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Dear Chiefs of Staff of the Senate Energy & Natural Resources Committee (ENR),
None of you have responded to my May 6 email, so I will repeat it verbatim, updated with a new
critical assessment published today:
I have written two dozen letters to your Senators and three dozen emails to you expressing my
doubts that oil and gas producers and refiners will weather the storm of low prices brought on by their
over production and resulting glut, and exacerbated by Saudi relentless intentions to maintain market
share at all cost.
My fear is that in the face of insolvency, debt default and bankruptcy, oil and gas CEOs and Boards of
Directors will not act in the Public Interest, let alone in the National Interest. We the People and our
National Security rely on trust that the suppliers of fuels will do the right thing. I have become
convinced that the right thing is dictated by Fiduciary Duty, which is in conflict with Public and
National Interest.
Today, I received the article written by Aristofanis Papadatos, which validates my concerns. You
cannot ignore this. [Note: That was May 6. Today, is a new article written by Moshe Ben-Reuven.]
[UPDATE: Moshe Ben-Reuven is an energy/environment professional who in 1995 began working on
renewable energy.] Today he published his assessment of ExxonMobil [which] is not complimentary
to ExxonMobil Management. His assessment answers the question I have been begging you to
explore in hearings, asking tough financial and moral questions of the top management of Americas
oil and gas producing and refining companies.
I repeat my admonition:
I am imploring Senator Lisa Murkowski, ENR staff and Messrs. Tillerson and Woods to
collaborate in organizing a series of hearings to explore how to deal with the implicit legal
conflicts that are presently evolving by the nexus of events that are already looming large in
everyday news, as well as building behind the scenes in Board Rooms around the world."
Please conduct hearings in the Pubic Interest and in the National Interest.
Lets manage oil and gasour national resourceresponsibly.
Doug Grandt
The hexagrams are interpreted as a whole, using the bottom and the top trigrams,
and then line by line. A "six" is a broken line; a "nine" is a solid line. An
interpretation of the first (bottom) broken line, by Wilhelm, 1950, bears an eerie
relevance to the current Exxon Mobil situation, in the last 2 sentences.
Namely, Chairman and CEO Rex W. Tillerson is retiring, and Darren W. Wood will
likely succeed, the first non-upstream person to lead Exxon Mobil.
Leaving this exciting track for the moment, we restate our two questions. What is
XOM like? And, where is it headed? For answers, we take a look at performance,
as provided by the recent XOM 10 K SEC filings since 2010. By performance we
mean proved reserves, production, revenues, and financial results.
For any of the large oil companies, there are three sectors of activity: upstream or
exploration and production, downstream or refining to finished product, and
synthetic petrochemical. Without question, until recently, upstream was king of
earning. And within upstream, crude production, by far, was ruler. For a long time,
crude oil was a high value product coming to the surface on its own, easily
flowing, and cheaply transportable all over the world. Those times are gone.
2. Proved Reserves
As reported in the 10 K filings, total proved reserves are the sum of developed and
undeveloped reserves. For Exxon Mobil, the total reserves in 5 product categories
are plotted in F.1. Over the six year period preceding, the total reserves are
remarkably flat, which shows a concern to keep the totals as constant as possible.
This gives the company the feel of sailing at even keel, keeping its stores
replenished, while producing significant volumes.
So, total of all reserves is a flat line, about 25 billion barrels of oil equivalent (BOE)
including crude, natural gas liquids (NGL), Bitumen from oil sands, synthetic oil,
and natural gas (NG). The composition of the total mix varies with time, in a
rather systematic manner. In general, bitumen is gradually rising, while NG
reserves are declining.
The tranquility of the total (developed + undeveloped) is disturbed when looking
at the developed part separately. This is the part of reserves actively engaged in
production, so one may expect some more dynamic effects. In F.2 we see the
developed resources separately. These come to about 18 billion BOE at the end of
2015.
...
The composition of the total developed resources is shown in F.3a and F.3b, for
2010 and 2015 respectively. Note that in 2010 NGL was likely small and reported
with crude, but is reported separately and is quite significant in 2015 as shown in
F.3b. What we clearly see in F.3, is that crude has shrunk appreciably, from 37%
to 27% of the developed reserves mix, while bitumen increased from 3% to 23%.
The largest shrinkage is in NG, which went from 56% to 41%, but still kept its
place as the largest developed resource.
In summary here, the inability of Exxon Mobil to replenish 1.67 billion barrels of
crude in developed reserves, over a period of just six years, must be appreciated.
The very costly move into oil sands and bitumen would not have been made, were
there any rational expectations of fresh crude resources. In other words, in 20102015 we have witnessed a new era, in which the most powerful oil company on
the planet is unable to replenish its developed petroleum reserves.
The hot water oil sands extraction process for strip mining requires about 4.5
barrels of fresh water per barrel of bitumen. At full capacity production, the Kearl
operations would demand an amount of fresh water of 247,000 cubic meters of
water daily, a huge amount. The Athabasca river, which until now was the source
of the water used by the strip-mining bitumen producers, is already running quite
low. In the meantime, 90% of the water ends up in toxic unlined settling ponds.
The whole field of oil sands strip mining came recently under attack by
environmental groups, due to the vast scale of land devastation it creates, and
under severe pressure due to looming water shortages.
In contrast, the recent (2013) acquisition by Exxon Mobil of 226,000 acres at
Clyden, from Conoco-Phillips (NYSE:COP), cost $720 million just for the acreage.
Located in south Athabasca, the Clyden site is for in-situ bitumen extraction, by
the steam assisted gravity drainage (SAGD) method. By my calculation, CAPEX for
a new SAGD production capacity of 125,000 BPD of bitumen, would be $5.5
billion. Although less expensive than strip mining operations of the same capacity,
the CAPEX here is by no means trivial.
In situ SAGD recovery requires about 1 barrel of fresh water per barrel of bitumen
extracted. Although water usage is far lower than in the Clark method, water
purification for re-use has created large quantities of toxic sludge.
In summary, even before touching the issue of (non) availability of pipelines for
bringing the product to the Chinese market through the Canadian port of
Vancouver, the whole field of oil sands bitumen production faces environmental
challenges, very expensive remediation, and water shortages. As we will see later,
the cost of production is high, and leaves a rather small net profit. It is risky,
expensive, and unsustainable. In one word, an act of desperation.
fresh water. These wells will not produce at a uniform volumetric rate; rather, a
spike, followed by exponential decay, the tail of which may last several years.
Observing 6,300 Marcellus wells taken at the end of 2015, (a mixture of few new
and many old wells), I calculated an average of 2 million SCF/day/well. This is not
brilliant, is quite expensive, and runs the risk of water shortage. Sounds familiar?
And one more thing. Once started, there is no turning-off and waiting for a higher
price in the market. The NG will re-adsorb into the shale, and the expensive
fracking cost component (about $2.5 million per well or higher), will be lost. That
is why the pipeline operators, or the buyers, (where well owners are unlucky
enough to have their service) managed to drop the price of Marcellus NG to about
$1/ MegaBTU. Lack of pipeline service prevents efficient pathways to markets in
the US northeast, but should these networks be built, prices can be expected to
drop further, due to competition.
In summary, for Exxon Mobil in particular there is no comfort in shale-NG in the
Marcellus, or anywhere else. Furthermore, shale-based liquids, and condensate,
are expensive to produce, have difficulty reaching the market for lack of proper
safe transportation (high volatility), and do not get the high price deserved for a
clean superior product.
3. Production
In a way of introduction, we take a look at Exxon Mobil's operating revenues from
Upstream, Downstream, and Chemical, as reported on it 10 K submissions, for the
years 2006-2015. This is shown in F.4. Note that progression is from right to left.
Clearly until 2014, Upstream exploration and production, E&P is the leading
earning mechanism. The other two activities do not distinguish Exxon Mobil from
others, so we focus here on the Upstream component. Clearly, in 2015, a drastic
loss of earnings from Upstream is evident: From $27.5 billion in 2014 to $7.1
billion in 2015: an 4-fold drop in one year. Of course we all know where this price
drop originates, nothing Exxon Mobil could control.
Exxon Mobil's annual production volumes are summarized in F.5, over the years
2010-2015. We note that per unit energy, or BOE, production of NG and crude are
very close. Recalling the developed reserves of the same two resources, in F.2
above, it is obvious that NG reserves are nearly twice those of crude.
...
The composition of the total volumes produced in 2010 and 2015 shown in F.6.
The composition of the total volumes produced in 2010 and 2015 shown in F.6.
The gross margins (price minus production cost) from sales of upstream products
can be calculated from the prices, costs and respective daily production volumes
reported. We have assumed 333 production days/year, which is congruent with
the standard 8,000 hours/year of online operation. The calculated gross margins
are depicted in F.7 for the same period. Note that bitumen cost of production is
relatively high, so margins are far lower than for crude.
...
...
What F.7 reveals, is that gross margins for crude have started slipping already in
2011, and continue declining to-date. Also evident how small bitumen, NGL, and
2011, and continue declining to-date. Also evident how small bitumen, NGL, and
Synthetic contributions to the total are. The Price, and production cost, for each
product is given in the 10 K reports. The calculated differences are called here
specific gross margins per BOE of product, and shown in F.8. These data were
used to calculate the values for F.7.
...
Note in particular the wide trajectory of crude margin in F.8, from 2009 to 2015.
The calculated gross margin composition is further highlighted for 2010 and 2015
respectively, in F.9a and F.9b.
...
What is striking about the calculated compositions in F.9, is that they remain very
similar for the respective components. This means that the sources of upstream
income remain roughly in the same proportion. Note for instance bitumen, 2% in
both 2010 and 2015, even though its volume proportion increased from 3% to
both 2010 and 2015, even though its volume proportion increased from 3% to
8%; this indicates bitumen is not an efficient revenue source. Otherwise, whereas
crude has decreased somewhat, NG+NGL have increased. Also evident, as
expected, that the total gross margin is halved between 2010 and 2015, from $66
billion to $32 billion.
The Upstream portion of total operational income, per F.4, has lost its dominant
position after 2014, as its net fell from $27.5 billion to $7.1 billion. Within this
(shrunk) Upstream domain, crude has largely retained its dominance as the
largest earning mechanism. Wherein lies the problem of inability to effectively
replenish reserves. If Exxon Mobil had no further additions to its crude developed
reserves, these would last another 8.5 years or so, with crude production frozen at
the 2015 level of 580 million barrels/year.
We are not saying that crude has disappeared, or is non-obtainable. Yet, worldwide demand for crude, regardless of GDP growth, will only increase, while global
resources shrink, regardless of deep-sea "discoveries" already accounted for.
Whence, uglier and hungrier sovereign toads must be kissed to get any, as years
go by. For Exxon Mobil, crude has already started an earning decline trajectory in
2011, three years before the start of the Saudi Arabia-Iran war, on July 8, 2014.
In a word, crude is already unsustainable.
4. The Financials
We will use here a physical measure to estimate a particular reserve lifespan. The
particular proved reserve volume, divided by its annual rate of production, should
give an estimate of the years remaining-if both reserve and production rate
remained unchanged. Of course this precludes the effect of diligently replenishing
of the reserve, and includes the unhappy case of inability to replenish at
reasonable cost. In other words, this is a conservative estimate of the actual
lifespan. This calculation is repeated at the end of each year, so the estimated
lifespans may vary for the same resource according to the levels recorded at
year's end. Now in this approximation, we use only the developed reserves,
assuming 100% are available for production, ignoring the unproved reserve
portion. This calculation is repeated for crude, NG and bitumen reserves, and the
results shown in F.10. With the exception of bitumen, crude and NG lifespans are
confined to 13 years or under. Bitumen developed reserve sizes are very large
compared to the amounts withdrawn, so lifespan goes to over 40 years.
To continue this simple exercise, we would calculate a net present value of the
particular resource at the end of each year, by assuming that the year-end gross
margin multiplies the annual production reported, to provide a payment. The
constant withdrawals and payments over the calculated life-span are used in a net
present value calculation. We assume an annual discount rate of 10%, uniformly
for all 3 resources, so we denote the calculation as PV10. Of course, we do not
have the CAPEX directly associated with these assets, so our calculated PV10s
would tend to the high side. The annual PV10s calculated this way for the 3
developed resources of crude, NG and bitumen, and their total, are drawn in F.11.
...
...
Over-plotted on F.11 is the total assets value of XOM, per its 10 K submissions. It
is emphasized that the important observation is the order of magnitude closeness,
and the trend shown by the black line denoting total of the 3 resources. This PV10
calculation has a downward trend since 2011, way before July 2014. It differs from
the accounting version of total assets, which is moderately increasing from 2010
to 2015. We hope that the net present value of these assets really does not go
much lower than their book value, or else impairments are looming ahead, an
undesirable specter.
A look at financial performance as reported, is shown in F.12. Net Income, long
term debt, total debt, and dividend payments are plotted. Already in 2012 we see
a sharp decline in net income, coupled with a sharp rise in total debt, and long
term debt, as one would expect from the even-keel sailing. It may be interesting
to point out that as the net income declined, dividend payments were also
increased, incrementally. In 2015, total dividend payments were $12.08 billion,
while the net income was $16.15 billion. Shareholders were getting a local
anesthetic, while Net dropped some $30 billion, losing 2/3 of its 2012 value.
...
We will not go into the Exxon Mobil stock value, which is likely driven mostly by a
variety of high frequency trading algorithms, vying through favorite electronic
exchanges to trip-up and better-buy, or out-sell each other, at a frequency of over
10,000 flops per second, completely without human intervention. For these
algorithms, only volatility matters.
We will also leave alone the speculation regarding the future of oil prices, which is
We will also leave alone the speculation regarding the future of oil prices, which is
clearly in the hands of Saudi Arabia. My speculation: If, and when, some form of
non-aggression agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran is reached, only then
the oil spigot will close, and oil prices will shoot up again. Now what happens to
the Saudi fields when they are producing at a rate of 10.5 million BPD for 2 years?
Accelerated decline. So world oil reserves will be tighter, while demand continues
to rise. Whereas artificially-high oil prices in 2008 caused havoc with the US work
force, the low oil prices of today fail to bring comfort. If you are poor and working,
$45 more in your pocket saved on gasoline will not save the month, but $45 less,
as in 2008, can be devastating.
Somewhere Exxon Mobil hopes that the day of very high oil prices returns, and is
nigh. But in a new world of rapidly shrinking resources, the former strategy of
upstream reliance will leave it very vulnerable. Most of all, Exxon Mobil reliance on
bitumen and shale-gas is unsustainable.