory, neoclassical
economics
Level 4
29
(1) Author
(3) Culture
Culture model of
Hofstede
Newman/Nollen
(1996)
Cultural model of
Hofstede
Western European,
Asian
Licht (2001)
Culture model of
Schwartz
Western European,
Asian, Anglo-Saxon
Cultural Model
Project Globe
Global
Organizational theory
Culture model of
Hofstede
Western European
(Denmark, Netherlands)
Culture model of
Hofstede
Asian, Anglo-Saxon
Social systems
Asian (Japan)
Gray (1988)
Culture model of
Hofstede
Global
Culture model of
Hofstede
Western European
(France, Norway),
Anglo-Saxon (USA)
Kachelmeier/Shehata
(1997)
Individualism vs.
collectivism
(Hofstede)
Anglo-Saxon (USA),
Confucian
Culture model of
Hofstede
European
Dahl (2004)
Culture model of
Hofstede
Global
30
Nakata/Sivakumar
(1996)
Culture model of
Hofstede
Global
Aaker/Williams
(1998)
Individualism vs.
collectivism
(Hofstede)
Anglo-Saxon (USA),
Confucian (China)
Tabellini (2005)
Culture model of
Inglehardt
Western European
Guiso/Sapienza/
Zingales (2006)
Ethnic groups,
religions, World
Value Survey
Global
Wennekers et al.
(2007)
Culture model of
Hofstede
Western European,
Asian (Japan), AngloSaxon
31
Focus
Author
Culture
Cultural Zone
Main Findings
Financing
environment
Capital structure
Corporate Finance
Stonehill/Stitzel
(1969)
No explicit measuring21
(local norms)
Sekely/Collins
(1988)
No explicit measuring
(historical/meaningful
cultural zones)
Global
Grouping of countries concerning cultural familiarity shows differences in financial (debt) structures between these groups, so cultural differences are correlated with a significant country effect in determining capital structures.
Chui/Lloyd/
Kwok (2002)
Global
Different capital structures around the world are explicable by means of differences in national culture. In particular, countries with high scores on conservatism and mastery tend to have lower debt ratios.
Griffin/Li/Yue/ Zhao
(2009)
Culture models of
Schwartz + Hofstede
Global
Stulz/Willamson
(2003)
No explicit measuring
(Religion and languages)
Global
Culture proxies religion and language can give some explanation why investor protection differs across countries. So, catholic countries have weaker protection of investor rights than protestant countries.
Kwok/Tadesse
(2006)
21
No explicit measuring means that culture is not measured by means of explicit instrumental variables in these studies.
32
Financing
environment
Breuer/
Salzmann (2008)
Global
Malul/Shoham
(2008)
Global
Global
Country differences in importance of earnings management are related to differences in cultural values. Egalitarism and conservatism (Schwartz) and individualism (Hofstede) have a negative impact on the magnitude of earnings management, while uncertainty avoidance positively effects earnings manipulations. In
general, the study shows that culture not only influences formal institutions but
also directly managerial (mis-)behaviour.
Castro/
Desender/
Escamilla (2007)
Culture models of
Schwartz + Hofstede
Ramirez/ Tadesse
(2007)
Culture model of
Hofstede
Global
Chang/
Noorbakhsh (2008)
Culture model of
Hofstede
Global
International levels of corporate cash holdings are influenced by cultural background of a firm. Corporate managers in countries with high scores on uncertainty avoidance and masculinity tend to hold more cash.
Fidrmuc/Jacob
(2008)
Global
Shao/Kwok/
Guedhami (2008)
Global
Global
Bae/Chang/Kang
(2009)
33
Financial
engineering
M&A
Weber/Shenkar/
Raveh (1996)
Culture model of
Hofstede
Chakrabarti/
Gupta-Mukherjee/
Jayaraman (2009)
Giannetti/Yafeh
(2009)
Anglo-Saxon (USA),
Western European
National culture has an essential effect on processes and outcomes of mergers &
acquisitions transactions. For international M&As, national culture differences
are a much better predictor than corporate culture differentials for post-merger
integration.
Global
The performance of cross-border M&As and the cultural distance of the acquirer
and the target are correlated. There is a positive relationship of the long-run
performance and cultural distance measured by a combined cultural distance
index and by alternative culture proxies such as religion and language.
Global
The importance and the development of stock markets in several countries differ
depending on nations cultural dimension. So, countries with high levels of
uncertainty avoidance and low level of masculinity (high femininity) have more
capitalized stock markets than other countries.
Global
Culture model of
Hofstede
Global
de Jong/
Semenov (2002)
Pirouz (2004)
Culture model of
Hofstede
de Jong/
Semenov (2006)
Guiso/Sapienza/
Zingales (2008)
34
Grinblatt/
Keloharju (2001)
Language; geographical
proximity (nationality)
Griffin/Ji/Martin
(2003)
No explicit measuring
(attitudes to risk)
Anderson/ Fedenia/
Hirschey/Rantala
(2007)
Siegel/Licht/
Schwartz (2007)
Beugelsdijk/Frijns
(2008)
Chui/Titman/Wei
(2008)
Aggarwal/ Kearney/
Lucey (2009)
Culture model of
Hofstede
Culture model of
Hofstede (individualism)
Culture model of
Hofstede
Western European
(Finland)
Global
Global
Foreign diversification and home bias in international asset allocation of institutional investors can be explained by a societys culture. In short, uncertainty
avoidance leads to more home bias and less diversification in foreign equity
holdings, while individualism and masculinity lead to less home bias and more
foreign diversification.
Global
Global
Home/foreign bias in international asset allocation can be explained by a societys culture and the cultural distance between two markets. So, foreign bias is
lower in nations characterized through high levels of uncertainty avoidance and
higher in nations with high scores on individualism. Moreover, the greater the
cultural distance between two countries the smaller is their foreign bias.
Global
Cultural differences have an impact on returns of investment styles. In particular, momentum strategy profits are strongly related to the countrys level of
individualism. The argumentation is based on a positive relationship between
the behavioural effects of overconfidence and self-attribution bias and the degree of individualism.
Global
Culture is a determinant in foreign portfolio investment. Especially, power distance has a negative effect of cross-border holdings of debt and equity, but uncertainty avoidance, masculinity and individualism have positive effects. In
addition, the cultural distance index is positively correlated to geographical
distance leading to less foreign portfolio investments.
Insurance
Asset
management
35
Beckmann/
Menkhoff/Suto
(2008)
Culture model of
Hofstede
Chui/Kwok (2008)
Global
Life insurance consumption figures differ across countries, depending on culture. Countries characterized by individualism tend to have more life insurance
consumption, whereas there is a negative relationship in countries with high
levels of power distance and masculinity.