Civil Law Review I Case Digests

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)
Atty. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan
CASE DIGEST
IN
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
Prof. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan
SUBMITTED BY:
IV - LLB-4402

SURNAME
1ABRINA
2AQUILINO
3BACARRA
4BAET
5BANOCAG
6BARIA
7BERMUDO
8BUESER, AM
9BUESER, JM
10CARLOS
11DAVID
12DAYA
13DE GUZMAN
14DISTURA
15GARCIA
16GENUINO
17GEREMIA
18GONZAGA
19GONZALES
20GUILLERMO
21GUTIERREZ
22LAYSON
23MALABANAN
24MARTINEZ
25MENDOZA
26MOLINA
27NEPOMUCENO
28PATAUEG
29PIO
30RADOVAN
31RODRIGUEZ
32RONQUILLO
33SACRAMENTO
34SITJAR
35TELOG
36TOLENTINO
37TORRES
38YAMAT
CASES ASSIGNED for DIGEST

TANADA V. TUVERA to VAN DORN V. ROMILLO
QUITA V. CA to LLORENTE V. CA
VELAYO V. SHELL CO. PHILS to RCPI V. CA
MERALCO V. CA to REYES V. LIM
NDC V. MADRIGAL to SPS. PAHANG V. METROBANK
ABACAN V. NUI to REPUBLIC V. CA
SILVERIO V. REPUBLIC to REPUBLIC V. ORBECIDO
ATENZA V. BRILLANTES to CHING MING TSOI V. CA
REPUBLIC V. MOLINA to FERRARIS V. FERRARIS
ZAMORA V. ZAMORA to CALISTERIO V. CALISTERIO
REPUBLIC V. NOLASCO to JIMENEZ V. REPUBLIC
OCAMPO V. FLORENCIANO to PELAYO V. LAURON
ILUSORIO V. ILUSORIO to ESTONINA V. CA
AYALA INVESTMENT V. CA to RELUCIO V. LOPEZ
HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS BANK V. DAILO to SAGUID V. REY
HONTIVEROS V. RTC, BR.25 ILOILO to PATRICIO V. DARIO III
ANDAL V. MACARAIG to CABATANIA V. REGODOS
SAYSON V. CA to AGUSTIN V. PROLLAMANTE
IN RE CHANGE OF NAME OF JULIAN LIN to TAMARGO V. CA
LAHOM V. SIBULO to SANTOS V. CA
PEREZ V. CA to ATOK V. IAC
REPUBLIC V. GUZMAN to EVADEL REALTY V. SORIANO
NAZARENO V. CA to HEIRS OF ROMAN SORIANO V. CA
SERASPI V. CA to DBP V. CA
VILLANUEVA V. CA to REPUBLIC V. SILIM
QUILALA V. ALCANTARA to DIONISIO V. ORTIZ
ROMAN CATHOLIC V. CA to CITY OF ANGELES
REPUBLIC V. CA to DKC HOLDINGS V. CA
ARUEGO V. CA to BUGNAO V. UBAG
BAGTAS V. PAGUIO to NERA V. RIMANDI
CANEDA V. CA to AZNAR V. GARCIA
UNSON V. ABELLA to CANIZA V. CA
PECSON V. CORONEL to ROSALES V. ROSALES
FRANCISCO V. ALFONSO to DE PAPA V. CAMACHO
LLORENTE V. RODRIGUEZ to DIAZ V. IAC
DELA PUERTA V. CA to SARITA V. CANDIA
ABLLENA DE BACAYO V. BORROMEO to SANCHEZ V. CA
NAZARENO V. CA to BICARME V. CA

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I.
PRELIMINARY TITLE--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------4
II.
HUMAN RELATIONS--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 15
III.
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 29
IV.
CIVIL PERSONALITY--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 35
V.
CITIZENSHIP-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 36
VI.
MARRIAGE---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 39
VII.
VOID MARRIAGES------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 51
VIII.
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 53
IX.
VOIDABLE MARRIAGES---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 73
X.
LEGAL SEPARATION-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 77
XI.
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS

BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 82
XII.
PROPERTY RELATIONS---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 85
XIII.
THE FAMILY AS AN INSTITUTION--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 108
XIV.
PATERNITY AND FILIATIOIN---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 116
XV.
ADOPTION----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 136
XVI.
PARENTAL AUTHORITY----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 143
XVII.
CASES IN PROPERTY-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 152
XVIII.
CASES IN SUCCESSION----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 193

1) TAADA VS. TUVERA

G.R. No. L-63915. April 24, 1985
Doctrine:
The publication of presidential issuances "of a public
nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement
of due process. It is a rule of law that before a
person may be bound by law, he must first be
officially and specifically informed of its contents.
Facts:
The petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel
respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause
the publication in the Official Gazette various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general
orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementation and administrative orders.
The respondents contend that the publication in the
Official Gazette is not a requirement for the
effectivity of the laws where the laws provide for their
own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since
the presidential issuances in question contain
special provisions as to the date that they are to take
effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not
indispensable for their effectivity based on Article 2
of the Civil Code.
The interpretation of the respondent is in accord with
the Courts construction of said article. In a long line
of decisions, the Court has ruled that publication in
the Official Gazette is necessary in cases where the
legislation itself does not provide for an effectivity
date - for the date of publication is material in
determining its date of effectivity which is the 15 th
day following its publication - but not when the law
itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.
Issue:
Whether there is still a need for publication of the
presidential decrees with specified dates of
effectivity.
Held:
Yes, there is still a need for publication. Article 2
does not preclude the requirement of publication in
the Officila Gazette, even if the law itself provides for
the date of its effectivity. Section 1 of CA 638
provides that: Section 1. There shall be published in
the Official Gazette [1] all important legislative acts
and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress
of the Philippines; [2] all executive and
administrative orders and proclamations, except

such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions
or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and
the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said
courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4]
such documents or classes of documents as may be
required so to be published by law; and [5] such
documents or classes of documents as the
President of the Philippines shall determine from
time to time to have general applicability and legal
effect, or which he may authorize so to be published.
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to
give the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions and
conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non
excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish
or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of
a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not
even a constructive one.
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth
Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the
Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein
imposes upon respondent officials an imperative
duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional
right of the people to be informed on matters of
public concern is to be given substance and reality.
The law itself makes a list of what should be
published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our
mind, leaves respondents with no discretion
whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded
from such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a
public nature" or "of general applicability" is
mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees
that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their
violation or otherwise impose a burden or the
people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall
within this category. Other presidential issuances
which apply only to particular persons or class of
persons such as administrative and executive orders
need not be published on the assumption that they
have been circularized to all concerned.
It is needless to add that the publication of
presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of

general applicability" is a requirement of due
process. It is a rule of law that before a person may
be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential
issuances of general application, which have not
been published, shall have no force and effect.
2) TAADA VS. TUVERA
G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986
Facts:
1. In the first Tanada case the petitioners were
invoking due process in demanding the disclosure of
a number of presidential decrees which they claimed
had not been published as required by law, which is
Art. 2 of the Civil Code. The government argued that
while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not
so when it was "otherwise provided," as when the
decrees themselves declared that they were to
become effective immediately upon their approval. In
the decision of the case on April 24, 1985, the Court
affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of
these decrees, declaring in the dispositive portion as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents
to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general
application, and unless so published, they shall have
no binding force and effect.
2.
Petitioners
are
now
moving
for
a
reconsideration/clarification of the aforementioned
decision.
Issue: 1. Whether or not the clause UNLESS IT IS
OTHERWISE PROVIDED solely refers to the
fifteen-day period and not to the requirement of
publication.
2. Whether or not the word LAWS refer to all laws
or only to those of general application.
3. Where should publication of said laws be made?
Held:
1. The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers
to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be
omitted. This clause does not mean that the
legislature may make the law effective immediately
upon approval, or on any other date, without its

previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the
legislature may in its discretion provide that the
usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or
extended. An example, as pointed out by the present
Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the
original decision, is the Civil Code which did not
become effective after fifteen days from its
publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after
such publication." The general rule did not apply
because it was "otherwise provided. "
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause
publication may be dispensed with altogether. The
reason is that such omission would offend due
process insofar as it would deny the public
knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern
the legislature could validly provide that a law be
effective
immediately
upon
its
approval
notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an
unreasonably short period after publication), it is not
unlikely that persons not aware of it would be
prejudiced as a result and they would be so not
because of a failure to comply with but simply
because they did not know of its existence.
It must be noted at this point the conclusive
presumption that every person knows the law, which
of course presupposes that the law has been
published if the presumption is to have any legal
justification at all. It is no less important to remember
that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the
right of the people to information on matters of public
concern," and this certainly applies to, among
others, and indeed especially, the legislative
enactments of the government.
2. The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not
only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking all laws relate to the people in general
albeit there are some that do not apply to them
directly.
Thus, all statutes, including those of local application
and private laws, shall be published as a condition
for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days
after publication unless a different effectivity date is
fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are:
a. Presidential decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the President in the exercise of
legislative powers whenever the same are
validly delegated by the legislature or, at
present, directly conferred by the Constitution;

b. Administrative rules and regulations, if
their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant also to a valid delegation;
c. Charter of a city;
procedure. Consequently, we have no

choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the
Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in
the Official Gazett and not elsewhere, as a
requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from
such publication or after a different period provided
by the legislature.
d. Circulars issued by the Monetary Board if

meant to fill in the details of the Central Bank Act
which that body is supposed to enforce.
However, no publication is required for the following:
a. Interpretative regulations and those
merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the
public;
b. Letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules or
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the
performance of their duties;
c. Municipal ordinances, which are covered
by the Local Government Code.
3. Publication must be in full or it is no publication at
all since its purpose is to inform the public of the
contents of the laws, and publication is to be made
in the Official Gazette as decided upon in the first
Tanada case, however, the Court made this
pronouncement:
There is much to be said of the view that the
publication need not be made in the Official Gazette,
considering its erratic releases and limited
readership. Undoubtedly,
newspapers
of
general circulation could better perform the function
of communicating, the laws to the people as such
periodicals are more easily available, have a wider
readership, and come out regularly. The
trouble, though, is that this kind of publication is not
the one required or authorized by existing law. As far
as we know, no amendment has been made of
Article 2 of the Civil Code. The Solicitor General has
not pointed to such a law, and we have no
information that it exists. If it does, it obviously has
not yet been published.
At any rate, the Court is not called upon to
rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify
it if we find it impractical. That is not our function.
That function belongs to the
legislature. Our task
is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived
and approved by the political departments of the
government in accordance with the prescribed
3) PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT and

SERVICES CORPORATION v THE HON.
SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT,
VIVENCIO DE MESA, RODRIGO MIKIN and
CEDRIC LEYSON
G.R. No. 103144. April 4, 2001
Doctrine:
All statutes, including those of local application and
private laws, shall be published as a condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed
by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and
executive orders promulgated by the President in the
exercise of legislative powers whenever the same
are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present,
directly conferred by the Constitution: Administrative
rules and regulations must also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal
in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and the public, need not be
published. Neither is publication required of the socalled letter of instructions issued by the
performance of their duties
Facts:
Petitioner Philsa International Placement and
Services Corporation is a domestic corporation
engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas
employment. Sometime in January 1985, private
respondents, who were recruited by petitioner for
employment in Saudi Arabia, were required to pay
placement fees in the amount of P5,000.00 for
private respondent Rodrigo L. Mikin and P6,500.00
each for private respondents Vivencio A. de Mesa
and Cedric P. Leyson.
After the execution of their respective work
contracts, private respondents left for Saudi Arabia
on January 29, 1985. They then began work for Al-

Hejailan Consultants A/E, the foreign principal of
petitioner.
While in Saudi Arabia, private respondents were
allegedly made to sign a second contract on
February 4, 1985 which changed some of the
provisions of their original contract resulting in the
reduction of some of their benefits and privileges. On
April 1, 1985, their foreign employer allegedly forced
them to sign a third contract which increased their
work hours from 48 hours to 60 hours a week
without any corresponding increase in their basic
monthly salary. When they refused to sign this third
contract, the services of private respondents were
terminated by Al-Hejailan and they were repatriated
to the Philippines.
Upon their arrival in the Philippines, private
respondents demanded from petitioner Philsa the
return of their placement fees and for the payment of
their salaries for the unexpired portion of their
contract. When petitioner refused, they filed a case
before the POEA against petitioner Philsa and its
foreign principal, Al-Hejailan.
Several hearings were conducted before the POEA
Hearing Officer. On the aspects of the case involving
money claims arising from the employer-employee
relations and illegal dismissal, the POEA rendered a
decision dated August 31, 1988, ordering
respondent PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT
AND
SERVICE
CORPORATION
to
pay
complainants, jointly and severally with its principal
Al Hejailan. Almost simultaneous with the
promulgation of August 31, 1988 decision of the
POEA on private respondents money claim, POEA
issued separate Order dated August 29, 1988
resolving the recruitment violation aspect of private
respondents complaint. In this order, POEA found
petitioner liable for three (3) counts of illegal
exaction, two (2) counts of contract substitution and
one count of withholding or unlawful deduction from
salaries of workers.
From the said Order, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was subsequently denied.
After the denial of its motion for reconsideration,
petitioner appealed to the Secretary of Labor and
Employment. However, public respondent Secretary
of Labor and Employment affirmed en toto the
assailed Order. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but this was likewise denied.
Hence, the instant Petition for Certiorari.
Petitioner insists, however, that it cannot be held
liable for illegal exaction as POEA Memorandum
Circular No. 11, Series of 1983, which enumerated
the allowable fees which may be collected from
applicants, is void for lack of publication.
Issue: Whether or not POEA Memorandum Circular

No. 11 Series of 1983 is void for lack of publication?
Held: Yes, the said memorandum circular is void for
lack of publication.
In Taada vs. Tuvera, the Court held, as follows:
"We hold therefore that all statutes, including those
of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which
shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and
executive orders promulgated by the President in the
exercise of legislative powers whenever the same
are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present,
directly conferred by the Constitution: Administrative
rules and regulations must also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal
in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and the public, need not be
published. Neither is publication required of the socalled letter of instructions issued by the
performance of their duties."
POEA Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1983
must likewise be declared ineffective as the same
was never published or filed with the National
Administrative Register. POEA Memorandum Order
No. 2, Series of 1983 provides for the applicable
schedule of placement and documentation fees for
private employment agencies or authority holders.
Under the said Order, the maximum amount which
may be collected from prospective Filipino overseas
workers is P2,500.00. The said circular was
apparently issued in compliance with the provisions
of Article 32 of the Labor Code.
It is thus clear that the administrative circular under
consideration is one of those issuances which
should be published for its effectivity, since its
purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law
pursuant to a valid delegation. Considering that
POEA Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983
has not as yet been published or filed with the
National Administrative Register, the same is
ineffective and may not be enforced.
The Office of the Solicitor General argues however
that the imposition of administrative sanctions on
petitioner was based not on the questioned
administrative circular but on Article 32 and Article
34 (a) 28 of the Labor Code.
The argument is not meritorious. The said articles of
the Labor Code were never cited, much less

discussed, in the body of the questioned Orders of
the POEA and Secretary of Labor and Employment.
In fact, the said Orders were consistent in
mentioning
that
petitioner's
violation
of
Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 was the
basis for the imposition of administrative sanctions
against petitioner. Furthermore, even assuming that
petitioner was held liable under the said provisions
of the Labor Code, Articles 32 and 34 (a) of the
Labor Code presupposes the promulgation of a valid
schedule of fees by the Department of Labor and
Employment. Considering that, as, previously
discussed, Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of
1983 embodying such a schedule of fees never took
effect, there is thus no basis for the imposition of the
administrative sanctions against petitioner
The Office of the Solicitor General likewise argues
that the questioned administrative circular is not
among those requiring publication contemplated by
Taada vs. Tuvera as it is addressed only to a
specific group of persons and not to the general
public.
Again, there is no merit in this argument. The fact
that the said circular is addressed only to a specified
group, namely private employment agencies or
authority holders, does not take it away from the
ambit of our ruling in Taada vs. Tuvera. In the case
of Phil. Association of Service Exporters vs. Torres,
the administrative circulars questioned therein were
addressed to an even smaller group, namely
Philippine and Hong Kong agencies engaged in the
recruitment of workers for Hong Kong, and still the
Court ruled therein that, for lack of proper
publication, the said circulars may not be enforced or
implemented.
Our pronouncement in Taada vs. Tuvera is clear
and categorical. Administrative rules and regulations
must be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation. The only exceptions are interpretative
regulations, those merely internal in nature, or those
so-called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules and
performance of their duties. Administrative Circular
No. 2, Series of 1983 has not been shown to fall
under any of these exceptions.
4) Unciano Paramedical College c CA
G.R. No. 100335, April 7, 1993
Doctrine:
Settled is the rule that when a doctrine of this Court
is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new
doctrine is applied prospectively, and should not

apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and
acted on the faith thereof Thus, the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction was issued by the
trial court with grave abuse of discretion.
Facts:
On April 16, 1990, private respondents Elena
Villegas and Ted Magallanes, thru their mothers,
Victoria
Villegas
and
Jacinta
Magallanes,
respectively, filed before the Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21, a
petition for injunction and damages with prayer for a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against
petitioners Unciano Paramedical College, Inc.,
Mirando C. Unciano, Sr., Dominador Santos, Editha
Mora, Dr. Evelyn Moral and Laureana Vitug, they
alleged therein that:
1.
On July 1989, the above-named
students initiated a petition proposing to
the school authorities the organization of
a student council in the school. They
solicited support of their petition from
the studentry by asking the students to
endorse the same with their signatures.
They were able to get at least 180
signatures.
2.
On August 18, 1989, the students were
summoned to the Office of Dr. Moral and
were admonished not to proceed with
the proposal because, according to her,
the school does not allow and had never
allowed such an organization.
3.
On October 28, 1989, in compliance
with an announcement to see the Dean
of Nursing, the above-named students
met with Dean Vitug and Dr. Moral who
informed them that they would be barred
from enrollment for the second semester
because the school does not allow their
students to put up a student council. Dr.
Moral advised them to get their
Honorable Dismissal.
4.
On November 6, 1989, the students
again approached Dr. Moral who
informed them that they were no longer
allowed to enroll because they are
allegedly members of the National
Union of Students of the Philippines
(NUSP) and the League of Filipino
Students (LFS), officers of the student
organization they organized, and,
moreover 'drug addicts.' The students
asked for proof of these accusations but
were not given any.

5.
6.
On 29 November 1989, the students

were informed that the President had
unilaterally refused to allow them to
enroll and it was up to their parents to
request or appeal to the school officials
to change their decision. Mrs. Victoria
Villegas and Mrs. Jacinta Magallanes
wrote to the school officials to request
that their children be allowed to enroll .
Dr. Moral informed them that the Board
of Trustees will have to decide on these
requests.
On 11 December 1989, the students
were informed that the Board of
Trustees had refused to grant the
parents' request."
The trial court issued a temporary restraining order

effective May 17, 1990, enjoining petitioner school
from not enrolling private respondents in its College
of Nursing and setting the hearing for the issuance
of the writ of preliminary injunction on June 4, 1990.
Petitioners filed an opposition but the RTC still
ordered the school to allow the students to enroll.
The Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the RTC
and based its the ruling in the recent case of Ariel
Non, et al. vs. Hon. Sancho Dames II, , May 20,
1990, the Supreme Court, abandoned and overruled
its decision in Alcuaz and declared thus:
The contract between the school and the student is
not an ordinary contract. It is imbued with public
interest, considering the high priority given by the
Constitution to education and the grant to the State
of supervisory and regulatory powers over all
educational institutions. When a student registers in
a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the
entire school year
'Every student has the right to enroll in any school,
college or university upon meeting its specific
requirement and reasonable regulation: Provided,
that except in the case of academic delinquency and
violation of disciplinary regulation, the student is
presumed to be qualified for enrollment for the entire
period he is expected to his complete his course
without prejudice to his right to transfer.'
Hence the instant appeal.
Issue: If the Ariel Non Doctrine should be applied
retroactively to govern and invalidate the legal
effects of the incidents that took place prior to its
adoption and which incidents were proper and valid
under the ALCUAZ doctrine prevailing at the time
said incident took place.
Held: No, the Non doctrine should not be applied to

the instant case. Under the then prevailing Alcuaz
doctrine which was promulgated on May 2, 1988, the
contract between them and private respondents was
validly terminated upon the end of the first semester
of school year 1989-1990.
Although said doctrine was later abandoned in Non,
et al. v. Dames II, et al., supra, this case was
promulgated much later, or on May 20, 1990, when
the termination of the contract between them had
long become fait accompli. Settled is the rule that
when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a
different view is adopted, the new doctrine is applied
prospectively, and should not apply to parties who
relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith
thereof. Thus, the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction was issued by the trial court with grave
abuse of discretion.
The ruling in the Non case should not be given a
retroactive effect to cases that arose before its
promulgation on May 20, 1990, as in this case,
which was filed on April 16, 1990. If it were
otherwise, it would result in oppression to petitioners
and other schools similarly situated who relied on
the ruling in the Alcuaz case, promulgated on May 2,
1988, which recognized the termination of contract
theory.
The contract between the parties was validly
terminated upon the end of the first semester of
school year 1989-1990, or in October, 1989. This is
the status quo. The trial court gravely abused its
discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction which ordered petitioners to
allow private respondents "to enroll for the first
semester of school year 1990-1190." 16 Guided by
the Capitol case, certainly, this writ will not restore
the status quo but will go a step backward, then
restore the condition preceding the status quo.
Private respondents do not possess any clear legal
right to re-enroll, corollarily, petitioners are not
obliged legally to re-admit them.
5) Cui v Arellano University
G.R. No. L-15127; May 30, 1961
Facts:
Plaintiff enrolled in the College of Law of the
defendant university from the school year 19481949. He finished his law studies in the defendant
university up to and including the first semester of
the fourth year. During all the time he was studying
law in the defendant university, he was awarded
scholarship grants, for scholastic merit, so that his
semestral tuition fees were returned to him after the

end of each semester and when his scholarship
grants were awarded to him. The whole amount of
tuition fees paid by plaintiff to defendant and
refunded to him by the latter from the first semester
up to and including the first semester of his last year
in the college of law or the fourth year, is in total of
P1,033.87. However, before defendant awarded to
plaintiff the scholarship grants as above stated, he
was made to sign the following contract covenant
and agreement which provides that in consideration
of the scholarship granted to him by the University,
he waives his right to transfer to another school
without having refunded to the University
(defendant) the equivalent of his scholarship cash.
For the last semester of his law studies,
plaintiff enrolled in the college of law of the Abad
Santos University and graduated therefrom. After
graduating in law he applied to take the bar
examination. Plaintiff then petitioned the defendant
university to issue to him the needed transcripts.
However, the defendant refused until after he had
paid back the P1,033 87 which defendant refunded
to him as above stated. As he could not take the bar
examination without those transcripts, plaintiff paid
to defendant the said sum under protest. This is the
sum which plaintiff seeks to recover from defendant
in this case.
Issue: Whether or not the said provision of the
contract is valid.
Held: No, the stipulation in question is contrary to
public policy and, hence, null and void.
The
practice of awarding scholarships to attract students
and keep them in school is not a good custom nor
has it received some kind of social and practical
confirmation except in some private institutions as in
Arellano University. The University of the Philippines
which implements Section 5 of Article XIV of the
Constitution with reference to the giving of free
scholarships to gifted children, does not require
scholars to reimburse the corresponding value of the
scholarships if they transfer to other schools. The
same goes for leading colleges and universities of
the United States after which our educational
practices or policies are patterned. In these
institutions scholarships are granted not to attract
and to keep brilliant students in school for their
propaganda mine but to reward merit or help gifted
students in whom society has an established interest
or a first lien.
55 SCRA 607
Facts:
On September 5, 1964, the accused was found to be
in possession of a revolver without the requisite
license or permit. He claimed to be entitled to
exoneration because, although he had no license or
permit, he had appointments as Secret Agent from
the Provincial Governor of Batangas and as
Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial
Commander, and the said appointments expressly
carried with them the authority to possess and carry
the said firearm. The accused further contended that
in view of his appointments, he was entitled to
acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Courts
decisions in People vs. Macarandang and in People
vs. Lucero.
The trial court found the accused criminally liable for
illegal possession of firearm and ammunition on the
ground that the rulings in Macarandang* and in
Lucero* were reversed and abandoned in People vs.
Mapa**.
The case was elevated to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the appellant should be
acquitted on the basis of the Supreme Courts
rulings in the cases of Macarandang and of Lucero.
Held: The appellant was acquitted.
Decisions of the Supreme Court, although in
themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of
what the law means; this is the reason why Article 8
of the New Civil Code provides that, Judicial
decisions applying and interpreting the laws or the
constitution shall form part of the legal system. The
interpretation upon a law by the Supreme Court
constitutes in a way a part of the law as of the date
the law was originally passed, since the courts
construction
merely
establishes
the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus
construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule
supported by numerous authorities is a restatement
of the legal maxim legis interpretatio legis vim
obtinetthe interpretation placed upon the written
law by a competent court has the force of law. The
doctrine laid down in Lucero and in Macarandang
was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law of
the land, at the time appellant was found in
possession of the firearm and when he was
arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine
was overruled in Mapa case in 1967,but when a
doctrine of the Supreme Court is overruled and a
different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be
applied prospectively, and should not apply to
6) People vs Jabinal
10

parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted
on the faith thereof.
Considering that the appellant possessed a firearm
pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in
Macarandang and in Lucero, under which no
criminal liability would attach to his possession of
said firearm, the appellant should be absolved. The
appellant may not be punished for an act which at
the time it was done was held not to be punishable.
below denied the motion to dismiss since the

property involved is located in the Philippines so that
the Divorce Decree had no bearing in this case. The
denial is now the subject of this certiorari
proceeding.
*The accused were acquitted for through their

appointment as confidential/secret agent they were
deemed to be peace officers. Peace officers had
the privilege of carrying firearms without license.
**Mapa was convicted although he was a
secret/confidential agent. The court ruled that thelaw
did not explicitly provide that secret/confidential
agents are among those who are exempted from
acquiring a license to carry a firearm.
Held: It is true that owing to the nationality principle

embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public police
and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national
law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released
private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage.
7) Van Dorn vs. Romillio

139 SCRA 139
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private

respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner.
He would have no standing to sue in the case below
as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control
over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision
of his own country's Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does
not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his
right over the alleged conjugal property.
Doctrine:
It is true that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public police
and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national
law
Facts:
Petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private
respondent is a citizen of the United States. They
were married in Hongkong in 1972. After the
marriage, they established their residence in the
Philippines. They begot two children born on April 4,
1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively. The
parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in
1982 and petitioner has re-married also in Nevada,
this time to Theodore Van Dorn. In 1983, private
respondent filed suit against petitioner alleging the
petitioners business in Ermita (the Galeon Shop) is
a conjugal property of the parties and prayed that
private respondent be declared with right to manage
said property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the
petition on the ground that the cause of action is
barred by previous judgement in the divorce
proceedings before the Nevada Court. The Court
Issue: Whether the foreign divorce on the parties

has affected the alleged conjugal property in the
Philippines?
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under

our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married
to private respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil
Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be
obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to private respondent.
The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs
with possible rights to conjugal property. She should
not be discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served.
8) QUITA vs. CA
G.R. No. 124862, December 22, 1998
Facts: Fe Quita and Arturo Padlan, both Filipinos,
were married in the Philippines on May 18, 1941, but
not blessed with any children. Fe sued Arturo for
divorce in San Francisco, USA, submitting as
evidence their agreement to live separately from
11

each other and a settlement of their conjugal
properties. A decree of divorce was granted on July
23, 1954. After 3 weeks, Fe married Felix Tupaz in
San Francisco, but eventually ended into a divorce.
For the third time, she married again in USA.
April 16, 1972, Arturo died leaving no will. August 31,
1972, Lino Javier Inciong filed with RTC QC a
petition for issuance of letters of administration
concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the
Philippine Trust Company. Blandina Dandan,
surviving spouse of Arturo, and their children
opposed the petition.
Later, Ruperto Padlan,
claiming to be the sole surviving brother of deceased
Arturo, intervened. October, 7, 1987, Fe moved fot
the immediate declaration of heirs of deceased
Arturo and distribution of his estate.
The trial court disregarded the divorce between Fe
and Arturo, and expressed the view that their
marriage subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972.
Issues: Whether or not Blandinas marriage to Arturo
was void ab initio.
Whether or not Fe can be declared the primary
beneficiary of Arturos estate.
Held: No, Blandinas marriage to Arturo was valid,
thus, Fe cannot be declared a beneficiary to Arturos
estate.
At the time Fe obtained a divorce decree against
Arturo in San Francisco, she was already an alien
and no longer a Filipino citizen. Hence, the divorce
decree is valid in the Philippines, since it is
considered valid in Fes national law, which is the
USA law.
9) CATALAN vs. BRAGANZA
G.R. No. 167109, February 6, 2007
Facts:
Felicitas Catalan married Orando on June 4, 1950.
They migrated to USA and became naturalized
citizens thereof. On April 1988, they divorced.
June 16, 1988, Orlando married Merope in
Pangasinan. Later, Felicitas filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage with RTC Dagupan
against Orlando and Merope, contending that
Merope has a prior subsisting marriage with Eusebio
Bristol. RTC ruled in favor of Felicitas.
Issue: Whether Felicitas has the personality to file a
petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage of
Orlando on the ground of bigamy.
Held: There is no specific provision as to who can

file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage under
the New Civil Code, which is the law governing at
the time of marriage between Orlando and Merope,
nor even in the Family Code. however, only a party
who can demonstrate proper interest can file the
same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage
must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party in interest and must be based on a cause
of action.
In the instant case, Felicitas personality to file the
petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be
ascertained due to the absence of the divorce
decree and the foreign law allowing it. Thus, the
case is remanded to trial court for reception of
additional evidence necessary.
10) SAN LUIS vs. SAN LUIS

G.R. No. 133743, February 6, 2007
Facts:
The case involves the settlement of Felicisimos
estate. During his lifetime, he contracted 3
marriages. First was with Virginia, who predeceased
him. On May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee
Corwin, but ended to a divorce, when Merry filed a
divorce complaint in Hawaii and was granted. On
June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married Felicidad.
Felicisimo died on December 18, 1992. Felicidad
sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership
assets and settlement of Felicisimos estate. She
filed with RTC Makati a petition for letters of
administration.
Rodolfo, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first
marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of
improper venue and failure to state a cause of
action, alleging that the petition should have been
filed in the Province of Laguna where Felicisimos
place of residence prior to his death, and that
Felicidad has no legal personality to file the petition
because she was only a mistress.
Issue: Whether a Filipino who is divorced by his
alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the
Civil Code, considering that Felicidads marriage to
Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or
before the effectivity of the Family Code.
12

Held: The divorce decree allegedly obtained by
Merry which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to
remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal
personality to file the present petition as the
surviving spouse of Felicisimo. But there is
insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the
divorce decree obtained by Merry, as well as the
marriage of Felicidad and Felicisimo under the laws
of USA.
Presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient, proof of its authenticity and due
execution must also be presented. Under Sections
24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may
be proven as a public or official record of a foreign
country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a
copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in
the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied
by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
With regard to Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo
solemnized in California USA, she only submitted
photocopies of the Marriated Certificate and the
annotated text of the Family Law Act of California.
The Court, however, cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.
Therefore, this case was remanded to the trial court
for further reception of evidence on the divorce
decree obtained by Merry and the marriage of
Felicidad and Felicisimo.
11) AZNAR VS. GARCIA
7 SCRA 95
Facts:
CIF of Davao directed the executor to reimburse
Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid
by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy,
and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the
residue of the property to be enjoyed during her
lifetime, and in case of death without issue, of said
residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C
Borton, etc, in accordance with the provisions of the
will of the testator Edward E. Christensen. Helen
Christensen Garcia filed an opposition, as it deprives
her of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child,
she having been declared by the Court as one. The
court ruled that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen
of the United States of America and of the State of
California at the time of his death and he was
domiciled in the Philippines.
Issue: Whether or not the Philippine Law shall

govern the administration of the will of Edward
Christensen.
Held: The Court ruled that the Philippine Law shall
govern the testamentary disposition of Edward
Christensen.
Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that the national
law shall govern intestate and testamentary
successions. National law refers to the private law of
the state of which the decedent is a citizen, in the
case at bar, the private law of the State of California.
Article 94 of the Civil Code of State of California
refers back the case, when a decedent is not
domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the
Philippines in the case at bar.
12) BELLIS vs. BELLIS
20 SCRA 358
Facts:
Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas,
United States. He had 5 legitimate children with his
first wife, 3 legitimate children with hi second wife,
and had 3 illegitimate children. On August 5, 1952,
Amos Bellis executed a will in the Philippines. July 8,
1958, Amos died.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and
Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions
to the project of partition on the ground that they
were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate
children of Amos Bellis, and therefore, compulsory
heirs of the deceased. Under the Laws of Texas,
there are no forced heirs of legitimes.
Issue: Which law must apply Texas Law or
Philippine Law?
Held: The decedents national law, which is the
Texas law, governs the order of succession, the
amount of successional rights, the intrinsic validity of
the provisions of the will and the capacity to
succeed.
It is not disputed that the decedent was both a
national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time
of his death.
A provision in a foreigners will to the effect that his
properties shall be distributed in accordance with
Philippine Law and not with his national law cannot
be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 16
of the Civil Code states said national law should
govern.
Since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will
and the amount of successional rights are to be
13

determined under Texas Law, the Philippine law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos
Bellis.
13) TESTATE ESTATE OF BOHANAN
BOHANAN
G.R. No. L-12105, January 30, 1960
vs.
Facts:
On April 24, 1950, admitting to probate C. O.
Bohanans last will and testament, executed on April
23, 1944 in Manila, CFI found that the testator was
born in Nebraska and a citizen of California, but
temporarily stayed in the Philippines for a long
period of time. At the time of his death, he was a
citizen of the United States and of the State of
Nevada, and his will was executed in accordance
with the laws of the state of Nevada. Out of his total
estate of P211,639.33 in cash, the testator gave his
grandson P90,819.67 and of all shares of stock of
several mining companies and to his brother and
sister the same amount. To his children, he gave a
legacy of only P6,000 each. Magdalena, his wife,
and her 2 children opposed the validity of the
testamentary provisions contending that the will
deprived them of their legitime.
Magdalena alleged that the trial court erred in
recognizing the Reno divorce secured by the testator
from his Filipino wife Magdalena, and that divorce
should be declared a nullity in this jurisdiction.
According to the laws of the State of Nevada, no
right to share in the inheritance in favor of a divorced
wife. The divorce was granted to the testator on May
20, 1922.
Issue: Whether Philippine laws or the law of the
State of Nevada should apply.
Held: The testator died in 1944, thus, the old Civil
Code governs. The old Civil Code provides that
successional rights to personal property are to be
earned by the national law of the person whose
succession is in question.
The foreign law, specifically Section 9905, compiled
Newada Laws, was introduced as evidence. That
law can be taken judicial notice by the Court, without
proof of such law having been offered at the hearing
of the project of partition.
According to Article 10 of the Old Civil Code, the
validity of testamentary dispositions are governed by
the national law of the testator, and it has been
decided without dispute that the national law of the
testator is that of the State of Nevada, which allows
a testator to dispose of all his property according to

his will.
14) LLORENTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G. R. No. 124371, November 23, 2000
Facts:
Lorenzo (enlisted serviceman of the US Navy from
March 10, 1927 Septermber 30, 1957) and Paula
were married on February 22, 1937. Before the
outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo went back to
the US while Paula stayed in the conjugal home at
Camarines Sur. On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo
was naturalized as an American citizen. He visited
the Philippines and discovered that his wife, Paula
was pregnant and was living in with his brother
Ceferino.
On November 1, 1951, Lorenzo filed for divorce with
the Superior Court of the State of California and was
granted.
On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia in
Manila and begot 3 children. On March 13, 1981,
Lorenzo executed a notarized Last Will and
Testament. On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed a
petition with the RTC for the probate and allowance
of his last will and testament, moving that Alicia be
appointed as Special Administratrix of his estate, but
was denied because Lorenzo was still alive. On
January 24, 1984, trial court admitted the will to
probate. On June 11, 1985, Lorenzo died. On
September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court
a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzos
estate in her favor, contending that she was
Lorenzos surviving spouse and that the
testamentary provisions in Lorenzos will encroached
on her legitime and share in the conjugal property.
Issue: Whether or not Paula is entitled to inherit from
Lorenzos estate.
Held: Foreign law should apply. Lorenzos divorce
decree with Paula is recognized as valid.
Foreign laws must be alleged and proved. Our
courts do not take judicial notice of them.
The fact is Lorenzo became an American citizen
long before and at the time of 1) his divorce from
Paula; 2) marriage to Alicia; 3) execution of his will;
and 4) death. Issues arising from these incidents are
governed by foreign law.
Both RTC and CA decisions in hastily applying
Philippine law are erroneous. Heres why:
1) Aliens may obtain divorces abroad provided
they are valid according to their national law.
In this case, LORENZOs divorce from
14

PAULA was valid and recognized in this
jurisdiction as a matter of comity.
2) LORENZOs will is valid. Article 17 The
forms and solemnities of contracts, wills,
and other public instruments shall be
governed by the laws of the country in which
they are executed. In this case, whether the
will was executed in accordance with the
formalities required is answered by referring
to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly
probated. The trial court should not that
Congress did not intend to extend the same
succession (system of legitime) to foreign
nationals.
15

II. HUMAN RELATIONS
15) ALFREDO M. VELAYO vs. SHELL
G.R. No. L-7817, October 31, 1956.
FACTS
CALI, a domestic airline corporation, met with its
creditors to inform them that the corporation was on
the verge of insolvency and had to stop operations.
To ensure payment of their claims against CALI, the
creditors agreed that it would be advantageous not
to present suits against CALI but to strive for a fair
pro-rata division of its assets, although CALI
announced that in case of non-agreement of the
creditors on a pro-rata division of the assets, it would
file insolvency proceedings. Right after the meeting,
defendant Shell Philippines, one of CALIs creditors
who was present in the meeting and who agreed to
the pro-rata division, assigned its credit to its sister
company, Shell USA. Shell USA then filed with a
California court an action for collection of the
assigned credit and applied for a writ of attachment
against CALIs Douglas C-54 plane which was in
California. Prior to the meeting with creditors, CALI
had already offered the plane to Shell Philippine but
the offer was rejected. Velayo, as assignee of the
other creditors of CALI, filed this action for damages
against defendant Shell Philippines. He claims that
that fraudulent assignment of Shell Philippines
credit to Shall USA prejudiced the other creditors
and was contrary to the agreed pro-rata division of
assets.
ISSUE: WON Shell Philippines, taking advantage
of its knowledge of the existence of CALI's
airplane in the US, acted in bad faith in assigning
its credit to its sister company effectively
defeating the agreed pro-rata division of assets
among the creditors of CALI.
HELD: PROVISIONS ON HUMAN RELATIONS
INTENDED AS CATCH-ALL PROVISIONS FOR
ANY WRONG FOR WHICH NO SPECIFIC
REMEDY IS PROVIDED FOR BY LAW.
Defendant schemed and effected the transfer to its
sister corporation in the United States, where CALI's
plane C- 54 was. By that swift and unsuspected
operation efficaciously disposed of said insolvent's
property depriving the latter and the Assignee that
was latter appointed, of the opportunity to recover
said plane.
Chapter 2 of the PRELIMINARY TITLE of the Civil

Code, dealing on Human Relations, provides the
following:
"Art 19. Any person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performances of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty
and good faith".
It maybe said that this article only contains a mere
declaration of principles and while such statement
may be is essentially correct, yet We find that such
declaration is implemented by Article 21 and
sequence of the same Chapter which prescribe the
following:
"Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage".
Another rule is expressed in Article 24 which
compels the return of a thing acquired 'without just
or legal grounds'. This provision embodies the
doctrine that no person should unjustly enrich
himself at the expense of another, which has been
one of the mainstays of every legal system for
centuries. It is most needful that this ancient
principle be clearly and specifically consecrated in
the Civil Code to the end that in cases not foreseen
by the lawmaker, no one may unjustly benefit himself
to the prejudice of another. Now, if Article 23 of the
Civil Code goes as far as to provide that:
"Even if an act or event causing damage to another's
property was not due to the fault or negligence of the
defendant, the latter shall be liable for indemnity if
through the act or event he was benefited." with
much more reason the Defendant should be liable
for indemnity for acts it committed in bad faith and
with betrayal of confidence.
Arnel P. Bacarra
16) Albenson Enterprises Corporation vs. CA
G.R. No. 88694, January 11, 1993
FACTS:
Petitioner Albenson Enterprises delivered to
Guaranteed Industries, located at 3267 V. Mapa St.
Sta.Mesa, Manila, mild steel plates. As part
payment, Albenson was given a check drawn
against the account of E.L. Woodworks. However,
when the check was presented for payment, it was
16

dishonored because of lack of funds. This led
Albenson to trace the origin. This led them to a
certain Eugenio Baltao. They made afterwards an
extrajudicial demand to private respondent Baltao.
But he denied that he signed on the check because
Guaranteed Industries was already inexistent. This
led Albenson to file a criminal complaint for violation
of BP 22. However, it was later found out that his
namesake, Eugenio Baltao III, his son, was the one
who manages E.L. Woodworks located on the
ground floor of the Baltao Building. Nevertheless,
Assistant Fiscal Sumaway filed the information. But
Provincial Fiscal Castro instructed the trial fiscal to
dismiss the information. Because of the unjust filing
of the criminal complaint, Baltao filed a complaint for
damages against Albenson Enterprises. The trial
court ruled in favor of Baltao. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the lower court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the criminal
complaint by Albenson Enterprises constituted
an abuse of right?
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.
Under Article 19 of the Civil Code, the following are
the requisites for abuse of right: (1) There is a legal
right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3)
for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
Article 20 speaks of the general sanction for all other
provisions of law which do not especially provide for
their own sanction. Article 21 deals with acts contra
bonus mores, and has the following elements: 1)
There is an act which is legal; 2) but which is
contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or
public policy; 3) and it is done with intent to injure. A
closer look at the said articles and it can be revealed
that Articles 19 and 21 share a common element:
that the act is intentional. Article 20, however, does
not distinguish. It is dependent on the circumstances
of the case. By applying these to the case at hand, it
cannot be said that Albenson Enterprises was
abusing the rights of Baltao. The trial court and the
appellate court made a mistake of lumping the three
articles and used them as bases for the award of
damages in a civil complaint filed against the
petitioners. Albenson was prompted by its natural
instinct and right to file a criminal complaint because
it was not able to collect the payment of the mild
steel plates it had delivered. It had every right to
exhaust all legal remedies to collect its unpaid credit.
Arnel P. Bacarra
17) GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND

CORPORATION V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R No. 81262, August 25, 1983
RADIO
FACTS:
Private respondent Tobias was employed by Globe
Mackay in a dual capacity as a purchasing agent
and administrative assistant. Petitioner discovered
fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions
for which it lost several thousands of pesos. Tobias
was implicated as the number one suspect. Police
investigations were conducted as a result of said
anomaly.
The police reports exculpated Tobias from any
participation in the offense. Unsatisfied, petitioner
still hired private investigators. Pending the
investigation of the private detectives, petitioner filed
a complaint for estafa against Tobias.
Later, Tobias was terminated. Hence, he filed an
action for illegal dismissal. While his case awaits
resolution, he sought employment with RETELCO.
However, petitioner, without being asked by
RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter stating that
Tobias was dismissed due to dishonesty.
Thus, Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored
on alleged unlawful, malicious and abusive acts of
petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should
indemnify private respondent for damages.
HELD: Article 19 of the Civil Code known to contain
what is commonly referred to as the principle of
abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must
be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights
but also in the performance of one's duties. These
standards are the following: to act with justice; to
give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and
good faith. Violation of Article 19 can result to right to
damages pursuant to Article 21 or Article 22.
This article was adopted to remedy the countless
gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of
moral wrongs helpless, even though they have
actually suffered material and moral injury.
In the case at bar, petitioners claim that they did not
violate any provision of law since they were merely
exercising their legal right to dismiss private
respondent.
17

Nevertheless, the Court, after examining the record
and circumstances of the case ruled that petitioners
have indeed abused the right that they invoke,
causing damage to private respondent.
Notwithstanding the fact that it was private
respondent Tobias who reported the possible
existence of anomalous transactions, petitioner
Hendry showed belligerence and told plaintiff that he
was the number one suspect and to take a one week
vacation leave, not to communicate with the office,
to leave his table drawers open, and to leave his
keys to petitioner Hendry. The high-handed
treatment accorded Tobias by petitioners was
certainly uncalled for. And this reprehensible attitude
of petitioners was to continue when private
respondent returned to work after his one week
forced leave. Upon reporting for work, Tobias was
confronted by Hendry who said. "Tobby, you are the
crook and swindler in this company."
The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern
of harassment during the investigations of Tobias
transgress the standards of human conduct set forth
in Article 19 of the Civil Code. The Court has already
ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an
employee should not be confused with the manner in
which the right is exercised and the effects flowing
therefrom.
Therefore, petitioners are liable for damages.
Arnel P. Bacarra
18) BARONS MARKETING VS. CA
G.R. No. 126486, February 9, 1998
FACTS
Private respondent Phelps Dodge, Phil. Appointed
petitioner Barons Marketing Corp as one of its
dealers of electrical wires and cables. As such,
petitioner was given by private respondent 60 days
credit for its purchases reckoned from the date of
delivery. During the period December 1986 to
August 1987, defendant purchased on credit from
plaintiff various electrical wires and cables in the
total amount of P4,102,438.3. Of this amount,
P300,000 was paid leaving a balance of
P3,802,748.2.
Respondent wrote petitioner
demanding payment of its unpaid obligation. In
response, petitioner requests to pay the amount in
monthly installments of P500,000 plus 1% interest.
Said offer was rejected by respondent. Thereafter,
private respondent filed a complaint before the Pasig
RTC against petitioner for recovery of P3,802,748.2,
including interest with 25% attorneys fees,

exemplary damages of P100,000 and cost of
litigation. In its answer, petitioner admitted the
purchase made but disputed the amount. Petitioner
likewise interposed a counterclaim on the ground of
abuse of rights since it suffered injury to its
reputation.
The trial court rendered its decision in favor of
private respondent, which decision was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent is
guilty of abuse of rights or whether private
respondent intended to prejudice or injure
petitioner when it rejected petitioners offer and
filed the action for collection.
HELD: No. It is an elementary rule in jurisdiction
that good faith is presumed and that the burden of
proving bad faith rests upon the party alleging the
same. In the case at bar, petitioner has failed to
prove bad faith on the part of private respondent.
Private respondent was driven by legitimate reasons
for rejecting petitioners offer and instituting the
action for collection before the trial court. As pointed
out by private respondent. The corporation had its
own cash position to protect in order to pay its own
obligations. Clearly, this would be inimical to the
interests of any enterprise, especially profit-oriented
one like private respondent. It is plain to see that
this is a case of an exercise of rights, not an abuse
thereof. As such, private respondent has not acted
in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy as to violate Article 21 of the Civil Code.
Arnel P. Bacarra
19) MWSS vs. Act Theater
G.R. No. 147076, June 17, 2004
FACTS:
On September 22, 1988, four employees of the
respondent Act Theater, Inc., namely, Rodolfo
Tabian, Armando Aguilar, Arnel Concha and Modesto
Ruales, were apprehended by members of the
Quezon City police force for allegedly tampering a
water meter in violation of P.D. No. 401, as amended
by B.P. Blg. 876. On account of the incident, the
respondents water service connection was cut off.
Consequently, the respondent filed a complaint for
injunction with damages against the petitioner
MWSS.
18

In the civil case, the respondent alleged in its
complaint filed with the court a quo that the petitioner
acted arbitrarily, whimsically and capriciously, in
cutting off the respondents water service connection
without prior notice. Due to lack of water, the health
and sanitation, not only of the respondents patrons
but in the surrounding premises as well, were
adversely affected. The respondent prayed that the
petitioner be directed to pay damages.
The petitioner insists that in cutting off the
respondents water service connection, the petitioner
merely exercised its proprietary right under Article
429 of the Civil Code, which provides that the owner
or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to
exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal
thereof.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner validly
exercised its right under Article 429 of the Civil
Code.
HELD: No, the petitioner did not validly exercise its
right under Article 429 of the Civil Code. A right is a
power, privilege, or immunity guaranteed under a
constitution, statute or decisional law, or recognized
as a result of long usage, constitutive of a legally
enforceable claim of one person against the other.
Concededly, the petitioner, as the owner of the utility
providing water supply to certain consumers
including the respondent, had the right to exclude
any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof.
However, the exercise of rights is not without
limitations. Having the right should not be confused
with the manner by which such right is to be
exercised. When a right is exercised in a manner,
which discards these norms resulting in damage to
another, a legal wrong is committed for which actor
can be held accountable. In this case, the petitioner
failed to act with justice and give the respondent
what is due to it when the petitioner
unceremoniously cut off the respondents water
service connection.
Arnel P. Bacarra
20) Carpio vs. Valmonte
G.R. No. 151866, September 9, 2004
FACTS:
Respondent Leonora Valmonte is a wedding
coordinator. Michelle del Rosario and Jon Sierra
engaged her services for their church wedding. At
about 4:30 p.m. on that day, Valmonte went to the
Manila Hotel where the bride and her family were
billeted. When she arrived, several persons were

already there. Among those present was petitioner
Soledad Carpio, an aunt of the bride who was
preparing to dress up for the occasion.
After reporting to the bride, Valmonte went out of the
suite. She proceeded to the Maynila Restaurant
where the reception was to be held. She paid the
suppliers, gave the meal allowance to the band, and
went back to the suite. Upon entering the suite,
Valmonte noticed the people staring at her. It was at
this juncture that petitioner allegedly uttered the
following words to Valmonte: "Ikaw lang ang
lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan ang dala mong bag?
Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw lang and lumabas ng
kwarto, ikaw ang kumuha." Petitioner then ordered
one of the ladies to search Valmontes bag. It turned
out that after Valmonte left the room to attend to her
duties, petitioner discovered that the pieces of
jewelry which she placed inside the comfort room in
a paper bag were lost.
The bags and personal belongings of all the people
inside the room were searched. Valmonte was
allegedly bodily searched, interrogated and trailed by
a security guard throughout the evening. Later,
police officers arrived and interviewed all persons
who had access to the suite and fingerprinted them
including Valmonte. During all the time Valmonte
was being interrogated by the police officers,
petitioner kept on saying the words "Siya lang ang
lumabas ng kwarto." Valmontes car which was
parked at the hotel premises was also searched but
the search yielded nothing.
After a futile attempt for a formal apology, Valmonte
filed a suit for damages against Carpio.
The trial court rendered dismissed Valmontes
complaint for damages. It ruled that when petitioner
sought investigation for the loss of her jewelry, she
was merely exercising her right and if damage
results from a person exercising his legal right, it is
damnum absque injuria.
The CA reversed, holding that petitioners verbal
assault upon Valmonte was done with malice and in
bad faith since it was made in the presence of many
people without any solid proof except petitioners
suspicion. Such unfounded accusation entitles
Valmonte to an award of moral damages for she was
publicly
humiliated,
deeply
insulted,
and
embarrassed.
ISSUE:
Should
Valmonte
be
entitled
to
19

Damages?
HELD: Yes. The victim of a wrongful act or omission,
whether done willfully or negligently, is not left
without any remedy or recourse to obtain relief for
the damage or injury he sustained. Incorporated into
our civil law are not only principles of equity but also
universal moral precepts which are designed to
indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain
of good conscience and which are meant to serve as
guides for human conduct. First of these
fundamental precepts is the principle commonly
known as "abuse of rights" under Article 19 of the
Civil Code. It provides that "Every person must, in
the exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due
and observe honesty and good faith." One is not
allowed to exercise his right in a manner which
would cause unnecessary prejudice to another or if
he would thereby offend morals or good customs.
In the case at bar, petitioners verbal reproach
against respondent was certainly uncalled for
considering that by her own account nobody knew
that she brought such kind and amount of jewelry
inside the paper bag. This being the case, she had
no right to attack respondent with her innuendos
which were not merely inquisitive but outrightly
accusatory. By openly accusing respondent as the
only person who went out of the room before the
loss of the jewelry in the presence of all the guests
therein, and ordering that she be immediately bodily
searched, petitioner virtually branded respondent as
the thief. True, petitioner had the right to ascertain
the identity of the malefactor, but to malign
respondent without an iota of proof that she was the
one who actually stole the jewelry is an act which, by
any standard or principle of law is impermissible.
Petitioner had willfully caused injury to respondent in
a manner which is contrary to morals and good
customs. Her firmness and resolve to find her
missing jewelry cannot justify her acts toward
respondent. She did not act with justice and good
faith for apparently, she had no other purpose in
mind but to prejudice respondent. Certainly,
petitioner transgressed the provisions of Article 19 in
relation to Article 21 for which she should be held
accountable.
Arnel P. Bacarra
21) RCPI VS CA
G.R No. L-44748, August 29, 1986
FACTS:
Plaintiff-respondent Loreto Dionela alleges that the
defamatory words on the telegram sent to him not
only wounded his feelings but also caused him
undue embarrassment and affected adversely his
business as well because other people have come
to know of said defamatory words. Defendantcorporation as a defense, alleges that the additional
words in Tagalog was a private joke between the
sending and receiving operators and that they were
not addressed to or intended for plaintiff and
therefore did not form part of the telegram and that
the Tagalog words are not defamatory. The telegram
sent through its facilities was received in its station
at Legaspi City. Nobody other than the operator
manned the teletype machine which automatically
receives telegrams being transmitted. The said
telegram was detached from the machine and
placed inside a sealed envelope and delivered to
plaintiff, obviously as is. The additional words in
Tagalog were never noticed and were included in the
telegram when delivered.
The trial court ruled that in favor of the plaintiff
holding that the liability of petitioner-companyemployer is predicated on Articles 19 and 20 of the
Civil Code. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision, upon appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner-companyemployer is liable for damages under Articles 19
and 20 of the Civil Code.
HELD: Yes. The cause of action of the private
respondent is based on Arts. 19 and 20 of the New
Civil Code. As well as on respondent's breach of
contract thru the negligence of its own employees.
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the
business of receiving and transmitting messages.
Every time a person transmits a message through
the facilities of the petitioner, a contract is entered
into. Upon receipt of the rate or fee fixed, the
petitioner undertakes to transmit the message
accurately. There is no question that in the case at
bar, libelous matters were included in the message
transmitted, without the consent or knowledge of the
sender. There is a clear case of breach of contract
by the petitioner in adding extraneous and libelous
matters in the message sent to the private
respondent. As a corporation, the petitioner can act
only through its employees. Hence the acts of its
employees in receiving and transmitting messages
are the acts of the petitioner.
20

To hold that the petitioner is not liable directly for the
acts of its employees in the pursuit of petitioner's
business is to deprive the general public availing of
the services of the petitioner of an effective and
adequate remedy. In most cases, negligence must
be proved in order that plaintiff may recover.
However, since negligence may be hard to
substantiate in some cases, we may apply the
doctrine of RES IPSA LOQUITUR (the thing speaks
for itself), by considering the presence of facts or
circumstances surrounding the injury.
The decision is affirmed.
22) MERALCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-39019, January 22, 1988
FACTS:
Petitioner Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) is a
public utility corporation providing electric power for
the consumption of the general public in Metro
Manila. Petitioner Pedro Yambao is a bill collector of
MERALCO.
Private respondents Isaac Chaves and Juana O.
Chaves, husband and wife, filed the complaint for
damages, together with their children, Isaac Chaves
Jr. and Rosendo Chaves. Isaac Sr. And Isaac Jr. and
Rosendo were members of the Philippine Bar; Isaac
Sr. And Isaac Jr. were practicing lawyers and
Rosendo was a legal officer at the Agricultural
Productivity Commission. Juana O. Chaves was a
public school teacher.
Private respondents became the customer of
petitioner MERALCO in the year 1953. At or about
the end of March, 1965, petitioner Yambao went to
the residence of private respondents and presented
two overdue bills, one for January 11 to February 9,
1965, for the sum of P7.90, and the other for
February 9 to March 10, 1965, for the sum of P7.20.
On April 2, 1965, Isaac Chaves went to the main
office of petitioner but paid only one bill, for January
11 to February 9, 1965, leaving the other bill unpaid.
Thereafter, on April 21, 1965, petitioner caused the
electric service in private respondents residence to
be discontinued and the power line cut off. On the
following day, Rosendo went to petitioners main
office and paid the unpaid bill. The power line was
restored at about 7:00 pm on the same day.
Private respondents filed an action for recovery of
damages for embarrassment, humiliation, wounded
feelings and hurt pride by reason of the
disconnection of their electric service by the
petitioner.
The CFI ordered rendered decision in favor of

private respondent, ordering petitioner to pay private
respondent moral damages, exemplary damages
and attorneys fees.
The Court of Appeal, affirmed in toto the trial courts
decision. Respondent Court stressed the importance
and necessity of 48 hour advance written notification
before the disconnection of service may be effected.
ISSUE: Whether advance written notification
before the disconnection of service may be
effected?
RULING: Yes. Petitioner being a public Utility having
monopoly of the supply of electrical power in Metro
Manila and some nearby municipalities. Being such,
the State may regulate the conditions under which
the manner by which a public utility such as
MERALCO may effect a disconnection of service to
delinquent customer. Among others, a prior written
notice to the customer is required before
disconnection of service. Failure to give such prior
notice amounts to a tort.
23) CUSTUDIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 116100. February 9, 1996.
FACTS:
Herein private respondents owned a parcel of land
wherein a two-storey apartment building was
constituted therein, for this, tenants then were
occupying the latter building. Such property was
surrounded by other immovables (houses) owned by
herein petitioners, Custidio and Santos. Before
reaching the property of the private respondents
from the P. Burgos St. there were two passage ways
in between the said other immovable, but however,
they were only narrow paths.
After sometimes, the petitioners constructed adobe
fence in the first passageway making it narrower in
width. Said adobe fence was first constructed by
defendants Santoses along their property which is
also along the first passageway. Defendant Morato
constructed her adobe fence and even extended
said fence in such a way that the entire passageway
was enclosed. As a result, the tenants left the
apartment because there was no longer a
permanent access -ingress and engress to the
public street.
The private respondents filed an action for the grant
of an easement of right of way. The trial court
ordered the petitioner to give plaintiff permanent
access ingress and egress, to the public street
and that in turn, the private respondent will pay a
21

sum of Php 8000 to the petitioner as an indemnity
for the permanent use of the passageway. On
appeal by the private respondent to the CA, the
latter Court affirmed the decision of the lower court
as to give a right of way to the private respondents
and awarded the latter actual, moral and exemplary
damages. For this, petitioner appealed to the SC
questioning the award of damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not the award of damages is
proper?
RULING: No. A reading of the decision of the Court
of Appeals will show that the award of damages was
based solely on the fact that the original plaintiff,
Pacifico Mabasa, incurred losses in the form of
unrealized rentals when the tenants vacated the
leased premises by reason of the closure of the
passageway. However, the mere fact that the plaintiff
suffered losses does not give rise to a right to
recover damages. To warrant the recovery of
damages, there must be both a right of action for a
legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage
resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without
damage, or damage without wrong, does not
constitute a cause of action, since damages are
merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury
caused by a breach or wrong. There is a material
distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the
illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss,
hurt, or harm which results from the injury, and
damages are the recompense or compensation
awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can
be damage without injury in those instances in which
the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a
legal duty. These situations are often called damnum
absque injuria. In order that a plaintiff may maintain
an action for the injuries of which he complains, he
must establish that such injuries resulted from a
breach of duty which the defendant owed to the
plaintiff a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and
legal responsibility by the person causing it.
In the case at bar, although there was damage, there
was no legal injury. Contrary to the claim of private
respondents, petitioners could not be said to have
violated the principle of abuse of right. In order that
the principle of abuse of right provided in Article 21
of the Civil Code can be applied, it is essential that
the following requisites concur: (1) The defendant
should have acted in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy; (2) The acts
should be willful; and (3) There was damage or
injury to the plaintiff. The act of petitioners in
constructing a fence within their lot is a valid
exercise of their right as owners, hence not contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy. The law

recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and
dispose of a thing, without other limitations than
those established by law. It is within the right of
petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence their
property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that
(e)very owner may enclose or fence his land or
tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead
hedges, or by any other means without detriment to
servitudes constituted thereon.
At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot
was not subject to any servitudes. There was no
easement of way existing in favor of private
respondents, either by law or by contract. The fact
that private respondents had no existing right over
the said passageway is confirmed by the very
decision of the trial court granting a compulsory right
of way in their favor after payment of just
compensation. It was only that decision which gave
private respondents the right to use the said
passageway after payment of the compensation and
imposed a corresponding duty on petitioners not to
interfere in the exercise of said right.
24) GASHEM vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 97336. February 19, 1993.
FACTS:
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the
assistance of counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial
court a complaint for damages against the petitioner
for the alleged violation of their agreement to get
married. She alleges in said complaint that: she is 22
years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good
moral character and reputation duly respected in her
community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an
Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments,
Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student
taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern
Colleges in Dagupan City; that the plaintiff is an
employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette, Fernandez
Avenue, Dagupan City and that the parties
happened to know each other when the Manager of
the Mabuhay Luncheonette, Johnny Rabino
introduced the defendant to the plaintiff; the latter
courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted
his love on the condition that they would get married;
they therefore agreed to get married after the end of
the school semester, which was in October of that
year; petitioner then visited the private respondent's
parents in Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure
their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20
August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with
him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin
22

before she began living with him; as a result of this
live-in relationship, plaintiff became pregnant, but
defendant gave her some medicine to abort the
foetus. Still plaintiff continued to live with defendant
and kept reminding him of his promise to marry her
until he told her that he could not do so because he
was already married to a girl in Bacolod City. Private
respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the
petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of not
less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual
expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and
costs, and granting her such other relief and
remedies as may be just and equitable.
In his Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner claimed
that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be
married with the private respondent; he neither
sought the consent and approval of her parents nor
forced her to live in his apartment; he did not
maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to his
place because he discovered that she had deceived
him by stealing his money and passport.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying
Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered a decision
favoring the private respondent. The petitioner was
thus ordered to pay the latter damages and
attorney's fees.
The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings
and conclusions that (a) petitioner and private
respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is not
a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who
readily submits to sexual advances, (c) petitioner,
through machinations, deceit and false pretenses,
promised to marry private respondent, (d) because
of his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed
herself to be deflowered by him, (e) by reason of that
deceitful promise, private respondent and her
parents in accordance with Filipino customs and
traditions made some preparations for the
wedding that was to be held at the end of October
1987 by looking for pigs and chickens, inviting
friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f)
petitioner did not fulfill his promise to marry her and
(g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and
who has abused Philippine hospitality, have
offended our sense of morality, good customs,
culture and traditions.
The CA affirmed in toto the trial court's ruling.
Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the
instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 21 of the Civil
Code applies to the case at bar.
RULING: It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21
is not applicable because he had not committed any
moral wrong or injury or violated any good custom or

public policy; he has not professed love or proposed
marriage to the private respondent; and he has
never maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for
liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions and
culture, and ignoring the fact that since he is a
foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino
customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian
Moslem, he is not familiar with Catholic and
Christian ways. He stresses that even if he had
made a promise to marry, the subsequent failure to
fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable because of
his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the
Muslim Code which purportedly allows a Muslim to
take four (4) wives and concludes that on the basis
thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does not
possess good moral character. Moreover, his
controversial "common law wife" is now his legal
wife as their marriage had been solemnized in civil
ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his
unlawful cohabitation with the private respondent,
petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be
pinned on him for the live-in relationship, the private
respondent should also be faulted for consenting to
an illicit arrangement. Finally, petitioner asseverates
that even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he
had professed his love to the private respondent and
had also promised to marry her, such acts would not
be actionable in view of the special circumstances of
the case. The mere breach of promise is not
actionable.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to
marry per se is not an actionable wrong. Congress
deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil
Code the provisions that would have made it so. The
reason therefor is set forth in the report of the
Senate Committee on the Proposed Civil Code, from
which We quote:
"The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That
breach of promise to marry is not actionable has
been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs.
Syquia. The history of breach of promise suits in the
United States and in England has shown that no
other action lends itself more readily to abuse by
designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this
experience which has led to the abolition of rights of
action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many of
the American states .."
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a
provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand
the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction
by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold
number of moral wrongs which is impossible for
human foresight to specifically enumerate and
punish in the statute books.
23

Article 2176, of the Civil Code, which defines a
quasi-delict thus:
"Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter." is
limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes
the notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict,
known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana,
is a civil law concept while torts is an AngloAmerican or common law concept. Torts is much
broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not
only negligence, but intentional criminal acts as well
such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and
deceit.
In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system
envisioned by the Commission responsible for
drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and
malicious acts with certain exceptions, are to be
governed by the Revised Penal Code while
negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by
Article 2176 of the Civil Code. In between these
opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the
absence of Article 21, would have been beyond
redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even
postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of
the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the
scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become
much more supple and adaptable than the AngloAmerican law on torts.
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article
21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a
man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate
cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and
his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter
becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself
unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in
reality, no intention of marrying her and that the
promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive
device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to
obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the
award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not
because of such promise to marry but because of
the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to
her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It
is essential, however, that such injury should have
been committed in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it
was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive
protestations of love for and promise to marry
plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and
womanhood to him and to live with him on the
honest and sincere belief that he would keep said

promise, and it was likewise these fraud and
deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's
parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him
preparatory to their supposed marriage." In short,
the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the
cherished possession of every single Filipina, not
because of lust but because of moral seduction
the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its
example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not
be held liable for criminal seduction punished under
either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal
Code because the private respondent was above
eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the
seduction.
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's
alternative proposition to the effect that granting, for
argument's sake, that he did promise to marry the
private respondent, the latter is nevertheless also at
fault. According to him, both parties are in pari
delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil
Code and the doctrine laid down in Batarra vs.
Marcos, the private respondent cannot recover
damages from the petitioner. The latter even goes as
far as stating that if the private respondent had
"sustained any injury or damage in their relationship,
it is primarily because of her own doing."
These statements reveal the true character and
motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he harbors a
condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the
private respondent on account of the latter's ignoble
birth, inferior educational background, poverty and,
as perceived by him, dishonorable employment.
Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not
at all moved by good faith and an honest motive.
Marrying with a woman so circumstanced could not
have even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his
profession of love and promise to marry were empty
words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile
and deceive the poor woman into believing that
indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his
life partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he
wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed
that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of
marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease
and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's
concept of morality and so brazenly defied the
traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It
can even be said that the petitioner committed such
deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of
the Civil Code which directs every person to act with
justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty
and good faith in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his obligations.
24

No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of
our laws, customs and traditions. The pari delicto
rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the
private respondent may not have been impelled by
the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to
the petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but
because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent
that she had qualms of conscience about the entire
episode for as soon as she found out that the
petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she
left him. She is not, therefore, in pari delicto with the
petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a
similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal
fault." At most, it could be conceded that she is
merely in delicto.
We should stress, however, that while We find for
the private respondent, let it not be said that this
Court condones the deplorable behavior of her
parents in letting her and the petitioner stay together
in the same room in their house after giving approval
to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to
protect the honor of their daughters and infuse upon
them the higher values of morality and dignity.
District, the intended demolition did not take place

following talks between petitioner Rellosa and
counsel who pleaded that the demolition be
suspended since the order sought to be
implemented was not yet final and executory. On 11
December 1989, respondents filed their appeal
contesting the order of the Office of the Building
Official. On 12 December 1989, petitioners once
again hired workers and proceeded with the
demolition of respondents' houses.
Respondents filed Civil Case before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, praying that petitioners be
ordered to pay moral and exemplary damages, as
well as attorneys fees, for the untimely demolition of
the houses.
The RTC dismissed the complaint of respondents
and instead ordered them to pay petitioners moral
damages.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
trial court and ordered petitioners to pay
respondents of moral damages, exemplary damages
and Attorney's fees.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a premature
demolition
25) RELLOSA vs. PELLOSIS

G.R. No. 138964 August 9, 2001.
FACTS:
Respondents were lessees of a parcel of land,
owned by one Marta Reyes, located at Malate,
Manila. Respondents had built their houses on the
land which, over the years, underwent continuous
improvements. After the demise of Marta, the land
was inherited by her son Victor Reyes. Sometime in
1986, Victor informed respondents that, for being
lessees of the land for more than twenty (20) years,
they would have a right of first refusal to buy the
land. Sometime in the early part of 1989, without the
knowledge of respondents, the land occupied by
them was sold to petitioner Cynthia Ortega who was
able to ultimately secure title to the property in her
name.
On 31 May 1989, respondents filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila a suit for the
"Declaration of Nullity of the Sale," made in favor of
petitioner Cynthia Ortega predicated upon their right
of first refusal.
The Office of the Building Official issued a resolution
ordering the demolition of the houses of
respondents. The following day Cynthia Ortega,
together with her father and co-petitioner, Vicente
Rellosa, hired workers to commence the demolition
of respondents' houses. Due to the timely
intervention of a mobile unit of the Western Police
RULING: The Court upheld the decision of the Court

of Appeals that there was a premature demolition.
Hence, the petitioners should pay damages to the
lessees.
A right is a power, privilege, or immunity guaranteed
under a constitution, statute or decisional law, or
recognized as a result of long usage, constitutive of
a legally enforceable claim of one person against
another.
The exercise of these rights is not without limitations.
The abuse of rights rule established in Article 19 of
the Civil Code requires every person to act with
justice, to give everyone his due; and to observe
honesty and good faith. When a right is exercised in
a manner which discards these norms resulting in
damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for
which the actor can be held accountable.
At the time petitioners implemented the order of
demolition, barely five days after respondents
received a copy thereof, the same was not yet final
and executory. The law provided for a fifteen-day
appeal period in favor of a party aggrieved by an
adverse ruling of the Office of the Building Official
but by the precipitate action of petitioners in
demolishing the houses of respondents (prior to the
expiration of the period to appeal), the latter were
effectively deprived of this recourse. The fact that
the order of demolition was later affirmed by the
Department of Public Works and Highways was of
25

no moment. The action of petitioners up to the point
where they were able to secure an order of
demolition was not condemnable but implementing
the order unmindful of the right of respondents to
contest the ruling was a different matter and could
only be held utterly indefensible.
Digested by: Baet, Mark
This prompted PHIBRO to file an action for damages

with application for injunction against NAPOCOR
with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 57, Makati City.
In its complaint, PHIBRO alleged that NAPOCOR's
act of disqualifying it in the October 1987 bidding
and in all subsequent biddings was tainted with
malice and bad faith.
26) NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION

PHILIPP BROTHERS OCEANIC, INC.
G.R. No. 126204, November 20, 2001
vs.
ISSUE: Whether or not NAPOCOR abused its right

or acted unjustly in disqualifying PHIBRO from the
public bidding.
FACTS:
On May 14, 1987, the National Power Corporation
(NAPOCOR) issued invitations to bid for the supply
and delivery of 120,000 metric tons of imported coal
for its Batangas Coal-Fired Thermal Power Plant in
Calaca, Batangas. The Philipp Brothers Oceanic,
Inc. (PHIBRO) prequalified and was allowed to
participate as one of the bidders. After the public
bidding was conducted, PHIBRO's bid was
accepted. NAPOCOR's acceptance was conveyed
in a letter dated July 8, 1987, which was received by
PHIBRO on July 15, 1987.
On July 10, 1987, PHIBRO sent word to NAPOCOR
that industrial disputes might soon plague Australia,
the shipment's point of origin, which could seriously
hamper PHIBRO's ability to supply the needed coal.
From July 23 to July 31, 1987, PHIBRO again
apprised NAPOCOR of the situation in Australia,
particularly informing the latter that the ship owners
therein are not willing to load cargo unless a "strikefree" clause is incorporated in the charter party or
the contract of carriage. In order to hasten the
transfer of coal, PHIBRO proposed to NAPOCOR
that they equally share the burden of a "strike-free"
clause. NAPOCOR refused.
On August 6, 1987, PHIBRO received from
NAPOCOR a confirmed and workable letter of credit.
Instead of delivering the coal on or before the
thirtieth day after receipt of the Letter of Credit, as
agreed upon by the parties in the July contract,
PHIBRO effected its first shipment only on
November 17, 1987.
Consequently, in October 1987, NAPOCOR once
more advertised for the delivery of coal to its Calaca
thermal plant. PHIBRO participated anew in this
subsequent bidding. On November 24, 1987,
NAPOCOR disapproved PHIBRO's application for
pre-qualification to bid for not meeting the minimum
requirements. Upon further inquiry, PHIBRO found
that the real reason for the disapproval was its
purported failure to satisfy NAPOCOR's demand for
damages due to the delay in the delivery of the first
coal shipment.
RULING: No. NAPOCOR was not bound under any

contract to approve PHIBRO's pre-qualification
requirements. In fact, NAPOCOR had expressly
reserved its right to reject bids as provided in its
Instruction to Bidders found in the "Post-Qualification
Documents/Specifications for the Supply and
Delivery of Coal for the Batangas Coal-Fired
Thermal Power Plant I.
27) FRENZEL vs. CATITO
G.R. No. 143958, July 11, 2003
FACTS:
Petitioner Alfred Fritz Frenzel is an Australian citizen
of German descent who was married to Teresita
Santos, a Filipino citizen. He works as a pilot for
New Guinea Airlines. On the other hand, private
respondent Ederlina P. Catito was married to Klaus
Muller, a German national. She worked as a
masseuse in the Kings Cross nightclub in Sydney,
Australia. The two met when Alfred went on a
vacation in Sydney. They met again and this time,
Alfred was able to convince Ederlina to stop working
and to go back to the Philippines. When she
returned to the Philippines, she was given money by
Alfred to put up a beauty salon. Later on, he also
gave money to her to be able to purchase a house
and lot in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City.
But since he was aware that aliens were prohibited
to purchase lands, he agreed to have Ederlina as
the sole vendee. Later also, they opened two bank
accounts with the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation in Kowloon, Hong Kong. Also, there
were subsequent purchases of other real and
personal properties. These were made on the
anticipation on the part of Alfred that he and Ederlina
will get married soon. However, this failed to
materialize because of the fact that Ederlina was still
married to Klaus. Ederlina failed to secure a divorce
from Klaus. This exasperated Alfred and eventually
their relationship started to fade. Later on, Alfred
filed a complaint before the RTC of Davao City for
26

recovery of real and personal properties. He
demanded from Ederlina that she return all the
money that were used to purchase the properties
and also the properties which were bought,
especially the house and lot and three other lots.
However, the complaint of Alfred was dismissed by
the RTC. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the RTC in toto.
ISSUE: Whether or not Alfred is entitled to
recover the said properties?
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.
The contention of petitioner Frenzel that to bar him
from recovering the properties would be in violation
of Article 22 of the Civil Code on unjust enrichment
did not hold water. It must be remembered that a
contract which violates the Constitution and the laws
is void and vests no rights and creates no
obligations. It does not produce any legal effect. His
reliance on Article 22 is misplaced because in this
case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or
the parties are in pari delicto. This is founded on the
general principles of public policy. It must be
remembered that Alfred knew all along that he was
disqualified from purchasing lands. His contention
that he entered into the transaction because he was
expecting that he and Ederlina will get married in the
future is not a valid one. He also knew that he
cannot get married to Ederlina because he still had a
valid existing marriage with Teresita Santos.
28) REYES vs. LIM
G.R. No. 134241, August 11, 2003
FACTS:
Petitoner Reyes and private respondent Lim entered
into a Contract to sell a parcel of land located in F.B.
Harrison, St. The parties stipulated that Lim shall
pay a down payment of P10 Million of the P28
Million purchase price. On one hand, Reyes shall
ensure that the lessee of the property, Harrison
Lumber, shall have vacated the lot upon payment of
the balance.
The day to consummate the contract arrived
however Harrison Lumber has still not vacated the
land. Worse, Lim found out that Reyes had already
sold the lot to Line One Food Corporation.
Aggrieved, Lim filed an action for specific
performance and nullification of the subsequent
contract of sale plus damages. The trial court and
Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Lim.
Hence, the present petition. Reyes primarily
contends that the CA erred in affirming the RTC
Decision when it was based on equity. Petitioner

argues that it is Rule 57 to 61 of the Rules on Civil
Procedure which should be applied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of
petitioner is tenable.
RULING: According to the Supreme Court, the case
involves an issue left unanswerable due to silence or
insufficiency of the law and the rules of court. At this
instance, Article 9 of the Civil Code expressly
mandates the Court to make a ruling despite the
silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law. This
calls for equity which fills open spaces in the law.
Before rescission of the contract can be had, the
parties must be restored to their status quo ante.
This was ordered by the Court.
To rule otherwise would improve Reyes to the
detriment of Lim contrary to Article 22 of the Civil
Code which provides that no person shall unjustly
enrich himself at the expense of another. Article 22
applies to substantive as well as procedural
remedies.
Therefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed.
29) NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY vs.
MADRIGAL WAN HAI LINES CORPORATION
G.R. No. 148332, September 30, 2003
FACTS:
The National Development Company, petitioner, is a
government-owned and controlled corporation.
petitioners Board of Directors approved the
privatization plan of the NSCP. In May 1993, the
Board offered for sale to the public its one hundred
percent (100%) stock ownership in NSCP as well as
its three (3) ocean-going vessels (M/V National
Honor, M/V National Pride and M/V National
Dignity).
Consequently, petitioner released to the public an
Information
Package
containing
NSCPs
background, assets, operational and financial status.
During the public bidding the lone bidder was herein
respondent, Madrigal Wan Hai Lines Corporation, a
domestic private corporation. Mr. Willie J. Uy,
respondents Consultant, submitted a bid of $15
million through the Proposal Letter Form.
The respondents bid was rejected by petitioner and
the Commission on Audit.
But since there was no other bidder, petitioner
entered into a negotiated sale with respondent. After
several negotiations, respondent increased its offer
to $18.5 million which was accepted by petitioner.
27

Accordingly, petitioner issued a Notice of Award to
respondent of the sale of the NSCP shares and
vessels for $18.5 million.petitioner and respondent
executed the corresponding Contract of Sale, and
the latter acquired NSCP, its assets, personnel,
records and its three (3) vessels.
After a while, respondent was surprised to receive
from the US Department of Treasury, Internal
Revenue Service (US IRS), a Notice of Final
Assessment against NSCP for deficiency taxes on
gross transportation income derived from US
sources for the years ending 1990, 1991 and 1992.
Anxious that the delay in the payment of the
deficiency taxes may hamper its shipping operations
overseas, assumed and paid petitioners tax
liabilities, including the tax due for the year
1993.Eventually, respondent demanded from
petitioner reimbursement for the amounts it paid to
the US IRS. But petitioner refused despite repeated
demands.
Hence, respondent filed with the
Regional Trial Court complaint against petitioner for
reimbursement and damages
the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondent
and against petitioner. The trial court found, among
others, that even before the sale, petitioner knew
that NSCP had tax liabilities with the US IRS, yet it
did not inform respondent about it.
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered a
Decision affirming the trial courts judgment with
modification. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is legally bound to
reimburse respondent for the amounts it paid
corresponding to the formers tax liabilities to the US
IRS.
HELD:
The case at bar calls to mind the principle of unjust
enrichment Nemo cum alterius detrimento
locupletari potest. No person shall be allowed to
enrich himself unjustly at the expense of others.
This principle of equity has been enshrined in our
Civil Code, Article 22 of which provides:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act or
performance by another or by any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at
the expense of the latter without just or legal ground,
shall return the same to him.
Justice and equity thus oblige that petitioner be held
liable for NSCPs tax liabilities and reimburse
respondent for the amounts it paid. It would be
unjust enrichment on the part of petitioner to be
relieved of that obligation.
DIGEST BY: JIHAN A.M. BANOCAG

30) ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES,
ISMAEL GONZALGO and JOSE FARLEY
BEDENIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-39999 May 31, 1984
FACTS:
That on or about February 8, 1964 at around 9:00
o'clock in the morning, in the municipality of Jose
Panganiban, province of Camarines Norte,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above- named accused, Roy
Padilla, Filomeno Galdones, Pepito Bedenia, Yolly
Rico, David Bermundo, Villanoac, Roberto Rosales,
Villania, Romeo Garrido, Jose Ortega, Jr., Ricardo
Celestino, Realingo alias Kamlon, John Doe alias
Tato, and Fourteen Richard Does, by confederating
and mutually helping one another, and acting without
any authority of law, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously, by means of threats,
force and violence prevent Antonio Vergara and his
family to close their stall located at the Public
Market, Building No. 3, Jose Panganiban,
Camarines Norte, and by subsequently forcibly
opening the door of said stall and thereafter brutally
demolishing and destroying said stall and the
furnitures therein by axes and other massive
instruments, and carrying away the goods, wares
and merchandise, to the damage and prejudice of
the said Antonio Vergara and his family in the
amount of P30,000.00 in concept of actual or
compensatory and moral damages, and further the
sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.
That in committing the offense, the accused took
advantage of their public positions: Roy Padilla,
being the incumbent municipal mayor, and the rest
of the accused being policemen, except Ricardo
Celestino who is a civilian, all of Jose Panganiban,
Camarines Norte, and that it was committed with
evident premeditation.
The Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte,
rendered a decision finding the accused guilty.
The petitioners appealed the judgment of conviction
to the Court of Appeals. the Court of Appeals
affirmed the lower court decision but with
modification
hence this petition.
ISSUE: whether or not the respondent court
committed a reversible error in requiring the
petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants
after acquitting them from the criminal charge.
28

HELD:
The extinction of the civil action by reason of
acquittal in the criminal case refers exclusively to
civil liability ex delicto founded on Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code. (Elcano v. Hill, 77 SCRA 98;
Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472). In other words, the
civil liability which is also extinguished upon acquittal
of the accused is the civil liability arising from the act
as a crime.
Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds
from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact
from which the civil might arise did not exist. In other
cases, the person entitled to the civil action may
institute it in the Jurisdiction and in the manner
provided by law against the person who may be
liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or
indemnity for the damage suffered.
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of
the accused for damages only when it includes a
declaration that the facts from which the civil might
arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not
extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is
based on reasonable doubt (PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil.
286) as only preponderance of evidence is required
in civil cases; where the court expressly declares
that the liability of the accused is not criminal but
only civil in nature (De Guzman v. Alvia, 96 Phil. 558;
People v. Pantig, supra) as, for instance, in the
felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief
committed by certain relatives who thereby incur
only civil liability (See Art. 332, Revised Penal
Code); and, where the civil liability does not arise
from or is not based upon the criminal act of which
the accused was acquitted (Castro v. Collector of
Internal Revenue, 4 SCRA 1093; See Regalado,
Remedial Law Compendium, 1983 ed., p. 623).
Article 29 of the Civil Code also provides that:
When the accused in a criminal prosecution is
acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for
damages for the same act or omission may be
instituted.
Such
action
requires
only
a
preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the
defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a
bond to answer for damages in case the complaint
should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is
based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so
declare. In the absence of any declaration to that
effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision
whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision
in the rendition of a judgment of acquittal and a
judgment awarding damages in the same criminal
action. The two can stand side by side. A judgment

of acquittal operates to extinguish the criminal
liability. It does not, however, extinguish the civil
liability unless there is clear showing that the act
from which civil liability might arise did not exist.
A separate civil action may be warranted where
additional facts have to be established or more
evidence must be adduced or where the criminal
case has been fully terminated and a separate
complaint would be just as efficacious or even more
expedient than a timely remand to the trial court
where the criminal action was decided for further
hearings on the civil aspects of the case. The
offended party may, of course, choose to file a
separate action. These do not exist in this case.
Considering moreover the delays suffered by the
case in the trial, appellate, and review stages, it
would be unjust to the complainants in this case to
require at this time a separate civil action to be filed.
With this in mind, we therefore hold that the
respondent Court of Appeals did not err in awarding
damages despite a judgment of acquittal.
WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM the decision of
the respondent Court of Appeals and dismiss the
petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
29

III. PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
31) DONATO VS. LUNA
160 SCRA 441
FACTS:
Paz Abayan filed an information for Bigamy against
petitioner Leonilo Donato. She also filed with the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court a civil action
for declaration of nullity of marriage to petitioner
because of a prior marriage of petitioner. In his
answer petitioner claimed that his 2nd marriage was
void because it was solemnized without a valid
marriage license and that violence, intimation and
undue influence were employed by Paz to obtain his
consent.
Prior to the date set for the trial of the criminal case,
petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings
of the case because the civil action raises a
prejudicial question which must first be determined
before the criminal case can proceed.
ISSUE:
Does a criminal case for bigamy suspend the civil
case of annulment of marriage on the ground that
the latter constitutes a prejudicial question?
HELD:
The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain
in the case at bar. I must be noted that the issue
before the JDRC touching upon the nullity of the
second marriage is not determinative of petitioner
Donato's guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy.
Furthermore, it was petitioner's 2nd wife, the herein
private respondent Paz Abayan who filed the
complaint for annulment of the 2nd marriage on the
ground that her consent was obtained through
deceit.
He who contracts a 2nd marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of first marriage assumes the
risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
32) RICARDO QUIAMBAO vs. HON. ADRIANO
OSORIO
G.R. No. L-48157, March 16, 1988
FACTS:
In a complaint for forcible entry filed by herein
private respondents Zenaida Gaza Buensucero,
Justina Gaza Bernardo and Felipe Gaza against
herein petitioner Ricardo Quiambao before the then
Municipal Court of Malabon, Rizal,it was alleged that
private respondents were the legitimate possessors
of a 30,835 sq. m. lot known as Lot No. 4, Block 12,
Bca 2039 of the Longos Estate situated at Barrio

Longos, Malabon Rizal, by virtue of the Agreement
to Sell No. 3482 executed in their favor by the former
Land Tenure Administration ; that under cover of
darkness, petitioner surreptitiously and by force,
intimidation, strategy and stealth, entered into a 400
sq. m. portion thereof, placed bamboo posts "staka"
over said portion and thereafter began the
construction of a house thereon;
After hearing, the municipal court denied the motion
to dismiss. It ruled that inasmuch as the issue
involved in the case was the recovery of physical
possession, the court had jurisdiction to try and hear
the case.
Dissatisfied with this ruling, petitioner filed before the
then Court of First Instance of Rizal, a petition for
certiorari with injunction against public respondent
Judge and private respondents, praying for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction ordering
respondent judge to suspend the hearing in the
ejectment case until after the resolution of said
petition
Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the
petition, maintaining that the administrative case did
not constitute a prejudicial question as it involved the
question of ownership, unlike the ejectment case
which involved merely the question of possession.
Meanwhile, the Land Authority filed an Urgent
Motion for Leave to Intervene in Civil Case No. C1576 alleging the pendency of an administrative
case between the same parties on the same subject
matter and praying that the petition for certiorari be
granted, the ejectment complaint be dismissed and
the Office of the Land Authority be allowed to decide
the matter exclusively.
ISSUE:
whether or not the administrative case between the
private parties involving the lot subject matter of the
ejectment case constitutes a prejudicial question
which would operate as a bar to said ejectment
case.
HELD:
A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that
which arises in a case the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case
and the cognizance of which pertains to another
tribunal.The doctrine of prejudicial question comes
into play generally in a situation where civil and
criminal actions are pending and the issues involved
in both cases are similar or so closely related that an
issue must be pre-emptively resolved in the civil
case before the criminal action can proceed. Thus,
the existence of a prejudicial question in a civil case
30

is alleged in the criminal case to cause the
suspension of the latter pending final determination
of the former.
The essential elements of a prejudicial question as
provided under Section 5, Rule 111 of the Revised
Rules of Court are: [a] the civil action involves an
issue similar or intimately related to the issue in the
criminal action; and [b] the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
The actions involved in the case at bar being
respectively civil and administrative in character, it is
obvious that technically, there is no prejudicial
question to speak of. Equally apparent, however, is
the intimate correlation between said two [2]
proceedings, stemming from the fact that the right of
private respondents to eject petitioner from the
disputed portion depends primarily on the resolution
of the pending administrative case. For while it may
be true that private respondents had prior
possession of the lot in question, at the time of the
institution of the ejectment case, such right of
possession had been terminated, or at the very
least, suspended by the cancellation by the Land
Authority of the Agreement to Sell executed in their
favor. Whether or not private respondents can
continue to exercise their right of possession is but a
necessary, logical consequence of the issue
involved in the pending administrative case assailing
the validity of the cancellation of the Agreement to
Sell and the subsequent award of the disputed
portion to petitioner. If the cancellation of the
Agreement to Sell and the subsequent award to
petitioner are voided, then private respondents
would have every right to eject petitioner from the
disputed area. Otherwise, private respondent's light
of possession is lost and so would their right to eject
petitioner from said portion.
Faced with these distinct possibilities, the more
prudent course for the trial court to have taken is to
hold the ejectment proceedings in abeyance until
after a determination of the administrative case.
Indeed, logic and pragmatism, if not jurisprudence,
dictate such move. To allow the parties to undergo
trial notwithstanding the possibility of petitioner's
right of possession being upheld in the pending
administrative case is to needlessly require not only
the parties but the court as well to expend time,
effort and money in what may turn out to be a sheer
exercise in futility. Thus, 1 Am Jur 2d tells us:
The court in which an action is pending may, in the
exercise of a sound discretion, upon proper
application for a stay of that action, hold the action in
abeyance to abide the outcome of another pending
in another court, especially where the parties and
the issues are the same, for there is power inherent

in every court to control the disposition of causes on
its dockets with economy of time and effort for itself,
for counsel, and for litigants. Where the rights parties
to the second action cannot be properly determined
until the questions raised in the first action are
settled the second action should be stayed.
While this rule is properly applicable to instances
involving two [2] court actions, the existence in the
instant case of the same considerations of Identity of
parties and issues, economy of time and effort for
the court, the counsels and the parties as well as the
need to resolve the parties' right of possession
before the ejectment case may be properly
determined, justifies the rule's analogous application
to the case at bar.
If a pending civil case may be considered to be in
the nature of a prejudicial question to an
administrative case, We see no reason why the
reverse may not be so considered in the proper
case, such as in the petition at bar.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED. Civil Case No. 2526 of the then
Municipal Court of Malabon, Rizal is hereby ordered
DISMISSED. No Costs.
SO ORDERED.
33) ISABELO APA, MANUEL APA and LEONILO
JACALAN vs. HON. RUMOLDO R. FERNANDEZ,
HON. CELSO V. ESPINOSA, and SPS.
FELIXBERTO TIGOL, JR. and ROSITA TAGHOY
TIGOL
G.R. No. 112381 March 20, 1995
FACTS:
the above-named accused [herein petitioners
Isabelo Apa, Manuel Apa and Dionisio Jacalan],
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with
one another, without the knowledge and consent of
the owner, ROSITA TIGOL, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take advantage of
the absence or tolerance of the said owner by
occupying or possessing a portion of her real
property, Lot No. 3635-B. whereon they constructed
their respective residential houses against the will of
Rosita Tigol, which acts of the said accused have
deprived the latter of the use of a portion of her land,
to her damage and prejudice because despite
repeated demands the said accused failed and
refused, as they still fail and refuse to vacate the
premises above-mentioned.
Petitioners moved for the suspension of their
arraignment on the ground that there was a
31

prejudicial question pending resolution in another
case being tried in Branch 27 of the same court. The
case, docketed as Civil Case No. 2247-L and
entitled "Anselmo Taghoy and Vicente Apa versus
Felixberto Tigol, Jr. and Rosita T. Tigol, et al.,"
concerns the ownership of Lot No. 3635-B. 1 In that
case, petitioners seek a declaration of the nullity of
TCT No. 13250 of Rosita T. Tigol and the partition of
the lot in question among them and private
respondent Rosita T. Tigol as heirs of Filomeno and
Rita Taghoy. The case had been filed in 1990 by
petitioners, three years before May 27, 1993 when
the criminal case for squatting was filed against
them.
the trial court denied the petitioners' motion and
proceeded with their arraignment. Petitioners,
therefore, had to enter their plea (not guilty) to the
charge.
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but their
motion was denied by the court in its order dated
September 21, 1993. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
whether the question of ownership of Lot No. 3635B, which was pending, in Civil Case No. 2247-L, is a
prejudicial question justifying suspension of the
proceedings in the criminal case against petitioners.
HELD:
We hold that it is.
A prejudicial question is a question which is based
on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that its resolution is
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused. To justify suspension of the criminal action,
it must appear not only that the civil case involves
facts intimately related to those upon which the
criminal prosecution is based but also that the
decision of the issue or issues raised in the civil case
would be decisive of the guilt or innocence of the
accused. 2 Rule 111, 5 provides:
Sec. 6. Elements of prejudicial question. The two
(2) essential elements of a prejudicial questions are:
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal
action; and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
In the criminal case, the question is whether
petitioners occupied a piece of land not belonging to
them but to private respondent and against the
latter's will. As already noted, the information alleges
that "without the knowledge and consent of the
owner, ROSITA TIGOL" petitioners occupied or took
possession of a portion of "her property" by building
their houses thereon and "deprived [her] of the use

of portion of her land to her damage and prejudice.
Now the ownership of the land in question, known as
Lot 3635-B of the Opon cadastre covered by TCT
No. 13250, is the issue in Civil Case 2247-L now
pending in Branch 27 of the RTC at Lapulapu City.
The resolution, therefore, of this question would
necessarily be determinative of petitioners criminal
liability for squatting.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and
respondent judge is ordered to SUSPEND the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 012489 until the
question of ownership in Civil Case No. 2247-L has
been resolved with finality and thereafter proceed
with the trial of the criminal case if the civil case is
decided
and
terminated
adversely against
petitioners. Otherwise he should dismiss the criminal
case.
SO ORDERED.
34) BELTRAN VS. PEOPLE
334 SCRA 106
FACTS:
Petitioner Maynardo Beltran and Charmaiene Felix
were married on June 16, 1973 at the Immaculate
Concepcion Parish Church in Cubao, Quezon City.
After 24 years of marriage and four children,
petitioner filed, in the RTC of Quezon City, Br. 87, a
petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code. In her Answer to said petition,
petitioners wife alleged that it was petitioner who
abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a
certain woman named Milagros Salting. She then
filed a criminal case for concubinage against
petitioner and his paramour before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Makati, Br. 61. Petitioner, in order to
forestall the issuance of a warrant for his arrest, filed
a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the
Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal
case. Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil
case for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a
prejudicial question to the determination of the
criminal case. Judge Alden Cervantes denied the
motion, so was with a Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner then went to the RTC of Makati, on
certiorari , questioning the Orders issued by Judge
Cervantes. The RTC denied the petition also a
Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
32

Does the declaration of nullity of marriage a
prejudicial question in a criminal case for
concubinage?
HELD:
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial
question is to avoid conflicting decisions. It has two
(2) essential elements: a) the civil action involves an
issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the criminal action; and b) the resolution of such
issue determines whether or not the criminal action
may proceed.
The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of
petitioners marriage is not a prejudicial question to
the concubinage case. For a civil case to be
considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to
cause the suspension of the latter pending the final
determination of the civil case, it must appear not
only that the said civil case involves the same facts
upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined.
In DOMINGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS ( 226 SCRA
572) , the SC ruled that the import of Article 40 of the
Family Code is that for purposes of remarriage, the
only legally acceptable bases for declaring a
previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void,
whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage,
other evidence is acceptable.
So, that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like
the herein petitioner need not present a final
judgment declaring his marriage void for he can
adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of
his marriage other than proof of a final judgment
declaring his marriage void for he can adduce
evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his
marriage other than proof of a final judgment
declaring his marriage void.
With regard to petitioners argument that he could be
acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his
marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state
that even a subsequent pronouncement that his
marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense.
Analogous to this case is that of LANDICHO VS.
RELOVA ( 22 SCRA 731), cited in DONATO VS.
LUNA (160 SCRA 441), where the SC held that: xxx
Assuming that the first marriage was null and void
on the ground alleged by petitioner, that fact would
not be material to the outcome of the criminal case.
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to
judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be
submitted to the judgment of the competent courts
and only when the nullity of the marriage is so

declared can it be held as void, and so long as there
is no such declaration the presumption is that the
marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a
second marriage before the judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy.
Thus, in the case at bar it must also be held that
parties to the marriage should not be permitted to
judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be
submitted to the judgment of the competent courts
and only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there
is no such declaration the presumption is that the
marriage exists for all intents and purposes.
Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his
wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
concubinage. The lower court therefore, has not
erred in affirming the Orders of the judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court ruling that pendency of a
civil action for nullity of marriage does not pose a
prejudicial question in a criminal case of
concubinage
35) SPOUSES ANTONIO S. PAHANG and LOLITA
T. PAHANG vs. HON. AUGUSTINE A. VESTIL,
Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court- Branch
56, Mandaue City, DEPUTY SHERIFF, Regional
Trial Court-Branch 56 and METROPOLITAN
BANK and TRUST COMPANY
G.R. No. 148595, July 12, 2004
FACTS:
the petitioners, Spouses Antonio and Lolita Pahang,
received a short-term loan of one million five
hundred thousand pesos (P1,500,000.00) from the
respondent Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company.
The loan was covered by Non-Negotiable
Promissory Note and was, likewise, secured by a
real estate mortgage on a parcel of land covered .
As the petitioners failed to pay the loan, the interest
and the penalties due thereon, the respondent
foreclosed the real estate mortgage extrajudicially.
As a consequence, the mortgaged property was sold
at public auction to the respondent bank as the
highest bidder. A certificate of sale was executed by
Ex-Officio Sheriff in favor of the respondent and was
registered with the Register of Deeds.
the respondent wrote the petitioners that the oneyear redemption period of the property would expire
on January 27, 1999. Instead of redeeming the
property, the petitioners filed, a complaint for
33

annulment of extrajudicial sale against the
respondent bank and the Sheriff.
After the expiration of the one-year redemption
period, the respondent consolidated its ownership
over the foreclosed property. Consequently, TCT No.
44668 was issued by the Register of Deeds in its
name. On July 23, 1999, the respondent filed a
Petition for Writ of Possession.
ISSUE:
whether or not the complaint of the petitioners in
Civil Case No. MAN-3454 for annulment of
extrajudicial sale is a prejudicial question to the
petition of the respondent bank for the issuance of a
writ of possession in LRC Case No.
HELD:
The contentions of the petitioners have no merit.
A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the
issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal. It generally comes into
play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal
action are both pending and there exists in the
former an issue that must be preemptively resolved
before the criminal action may proceed, because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is
resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of
the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal
case. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial
question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.
In the present case, the complaint of the petitioners
for Annulment of Extrajudicial Sale is a civil action
and the respondents petition for the issuance of a
writ of possession of Lot No. 3-A, Block 1, Psd-07021410, TCT No. 44668 is but an incident in the land
registration case and, therefore, no prejudicial
question can arise from the existence of the two
actions.
It bears stressing that the proceedings in a petition
and/or motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession, after the lapse of the statutory period for
redemption, is summary in nature.The trial court is
mandated to issue a writ of possession upon a
finding of the lapse of the statutory period for
redemption without the redemptioner having
redeemed the property. It cannot be validly argued
that the trial court abused its discretion when it
merely complied with its ministerial duty to issue the
said writ of possession.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is
DENIED DUE COURSE. The assailed decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
Cost against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
36) ABACAN vs. NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY,

INC
G.R. No. 140777. April 8, 2005
FACTS:
Two opposing factions within respondent
Northwestern University, Inc. (NUI), the Castro and
the Nicolas factions, seek control as the legitimate
board thereof. These two factions are parties to
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Case
No. 12-96-5469, which is an action filed by the
Nicolas faction to nullify the election of the directors
of NUI belonging to the Castro faction and SEC
Case No. 12-96-5511 which is a counter-suit initiated
by the Castro faction seeking the nullification of
several board resolutions passed by the Nicolas
faction.
On December 19, 1996, SEC Hearing
Officer Rolando G. Andaya, Jr., issued an Order
authorizing the Castro faction and the Metropolitan
Bank Laoag City branch to withdraw the amount of
P2.5M from the account of NUI with said bank.
Metrobank thru Petitioner Abacan, complied and
released P1.4 M in favor of the Castro faction. The
Nicolas faction then initiated a criminal complaint
for estafa against the Castro faction as well as the
petitioners herein who are officers of Metrobank,
however the criminal case was later dismissed
insofar as petitioners are concerned.
Nicolas faction filed a suit for damages
against Castro faction and petitioner on the ground
that the corporate funds of NUI deposited with said
bank in the sum of P1.4 M was withdrawn without
the knowledge, consent or approval of NUI to the
grave and serious damage and prejudice of the
latter.
Marieta Y. Palanca filed a motion to dismiss
alleging that SEC Case No. 12-96-5469 must take
precedence over the civil case since it is a logical
antecedent to the issue of standing in said case.
Petitioners then prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint in Civil Case No. 11296-14 against them,
or in the alternative, to hold in abeyance the
proceedings therein until after the final determination
of SEC Case No. 12-96-5469. However, NUI avers
that the rule on prejudicial question finds no
application between the civil complaint below and
the case before the SEC as the rule presupposes
the pendency of a civil action and a criminal action;
and even assuming arguendo that the issues
pending before the SEC bear a similarity to the
cause of action below, the complaint of NUI can
stand and proceed separately from the SEC case
34

inasmuch as there is no identity in the reliefs prayed
for.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is prejudicial question
in this case.
RULING:
Yes. Considering the rationale behind the
principle of prejudicial question, being to avoid two
conflicting decisions, prudence dictates that we
apply the principle underlying the doctrine to the
case at bar.
A prejudicial question is that which arises in
a case, the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.
The prejudicial question must be determinative of
the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try
and resolve it must be lodged in another court or
tribunal.
In the case at bar, the question of which
between the Castro and the Nicolas factions are the
de jure board of directors of NUI is lodged before the
SEC. The complaint before the RTC of Laoag
meanwhile alleges that petitioners, together with
their co-defendants, comprised of the Castro
faction, wrongfully withdrew the amount of P1.4 M
from the account of NUI with Metrobank. Moreover,
whether or not Roy Nicolas of the Nicolas faction is
a duly elected member of the Board of NUI and thus
with capacity to institute the herein complaint in
behalf of the NUI depends on the findings of the
SEC in the case pending before it. It would finally
determine whether Castro, et al. legally withdrew the
subject amount from the bank and whether Nicolas
lawfully initiated the complaint in behalf of herein
respondent NUI. It is petitioners claim, and we
agree, that the presence or absence of their liability
for allowing the withdrawal of P1.4 M from the
account of NUI with Metrobank in favor of the
Castro faction is reliant on the findings of the SEC
as to which of the two factions is the de jure board.
Since the determination of the SEC as to which of
the two factions is the de jure board of NUI is crucial
to the resolution of the case before the RTC. Hence,
the trial court should suspend its proceedings until
the SEC comes out with its findings.
35

IV. CIVIL PERSONALITY
37) Antonio Gelus v. Court of Appeals
No. L-16439. July 20, 1961
Doctrine: Since an action for pecuniary damages on
account of personal injury or death pertains primarily
to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action
for such damages could be instituted on behalf of
the unborn child on account of the injuries it
received, no such right of action could deliberately
accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause
of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child,
the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death,
since no transmission to anyone can take place from
one that lacked of juridical personality under Article
40 of the Civil Code, which expressly limits such
provisional personality by imposing the condition that
the child should be subsequently alive.
Reyes, JBL, J.
FACTS: Nita Villanueva came to know the petitioner,
a physician, for the first time in 1948 through her
aunt Paula Yambot. The said physician made three
abortions on Villanueva on the following
circumstances: (1) In 1950, when she became
pregnant by her present husband, Oscar Lazo,
before they were legally married, and she deisred to
conceal her pregnancy from her parents; (2) after
their marriage, her second pregnancy proved to be
inconvenient as she was then working for the
COMELEC; and lastly (3) on February 21, 1955
she was aborted of a 2-month old fetus for the
amount of P50.00.
Upon knowing of the last abortion, Lazo filed
a complaint for damages against Geluz, claiming
that he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the
abortion.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Lazo
and against Geluz, ordering the latter to pay
P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 attorney's fees and
the costs of the suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
sustained the award.
ISSUE: W/N the award of damages was proper.
HELD: NO. the Court of Appeals and the trial court
predicated the award of damages in the sum of
P3,000.06 upon the provisions of the initial
paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. This the Court believes to be error, for
the said article, in fixing a minimum award of
P3,000.00 for the death of a person, does not cover
the case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed

with personality; being incapable of having rights
and obligations.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on
account of personal injury or death pertains primarily
to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action
for such damages could be instituted on behalf of
the unborn child on account of the injuries it
received, no such right of action could deliberately
accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause
of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child,
the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death,
since no transmission to anyone can take place from
one that lacked of juridical personality under Article
40 of the Civil Code, which expressly limits such
provisional personality by imposing the condition that
the child should be subsequently alive.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
have not found any basis for an award of moral
damages, evidently because of Lazos indifference
to the previous abortions of his wife, also caused by
the petitioner herein, clearly indicates that he was
unconcerned with the frustration of his parental
hopes and affections. The lower court expressly
found, and the majority opinion of the Court of
Appeals did not contradict it, that the appellee Lazo
was aware of the second abortion; and the
probabilities are that he was likewise aware of the
first. Yet despite the suspicious repetition of the
event, he appeared to have taken no steps to
investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof, and
secure the punishment of the responsible
practitioner. Even after learning of the third abortion,
the appellee does not seem to have taken interest in
the administrative and criminal cases against the
appellant. His only concern appears to have been
directed at obtaining from the doctor a large money
payment, since he sued for P50,000.00 damages
and P3,000.00 attorney's fees, an "indemnity" claim
that, under the circumstances of record, was clearly
exaggerated.
It is unquestionable that the appellant's act
in provoking the abortion of appellee's wife, without
medical necessity to warrant it, was a criminal and
morally reprehensible act, that can not be too
severely condemned; and the consent of the woman
or that of her husband does not excuse it. But the
immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an
award of damage that, under the circumstances on
record, have no factual or legal basis.
36

V. CITIZENSHIP
38) Mercado vs. Manzano
G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999
Doctrine:
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance.
The former arises when, as a result of the
concurrent application of the different laws of two or
more states, a person is simultaneously considered
a national by the said states. Dual allegiance, on the
other hand, refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to
two or more states. While dual citizenship is
involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an
individuals volition.
FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private
respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates
for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11,
1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel V. Daza
III.
The proclamation of private respondent was
suspended in view of a pending petition for
disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril
who alleged that private respondent was not a
citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and
ordered the cancellation of the certificate of
candidacy of private respondent on the ground that
he is a dual citizen and, under 40(d) of the Local
Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are
disqualified from running for any elective position.
The respondent admitted that he is registered as a
foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien
Certificate of Registration No. B-31632 and alleged
that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in
1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He
was born in the United States, San Francisco,
California, on September 14, 1955, and is
considered an American citizen under US Laws. But
notwithstanding his registration as an American
citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.
It would appear that respondent Manzano is both a
Filipino and a US citizen. In other words, he holds
dual citizenship.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Private Respondent Manzano is
disqualified from the position for which he filed his
certificate of candidacy.
HELD: NO.
He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by
operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, as his

father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his
birth. At the age of six (6), his parents brought him
to the Philippines using an American passport as
travel document. His parents also registered him as
an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration.
He was issued an alien certificate of registration.
This, however, did not result in the loss of his
Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce
Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of
allegiance to the United States.
It is an undisputed fact that when respondent
attained the age of majority, he registered himself as
a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and
1998, which effectively renounced his US citizenship
under American law. Under Philippine law, he no
longer had U.S. citizenship.
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance.
The former arises when, as a result of the
concurrent application of the different laws of two or
more states, a person is simultaneously considered
a national by the said states. Dual allegiance, on the
other hand, refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to
two or more states. While dual citizenship is
involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an
individuals volition.
The phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160,
40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, 20 must be
understood as referring to dual allegiance.
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do
not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with
dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to
strict process with respect to the termination of their
status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should
suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to
terminate their status as persons with dual
citizenship considering that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of
different states.
The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to
renounce his American citizenship, effectively
removing any disqualification he might have as a
dual citizen.
By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is
a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident
or immigrant of another country; that he will defend
and support the Constitution of the Philippines and
bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he
does so without mental reservation, private
respondent has, as far as the laws of this country
are concerned, effectively repudiated his American
citizenship and anything which he may have said
before as a dual citizen.Petition dismissed
37

39) Republic v. Chule Lim
G.R. NO. 153883, January 13, 2004
Facts:
Chule Lim claimes that she was born on October 29,
1954 in Buru-an, Iligan City. Her birth was registered
in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte but the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Kauswagan transferred her record
of birth to Iligan City. She alleged that both her
Kauswagan and Iligan City records of birth have four
erroneous entries, and prays that they be corrected.
During the hearing, respondent testified thus:
First, she claims that her surname "Yu" was
misspelled as "Yo". She has been using "Yu" in all
her school records and in her marriage certificate. 2
She presented a clearance from the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI)3 to further show the
consistency in her use of the surname "Yu".
Second, she claims that her fathers name in her
birth record was written as "Yo Diu To (Co Tian)"
when it should have been "Yu Dio To (Co Tian)."
Third, her nationality was entered as Chinese when
it should have been Filipino considering that her
father and mother never got married. Only her
deceased father was Chinese, while her mother is
Filipina. She claims that her being a registered voter
attests to the fact that she is a Filipino citizen.
Finally, it was erroneously indicated in her birth
certificate that she was a legitimate child when she
should have been described as illegitimate
considering that her parents were never married.
Placida Anto, respondents mother, testified that she
is a Filipino citizen as her parents were both Filipinos
from Camiguin. She added that she and her
daughters father were never married because the
latter had a prior subsisting marriage contracted in
China.
In this connection, respondent presented a
certification attested by officials of the local civil
registries of Iligan City and Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte that there is no record of marriage between
Placida Anto and Yu Dio To from 1948 to the
present.
The Republic, through the City Prosecutor of Iligan
City, did not present any evidence although it
actively participated in the proceedings by attending
hearings and cross-examining respondent and her
witnesses.
On February 22, 2000, the trial court granted
respondents petition and rendered judgment.
Issue: whether or not lims citizenship should be
changed from Chinese to Filipino?
Held: YES. To digress, it is just as well that the

Republic did not cite as error respondents recourse
to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court to effect what
indisputably are substantial corrections and changes
in entries in the civil register. To clarify, Rule 108 of
the Revised Rules of Court provides the procedure
for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry. The proceedings under said rule may either
be summary or adversary in nature. If the correction
sought to be made in the civil register is clerical,
then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the
rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or
nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and
the procedure to be adopted is adversary. This is our
ruling in Republic v. Valencia7 where we held that
even substantial errors in a civil registry may be
corrected and the true facts established under Rule
108 provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail
themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding.
An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one
where the trial court has conducted proceedings
where all relevant facts have been fully and properly
developed, where opposing counsel have been
given opportunity to demolish the opposite partys
case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly
weighed and considered.8
As likewise observed by the Court of Appeals, we
take it that the Republics failure to cite this error
amounts to a recognition that this case properly falls
under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court
considering that the proceeding can be appropriately
classified as adversarial.
Instead, in its first assignment of error, the Republic
avers that respondent did not comply with the
constitutional requirement of electing Filipino
citizenship when she reached the age of majority. It
cites Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution,
which provides that the citizenship of a legitimate
child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father
followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon
reaching the age of majority, the child elected
Philippine citizenship.9 Likewise, the Republic
invokes the provision in Section 1 of Commonwealth
Act No. 625, that legitimate children born of Filipino
mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by
expressing such intention "in a statement to be
signed and sworn to by the party concerned before
any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall
be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party
shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the
oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the
Government of the Philippines."10
Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory
requirements of electing Filipino citizenship apply
only to legitimate children. These do not apply in the
38

case of respondent who was concededly an
illegitimate child, considering that her Chinese father
and Filipino mother were never married. As such,
she was not required to comply with said
constitutional and statutory requirements to become
a Filipino citizen. By being an illegitimate child of a
Filipino mother, respondent automatically became a
Filipino upon birth. Stated differently, she is a Filipino
since birth without having to elect Filipino citizenship
when she reached the age of majority.
In Ching, Re: Application for Admission to the Bar,11
citing In re Florencio Mallare,12 we held:
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a
Filipina, is therefore himself a Filipino, and no other
act would be necessary to confer on him all the
rights and privileges attached to Philippine
citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332;
Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine Islands,
42 Phil. 543; Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May 12,
1952; Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16,
1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954).
Neither could any act be taken on the erroneous
belief that he is a non-Filipino divest him of the
citizenship privileges to which he is rightfully
entitled.13
This notwithstanding, the records show that
respondent elected Filipino citizenship when she
reached the age of majority. She registered as a
voter in Misamis Oriental when she was 18 years
old.14 The exercise of the right of suffrage and the
participation in election exercises constitute a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.15
In its second assignment of error, the Republic
assails the Court of Appeals decision in allowing
respondent to use her fathers surname despite its
finding that she is illegitimate.
The Republics submission is misleading. The Court
of Appeals did not allow respondent to use her
fathers surname. What it did allow was the
correction of her fathers misspelled surname which
she has been using ever since she can remember.
In this regard, respondent does not need a court
pronouncement for her to use her fathers surname.
Court of Appeals is was correct when it held:
Firstly, Petitioner-appellee is now 47 years old. To
bar her at this time from using her fathers surname
which she has used for four decades without any
known objection from anybody, would only sow
confusion. Concededly, one of the reasons allowed
for changing ones name or surname is to avoid
confusion.
Secondly, under Sec. 1 of Commonwealth Act No.
142, the law regulating the use of aliases, a person
is allowed to use a name "by which he has been
known since childhood."
While judicial authority is required for a change of

name or surname,18 there is no such requirement for
the continued use of a surname which a person has
already been using since childhood.19
The doctrine that disallows such change of name as
would give the false impression of family relationship
remains valid but only to the extent that the
proposed change of name would in great probability
cause prejudice or future mischief to the family
whose surname it is that is involved or to the
community in general.20 In this case, the Republic
has not shown that the Yu family in China would
probably be prejudiced or be the object of future
mischief. In respondents case, the change in the
surname that she has been using for 40 years would
even avoid confusion to her community in general.
39

VI. MARRIAGE
40) Balogbog vs. CA
G.R. No. 83598 March 7, 1997
FACTS:
Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the
children of Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arnibal
who died intestate in 1951 and 1961, respectively.
They had an older brother, Gavino, but he died in
1935, predeceasing their parents. In 1968, private
respondents Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog
brought an action for partition and accounting
against petitioners, claiming that they were the
legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and
that, as such, they were entitled to the one-third
share of Gavino in the estate of their grandparents.
In their answer, petitioners denied knowing private
respondents. They alleged that their brother Gavino
died single and without issue in their parents
residence at Asturias, Cebu.
the alleged marriage.

Nonetheless, evidence
consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held
competent to prove the marriage. Indeed, although
a marriage contract is considered primary evidence
of marriage, the failure to present it is not proof that
no marriage took place. Other evidence may be
presented to prove marriage.
Here, private
respondents proved, through testimonial evidence,
that Gavino and Catalina were married in 1929; that
they had three children, one of whom died in infancy;
that their marriage subsisted until 1935 when Gavino
died; and that their children, private respondents,
were recognized by Gavinos family and by the
public as the legitimate children of Gavino.
To support their claim, the petitioners obtained a

certificate from the Local Civil Registrar of Asturias
to the effect that that office did not have a record of
the names of Gavino and Catalina. The certificate
was prepared by Assistant Municipal Treasurer Juan
Maranga, who testified that there was no record of
the marriage of Gavino and Catalina in the Book of
Marriages.
On the other hand, the private
respondents presented several pieces of testimonial
evidence to bolster their claim.
Neither is there merit in the argument of the

petitioners that the existence of the marriage cannot
be presumed because there was no evidence
showing in particular that Gavino and Catalina, in the
presence of two witnesses, declared that they were
taking each other as husband and wife. An
exchange of vows can be presumed to have been
made from the testimonies of the witnesses who
state that a wedding took place, since the very
purpose for having a wedding is to exchange vows
of marital commitment. It would indeed be unusual
to have a wedding without an exchange of vows and
quite unnatural for people not to notice its absence.
The law favors the validity of marriage, because the
State is interested in the preservation of the family
and the sanctity of the family is a matter of
constitutional concern.
ISSUE:
Whose claim, as supported by their respective
pieces of evidence, will prevail?
41) VDA. De Jacob V. CA

312 SCRA 772
HELD:
The claim of the private respondents will prevail.
Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a
man and a woman conducting themselves as
husband and wife are legally married.
This
presumption may be rebutted only by cogent proof to
the contrary. In this case, petitioners claim that the
pieces of evidence presented by private respondents
was belied by the production of the Book of
Marriages by the assistant municipal treasurer of
Asturias. Petitioners argue that this book does not
contain any entry pertaining to the alleged marriage
of private respondents parents. This contention has
no merit. In Pugeda v. Trias, the defendants, who
questioned the marriage of the plaintiffs, produced a
photostatic copy of the record of marriages of the
Municipality of Rosario, Cavite for the month of
January, 1916, to show that there was no record of
FACTS:
Plaintiff-appellant [petitioner herein] claimed to be
the surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo E.
Jacob and was appointed Special Administratix for
the various estates of the deceased by virtue of a
reconstructed Marriage Contract between herself
and the deceased.
Defendant-appellee on the other hand, claimed to be
the legally-adopted son of Alfredo. In support of his
claim, he presented an Order dated 18 July 1961
issued by then Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI,
Camarines Sur, granting the petition for adoption
filed by deceased Alfredo in favor of Pedro Pilapil.
During the proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased Alfredo in Case No. T-46
(entitled "Tomasa vda. de Jacob v. Jose Centenera,
et al) herein defendant-appellee Pedro sought to
intervene therein claiming his share of the
40

deceaseds estate as Alfredo's adopted son and as
his sole surviving heir. Pedro questioned the validity
of the marriage between appellant Tomasa and his
adoptive father Alfredo.
Appellant Tomasa opposed the Motion for
Intervention and filed a complaint for injunction with
damages (Civil Case No. T-83) questioning
appellee's claim as the legal heir of Alfredo.
appellant claims that the marriage between her and
Alfredo was solemnized by one Msgr. Florencio C.
Yllana, CBCP, Intramuros, Manila sometime in 1975.
She could not however present the original copy of
the Marriage Contract stating that the original
document was lost when Msgr. Yllana allegedly gave
it to Mr. Jose Centenera for registration. In lieu of the
original, Tomasa presented as secondary evidence a
reconstructed Marriage Contract issued in 1978. No
copy of the Marriage Contract was sent to the local
civil registrar by the solemnizing officer thus giving
the implication that there was no copy of the
marriage contract sent to, nor a record existing in the
civil registry of Manila;
In signing the Marriage Contract, the late Alfredo
Jacob merely placed his "thumbmark" on said
contract purportedly on 16 September 1975 (date of
the marriage). However, on a Sworn Affidavit
executed between appellant Tomasa and Alfredo a
day before the alleged date of marriage or on 15
September 1975 attesting that both of them lived
together as husband and wife for five (5) years,
Alfredo [af]fixed his customary signature. Thus the
trial court concluded that the "thumbmark" was
logically "not genuine". In other words, not of Alfredo
Jacobs;
Issue: Whether the marriage between the plaintiffappellant and deceased Alfredo Jacob was valid?
Held:
Doctrinally, a void marriage may be subjected to
collateral attack, while a voidable one may be
assailed only in a direct proceeding. 8 Aware of this
fundamental
distinction,
Respondent
Pilapil
contends that the marriage between Dr. Alfredo
Jacob and petitioner was void ab initio, because
there was neither a marriage license nor a marriage
ceremony.9 We cannot sustain this contention.
To start with, Respondent Pedro Pilapil argues that
the marriage was void because the parties had no
marriage license. This argument is misplaced,
because it has been established that Dr. Jacob and
petitioner lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years.10 An affidavit to this effect was
executed by Dr. Jacob and petitioner.11 Clearly then,
the marriage was exceptional in character and did
not require a marriage license under Article 76 of the

Civil Code.12 The Civil Code governs this case,
because the questioned marriage and the assailed
adoption took place prior the effectivity of the Family
Code.
"It is settled that if the original writing has been lost
or destroyed or cannot be produced in court, upon
proof of its execution and loss or destruction, or
unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy
or a recital of its contents in some authentic
document, or by recollection of witnesses." 13 Upon a
showing that the document was duly executed and
subsequently lost, without any bad faith on the part
of the offeror, secondary evidence may be adduced
to prove its contents.14
The trial court and the Court of Appeals committed
reversible error when they (1) excluded the
testimonies of petitioner, Adela Pilapil and Msgr.
Florencio Yllana and (2) disregarded the following:
(a) photographs of the wedding ceremony; (b)
documentary evidence, such as the letter of
Monsignor Yllana stating that he had solemnized the
marriage between Dr. Jacob and petitioner, informed
the Archbishop of Manila that the wedding had not
been recorded in the Book of Marriages, and at the
same time requested the list of parties to the
marriage; (c) the subsequent authorization issued by
the Archbishop through his vicar general and
chancellor, Msgr. Benjamin L. Marino ordaining
that the union between Dr. Jacob and petitioner be
reflected through a corresponding entry in the Book
of Marriages; and (d) the Affidavit of Monsignor
Yllana stating the circumstances of the loss of the
marriage certificate.
It should be stressed that the due execution and the
loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the
conditio sine qua non for the introduction of
secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by
the very evidence they have disregarded. They have
thus confused the evidence to show due execution
and loss as "secondary" evidence of the marriage. In
Hernaez v. Mcgrath,15 the Court clarified this
misconception thus:
. . . [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in
holding that parol evidence of the execution of the
instrument was barred. The court confounded the
execution and the contents of the document. It is the
contents, . . . which may not be prove[n] by
secondary evidence when the instrument itself is
accessible. Proofs of the execution are not
dependent on the existence or non-existence of the
document, and, as a matter of fact, such proofs
precede proofs of the contents: due execution,
besides the loss, has to be shown as foundation for
the introduction of secondary evidence of the
41

contents.
The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried
to justify its stand on this issue by relying on Lim
Tanhu v. Ramolete.16 But even there, we said that
"marriage may be prove[n] by other competent
evidence."17
Truly, the execution of a document may be proven
by the parties themselves, by the swearing officer,
by witnesses who saw and recognized the
signatures of the parties; or even by those to whom
the parties have previously narrated the execution
thereof.18 The Court has also held that "[t]he loss
may be shown by any person who [knows] the fact
of its loss, or by any one who ha[s] made, in the
judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the
place or places where the document or papers of
similar character are usually kept by the person in
whose custody the document lost was, and has
been unable to find it; or who has made any other
investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court
that the instrument [has] indeed [been] lost." 19
In the present case, due execution was established
by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was present
during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner
herself as a party to the event. The subsequent loss
was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the
officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana, as well as by
petitioner's own declaration in court. These are
relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since
the due execution and the loss of the marriage
contract were clearly shown by the evidence
presented, secondary evidence testimonial and
documentary may be admitted to prove the fact of
marriage.
The trial court pointed out that on the face of the
reconstructed marriage contract were certain
irregularities suggesting that it had fraudulently been
obtained.20 Even if we were to agree with the trial
court and to disregard the reconstructed marriage
contract, we must emphasize that this certificate is
not the only proof of the union between Dr. Jacob
and petitioner.
Respondent Pedro Pilapil misplaces emphasis on
the absence of an entry pertaining to 1975 in the
Books of Marriage of the Local Civil Registrar of
Manila and in the National Census and Statistics
Office (NCSO).26 He finds it quite "bizarre" for
petitioner to have waited three years before
registering their marriage.27 On both counts, he
proceeds from the wrong premise. In the first place,
failure to send a copy of a marriage certificate for
record purposes does not invalidate the marriage. 28
In the second place, it was not the petitioners duty
to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the civil
registrar. Instead, this charge fell upon the
solemnizing officer.29
The basis of human society throughout the civilized
world is . . . of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction
is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an
institution in the maintenance of which the public is
deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment
of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony.
Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony
are presumed, in the absence of any
counterpresumption or evidence special to the case,
to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the
common order of society, and if the parties were not
what they thus hold themselves out as being, they
would be living in the constant violation of decency
and of law. A presumption established by our Code
of Civil Procedure is "that a man and woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage." Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio Always presume
marriage.
This jurisprudential attitude31 towards marriage is
based on the prima facie presumption that a man
and a woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage.32 Given the undisputed, even accepted, 33
fact that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together as
husband and wife,34 we find that the presumption of
marriage was not rebutted in this case.
42) Republic Of The Philippines v. CA
G.R. No. 92326 January 24, 1992
Facts:
On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed
a petition to adopt Jason Condat, then six (6) years
old and who had been living with her family since he
was four (4) months old, before the Regional Trial
Court of Legaspi City.
The petition for adoption was filed by private
respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles on February 2, 1988,
when the law applicable was Presidential Decree
No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code. Under
said code, a petition for adoption may be filed by
either of the spouses or by both of them. However,
after the trial court rendered its decision and while
the case was pending on appeal in the Court of
Appeals, Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code,
took effect on August 3, 1988. Under the said new
law, joint adoption by husband and wife is
mandatory.
Petitioner contends that the petition for adoption
should be dismissed outright for it was filed solely by
private respondent without joining her husband, in
violation of Article 185 of the Family Code which
42

requires joint adoption by the spouses. It argues that
the Family Code must be applied retroactively to the
petition filed by Mrs. Bobiles, as the latter did not
acquire a vested right to adopt Jason Condat by the
mere filing of her petition for adoption.
Issues:
1.)
Can the Family Code be applied
retroactively to the petition for adoption filed by
Zenaida C. Bobiles and;
2.)
Granting that the FC should be applied
retroactively should the adoption in favor of private
respondent only, her husband not being a petitioner.
Held:
1.)Article 246 of the Family Code provides for
retroactive effect of appropriate relevant provisions
thereof, subject to the qualification that such
retrospective application will not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws.
A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and
extent does not depend upon events foreign to the
will of the holder. The term expresses the concept of
present fixed interest which in right reason and
natural justice should be protected against arbitrary
State action, or an innately just and imperative right
which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent
and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny.
Vested rights include not only legal or equitable title
to the enforcement of a demand, but also an
exemption from new obligations created after the
right has vested.
Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, private
respondent had the right to file a petition for adoption
by herself, without joining her husband therein.
When Mrs. Bobiles filed her petition, she was
exercising her explicit and unconditional right under
said law. Upon her filing thereof, her right to file such
petition alone and to have the same proceed to final
adjudication, in accordance with the law in force at
the time, was already vested and cannot be
prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new
law.
When private respondent filed her petition in Special
Proceeding No. 1386, the trial court acquired
jurisdiction thereover in accordance with the
governing law. Jurisdiction being a matter of
substantive law, the established rule is that the
jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute
in force at the time of the commencement of the
action. We do not find in the present case such facts
as would constitute it as an exception to the rule.
2.)Petitioner argues that, even assuming that the

Family Code should not apply retroactively, the
Court of Appeals should have modified the trial
court's decision by granting the adoption in favor of
private respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles only, her
husband not being a petitioner. We do not consider
this as a tenable position and, accordingly, reject the
same.
Although Dioscoro Bobiles was not named as one of
the petitioners in the petition for adoption filed by his
wife, his affidavit of consent, attached to the petition
as Annex "B" and expressly made an integral part
thereof, shows that he himself actually joined his
wife in adopting the child. The pertinent parts of his
written consent and the foregoing declarations, and
his subsequent confirmatory testimony in open court,
are sufficient to make him a co-petitioner. Under the
circumstances then obtaining, and by reason of his
foreign residence, he must have yielded to the legal
advice that an affidavit of consent on his part
sufficed to make him a party to the petition. This is
evident from the text of his affidavit. Punctiliousness
in language and pedantry in the formal requirements
should yield to and be eschewed in the higher
considerations of substantial justice. The future of an
innocent child must not be compromised by arbitrary
insistence of rigid adherence to procedural rules on
the form of pleadings.
43) SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 174689, October 22 2009
FACTS
Petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a
petition for the change of his first name and sex in
his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila. The petition impleaded the civil registrar of
Manila as respondent. Petitioner alleged in his
petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the
spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino
Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as
"Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of
live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as
"male." He further alleged that he is a male
transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels,
thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always
identified himself with girls since childhood. Feeling
trapped in a mans body, he consulted several
doctors in the United States. He underwent
psychological examination, hormone treatment and
breast augmentation. His attempts to transform
himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27,
2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery
in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined
43

by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and
reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who
issued a medical certificate attesting that he
(petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was
in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to
have his name in his birth certificate changed from
"Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male"
to "female." On the scheduled initial hearing,
jurisdictional requirements were established. No
opposition to the petition was made. During trial,
petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr.
Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American fianc, Richard P.
Edel, as witnesses. On June 4, 2003, the trial court
rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. Its relevant
portions read: Petitioner filed the present petition not
to evade any law or judgment or any infraction
thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the
purpose of making his birth records compatible with
his present sex. Firstly, the court is of the opinion
that granting the petition would be more in
consonance with the principles of justice and equity.
With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has
always felt, thought and acted like a woman, now
possesses the physique of a female. Petitioners
misfortune to be trapped in a mans body is not his
own doing and should not be in any way taken
against him. Likewise, the court believes that no
harm, injury or prejudice will be caused to anybody
or the community in granting the petition. On the
contrary, granting the petition would bring the muchawaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and
her [fianc] and the realization of their dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any
cause or ground to deny the present petition despite
due notice and publication thereof. Even the State,
through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any
opposition.
ISSUE
Whether or not sex reassignment is a ground for
change of entry in the birth certificate?
HELD
No, there is no law legally recognizing sex
reassignment and its effect. The sex of a person is
determined at birth, visually done by the birth
attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining
the genitals of the infant Civil Register Law (Act
3753). If the determination of a persons sex made at
the time of his or her birth is not attendant by error,
the same is immutable and may not be changed by
reason of a sex reassignment surgery.
44) SY vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 127263. April 12, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent contracted marriage on
November 15, 1973. both were then 22 years old.
Their union was blessed with two children.
Respondent left their conjugal dwelling, since the
they lived separately.
Petitioner filed a petition for legal separation.
Judgment was rendered dissolving their conjugal
partnership of gains and approving a regime of
separation of properties based on the Memorandum
of Agreement executed by the spouse. The trial
court granted custody of the children to Filipina.
Petitioner filed a criminal action for attempted
parricide against her husband, which RTC convicted
him for lesser offense of slight physical injuries.
Petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of
absolute nullity of her marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. RTC denied. CA affirmed.
The petitioner for the first time on appeal, the issue
with regard to the absence of marriage license.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is valid?
HELD: No. The marriage is not valid on the ground
that there is no marriage license.
Although, the petitioner raises the issue for the first
time on appeal the issue on lack of marriage license.
The petitioner states that though she did not
categorically state her petition for annulment of
marriage before the trial court that the inconguinoty
in the dates of the marriage license and the
celebration of the marriage itself would lead to the
conclusion that her marriage to respondent was void
from the beginning, she pointed out that these
critical dates were contained in the documents she
submitted before the Court.
The marriage license was issued one year after the
ceremony took place. Hence the marriage was
celebrated without the marriage license.
Petition granted.
45) SEVILLA vs. CARDENAS
G.R. No. 167684. July 31, 2006.
FACTS:
Herein petitioner, Jaime Sevilla and respondent
Carmelita Cardenas were allegedly married without
a valid marriage license. The former contended that
44

his marriage with the latter was contracted through
machinations, duress and intimidation employed
upon him by Carmelita N. Cardenas and the latter's
father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines. That they never applied or
obtained a marriage license for their supposed
marriage, thus no marriage license was presented to
the solemnizing officer. In support for his contention,
petitioner further argued that although marriage
license no. 2770792 allegedly issued in San Juan,
Rizal on May 19, 1969 was indicated in the marriage
contract, the same was fictitious for he never applied
for any marriage license, Upon verifications made by
him through his lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Abola, with the
Civil Registry of San Juan, a Certification was issued
by Rafael D. Aliscad, Jr., Local Civil Registrar of San
Juan, that "no marriage license no. 2770792 was
ever issued by said office."
claim that all efforts to locate the logbook or prove

the material contents therein, had been exerted.
However, Perlita Mercader, Registration Officer III of

the Local Registry of San Juan, identified the
Certificates issued by Rafael Aliscad, Jr., the Local
Civil Registrar, and testified that their office failed to
locate the book wherein marriage license no.
2770792 may have been registered.
FACTS:
On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar P. Mallion
filed a petition with the RTC, Branch 29, of San
Pablo City seeking a declaration of nullity of his
marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara under
Article 36 of the Family Code, citing respondent's
alleged psychological incapacity. After trial on the
merits, the RTC denied the petition in a decision
dated November 11, 1997 upon the finding that
petitioner "failed to adduce preponderant evidence
to warrant the grant of the relief he is seeking." The
appeal filed with the Court of Appeals was likewise
dismissed for failure of petitioner to pay the docket
and other lawful fees within the reglementary period.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage is void for lack of a valid
marriage license?
HELD: No. It has been held by the Court that the
certificates issued by the Local Civil Registrar were
not sufficient as to invalidate the marriage license
no. 2770792 which had been secured by the parties.
It could be easily implied from the said statement
that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar could not
exert its best efforts to locate and determine the
existence of Marriage License No. 2770792 due to
its "loaded work and that they failed to locate the
book in which the marriage license was entered.
Likewise, both certifications failed to state with
absolute certainty whether or not such license was
issued.
This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the
representative from the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Ms. Perlita Mercader, who
stated that they cannot locate the logbook due to the
fact that the person in charge of the said logbook
had already retired. Further, the testimony of the
said person was not presented in evidence. It does
not appear on record that the former custodian of the
logbook was deceased or missing, or that his
testimony could not be secured. This belies the
It is required that the custodian of the document is

authorize to certify that despite diligent search, a
particular document does not exist in his office or
that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to
be found in a register. As custodians of public
documents, civil registrars are public officers
charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a
register book where they are required to enter all
applications for marriage licenses, including the
names of the applicants, the date the marriage
license was issued and such other relevant data.
46) MALLION vs. EDITHA ALCANTARA
G.R. No. 141528. October 31, 2006
After the decision in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95

attained finality, petitioner filed on July 12, 1999
another petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
with the RTC of San Pablo City, this time alleging
that his marriage with respondent was null and void
due to the fact that it was celebrated without a valid
marriage license. For her part, respondent filed an
answer with a motion to dismiss, praying for the
dismissal of the petition on the ground of res judicata
and forum shopping.
In an order dated October 8, 1999, the RTC granted
respondent's motion to dismiss. Petitioner's motion
for reconsideration was also denied.
Petitioner argues that while the relief prayed for in
the two cases was the same, that is, the declaration
of nullity of his marriage to respondent, the cause of
action in the earlier case was distinct and separate
from the cause of action in the present case
because the operative facts upon which they were
45

based as well as the evidence required to sustain
either were different. Because there is no identity as
to the cause of action, petitioner claims that res
judicata does not lie to bar the second petition. In
this connection, petitioner maintains that there was
no violation of the rule on forum shopping or of the
rule which proscribes the splitting of a cause of
action.
On the other hand, respondent, in her comment
counters that while the present suit is anchored on a
different ground, it still involves
the same issue raised in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95,
that is, the validity of petitioner and respondent's
marriage, and prays for the same remedy, that is,
the declaration of nullity of their marriage.
Respondent thus contends that petitioner violated
the rule on forum shopping. Moreover, respondent
asserts that petitioner violated the rule on multiplicity
of suits as the ground he cites in this petition could
have been raised during the trial in Civil Case No.
SP 4341-95.
ISSUE:
The issue before this Court is one of first impression.
Should the matter of the invalidity of a marriage due
to the absence of an essential requisite prescribed
by Article 4 of the Family Code be raised in the same
proceeding where the marriage is being impugned
on the ground of a party's psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code?
HELD: Petitioner insists that because the action for
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity and the action for
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
absence of marriage license constitute separate
causes of action, the present case would not fall
under the prohibition against splitting a single cause
of action nor would it be barred by the principle of
res judicata.
The contention is untenable. Res judicata is defined
as "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon
or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. It
also refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree
on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is
conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies
in all later suits on points and matters determined in
the former suit."
This doctrine is a rule which pervades every wellregulated system of jurisprudence and is founded
upon the following precepts of common law, namely:
(1) public policy and necessity, which makes it to the
interest of the State that there should be an end to
litigation, and (2) the hardship on the individual that

he should be vexed twice for the same cause. A
contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and
quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer
the gratification of the litigious disposition on the part
of suitors to the preservation of the public tranquility
and happiness.
Res judicata in this sense requires the concurrence
of the following requisites: (1) the former judgment is
final; (2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it is a
judgment or an order on the merits; and (4) there is
between the first and the second actions
identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of
action.
Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the first
three requisites. What is in issue is the presence of
the fourth requisite. In this regard, the test to
determine whether the causes of action are identical
is to ascertain whether the same evidence will
sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity
in the facts essential to the maintenance of the two
actions. If the same facts or evidence would sustain
both, the two actions are considered the same, and
a judgment in the first case is a bar to the
subsequent action.
Based on this test, petitioner would contend that the
two petitions brought by him seeking the declaration
of nullity of his marriage are anchored on separate
causes of action for the evidence necessary to
sustain the first petition which was anchored on the
alleged psychological incapacity of respondent is
different from the evidence necessary to sustain the
present petition which is anchored on the purported
absence of a marriage license.
Petitioner, however, forgets that he is simply
invoking different grounds for the same cause of
action. By definition, a cause of action is the act or
omission by which a party violates the right of
another. In both petitions, petitioner has the same
cause the declaration of nullity of his marriage to
respondent. What differs is the ground upon which
the cause of action is predicated. These grounds
cited by petitioner essentially split the various
aspects of the pivotal issue that holds the key to the
resolution of this controversy, that is, the actual
status of petitioner and respondent's marriage.
Furthermore, the instant case is premised on the
claim that the marriage is null and void because no
valid celebration of the same took place due to the
46

alleged lack of a marriage license. In Civil Case No.
SP 4341-95, however, petitioner impliedly conceded
that the marriage had been solemnized and
celebrated in accordance with law. Petitioner is now
bound by this admission. The alleged absence of a
marriage license which petitioner raises now could
have been presented and heard in the earlier case.
Suffice it to state that parties are bound not only as
regards every matter offered and received to sustain
or defeat their claims or demand but as to any other
admissible matter which might have been offered for
that purpose and of all other matters that could have
been adjudged in that case.
It must be emphasized that a party cannot evade or
avoid the application of res judicata by simply
varying the form of his action or adopting a different
method of presenting his case. It bears stressing
that a party cannot divide the grounds for recovery.
A plaintiff is mandated to place in issue in his
pleading, all the issues existing when the suit began.
A lawsuit cannot be tried piecemeal. The plaintiff is
bound to set forth in his first action every ground for
relief which he claims to exist and upon which he
relied, and cannot be permitted to rely upon them by
piecemeal in successive action to recover for the
same wrong or injury.
47) NAVARRO vs. DOMAGTOY
A.M. No. MTJ-96-108. July 19, 1996
FACTS:
The complainant in this administrative case is the
Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo
G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to
two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal
Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy,
which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as
well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge
solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A.
Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge
that the groom is merely separated from his first
wife.
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage
ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and
Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's
jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent judge
holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao
del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the
respondent judge's residence in the municipality of
Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional

area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos,
located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the
municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.
Respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of
having solemnized the marriage between Gaspar
Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife,
and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied
on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge
of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr.
Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other
for almost seven years. With respect to the second
charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the
marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did
not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code
which states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the
court's jurisdiction;" and that article 8 thereof applies
to the case in question.
The marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan
and Arlyn Borga states that Tagadan's civil status is
"separated." Despite this declaration, the wedding
ceremony was solemnized by respondent judge. He
presented in evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio A.
Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and
sworn to before Judge Demosthenes C. Duquilla,
MTC of Basey, Samar. In their affidavit, the affiants
stated that they knew Gaspar Tagadan to have been
civilly married to Ida D. Pearanda in September
1983; that after thirteen years of cohabitation and
having borne five children, Ida Pearanda left the
conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she
has not returned nor been heard of for almost seven
years, thereby giving rise to the presumption that
she is already dead.
ISSUE:
1.Whether or not the joint affidavit is sufficient proof
of the wife's presumptive death?
2.Whether or not the respondent judge erred when
he solemnized the marriage outside his court's
jurisdiction?
HELD:
1. The Supreme Court ruled that the joint affidavit is
insufficient proof to declare wife's presumptive
death.
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides that
for the purpose of contracting the subsequent
marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the declaration of
47

presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse.
Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief
that the absent spouse was already dead, a
summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death is necessary in order to contract
a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement
which has been precisely incorporated into the
Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages
where it is not proven that the previous marriage has
been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or
presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent
provisions of law.
Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary
proceeding for the declaration of his first wife's
presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration,
he remains married to Ida Pearanda. Whether
wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the
part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint
affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or
ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and
therefore void, marriage.
2. The Supreme Court ruled that Judge Domagtoy
erred when he soemnized the marriage outside his
court's jurisdiction. According to article 8 of the
Familiy Code The marriage shall be solemnized
publicly in the chambers the judge or in open court,
in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the
consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case
may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of
marriages contracted on the point of death or in
remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this
Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing
officer in writing in which case the marriage may be
solemnized at a house or place designated by them
in a sworn statement to that effect.
There is no proof that either Sumaylo or del Rosario
was at the point of death or in the remote place.
Moreover, the written request presented addressed
to the respondent judge was made by only one
party, Gemma del Rosario.
One of the formal requisites of marriage is the
"authority of the solemnizing officer." Article 8, which
is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of
the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify
the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in
the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith
will not invalidate the marriage.
Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions,

may officiate in weddings only within said areas and
not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage
outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite, which while it may
not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject
the officiating official to administrative liability.
Respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the
municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was
not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in
the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.
The Supreme Court finds respondent to have acted
in gross ignorance of the law. The legal principles
applicable in the cases brought to our attention are
elementary and uncomplicated, prompting us to
conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is
due to a lack of comprehension of the law. Judge
Domagtoy is SUSPENDED for a period of 6 months.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn
Borga is considered bigamous and void, there being
a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and
Ida Pearanda.
48) BESO vs. DAGUMAN
A.M. No. 99-1211, January 28, 2000
FACTS:
On August 28, 1997, the marriage between Zenaida
Beso and Bernardito Yman was solemnized by
Judge Juan Daguman at J.P.R. Subdivision in
Calbayog City, Samar. After the wedding, Yman
abandoned Petitioner. Thereafter, Petitioner found
that her marriage was not registered at the Civil
Registry. She then filed an administrative complaint
against the Respondent charging him with Neglect of
Duty and Abuse of Authority for solemnizing
marriage outside of his jurisdiction and of negligence
in not retaining a copy and not registering the
marriage contract with the office of the Local
Registrar.
In his Comment, Respondent averred that the civil
marriage had to be solemnized outside his territory
because on that date respondent was physically
indisposed and unable to report to his station in Sta.
Margarita and that Beso and Yman unexpectedly
came to his house urgently requesting the
celebration of their marriage rites since the
complainant, who is an overseas worker, would be
out of the country for a long period and their
marriage license would lapse before she could
48

return to the Philippines. He further averred that after
handling to Yman the first copy of the marriage
certificate, he left the three remaining copies on top
of the desk in his private office intending later to
register the duplicate and triplicate copies and to
keep the fourth in his office but said copies were
lost; that he diligently searched for them and even
subpoenad Yman to further inquire but was told that
Complainant put the copies of the marriage
certificate in her bag during the wedding party and
that Complainant already left for abroad.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is guilty of Neglect of
Duty and Abuse of Authority?
HELD:
Yes. As presiding judge of the MCTC Sta. Margarita
Tarangnan-Pagsanjan, Samar, his authority to
solemnize marriage is only limited to those
municipalities under his jurisdiction. Considering that
respondents Judge's jurisdiction covers the
municipality of Sta. Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan,
Samar only, he was not clothed with authority to
solemnize a marriage in the City of Calbayog. As
provided by Article 8 of the Family Code, wherein a
marriage may be solemnized by a judge outside his
chamber[s] or at a place other than his sala, to wit:
(1) when either or both of the contracting parties is at
the point of death;(2) when the residence of either
party is located in a remote place; (3) where both of
the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing
in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a
house or place designated by them in a sworn
statement
to
that
effect.
The
foregoing
circumstances are unavailing in the instant case.
Moreover, as solemnizing officer, respondent Judge
neglected his duty when he failed to register the
marriage. Such duty is entrusted upon him pursuant
to Article 23 of the Family Code requiring the same
not later than fifteen days after the marriage. The
records show that the loss was occasioned by
carelessness on respondent Judge's part. Hence,
Respondent is guilty of neglect of duty and abuse of
authority.
49) REPUBLIC vs. IYOY

G.R. No. 152577 September 21, 2005
FACTS:
Private respondent Crasus Iyoy filed a complaint for

declaration of nullity of marriage due to
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code, in relation with Articles 68, 70, and 72,
with Fely Ada Rosal. According to him, they got
married in 1961. The marriage produced five
children. But the marriage faded because Fely was a
nagger, extravagant and hot-tempered. In 1984, Fely
left for the United States. Barely a year after she left,
Crasus received a letter from her requesting that he
sign the divorce papers. But he ignored the request
Sometime in 1985, he was informed that Fely had
already married an American. In 1987, she came
back to the Philippines with her American family. In
1990, she came back to attend the wedding of their
eldest son, but in the invitations, she used the
surname of her American husband. She returned in
1992 for the operation of their fourth child. In her
Answer to the Complaint, she asserted that she was
already an American citizen in 1988, that she was no
longer hot-tempered, nagger and extravagant and
that the only reason she went to the United States
was that their income was not enough to sustain
their family, that it was Crasus who was irresponsible
and in fact living with another woman who bore her a
child. She also denied that she sent a letter
requesting him to sign the divorce papers. After
hearing both sides, the RTC rendered a decision
declaring the marriage null and void ab initio under
Article 36 of the Family Code. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court
but this time it had added a ratiocination, stating that
Article 26, 2nd paragraph of the Family Code is
applicable also to this case.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there was psychological incapacity
on the part of Fely?
2. Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code is applicable?
HELD
1. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Article
36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to
take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. It
was held in previous rulings that irreconcilable
differences, conflicting personalities, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse,
habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion,
and abandonment, by themselves, also do not
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under
the said Article.
49

2. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The
second paragraph of Article 26 is not applicable. As
plainly worded, the provision refers to a special
situation wherein a foreigner divorces his or her
Filipino spouse. However, in this case, it cannot be
applied because of the simple fact that at the time
Fely secured a divorce decree, she was still a
Filipino. Fely admitted in her Answer filed before the
RTC that she married her American spouse in 1985
but she also admitted that she became and
American citizen only in 1988. Thus, she was still a
Filipino citizen and Article 15 of the Civil Code
applies, she was still bound by Philippine laws on
family rights and duties, status, condition and legal
capacity, even though she was already living abroad.
50) REPUBLIC vs. ORBECIDO III
GR No. 154380 October 5, 2005
FACTS:
In 1981, Cipriano Orbecido and Lady Myros
Villanueva were married in Ozamis City. Their
marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter,
Krsitoffer and Kimberly. In 1986, Lady Myros left for
the US bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few
years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had
been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son
that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then
married an American, Innocent Stanley. Thereafter,
Cipriano filed with the trial court a petition for
authority to remarry invoking paragraph 2 of Article
26 of the Family Code. Finding merit on the petition,
the court granted the same. The Republic, through
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought
reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the Republic contends that Par. 2 of
Art. 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the
instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed
marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a
Filipino and an alien.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent can remarry pursuant to
Article 26 of the Family Code?
HELD:
The Supreme Court was unanimous in holding that
par. 2, Art. 26 of the Family Code should be
interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been
divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign

citizenship and remarried, also to remarry.
The twin elements of Par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family
Code are as follows: (1) there is a valid marriage
that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner and (2) a valid divorce is obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry. The reckoning point is not the citizenship
at the time of the celebration of marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to
remarry. In this case, when Lady Myros was
naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a
valid marriage that has been celebrated between her
and Cipriano. Subsequently, the wife obtained a
divorce capacitating him to remarry. Clearly, the twin
requisites are both present in the case. Thus,
Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be
allowed to remarry.
However, for respondents plea to prosper, he must
prove that his wife was naturalized as an American
citizen and must show sufficient proof of the divorce
decree. Cipriano failed to do this so the petition of
the Republic was granted.
51) Atienza vs. Brillantes
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706, 29 March 1995
Quiason, J.:
FACTS: A complaint file by complainant Lupo A.
Atienza (Atienza) for gross immorality and
appearance of impropriety against respondent Judge
Francisco Brillantes, Jr. (Brillantes).
Atienza has two children with Yolanda De
Castrp (De Castro). There was a time when
Atienza chanced upon Brillantes sleeping on his
bedroom and was later on informed by their
houseboy that Brillantes is cohabiting wioth De
Castro.
Atienza claims that Brillantes was married to
Zenaida Ongkiko (Ongkiko) whom the latter has
five children.
Brillantes denied having married Ongkiko,
because it was celebrated without a marriage
license, the same incident also happened on their
second marriage. Brillantes was thereafter
abandoned by Ongkiko seventeen years ago.
Brillantes claims that when he married De
Castro in Los Angeles, California, he believed in
good faith and for all legal purposes that he was
50

single because his marriage with Ongkiko was
celebrated without a license.
ISSUE: Wether a judicial declaration that the
previous marriage was void is under Article 40 of the
Family Code required before entering into a second
marriage.
RULING: YES, respondent argues that the provision
of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to
him considering that his first marriage took place in
1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the
Philippines, while the second marriage took place in
1991 and governed by the Family Code.
Article 40 of the Family Code is
applicable to marriages entered into after the
effectively of the Family Code on 3 August 1988
regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides,
under Article 256 of the Family Code, said article is
given retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other Laws. This
is particularly true with Article 40 of the Family Code,
which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not
shown any vested right that was impaired by the
application of Article of the Family Code in this case.
>Digest by: Allan Matthew G. Bueser
52) Borja-Manzano vs. Sanchez
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329, 8 March 2001
cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must

apply:
1.) The man and woman have been
living together as husband and
wife for at least five years before
the marriage;
2.) The parties must have no legal
impediment to marry each other;
3.) The fact of absence of legal
impediment between the parties
must be present at the time of
marriage;
4.) The parties must execute an
affidavit stating that they lived
together for at least five years
and
are
without
legal
impediment to marry each other.
5.) The solemnizing officer must
execute a sworn statement that
he
had
ascertained
the
qualifications of the parties and
that he had found no legal
impediment to their marriage.
Not all this requirement are present in the
case at bar. It is significant to note that in their
separate affidavits executed on 22nd of March 1993
and sworn to before respondent Judge himself.
David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly
stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also in
their marriage contract, it was indicated that both
were separated.
Digest by: Allan Matthew G. Bueser
David, Jr. C,.J.:

FACTS: Complainant-petitioner Herminia BorjaManzano (Herminia) was the lawful wife of the late
David Manzano being married on 21 May 1966. On
22nd of March 1993, her husband contracted another
marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before
respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez (Judge
Sanchez). That Judge Sanchez should have known
that the marriage was a bigamous one as the
marriage clearly stated that both contracting parties
were Separate.
Judge Sanchez claims innocence as to the
fact of the previous marriage, and solemnized their
marriage in accordance with Article 34 of the Family
Code.
ISSUE: Whether Judge Sanchez should be held
liable.
RULING: YES, for Article 31 of the Family Code to
apply the provision on legal ratification of marital
51

VII. VOID MARRIAGES
53) Suntay vs. Cojuangco-Suntay
G.R. No. 132524, 29 December 1998
Martinez, J:
FACTS: Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (Emilio), son of
petitioner Federico Suntay (Federico), was married
to Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay (Isabel:) their marriage
was celebrated in the Portuguese Colony of Macao.
Subsequently it was declared as void ab initio or null
and void.
The basis of the Court of First Instance for
such a ruling was that Emilio suffers from a mental
aberration known as schizophrenia.
Emilio predeceased his mother, decedent
Cristina
Aguinaldo
Suntay.
Isabel,
herein
respondent, the daughter of Emilio and Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay, filed before the Regional Trial
Court a petition for letters of administration of the
intestate estate of her late grandmother Cristina
Aguinaldo Suntay.
Petitioner Federico moved to dismiss the
case on the ground of Article 922 of the Civil Code
an illegitimate child has no right to succeed by right
of representation the legitimate relatives of her father
or mother. Federico contends that Emilio Aguinaldo
Suntay, respondent Isabels father predeceased his
mother, the late Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay. It opened
a path to succession by representation, as a
consequence of declaration by the Court of First
Instance that the marriage of respondent Isabels
parents is null and void. Making Isabel an illegitimate
child and has no right nor interest in the estate of her
paternal grandmother the decedent.
ISSUE: Whether Isabel Aguinaldo CojuangcoSuntay is a legitimate child despite the declaration
that her parents marriage was void ab initio denying
her succession right from her grandmother.
RULING: YES. the marriage of Emilio Suntay and
Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay was annulled on the basis
of Article 85 par. 3 of the Civil Code which refers to
marriages which are considered voidable. Being
conceived and born of a voidable marriage before
the decree of annulment, she is considered
legitimate.
The status of children born in voidable
marriages is governed by the second paragraph of
Article 89 which provides that:
Children conceived of voidable marriages before

the decree of annulment shall be considered as
legitimate
The annulment of the marriage by the court
abolishes the legal character of the society formed
by the putative spouses, but It cannot destroy
consequences which marital union produced during
its continuance.
54) Nial vs. Bayadaog
G.R. No. 133778, 14 March 2000
Ynares Santiago, J.:
FACTS: Pepito Nial (Pepito) and Teodulfa
Bellones was married on September 26, 1974
whereby petitioners Babyline, Ingrid, Archie and
Pepito Jr., a;; surnamed Nial were born. Pepito shot
Teodulfa resulting to the latters death. One year and
eight months after the incident Pepito and Norma
Bayadog, herein respondent (Bayadog) got
married without any marriage license. Pepito and
Bayadog executed an affidavit dated December 11,
1986 state that they had lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years thus exempting them
from securing a marriage license. Pepito died in a
car accident. Thereafter petitioners question the
validity of the subsequent marriage of Pepito and
Bayadog due to the absence of a marriage license
as it was void.
ISSUE: Whether the cohabitation of Pepito and
Bayadog is that one in contemplation of the law.
RULING: No, the five year period should be the
years immediately before the day of the marriage
and it should be a period of cohabitation
characterized by exclusivity-meaning no third part
was involved at any time within the five years and
continuity that is unbroken.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and
respondents marriage, it cannot be said that they
have lived with each other as husband and wife for
at least five years prior to this wedding day. From the
time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time
of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty
months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and
respondent had started living with each other the
fact remains that their five year period of
cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated
by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union
52

that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect
only by the absence of a marriage contract. Pepito
had a subsisting marriage at the time when he
started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial
that when they lived with each other, Pepito had
already been separated in fact from his lawful
spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even
where there was actual severance of the filial
companionship between the spouses cannot make
any cohabitation by either spouse with any third
party as being as husband and wife.
55) Ty vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 127406, 27 November 2000
Quisumbing, J.:
FACTS: Private Respondent Edgardo M. Reyes
married in a civil ceremony Anna Maria Regina
Villanueva thereafter a church wedding was
celebrated. The marriage was subsequently
declared null and void ab initio for lack of marriage
license and lack of consent of the parties.
Even before the decree was issued
nullifying the marriage, private respondent Edgardo
M. Reyes married Ofelia P. Ty, herein petitioner, on 4
April 1979. The decree of nullity of his marriage to
Anna Maira was rendered only on 4 August 1980,
while his civil marriage to petitioner Ofelia P. Ty took
place on 4 April 1979.
ISSUE: Whether the decree of nullity of the first
marriage is required before a subsequent marriage
can be entered into validity.
RULING: YES, a declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause
of action or a ground for defense. (Art. 39 of the
Family Code). Where the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purposes of contacting a second marriage, the sole
basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage
to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment
declaring previous marriage void.
In the present case, the second
marriage of private respondent was entered into
1979, before Wiegel, at that time the prevailing rules
was found In Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first
marriage of private respondent being void for lack of
license and consent, there was no need for judicial
declaration of its nullity before he could contract a
second marriage. In this case, therefore, we
conclude that private respondents second marriage

to petitioner was valid.
56) Terre vs. Terre
A.M. No 2349, 3 July 1992
Per Curiam
FACTS: Complaint Dorothy B. Terre met respondent
Atty. Jordan Terre for the first time in 1979 as fourth
year high school classmates; Dorothy was then
married to Merillo Bercellina. Dorothy and Atty.
Jordan went to manila to pursue their education of
personal choosing. Atty. Jordan took up law at
Lyceum Univsersity, still courting Dorothy on the
process this time with more persistence. Jordan
explained to Dorothy that their marriage is void ab
initio due to the reason that Dorothy and Merlito
were first cousins, convince by his explanation and
having secured a favorable advice from her mother
and ex in-laws, Dorothy agreed to marry Atty.
Jordan. In their marriage license Atty. Jordan wrote
single as her status explaining that since her
marriage was void ab initio, no need to go to court
for a declaration. Later on Dorothy found out that
Atty. Jordan was already married to one Helina
Malicdem.
When Atty. Jordan prior marriage
with Dorothy was subsisting, no judicial declaration
was obtained as to nullity of or any judicial
declaration obtained as to nullity of such prior
marriage of respondent with complainant.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Jordan Terre should be liable
for gross immorality.
RULING: Yes, respondent Terre, being a lawyer,
knew or should have known that such an agreement
ran counter to the prevailing case law of the court
which holds that for purposes of determining
whether a person is legally free to contract a second
marriage, a judicial declaration that the first a
marriage was null and void ab initio is essential.
Even if we are to assume , arguendo merely, that
Jordan Terre held that mistaken belief in good faith,
the same result will follow. For if we are to hold
Jordan Terre to his own argument, his first marriage
to complainant Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid,
with the result that his second marriage to Helina
Malicdem must be regarded as bigamous and
criminal in character.
53

VIII. PSCYHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
57) Santos vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995
En Banc:
FACTS: Petitioner Leouel Santos (Leouel), a first
lieutenant in the Philippine Army, and private
respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos (Julia)
were married. The ecstasy did not last long because
of the frequent interference of Julias parents into the
young spouses family affairs.
Julia left for United States of America to work as a
Nurse despite Leouels pleas to dissuade her. Seven
months after her departure, Julia called up Leoule
for the first time by long distance telephone. She
promised to return home upon the expiration of her
contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel
got a chance to visit the United States during a
training program under the auspices of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, he desperately tried to
locate Julia but his efforts were in vain.
Having failed, Leouel filed with the Regional Trial
Court a complaint for Voiding of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether Leouels petition to declare their
marriage with Julia void ab initio under Article 36 of
the Family Code will prosper.
RULING: No, Article 36 of the Family Code cannot
be taken and construed independently of, but must
stand in conjunction with, existing precept un our law
on marriage. Thus correlated, psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed
by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. There is
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of psychological
incapacity to the most serious cases of personality
disorder clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psycholigic
condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated. The law does not evidently envision,
upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to
have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion
is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which
considers children conceived prior to the judicial
declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be

legitimate.
The factual setting in the case at bench, in
no measure at all, can come close to the standards
required to decree nullity of marriage. Undeniably
and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even
desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably,
neither law nor society itself can always provide all
the specific answers to every individual problem.
58) Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 119190, 16 January 1997
Torres, Jr.:
FACTS: Petitioner Chi Ming Tsos (Petitioner) and
private respondent Gina Lao-Tsoi (Respondent)
were married at the Manila Cathedral. They went
and proceeded to the house of petitioners mother
and slept together on the same room in the first night
of their married life. Instead of enjoying the night of
their marriage, petitioner just went to bed and slept
on his side then turned his back and went to sleep.
There was no sexual intercourse between them
during the first night. The same thing happened on
the second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a
private place where they can enjoy together during
their first week as husband and wife, they went to
Baguio City. But, they did so together with her
mother, uncle, his mother and his nephew. They
were all invited to join them. There was no sexual
intercourse between them, since petitioner avoided
her by taking a long walk during siesta time or just
by sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living
room. Respondent claims that she never seen her
husbands private parts.
They submitted themselves to medical
examinations, respondent was found to be healthy
and still a virgin but petitioner was told to return but
never did. It was found that petitioner is capable of
having sexual intercourse with a woman.
Respondent claims that petitioner is
impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show
his penis.
ISSUE: Whether their marriage can be declared as
null and void ab initio due to psychological
incapacity.
RULING: Yes, one of the essential marital
obligations under the Family Code is to procreate
54

children based on the universal principle that
procreation of children through sexual cooperation is
the basic end of marriage. Constant non-fulfillment
of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or
wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the
senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill the above marital obligations is
equivalent to incapacity.
It is sexual intimacy which brings spouses
wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift
and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a
function which enlivens the hope of procreation and
ensures the continuation of family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy
between petitioner and private respondent. That is
a shared feeling which between husband and wife
must be experienced not only by having
spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of
spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way
process. An expressive interest in each others
feelings at a time is needed by the other can go
along way in deepening the marital relationship.
Marriage is definitely not for children but for two
consenting adults who view the relationship with
love, amor gignit amore, respect, sacrifice and a
continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of
its value as a sublime social institution.
59) REPUBLIC VS. CA and MOLINA
GR No. 108763. February 13, 1997
FACTS: Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo
Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila, and gave birth to
a son a year after. Reynaldo showed signs of
immaturity and irresponsibility on the early stages
of the marriage, observed from his tendency to
spend time with his friends and squandering his
money with them, from his dependency from his
parents, and his dishonesty on matters involving his
finances.
Thereafter, Reynaldo was relieved of his job
in 1986. Roridel became the sole breadwinner of the
family. In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job
in Manila and proceeded to Baguio City. Reynaldo
left her and their child a week later. The couple are
separated-in-fact for more than three years.
On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified
petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to
Reynaldo Molina. Evidence for Roridel consisted of
her own testimony, that of two of her friends, a social
worker, and a psychiatrist of the Baguio General
Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did not
present any evidence as he appeared only during

the pre-trial conference.
On 14 May 1991, the trial court rendered
judgment declaring the marriage void. The Solicitor
General appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court
of Appeals denied the appeals and affirmed in toto
the RTCs decision. Hence, the present recourse.
ISSUE:
Whether
opposing
or
conflicting
personalities should be construed as psychological
incapacity
HELD: In Santos v. Court of Appeals, where
psychological incapacity should refer to no less than
a mental (not physical) incapacity, existing at the
time the marriage is celebrated, and that there is
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of psychological
incapacity to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. Psychological
incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability. In the present case,
there is no clear showing to us that the psychological
defect spoken of is an incapacity; but appears to be
more of a difficulty, if not outright refusal or
neglect in the performance of some marital
obligations. Mere showing of irreconcilable
differences and conflicting personalities in no wise
constitutes psychological incapacity.
The Court, in this case, promulgated the
guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Article 36 of the Family Code, removing any visages
of it being the most liberal divorce procedure in the
world: (1) The burden of proof belongs to the
plaintiff; (2) the root cause of psychological
incapacity must be medically or clinically identified,
alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by
expert, and clearly explained in the decision; (3) The
incapacity must be proven existing at the time of the
celebration of marriage; (4) the incapacity must be
clinically or medically permanent or incurable; (5)
such illness must be grave enough; (6) the essential
marital obligation must be embraced by Articles 68
to 71 of the Family Code as regards husband and
wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the same code as
regards parents and their children; (7) interpretation
made by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
of the Catholic Church, and (8) the trial must order
the fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appeal as
counsels for the State.
The Supreme Court granted the petition,
and reversed and set aside the assailed decision;
concluding that the marriage of Roridel Olaviano to
55

Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
60) BARCELONA vs. CA & TADEO R. BENGZON
G.R. No. 130087. September 24, 2003
FACS: On 29 March 1995, private respondent Tadeo
filed a Petition for Annulment of Marriage against
petitioner petitioner Diana before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 87. On 9 May 1995,
respondent Tadeo filed a Motion to Withdraw Petition
which the trial court granted.
On 21 July 1995, respondent Tadeo filed anew a
Petition for Annulment of Marriage against petitioner
Diana. Petitioner Diana filed a Motion to Dismiss the
second petition on two grounds. First, the second
petition fails to state a cause of action. Second, it
violates Supreme Court Administrative Circular No.
04-94 on forum shopping. Respondent Tadeo
opposed the Motion to which petitioner Diana filed
Additional Arguments in Support of the Motion.
The trial court issued on 18 September 1996
an Order deferring resolution of the Motion until the
parties ventilate their arguments in a hearing.
Petitioner
Diana
filed
a
motion
for
reconsideration. However, the trial court issued on
second order denying the motion.
Petitioner Diana filed a Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court of
Appeals assailing the trial courts first order deferring
action on the Motion and the second order denying
the motion for reconsideration on 14 February 1997.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and
denied the motion for reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals agreed with petitioner
Diana that the trial court in its first order erred in
deferring action on the Motion until after a hearing
on whether the complaint states a cause of action.
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals pointed out that
the trial courts second order corrected the situation
since in denying the motion for reconsideration, the
trial court in effect denied the Motion. The appellate
court agreed with the trial court that the allegations
in the second petition state a cause of action
sufficient to sustain a valid judgment if proven to be
true. The Court of Appeals also held that there was
no violation of Circular No. 04-94. To determine the
existence of forum shopping, the elements of litis
pendentia must exist or a final judgment in one case
must amount to res judicata in the other. In this
case, there is no litis pendentia because respondent
Tadeo had caused the dismissal without prejudice of
the first petition before filing the second petition.
Neither is there res judicata because there is no final
decision on the merits.
ISSUE: Whether the allegations of the second

petition for annulment of marriage sufficiently state a
cause of action.
HELD: The petition has no merit. Petitioner Dianas
contention that the second petition fails to state a
cause of action is untenable.
We find the second petition sufficiently
alleges a cause of action. The petition sought the
declaration of nullity of the marriage based on Article
36 of the Family Code. The petition alleged that
respondent Tadeo and petitioner Diana were legally
married at the Holy Cross Parish after a whirlwind
courtship as shown by the marriage contract
attached to the petition. The couple established
their residence in Quezon City. The union begot five
children, Ana Maria, born on 8 November 1964;
Isabel, born on 28 October 1968; Ernesto Tadeo,
born on 31 March 1970; Regina Rachelle born on 7
March 1974; and Cristina Maria born in February
1978. The petition further alleged that petitioner
Diana was psychologically incapacitated at the time
of the celebration of their marriage to comply with
the essential obligations of marriage and such
incapacity subsists up to the present time.
Petitioner Diana argues that the second
petition falls short of the guidelines set forth in
Santos and Molina. Specifically, she contends that
the second petition is defective because it fails to
allege the root cause of the alleged psychological
incapacity. The second petition also fails to state
that the alleged psychological incapacity existed
from the celebration of the marriage and that it is
permanent or incurable. Further, the second petition
is devoid of any reference of the grave nature of the
illness to bring about the disability of the petitioner to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Lastly, the second petition did not even state the
marital obligations which petitioner Diana allegedly
failed to comply due to psychological incapacity.
The complete facts should allege the
physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative
of psychological incapacity at the time of the
celebration of the marriage but expert opinion
need not be alleged.
Procedural rules apply to actions pending
and unresolved at the time of their passage. The
obvious effect of the new Rules providing that
expert opinion need not be alleged in the petition
is that there is also no need to allege the root cause
of the psychological incapacity. Only experts in the
fields of neurological and behavioral sciences are
competent to determine the root cause of
56

psychological incapacity. Since the new Rules do not
require the petition to allege expert opinion on the
psychological incapacity, it follows that there is also
no need to allege in the petition the root cause of the
psychological incapacity.
The second petition states a cause of action
since it states the legal right of respondent Tadeo,
the correlative obligation of petitioner Diana, and the
act or omission of petitioner Diana in violation of the
legal right.
61) MARCOS vs. MARCOS
G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000
FACTS: Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the
Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1973. Later on,
he was transferred to the Presidential Security
Command in Malacaang during the Marcos
Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other
hand, joined the Women's Auxilliary Corps under the
Philippine Air Force in 1978. After the Edsa
Revolution, both of them sought a discharge from
the military service.
They first met sometime in 1980 when both
of them were assigned at the Malacaang Palace,
she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a
Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos.
Through telephone conversations, they became
acquainted and eventually became sweethearts.
After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they
resided at No. 1702 Daisy Street, Hulo Bliss,
Mandaluyong, a housing unit which she acquired
from the Bliss Development Corporation when she
was still single.
After the downfall of President Marcos, he
left the military service in 1987 and then engaged in
different business ventures that did not however
prosper. As a wife, she always urged him to look for
work so that their children would see him, instead of
her, as the head of the family and a good provider.
Due to his failure to engage in any gainful
employment, they would often quarrel and as a
consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would
even force her to have sex with him despite her
weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on
their children for a slight mistake and was so severe
in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several
times during their cohabitation, he would leave their
house. In 1992, they were already living separately.
All the while, she was engrossed in the
business of selling "magic uling" and chickens.
When she was discharged from the military service,
she concentrated on her business. Then, she
became a supplier in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines until she was able to put up a trading and
construction company, NS Ness Trading and

Construction Development Corporation.
On October 16, 1994 the spouses had a
bitter quarrel. As they were already living separately,
she did not want him to stay in their house anymore.
On that day, when she saw him in their house, she
was so angry that she lambasted him. He then
turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and
even on her mother who came to her aid. The
following day, October 17, 1994, she and their
children left the house and sought refuge in her
sister's house.
On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself
[to] medical examination at the Mandaluyong
Medical Center where her injuries were diagnosed
as contusions. Sometime in August 1995, she
together with her two sisters and driver, went to him
at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look for their
missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad.
After knowing the reason for their unexpected
presence, he ran after them with a samurai and even
beat her driver.
At the time of the filing of this case, she and
their children were renting a house in Camella,
Paraaque, while the appellant was residing at the
Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.
In the case study conducted by Social
Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children described their
father as cruel and physically abusive to them. The
appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad
A. Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological evaluation while
the appellant on the other hand, did not.
The court a quo found the appellant to be
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations mainly because of his failure to find work
to support his family and his violent attitude towards
appellee and their children.
CA reversed the RTC and held that
psychological incapacity had not been established
by the totality of the evidence presented on the basis
that there is no evidence at all that would show that
the appellant was suffering from an incapacity which
was psychological or mental - not physical to the
extent that he could not have known the obligations
he was assuming: that the incapacity was grave, had
preceded the marriage and was incurable."
Hence, this Petition.
ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the Honorable Court of
Appeals could set aside the findings by the Regional
Trial Court of psychological incapacity of a
respondent in a Petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage simply because the respondent did not
subject himself to psychological evaluation.
57

2) Whether or not the totality of evidence presented
and the demeanor of all the witnesses should be the
basis of the determination of the merits of the
Petition.
HELD: 1)The guidelines incorporate the three basic
requirements earlier mandated by the Court in
Santos v. Court of Appeals: "psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The
foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician
examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be
"medically or clinically identified." What is important
is the presence of evidence that can adequately
establish the party's psychological condition. For
indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to.
2) We rule in the negative. Although this Court is
sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to
provide material support to the family and may have
resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the
totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of
psychological incapacity on his part. There is
absolutely no showing that his "defects" were
already present at the inception of the marriage or
that they are incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be
attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was
not gainfully employed for a period of more than six
years. It was during this period that he became
intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral
support, and even left the family home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was
traced only to said period and not to the inception of
the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence
showing that his condition is incurable, especially
now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is
not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the
marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest
themselves. It refers to a serious psychological
illness afflicting a party even before the celebration
of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
one is about to assume. These marital obligations
are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221
and 225 of the Family Code.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal
separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted
in psychological incapacity but on physical violence,
moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction,

drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
abandonment and the like. At best, the evidence
presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for
legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
Because Article 36 has been abused as a
convenient divorce law, this Court laid down the
procedural requirements for its invocation in Molina.
Petitioner, however, has not faithfully observed them.
In sum, this Court cannot declare the
dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to
show that the alleged psychological incapacity is
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability; and for her failure to observe the
guidelines outlined in Molina.
62) REPUBLIC vs. LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO
G.R. No. 149498. May 20, 2004
FACTS: On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita filed a
complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage to
her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national,
on the ground of psychological incapacity.
In October 1986, she and Toshio started a
common-law relationship in Japan. They later lived
in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio
went back to Japan and stayed there for half of
1987. On November 16, 1987, she gave birth to their
child.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were
married by Judge Isauro M. Balderia of the Municipal
Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to
respondent,
Toshio
was
psychologically
incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities,
which incapacity became manifest only after the
marriage. One month after their marriage, Toshio
returned to Japan and promised to return by
Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family.
After sending money to respondent for two months,
Toshio stopped giving financial support. She wrote
him several times but he never responded.
Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from her
friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did
not bother to see her and their child.
The summons issued to Toshio remained
unserved because he was no longer residing at his
given address. Because Toshio failed to file a
responsive pleading after the lapse of 60 days from
publication, respondent filed a motion dated
November 5, 1996 to refer the case to the
prosecutor for investigation. The trial court granted
the motion on November 7, 1996.
On November 20, 1996, prosecutor Rolando
I. Gonzales filed a report finding that no collusion
58

existed between the parties. On February 13, 1997,
the trial court granted respondents motion to
present her evidence ex parte. She then testified on
how Toshio abandoned his family. She thereafter
offered documentary evidence to support her
testimony.
The trial court rendered a decision declaring
the marriage between petitioner Lolita and Toshio
null and void on the basis of the records that
respondent spouses failed to fulfill his obligations as
husband of the petitioner and father to his daughter.
Respondent
remained
irresponsible
and
unconcerned over the needs and welfare of his
family.
The Office of the Solicitor General,
representing herein petitioner Republic of the
Philippines, appealed to the Court of Appeals but the
same was denied.
The appellate court thus concluded that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
perform his marital obligations to his family, and to
"observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support" pursuant to Article
68 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The
appellate court emphasized that this case could not
be equated with Republic vs. Court of Appeals and
Molina and Santos vs. Court of Appeals. In those
cases, the spouses were Filipinos while this case
involved a "mixed marriage," the husband being a
Japanese national. Hence, this petition,
ISSUE: Whether or not the mere abandonment by
Toshio of his family and his insensitivity to them
constitute psychological incapacity.
HELD: We rule in favor of petitioner.
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987
Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as
the basic autonomous social institution and marriage
as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage.
What is important is the presence of
evidence that can adequately establish the partys
psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to.
We find that the totality of evidence
presented fell short of proving that Toshio was
psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital
responsibilities. Toshios act of abandonment was
doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged
nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological
illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio

abandoned his family, no other evidence was
presented showing that his behavior was caused by
a psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there
was no need for an actual medical examination, it
would have greatly helped respondents case had
she presented evidence that medically or clinically
identified his illness. This could have been done
through an expert witness. This respondent did not
do.
We must remember that abandonment is
also a ground for legal separation. There was no
showing that the case at bar was not just an
instance of abandonment in the context of legal
separation. We cannot presume psychological
defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his
family immediately after the celebration of the
marriage. As we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to
prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility
and duty as a married person; it is essential that he
must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to
some psychological, not physical, illness. There was
no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in
the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates a
person from accepting and complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
According to the appellate court, the
requirements in Molina and Santos do not apply
here because the present case involves a "mixed
marriage," the husband being a Japanese national.
We disagree. In proving psychological
incapacity, we find no distinction between an alien
spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient
in the application of the rules merely because the
spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated
happens to be a foreign national. The medical and
clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity
were formulated on the basis of studies of human
behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for
determining psychological incapacity should apply to
any person regardless of nationality.
63) DEDEL vs. DEDEL
G.R. No. 151867. January 29, 2004
FACTS: Petitioner David met respondent Sharon
while he was working in the advertising business of
his father. Eventually, their relationship resulted in
the exchange of marital vows before the City Court
of Pasay on September 28, 1966 and followed by
civil marriage in a church wedding on May 20, 1967.
The union produced four children. The conjugal
59

partnership, nonetheless, acquired neither property
nor debt.
Petitioner avers that during the marriage,
Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible and
immature wife and mother. She had extra-marital
affairs with several men: a dentist in the AFP; a
Lieutenant in the Presidential Security Command
and later a Jordanian national.
Sharon was once confirmed in the Manila
Medical City for treatment by Dr. Lourdes Lapuz, a
clinical psychiatrist. Petitioner alleged that despite
the treatment, Sharon did not stop her illicit
relationship with the Jordanian national named
Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she married and with whom
she had two children. When Mustafa Ibrahim left the
country, Sharon returned to petitioner bringing along
her two children by Ibrahim. Petitioner accepted her
back and even considered the two illegitimate
children as his own. Thereafter, on December 9,
1995, Sharon abandoned petitioner to join Ibrahim in
Jordan with their two children. Since then, Sharon
would only return to the country on special
occasions.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition seeking
the declaration of nullity of his marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity, as defined in
Article 36 of the Family Code, before the RTC of
Makati City, Branch 149. Summons was effected by
publication in the Pilipino Star Ngayon, a newspaper
of general circulation in the country considering that
Sharon did not reside and could not be found in the
Philippines.
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad A. Dayan,
who testified that she conducted a psychological
evaluation of petitioner and found him to be
conscientious, hardworking, diligent, a perfectionist
who wants all tasks and projects completed up to the
final detail and who exerts his best in whatever he
does.
On the other hand, Dr. Dayan declared that
Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social Personality
Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity;
that she committed several indiscretions and had no
capacity for remorse, even bringing with her the two
children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner.
Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the
marriage like her repeated acts of infidelity and
abandonment of her family are indications of AntiSocial
Personality
Disorder
amounting
to
psychological incapacity to perform the essential
obligations of marriage.
The trial court declared the marriage
between the spouses Dedel null and void on the
ground of psychological incapacity on the part of
respondent. Respondent Republic of the Philippines,
through the Solicitor General, appealed alleging that

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A
DECISION WITHOUT A CERTIFICATION HAVING
BEEN ISSUED BY THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AS
REQUIRED IN THE MOLINA CASE.
The Court of Appeals recalled and set aside
the judgment of the trial court and ordered dismissal
of the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage.Petitioners motion for reconsideration was
denied in a Resolution dated January 8, 2002.
Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the totality of the evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated
HELD: No. The petition is DENIED.
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at
the inception of marriage, like the state of a party
being of unsound mind or concealment of drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or
lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract
voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the
marriage, they become mere grounds for legal
separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.
These provisions, however, do not necessarily
preclude the possibility of these various
circumstances being themselves, depending on the
degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential
parameters are established, every circumstance that
may have some bearing on the degree, extent and
other conditions of that incapacity must, in every
case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that
no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is
peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinion
of psychiatrists, psychologists and persons with
expertise in psychological disciplines might be
helpful or even desirable.
Respondents sexual infidelity can hardly
qualify as being mentally or psychically ill to such an
extent that she could not have known the obligations
she was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given a valid assumption thereof. It appears that
respondents promiscuity did not exist prior to or at
the inception of the marriage. What is, in fact,
disclosed by the records is a blissful marital union at
its celebration, later affirmed in church rites, and
which produced four children.
Respondents sexual infidelity or perversion and
abandonment do not by themselves constitute
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of
60

the Family Code. Neither could her emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with
psychological incapacity. It must be shown that
these acts are manifestations of a disordered
personality which make respondent completely
unable to discharge the essential obligations of the
marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity
or sexual promiscuity.
64) CARATING-SIAYNGCO vs. SIAYNGCO
G.R. NO. 158896. October 27, 2004
FACTS: Petitioner Juanita and respondent Manuel
were married at civil rites on 27 June 1973 and
before the Catholic Church on August 11 1973. After
discovering that they could not have a child of their
own, the couple decided to adopt a baby boy in
1977, who they named Jeremy.
On 25 September 1997, or after twenty-four
(24) years of married life together, respondent
Manuel filed for the declaration of its nullity on the
ground of psychological incapacity of petitioner
Juanita. He alleged that all throughout their
marriage, his wife exhibited an over domineering
and selfish attitude towards him.
In her Answer, petitioner Juanita alleged that
respondent Manuel is still living with her at their
conjugal home in Malolos, Bulacan; that he invented
malicious stories against her so that he could be free
to marry his paramour. The trial court denied
respondent Manuels petition for declaration of nullity
of his marriage to petitioner Juanita.
The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC
decision, relying mainly on the psychiatric evaluation
of Dr. Garcia finding both Manuel and Juanita
psychologically incapacitated. Hence, this petition for
review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity against petitioner Juanita
and/or respondent Manuel.
HELD: The petition for review is hereby granted.
The presumption is always in favor of the
validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio. In the case at bar, respondent Manuel
failed to prove that his wifes lack of respect for him,
her jealousies and obsession with cleanliness, her
outbursts and her controlling nature, and her inability
to endear herself to his parents are grave
psychological maladies that paralyze her from
complying with the essential obligations of marriage.
Neither is there any showing that these defects

were already present at the inception of the marriage
or that they are incurable. In fact, the psychiatrist
reported that petitioner was psychologically
capacitated to comply with the basic and essential
The Court of Appeals committed reversible
error in holding that respondent Manuel is
psychologically incapacitated. The psychological
report of Dr. Garcia, which is respondent Manuels
own evidence, contains candid admissions of
petitioner Juanita, the person in the best position to
gauge whether or not her husband fulfilled the
essential marital obligations of marriage.
Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not
constitute psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown
that respondent Manuels unfaithfulness is a
manifestation of a disordered personality, which
makes him completely unable to discharge the
essential obligations of the marital state and not
merely due to his ardent wish to have a child of his
own flesh and blood. In herein case, respondent
Manuel has admitted that: "I had [extra-marital]
affairs because I wanted to have a child at that
particular point
The psychological report of respondent
Manuels witness, Dr. Garcia, showed that the root
cause of petitioner Juanitas behavior is traceable
not from the inception of their marriage as required
by law but from her experiences during the
marriage, e.g., her in-laws disapproval of her as
they wanted their son to enter the priesthood, her
husbands philandering, admitted no less by him,
and her inability to conceive. Thus, from the totality
of the evidence adduced by both parties, we have
been allowed a window into the Siayngcoss life and
have perceived therefrom a simple case of a married
couple drifting apart, becoming strangers to each
other, with the husband consequently falling out of
love and wanting a way out.
An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not
a null and void marriage. Mere showing of
irreconcilable
differences
and
conflicting
personalities in no wise constitutes psychological
incapacity.
65) VILLALON VS. MA. CORAZON VILLALON
G.R. No. 167206. November 18, 2005
FACTS: Petitioner was married to respondent for 18
years. Petitioner filed a petition for annulment of his
marriage to respondent, citing psychological
incapacity on his part as a ground. Petitioner alleged
61

the psychological disorder as that of Narcissistic
Histrionic Personality Disorder with Cassanova
Complex.
On July 12, 1996, petitioner Jaime filed a
petition for the annulment of his marriage to
respondent Ma. Corazon before the RTC of Pasig
City on the ground of petitioners psychological
incapacity which he claimed existed even prior to his
marriage.
According to petitioner, the manifestations of
his psychological incapacity were: (a) his chronic
refusal to maintain harmonious family relations and
his lack of interest in having a normal married life;
(b) his immaturity and irresponsibility in refusing to
accept the essential obligations of marriage as
husband to his wife; (c) his desire for other women
and a life unchained from any spousal obligation;
and (d) his false assumption of the fundamental
obligations of companionship and consortium
towards respondent. Petitioner thus prayed that his
marriage to respondent be declared null and void ab
initio.
Respondent filed an answer denying
petitioners allegations. She asserted that her 18year marriage to petitioner has been fruitful and
characterized by joy, contentment and hopes for
more growth in their relationship and that their
marital squabbles were normal based on community
standards. Petitioners success in his professional
life aided him in performing his role as husband,
father, and provider. Respondent claimed that
petitioners commitment to his paternal and marital
responsibilities was beyond reproach.
On October 7, 1996, the trial court directed
the prosecutor to conduct an investigation on
whether there was collusion between the parties. As
a result of the report, there was no collusion. The
OSG opposed to the petition. Thereafter, trial on the
merits ensued.
Petitioner testified that he met respondent
sometime in the early seventies when he applied for
a job at Metrobank, where respondent was
employed as a foreign exchange trader. They began
dating in 1975 and had a romantic relationship soon
thereafter. After going steady for about two years,
petitioner and respondent were married at the San
Pancracio Chapel in Paco, Manila on April 22, 1978.
In the middle of 1993, petitioner decided to separate
from respondent because their marriage reached a
point where there was no longer any communication
between them and their relationship became devoid
of love, affection, support and respect due to his
constant urge to see other women. Moreover, their
relationship tended to be one-sided since
respondent was unresponsive and hardly ever

showed her love, needs, wants and emotions.
Petitioner admitted that on certain occasions
before his marriage, he had two girlfriends at the
same time. He also saw other women even when
he became engaged to and, later on, married
respondent. Respondent learned of his affairs but
reacted in a subdued manner. Petitioner surmised
that it was respondents nature to be silent and
withdrawn.
In January 1994, petitioner left the conjugal
abode and moved into an apartment located five to
ten minutes away. Before he left, he and his wife
spoke to their three children who, at that time, were
14, 8, and 6 years old, respectively. Petitioner
consulted a child psychologist before talking to his
children. He considered himself as a good and
loving father and described his relationship with the
children as great. Despite the separation, petitioner
would regularly visit his children who stayed with him
on alternate weekends, voluntarily gave monthly
support to the children and paid for their tuition fees
and also shouldered the childrens medical
expenses as well as the maintenance and
miscellaneous fees for the conjugal abode.
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad Dayan, a
clinical psychologist, to testify on his alleged
psychological disorder of Narcissistic Histrionic
Personality Disorder with Casanova Complex. Dr.
Dayan submitted a psychological report on both
petitioner and respondent based on clinical
interviews and psychological tests.
Respondent testified that she first learned of
her husbands infidelity in 1980. She discovered that
he was having an affair with one of her friends who
worked as a trader in her husbands company. The
affair was cut short when the woman left for the
United States to work. Eventually, she and petitioner
were able to rebuild their relationship and overcome
the crisis.
When asked about the womanizing ways of
her husband, respondent averred that she did not
know whether her husbands acts could be deemed
womanizing since there were only two instances of
infidelity which occurred 13 years apart. She also
theorized that petitioner wanted to have their
marriage annulled so he could marry her old friend.
She stated that she has not closed her doors to
petitioner but the latter would have to give up his
extra-marital relationship.
To controvert the findings of petitioners
expert witness, respondent presented a psychiatrist,
Dr. Cecilia Villegas, who testified that Dr. Dayans
findings were incomplete because a team
approach was necessary in evaluating an
62

individuals personality. An evaluation of ones
psychological capacity requires the expertise of a
psychiatrist and social worker.
The trial court declared the marriage
between petitioner and respondent null and void on
the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of
petitioner. Thereafter. The respondent and the OSG
seasonably filed an appeal from the decision of the
trial court.
The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision
reversed and set aside the trial courts decision.
Contrary to the trial courts findings, the appellate
court held that petitioner failed to prove the juridical
antecedence, gravity and incurability of his alleged
psychological
incapacity.
Petitioners
sexual
infidelity was made to appear as symptomatic of a
grave psychological disorder when, in reality, the
same merely resulted from a general dissatisfaction
with the marriage.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
of the appellate courts decision but it was denied.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was indeed
psychologically incapacitated to render his marital
obligations
HELD: The petition has no merit.
The totality of the evidence in this case does
not support a finding that petitioner is psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations.
The illness must be shown as downright incapacity
or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will.
Sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient
proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological
incapacity. It must be shown that the acts of
unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered
personality which make petitioner completely unable
to discharge the essential obligations of marriage
Petitioner failed to establish the incurability
and gravity of his alleged psychological disorder. He
simply fall out of love and has consequently refused
to stay married to her. Refusal to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage is not psychological
incapacity within the meaning of law.
FACTS: On February 20, 2001, the RTC of Pasig

City, Branch 151 rendered a Decision denying the
petition for declaration of nullity of petitioners
marriage with Brix Ferraris. The trial court noted that
suffering from epilepsy does not amount to
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Civil
Code and the evidence on record were insufficient to
prove
infidelity.
Petitioners
motion
for
reconsideration was denied in an Order dated April
20, 2001 where the trial court reiterated that there
was no evidence that respondent is mentally or
physically ill to such an extent that he could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed in toto the judgment of the trial court
on the basis that the evidence on record did not
convincingly establish that respondent was suffering
from psychological incapacity or that his defects
were incurable and already present at the inception
of the marriage. The Court of Appeals also found
that Dr. Dayans testimony failed to establish the
substance of respondents psychological incapacity;
that she failed to explain how she arrived at the
conclusion that the respondent has a mixed
personality disorder; that she failed to clearly
demonstrate that there was a natal or supervening
disabling factor or an adverse integral element in
respondents character that effectively incapacitated
him from accepting and complying with the essential
marital obligations.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was
denied for lack of merit; thus, she filed a petition for
review on certiorari with this Court.
Petitioner filed the instant motion for
reconsideration. The Court required respondent Brix
Ferraris to file comment but failed to comply; thus,
he is deemed to have waived the opportunity to file
comment. Further, the Court directed the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on
petitioners motion for reconsideration which it
complied on March 2, 2006.
After considering the arguments of both the
petitioner and the OSG, the Court resolves to deny
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not Brix is psychologically
incapacitated as to render his marriage with Amy
void.
66) A. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS

FERRARIS
G.R. No. 162368 July 17, 2006
VS. BRIX
HELD: No. The Court found Brixs alleged mixed

personality disorder, the"leaving-the-ho use" attitude
whenever he and Amy quarreled, the violent
tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual
63

infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and
his preference to spend more time with his band
mates than his family, are not rooted on some
debilitating psychological condition but a mere
refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
A mere showing of irreconcilable differences
and conflicting personalities in no wise constitute
psychological incapacity; it is not enough to prove
that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities
and duties as married persons; it is essential that
they must be shown to be incapable of doing so due
to some psychological, not physical, illness.
The intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to
the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.
67) ZAMORA VS. CA and Norma ZAMORA
G.R. NO. 141917. February 7, 2007
Facts:
Bernardino Zamora and Norma Zamora were
married on June 4, 1970. Their union was not
blessed of a child. Two years after, Norma left the
country and went to the US to work as a nurse. After
two years she did come back in the Philippines and
thereafter she made periodic visits until she was
already a US citizen.
Bernardino filed a complaint for declaration of nullity
of marriage anchored on the alleged psychological
incapacity of Norma. To support his position, he
alleged that his wife was horrified by the mere
thought of having children as evidenced by the fact
that she had not borne him a child. Furthermore, he
also alleged that she abandoned him by living in the
US and that throughout their marriage they live
together for not more than three years. He alleged
that Art.36 of the Family Code provides that the
marriage contracted by any party who at that time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the marital obligations of the marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization and
that one of the essential marital obligations is to
procreate children through sexual cooperation which
is the basic end of marriage.
On the other hand, Norma denied that she refused
to have a child. She portrayed herself as one who
loves children as she is a nurse by profession and
that she would from time to time borrow her

husbands niece and nephews to care for them.
Issue:
Whether or not Norma was suffering from
psychological incapacity, hence their marriage be
declared void?
Held:
No. Norma was not psychologically incapacitated.
Under the law, the facts alleged in the petition and
the evidence presented, considered totality, should
be sufficient to convince the court of the
psychological incapacity of the party concerned.
In the case at bar the petition filed by Bernardino
was not sufficient as to substantiate his allegations
that Norma is psychologically incapacitated. His
allegations relating to her refusal to cohabit with him
and to bear a child was strongly disputed, as the
records undeniably bear out. Furthermore, the acts
and behavior of Norma that Bernardino cited
occurred during the marriage, and there is no proof
that the former exhibited a similar predilection even
before or the inception of the marriage.
68) DOMINGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 104818. September 17, 1993
FACTS:
Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition on May 29,
1991 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
entitled "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and
Separation of Property" against Roberto Domingo.
The petition alleged among others that: they were
married on November 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth
Center Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage Contract
Registry No. 1277K-76 with Marriage License issued
at Carmona, Cavite; unknown to her, he had a
previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz on
April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still
existing; she came to know of the prior marriage only
sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued
them for bigamy; from January 23, 1979 up to the
present, she has been working in Saudi Arabia and
she used to come to the Philippines only when she
would avail of the one-month annual vacation leave
granted by her foreign employer; since 1983 up to
the present, he has been unemployed and
completely dependent upon her for support and
subsistence; out of her personal earnings, she
purchased real and personal properties with a total
amount of approximately P350,000.00, which are
64

under the possession and administration of Roberto;
sometime in June 1989, while on her one-month
vacation, she discovered that he was cohabiting with
another woman; she further discovered that he had
been disposing of some of her properties without her
knowledge or consent; she confronted him about this
and thereafter appointed her brother Moises R.
Avera as her attorney-in-fact to take care of her
properties; he failed and refused to turn over the
possession and administration of said properties to
her brother/attorney-in-fact. The petition prayed that
a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from
exercising any act of administration and ownership
over said properties; their marriage be declared null
and void and of no force and effect; and Delia
Soledad be declared the sole and exclusive owner of
all properties acquired at the time of their void
marriage and such properties be placed under the
proper management and administration of the
attorney-in-fact.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a
void marriage is necessary. If in the affirmative,
whether the same should be filed only for purposes
of remarriage.
HELD:
Yes, a judicial declaration of a void marriage is
necessary and it can be filed even if not for the
purpose of remarriage.
Under the law, parties to a marriage should not be
allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if
such be the fact but must first secure a judicial
declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they
can be allowed to marry again.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
"ART. 40.The absolute nullity of a previous marriage
may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void." (n).
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the
significant clause denotes that such final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void need not be
obtained only for purposes of remarriage.
Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances
where a party might well invoke the absolute nullity
of a previous marriage for purposes other than
remarriage, such as in case of an action for
liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of
property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as
an action for the custody and support of their

common children and the delivery of the latter's
presumptive legitimes.
Therefore, in the instance where a party who has
previously contracted a marriage which remains
subsisting desires to enter into another marriage
which is legally unassailable, he is required by law to
prove that the previous one was an absolute nullity.
But this he may do on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
69) BELTRAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 137567. June 20, 2000
Facts:
Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix were
married on June 16, 1973 at the Immaculate
Concepcion Parish Church in Cubao, Quezon City.
They were blessed with four children. After 24 years
of marriage, Beltran filed a petition for nullity of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code before the RTC
of Quezon City.
Charmaine Felix answer she alleged that it was
Meyanard who abandoned the conjugal home and
lived with a certain woman named Milagros Salting.
Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal complaint
for concubinage against Meynard and his paramour
before the City Prosecutor's Office of Makati who, in
a Resolution found probable cause and ordered the
filing of an Information against them. The case,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 236176, was filed
before the MTC of Makati City.
On March 20, 1998, Meynard filed a Motion to Defer
Proceedings Including the Issuance of the Warrant
of Arrest in the criminal case. He argued that the
pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of
his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the
determination of the criminal case.
Issue:
Whether or not the pending case involving a
declaration of nullity of marriage based on article 36
is a prejudicial question to a criminal action of
concubinage involving identical parties.
Held: No. It is not a prejudicial question.
Under the law, the pendency of the case for
declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage is not a
prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a
civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal
65

action as to cause the suspension of the latter
pending the final determination of the civil case, it
must appear not only that the said civil case involves
the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution
would be based, but also that in the resolution of the
issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action,
the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined.
In the case at bar, the parties to the marriage should
not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity,
for the same must be submitted to the judgment of
the competent courts and only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and
so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore,
he who contracts a second marriage before the
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy."
Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his
wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
concubinage.
70) MARBELA-BOBIS vs. ISAGANI BOBIS
G.R. No. 138509, July 31, 2000
FACTS:
On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first
marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier. Without
said marriage having been annulled, nullified or
terminated, the same respondent contracted a
second marriage with petitioner Imelda MarbellaBobis on January 25, 1996 and allegedly a third
marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez.
Based on petitioner's complaint-affidavit, an
information for bigamy was filed against respondent
on February 25, 1998, which was docketed as
Criminal Case No. Q98-75611 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 226, Quezon City. Sometime
thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the
judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first
marriage on the ground that it was celebrated
without a marriage license. Respondent then filed a
motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal
case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case for
nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question
to the criminal case. The trial judge granted the
motion to suspend the criminal case in an Order
dated December 29, 1998.
ISSUE:
Whether the subsequent filing of a civil action for

declaration of nullity of a previous marriage
constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case
for bigamy.
HELD:
No, it is not a prejudicial question.
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, which was
effective at the time of celebration of the second
marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of
nullity of a previous marriage before a party may
remarry. The clear implication of this is that it is not
for the parties, particularly the accused, to determine
the validity or invalidity of the marriage. Whether or
not the first marriage was void for lack of a license is
a matter of defense because there is still no judicial
declaration of its nullity at the time the second
marriage was contracted. It should be remembered
that bigamy can successfully be prosecuted
provided all its elements concur, two of which are a
previous marriage and a subsequent marriage which
would have been valid had it not been for the
existence at the material time of the first marriage.
Therefore, Isagani cannot be permitted to use his
own malfeasance to defeat the criminal action
against him. The court should then immediately
proceed with the criminal case without waiting for the
result of the civil case.
71) MERCADO vs. CONSUELO TAN
G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000
FACTS:
Ma. Consuelo Tan and Vincent Mercado were
married in 1991. However, at the time of the
marriage of Tan with Mercado, the latter was actually
a married man, having been in lawful wedlock with
Ma. Thelma Oliva on 1976. In the first marriage he
have two children and in the second marriage he
has one child.
On October 5, 1992, a complaint for bigamy was
filed by Tan against Mercado. A month later, a
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage was
filed by Mercado against Oliva. On May 6, 1993, the
trial court declared the marriage of Mercado and
Oliva as void ab initio. Nevertheless, the lower court
found accused Mercado guilty of the crime of bigamy
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower
court by stating that accused Mercado failed to
comply with Article 40 of the Family Code.
66

ISSUE:
Whether or not accused Mercado is guilty of bigamy
despite of his having obtained a judicial declaration
of nullity of marriage?
RULING:
Yes, Mercado is guilty of bigamy.
Under Article 40 of the Family Code and the rulings
enunciated in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy and Domingo
vs. Court of Appeals which expressly state that in
order to re-marry, one must first obtain a judicial
declaration of nullity of the previous marriage.
In the case at bar, accused Mercado failed to comply
with the requirement because he married Tan
without first securing a judicial declaration of his
marriage with Oliva. He only filed for such a month
after he was charge with the crime of bigamy.
Therefore, the crime of bigamy was already
consummated when he contracted a second
marriage while the first was still subsisting. The
subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the
first marriage was immaterial.
72) MORIGO V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. 145226, February 6, 2004
Facts:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates
four years.. After the school year 1977-1978 they
lost contact with each other. Yet, after some time,
when Lucia was in Singapore she sent a letter to
Lucio, their friendship was rekindled. They became
sweethearts and on 1986 Lucia returned to the
Philippines. On 1990 they eventually got married.
After their marriage celebration, Lucia once again
left for Canada. After a year, Lucia filed with the
Ontario Court a petition for divorce against Lucio
which was granted on January 17, 1992.
In October of the same year, Lucio married Maria
Lumbago. Thereafter, he filed a petition for nullity of
his marriage to Lucia on the ground that no marriage
ceremony actually took place. In 1993, an
Information for Bigamy was filed against Lucio. He
moved for the suspension of the arraignment
alleging that the civil case for judicial nullification of
his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question
in the bigamy case. His motion was denied.
and on appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the

conviction of Bigamy. It ruled that what is sought to
be punished by Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code is the act of contracting a second marriage
before the first marriage had been dissolved.
Issue:
Whether or not Lucio is guilty of bigamy by
contracting a marriage with Maria, considering that
there was no marriage ceremony took place with his
marriage with Lucia.
Held:
No, he is not guilty.
Under the law, the first element of Bigamy is that the
offender has been legally married and under the
principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared
void ab initio, the two were never married "from the
beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears
no legal effect.
In the case at bar, no marriage ceremony at all was
performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer.
Lucio and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage
contract on their own. The mere private act of
signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a
valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial
declaration of nullity. Legally speaking, Lucio was
never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first
marriage to speak of.
Therefore, Lucio is acquitted by the Supreme Court
from the charge of Bigamy because Lucio was not
married to Lucia at the time he contracted his
marriage with Maria,
73) CALISTERIO vs. MARIETTA CALISTERIO
G.R. No. 136467, April 6, 2000
Facts:
On 24 April 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died intestate,
leaving several parcels of land with an estimated
value of P604,750.00. Teodorico was survived by his
wife, Marietta Calisterio. Teodorico was the second
husband of Marietta who had previously been
married to James William Bounds. James Bounds
disappeared without a trace on 11 February 1947.
Teodorico and Marietta were married eleven years
later, or on 08 May 1958, without Marietta having
priorly secured a court declaration that James was
presumptively dead.
Subsequently, Lucio was convicted by the Trial Court
67

On 09 October 1992, Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a
surviving sister of Teodorico, filed with the Regional
Trial Court a petition entitled, "In the Matter of
Intestate Estate of the Deceased Teodorico
Calisterio y Cacabelos, Antonia Armas claiming to
be the sole surviving heir of Teodorico Calisterio,
and that the marriage between the latter and
Marietta Espinosa Calisterio being allegedly
bigamous and thereby null and void. Marietta
opposed the petition. Marietta stated that her first
marriage with James Bounds had been dissolved
due to the latter's absence, his whereabouts being
unknown, for more than eleven years before she
contracted her second marriage with Teodorico.
Contending to be the surviving spouse of Teodorico,
she sought priority in the administration of the estate
of the decedent.
On 17 January 1996, the lower court handed down
its decision in favor of petitioner Antonia and
declared the latter as the sole heir of the estate of
Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos. Respondent
Marietta appealed the decision of the trial court to
the Court of Appeals which ruled in her favor.
Issue:
Whether or not the second marriage, having been
contracted during the regime of the Civil Code,
should be deemed valid notwithstanding the
absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive
death of James Bounds.
Held:
The marriage between the deceased Teodorico and
Marietta was solemnized on 08 May 1958. The law
in force at that time was the Civil Code, not the
Family Code which took effect only on 03 August
1988. Article 256 of the Family Code itself limited its
retroactive governance only to cases where it
thereby would not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws.
Verily, the applicable specific provision in the instant
controversy is Article 83 (2) of the New Civil Code
which provides: Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently
contracted by any person during the lifetime of the
first spouse of such person with any person other
than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from
its performance, unless: (2) The first spouse had
been absent for seven consecutive years at the time
of the second marriage without the spouse present
having news of the absentee being alive, or if the
absentee, though he has been absent for less than
seven years, is generally considered as dead and
believed to be so by the spouse present at the time
of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the

absentee is presumed dead according to articles
390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be
valid in any of the three cases until declared null and
void by a competent court.
Under the foregoing provisions a judicial declaration
of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary
as long as the prescribed period of absence is met.
It is equally noteworthy that the marriage in these
exceptional cases are, by the explicit mandate of
Article 83, to be deemed valid "until declared null
and void by a competent court." It follows that the
burden of proof would be, in these cases, on the
party assailing the second marriage.
Therefore, it remained undisputed that Mariettas
first husband, James Bounds, had been absent or
had disappeared for more than eleven years before
she entered into a second marriage in 1958 with the
deceased Theodorico Calisterio. This second
marriage, having been contracted during the regime
of the civil code should thus be deemed valid.
74) REPUBLIC vs. NOLASCO
220 SCRA 21
FACTS:
On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco
filed before the RTC of Antique a petition for the
declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet
Monica Parker, invoking Article 41 of the Family
Code. The petition prayed that respondent's wife be
declared presumptively dead or, in the alternative,
that the marriage be declared null and void. The
Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition
through the Provincial Prosecutor of Antique who
had been deputized to assist the Solicitor-General in
the instant case. The Republic argued, first, that
Nolasco did not possess a "well-founded belief that
the absent spouse was already dead," 2 and second,
Nolasco's attempt to have his marriage annulled in
the same proceeding was a "cunning attempt" to
circumvent the law on marriage. During trial,
respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman
and that he had first met Janet Monica Parker, a
British subject, in a bar in England during one of his
ship's port calls. From that chance meeting onwards,
Janet Monica Parker lived with respondent on his
ship for six (6) months until they returned to
respondent's hometown of San Jose, Antique after
his seaman's contract expired. Respondent married
Janet Monica Parker in San Jose, Antique, in
Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in
the Cathedral of San Jose.
68

Respondent further testified that after the marriage
celebration, he obtained another employment
contract as a seaman and left his wife with his
parents in San Jose, Antique. Sometime in January
1983, while working overseas, respondent received
a letter from his mother informing him that Janet
Monica had given birth to his son. The same letter
informed him that Janet Monica had left Antique.
Respondent claimed he then immediately asked
permission to leave his ship to return home. He
arrived in Antique in November 1983. Respondent
further testified that his efforts to look for her himself
whenever his ship docked in England proved
fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he had
sent to his missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road,
Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of the bar
where he and Janet Monica first met, were all
returned to him. He also claimed that he inquired
from among friends but they too had no news of
Janet Monica. On cross-examination, respondent
stated that he had lived with and later married Janet
Monica Parker despite his lack of knowledge as to
her family background. He insisted that his wife
continued to refuse to give him such information
even after they were married. He also testified that
he did not report the matter of Janet Monica's
disappearance to the Philippine government
authorities.
Respondent presented his mother, Alicia Nolasco, as
his witness. She testified that her daughter-in-law
Janet Monica had expressed a desire to return to
England even before she had given birth to Gerry
Nolasco. When asked why her daughter-in-law might
have wished to leave Antique, respondent's mother
replied that Janet Monica never got used to the rural
way of life in San Jose, Antique. Alicia Nolasco also
said that she had tried to dissuade Janet Monica
from leaving as she had given birth to her son just
fifteen days before, but when she (Alicia) failed to do
so, she gave Janet Monica P22,000.00 for her
expenses before she left for England. She further
claimed that she had no information as to the
missing person's present whereabouts.The trial
court granted Nolasco's petition declaring Janet
Monica Parker Nolasco as presumptively dead,
without prejudice to her reappearance. The Republic
appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the
trial court erred in declaring Janet Monica Parker
presumptively dead because respondent Nolasco
had failed to show that there existed a well founded
belief for such declaration.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision. Hence this Petition for Review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief
that his wife is already dead.
HELD:
Four (4) requisites for the declaration of presumptive
death under Article 41 of the Family Code:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing
for four consecutive years, or two
consecutive years if the disappearance
occurred where there is danger of death
under the circumstances laid down in Article
391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded
belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary
proceeding
for
the
declaration
of
presumptive death of the absentee.
The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to
conduct a search for his missing wife with such
diligence as to give rise to a "well-founded belief"
that she is dead.
In the case at bar, the Court considers that the
investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in
his attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's
whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a
reasonable or well-founded belief that she was
already dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique
after learning of Janet Monica's departure, instead of
seeking the help of local authorities or of the British
Embassy, he secured another seaman's contract
and went to London, a vast city of many millions of
inhabitants, to look for her there. In Respondent's
testimony, however, showed that he confused
London for Liverpool and this casts doubt on his
supposed efforts to locate his wife in England. The
Court of Appeal's justification of the mistake, to wit:
Well, while the cognoscente would readily know the
geographical difference between London and
Liverpool, for a humble seaman like Gregorio the
two places could mean one place in England, the
port where his ship docked and where he found
Janet. Our own provincial folks, every time they
leave home to visit relatives in Pasay City, Kalookan
City, or Paraaque, would announce to friends and
relatives, "We're going to Manila." This apparent
error in naming of places of destination does not
appear to be fatal. Is not well taken. There is no
analogy between Manila and its neighboring cities,
69

on one hand, and London and Liverpool, on the
other, which, as pointed out by the Solicitor-General,
are around three hundred fifty (350) kilometers
apart. We do not consider that walking into a major
city like Liverpool or London with a simple hope of
somehow bumping into one particular person there
which is in effect what Nolasco says he did can
be regarded as a reasonably diligent search.
The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet
Monica declined to give any information as to her
personal background even after she had married
respondent 17 too convenient an excuse to justify his
failure to locate her. The same can be said of the
loss of the alleged letters respondent had sent to his
wife which respondent claims were all returned to
him. Respondent said he had lost these returned
letters, under unspecified circumstances. Neither
can this Court give much credence to respondent's
bare assertion that he had inquired from their friends
of her whereabouts, considering that respondent did
not identify those friends in his testimony. The Court
of Appeals ruled that since the prosecutor failed to
rebut this evidence during trial, it is good evidence.
But this kind of evidence cannot, by its nature, be
rebutted. In any case, admissibility is not
synonymous with credibility. As noted before, there
are serious doubts to respondent's credibility.
Moreover, even if admitted as evidence, said
testimony merely tended to show that the missing
spouse had chosen not to communicate with their
common acquaintances, and not that she was dead.
Respondent testified that immediately after receiving
his mother's letter sometime in January 1983, he cut
short his employment contract to return to San Jose,
Antique. However, he did not explain the delay of
nine (9) months from January 1983, when he
allegedly asked leave from his captain, to November
1983 when be finally reached San Jose.
Respondent, moreover, claimed he married Janet
Monica Parker without inquiring about her parents
and their place of residence. 19 Also, respondent
failed to explain why he did not even try to get the
help of the police or other authorities in London and
Liverpool in his effort to find his wife. The
circumstances of Janet Monica's departure and
respondent's subsequent behavior make it very
difficult to regard the claimed belief that Janet
Monica was dead a well-founded one.
The spouses should not be allowed, by the simple
expedient of agreeing that one of them leave the
conjugal abode and never to return again, to
circumvent the policy of the laws on marriage. The
Court notes that respondent even tried to have his

marriage annulled before the trial court in the same
proceeding.
While the Court understands the need of
respondent's young son, Gerry Nolasco, for
maternal care, still the requirements of the law must
prevail. Since respondent failed to satisfy the clear
requirements of the law, his petition for a judicial
declaration of presumptive death must be denied. In
fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the
well-founded belief required by law that his absent
wife was already dead that would sustain the
issuance of a court order declaring Janet Monica
Parker presumptively dead.
74) REPUBLIC VS. LORINO
G.R. No. 160258 January 19, 2005
FACTS:
Respondent Gloria Bermudez-Lorino filed, On
August 14, 2000, nine (9) years after she left her
husband, a verified petition with the RTC under the
rules on Summary Judicial Proceedings in the
Family Law provided for in the Family Code, for a
Court declaration that her husband is judicially
presumed dead for the purpose of remarriage. She
alleged that: A) she and FRANCISCO LORINO, JR.
were married on June 12, 1987 and begot three (3)
children. B) Before they got married she was
unaware that her husband was a habitual drinker,
possessed with violent character/attitude, and had
the propensity to go out with friends to the extent of
being unable to engage in any gainful work. C)
Because of her husbands violent character, Gloria
found it safer to leave him behind and decided to go
back to her parents together with her three (3)
children. D) From the time of her physical separation
from her husband in 1991, Gloria has not heard of
him at all. She had absolutely no communications
with him, or with any of his relatives. She believes
that he is already dead and is now seeking through
this petition for a Court declaration that her husband
is judicially presumed dead for the purpose of
remarriage. On August 28, 2000, the RTC issued an
order directing, the publication of the petition in a
newspaper of general circulation. On September 16,
2000, the order for hearing was published in a
newspaper of general circulation in this province
once a week for three consecutive weeks and be
posted in the bulletin boards of the Hall of Justice
and the Municipal Hall, San Mateo, Rizal. Finding
the said petition to be sufficient in form and
substance, the same is hereby set for hearing before
70

the Court on September 18, 2000. The trial court
ruled declaring the presumptive death/absence of
Francisco Lorino, Jr. pursuant to Art. 41 of the New
Family Code but subject to all restrictions and
conditions provided therein. The judgment being
immediately final and executory under the provisions
of Article 247 of the Family Code, thus: Art. 247. The
judgment of the court shall be immediately final and
executory, Despite the decision of the trial court
having become final, the Office of the Solicitor
General, nevertheless filed a Notice of Appeal. The
RTC had the records elevated to the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals, treating the case as
an ordinary appealed case under Rule 41 of the
Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, denied the
Republics appeal and accordingly affirmed the
appealed decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals duly acquired
jurisdiction over the appeal on a final and executory
judgment of the Regonal Trial Court.
HELD:
No. In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the
Family Code, there is no reglementary period within
which to perfect an appeal, precisely because
judgments rendered thereunder, by express
provision of Section 247, Family Code, are
"immediately final and executory". It was erroneous,
therefore, on the part of the RTC to give due course
to the Republics appeal and order the transmittal of
the entire records of the case to the Court of
Appeals. An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction
to review a judgment which, by express provision of
law, is immediately final and executory. The right to
appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of due
process, for it is merely a statutory privilege." Since,
by express mandate of Article 247 of the Family
Code, all judgments rendered in summary judicial
proceedings in Family Law are "immediately final
and executory", the right to appeal was not granted
to any of the parties therein. The Republic of the
Philippines, as oppositor in the petition for
declaration of presumptive death, should not be
treated differently. It had no right to appeal the RTC
decision of November 7, 2001. Nothing is more
settled in law than that when a judgment becomes
final and executory it becomes immutable and
unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in
any respect, even if the modification is meant to
correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law, and whether made by the
highest court of the But, if only to set the records
straight and for the future guidance of the bench and
the bar, let it be stated that the RTCs decision dated

November 7, 2001, was immediately final and
executory upon notice to the parties. It was
erroneous for the OSG to file a notice of appeal, and
for the RTC to give due course thereto. The Court of
Appeals acquired no jurisdiction over the case, and
should have dismissed the appeal outright on that
ground.
76) TY VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 127406. November 27, 2000
FACTS:
As shown in the records of the case, private
respondent married Anna Maria Regina Villanueva in
a civil ceremony on March 29, 1977, in Manila.
Then they had a church wedding on August 27,
1977. However, on August 4, 1980, the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City declared
their marriage null and void ab initio for lack of a
valid marriage license. The church wedding on
August 27, 1977, was also declared null and void ab
initio for lack of consent of the parties.
Even before the decree was issued nullifying his
marriage to Anna Maria, private respondent wed
Ofelia P. Ty, herein petitioner, on April 4, 1979, in
ceremonies officiated by the judge of the City Court
of Pasay. On April 4, 1982, they also had a church
wedding in Makati, Metro Manila.
Private respondent filed a petition, which alleged that
his marriage with petitioner was void for lack of
marriage license and his marriage with Anne Maria
was still subsisting.
ISSUE:
Whether or not nullity of first marriage is required
before obtaining 2nd marriage.
HELD:
In Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy (1986), the Court held that
there is a need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a
void marriage. In Wiegel, Lilia married Maxion in
1972. In 1978, she married another man, Wiegel.
Wiegel filed a petition with the Juvenile Domestic
Relations Court to declare his marriage to Lilia as
void on the ground of her previous valid marriage.
The Court, expressly relying on Consuegra,
concluded that:
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence
about the existing prior marriage of her first husband
at the time they married each other, for then such a
marriage though void still needs according to this
Court a judicial declaration (citing Consuegra) of
such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she
71

would still be regarded as a married woman at the
time she contracted her marriage with respondent
Karl Heinz Wiegel; accordingly, the marriage of
petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID
under the law.
At any rate, the confusion under the Civil Code was
put to rest under the Family Code. Our rulings in
Gomez, Consuegra, and Wiegel were eventually
embodied in Article 40 of the Family Code. Article 40
of said Code expressly required a judicial declaration
of nullity of marriage
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage
may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void.
In Terre v. Terre (1992) the Court, applying Gomez,
Consuegra and Wiegel, categorically stated that a
judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is
necessary. Thus, we disbarred a lawyer for
contracting a bigamous marriage during the
subsistence of his first marriage. He claimed that his
first marriage in 1977 was void since his first wife
was already married in 1968. We held that Atty.
Terre should have known that the prevailing case
law is that for purposes of determining whether a
person is legally free to contract a second marriage,
a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null
and void ab initio is essential.
In the present case, the second marriage of private
respondent was entered into in 1979, before
Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found in
Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first marriage of
private respondent being void for lack of license and
consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of
its nullity before he could contract a second
marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude that
private respondents second marriage to petitioner is
valid.
77) CARINO vs. CARINO
351 SCRA 131
FACTS:
SPO4 Santiago S. Carino contracted two
marriages during his lifetime, the first was on June
20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao, with whom
he had two children, and the second was on
November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee and
had no children at all in their 10 years of
cohabitation. On November 23, 1992, SPO4
Santiago Carino passed away in the care of Susan
Yee who paid the medical and burial expenses. Both
petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary
benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the
deceased from various government agencies,

petitioner was able to collect a total of P146,000.00
and respondent has collected P21,000.00
On December 14, 1993, respondent filed the
instant case for the collection of money against
petitioner to return to respondent at least one half of
the money she has collected from the government
agencies. Petitioner failed to file her answer and was
declared in default. Respondent then admitted that
her marriage with the deceased took place during
the subsistence of, and without the judicial
declaration of nullity of the 1st marriage. She also
claimed that she was not aware that the deceased
has a previous marriage and only found out when
petitioner introduced herself as the wife. To bolster
her action for collection of money, respondent
contended that the marriage of petitioner with the
deceased is void ab initio because the same was
solemnized without the required marriage license. In
support thereof, respondent presented: 1) the
marriage certificate of the deceased and the
petitioner which bears no marriage license number,
and 2) a certification dated March 9, 1994, from the
Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila.
RTC ruled in favor of respondent. And on
appeal, CA affirmed the decision of the lower court in
toto. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the two marriages contracted
by the deceased are valid
HELD:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of
a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for the
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole
basis acceptable by law, for said projected marriage
to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void. However, for
purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.
In the case at bar, there is no question that
the marriage of petitioner and deceased does not fall
within the marriages exempt from the marriage
license requirement. A marriage license, therefore,
was indispensible to the validity of their marriage.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the
marriage of petitioner and deceased has been
sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of
petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and
that they secured the valid marriage license.
72

It does not follow from the foregoing
disposition , however, that since the marriage of
petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab
initio, the death benefits under the scrutiny would
now be awarded to respondent. Accordingly, the
declaration in the instant case of nullity of the
previous marriage of the deceased and the petitioner
does not validate the second marriage of the
deceased with respondent. The fact remains that
their marriage was solemnize without first obtaining
a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner
and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of
respondent and the deceased is likewise, void ab
initio. As to the death benefits that the deceased
obtained from the government agencies, it should be
given to his legal heirs as it was declared an
intestate succession. The children from the first
marriage shall be the ones obtaining the said
benefits.
73

IX. VOIDABLE MARRIAGES
78) ANAYA vs. PALAROAN
36 SCRA 97
FACTS:
Plaintiff Aurora and defendant Fernando were
married on 4 December 1953; that defendant
Fernando filed an action for annulment of the
marriage on 7 January 1954 on the ground that his
consent was obtained through force and intimidation;
that judgment was rendered therein on 23
September 1959 dismissing the complaint of
Fernando, upholding the validity of the marriage and
granting Aurora's counterclaim; that (per paragraph
IV) while the amount of the counterclaim was being
negotiated "to settle the judgment," Fernando had
divulged to Aurora that several months prior to their
marriage he had pre-marital relationship with a close
relative of his; and that "the non-divulgement to her
of the aforementioned pre-marital secret on the part
of defendant that definitely wrecked their marriage,
which apparently doomed to fail even before it had
hardly commenced ... frank disclosure of which,
certitude precisely precluded her, the Plaintiff herein
from going thru the marriage that was solemnized
between them constituted 'FRAUD', in obtaining her
consent, within the contemplation of No. 4 of Article
85 of the Civil Code" (sic) (Record on Appeal, page
3). She prayed for the annulment of the marriage
and for moral damages.
Failing in its attempt to have the parties
reconciled, the court set the case for trial on 26
August 1966 but it was postponed. Thereafter, while
reviewing the expendiente, the court realized that
Aurora's allegation of the fraud was legally
insufficient to invalidate her marriage. The court
dismissed the complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her
husband of his pre-marital relationship with another
woman is a ground for annulment of marriage.
HELD:
We must agree with the lower court that it is not. For
fraud as a vice of consent in marriage, which may be
a cause for its annulment, comes under Article 85,
No. 4, of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 85. A marriage may be annulled for any of the
following causes, existing at the time of the
marriage:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by
fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full
knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely

cohabited with the other as her husband or his wife,
as the case may be;
This fraud, as vice of consent, is limited exclusively
by law to those kinds or species of fraud enumerated
in Article 86, as follows:
ART. 86. Any of the following circumstances shall
constitute fraud referred to in number 4 of the
preceding article:
(1) Misrepresentati
on as to the
identity of one
of
the
contracting
parties;
(2) Non-disclosure
of the previous
conviction
of
the other party
of
a
crime
involving moral
turpitude, and
the
penalty
imposed
was
imprisonment
for two years or
more;
(3) Concealment
by the wife of
the fact that at
the time of the
marriage, she
was pregnant
by a man other
than
her
husband.
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character,
rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud
as will give grounds for action for the annulment of
marriage.
The intention of Congress to confine the
circumstances that can constitute fraud as ground
for annulment of marriage to the foregoing three
cases may be deduced from the fact that, of all the
causes of nullity enumerated in Article 85, fraud is
the only one given special treatment in a subsequent
article within the chapter on void and voidable
marriages. If its intention were otherwise, Congress
would have stopped at Article 85, for, anyway, fraud
in general is already mentioned therein as a cause
for annulment. But Article 86 was also enacted,
expressly and specifically dealing with "fraud
referred to in number 4 of the preceding article," and
proceeds by enumerating the specific frauds
(misrepresentation as to identity, non-disclosure of a
74

previous conviction, and concealment of pregnancy),
making it clear that Congress intended to exclude all
other frauds or deceits. To stress further such
intention, the enumeration of the specific frauds was
followed
by
the
interdiction:
"No
other
misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank,
fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will
give grounds for action for the annulment of
marriage."
Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital
relationship with another woman is not one of the
enumerated circumstances that would constitute a
ground for annulment; and it is further excluded by
the last paragraph of the article, providing that "no
other misrepresentation or deceit as to ... chastity"
shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage.
While a woman may detest such non-disclosure of
premarital lewdness or feel having been thereby
cheated into giving her consent to the marriage,
nevertheless the law does not assuage her grief
after her consent was solemnly given, for upon
marriage she entered into an institution in which
society, and not herself alone, is interested. The
lawmaker's intent being plain, the Court's duty is to
give effect to the same, whether it agrees with the
rule or not.
On the merits of this second fraud charge, it
is enough to point out that any secret intention on
the husband's part not to perform his marital duties
must have been discovered by the wife soon after
the marriage: hence her action for annulment based
on that fraud should have been brought within four
years after the marriage. Since appellant's wedding
was celebrated in December of 1953, and this
ground was only pleaded in 1966, it must be
declared already barred.
79) AQUINO vs. DELIZO
109 Phil. 21
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari to review a
decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal which dismissed
petitioner's complaint for annulment of his marriage
with respondent Conchita Delizo.
The dismissed complaint, which was filed on
September 6, 1955, was based on the ground of
fraud, it being alleged, among other things, that
respondent, at the date of her marriage to petitioner
Aquino, on December 27, 1954, concealed from the
latter that fact that she was pregnant by another
man, and sometime in April, 1955, or about four
months after their marriage, gave birth to a child. In
her answer, defendant claimed that the child was

conceived out of lawful wedlock between her and the
plaintiff.
At the trial, the attorney's for both parties appeared
and the court a quo ordered Assistant Provincial
Fiscal Jose Goco to represent the State in the
proceedings to prevent collusion. Only the plaintiff
however, testified and the only documentary
evidence presented was the marriage contract
between the parties. Defendant neither appeared
nor presented any evidence despite the reservation
made by her counsel that he would present evidence
on a later date.
On June 16, 1956, the trial court, noting that no birth
certificate was presented to show that the child was
born within 180 days after the marriage between the
parties, and holding that concealment of pregnancy
as alleged by the plaintiff does not constitute such
fraud that would annul a marriage, dismissed the
complaint. Through a verified "petition to reopen for
reception of additional evidence", plaintiff tried to
present the certificates of birth and delivery of the
child born of the defendant on April 26, 1955, which
documents, according to him, he had failed to
secure earlier and produce before the trial court thru
excusable negligence. The petition, however, was
denied.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, that court held
that there has been excusable neglect in plaintiff's
inability to present the proof of the child's birth,
through her birth certificate, and for that reason the
court a quo erred in denying the motion for reception
of additional evidence. On the theory, however, that
it was not impossible for plaintiff and defendant to
have had sexual intercourse during their
engagement so that the child could be their own,
and finding unbelievable plaintiff's claim that he did
not notice or even suspect that defendant was
pregnant when he married her, the appellate court,
nevertheless, affirmed the dismissal of the
complaint.
Plaintiff filed a motion praying that the decision be
reconsidered, or, if such reconsideration be denied,
that the case be remanded to the lower court for new
trial.
The Court of Appeals denied the motion. From that
order, the plaintiff brought the case to this Court thru
the present petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the concealment by the wife
of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was
pregnant by a man other than her husband
constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment of
marriage.
75

HELD:
The court held that the dismissal of plaintiff's
complaint cannot be sustained.
Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the wife
of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was
pregnant by a man other than her husband
constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment of
marriage. The defendant wife was alleged to be only
more than four months pregnant at the time of her
marriage to plaintiff. At that stage, we are not
prepared to say that her pregnancy was readily
apparent, especially since she was "naturally plump"
or fat as alleged by plaintiff. According to medical
authorities, even on the 5th month of pregnancy, the
enlargement of a woman's abdomen is still below
the umbilicus, that is to say, the enlargement is
limited to the lower part of the abdomen so that it is
hardly noticeable and may, if noticed, be attributed
only to fat formation on the lower part of the
abdomen. It is only on the 6th month of pregnancy
that the enlargement of the woman's abdomen
reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the
roundness of the abdomen more general and
apparent. If, as claimed by plaintiff, defendant is
"naturally plump", he could hardly be expected to
know, merely by looking, whether or not she was
pregnant at the time of their marriage more so
because she must have attempted to conceal the
true state of affairs. Even physicians and surgeons,
with the aid of the woman herself who shows and
gives her subjective and objective symptoms, can
only claim positive diagnosis of pregnancy in 33% at
five months. and 50% at six months.
The appellate court also said that it was not
impossible for plaintiff and defendant to have had
sexual intercourse before they got married and
therefore the child could be their own. This
statement, however, is purely conjectural and finds
no support or justification in the record.
Upon the other hand, the evidence sought to be
introduced at the new trial, taken together with what
has already been adduced would, in our opinion, be
sufficient to sustain the fraud alleged by plaintiff. The
Court of Appeals should, therefore, not have denied
the motion praying for new trial simply because
defendant failed to file her answer thereto. Such
failure of the defendant cannot be taken as evidence
of collusion, especially since a provincial fiscal has
been ordered to represent the Government precisely
to prevent such collusion. As to the veracity of the
contents of the motion and its annexes, the same
can best be determined only after hearing evidence.
In the circumstance, we think that justice would be
better served if a new trial were ordered.
80) JIMENEZ vs. REPUBLIC

109 PHIL 273
FACTS:
The plaintiff Joel Jimenez prays for a decree
annulling his marriage to the defendant Remedios
Cazares contracted on 3 August 1950 before a judge
of the municipal court of Zamboanga City, upon the
ground that the office of her genitals or vagina was
to small to allow the penetration of a male organ or
penis for copulation; that the condition of her genitals
as described above existed at the time of marriage
and continues to exist; and that for that reason he
left the conjugal home two nights and one day after
they had been married. The wife was summoned
and served a copy of the complaint. She did not file
an answer. On 29 September 1956, pursuant to the
provisions of article 88 of the Civil Code, the Court
directed the city attorney of Zamboanga to inquire
whether there was a collusion, to intervene for the
State to see that the evidence for the plaintiff is not a
frame-up, concocted or fabricated. On 17 December
1956 the Court entered an order requiring the
defendant to submit to a physical examination by a
competent lady physician to determine her physical
capacity for copulation and to submit, within ten days
from receipt of the order, a medical certificate on the
result thereof. On 14 March 1957 the defendant was
granted additional five days from notice to comply
with the order of 17 December 1956 with warning
that her failure to undergo medical examination and
submit the required doctor's certificate would be
deemed lack of interest on her part in the case and
that judgment upon the evidence presented by her
husband would be rendered.
After hearing, at which the defendant was not
present, on 11 April 1957 the Court entered a decree
annulling the marriage between the plaintiff and the
defendant. The city attorney filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decree thus entered, upon the
ground, among others, that the defendant's
impotency has not been satisfactorily established as
required by law; that she had not been physically
examined because she had refused to be examined;
that instead of annulling the marriage the Court
should have punished her for contempt of court and
compelled her to undergo a physical examination
and submit a medical certificate; and that the decree
sought to be reconsidered would open the door to
married couples, who want to end their marriage to
collude or connive with each other by just alleging
impotency of one of them. He prayed that the
complaint be dismissed or that the wife be subjected
76

to a physical examination. Pending resolution of his
motion, the city attorney timely appealed from the
decree. On 13 May 1957 the motion for
reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage in question
may be annulled on the strength only of the lone
testimony of the husband who claimed and testified
that his wife was and is impotent.
HELD:
The law specifically enumerates the legal
grounds, that must be proved to exist by indubitable
evidence, to annul a marriage. In the case at bar, the
annulment of the marriage in question was decreed
upon the sole testimony of the husband who was
expected to give testimony tending or aiming at
securing the annulment of his marriage he sought
and seeks. Whether the wife is really impotent
cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily
established, because from the commencement of
the proceedings until the entry of the decree she had
abstained from taking part therein. Although her
refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court
show indifference on her part, yet from such attitude
the presumption arising out of the suppression of
evidence could not arise or be inferred because
women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and
shy and would not submit to a physical examination
unless compelled to by competent authority. This the
Court may do without doing violence to and
infringing in this case is not self-incrimination. She is
not charged with any offense. She is not being
compelled to be a witness against herself.
"Impotency being an abnormal condition should not
be presumed. The presumption is in favor of
potency." The lone testimony of the husband that his
wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is
insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound
them together as husband and wife.
The decree appealed from is set aside and the case
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings
in accordance with this decision, without
pronouncement as to costs.
77

X. LEGAL SEPARATION
81) DE OCAMPO vs. FLORENCIANO
G.R. No. L-13553, February 23, 1960
FACTS:
In 1938, Jose and Serafina were married
and lived together as husband and wife. They were
blessed of several children who are now living with
plaintiff. In March, 1951, Jose discovered on several
occasions that Serafina was maintaining illicit
relations with Jose Arcalas. For this reason, Jose
sent his wife Serafina to Manila in June 1951 to
study beauty culture, where she stayed for a year.
However, Jose discovered that his wife, while in
Manila was going out with several other men, aside
from Jose Arcalas. After Serafina finished her study
in 1952, she and her husband lived separately. On
June 18, 1955, Jose surprised his wife in the act of
having illicit relations with another man by the name
of Nelson Orzame. Jose signified his intention of
filing a petition for legal separation, to which Serafina
agreed provided she is will not be charged with
adultery. On July 5, 1955, a petition for legal
separation was filed by Jose in conformity with the
condition requested by Serafina.
The Court of Appeals found that in the night
of June 18, 1955, the husband upon discovering the
illicit happening has expressed his wish to file a
petition for legal separation and defendant readily
agreed to such filing. And when she was questioned
by the Fiscal upon orders of the court, she reiterated
her conformity to the legal separation even as she
admitted having had sexual relations with one
Nelson Orzame. Interpreting these facts virtually to
mean a confession of judgment the Appellate Court
declared that under Art. 101, legal separation could
not be decreed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the
committed a reversible error.
appellate
court
RULING:
Yes. As we understand the article, it does
not exclude, as evidence, any admission or
confession made by the defendant outside of the
court. It merely prohibits a decree of separation upon
a confession of judgment. Confession of judgment
usually happens when the defendant appears in
court and confesses the right of plaintiff to judgment
or files a pleading expressly agreeing to the plaintiff's
demand.
Yet, even supposing that the above
statement of defendant constituted practically a
confession of judgment, inasmuch as there is
evidence of the adultery independently of such

statement, the decree may and should be granted,
since it would not be based on her confession, but
upon evidence presented by the plaintiff. What the
law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively or
mainly on defendant's confession. If a confession
defeats the action ipso facto, any defendant who
opposes the separation will immediately confess
judgment, purposely to prevent it.
The mere circumstance that defendants told
the Fiscal that she "like also" to be legally separated
from her husband, is no obstacle to the successful
prosecution of the action. When she refused to
answer the complaint, she indicated her willingness
to be separated. Yet, the law does not order the
dismissal. Allowing the proceeding to continue, it
takes precautions against collusion, which implies
more than consent or lack of opposition to the
agreement.
82) BROWN vs. JUANITA YAMBAO
G.R. No. L-10699, October 18, 1957
FACTS:
William H. Brown filed suit in the Court of First
Instance of Manila to obtain legal separation from his
lawful wife Juanita Yambao. He alleged under oath
that while interned by the Japanese invaders, from
1942 to 1945, at the University of Sto. Tomas
internment camp, his wife engaged in adulterous
relations with one Carlos Field of whom she begot a
baby girl that Brown learned of his wifes misconduct
only in 1945, upon his release from internment; that
thereafter the spouse lived separately and later
executed a document liquidating their conjugal
partnership and assigning certain properties to the
erring wife as her share. The complaint prayed for
confirmation of the liquidation agreement; for
custody of the children issued of the marriage; that
the defendant be declared disqualified to succeed
the plaintiff; and for their remedy as might be just
and equitable. Upon petition of the plaintiff, the court
subsequently declared the wife in default, for failure
to answer in due time, despite service of summons;
and directed the City Fiscal or his representatives to
investigate, in accordance with Article 101 of the
Civil Code, whether or not a collusion exists between
the parties and to report to this Court the result of his
investigation within fifteen (15) days from receipt of
copy of this order. The City Fiscal or his
representative is also directed to intervene in the
case in behalf of the State.
As ordered, Assistant City Fiscal Rafael Jose
appeared at the trial, and cross-examined plaintiff
78

Brown. His questions (strenuously objected to by
Brown's counsel) elicited the fact that after liberation,
Brown had lived maritally with another woman and
had begotten children by her. Thereafter, the court
rendered judgment denying the legal separation
asked, on the ground that, while the wife's adultery
was established, Brown had incurred in a
misconduct of similar nature that barred his right of
action under Article 100 of the new Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in permitting the
Assistant Fiscal Rafel Jose of Manila to act as
counsel for the defendant, who defaulted.
RULING:
NO. Appellant Brown argues that in cross-examining
him with regard to his marital relation with Lilia Deito,
who was not his wife, the Assistant Fiscal acted as
counsel for the defaulting wife, "when the power of
the prosecuting officer is limited to finding out
whether or not there is collusion, and if there is no
collusion, which is the fact in the case at bar, to
intervene for the state which is not the fact in the
instant case, the truth of the matter being that he
intervened for Juanita Yambao, the defendantappellee, who is private citizen and who is far from
being the state.
The court below also found, and correctly held that
the appellant's action was already barred, because
Brown did not petition for legal separation
proceedings until ten years after he learned of his
wife's adultery, which was upon his release from
internment in 1945. Under Article 102 of the new
Civil Code, action for legal separation can not be
filed except within one (1) year from and after the
plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within
five years from and after the date when such cause
occurred. Appellant's brief does not even contest the
correctness of such findings and conclusion.
It is true that the wife has not interposed prescription
as a defense. Nevertheless, the courts can take
cognizance thereof, because actions seeking a
decree of legal separation, or annulment of
marriage, involve public interest and it is the policy of
our law that no such decree be issued if any legal
obstacles thereto appear upon the record.
83) LERMA vs. CA

G.R. No. L-33352 December 20, 1974
FACTS:
Petitioner Lerma and respondent Diaz are husband
and wife. Petitioner filed a complaint for adultery
against the respondent and a certain Teodoro
Ramirez. Respondent a complaint against the
petitioner for legal separation and/or separation of
properties, custody of their children and support,
with an urgent petition for support pendente lite for
her and their youngest son, Gregory, who was then
and until now is in her custody. The respondent's
complaint for legal separation is based on two
grounds: concubinage and attempt against her
life.The petitioner filed his opposition to the
respondent's application for support pendente lite,
setting up as defense te adultery charge he had filed
against the respondent.Judge Luciano of CFI of
Rizal granted the respondent's application for
support pendente lite to the following effect: (1) the
respondent was declared entitled to support
pendente lite from the date of the filing of the
complaint; and (2) the amount of such monthly
support was reduced from P2,250.00 to P1,820.00.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals and
requested for prohibition and preliminary injunction
to annul the aforementioned orders. Court of
Appeals gave due course to the petition and issued
a writ of preliminary injunction to stop Judge Luciano
from enforcing said orders. Moreover, on opposition
of the respondent , the Court of Appeals dismissed
such petition of the petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not adultery is a good defense against
the respondent's claim for support pendente lite.
RULING:
Yes. The probable failure of the respondent's suit for
legal separation can be foreseen since she is not an
innocent spouse, having been convicted of adultery
by the Court of First Instance. It is true that the
judgment of conviction is on appeal in the Court of
Appeals, but the same undoubtedly satisfies the
standard of provisional showing set by the aforesaid
Rule. If legal separation cannot be claimed by the
guilty spouse in the first place, the fact that an action
for that purpose is filed anyway should not be
permitted to be used as a means to obtain support
pendente lite, which, without such action, would be
denied on the strength of the decisions of this Court
recognizing adultery as a good defense. Otherwise,
as pointed out by the petitioner, all that an erring
spouse has to do to circumvent such defense would
79

be to file a suit for legal separation no matter how
groundless.
The right to separate support or maintenance, even
from the conjugal partnership property, presupposes
the existence of a justifiable cause for the spouse
claiming such right to live separately. This is implicit
in Article 104 of the Civil Code, which states that
after the filing of the petition for legal separation the
spouses shall be entitled to live separately from
each other. A petition in bad faith, such as that filed
by one who is himself or herself guilty of an act
which constitutes a ground for legal separation at the
instance of the other spouse, cannot be considered
as within the intendment of the law granting separate
support. In fact under Article 303 of the same Code
the obligation to give support shall cease "when the
recipient, be he a forced heir or not, has committed
some act which gives rise to disinheritance;" and
under Article 921 one of the causes for disinheriting
a spouse is "when the spouse has given cause for
legal separation." The loss of the substantive right to
support in such a situation is incompatible with any
claim for support pendente lite.
84) BUGAYONG vs. GINEZ
G.R. No. L-10033, December 28, 1956
FACTS:
Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the United
States Navy, was married to defendant Leonila
Ginez on August 27, 1949, at Asingan, Pangasinan,
while on leave. Immediately after their marriage, the
couple lived with their sisters who later moved to
Sampaloc, Manila. After some time, or about July,
1951, Leonila Ginez left the dwelling of her sister-inlaw and informed her husband by letter that she had
gone to reside with her mother in Asingan,
Pangasinan, from which place she later moved to
Dagupan City to study in a local college there.
As early as July, 1951, Benjamin Bugayong began
receiving letters from Valeriana Polangco and some
from anonymous writers informing him of alleged
acts of infidelity of his wife which he did not even
care to mention. In August, 1952, plaintiff went to
Asingan, Pangasinan, and sought for his wife whom
he met in the house of one Mrs. Malalang,
defendant's godmother. She came along with him
and both proceeded to the house of Pedro
Bugayong, a cousin of the plaintiff-husband, where
they stayed and lived for 2 nights and 1 day as
husband and wife. Then they repaired to the
plaintiff's house and again passed the night therein
as husband and wife. On the second day, Benjamin
Bugayong tried to verify from his wife the truth of the
information he received that she had committed

adultery but Leonila, instead of answering his query,
merely packed up and left, which he took as a
confirmation of the acts of infidelity imputed on her.
After that and despite such belief, plaintiff exerted
efforts to locate her and failing to find her, he went to
Bacarra, Ilocos Norte, "to soothe his wounded
feelings".
On November 18, 1952, Benjamin Bugayong filed in
the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan a
complaint for legal separation against his wife. The
motion to dismiss was answered by plaintiff and the
Court, considering only the second ground of the
motion to dismiss i. e., condonation, ordered the
dismissal of the action.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is condonation on the
part of the husband with respect to the legal
separation case on account of adultery of the wife.
RULING:
Yes. The Court considered plaintiff's line of conduct
under the assumption that he really believed his wife
guilty of adultery. What did he do in such state of
mind. In August, 1952, he went to Pangasinan and
looked for his wife and after finding her they lived
together as husband and wife for 2 nights and 1 day,
after which he says that he tried to verify from her
the truth of the news he had about her infidelity, but
failed to attain his purpose because his wife, instead
of answering his query on the matter, preferred to
desert him, probably enraged for being subjected to
such humiliation. And yet he tried to locate her,
though in vain.
A detailed examination of the testimony of the
plaintiff-husband, especially those portions quoted
above, clearly shows that there was a condonation
on the part of the husband for the supposed "acts of
rank infidelity amounting to adultery" committed by
defendant-wife. Admitting for the sake of argument
that the infidelities amounting to adultery were
committed by the defendant, a reconciliation was
effected between her and the plaintiff. The act of the
latter in persuading her to come along with him, and
the fact that she went with him and consented to be
brought to the house of his cousin Pedro Bugayong
and together they slept there as husband and wife
for one day and one night, and the further fact that in
the second night they again slept together in their
house likewise as husband and wife all these
facts have no other meaning in the opinion of this
court than that a reconciliation between them was
effected and that there was a condonation of the
wife by the husband. The reconciliation occurred
almost ten months after he came to know of the acts
80

of infidelity amounting to adultery.
There is no merit in the contention of appellant that
the lower court erred in entertaining condonation as
a ground for dismissal inasmuch as same was not
raised in the answer or in a motion to dismiss,
because in the second ground of the motion to
dismiss.
85) LAPERAL vs. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. L- 18008. October 30, 1962
FACTS:
After several years of marriage with Enrique Sta.
Maria, a decree of legal separation was granted by
the court. On the other hand, Elisea Laperal has also
ceased to live with him. A special procedure for
change of name and /or permission to resume the
maiden name of herein petitioner Elisea Laperal,
was filed. The petition was opposed on the ground
that the same violates the provisions of Art. 372 of
the New Civil Code. The court however granted the
petition on the ground that her continued use of her
married name will give rise to confusion in her affairs
and in the eventual liquidation of their conjugal
assets. The State appealed.
That in view of the fact that she has been legally
separated from Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria and has
likewise ceased to live with him for many years, it is
desirable that she be allowed to change her name
and/or be permitted to resume using her maiden
name to ELISEA LAPERAL. In its decision of
October 31, 1960, the court denied the petition for
the reason that Article 372 of the Civil Code requires
the wife, even after she is decreed legally separated
from her husband, to continue using the name and
surname she employed before the legal separation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for the change of name
should be granted.
RULING:
No, Art. 372 of New Civil Code is written in a
language that is mandatory, that the wife, even after
the legal separation has been decreed should
continue using her name and surname employed
before legal separation. This is so because her
married status is unaffected by the separation, there
being no severance of the vinculum. It seems to be
the policy of the law that the wife should continue to
use the name indicative of her unchanged status for
the benefit of all concerned.
The Supreme Court decided that from the petition
quoted in full at the beginning of these opinion, the
only reason relied upon for the change of name is

the fact that petitioner is legally separated from her
husband and has, in fact, ceased to live with him for
many years. It is doubtful, to say the least, whether
Rule 103 which refers to change of name in general,
may prevail over the specific provisions of Article
372 of the New Civil Code with regards to married
women legally separated from their husbands. Even,
however, applying Rule 103 to this case, the fact of
legal separation alone which is the only basis for the
petition at bar is, in the opinion of the Court, not a
sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of
herein petitioner, for to hold otherwise would be to
provide an easy circumvention of the mandatory
provisions of Article 372.
86) ONG vs. LUCITA G. ONG
G.R. No. 153206, October 23, 2006
FACTS:
Ong Eng Kiam, also known as William Ong (William)
and Lucita G. Ong (Lucita) were married on July 13,
1975 at the San Agustin Church in Manila. They
have three children: Kingston, Charleston, and
Princeton who are now all of the age of majority. In
1996, Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal Separation
alleging that her life with William was marked by
physical violence, threats, intimidation and grossly
abusive conduct.
Lucita claimed that she and William quarreled almost
every day, with physical violence being inflicted upon
her; William would shout invectives at her like
"putang ina mo", "gago", "tanga", and he would slap
her, kick her, pull her hair, bang her head against
concrete wall and throw at her whatever he could
reach with his hand; the causes of these fights were
petty things regarding their children or their
business.William would also scold and beat the
children at different parts of their bodies using the
buckle of his belt; whenever she tried to stop William
from hitting the children, he would turn his ire on her
and box her
In 1995, after she protested with Williams decision
to allow their eldest son Kingston to go to Bacolod,
William slapped her and said, "it is none of your
business". In the same year, she asked William to
bring Kingston back from Bacolod; a violent quarrel
ensued and William hit her on her head, left cheek,
eye, stomach, and arms; when William hit her on the
stomach and she bent down because of the pain, he
hit her on the head then pointed a gun at her and
asked her to leave the house; she then went to her
sisters house in Binondo where she was fetched by
her other siblings and brought to their parents house
81

in Dagupan; the following day, she went to her
parents doctor, Dr. Vicente Elinzano for treatment of
her injuries.
William for his part denied that he ever inflicted
physical harm on his wife, used insulting language
against her, or whipped the children with the buckle
of his belt. RTC rendered its Decision decreeing
legal separation. It found that "it is indubitable that
plaintiff (Lucita) and defendant (William) had their
frequent quarrels and misunderstanding which made
both of their lives miserable and hellish. This is even
admitted by the defendant when he said that there
was no day that he did not quarrel with his wife.
Defendant had regarded the plaintiff negligent in the
performance of her wifely duties and had blamed her
for not reporting to him about the wrongdoings of
their children." The CA found that the testimonies for
Lucita were straightforward and credible and the
ground for legal separation. William filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the CA.
William to smash the plate with steak and hit

Charleston, then slapped Lucita and shouted at her
"putang ina mo, gago, wala kang pakialam,
tarantado" when she sided with Charleston.
William also posits that the real motive of Lucita in
filing the case for legal separation is in order for her
side of the family to gain control of the conjugal
properties; that Lucita was willing to destroy his
reputation by filing the legal separation case just so
her parents and her siblings could control the
properties he worked hard for. The Court finds such
reasoning hard to believe. The claim of William that
a decree of legal separation would taint his
reputation and label him as a wife-beater and childabuser also does not elicit sympathy from this Court.
If there would be such a smear on his reputation
then it would not be because of Lucitas decision to
seek relief from the courts, but because he gave
Lucita reason to go to court in the first place.
ISSUE:
Whether a decree of legal separation should not be
granted following Art. 56(4) of the FC which provides
that legal separation shall be denied when both
parties have given ground for legal separation.
HELD:
A decree of legal separation should be granted in
this case. The abandonment referred to by the
Family Code is abandonment without justifiable
cause for more than one year. As it was established
that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct,
such
does
not
constitute
abandonment
contemplated by the said provision. As correctly
observed by the trial court, William himself admitted
that there was no day that he did not quarrel with his
wife, which made his life miserable, and he blames
her for being negligent of her wifely duties and for
not reporting to him the wrongdoings of their
children.
Lucita and her sister, Linda Lim, also gave numerous
accounts of the instances when William displayed
violent temper against Lucita and their children; such
as: when William threw a steel chair at Lucita threw
chairs at their children slapped Lucita and utter
insulting words at her use the buckle of the belt in
whipping the children; pinned Lucita against the wall
with his strong arms almost strangling her, and
smashed the flower vase and brick rocks and
moldings leaving the bedroom in disarray shouted at
Lucita and threw a directory at her, in front of Linda
and the employees of their business, because he
could not find a draft letter on his table got mad at
Charleston for cooking steak with vetchin prompting
82

XI.
RIGHTS
AND OBLIGATIONS
HUSBAND AND WIFE
BETWEEN
87) ARROYO vs. DE ARROYO

G.R. No. L-17014, August 11, 1921
FACTS:
In 1910 Mariano and Dolores married each other
and lived together as husband and wife. In 1920
Dolores went away and left their common home with
the intention of living separately from her husband
Mariano. After failing to convince and induce Dolores
to come back and resume her marital obligations,
Mariano filed an action to compel her to live with
him. Dolores answered by claiming that her husband
was very cruel and in turn prayed for a decree of
separation. The trial judge, upon consideration of the
evidence before him, reached the conclusion that
the husband was more to blame than his wife and
that his continued ill-treatment of her furnished
sufficient justification for her abandonment of the
conjugal home and the permanent breaking off of
marital relations with him.
The Court has carefully examined and weighed
every line of the proof, and is of the opinion that the
conclusion stated is wholly untenable. The evidence
shows that the wife is afflicted with a disposition of
jealousy towards her husband in an aggravated
degree; and to his cause are chiefly traceable
without a doubt the many miseries that have
attended their married life. During the trial it was
found out that the husband was not cruel to the wife.
Furthermore, it was the wife who was excessively
jealous without any proof of infidelity of the husband.
Therefore the wife is morally and legally obligated to
live with her husband.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the wife can be ordered by the court
to live with her husband and failure of which will
constitute contempt of court?
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court in this case is unable to
hold that Mariano B. Arroyo is entitled to the
unconditional and absolute order for the return of the
wife to the marital domicile, which is sought in the
petitory part of the complaint though he is, without
doubt, entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife
has presented herself without sufficient cause and
that it is her duty to return. Moreover, upon
examination of the authorities the court ruled that it
is convinced that it is not within the province of the
courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the
spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights
to, the other. Of course where the property rights of

one of the pair are invalid, an action for restitution of
such rights can be maintained. But we are
disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order,
enforcible by process of contempt, may be entered
to compel the restitution of the purely personal rights
of consortium.
At best such an order can be effective for no
other purpose than to compel the spouses to live
under the same roof; and the experience of these
countries where the court of justice have assumed to
compel the cohabitation of married people shows
that the policy of the practice is extremely
questionable
Therefore, reversing the judgment appealed from, in
respect both to the original complaint and the crossbill, it is declared that Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo
has absented herself from the marital home without
sufficient cause; and she is admonished that it is her
duty to returnNo. The court ruled in the negative.
The authorities are convinced that it is not within the
province of the court to compel the wife to live with
her husband because such obligation is purely
personal in nature. However the court can declare
her to be absent from the marital home without
sufficient cause. She is further admonished that it is
her duty to return.
88) PELAYO vs. MARCELO LAURON
G.R. No. L-4089, January 12, 1909
FACTS:
Arturo Pelayo, a physician, filed a complaint against
Marcelo Lauron and Juana Abella setting forth that
on or about the 13th of October of said year, at night,
the plaintiff was called to the house of the
defendants, situated in San Nicolas, and that upon
arrival he was requested by them to render medical
assistance to their daughter-in-law who was about to
give birth to a child; that therefore, and after
consultation with the attending physician, Dr.
Escao, it was found necessary, on account of the
difficult birth, to remove the fetus by means of
forceps which operation was performed by the
plaintiff, who also had to remove the afterbirth, in
which services he was occupied until the following
morning, and that afterwards, on the same day, he
visited the patient several times; that the just and
equitable value of the services rendered by him was
P500, which the defendants refuse to pay without
alleging any good reason therefor; that.
In answer to the complaint counsel for the
defendants denied all of the allegation therein
contained and alleged as a special defense, that
83

their daughter-in-law had died in consequence of the
said childbirth, and that when she was alive she
lived with her husband independently and in a
separate house without any relation whatever with
them, and that, if on the day when she gave birth
she was in the house of the defendants, her stay
their was accidental and due to fortuitous
circumstances
ISSUE:
Whether or not father and mother-in-law
may be compelled to pay the fees concerning the
services performed with the daughter-in-law.
RULING:
No. In the face of the above legal precepts it is
unquestionable that the person bound to pay the
fees due to the plaintiff for the professional services
that he rendered to the daughter-in-law of the
defendants during her childbirth, is the husband of
the patient and not her father and mother- in-law, the
defendants herein. Father and mother-in-law are
strangers with respect to the obligation that devolves
upon the husband to provide support, among which
is the furnishing of medical assistance to his wife at
the time of her confinement; and, on the other hand,
it does not appear that a contract existed between
the defendants and the plaintiff physician, for which
reason it is obvious that the former can not be
compelled to pay fees which they are under no
liability to pay because it does not appear that they
consented to bind themselves.
The foregoing suffices to demonstrate that the first
and second errors assigned to the judgment below
are unfounded, because, if the plaintiff has no right
of action against the defendants, it is needless to
declare whether or not the use of forceps is a
surgical operation. From the foregoing it may readily
be understood that it was improper to have brought
an action against the defendants simply because
they were the parties who called the plaintiff and
requested him to assist the patient during her difficult
confinement, and also, possibly, because they were
her father and mother-in-law and the sickness
occurred in their house. The defendants were not,
nor are they now, under any obligation by virtue of
any legal provision, to pay the fees claimed, nor in
consequence of any contract entered into between
them and the plaintiff from which such obligation
might have arisen.
89) ILUSORIO V. ILUSORIO

GRN 139789, May 12, 2000
FACTS: Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer
Potenciano Ilusorio.
Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age
possessed of extensive property valued at millions of
pesos. For many years, lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio
was Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio
Country Club.
On July 11, 1942, Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano
Ilusorio contracted matrimony and lived together for
a period of thirty (30) years. In 1972, they separated
from bed and board . Potenciano lived at Urdaneta
Condominium, Ayala Ave., Makati City when he was
in Manila and at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country
Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other
hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo City.
Out of their marriage, the spouses had six (6)
children.
On December 30, 1997, upon Potenciano's arrival
from the United States, he stayed with Erlinda for
about five (5) months in Antipolo City. The children,
Sylvia and Erlinda, alleged that during this time, their
mother gave Potenciano an overdose of
an
antidepressant drug prescribed by his doctor. As a
consequence, Potenciano's health deteriorated.
On February 25, 1998, Erlinda filed with the RTC
Antipolo City a petition for guardianship over the
person and property of Potenciano Ilusorio due to
the latter's advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight
and impaired judgment.
On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate
meeting in Baguio City, Potenciano Ilusorio did not
return to Antipolo City and instead lived at Cleveland
Condominium, Makati.
On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed with the CA a
petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of
lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. She alleged that
respondents refused petitioner's demands to see
and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano
from returning to Antipolo City.
CA granted visitation rights in favor of
Erlinda though she did not pray for such and the
administration of the Cleveland Condominium
ISSUE: May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to
compel her husband to live with her in conjugal
bliss?
HELD: The answer is no. Marital rights including
coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be
enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus.
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention or by which the rightful
84

custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled
thereto.
"Habeas corpus is a writ directed to the person
detaining another, commanding him to produce the
body of the prisoner at a designated time and place,
with the day and cause of his capture and detention,
to do, submit to, and receive whatsoever the court or
judge awarding the writ shall consider in that behalf.
The evidence shows that there was no actual and
effective detention or deprivation of lawyer
Potenciano Ilusorio's liberty that would justify the
issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano
Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or under
medication does not necessarily render him mentally
incapacitated.
After due hearing, the Court of Appeals
concluded that there was no unlawful restraint on his
liberty. Likewise, Potenciano Ilusorio did not request
the administrator of the Cleveland Condominium and
not to allow his wife and other children from seeing
or visiting him. He made it clear that he did not
object to seeing them.
Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed
with the capacity to make choices. In this case, the
crucial choices revolve on his residence and the
people he opts to see or live with. The choices he
made may not appeal to some of his family
members but these are choices which exclusively
belong to Potenciano. He made it clear before the
Court of Appeals that he was not prevented from
leaving his house or seeing people.
With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of
choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the subject of
visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise,
we will deprive him of his right to privacy. Needless
to say, this will run against his fundamental
constitutional right.
In case the husband refuses to see his wife for
private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without
threat of any penalty attached to the exercise of his
right.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to
compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture
cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of
habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other
mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial
authority and is best left to the man and woman's
free choice.
85

XII. PROPERTY RELATIONS
90) MOISES JOCSON V. C.A
170 SCRA 333
FACTS: Emilio Jocson during his lifetime sold
parcels of land to his daughter Agustina. One said
parcels of land bears and entry in the TCT Emilio
Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete. These parcels
of land are claimed by one of the surviving heirs of
Emilio to have been sold fictitiously and without any
or insufficient consideration. Futhermore he claimed
that when his father sold one of the land, it was still
part of the conjugal property of their parents which
has not been liquidated.
Agustina on the otherhand claim that the sale was
with sufficient consideration and rebutted the
allegation that she has no source of income by
alleging she is engaged in playa buying business.
This was not controverted by Moises.
ISSUE: Will the presumption that a property is
conjugal arise based on the entry in the registry
which states that the owner is Married to thereby
making it conjugal.
HELD; In order for the presumption to apply, it must
first be proven that the property was acquired during
the marriage. The description married to does not
vest title but merely serves to describe the civil
status. Registration does not vest ownership but
merely confirms one already vested. The allegation
that the sale is fictitious due to insufficient
consideration must be proven by the one who allege
the same. In this case Moises failed to prove this
fact which likewise fails to overcome the
presumption that a sale is with sufficient
consideration.
91) TODA JR V. ROSEMARIE TUASON-TODA
153 SCRA 713
FACTS: Benigno Toda, Jr and Rose Marie TuasonToda were married on June 9, 1951 and were
blessed with two children. Individual differences and
the alleged infidelity of Benigno, however, marred
the conjugal union thereby prompting Rose Marie to
file on December 18, 1979 in the CFI of Rizal, a
petition for termination of conjugal partnership for
alleged mismanagement and dissipation of conjugal
funds against Benigno.
In order not to lengthen the proceedings, the parties
entered into a compromise agreement. However
said agreement caused further litigation due to the

question on its effectivity. This is material to
determine when and how much certain shares of
stock is payable.
ISSUE: When is the effectivity of a compromise
agreement entered into by the husband and wife? Is
it when the court approves of the same or when the
spouses signed it?
HELD: The compromise agreement separating their
properties is given effect only upon the approval of
the court. Under Article 190 of the Civil Code, "(i)n
the absence of an express declaration in the
marriage settlements, the separation of property
between spouses during the marriage shall not take
place save in virtue of a judicial order." Hence, the
separation of property is not effected by the mere
execution of the contract or agreement of the
parties, but by the decree of the court approving the
same. It, therefore, becomes effective on y upon
judicial approval, without which it is void.
Furthermore, Article 192 of said Code explicitly
provides that the conjugal partnership is dissolved
only upon the issuance of a decree of separation of
property
92) WONG V. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT and ROMARICO HENSON
200 SCRA 792
FACTS: Romarico Henson married Katrina Pineda
on January 6, 1964. They have three children but
even during the early years of their marriage,
Romarico and Katrina had been most of the time
living separately. The former stayed in Angeles City
while the latter lived in Manila. During the marriage
or on January 6, 1971, Romarico bought a 1,787
square-meter parcel of land in Angeles City for
P11,492 from his father, Dr. Celestino L. Henson
with money borrowed from an officemate.
Meanwhile, in Hongkong sometime in June 1972,
Katrina entered into an agreement with Anita Chan
whereby the latter consigned to Katrina pieces of
jewelry for sale valued at 199,895 Hongkong dollars
or P321,830.95. 4 When Katrina failed to return the
pieces of jewelry within the 20-day period agreed
upon, Anita Chan demanded payment of their value.
Thereafter Anita and her husband filed an action for
collection of sum of money. After trial, the court
promulgated a decision in favor of the Wongs. It
ordered Katrina and Romarico Henson to pay the
Wongs.
86

A writ of execution was thereafter issued. Levied
upon were four lots in Angeles City all in the name of
Romarico Henson ... married to Katrina Henson.
ISSUE: WON the judgment of execution extends to
the properties owned by the husband
HELD: The Court disagrees with the CA that the said
properties are exclusively owned by Romarico.
Having been acquired during the marriage, they are
still presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership
even though Romarico and Katrina had been living
separately.
The presumption of the conjugal nature of the
properties subsists in the absence of clear,
satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome
said presumption or to prove that Romarico
exclusively owns the properties. While there is proof
that Romarico acquired the properties with money
he had borrowed from an officemate, it is unclear
where he obtained the money to repay the loan. If he
paid it out of his salaries, then the money is part of
the conjugal assets and not exclusively his. Proof on
this matter is of paramount importance considering
that in the determination of the nature of a property
acquired by a person during covertrue, the
controlling factor is the source of the money utilized
in the purchase.
The
conjugal
nature
of
the
properties
notwithstanding, Katrina's indebtedness may not be
paid for with them her obligation not having been
shown by the petitioners to be one of the charges
against the conjugal partnership. In addition to the
fact that her rights over the properties are merely
inchoate prior to the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership, the consent of her husband and her
authority to incur such indebtedness had not been
alleged in the complaint and proven at the trial.
Furthermore, under the Civil Code (before the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988), a
wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when
she purchases things necessary for the support of
the family or when she borrows money for the
purpose of purchasing things necessary for the
support of the family if the husband fails to deliver
the proper sum; 32 when the administration of the
conjugal partnership is transferred to the wife by the
courts 33 or by the husband 34 and when the wife
gives moderate donations for charity. 35 Having failed
to establish that any of these circumstances
occurred, the Wongs may not bind the conjugal
assets to answer for Katrina's personal obligation to
them.
93) BELCODERO V. CA
227 SCRA 303
FACTS: Alayo D. Bosing, married Juliana Oday on
27 July 1927, with whom he had three children. In
1946, he left the conjugal home, and he started to
live instead with Josefa Rivera with whom he later
begot one child, named Josephine Bosing, now
Josephine Belcodero.
On 23 August 1949, Alayo purchased a parcel of
land on installment basis from the Magdalena
Estate, Inc. In the deed, he indicated his civil status
as, "married to Josefa R. Bosing," the common-law
wife. In a letter which he addressed to Magdalena
Estate, Inc., he authorized the latter to transfer the
lot in the name of his "wife Josefa R. Bosing." The
final deed of sale was executed by Magdalena
Estate, Inc. A few days later, or on 09 November
1959, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 48790 was
issued in the name of "Josefa R. Bosing, . . . married
to Alayo Bosing, . . ."
On 06 June 1958, Alayo married Josefa while his
prior marriage with Juliana was still subsisting.
Alayo died on 11 March 1967. About three years
later, or on September 1970, Josefa and Josephine
executed a document of extrajudicial partition and
sale of the lot in question, which was there described
as "conjugal property" of Josefa and deceased
Alayo. In this deed, Josefa's supposed one-half (1/2)
interest as surviving spouse of Alayo, as well as her
one-fourth (1/4) interest as heir, was conveyed to
Josephine for a P10,000.00 consideration, thereby
completing for herself, along with her one-fourth
(1/4) interest as the surviving child of Alayo, a full
"ownership" of the property. A new TCT No. 198840
was issued on June 1974 in the name of Josephine.
On October 1980, Juliana (deceased Alayo's real
widow) and her three legitimate children filed with
the court a quo an action for reconveyance of the
property. TC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.
CA affirmed.
ISSUE: WON THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION
BELONGS EXCLUSIVELY TO THE PETITIONERS.
HELD: It cannot be seriously contended that, simply
because the Property was titled in the name of
Josefa at Alayo's request, she should thereby be
deemed to be its owner. The property
unquestionably was acquired by Alayo. Alayo's letter,
dated 06 October 1959, to Magdalena Estate, Inc.,
merely authorized the latter to have the title to the
property transferred to her name. More importantly,
she implicitly recognized Alayo's ownership when,
87

three years after the death of Alayo, she and
Josephine executed the deed of extrajudicial
partition and sale in which she asserted a one-half
(1/2) interest .
The property remained as belonging to the conjugal
partnership of Alayo and his legitimate wife Juliana.
Under both the new Civil Code (Article 160) and the
old Civil Code (Article 1407), "all property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife." This
presumption has not been convincingly rebutted.
As regards the property relation between
common-law spouses, Article 144 of the Civil Code
merely codified the law established through judicial
precedents under the old code. In both regimes, the
co-ownership rule had more than once been
repudiated when either or both spouses suffered
from an impediment to marry.
The present
provisions under Article 147 and Article 148 of the
Family Code did not much deviate from the old rules;
in any case, its provisions cannot apply to this case
without interdicting prior vested rights (Article 256,
Family Code).
It was at the time that 'the adjudication of ownership
was made following Alayo's demise (not when Alayo
merely allowed the property to be titled in Josefa's
name which clearly was not intended to be
adversarial to Alayo's interest), that a constructive
trust was deemed to have been created by operation
of law under the provisions of Article 1456 of the
Civil Code.
Article 1456. If the property is acquired through
mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force
of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for
the benefit of the person from whom the property
comes. AFFIREMED.
94) VALDEZ V. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY and CONSUELO M.
GOMEZ-VALDEZ
260 SCRA 221
FACTS: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were
married in January 1971 and had five children. In a
petition, dated 22 June 1992, Valdez sought the
declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family code. After the hearing the
parties following the joinder of issues, the trial court,
in its decision of 29 July 1994, granted the petition,
declaring among others that (1) the marriage of
petitioner Antonio Valdez and respondent Consuelo
Gomez-Valdez null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code on the ground of their mutual
psychological incapacity to comply with their

essential marital obligations; and (2) the petitioner
and the respondent are directed to start proceedings
on the liquidation of their common properties as
defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to
comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51, and 52
of the same code, within thirty (30) days from notice
of this decision.
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that
portion of the decision directing compliance with
Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She
asserted that the Family Code contained no
provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of
common property in "unions without marriage." In an
order, the TC made the following clarification:
Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the
Family Code explicitly provides that the property
acquired by both parties during their union, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to
have been obtained through the joint efforts of the
parties and will be owned by them in equal shares,
plaintiff and defendant will own their "family home"
and all their properties for that matter in equal
shares. In the liquidation and partition of properties
owned in common by the plaintiff and defendant, the
provisions on ownership found in the Civil Code shall
apply.
The TC said that considering that this Court has
already declared the marriage between petitioner
and respondent as null and void ab initio, pursuant
to Art. 147, the property regime of petitioner and
respondent shall be governed by the rules on coownership.
In his recourse to this Court, petitioner submits that
Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code should be
held controlling.
ISSUE: WON Article 147 of the Family Code apply to
cases where the parties are psychologically
incapacitated.
HELD: The trial court correctly applied the law. In a
void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article
147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the
Family Code. Article 147 provides:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are
capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit
of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages
and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares
and the property acquired by both of them through
their work or industry shall be governed by the rules
on co-ownership
88

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties
acquired while they lived together shall be presumed
to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be owned by them in equal
shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did
not participate in the acquisition by the other party of
any property shall be deemed to have contributed
jointly in the acquisition thereof in the former's efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
and of the household.
Under this property regime, property acquired by
both spouses through their work and industry shall
be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership.
Any property acquired during the union is prima facie
presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall be considered as
having contributed thereto jointly if said party's
"efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of
gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are
not included in the co-ownership.
Thus, petitioner and private respondent own the
"family home" and all their common property in equal
shares, as well as in concluding that, in the
liquidation and partition of the property owned in
common by them, the provisions on co-ownership
under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in
relation to Articles 102 and 129, of the Family Code,
should aptly prevail. AFFIRMED.
95) ESTONINA V. COURT OF APPEALS
266 SCRA 627
FACTS: The controversy involves Lot C situated in
Barrio Santisima Cruz, Sta. Cruz, Laguna with an
area of 273 square meters. The said parcel of land
was in the name of Santiago Garcia who died on
October 2, 1967. Some six years after Santiago
Garcia's death, or on March 10, 1973, the then CFI
of Manila issued an order granting Trinidad
Estonina's application for a writ of preliminary
attachment. Consequently, a notice of attachment
was inscribed in favor of Trinidad Estonina covering
all the rights, title, interest, and participation that
Consuelo Garcia, the widow of Santiago Garcia,
may have in and to the parcel of land covered by the
said title.
On August 14, 1977, the children of Santiago Garcia
with his first wife, Adela Isoreta, namely Ofelia,
Remedios, Elvira and Castor all surnamed Garcia,
executed a deed selling, transferring and conveying
unto the spouses Celso Atayan and Nilda Hicban
their "title, rights, interest and participation which is
four tenths (4/10) pro indiviso share" in the said

parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-82229. About a
year after, Santiago Garcia's second wife and widow,
Consuelo Garcia and their children, Virgilio, Marilou
and Lolita, all surnamed Garcia, followed suit and
also sold to the spouses Atayan, their four-tenths
(4/10) pro indidviso share in the same parcel of land.
On February 22, 1980, Estrella R. Garcia, the widow
of Santiago Garcia, Jr. (Santiago Garcia's son from
his first marriage), and their children, Roderick,
Elizabeth, Dorothy and Erlinda, likewise sold to the
spouses Atayan, their one-tenth (1/10) pro indiviso
share in the parcel of land covered by TCT No. T82229.
Subsequent to a favorable decision obtained by
Trinidad Estonina against Consuelo Garcia,
execution pending appeal was made on the parcel of
land formerly covered by TCT No. T-82229 on July
20, 1979. The said parcel of land was sold at a
public auction where Trinidad Estonina was the
highest bidder. Consuelo Garcia appealed the
decision in Civil Case before the IAC which,
however, ruled in favor of Trinidad Estonina. Upon
the finality of the said decision, TCT No. T-82229
was cancelled by the Register of Deeds of Laguna
and in lieu thereof, TCT No. T-99961 was issued in
favor of "Trinidad Estonina married to Paulino
Estonina".
On July 25, 1985, the spouses Atayan filed a
complaint for annulment of sheriff's sale and transfer
certificate of title with damages before Branch 28 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santa Cruz,
Laguna, impleading as defendants therein the
spouses Trinidad and Paulino Estonina , Nicanor E.
Silvano, Reynaldo G. Javier, Edmund R. Solidum,
the Register of Deeds of Laguna, and the heirs of
Santiago Garcia who sold to the spouses Atayan
their pro indiviso shares in the parcel of land covered
by TCT No. T-82229.
RTC:dismissed the complaint. It found the lot
covered by TCT No. T-82229, was acquired during
the marriage of Santiago Garcia and Consuelo
Gaza, and is presumed to be conjugal in nature.
Upon the death of Santiago Garcia on October 2,
1967, his conjugal share of one-half (l/2) of the said
parcel of land was transmitted to his heirs by
intestate succession. By the law on intestate
succession, his nine children, five by his first wife
and four out of the subsequent marriage, and
Consuelo Garcia, his second wife and widow,
inherited the same at one-tenth (1/10) each pro
indiviso. The remaining one-half (1/2) pertained to
the conjugal share of Consuelo Garcia. Thus,
inasmuch as Consuelo Garcia inherited one-tenth
(1/10) of her husband's conjugal share in the said
89

property and is the owner of one-half (1/2) thereof as
her conjugal share, she owns a total of 55% (or 1/10
plus 1/2) of the said parcel of land. What could be
attached by the spouses Estonina and later levied
on execution and sold at public auction was only
Consuelo Garcia's rights and interests which is fifty
five per cent (55%) of the property.
CA: the parcel of land in question was not the
conjugal property of Santiago and Consuelo Garcia,
but was the former's exclusive property. It was
therefore the entire property that formed part of
Santiago Garcia's estate upon his death. When
Santiago Garcia died, his nine children and
Consuelo Garcia inherited the said property each to
the extent of one-tenth (1/10) pro indiviso share.
Hence, it was only Consuelo Garcia's one-tenth(l/l0)
pro indiviso share in the parcel of land in question
which could be validly attached, levied and sold in
execution to satisfy the judgment against her and in
favor of Trinidad Estonina in Civil Case No. 88430.
ISSUE: WON the land is a conjugal property of
Santiago and Consuelo
HELD: The property involved in this dispute is
indeed the exclusive property of the deceased
Santiago Garcia. It has been repeatedly held that the
presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code that
all property of the marriage belong to the conjugal
partnership applies only when there is proof that the
property was acquired during the marriage.
Otherwise stated, proof of acquisition during the
marriage is a condition sine qua non for the
operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal
partnership. In the case at bench, the petitioners
have been unable to present any proof that the
property in question was acquired during the
marriage of Santiago and Consuelo. They anchor
their claim solely on the fact that when the title over
the land in question was issued, Santiago was
already married to Consuelo as evidenced by the
registration in the name of "Santiago Garcia married
to Consuelo Gaza". This, according to the spouses
Estonina, suffices to establish the conjugal nature of
the property.
In the case of Jocson v. Court of Appeals
The fact that the properties were registered in the
name of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra
Poblete" is no proof that the properties were
acquired during the spouses' coverture. Acquisition
of title and registration thereof are two different acts.
It is well settled that registration does not confer title
but merely confirms one already erdsting. The words
"married to" preceding "Alejandra Poblete" are
merely descriptive of the civil status of Emilio
Jocson. In other words, the import from the

certificates of title is that Emilio Jocson is the owner
of the properties, the same having been registered in
his name alone, and that he is married to Alejandra
Poblete.
Being the exclusive property of Santiago
Garcia, it was the entire parcel of land in question
that formed part of his estate and which passed to
his ten heirs by compulsory succession upon his
death. And as correctly held by the Court of Appeals,
what could therefore be attached and sold at public
auction in Civil Case No. 88430 was only the onetenth (1/10) pro indiviso share of Consuelo Garcia in
the said parcel of land. The sale at public auction of
the disputed property in its entirety by the Sheriff in
favor of Trinidad Estonina over and above the onetenth (1/10) share of Consuelo Garcia is null and
void, belonging as it does to the other heirs of
Santiago Garcia and later to the spouses Atayan.
Anent the contention that the spouses Atayan are
guilty of laches, suffice it to state that this residual
argument deserves scant consideration. Being
strangers to Civil Case No. 88430 where the writ of
execution over the land in question was issued, they
cannot be faulted for filing the "proper action" only in
1985 or six (6) years after the levy on execution.
Besides, it was only in 1984 that the Court of
Appeals rendered a decision finally cancelling the
title of their predecessors-in-interest and issuing
another one in favor of Trinidad Estonina. The action
filed by the spouses Atayan seeking the annulment
of the sheriffs sale and the transfer certificate of title
with damages immediately thereafter or on July 25,
1985 cannot be considered as undue delay nor does
it imply a lack of interest to enforce their claim over
the disputed property.
96) AYALA INVESTMENT VS. CA & SPS. SHING
GR NO. 118305, FEBRUARY 12, 1998
DOCTRINE: If the money or services are given to
another person or entity, and the husband acted only
as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by
itself, alone be categorized as falling within the
context of "obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership." The contract of loan or services is
clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not
for the surety or his family.
FACTS:
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a
P50,300,000 loan from petitioner Ayala Investment
and Development Corporation (AIDC). As added
security for the credit line extended to PBM,
90

respondent Alfredo Ching, Executive Vice President
of PBM, executed security agreements, making
himself jointly and severally answerable with PBM's
indebtedness to AIDC.
PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, AIDC filed a case
for sum of money against PBM and respondenthusband Alfredo Ching with the CFI of Pasig.
After trial, the court rendered judgment ordering
PBM and respondent-husband Alfredo Ching to
jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount
of P50,300,000 with interests.
Upon motion of AIDC, the lower court issued a writ
of execution pending appeal. Upon AIDC's putting
up of an P8,000,000 bond, a writ of execution was
issued. Thereafter, petitioner Abelardo Magsajo, Sr.,
Deputy Sheriff of Pasig, caused the issuance and
service upon respondents-spouses of a notice of
sheriff sale on 3 of their conjugal properties.
Petitioner Magsajo then scheduled the auction sale
of the properties levied.
Private respondents filed a case of injunction against
petitioners to enjoin the auction sale alleging that
petitioners cannot enforce the judgment against the
conjugal partnership levied on the ground that,
among others, the subject loan did not redound to
the benefit of the said conjugal partnership. The
lower court issued a temporary restraining order.
AIDC filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals, questioning the order of the lower court
enjoining the sale. Court of Appeals issued a
Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the lower
court from enforcing its Order, thus paving the way
for the scheduled auction sale of respondentsspouses conjugal properties.
The auction sale took place. AIDC being the only
bidder, was issued a Certificate of Sale. Upon
expiration of the redemption period, petitioner sheriff
issued the final deed of sale which was registered.
AIDC filed a motion to dismiss the petition for
injunction filed before the CFI of Pasig on the ground
that the same had become moot and academic with
the consummation of the sale. Respondents filed
their opposition to the motion arguing, among others,
that where a third party who claim is ownership of
the property attached or levied upon, a different legal
situation is presented; and that in this case, 2 of the
real properties are actually in the name of
Encarnacion Ching, a non-party to the civil case.
RTC: the conjugal partnership of gains of
respondents-spouses Alfredo and Encarnacion
Ching is not liable for the payment of the debts
secured by respondent-husband Alfredo Ching.
Thus, the sale on execution null and void.
CA: Affirmed decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
WON a surety agreement entered into by the
husband in favor of his employer is within the
contemplation of Art. 161 of the Civil Code and
considered for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership?
HELD:
No. The surety agreement entered into by the
husband in favor of his employer is not considered
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
We do not agree with petitioners that there is a
difference between the terms "redounded to the
benefit of" or "benefited from" on the one hand; and
"for the benefit of" on the other. They mean one and
the same thing. Art. 161 (1) of the Civil Code and Art.
121 (2) of the Family Code are similarly worded, i.e.,
both use the term "for the benefit of." On the other
hand, Art. 122 of the Family Code provides that "The
payment of personal debts by the husband or the
wife before or during the marriage shall not be
charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar
as they redounded to the benefit of the family." As
can be seen, the terms are used interchangeably.
From the jurisprudential rulings of this Court, we can
derive the following conclusions:
(A) If the husband himself is the principal obligor in
the contract, i.e., he directly received the money and
services to be used in or for his own business or his
own profession, that contract falls within the term . . .
. obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership." Here, no actual benefit may be proved.
It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent
at the time of the signing of the contract. From the
very nature of the contract of loan or services, the
family stands to benefit from the loan facility or
services to be rendered to the business or
profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the
end, his business or profession fails or does not
succeed. Simply stated, where the husband
contracts obligations on behalf of the family
business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that
such obligation will redound to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.
(B) On the other hand, if the money or services are
given to another person or entity, and the husband
acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract
cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling
within the context of "obligations for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership." The contract of loan or
services is clearly for the benefit of the principal
debtor and not for the surety or his family. No
presumption can be inferred that, when a husband
enters into a contract of surety or accommodation
agreement, it is "for the benefit of the conjugal
91

partnership." Proof must be presented to establish
benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership.
The provisions of the Family Code is applicable in
this case. These provisions highlight the underlying
concern of the law for the conservation of the
conjugal partnership; for the husband's duty to
protect and safeguard, if not augment, not to
dissipate it.
This is the underlying reason why the Family Code
clarifies that the obligations entered into by one of
the spouses must be those that redounded to the
benefit of the family and that the measure of the
partnership's liability is to "the extent that the family
is benefited."
Here, the property in dispute also involves the family
home. The loan is a corporate loan not a personal
one. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise
of an industry or profession nor an act of
administration for the benefit of the family.
97) GUIANG VS. CA AND GILDA COPUZ
G.R. No. 125172, June 26, 1998
DOCTRINE: The sale of a conjugal property
requires the consent of both the husband and the
wife. The absence of the consent of one renders the
sale null and void, while the vitiation thereof makes it
merely voidable. Only in the latter case can
ratification cure the defect.
FACTS:
Private respondent Gilda Corpuz and Judie Corpuz
are legally married spouses. They have three
children, namely: Junie (18 years old), Harriet (17),
and Jodie (15). The couple bought a 421 sq. meter
lot in Koronadal, South Cotabato from Manuel
Callejo through a conditional deed of sale. The
consideration was payable in installment. In 1988,
the couple sold one-half portion of their Lot to
petitioner-spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang.
Since then, Guiang occupied the one-half portion
and built their house thereon. They are thus
adjoining neighbors of the Corpuzes.
Gilda Corpuz left for Manila to look for work abroad.
Unfortunately, she became a victim of an
unscrupulous illegal recruiter. She was not able to go
abroad. She stayed for sometime in Manila.
After his wife's departure for Manila, Judie Corpuz
seldom went home to the conjugal dwelling. He
stayed most of the time at his place of work. Harriet
Corpuz learned that her father intended to sell the
remaining one-half portion including their house to
Guiangs. She wrote a letter to her mother. Gilda
Corpuz replied that she was objecting to the sale.
Harriet, however, did not inform her father about this;

but instead gave the letter to Luzviminda Guiang so
that she would advise her father.
However, in the absence of his wife Gilda, Judie
Corpuz pushed through the sale. He sold to
Luzviminda Guiang thru a "Deed of Transfer of
Rights" remaining one-half portion of their lot and the
house.
Gilda returned home. She found her children staying
with other households. Only Junie was staying in
their house. Harriet and Joji were with Mr. Panes.
Gilda gathered her children together and stayed at
their house. Her husband was nowhere to be found.
She was informed by her children that their father
had a wife already.
For staying in their house sold by her husband,
spouses Guiang complained before the Barangay
authorities for trespassing. The parties thereat
signed a document for amicable settlement stating
that Gilda Corpuz and her three children must leave
voluntarily the house without any charge.
Thereafter, Gilda approached the Barangay Captain
for the annulment of the settlement. Annulment not
having been made, they stayed put in her house and
lot. Spouses Guiang filed a motion for execution of
the amicable settlement with the MTC.
However, Private Respondent Gilda Corpuz filed a
Complaint against her husband Judie Corpuz and
Petitioner-Spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang.
The said Complaint sought the declaration of a Deed
of Transfer of Right, which involved the conjugal
property, null and void. The trial court ruled in favor
of private respondent. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: WON the assailed Deed of Transfer of
Rights was validly executed.
HELD: NO
Petitioners insist that the questioned Deed was
validly executed by the parties in good faith and for
valuable consideration. The absence of private
respondent's consent merely rendered the Deed
voidable under Article 1390 of the Civil Code. The
provision in par. 2, refers to contracts visited by vices
of consent, i.e., contracts which were entered into by
a person whose consent was obtained and vitiated
through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue
influence or fraud. In this instance, private
respondent's consent to the contract of sale of their
conjugal property was totally inexistent or absent.
The contract falls within the ambit of Article 124 of
the Family Code, which provides that "...In the
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition
or encumbrance shall be void..."
Furthermore, it must be noted that the fraud and the
92

intimidation referred to by petitioners were
perpetrated in the execution of the document
embodying the amicable settlement. Gilda Corpuz
alleged during trial that barangay authorities made
her sign said document through misrepresentation
and coercion. In any event, its execution does not
alter the void character of the deed of sale between
the husband and the petitioners-spouses. The fact
remains that such contract was entered into without
the wife's consent.
In sum, the nullity of the contract of sale is premised
on the absence of private respondent's consent. To
constitute a valid contract, the Civil Code requires
the concurrence of the following elements: cause,
object, and consent, the last element being
indubitably absent in the case at bar.
Doctrinally, a void contract cannot be ratified. By
Art.1390 of the Civil Code, the Deed to Transfer of
Rights cannot be ratified, even by an amicable
settlement.
Neither can the amicable settlement be considered a
continuing offer that was accepted and perfected by
the parties, following the last sentence of Article 124.
The order of the pertinent events is clear: after the
sale, petitioners filed a complaint for trespassing
against private respondent, after which the barangay
authorities secured an "amicable settlement" and
petitioners filed before the MTC a motion for its
execution. The settlement, however, does not
mention a continuing offer to sell the property or an
acceptance of such a continuing offer. Its tenor was
to the effect that private respondent would vacate
the property. By no stretch of the imagination, can
the Court interpret this document as the acceptance
mentioned in Article 124.
Petition denied.
98) FERRER VS. FERRER
G.R. No. 166496, November 9, 2006
It is the owner-spouse who has the obligation to
reimburse the conjugal partnership or the spouse
who expended the acts or efforts, as the case may
be.
FACTS:
In her Complaint for payment of conjugal
improvements, sum of money, and accounting with
prayer for injunction and damages, petitioner alleged
that she is the widow of Alfredo Ferrer (Alfredo), halfbrother of respondents Manuel M. Ferrer (Manuel)
and Ismael M. Ferrer (Ismael).
Before her marriage to Alfredo, the latter acquired a

piece of lot. He applied for a loan with the Social
Security System (SSS) to build improvements
thereon, including a residential house and a twodoor apartment building. It was during their
marriage that payment of the loan was made using
the couples conjugal funds. From their conjugal
funds, petitioner posited, they constructed a
warehouse on the lot. Moreover, petitioner averred
that respondent Manuel occupied one door of the
apartment building, as well as the warehouse;
however, in September 1991, he stopped paying
rentals thereon, alleging that he had acquired
ownership over the property by virtue of a Deed of
Sale executed by Alfredo in favor of respondents,
Manuel and Ismael and their spouses.
It is petitioners contention that when her husband
was already bedridden, respondents Ismael and
Flora Ferrer made him sign a document, purported
to be his last will and testament. The document,
however, was a Deed of Sale covering Alfredos lot
and the improvements thereon.
Learning of this development, Alfredo filed with the
RTC a Complaint for Annulment of the said sale
against respondents.
The RTC dismissed the
same. The RTC found that the terms and conditions
of the Deed of Sale are not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, and public policy, and should be
complied with by the parties in good faith, there
being no compelling reason under the law to do
otherwise. The dismissal was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals.
Further, in support of her Complaint, petitioner
alluded to a portion of the Decision of the RTC,
which stated, that in determining which property is
the principal and which is the accessory, the
property of greater value shall be considered the
principal. In this case, the lot is the principal and the
improvements the accessories. Since Article 120 of
the Family Code provides the rule that the ownership
of accessory follows the ownership of the principal,
then the subject lot with all its improvements became
an exclusive and capital property of Alfredo with an
obligation to reimburse the conjugal partnership of
the cost of improvements at the time of liquidation of
[the] conjugal partnership. Clearly, Alfredo has all
the rights to sell the subject property by himself
without need of Josefas consent.
According to petitioner, the ruling of the RTC shows
that, when Alfredo died she had the right to be
reimbursed for the cost of the improvements on
Alfredos lot. Hence, one-half thereof should be
reimbursed and paid by respondents as they are
now the registered owners of Alfredos lot. She
averred that respondents cannot claim lack of
93

knowledge about the fact that the improvements
were constructed using conjugal funds as they had
occupied one of the apartment buildings on Alfredos
lot, and even paid rentals to petitioner.
For their part, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss,
contending that petitioner had no cause of action
against them, and that the cause of action was
barred by prior judgment.
RTC rendered an Order, denying the Motion to
Dismiss. According to the RTC, no pronouncement
as to the improvements constructed on Alfredos lot
has been made and the payment of petitioners
share in the conjugal partnership constitutes a
separate cause of action. A subsequent Order was
issued by the RTC, denying respondents Motion for
Reconsideration.
Aggrieved, respondents elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals by way of a Petition for Certiorari,
alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the RTC in denying the
dismissal.
Court of Appeals rendered a Decision granting the
Petition. It held that petitioners Complaint failed to
state a cause of action. The appellate court
rationalized as follows:
[W]e believe that the instant complaint is not the
proper action for the respondent to enforce her right
of reimbursement of the cost of the improvement[s]
on the subject property. As correctly pointed out by
the petitioners, the same should be made and
directed in the settlement of estate of her deceased
husband Alfredo Ferrer pursuant to Article 129 of the
Family Code. Such being the case, it appears that
the complaint herein fails to state a cause of action
against the petitioners, the latter not being the
proper parties against whom the subject action for
reimbursement must be directed to. xxx Albeit the
respondent herein has the legal right to be
reimbursed of the cost of the improvements of the
subject property, it is not the petitioners but the
estate of her deceased husband which has the
obligation to pay the same. The complaint herein is
therefore dismissible for failure to state a cause of
action against the petitioners. Needless to say, the
respondent is not without any further recourse as
she may file her claim against the estate of her
deceased husband.
In light of the foregoing, we find that the public
respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying the petitioners motion to dismiss for failure
to state a cause of action.
Aggrieved,
petitioner
filed
a
Motion
for
Reconsideration thereon. Court of Appeals rendered
a Resolution denying the motion.
Hence, the present recourse.
ISSUE:
Whether or not he Court of Appeals erred in
dismissing petitioners Complaint for failure to state
a cause of action.
HELD:
NO.After a reading of the allegations contained in
petitioners Complaint, we are convinced that the
same failed to state a cause of action.
According to petitioner, while the RTC recognized
that the improvements constructed on Alfredos lots
were deemed as Alfredos exclusive and capital
property, the court also held that petitioner, as
Alfredos spouse, has the right to claim
reimbursement from the estate of Alfredo. It is
argued by petitioner that her husband had no other
property, and his only property had been sold to the
respondents; hence, she has the legal right to claim
for reimbursement from the respondents who are
now the owners of the lot and the improvements
thereon. In fine, petitioner asseverates that the
Complaint cannot be dismissed on the ground of
failure to state a cause of action because the
respondents have the correlative obligation to pay
the value of the improvements.
Petitioner was not able to show that there is an
obligation on the part of the respondents to respect
or not to violate her right. While we could concede
that Civil Case No. 61327 made a reference to the
right of the spouse as contemplated in Article 120 of
the Family Code to be reimbursed for the cost of the
improvements, the obligation to reimburse rests on
the spouse upon whom ownership of the entire
property is vested. There is no obligation on the part
of the purchaser of the property, in case the property
is sold by the owner-spouse.
Indeed, Article 120 provides the solution in
determining the ownership of the improvements that
are made on the separate property of the spouses at
the expense of the partnership or through the acts or
efforts of either or both spouses. Thus, when the
cost of the improvement and any resulting increase
in value are more than the value of the property at
the time of the improvement, the entire property of
one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal
partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of
the property of the owner-spouse at the time of the
improvement; otherwise, said property shall be
retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise
subject to reimbursement of the cost of the
improvement. The subject property was precisely
declared as the exclusive property of Alfredo on the
basis of Article 120 of the Family Code.
94

What is incontrovertible is that the respondents,
despite the allegations contained in the Complaint
that they are the buyers of the subject premises, are
not petitioners spouse nor can they ever be deemed
as the owner-spouse upon whom the obligation to
reimburse petitioner for her costs rested. It is the
owner-spouse who has the obligation to reimburse
the conjugal partnership or the spouse who
expended the acts or efforts, as the case may be.
Otherwise stated, respondents do not have the
obligation to respect petitioners right to be
reimbursed.
It can be said, thus, that respondents act of
acquiring the subject property by sale was not in
violation of petitioners rights. The same can also be
said of the respondents objection to reimburse
petitioner. Simply, no correlative obligation exists on
the part of the respondents to reimburse the
petitioner. Corollary thereto, neither can it be said
that their refusal to reimburse constituted a violation
of petitioners rights. As has been shown in the
foregoing, no obligation by the respondents under
the law exists. Petitioners Complaint failed to state
a cause of action against the respondents, and for
this reason, the Court of Appeals was not in error in
dismissing the same.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.
99) DOCENA VS. HON. RICARDO LAPESURA
GR NO. 140153, MARCH 28, 2001
FACTS:
On June 1, 1977, private respondent,
Casiano Hombria filed a Complaint for the recovery
of a parcel of land against lessees, petitionerspouses Docena. The petitioners clamed ownership
of the land based on occupation since time
immemorial. A certain Guillermo Abuda intervened in
the case. In a decision dated November 24, 1989,
the trial court ruled in favor of petitioners and the
intervenor Abuda. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
reversed the judgment of the trial court and ordered
the petitioners to vacate the land they have leased
from plaintiff-appellant.
On May 22, 19995, Hombria filed a Motion
for Execution of the above decision which has
already become final and executory. The above
motion was granted by judge Lapesura and a Writ of
Execution was issued therefore. An alias Writ of
Demolition was then filed by the Sheriff.
A Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was
filed by the petitioners eith the Court of Appeals,
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial court judge in issuing the orders and the sheriff
in issuing the Alias Writ of Demolition. CA dismissed

the petition on the grounds that the petition was filed
beyond the 60-day period provided under Section 4
of Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure as amended by Bar Matter No. 803 and
that the certification of non-forum shopping attached
thereto was signed by the husband alone. the The
Motion for reconsideration was also denied.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
dismissing the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.
HELD: YES.
Under the New Civil Code, the husband is
the administrator of the conjugal partnership. In fact,
he is the sole administrator, and the wife is not
entitled as a matter of right to join him in this
endeavor. The husband may defend the conjugal
partnership in a suit or action without being joined by
the wife. Corollarily, the husband alone may execute
the necessary certificate of non-forum shopping to
accompany the pleading. The husband as the
statutory administrator of the conjugal property could
have filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition
alone, without the concurrence of the wife. If suits to
defend an interest in the conjugal prperties may be
filed by the husband alone, with more reason, he
may sign the certficate of non-forum shopping to be
attched to the petition.
Under the Family Code, the administration
of the conjugal property belongs to the husband and
the wife jointly. However, an act of alienation or
encumbrance where the consent of both spouses is
required, joint management or administration does
not require that the husband and wife always act
together. Each spouse may validly exercise full
power of management alone, subject to the
intervention of the court in proper cases as provided
under Article 124 of the Family Code. It is believed
taht even under the provisions of the Family Code,
the husband alone could have filed the petition for
certiorari and prohibition to contests the writs of
demolition issued against the conjugal property with
the Court of Appeals without being joined by his wife.
The signing of the attached certificate of non-forum
shopping only by the husband is not a fatal defect.
100) MANALO VS. CAMAISA

GR No. 147978, January 23, 2002
FACTS:
Thelma A. Jader-Manalo was interested in buying
95

the two properties of Spouses Camaisa. So she
negotiated for the purchase through a real estate
broker, Mr. Proceso Ereno. She made a definite offer
to buy the properties to respondent Edilberto
Camaisa with the knowledge and conformity of his
wife, respondent Norma Camaisa in the presence of
the real estate broker.
After Edilberto signed the contracts, Manalo
delivered to him two checks as down payments. The
contracts were given to Edilberto for the formal
affixing of his wife's signature. However, the
following day, petitioner received a call from
respondent Norma, requesting a meeting to clarify
some provisions of the contracts. To accommodate
her queries, petitioner, accompanied by her lawyer,
met with Edilberto and Norma and the real estate
broker at Cafe Rizal in Makati. During the meeting,
handwritten notations were made on the contracts to
sell, so they arranged to incorporate the notations
and to meet again for the formal signing of the
contracts.
When petitioner met again with respondent spouses
and the real estate broker at Edilberto's office for the
formal affixing of Norma's signature, she was
surprised when respondent spouses informed her
that they were backing out of the agreement
because they needed "spot cash" for the full amount
of the consideration. Petitioner reminded respondent
spouses that the contracts to sell had already been
duly perfected and Norma's refusal to sign the same
would unduly prejudice petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the husband may validly
dispose of a conjugal property of the without the
wifes written consent.
HELD: NO.
The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal
property by the husband as administrator in
appropriate cases requires the written consent of the
wife, otherwise, the disposition is void. Thus, Article
124 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the
conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the
husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse
to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which
must be availed of within five years from the date of
the contract implementing such decision.
The properties subject of the contracts in this case
were conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell to be
effective, the consent of both husband and wife must
concur.
Even granting that respondent Norma actively

participated in negotiating for the sale of the subject
properties, which she denied, her written consent to
the sale is required by law for its validity.
Significantly, petitioner herself admits that Norma
refused to sign the contracts to sell. Respondent
Norma may have been aware of the negotiations for
the sale of their conjugal properties. However, being
merely aware of a transaction is not consent.
101) CARLOS VS. ABELARDO
GR NO. 146504, April 9, 2002
DOCTRINE:
The loan is the liability of the conjugal partnership
FACTS:
In October 1989, respondent and his wife Maria
Theresa Carlos-Abelardo approached him and
requested him to advance the amount of
US$25,000.00 (P625, 000. 00) for the purchase of a
house and lot. To enable and assist the spouses
conduct their married life independently and on their
own, petitioner, in October 31, 1989, issued a check
in the name of a certain Pura Vallejo, seller of the
property, who acknowledged receipt thereof.
When petitioner inquired from the spouses in July
1991 as to the status of the amount he loaned to
them, the latter acknowledged their obligation but
pleaded that they were not yet in a position to make
a definite settlement of the same. Thereafter,
respondent expressed violent resistance to
petitioners inquiries on the amount to the extent of
making various death threats against petitioner.
Despite formal demand for the payment of the said
loan, spouses were unable to pay their obligation.
Hence, this prompted petitioner to institute a
collection suit against respondent and his wife. As
they were separated in fact for more than a year
prior to the filing of the complaint, respondent and
his wife filed separate answers. Maria Theresa
Carlos-Abelardo admitted securing a loan together
with her husband, from petitioner. She claimed,
however, that said loan was payable on a staggered
basis so she was surprised when petitioner
demanded immediate payment of the full amount.
In his separate Answer, respondent admitted
receiving the amount of US$25,000.00 but claimed
that the said US$25,000.00 was never intended as
loan of defendant. It was his share of income on
contracts obtained by defendant.
96

RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner. CA reversed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the loan is chargeable to the
conjugal partnership.
HELD:
Yes. The loan is the liability of the conjugal
partnership pursuant to Article 121 of the Family
Code:
Article 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable
for:
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the
marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, or by
both spouses or by one of them with the consent of
the other;
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either
spouse without the consent of the other to the extent
that the family may have been benefited; If the
conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the
foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily
liable for the unpaid balance with their separate
properties.
While respondent did not and refused to sign the
acknowledgment executed and signed by his wife,
undoubtedly, the loan redounded to the benefit of the
family because it was used to purchase the house
and lot which became the conjugal home of
respondent and his family. Hence, notwithstanding
the alleged lack of consent of respondent, under Art.
21 of the Family Code, he shall be solidarily liable for
such loan together with his wife.
Early in time, it must be noted that payment of
personal debts contracted by the husband or the
wife before or during the marriage shall not be
charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar
as they redounded to the benefit of the family. The
defendants never denied that the check of
US$25,000.00 was used to purchase the subject
house and lot. They do not deny that the same
served as their conjugal home, thus benefiting the
family.
On the same principle, acknowledgment of the loan
made by the defendant-wife binds the conjugal
partnership since its proceeds redounded to the
benefit of the family. Hence, defendant-husband and
defendant-wife are jointly and severally liable in the
payment of the loan.
102) RELUCIO VS. ANGELINA MEJIA LOPEZ

G.R. NO. 138497 January 16, 2002
FACTS:
Angelina Mejia Lopez filed a petition for
"APPOINTMENT AS SOLE ADMINISTRATIX OF
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF PROPERTIES,
FORFEITURE, ETC.," against defendant Alberto
Lopez and petitioner Imelda Relucio. Angelina
alleged that sometime in 1968, defendant Lopez,
who is legally married to her, abandoned the latter
and their four legitimate children; that he arrogated
unto himself full and exclusive control and
administration of the conjugal properties, that
defendant Lopez maintained an illicit relationship
and cohabited with petitioner since 1976. It was
further alleged that defendant Lopez and petitioner
Relucio, during their period of cohabitation have
amassed
a fortune
consisting mainly of
stockholdings in Lopez-owned or controlled
corporations, residential, agricultural, commercial
lots, houses, apartments and buildings, cars and
other motor vehicles, bank accounts and jewelry.
These properties, which are in the names of
defendant Lopez and petitioner Relucio singly or
jointly or their dummies and proxies, have been
acquired principally if not solely through the actual
contribution of money, property and industry of
defendant Lopez with minimal, if not nil, actual
contribution from petitioner Relucio. On December 8,
1993, a Motion to Dismiss the Petition was filed by
herein petitioner on the ground that private
respondent has no cause of action against her.An
Order dated February 10, 1994 was issued by herein
respondent Judge denying petitioner Relucio's
Motion to Dismiss on the ground that she is
impleaded as a necessary or indispensable party
because some of the subject properties are
registered in her name and defendant Lopez, or
solely in her name. Petitioner filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari assailing the trial
court's denial of her motion to dismiss. The Court of
Appeals promulgated a decision denying the
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent's petition for
appointment as sole administratrix of the conjugal
property, accounting, etc. against her husband
Alberto J. Lopez established a cause of action
against petitioner.
HELD:: No. The complaint is by an aggrieved wife
against her husband. Nowhere in the allegations
97

does it appear that relief is sought against petitioner.
Respondent's causes of action were all against her
husband. The first cause of action is for judicial
appointment of respondent as administratrix of the
conjugal partnership or absolute community property
arising from her marriage to Alberto J. Lopez.
Petitioner is a complete stranger to this cause of
action. Article 128 of the Family Code refers only to
spouses, to wit: "If a spouse without just cause
abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her
obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may
petition the court for receivership, for judicial
separation of property, or for authority to be the sole
administrator of the conjugal partnership property
xxx". The administration of the property of the
marriage is entirely between them, to the exclusion
of all other persons. Respondent alleges that Alberto
J. Lopez is her husband. Therefore, her first cause
of action is against Alberto J. Lopez. There is no
right-duty relation between petitioner and respondent
that can possibly support a cause of action. The
second cause of action is for an accounting "by
respondent husband." The accounting of conjugal
partnership arises from or is an incident of marriage.
Petitioner has nothing to do with the marriage
between respondent Alberto J. Lopez. Hence, no
cause of action can exist against petitioner on this
ground. Respondent's alternative cause of action is
for forfeiture of Alberto J. Lopez' share in the coowned property "acquired during his illicit
relationship and cohabitation with [petitioner]" and
for the "dissolution of the conjugal partnership of
gains between him [Alberto J. Lopez] and the
[respondent]." The third cause of action is essentially
for forfeiture of Alberto J. Lopez' share in property
co-owned by him and petitioner. It does not involve
the issue of validity of the co-ownership between
Alberto J. Lopez and petitioner. The issue is whether
there is basis in law to forfeit Alberto J. Lopez' share,
if any there be, in property co-owned by him with
petitioner. Respondent's asserted right to forfeit
extends to Alberto J. Lopez' share alone. Failure of
Alberto J. Lopez to surrender such share, assuming
the trial court finds in respondent's favor, results in a
breach of an obligation to respondent and gives rise
to a cause of action. Such cause of action, however,
pertains to Alberto J. Lopez, not petitioner. The
respondent also sought support. Support cannot be
compelled from a stranger. The action in Special
Proceedings M-3630 is, to use respondent Angelina
M. Lopez' own words, one by "an aggrieved wife
against her husband."
103) Homeowners Savings & Loan Bank vs.

Miguela C. Dailo
G.R. No. 153802, March 11, 2005
Facts
During their marriage, respondents Miguela C. Dailo
and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. purchased a house and lot
with the Deed of Absolute Sale executed only in
favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee.
Without the knowledge and consent of respondent
Miguela Dailo, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Lilibeth
Gesmundo, authorizing her to obtain a loan from
petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to
be secured by the spouses Dailos house and lot.
Gesmundo was able to obtain a loan from petitioner
and as security executed a Real Estate Mortgage on
the subject property in favor of petitioner.
Upon maturity, the loan remained unpaid and as a
result, petitioner instituted extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings on the mortgaged property.
After the death of her husband, during one of her
visits to the subject property, respondent learned
that petitioner had already employed a certain
Roldan Brion to clean its premises and that her car,
a Ford sedan, was razed because Brion allowed a
boy to play with fire within the premises.
Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage
constituted on the subject property, which was
conjugal in nature, respondent instituted a case
for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of
Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, Deed
of Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction and Damages against petitioner. In the
latters Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner prayed
for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that
the property in question was the exclusive property
of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered
a Decision in favor of the respondent, and upon
elevation, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
courts finding in the absence of clear and
convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that
the subject property was conjugal in nature. Hence,
the appellate court declared as void the mortgage on
the subject property because it was constituted
without the knowledge and consent of respondent, in
accordance with Article 124 of the Family Code.
With respect to the damage to respondents car, the
appellate court found petitioner to be liable because
it is responsible for the consequences of the acts or
omissions of the person it hired to accomplish the
assigned task. All told, the appellate court affirmed
the trial courts Decision, but deleted the award for
damages and attorneys fees for lack of basis.
98

As a response to above decision, petitioner filed a
petition for review on certiorari assailing
the Decision of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed
with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court. Petitioner argues that although Article 124 of
the Family Code requires the consent of the other
spouse to the mortgage of conjugal properties, the
framers of the law could not have intended to curtail
the right of a spouse from exercising full ownership
over the portion of the conjugal property pertaining
to him under the concept of co-ownership. Thus,
petitioner would like the Court to uphold the validity
of the mortgage to the extent of the late Marcelino
Dailo, Jr.s share in the conjugal partnership. In
addition, petitioner imposes the liability for the
payment of the principal obligation obtained by the
late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. on the conjugal partnership
to the extent that it redounded to the benefit of the
family.
Issues
1. Whether or not the mortgage constituted by
the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. on the subject
property as co-owner thereof is valid as to
his undivided share.
2. Whether or not the conjugal partnership is
liable for the payment of the loan obtained
by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. the same
having redounded to the benefit of the
family.
Held
On the first issue, the Court cited the case, Guiang
v. Court of Appeals, where it was held that the sale
of a conjugal property requires the consent of both
the husband and wife and the same principle shall
squarely applies to the instant case.
Respondent and the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were
married on August 8, 1967. In the absence of a
marriage settlement, the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains
governed the property relations between respondent
and her late husband. With the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988, Chapter 4
on Conjugal Partnership of Gains in the Family Code
was made applicable to conjugal partnership of
gains already established before its effectivity unless
vested rights have already been acquired under the
Civil Code or other laws.
The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the
property relations of respondent and the late
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. even in a suppletory manner.
The regime of conjugal partnership of gains is a
special type of partnership, where the husband and
wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products,
fruits and income from their separate properties and

those acquired by either or both spouses through
their efforts or by chance. Unlike the absolute
community of property wherein the rules on coownership apply in a suppletory manner, the
conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules
on contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict
with what is expressly determined in the chapter (on
conjugal partnership of gains) or by the spouses in
their marriage settlements. Thus, the property
relations of respondent and her late husband shall
be governed, foremost, by Chapter 4 on Conjugal
Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and,
suppletorily, by the rules on partnership under the
Civil Code. In case of conflict, the former prevails
because the Civil Code provisions on partnership
apply only when the Family Code is silent on the
matter.
The basic and established fact is that during his
lifetime, without the knowledge and consent of his
wife, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. constituted a real estate
mortgage on the subject property, which formed part
of their conjugal partnership. By express provision of
Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of
(court) authority or written consent of the other
spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the
conjugal property shall be void.
The aforequoted provision does not qualify with
respect to the share of the spouse who makes the
disposition or encumbrance in the same manner that
the rule on co-ownership under Article 493 of the
Civil Code does. Where the law does not distinguish,
courts should not distinguish. Thus, both the trial
court and the appellate court are correct in declaring
the nullity of the real estate mortgage on the subject
property for lack of respondents consent.
On the second issue, the Court cited that under
Article 121 of the Family Code, The conjugal
partnership shall be liable for: . . . (3) Debts and
obligations contracted by either spouse without the
consent of the other to the extent that the family may
have been benefited; . . . . For the subject property
to be held liable, the obligation contracted by the late
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. must have redounded to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership. There must be
the requisite showing then of some advantage which
clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses.
Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership respond
for a liability that should appertain to the husband
alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective
of the new Civil Code to show the utmost concern for
the solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit.
The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains lies
with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. Ei
99

incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he who
asserts, not he who denies, must prove).
Petitioners sweeping conclusion that the loan
obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. to finance
the construction of housing units without a doubt
redounded to the benefit of his family, without
adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this
Court. Other than petitioners bare allegation, there
is nothing from the records of the case to compel a
finding that, indeed, the loan obtained by the late
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. redounded to the benefit of the
family. Consequently, the conjugal partnership
cannot be held liable for the payment of the principal
obligation.
104) In Re: Petition For Separation Of Property
Elena Buenaventura Muller vs. Helmut Muller
G.R. No. 149615, August 29, 2006
Facts
Petitioner
Elena
Buenaventura
Muller
and
respondent Helmut Muller were married in Germany.
The couple resided in Germany at a house owned
by respondents parents but decided to move and
reside permanently in the Philippines in 1992. By
this time, respondent had inherited the house in
Germany from his parents which he sold and used
the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in
Antipolo Rizal at the cost of P528,000.00 and the
construction
of
a
house
amounting
to
P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo property was registered
in the name of petitioner.
Due to incompatibilities, respondent filed a
petition for separation of properties before the
Regional Trial Court.
The trial court rendered a decision which terminated
the regime of absolute community of property
between the petitioner and respondent. It also
decreed the separation of properties between them
and ordered the equal partition of personal
properties located within the country, excluding
those acquired by gratuitous title during the
marriage. With regard to the Antipolo property, the
court held that it was acquired using paraphernal
funds of the respondent. However, it ruled that
respondent cannot recover his funds because the
property was purchased in violation of Section 7,
Article XII of the Constitution.
However, pursuant to Article 92 of the Family Code,
properties acquired by gratuitous title by either
spouse during the marriage shall be excluded from
the community property. The real property, therefore,
inherited by respondent-petitioner in Germany is
excluded from the absolute community of property of
the herein spouses. Necessarily, the proceeds of the

sale of said real property as well as the personal
properties purchased thereby, belong exclusively to
the respondent-petitioner. However, the part of that
inheritance used by the respondent-petitioner for
acquiring the house and lot in this country cannot be
recovered by the respondent-petitioner, its
acquisition being a violation of Section 7, Article XII
of the Constitution which provides that "save in
cases of hereditary succession, no private lands
shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain." The law
will leave the parties in the situation where they are
in without prejudice to a voluntary partition by the
parties of the said real property.
Hence, as regards the property situated in Antipolo
and the improvements thereon, the Court shall not
make any pronouncement on constitutional grounds.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which
rendered the assailed decision modifying the trial
courts Decision. It held that respondent merely
prayed for reimbursement for the purchase of the
Antipolo property, and not acquisition or transfer of
ownership to him. It also considered petitioners
ownership over the property in trust for the
respondent. As regards the house, the Court of
Appeals ruled that there is nothing in the
Constitution which prohibits respondent from
acquiring the same.
Issue
Whether or not the respondent is entitled to
reimbursement of the amount used to purchase the
land as well as the costs for the construction of the
house.
Held
The Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in
holding that an implied trust was created and
resulted by operation of law in view of petitioners
marriage to respondent. Save for the exception
provided in cases of hereditary succession,
respondents disqualification from owning lands in
the Philippines is absolute. Not even an ownership in
trust is allowed. Besides, where the purchase is
made in violation of an existing statute and in
evasion of its express provision, no trust can result
in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud. To hold
otherwise would allow circumvention of the
constitutional prohibition.
Invoking the principle that a court is not only a court
of law but also a court of equity is likewise
misplaced. He who seeks equity must do equity,
and he who comes into equity must come with clean
100

hands. Thus, in the instant case, respondent cannot
seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it
is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the
property despite the constitutional prohibition.
Further, the distinction made between transfer of
ownership as opposed to recovery of funds is a futile
exercise
on
respondents part.
To allow
reimbursement would in effect permit respondent to
enjoy the fruits of a property which he is not allowed
to own.
In view of the foregoing, the Court ordered the
Decision of the Court of Appeals to be REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial
Court terminating the regime of absolute community
between the petitioner and respondent, decreeing a
separation of property between them and ordering
the partition of the personal properties located in the
Philippines equally, is REINSTATED.
105) Agapay vs. Palang
276 SCRA 341
Facts
Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage with
private respondent Carlina (or Cornelia) Vallesterol
in 1949. A few months after the wedding, he left to
work in Hawaii. The trial court found evidence that
as early as 1957, Miguel had attempted to divorce
Carlina in Hawaii.
On July 15, 1973, the then sixty-three-year-old
Miguel contracted his second marriage with
nineteen-year-old
Erlinda
Agapay,
herein
petitioner. Two months earlier, on May 17, 1973,
Miguel and Erlinda, as evidenced by the Deed of
Sale, jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land
located in Pangasinan. Consequently, a Transfer
Certificate of Title covering said rice land was issued
in their names.
A house and lot in Pangasinan was likewise
purchased on September 23, 1975, allegedly by
Erlinda as the sole vendee. A Transfer Certificate of
Title covering said property was later issued in her
name.
On October 30, 1975, Miguel and Cornelia Palang
executed a Deed of Donation as a form of
compromise agreement to settle and end a case
filed by the latter. The parties therein agreed to
donate their conjugal property consisting of six
parcels of land to their only child, Herminia Palang.
Miguel and Erlindas cohabitation produced a son,
Kristopher A. Palang. In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda
were convicted of Concubinage upon Carlinas
complaint and two years later, Miguel died.
On July 11, 1981, Carlina Palang and her daughter

Herminia Palang de la Cruz, herein private
respondents, instituted an action for recovery of
ownership and possession with damages against
petitioner before the Regional Trial Court. Private
respondents sought to get back the riceland and the
house and lot allegedly purchased by Miguel during
his cohabitation with petitioner.
Petitioner, as defendant below, contended that while
the riceland is registered in their names (Miguel and
Erlinda), she had already given her half of the
property to their son Kristopher Palang. She added
that the house and lot is her sole property, having
bought the same with her own money. Erlinda
added that Carlina is precluded from claiming
aforesaid properties since the latter had already
donated their conjugal estate to Herminia.
After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered its
decision dismissing the complaint after declaring that
there was little evidence to prove that the subject
properties pertained to the conjugal property of
Carlina and Miguel Palang.
On appeal, respondent court reversed the trial
courts decision. The Court of Appeals declared the
plaintiffs-appellants as the owners of the riceland
and the house and lot allegedly purchased by Miguel
during his cohabitation with defendant appellee.
Issue
Whether or not petitioner can be considered as the
rightful co-owner of the riceland and the house and
lot.
Held
The Court held that under Article 148 of the Family
Code, providing for cases of cohabitation when a
man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry
each other live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or
under a void marriage, only the properties acquired
by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. It must be stressed that
actual contribution is required by this provision. If
the actual contribution of the party is not proved,
there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of
equal shares.
In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her
testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy
and sell and had a sari-sari store but failed to
persuade the Court that she actually contributed
money to buy the subject riceland. Worth noting is
the fact that on the date of conveyance, May 17,
1973, petitioner was only around twenty years of age
101

and Miguel Palang was already sixty-four and a
pensioner of the U.S. Government. Considering her
youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that in 1973
she contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the
purchase price of subject property, there being no
proof of the same.
Petitioner again claims that the riceland was bought
two months before Miguel and Erlinda actually
cohabited. In the nature of an afterthought, said
added assertion was intended to exclude their case
from the operation of Article 148 of the Family
Code. Proof of the precise date when they
commenced their adulterous cohabitation not having
been adduced, the Court cannot state definitively
that the riceland was purchased even before they
started living together. In any case, even assuming
that the subject property was bought before
cohabitation, the rules of co-ownership would still
apply and proof of actual contribution would still be
essential. Since petitioner failed to prove that she
contributed money to the purchase price of the
riceland, the Court finds no basis to justify her coownership
with
Miguel
over
the
same. Consequently, the riceland should revert to
the conjugal partnership property of the deceased
Miguel and private respondent Carlina Palang.
With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly
bought the same for P20,000.00 on when she was
only 22 years old. The testimony of the notary public
who prepared the deed of conveyance for the
property reveals the falsehood of this claim. Atty.
Constantino Sagun testified that Miguel Palang
provided the money for the purchase price and
directed that Erlindas name alone be placed as the
vendee.
The transaction was properly a donation made by
Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was clearly void
and inexistent by express provision of law because it
was made between persons guilty of adultery or
concubinage at the time of the donation, under
Article 739 of the Civil Code. Moreover, Article 87 of
the Family Code expressly provides that the
prohibition against donations between spouses now
applies to donations between persons living together
as husband and wife without a valid marriage.
106) Tumlos vs. Fernandez

330 SCRA 718
Facts
Herein respondents were the plaintiffs in an action

for ejectment filed before the MTC of Valenzuela
against herein Petitioner Guillerma Tumlos, Toto
Tumlos, and Gina Tumlos. In their complaint, the
said spouses alleged that they are the absolute
owners of an apartment building located at ARTE
SUBDIVISION III; that through tolerance they had
allowed the defendants-private respondents to
occupy the apartment building for the last seven (7)
years without the payment of any rent; that it was
agreed upon that after a few months, defendant
Guillerma Tumlos will pay P1,600.00 a month while
the other defendants promised to pay P1,000.00 a
month, both as rental, which agreement was not
complied with by the said defendants; that they have
demanded several times for the defendants to
vacate the premises, as they are in need of the
property for the construction of a new building; and
that they have also demanded payment of
P84,000.00 from Toto and Gina Tumlos representing
rentals for seven (7) years and payment of
P143,600.00 from Guillerma Tumlos as unpaid
rentals for seven (7) years, but the said demands
went unheeded.
Petitioner Guillerma Tumlos was the only one who
filed an answer to the complaint. She averred therein
that the Fernandez spouses had no cause of action
against her, since she is a co-owner of the subject
premises as evidenced by a Contract to Sell wherein
it was stated that she is a co-vendee of the property
in question together with Respondent Mario
Fernandez. Thus, she asked for the dismissal of the
complaint.
After an unfruitful preliminary conference, the MTC
required the parties to submit their affidavits and
other evidence on the factual issues defined in their
pleadings within ten (10) days from receipt of such
order and thereafter promulgated its judgment.
Upon appeal to the RTC, petitioner and the two
other defendants alleged in their memorandum on
appeal that Respondent Mario Fernandez and
Petitioner Guillerma had an amorous relationship,
and that they acquired the property in question as
their love nest. It was further alleged that they lived
together in the said apartment building with their two
(2) children for around ten (10) years, and that
Guillerma administered the property by collecting
rentals from the lessees of the other apartments,
until she discovered that Respondent Mario
deceived her as to the annulment of his marriage.
In the same memorandum, petitioner and the two
other defendants further averred that it was only
recently that Toto Tumlos was temporarily
accommodated in one of the rooms of the subject
premises while Gina Tumlos acted as a nanny for
102

the children. In short, their presence there was only
transient and they were not tenants of the
Fernandez spouses.
The RTC subsequently rendered a decision affirming
in toto the judgment of the MTC.
The petitioner and the two other defendants filed a
motion for reconsideration, alleging that the decision
of affirmance by the RTC was constitutionally flawed
for failing to point out distinctly and clearly the
findings of facts and law on which it was based vis-vis the statements of issues they have raised in
their memorandum on appeal. They also averred
that the Contract to Sell presented by the plaintiffs
which named the buyer as Mario P. Fernandez, of
legal age, married to Lourdes P. Fernandez, should
not be given credence as it was falsified to appear
that way. According to them, the Contract to Sell
originally named Guillerma Fernandez as the
spouse of Respondent Mario. As found by the RTC
in its judgment, a new Contract to Sell was issued by
the sellers naming the respondents as the buyers
after the latter presented their marriage contract and
requested a change in the name of the vendee-wife.
Such facts necessitate the conclusion that Guillerma
was really a co-owner thereof, and that the
respondents manipulated the evidence in order to
deprive her of her rights to enjoy and use the
property as recognized by law.
The RTC subsequently ruled that the Contract to
Sell submitted by the Fernandez spouses appeared
not to be authentic, as there was an alteration in the
name of the wife of Respondent Mario Fernandez.
Hence, the contract presented by the respondents
cannot be given any weight. The court further ruled
that Guillerma and Respondent Mario acquired the
property during their cohabitation as husband and
wife, although without the benefit of marriage. From
such findings, the court concluded that Petitioner
Guillerma Tumlos was a co-owner of the subject
property and could not be ejected therefrom.
The CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The CA
ruled that from the inception of the instant case, the
only defense presented by private respondent
Guillerma is her right as a co-owner of the subject
property, which was not satisfactorily proven by
Guillerma. It was only on appeal that Guillerma
alleged that she cohabited with the petitionerhusband without the benefit of marriage, and that
she bore him two (2) children. Attached to her
memorandum on appeal are the birth certificates of
the said children. Such contentions and documents
should not have been considered by the RTC, as
they were not presented in her affidavit/position
paper before the MTC. Even if the said allegations
and documents could be considered, the claim of co-
ownership must still fail as Respondent Mario

Fernandez is validly married to Respondent Lourdes
Fernandez as per Marriage Contract. Guillerma and
Mario are not capacitated to marry each other. Thus,
the property relations governing their supposed
cohabitation is that found in Article 148 of the Family
Code. It is clear that actual contribution is required
by this provision. Hence, if actual contribution of the
party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership
and no presumption of equal shares.
In the instant case, no proof of actual contribution by
Guillerma Tumlos in the purchase of the subject
property was presented. Her only evidence was her
being named in the Contract to Sell as the wife of
Respondent Mario Fernandez. Since she failed to
prove that she contributed money to the purchase
price of the subject apartment building, the Court
finds no basis to justify her co-ownership with
Respondent Mario. The said property is thus
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership
property of Mario and Lourdes Fernandez, it being
acquired during the subsistence of their marriage
and there being no other proof to the contrary.
The RTC also found that Respondent Mario has two
(2) children with Guillerma who are in her custody,
and that to eject them from the apartment building
would be to run counter with the obligation of the
former to give support to his minor illegitimate
children, which indispensably includes dwelling.
Such finding has no leg to stand on, it being based
on evidence presented for the first time on appeal.
Even assuming arguendo that the said evidence was
validly presented, the RTC failed to consider that the
need for support cannot be presumed. Article 203 of
the Family Code expressly provides that the
obligation to give support shall be demandable from
the time the person who has a right to receive the
same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be
paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial
demand.
Issues
1. Whether or not the petitioner is a co-owner
of the property pursuant to Article 148 of the
Family Code.
2. Whether or not the petitioners claim for
support bar the subject ejectment suit.
Held
On the first issue, the Court held that it cannot
accept petitioners submission that she is a coowner of the disputed property pursuant to Article
144 of the Civil Code. As correctly held by the CA,
the applicable law is not Article 144 of the Civil
Code, but Article 148 of the Family Code. Under
103

Article 148 of the Family Code, a man and a woman,
who are not legally capacitated to marry each other,
but who nonetheless live together conjugally, may be
deemed co-owners of a property acquired during the
cohabitation only upon proof that each made an
actual contribution to its acquisition. Hence, mere
cohabitation without proof of contribution will not
result in a co-ownership.
Article 144 of the Civil Code applies only to a
relationship between a man and a woman, who are
not incapacitated to marry each other, or to one in
which the marriage of the parties is void from the
beginning. It does not apply to a cohabitation that
amounts to adultery or concubinage, for it would be
absurd to create a co-ownership where there exists
a prior conjugal partnership or absolute community
between the man and his lawful wife.
Based on evidence presented by respondents, as
well as those submitted by petitioner herself before
the RTC, it is clear that Mario Fernandez was
incapacitated to marry petitioner because he was
legally married to Lourdes Fernandez. It is also clear
that, as readily admitted by petitioner, she cohabited
with Mario in a state of concubinage. Therefore,
Article 144 of the Civil Code is inapplicable.
In this case, petitioner fails to present any evidence
that she had made an actual contribution to
purchase the subject property. Likewise, her claim of
having administered the property during the
cohabitation is unsubstantiated and in any event,
this fact by itself does not justify her claim, for
nothing in Article 148 of the Family Code provides
that the administration of the property amounts to a
contribution in its acquisition. Clearly, there is no
basis for petitioners claim of co-ownership. The
property in question belongs to the conjugal
partnership of respondents. Hence, the MTC and the
CA were correct in ordering the ejectment of
petitioner from the premises.
On the second issue, the Court disagree with the
petitioner that the childrens right to support, which
necessarily includes shelter, prevails over the right of
respondents to eject her. The Court emphasized
that the case at bar is an ejectment suit whereby
respondents seek to exercise their possessory right
over their property. It is summary in character and
deals solely with the issue of possession of the
property in dispute and it has been shown that they
have a better right to possess it than does the
petitioner, whose right to possess is based merely
on their tolerance. Further, Article 298 of the Civil
Code expressly provides that the obligation to give
support shall be demandable from the time the
person who has a right to receive the same need it
for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from
the date of judicial and extrajudicial demand. In this

case, none was made.
107) Eustaquio Mallilin vs. Ma. Elvira Castillo
333 SCRA 628
Facts
On February 24, 1993, petitioner Eustaquio Mallilin,
Jr. filed a complaint for "Partition and/or Payment of
Co-Ownership Share, Accounting and Damages"
against respondent Ma. Elvira Castillo. The
complaint alleged that petitioner and respondent,
both married and with children, but separated from
their respective spouses, cohabited after a brief
courtship sometime in 1979 while their respective
marriages still subsisted. During their union, they set
up the Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation,
with petitioner as president and chairman of the
board of directors, and respondent as vice-president
and treasurer. The business flourished and petitioner
and respondent acquired real and personal
properties which were registered solely in
respondent's name. In 1992, due to irreconcilable
differences, the couple separated. Petitioner
demanded from respondent his share in the subject
properties, but respondent refused alleging that said
properties had been registered solely in her name.
In her Amended Answer, respondent admitted that
she engaged in the customs brokerage business
with petitioner but alleged that the Superfreight
Customs Brokerage Corporation was organized with
other individuals and duly registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission in 1987. She
denied that she and petitioner lived as husband and
wife because the fact was that they were still legally
married to their respective spouses. She claimed to
be the exclusive owner of all real personal properties
involved in petitioner's action for partition on the
ground that they were acquired entirely out of her
own money and registered solely in her name.
On November 25, 1994, respondent filed a Motion
for Summary Judgment, in accordance with Rule 34
of the Rules of Court. She contended that summary
judgment was proper, because the issues raised in
the pleadings were sham and not genuine.
The respondent contended that even if she and
petitioner actually cohabited, petitioner could not
validly claim a part of the subject real and personal
properties because Art. 144 of the Civil Code, which
provides that the rules on co-ownership shall govern
the properties acquired by a man and a woman
living together as husband and wife but not married,
or under a marriage which is void ab initio, applies
only if the parties are not in any way incapacitated to
104

contract marriage. In the parties' case, their union
suffered the legal impediment of a prior subsisting
marriage. Thus, the question of fact being raised by
petitioner, i.e., whether they lived together as
husband and wife, was irrelevant as no coownership could exist between them.
Further,
respondent maintained that petitioner cannot be
considered an unregistered co-owner of the subject
properties on the ground that, since titles to the land
are solely in her name, to grant petitioner's prayer
would be to allow a collateral attack on the validity of
such titles.
Petitioner opposed respondent's Motion for
Summary Judgment. 8 He contended that the case
presented genuine factual issues and that Art. 144 of
the Civil Code had been repealed by the Family
Code which now allows, under Art. 148, a limited coownership even though a man and a woman living
together are not capacitated to marry each other.
Petitioner also asserted that an implied trust was
constituted when he and respondent agreed to
register the properties solely in the latter's name
although the same were acquired out of the profits
made from their brokerage business. Petitioner
invoked Articles 1452 and 1453 of the Civil Code.
On January 30, 1995, the trial court rendered its
decision granting respondent's motion for summary
judgment. It ruled that an examination of the
pleadings shows that the issues involved were
purely legal. The trial court also sustained
respondent's contention that petitioner's action for
partition amounted to a collateral attack on the
validity of the certificates of title covering the subject
properties. It held that even if the parties really had
cohabited, the action for partition could not be
allowed because an action for partition among coowners ceases to be so and becomes one for title if
the defendant, as in the present case, alleges
exclusive ownership of the properties in question.
For these reasons, the trial court dismissed Case.
On appeals, the Court of Appeals, ordered the case
remanded to the court of origin for trial on the merits.
It cited the decision in Roque v. Intermediate
Appellate Court to the effect that an action for
partition is at once an action for declaration of coownership and for segregation and conveyance of a
determinate portion of the properties involved. If the
defendant asserts exclusive title over the property,
the action for partition should not be dismissed.
Rather, the court should resolve the case and if the
plaintiff is unable to sustain his claimed status as a
co-owner, the court should dismiss the action, not
because the wrong remedy was availed of, but
because no basis exists for requiring the defendant
to submit to partition. Resolving the issue whether
petitioner's action for partition was a collateral attack

on the validity of the certificates of title, the Court of
Appeals held that since petitioner sought to compel
respondent to execute documents necessary to
effect transfer of what he claimed was his share,
petitioner was not actually attacking the validity of
the titles but in fact, recognized their validity. Finally,
the appellate court upheld petitioner's position that
Art. 144 of the Civil Code had been repealed by Art.
148 of the Family Code.
Respondent moved for reconsideration of the
decision of Court of Appeals. Subsequently, the
Court of Appeals granted respondent's motion and
reversed its previous decision.
Issue
Whether or not the fact that the petitioner and
respondent indeed cohabited is material to
determine co-ownership of properties between the
parties.
Held
The Court held that although Art. 144 of the Civil
Code, applies only to cases in which a man and a
woman live together as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage provided they are not
incapacitated or are without impediment to marry
each other, or in which the marriage is void ab initio,
provided it is not bigamous, therefore, does not
cover parties living in an adulterous relationship. Art.
148 of the Family Code, however, provides for a
limited co-ownership in cases where the parties in
union are incapacitated to marry each other.
It was error for the trial court to rule that, because
the parties in this case were not capacitated to marry
each other at the time that they were alleged to have
been living together, they could not have owned
properties in common. The Family Code, in addition
to providing that a co-ownership exists between a
man and a woman who live together as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage, likewise
provides that, if the parties are incapacitated to
marry each other, properties acquired by them
through their joint contribution of money, property or
industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their contributions which, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be
equal. There is thus co-ownership even though the
couples are not capacitated to marry each other.
In this case, there may be a co-ownership between
the parties. Consequently, whether petitioner and
respondent cohabited and whether the properties
involved in the case are part of the alleged coownership, are genuine and material. All but one of
the properties involved were alleged to have been
105

acquired after the Family Code took effect on August
3, 1988. With respect to the property acquired before
the Family Code took effect if it is shown that it was
really acquired under the regime of the Civil Code,
then it should be excluded.
108) Elna Mercado-Fehr vs. Bruno Fehr
G.R. No. 152716, OCTOBER 23, 2003
Facts
This case arose from a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity to comply with the essential marital
obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code filed
by petitioner Elna Mercado-Fehr against respondent
Bruno Fehr before the Regional Trial Court of Makati
in March 1997.
After due proceedings, the trial court declared the
marriage between petitioner and respondent void ab
initio under Article 36 of the Family Code and
ordered the dissolution of their conjugal partnership
of property. Custody over the two minor children
was awarded to petitioner.
After a careful scrutiny of the inventory of properties
submitted by both parties, the Court finds the
following properties to be excluded from the conjugal
properties:
a) The Bacolod property, considering that the same
is owned by petitioners parents; and
b) Suite 204 of the LCG Condominium, considering
that the same was purchased on installment basis
by respondent with his exclusive funds prior to his
marriage, as evidenced by a Contract to Sell dated
July 26, 1983.
In view of the above decision, Suite 204, LCG
Condominium was declared the EXCLUSIVE
PROPERTY of respondent. Accordingly, petitioner
was directed to transfer ownership of Suite 204 in
the name of respondent.
The Petitioner and Respondent are further enjoined
to jointly support their minor children, Michael and
Patrick Fehr, for their education, uniforms, food and
medical expenses.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said
Order with respect to the adjudication of Suite 204,
LCG Condominium and the support of the children.
Petitioner alleged that Suite 204 was purchased on
installment basis at the time when petitioner and
respondent were living exclusively with each other
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage,
hence the rules on co-ownership should apply in
accordance with Article 147 of the Family Code.
Resolving said motion, the trial court held that since
the marriage between petitioner and respondent was
declared void ab intio, the rules on co-ownership

should apply in the liquidation and partition of the
properties they own in common pursuant to Article
147 of the Family Code. The court, however,
affirmed its previous ruling that Suite 204 of LCG
Condominium was acquired prior to the couples
cohabitation and therefore pertained solely to
respondent.
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal questioning the
order of the trial court but subsequently withdrew the
notice and instead filed a special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals,
questioning the findings of the trial court.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for
certiorari for lack of merit. Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration of said Decision, which was also
denied by the appellate court.
Issue
Whether or not Suite 204 of LCG Condominium
should be governed by the rules on co-ownership
and what rules should be applied in the settlement of
the common properties?
Held
It appears from the facts, as found by the trial court,
that in March 1983, after two years of long-distance
courtship, petitioner left Cebu City and moved in with
respondent in the latters residence in Metro Manila.
Their relations bore fruit and their first child, Michael
Bruno Fehr, was born on December 3, 1983. The
couple got married on March 14, 1985. In the
meantime, they purchased on installment a
condominium unit, Suite 204, at LCG Condominium,
as evidenced by a Contract to Sell dated July 26,
1983 executed by respondent as the buyer and J.V.
Santos Commercial Corporation as the seller.
Petitioner also signed the contract as witness, using
the name "Elna Mercado Fehr". Upon completion of
payment, the title to the condominium unit was
issued in the name of petitioner.
In light of these facts, the Court gave more credence
to petitioners submission that Suite 204 was
acquired
during
the
parties
cohabitation.
Accordingly, under Article 147 of the Family Code,
said property should be governed by the rules on coownership. Article 147 applies to unions of parties
who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but whose
marriage is nonetheless void, as in the case at bar.
This provision creates a co-ownership with respect
to the properties they acquire during their
cohabitation.
This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a
man and a woman, suffering no legal impediment to
marry each other, so exclusively live together as
106

husband and wife under a void marriage or without
the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the
provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to
the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage,
i.e., any "male or female of the age of eighteen
years or upwards not under any of the impediments
mentioned in Article 37 and 38" of the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by
both spouses through their work and industry shall
be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership.
Any property acquired during the union is prima facie
presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall still be considered as
having contributed thereto jointly if said partys
"efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family household."
Thus, for Article 147 to operate, the man and the
woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each
other; (2) live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the
benefit of marriage or their marriage is void. All these
elements are present in the case at bar. It has not
been shown that petitioner and respondent suffered
any impediment to marry each other. They lived
exclusively with each other as husband and wife
when petitioner moved in with respondent in his
residence and were later united in marriage. Their
marriage, however, was found to be void under
Article 36 of the Family Code because of
respondents psychological incapacity to comply with
essential marital obligations.
The disputed property, Suite 204 of LCG
Condominium, was purchased on installment basis
on July 26, 1983, at the time when petitioner and
respondent were already living together. Hence, it
should be considered as common property of
petitioner and respondent. Further, the Court held
that the property regime of the parties should be
divided in accordance with the law on co-ownership.
109) Saguid vs. Rey
G.R. No. 150611.JUNE 10, 2003
Facts
Gina S. Rey was married, but separated de
facto from her husband, when she met petitioner
Jacinto Saguid sometime in July 1987. After a brief
courtship, the two decided to cohabit as husband
and wife in a house built on a lot owned by Jacintos
father. Jacinto made a living as the patron of their
fishing vessel Saguid Brothers. Gina, on the other
hand, worked as a fish dealer, but decided to work
as an entertainer in Japan from 1992 to 1994. In

1996, the couple decided to separate.
On January 9, 1997, private respondent filed a
complaint for Partition and Recovery of Personal
Property
with
Receivership
against
the
petitioner. She alleged that from her salary as
entertainer in Japan, she was able to contribute
P70,000.00 in the completion of their unfinished
house. Also, from her own earnings as an
entertainer and fish dealer, she was able to acquire
and accumulate appliances, pieces of furniture and
household effects, with a total value of
P111,375.00. She prayed that she be declared the
sole owner of these personal properties and that the
amount of P70,000.00, representing her contribution
to the construction of their house, be reimbursed to
her.
Private respondent stated that she had a total of
P35,465.00 share in the joint account deposit which
she and the petitioner maintained. Gina declared
that said deposits were spent for the purchase of
construction materials, appliances and other
personal properties.
Petitioner, on the other hand, claimed that the
expenses for the construction of their house were
defrayed solely from his income. He averred that
private respondents meager income as fish dealer
rendered her unable to contribute in the construction
of said house. Petitioner further contended that
Gina did not work continuously in Japan from 1992
to 1994. When their house was repaired and
improved
sometime
in
1995-1996,
private
respondent did not share in the expenses because
her earnings as entertainer were spent on the daily
needs and business of her parents. Petitioner
further claimed that his savings from his income in
the fishing business were the ones used in
purchasing the disputed personal properties.
The respondent was allowed to present evidence ex
parte after the trial court declared the petitioner as in
default for failure to file a pre-trial brief. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
Subsequently, a decision was rendered in favor of
the private respondent.
On appeal, said decision was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals except for the award for moral damages.
Issue
What provision of the Family Code shall governed
the property regime of the petitioner and private
respondent?
Held
The Court held that the property regime of Jacinto
and Gina, who was validly married to another man at
107

the time of her cohabitation with the former, should
be governed by Article 148 of the Family Code, as it
applies to adulterous relationships and under this
regime, proof of actual contribution is required.
In the case at bar, although the adulterous
cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1987,
which is before the date of the effectivity of the
Family Code, Article 148 still applies because this
provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus
in Article 144 of the Civil Code. Before Article 148 of
the Family Code was enacted, there was no
provision governing property relations of couples
living in a state of adultery or concubinage. Hence,
even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the
property occurred before the Family Code took
effect, Article 148 governs.
In the case at bar, the controversy centers on the
house
and
personal
properties
of
the
parties. Private respondent alleged in her complaint
that she contributed P70,000.00 for the completion
of their house. However, nowhere in her testimony
did she specify the extent of her contribution. What
appears in the record are receipts in her name for
the purchase of construction materials in the total
amount of P11,413.00.
On the other hand, both parties claim that the money
used to purchase the disputed personal properties
came partly from their joint account. While there is
no question that both parties contributed in their joint
account deposit, there is, however, no sufficient
proof of the exact amount of their respective shares
therein. Pursuant to Article 148 of the Family Code,
in the absence of proof of extent of the parties
respective contribution, their share shall be
presumed to be equal. Here, the disputed personal
properties were valued at P111,375.00, the
existence and value of which were not questioned by
the petitioner. Hence, their share therein is
equivalent to one-half, which is P 55,687.50 each.
On the basis of the evidence established, the extent
of private respondents co-ownership over the
disputed house is only up to the amount of
P11,413.00, her proven contribution in the
construction thereof. While for the personal
properties, her participation should be limited only to
the amount of P55,687.50.
108

XIII. THE FAMILY AS AN INSTITUTION
110) Hontiveros vs. RTC Br. 25, Iloilo City &
Spouses Gregorio Hontiveros & Teodora Ayson
G.R.No. 125465, June 29, 1999
Facts:
Spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a
complaint for damages against private respondents
Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson before the
RTC Iloilo City.
Petitioners alleged that they are the owners of a
land located at the town of Jamindan, Province of
Capiz, as shown by OCT No. 0-2124, issued
pursuant to the decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court which modified decision of CFI
Capiz, in a land registration case filed by private
respondent Gregorio Hontivero. Also, that they were
deprived of income from the land as a result of the
filing of the land registration case. The income
consisted of rentals from tenants of the land in the
amount of P66,000.00 per year from 1968 to 1987,
and P595,000.00 per year thereafter; and that
private respondents filed the land registration case
and withheld possession of the land from petitioners
in bad faith.
Private respondents denied that they were married
and alleged that private respondent Hontiveros was
a widower while private respondent Ayson was
single. They denied that they had deprived
petitioners of possession of and income from the
land. They alleged that possession of the property
in question had already been transferred to
petitioners on August 7, 1985, by virtue of a writ of
possession, dated July 18, 1985, issued by the clerk
of court of the RTC Capiz, Mambusao, the return
thereof having been received by petitioners counsel.
Since then, petitioners have been directly receiving
rentals from the tenants of the land. The complaint
failed to state a cause of action since it did not allege
that earnest efforts towards a compromise had been
made,
considering
that
petitioner
Augusto
Hontiveros and private respondent Gregorio
Hontiveros are brothers. The decision of the IAC in
Land Registration Case was null and void since it
was based upon a ground which was not passed
upon by the trial court. That petitioners claim for
damages was barred by prescription with respect to
claims before 1984; that there were no rentals due
since private respondent Hontiveros was a
possessor in good faith and for value; and that
private respondent Ayson had nothing to do with the
case as she was not married to private respondent
Gregorio Hontiveros and did not have any

proprietary interest in the subject property. Private
respondents prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint and for an order against petitioners to pay
damages to private respondents by way of
counterclaim, as well as reconveyance of the subject
land to private respondent.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC palpably erred in
dismissing the complaint on the ground that it
does not allege under oath that earnest efforts
toward a compromise were made prior to filing
as required by Art. 151 of FC.
Held:
No. This rule shall not apply to cases which may not
be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code.
Moreover, as petitioners contend, Art. 151 of the
Family Code does not apply in this case since the
suit is not exclusively among family members.
Petitioners claim that whenever a stranger is a party
in a case involving family members, the requisite
showing of earnest efforts to compromise is no
longer mandatory. They argue that since private
respondent Ayson is admittedly a stranger to the
Hontiveros family, the case is not covered by the
requirements of Art. 151 of the Family Code.
We agree with petitioners. The inclusion of private
respondent Ayson as defendant and petitioner Maria
Hontiveros as plaintiff takes the case out of the
ambit of Art. 151 of the Family Code. Under this
provision, the phrase members of the same family
refers to the husband and wife, parents and children,
ascendants and descendants, and brothers and
sisters, whether full or half-blood.
In Gayon v. Gayon, the enumeration of brothers and
sisters as members of the same family does not
comprehend sisters-in-law. In that case, then Chief
Justice Concepcion emphasized that sisters-in-law
(hence, also brothers-in-law) are not listed under
Art. 217 of the New Civil Code as members of the
same family. Since Art. 150 of the Family Code
repeats essentially the same enumeration of
members of the family, we find no reason to alter
existing jurisprudence on the mater. Consequently,
the court a quo erred in ruling that petitioner
Guerrero, being a brother-in-law of private
respondent Hernando, was required to exert earnest
efforts towards a compromise before filing the
present suit.
Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are
not given any legal effect in this jurisdiction.
Consequently, private respondent Ayson, who is
described in the complaint as the spouse of
109

respondent Hontiveros, and petitioner Maria
Hontiveros, who is admittedly the spouse of
petitioner Augusto Hontiveros, are considered
strangers to the Hontiveros family, for purposes of
Art. 151.
Petitioners finally question the constitutionality of Art.
151 of the Family Code on the ground that it in effect
amends the Rules of Court. This, according to them,
cannot be done since the Constitution reserves in
favor of the Supreme Court the power to promulgate
rules of pleadings and procedure. Considering the
conclusion we have reached in this case, however, it
is unnecessary for present purposes to pass upon
this question.
Courts do not pass upon
constitutional questions unless they are the very lis
mota of the case.
111) Guerrero vs. RTC Ilocos Norte, Judge Luis
Bello & Pedro Hernando
G.R. No. 109068 January 10, 1994
Facts:
Filed by petitioner as an accion publicana against
private respondent, this case assumed another
dimension when it was dismissed by respondent
Judge on the ground that the parties being brotherin-law the complaint should have alleged that
earnest efforts were first exerted towards a
compromise.
Admittedly, the complaint does not allege that the
parties exerted earnest efforts towards a
compromise and that the same failed. However,
private respondent Pedro G. Hernando apparently
overlooked this alleged defect since he did not file
any motion to dismiss nor attack the complaint on
this ground in his answer. It was only at the pre-trial
conference, that the relationship of petitioner
Gaudencio Guerrero and Hernando was noted by
respondent Judge Luis B. Bello, Jr.
Guerrero claims that since brothers by affinity are
not members of the same family, he was not
required to exert efforts towards a compromise.
Issue:
Whether brothers by affinity are considered
members of the same family contemplated in Art.
217, par. (4), and Art. 222 of the New Civil Code,
as well as under Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, of the
Rules of Court requiring earnest efforts towards
a compromise before a suit between them may
be instituted and maintained.
Held:
No. The reason for the requirement that earnest
efforts at compromise be first exerted before a
complaint is given due course is because it is
difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic
spectacle than a litigation between members of the
same family. It is necessary that every effort should
be made toward a compromise before a litigation is
allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is
known that a lawsuit between close relatives
generates deeper bitterness than between
strangers. A litigation in a family is to be lamented
far more than a lawsuit between strangers .
In Gayon v. Gayon, the enumeration of brothers and
sisters as members of the same family does not
comprehend sisters-in-law. The attempt to
compromise as well as inability to succeed is a
condition precedent to the the filing of a suit between
members of the same family.
Since Art. 150 of the Family Code repeats
essentially the same enumeration of "members of
the family", we find no reason to alter existing
jurisprudence on the matter. Consequently, the court
a quo erred in ruling that petitioner Guerrero, being a
brother-in-law of private respondent Hernando, was
required to exert earnest efforts towards a
compromise before filing the present suit.
Also, Guerreros wife has no actual interest and
participation in the land subject of the suit, which the
petitioner bought, before he married his wife.
112) Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. vs. Hon.
Edmundo Acua, RTC Judge Caloocan City and
Alberto Moreno
G.R. no. 154132 August 31, 2006
Facts:
Alberto Moreno filed with the RTC of Caloocan City
a complaint against Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank,
his wife Remedios, the spouses Felipe and Maria
Owe and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City for
cancellation of mortgage.
Respondent Moreno
contends that he did not secure any loan from
petitioner, nor did he sign or execute any contract of
mortgage in its favor; that his wife, acting in
conspiracy with Hiyas and the spouses Owe, who
were the ones that benefited from the loan, made it
appear that he signed the contract of mortgage; that
he could not have executed the said contract
because he was working abroad.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss because private
respondent failed to comply with Article 151 of the
110

Family wherein it is provided that no suit between
members of the same family shall prosper unless it
should appear from the verified complaint or petition
that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been
made, but that the same have failed.
Petitioner
contends that since the complaint does not contain
any fact or averment that earnest efforts toward a
compromise had been made prior to its institution,
then the complaint should be dismissed for lack of
cause of action.
made to depend on the way the latter would settle

their differences among themselves. 22 x x x.
Hence, once a stranger becomes a party to a suit
involving members of the same family, the law no
longer makes it a condition precedent that earnest
efforts be made towards a compromise before the
action can prosper.
Petition is Dismissed.
FAMILY HOME
RTC denied the motion to dismiss, it held that

earnest efforts towards a compromise is not required
before the filing of the instant case considering that
the above-entitled case involves parties who are
strangers to the family.
Issue:
Whether or not lack of earnest efforts toward a
compromise is not a ground for a motion to
dismiss in suits between husband and wife when
other parties who are strangers to the family are
involved in the suit.
Held:
Yes. The Code Commission that drafted Article 222
of the Civil Code from which Article 151 of the Family
Code was taken explains: it is difficult to imagine a
sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation
between members of the same family. It is
necessary that every effort should be made toward a
compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed
hate and passion in the family. It is known that a
lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper
bitterness than between strangers.
In Magbaleta vs. Gonong, the case involved brothers
and a stranger to the family, the alleged owner of the
subject property. The Court, taking into consideration
the explanation made by the Code Commission in its
report, ruled that: These consideration s do not
however weigh enough to make it imperative that
such efforts to compromise should be a jurisdictional
pre-requisite for the maintenance of an action
whenever a stranger to the family is a party thereto,
whether as a necessary or indispensable one. It is
not always that one who is alien to the family would
be willing to suffer the inconvenience of; much less,
relish the delay and the complications that wrangling
between or among relatives more often than not
entail.
Besides, it is neither practical nor fair that
the determination of the rights of a stranger to the
family who just happened to have innocently
acquired some kind of interest in any right or
property disputed among its members should be
113) Modequillo vs. Breva

G.R. No. 86355 May 31, 1990
Facts:
In 1988, a judgment was rendered by the Court of
Appeals in "Francisco Salinas, et al. vs. Jose
Modequillo, et al. finding the defendants-appellees
Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay jointly and
severally liable to plaintiffs-appellants
as
compensation for the death of Audie Salinas for
hospitalization expenses of Renato Culan- Culan.
The said judgment having become final and
executory, a writ of execution was issued by the
RTC Davao City to satisfy the said judgment on the
goods and chattels of the defendants Jose
Modequillo and Benito Malubay at Malalag, Davao
del Sur.
The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land
located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur
containing an area of 600 square meters with a
market value of P34,550.00 and assessed value of
P7,570.00 per Tax Declaration No. 87008-01359,
registered in the name of Jose Modequillo in the
office of the Provincial Assessor of Davao del Sur;
and a parcel of agricultural land located at
Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao del Sur
containing an area of 3 hectares with a market value
of P24,130.00 and assessed value of P9,650.00 per
Tax Declaration No. 87-08-01848 registered in the
name of Jose Modequillo in the office of the
Provincial Assessor of Davao del Sur.
A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of
execution was filed by defendant Jose Modequillo
alleging that the residential land located at Poblacion
Malalag is where the family home is built since 1969
prior to the commencement of this case and as such
is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment
under Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code
except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof,
and that the judgment debt sought to be enforced
against the family home of defendant is not one of
those enumerated under Article 155 of the Family
Code. As to the agricultural land although it is
111

declared in the name of defendant it is alleged to be
still part of the public land and the transfer in his
favor by the original possessor and applicant who
was a member of a cultural minority was not
approved by the proper government agency. An
opposition thereto was filed by the plaintiffs.
Issue:
Whether or not a final judgment of the Court of
Appeals in an action for damages may be
satisfied by way of execution of a family home
constituted under the Family Code.
Held:
Yes. Under the Family Code, a family home is
deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time
it is occupied as a family residence. There is no
need to constitute the same judicially or
extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the
family actually resides in the premises, it is,
therefore, a family home as contemplated by law.
Thus, the creditors should take the necessary
precautions to protect their interest before extending
credit to the spouses or head of the family who owns
the home.
Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment except:
(1) For non-payment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the
family home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises
before or after such constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects,
builders, material men and others who have
rendered service or furnished material for the
construction of the building.
The exemption provided as aforestated is effective
from the time of the constitution of the family home
as such, and lasts so long as any of its beneficiaries
actually resides therein.
In the present case, the residential house and lot of
petitioner was not constituted as a family home
whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil
Code. It became a family home by operation of law
only under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is
deemed constituted as a family home upon the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 not
August 4, one year after its publication in the Manila
Chronicle on August 4, 1987 (1988 being a leap
year).
The contention of petitioner that it should be
considered a family home from the time it was
occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not
well- taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it
is provided that "the provisions of this Chapter shall
also govern existing family residences insofar as

said provisions are applicable." It does not mean
that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a
retroactive effect such that all existing family
residences are deemed to have been constituted as
family homes at the time of their occupation prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt
from execution for the payment of obligations
incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code.
Article 162 simply means that all existing family
residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family
Code, are considered family homes and are
prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a
family home under the Family Code. Article 162
does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title
V have a retroactive effect.
Is the family home of petitioner exempt from
execution of the money judgment aforecited? No.
The debt or liability which was the basis of the
judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the
vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the
money judgment arising therefrom was rendered by
the appellate court on January 29, 1988. Both
preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988. This case does not fall under the
exemptions from execution provided in the Family
Code.
As to the agricultural land subject of the execution,
the trial court correctly ruled that the levy to be made
by the sheriff shall be on whatever rights the
petitioner may have on the land.
114) Manacop vs. CA and F.F. CRUZ & CO., INC.,
G.R. No. 104875 November 13, 1992
Facts:
Owing to the failure to pay the sub-contract
cost pursuant to a deed of assignment signed
between petitioner's corporation and private
respondent herein, the latter filed on July 3, 1989, a
complaint for a sum of money, with a prayer for
preliminary attachment, against the former. As a
consequence of the order on July 28, 1989, the
corresponding writ for the provisional remedy was
issued on August 11, 1989 which triggered the
attachment of a parcel of land in Quezon City owned
by Manacop Construction President Florante F.
Manacop, herein petitioner.
The petitioner insists that the attached
property is a family home, having been occupied by
him and his family since 1972, and is therefore
exempt from attachment.
112

RTC held that the subject property is not
exempt from attachment.
Issue:
Whether or not the property of Florante Manacop
is exempt from attachment.
Held:
No. The debt or liability which was the basis of the
judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the
vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the
money judgment arising therefrom was rendered by
the appellate court on January 29, 1988. Both
preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988. This case does not fall under the
exemptions from execution provided in the Family
Code.
The contention of petitioner that it should be
considered a family home from the time it was
occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not
well-taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it
is provided that "the provisions of this Chapter shall
also govern existing family residences insofar as
said provisions are applicable." It does not mean
that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a
retroactive effect such that all existing family
residences are deemed to have been constituted as
family homes at the time of their occupation prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt
from execution for the payment of obligations
incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code.
Article 162 simply means that all existing family
residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family
Code, are considered family homes and are
prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a
family home under the Family Code. Article 162
does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title
V have a retroactive effect.
115) Manacop vs. CA and E & L MERCANTILE
INC.
227 SCRA 57
Facts:
On March 10, 1972, Petitioner Florante F. Manacop
and his wife Eulaceli purchased a 446-square-meter
residential lot with a bungalow, in consideration of
P75,000.00.
The
property
is
located
at
Commonwealth Village, Commonwealth Avenue,
Quezon City.
Private Respondent E & L Mercantile, Inc. filed a
complaint against petitioner and F.F. Manacop
Construction Co., Inc. before the RTC Pasig to

collect an indebtedness of P3,359,218.45. Instead
of filing an answer, petitioner and his company
entered into a compromise agreement with private
respondent.
On July 15, 1986, E & L Mercantile filed a motion for
execution which the lower court. However,
execution of the judgment was delayed. Eventually,
the sheriff levied on several vehicles and other
personal properties of petitioner.
In partial
satisfaction of the judgment debt, these chattels
were sold at public auction for which certificates of
sale were correspondingly issued by the sheriff.
Petitioner and his company filed a motion to quash
the alias writs of execution and to stop the sheriff
from continuing to enforce them on the ground that
the judgment was not yet executory.
Private respondent opposed the motion alleging that
the property covered by TCT No. 174180 could not
be considered a family home on the grounds that
petitioner was already living abroad and that the
property, having been acquired in 1972, should have
been judicially constituted as a family home to
exempt it from execution.
RTC ruled in favor of private respondent. It held that
petitioners residence was not exempt from
execution as it was not duly constituted as a family
home, pursuant to the Civil Code.
CA affirmed.
Issue: May a writ of execution of a final and
executory judgment issued before the effectivity of
the Family Code be executed on a house and lot
constituted as a family home under the provision of
said Code?
HELD
Yes. [The Court of Appeals committed no reversible
error. On the contrary, its Decision and Resolution
are supported by law and applicable jurisprudence.]
Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in
holding that his residence was not exempt from
execution in view of his failure to show that the
property involved has been duly constituted as a
family home in accordance with law. He asserts
that the Family Code and Modequillo require simply
the occupancy of the property by the petitioner,
without need for its judicial or extrajudicial
constitution as a family home.
Petitioner is only partly correct. True, under the
Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988,
the subject property became his family home under
the simplified process embodied in Article 153 of
113

said Code. However, Modequillo explicitly ruled that
said provision of the Family Code does not have
retroactive effect. In other words, prior to August 3,
1988, the procedure mandated by the Civil Code
had to be followed for a family home to be
constituted as such. There being absolutely no
proof that the subject property was judicially or
extrajudicially constituted as a family home, it follows
that the laws protective mantle cannot be availed of
by petitioner. Since the debt involved herein was
incurred and the assailed orders of the trial court
issued prior to August 3, 1988, the petitioner cannot
be shielded by the benevolent provisions of the
Family Code.
Petitioner contends that he should be deemed
residing in the family home because his stay in the
United States is merely temporary. He asserts that
the person staying in the house is his overseer and
that whenever his wife visited this country, she
stayed in the family home. This contention lacks
merit.
The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the
family home either by the owner thereof or by any of
its beneficiaries must be actual. That which is
actual is something real, or actually existing, as
opposed to something merely possible, or to
something which is presumptive or constructive.
Actual occupancy, however, need not be by the
owner of the house specifically. Rather, the property
may be occupied by the beneficiaries enumerated
by Article 154 of the Family Code.
116) Versola vs. Ong
G.R. No. 164740 July 31, 2006
Facts:
Private respondent Dr. Victoria T. Ong Oh granted a
loan to a certain Dolores Ledesma in the amount of
P1M. As a security for said loan, Ledesma issued to
private respondent a check for the same amount
dated 10 February 1993 and promised to execute a
deed of real estate mortgage over her house and lot
located at Tandang Sora, Quezon City which did not
materialize.
Subsequently, Ledesma sold the said house and lot
to petitioners for P2.5M. Petitioners paid Ledesma
P1M as downpayment, with the remaining balance
of P1.5M to be paid in monthly installments of
P75,000. Petitioners, however, were only able to
pay the amount of P50,000.00 to Ledesma. To raise
the full amount that Ledesma demanded, petitioners
applied for a loan with Asiatrust Bank, Inc. (Asiatrust)
in the amount of P2M. In the course of the
application for said loan, petitioners, private

respondent, and Ledesma convened with Asiatrust
to arrive at a scheme to settle the obligation of
Ledesma to private respondent and the obligation of
petitioners to Ledesma.
In keeping with the foregoing agreement, private
respondent granted Ledesma an additional loan of
P450,000.00. Ledesma, in turn, executed a Deed of
Sale transferring the title of the subject property to
petitioners. Private respondent then delivered the
title of the said property to Asiatrust. The Deed of
Sale was registered and the title in the name of
Ledesma was cancelled and a new one was issued
in the names of petitioners. Thereafter, Asiatrust
approved the loan application of petitioners.
However, when Asiatrust tried to register the Real
Estate Mortgage covering the subject property
executed in its favor by petitioners, it discovered a
notice of levy on execution was annotated on the
title in connection with Ledesma's obligation to a
certain Miladay's Jewels, Inc., in the amount of
P214,284.00.
Because
of
this
annotated
encumbrance, Asiatrust did not register said Real
Estate Mortgage and refused to release the P2M
loan of petitioners. When private respondent
presented Ledesma's check for payment, the same
was dishonored for the reason that the account was
already closed. Subsequently, when private
respondent presented for payment the check issued
by petitioners, the said check was likewise
dishonored because there was a stop payment
order. With the dishonor of the checks and with
Asiatrust's refusal to release the P2M loan of
petitioners, private respondent came away emptyhanded as she did not receive payment for the
P1.5M loan she granted to Ledesma that was
assumed by petitioners. As a result, private
respondent filed a Complaint for Sum of Money
against Ledesma, petitioners, and Asiatrust.
RTC ruled in favor of Dr. Victoria T. Ong Oh. CA
affirmed withmodification.
Private respondent filed a Motion for Execution with
the RTC. The property in the name of Spouses
Versola were subsequently levied upon. On 5
August 2002, private respondent filed with the trial
court an Ex-parte Motion for Issuance of
Confirmation of Judicial Sale of Real Property of
Sps. Eduardo and Elsa Versola. Petitioners opposed
the said motion on the following grounds: (1) the
property sold at the public auction is the family home
of petitioners which is exempt from execution
pursuant to Article 155 of the Family Code; and (2)
114

no application was made by private respondent for
the determination of the value of their family home to
be subjected to execution, as required under Article
160 of the Family Code.
Petitioners maintain that said objection to the sale
was based on the fact that there was no order or
clearance from the trial court for the sheriff to
proceed with the auction sale, in clear violation of
Article 160 of the Family Code, which requires an
application by the creditor and a determination of the
actual value of the family home by the court ordering
the sale of property under execution.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners timely raised and proved
that their property is exempt from execution.
Held:
No. Article 153 of the Family Code provides:
The family home is deemed constituted on a house
and lot from the time it is occupied as the family
residence. From the time of its constitution and so
long as its beneficiaries resides therein, the family
home continues to be such and is exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment except as
hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value
allowed by law.
Under the cited provision, a family home is deemed
constituted on a house and lot from the time it is
occupied as a family residence; there is no need to
constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially.
The settled rule is that the right to exemption or
forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code is a
personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor
and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff,
but by the debtor himself before the sale of the
property at public auction. It is not sufficient that the
person claiming exemption merely alleges that such
property is a family home. This claim for exemption
must be set up and proved to the Sheriff. Failure to
do so would estop the party from later claiming the
exception.
In the instant case, it was only after almost two years
from the time of the execution sale and after the
"Sheriff's Final Deed of Sale" was issued did
petitioners rigorously claim in their Opposition to
private respondent's Ex-parte Motion for Issuance of
Confirmation of Judicial Sale of Real Property of
Sps. Eduardo and Elsa Versola that the property in
question is exempt from execution. Even then, there
was no showing that petitioners adduced evidence
to prove that it is indeed a family home.
117) Patricio vs. Marcelino G. Dario III and CA

G.R. No. 170829 November 20, 2006
Facts:
On July 5, 1987, Marcelino V. Dario died intestate.
He was survived by his wife, petitioner Perla G.
Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario
and private respondent Marcelino G. Dario III.
Among the properties he left was a parcel of land
with a residential house and a pre-school building.
On August 10, 1987, petitioner, Marcelino Marc and
private respondent, extrajudicially settled the estate
of Marcelino V. Dario. Thereafter, petitioner and
Marcelino Marc formally advised private respondent
of their intention to partition the subject property and
terminate the co-ownership. Private respondent
refused to partition the property hence petitioner and
Marcelino Marc instituted an action for partition.
The RTC ordered the partition and the sale of the
property by public auction. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the complaint for partition filed by
petitioner and Marcelino Marc for lack of merit. It
held that the family home should continue despite
the death of one or both spouses as long as there is
a minor beneficiary thereof. The heirs could not
partition the property unless the court found
compelling reasons to rule otherwise. The appellate
court also held that the minor son of private
respondent, who is a grandson of spouses Marcelino
V. Dario and Perla G. Patricio, was a minor
beneficiary of the family home.
Issue:
Whether Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, the minor
son of private respondent, can be considered as a
beneficiary under Article 154 of the Family Code.
Held:
No. Article 154 of the Family Code enumerates who
are the beneficiaries of a family home: (1) The
husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is
the head of a family; and (2) Their parents,
ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters,
whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate,
who are living in the family home and who depend
upon the head of the family for legal support.
To be a beneficiary of the family home, three
requisites must concur: (1) they must be among the
relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family
Code; (2) they live in the family home; and (3) they
are dependent for legal support upon the head of the
family.
115

As to the first requisite, the beneficiaries of the family
home are: (1) The husband and wife, or an
unmarried person who is the head of a family; and
(2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants,
brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be
legitimate or illegitimate. The term descendants
contemplates all descendants of the person or
persons who constituted the family home without
distinction; hence, it must necessarily include the
grandchildren and great grandchildren of the
spouses who constitute a family home. Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos. Where the
law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish.
Thus, private respondents minor son, who is also
the grandchild of deceased Marcelino V. Dario
satisfies the first requisite.
As to the second requisite, minor beneficiaries must
be actually living in the family home to avail of the
benefits derived from Art. 159. Marcelino Lorenzo R.
Dario IV, also known as Ino, the son of private
respondent and grandson of the decedent Marcelino
V. Dario, has been living in the family home since
1994, or within 10 years from the death of the
decedent, hence, he satisfies the second requisite.
However, as to the third requisite, Marcelino Lorenzo
R. Dario IV cannot demand support from his paternal
grandmother if he has parents who are capable of
supporting him. The liability for legal support falls
primarily on Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IVs
parents, especially his father, herein private
respondent who is the head of his immediate family.
The law first imposes the obligation of legal support
upon the shoulders of the parents, especially the
father, and only in their default is the obligation
imposed on the grandparents.
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV is dependent on legal
support not from his grandmother, but from his
father. Thus, despite residing in the family home
and his being a descendant of Marcelino V. Dario,
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot be considered
as beneficiary contemplated under Article 154
because he did not fulfill the third requisite of being
dependent on his grandmother for legal support. It
is his father whom he is dependent on legal support,
and who must now establish his own family home
separate and distinct from that of his parents, being
of legal age.
116

XIV. PATERNITY AND FILIATION
118) Andal vs. Macaraig
G.R. No. L-2474 May 30, 1951
FACTS:
Emiliano Andal was the owner of the parcel of land
in question having acquired it from his mother
Eduvigis Macaraig by virtue of a donation propter
nuptias executed by the latter in favor of the former
on the occasion of his marriage to Maria Dueas.
Emiliano Andal had been in possession of the land
from 1938 up to 1942, when Eduvigis Macaraig,
taking advantage of the abnormal situation then
prevailing, entered the land in question. Emiliano
Andal became sick of tuberculosis in January 1941.
Sometime thereafter, his brother, Felix, went to live
in his house to help him work his farm. His sickness
became worse that on or about September 10, 1942,
he became so weak that he could hardly move and
get up from his bed. On September 10, 1942, Maria
Duenas, his wife, eloped with Felix, and both went to
live in the house of Maria's father, until the middle of
1943. Since May, 1942, Felix and Maria had sexual
intercourse and treated each other as husband and
wife. On January 1, 1943, Emiliano died without the
presence of his wife, who did not even attend his
funeral. On June 17, 1943, Maria Dueas gave birth
to a boy, who was given the name of Mariano Andal.
If the son born to the couple is deemed legitimate,
then he is entitled to inherit the land in question. If
otherwise, then the land should revert back to
Eduvigis Macaraig as the next of kin entitled to
succeed him under the law. The lower court
rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the child born by Maria is considered
as the legitimate son of Emiliano.
HELD:
Yes. Article 108 of the Civil Code provides that
children born after the one hundred and eighty days
next following that of the celebration of marriage or
within the three hundred days next following its
dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be
presumed to be legitimate. This presumption may be
rebutted only by proof that it was physically
impossible for the husband to have had access to
his wife during the first one hundred and twenty days
of the three hundred next preceding the birth of the
child. Impossibility of access by husband to wife
would include (1) absence during the initial period of
conception, (2) impotence which is patent,
continuing and incurable, and (3) imprisonment,
unless it can be shown that cohabitation took place

through corrupt violation of prison regulations. Since
the boy was born on June 17, 1943, and Emiliano
Andal died on January 1, 1943, that boy is presumed
to be the legitimate son of Emiliano and his wife, he
having been born within three hundred (300) days
following the dissolution of the marriage. There was
no evidence presented that Emiliano Andal was
absent during the initial period of conception,
especially during the period comprised between
August 21, 1942 and September 10, 1942, which is
included in the 120 days of the 300 next preceding
the birth of the child Mariano Andal. On the contrary,
there is enough evidence to show that during that
initial period, Emiliano Andal and his wife were still
living under the marital roof, or at least had access
one to the other. Even if Felix, the brother, was living
in the same house, and he and the wife were
indulging in illicit intercourse since May, 1942, that
does not preclude cohabitation between Emiliano
and his wife. Also, even though Emiliano was
already suffering from tuberculosis and his condition
then was so serious that he could hardly move and
get up from bed does not show that this does not
prevent carnal intercourse. He was not impotent.
The fact that Maria Dueas has committed adultery
can not also overcome this presumption. Therefore,
presumption of legitimacy under the Civil Code in
favor of the child has not been overcome.
Renren Geremia
119) Teofista Babiera vs. Presentacion B. Catotal
G.R. No. 138493 June 15, 2000
FACTS:
Presentacion B. Catotal filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Lanao del Node, Branch II, Iligan City, a
petition for the cancellation of the entry of birth of
Teofista Babiera in the Civil Registry of Iligan City.
The case was docketed as Special Proceedings No.
3046. From the petition filed, Presentacion asserted
that she is the only surviving child of the late
spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariosa,
who died on May 26, 1996 and July 6, 1990
respectively. On September 20, 1996 a baby girl was
delivered by "hilot" in the house of spouses Eugenio
and Hermogena Babiera and without the knowledge
of said spouses, Flora Guinto, the mother of the
child and a housemaid of spouses Eugenio and
Hermogena
Babiera,
caused
the
registration/recording of the facts of birth of her child,
by simulating that she was the child of the spouses
Eugenio, then 65 years old and Hermogena, then 54
117

years old, and made Hermogena Babiera appear as
the mother by forging her signature. Petitioner, then
15 years old, saw with her own eyes and personally
witnessed Flora Guinto give birth to Teofista Guinto,
in their house, assisted by "hilot". The birth
certificate of Teofista Guinto is void ab initio, as it
was totally a simulated birth, signature of informant
forged, and it contained false entries, to wit: a) The
child is made to appear as the legitimate child of the
late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena
Cariosa, when she is not; b) The signature of
Hermogena Cariosa, the mother, is falsified/forged.
She was not the informant; c) The family name
Babiera is false and unlawful and her correct family
name is Guinto, her mother being single; d) Her real
mother was Flora Guinto and her status, an
illegitimate child. The natural father, the carpenter,
did not sign it. Also, the respondent Teofista
Barbiera's birth certificate is void ab initio, and it is
patently a simulation of birth, since it is clinically and
medically impossible for the supposed parents to
bear a child in 1956 because: a) Hermogena
Cariosa Babiera, was already 54 years old; b)
Hermogena's last child birth was in the year 1941,
the year petitioner was born; c) Eugenio was already
65 years old, that the void and simulated birth
certificate of Teofista Guinto would affect the
hereditary rights of petitioner who inherited the
estate. The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner
therein. Teofista averred "that she was always
known as Teofista Babiera and not Teofista Guinto
and that plaintiff is not the only surviving child of the
late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena C.
Babiera, for the truth of the matter is that they are
sisters of the full-blood. The Court of Appeals held
that the evidence adduced during trial proved that
petitioner was not the biological child of Hermogena
Babiera. It also ruled that no evidence was
presented to show that Hermogena became
pregnant in 1959. It further observed that she was
already 54 years old at the time, and that her last
pregnancy had occurred way back in 1941. The CA
noted that the supposed birth took place at home,
notwithstanding the advanced age of Hermogena
and its concomitant medical complications.
Moreover, petitioner's Birth Certificate was not
signed by the local civil registrar, and the signature
therein, which was purported to be that of
Hermogena, was different from her other signatures.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Teofista is the legitimate child of
spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariosa.
HELD:
No. Article 171 of the Family Code states that, the

child's filiation can be impugned only by the father
or, in special circumstances, his heirs. Respondent
has the requisite standing to initiate the present
action. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court,
provides that a real party in interest is one "who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
The interest of respondent in the civil status of
petitioner stems from an action for partition which
the latter filed against the former. The case
concerned the properties inherited by respondent
from her parents. Moreover, Article 171 of the Family
Code is not applicable to the present case. A close
reading of this provision shows that it applies to
instances in which the father impugns the legitimacy
of his wife's child. The provision, however,
presupposes that the child was the undisputed
offspring of the mother. The present case alleges
and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to
petitioner. In other words, the prayer herein is not to
declare that petitioner is an illegitimate child of
Hermogena, but to establish that the former is not
the latter's child at all. Verily, the present action does
not impugn petitioner's filiation to Spouses Eugenio
and Hermogena Babiera, because there is no blood
relation to impugn in the first place. Also, the
prescriptive period set forth in Article 170 of the
Family Code does not apply. Verily, the action to
nullify the Birth Certificate does not prescribe,
because it was allegedly void ab initio. A birth
certificate may be ordered cancelled upon adequate
proof that it is fictitious. Thus, void is a certificate
which shows that the mother was already fifty-four
years old at the time of the child's birth and which
was signed neither by the civil registrar nor by the
supposed mother. Because her inheritance rights
are adversely affected, the legitimate child of such
mother is a proper party in the proceedings for the
cancellation of the said certificate.
Renren Geremia
120) Marissa Benitez-Badua vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 105625 January 24, 1994
FACTS:
The facts show that the spouses Vicente Benitez
and Isabel Chipongian owned various properties
especially in Laguna. Isabel died on April 25, 1982.
Vicente followed her in the grave on November 13,
1989. He died intestate.The fight for administration
of Vicente's estate ensued. On September 24, 1990,
private respondents Victoria Benitez-Lirio and
118

Feodor Benitez Aguilar (Vicente's sister and nephew,
respectively) instituted Sp. Proc. No. 797 (90) before
the RTC of San Pablo City, 4th Judicial Region, Br.
30. They prayed for the issuance of letters of
administration of Vicente's estate in favor of private
respondent Aguilar. They alleged, that the decedent
is survived by no other heirs or relatives either any
ascendants or descendants, whether legitimate,
illegitimate or legally adopted. Also, despite claims or
representation to the contrary, petitioners can well
and truly establish, given the chance to do so, that
said decedent and his spouse Isabel Chipongian
who pre-deceased him, and whose estate had
earlier been settled extra-judicial, were without issue
and/or without descendants whatsoever, and that
one Marissa Benitez-Badua who was raised and
cared by them since childhood is, in fact, not related
to them by blood, nor legally adopted, and is
therefore not a legal heir. Petitioner opposed the
petition and alleged that she is the sole heir of the
deceased Vicente Benitez and capable of
administering his estate. The parties further
exchanged reply and rejoinder to buttress their legal
postures. Petitioner tried to prove that she is the only
legitimate child of the spouses Vicente Benitez and
Isabel Chipongian. She submitted documentary
evidence, among others: (1) her Certificate of Live
Birth; (2) Baptismal Certificate; (3) Income Tax
Returns and Information Sheet for Membership with
the GSIS of the late Vicente naming her as his
daughter; and (4) School Records. She also testified
that the said spouses reared and continuously
treated her as their legitimate daughter. On the other
hand, private respondents tried to prove, mostly thru
testimonial evidence, that the said spouses failed to
beget a child during their marriage and that the late
Isabel, then thirty six (36) years of age, was even
referred to Dr. Constantino Manahan, a noted
obstetrician-gynecologist, for treatment. The trial
court decided in favor of the petitioner. However, the
Court of Appeals, reversed the said decision of the
trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is the legitimate
child and thus the surviving heir of the spouses
Benitez.
HELD:
No. A careful reading of Articles 164, 166, 170 and
171 of the Family Code will show that they do not
contemplate a situation, like in the instant case,
where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature
or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these
articles govern a situation where a husband (or his
heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, it

is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of
said child by proving: (1) it was physically impossible
for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife
within the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that
for biological or other scientific reasons, the child
could not have been his child; (3) that in case of
children conceived through artificial insemination,
the written authorization or ratification by either
parent was obtained through mistake, fraud,
violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles
170 and 171 speak of the prescriptive period within
which the husband or any of his heirs should file the
action impugning the legitimacy of said child.
Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when
it refused to apply these articles to the case at bench
for it is not one where the heirs of the late Vicente
are contending that petitioner is not his child by
Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that
petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel.
Factual finding of the appellate court that petitioner
was not the biological child or child of nature of the
spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian is
meritorious. There was strong and convincing
evidence that Isabel Chipongian never became
pregnant and, therefore, never delivered a child.
Renren Geremia
121) Jao vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-49162 July 28, 1987
FACTS:
Petitioner, assisted by her mother, filed a
case for recognition and support against Perico Jao.
The latter denied paternity thus the parties agreed to
a blood grouping test conducted by the National
Bureau of Investigation. The result indicated that the
petitioner could not have been the offspring of the
latter and her mother, Arlene. The lower court found
the test conclusive however, upon a second motion
for reconsideration the trial resulted on the
declaration of the petitioner being the child of Perico
and is entitled to support. The latter questioned said
decision to the Court of Appeals where it reversed
said decision of the lower court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the results of the blood
grouping test are admissible and conclusive to prove
non-paternity.
HELD:
119

Yes. The use of blood typing in cases of
disputed percentage has already become an
important legal procedure. There is now almost
universal scientific agreement that blood grouping
tests are conclusive as to non-paternity, although
inconclusive to paternity. This is because the fact
that the blood type of a child is a possible product of
the mother and alleged father does not conclusively
prove that the child is born by such parents. On the
other hand, if the blood type of the child is not a
possible blood type when the blood of the mother
and that of the alleged father are cross-matched,
then the child cannot possibly be that of the alleged
father.
Renren Geremia
122) Artemio G. Ilano vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 104376 February 23, 1994
FACTS:
Leoncia first met petitioner Artemio G. Ilano while
she was working as secretary to Atty. Mariano C.
Virata. Petitioner was one of the clients of Atty.
Virata. On several occasions, she and petitioner took
lunch together. Sometime in 1957, Leoncia, then
managing a business of her own as Namarco
distributor, met petitioner again who was engaged in
the
same
business
and
they
renewed
acquaintances. Since then, he would give her his
unsold allocation of goods. Later, he courted her
more than four years. Their relationship became
intimate and with his promise of marriage, they
eloped to Guagua, Pampanga in April, 1962. They
stayed at La Mesa Apartment, located behind the
Filipinas Telephone Company branch office, of which
he is the president and general manager. He came
home to her three or four times a week. The
apartment was procured by Melencio Reyes, Officerin-Charge of the Filipinas Telephone Company
branch office. He also took care of the marketing
and paid rentals, lights and water bills. Unable to
speak the local dialect, Leoncia was provided also
by Melencio with a maid by the name of Nena.
Petitioner used to give her P700.00 a month for their
expenses at home. In June, 1962, Leoncia, who was
conceiving at that time, was fetched by petitioner
and they transferred to San Juan St., Pasay City. In
October, 1962, she delivered a still-born female child
at the Manila Sanitarium. The death certificate was
signed by petitioner. Thereafter, while they were
living at Highway 54, Makati, private respondent
Merceditas S. Ilano was born on December 30, 1963
also at the Manila Sanitarium. Her birth was
recorded as Merceditas de los Santos Ilano, child of

Leoncia Aguinaldo de los Santos and Artemio Geluz
Ilano. Leoncia submitted receipts issued by the
Manila Sanitarium to show that she was confined
there from December 30, 1963 until January 2, 1964
under the name of Mrs. Leoncia Ilano. The support
by petitioner for Leoncia and Merceditas was
sometimes in the form of cash personally delivered
by him, thru Melencio, thru Elynia (niece of Leoncia)
or thru Merceditas herself. Sometimes in the form of
a check like Manila Banking Corporation Check No.
81532, the signature appearing thereon having been
identified by Leoncia as that of petitioner because he
often gives her checks which he issues at home and
saw him sign the checks. During the time that
petitioner and Leoncia were living as husband and
wife, he showed concern as the father of Merceditas.
When Merceditas was in Grade I at the St. Joseph
Parochial School, he signed her Report Card for the
fourth and fifth grading periods as her parent. Those
signatures were both identified by Leoncia and
Merceditas because he signed them in their
residence in their presence and of Elynia. Since
Merceditas started to have discernment, he was
already the one whom she recognized as her Daddy.
He treated her as a father would to his child. He
would bring home candies, toys, and anything a
child enjoys. He would take her for a drive, eat at
restaurants, and even cuddle her to sleep. In May,
1963, Ruth Elynia Mabanglo, niece of Leoncia, lived
with Leoncia and petitioner. She accompanied her
aunt when she started having labor pains in the
morning of December 30, 1963. Petitioner arrived
after five o'clock in the afternoon. When the nurse
came to inquire about the child, Leoncia was still
unconscious so it was from petitioner that the nurse
sought the information. Inasmuch as it was already
past seven o'clock in the evening, the nurse
promised to return the following morning for his
signature. However, he left an instruction to give
birth certificate to Leoncia for her signature, as he
was leaving early the following morning. Prior to the
birth of Merceditas, Elynia used to accompany her
aunt and sometimes with petitioner in his car to the
Manila Sanitarium for prenatal check-up. At times,
she used to go to his office at 615 Sales St., Sta.
Cruz, Manila, upon his instructions to get money as
support and sometimes he would send notes of
explanation if he cannot come which she in turn
gave to her aunt. They stayed at 112 Arellano St.,
then Sta. Cruz, Manila in 1966 before they finally
transferred to Gagalangin in 1967. Petitioner lived
with them up to June, 1971 when he stopped coming
home.
ISSUE:
120

Whether or not Merceditas is the child of
Artemio and is entitled to support.
HELD:
Yes. Under the then prevailing provisions of the Civil
Code, illegitimate children or those who are
conceived and born out of wedlock were generally
classified into two groups: (1) Natural, whether
actual or by fiction, were those born outside of lawful
wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception of
the child, were not disqualified by any impediment to
marry each other and (2) Spurious, whether
incestuous, were disqualified to marry each other on
account of certain legal impediments. Since
petitioner had a subsisting marriage to another at the
time Merceditas was conceived, she is a spurious
child. In this regard, Article 287 of the Civil Code
provides that illegitimate children other than natural
in accordance with Article 269 and other than natural
children by legal fiction are entitled to support and
such successional rights as are granted in the Civil
Code. The Civil Code has given these rights to them
because the transgressions of social conventions
committed by the parents should not be visited upon
them. They were born with a social handicap and the
law should help them to surmount the disadvantages
facing them through the misdeeds of their parents.
However, before Article 287 can be availed of, there
must first be a recognition of paternity either
voluntarily or by court action. The Court finds that
there is sufficient evidence of recognition on the part
of petitioner. The evidences submitted like the
signature in the report cards, testimonies, and other
pieces of evidence shows that petitioner indeed
recognized Merceditas as his child and thus entitles
her to support.
Renren Geremia
123) Corito Ocampo Tayag vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 95229 June 9, 1992
FACTS:
Private respondent is the mother and legal guardian
of her minor son, Chad Cuyugan, by the father of the
petitioner, the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo. Petitioner
is the known administratrix of the real and personal
properties left by her deceased father, said Atty.
Ocampo, who died intestate in Angeles City on
September 28, 1983. Private respondent has been
estranged from her husband, Jose Cuyugan, for
several years now and during which time, she and
Atty. Ricardo Ocampo had illicit amorous relationship
with each other that, as a consequence thereof, they
begot a child who was christened Chad Cuyugan in

accordance with the ardent desire and behest of
said Atty. Ocampo. Chad, the son of private
respondent by the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, who
was born in Angeles City on October 5, 1980 had
been sired, showered with exceptional affection,
fervent love and care by his putative father for being
his only son as can be gleaned from indubitable
letters and documents of the late Atty. Ocampo to
herein private respondent. The minor, Chad D.
Cuyugan, although illegitimate is nevertheless
entitled to a share in the intestate estate left by his
deceased father, Atty. Ricardo Ocampo as one of the
surviving heirs. The deceased Atty. Ricardo
Ocampo, at the time of his death was the owner of
real and personal property, located in Baguio City,
Angeles City and in the Province of Pampanga with
approximate value of several millions of pesos. The
estate of the late Atty. Ocampo has not as yet been
inventoried by the petitioner and the inheritance of
the surviving heirs including that of said Chad has
not likewise been ascertained. The only known
surviving heirs of the deceased Atty. Ricardo
Ocampo are his children, namely: Corito O. Tayag,
Rivina O. Tayag, Evita O. Florendo, Felina Ocampo,
and said minor Chad, for and in whose behalf this
instant complaint is filed. Private respondent has no
means of livelihood and she only depends on the
charity of friends and relatives for the sustenance of
her son, Chad, such that it is urgent, necessary and
imperative that said child be extended financial
support from the estate of his putative father, Atty.
Ricardo Ocampo. Several demands, verbal and
written, have been made for petitioner to grant
Chad's lawful inheritance, but despite said demands,
the latter failed and refused and still fails and refuses
to satisfy the claim for inheritance against the estate
of the late Atty. Ocampo.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Chad is entitled to inherit
from Atty. Ocampos estate as his illegitimate child.
HELD:
Yes. Although petitioner contends that the complaint
filed by herein private respondent merely alleges
that the minor Chad Cuyugan is an illegitimate child
of the deceased and is actually a claim for
inheritance, from the allegations therein the same
may be considered as one to compel recognition.
Further that the two causes of action, one to compel
recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may
be joined in one complaint is not new in our
jurisprudence. Also, the action has not yet
121

prescribed. The applicable law is Article 285 of the
Civil Code which states that the action for the
recognition of natural children may be brought only
during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except
in the following cases: (1) If the father or mother died
during the minority of the child, in which case the
latter may file the action before the expiration of four
years from the attainment of his majority. The Court
holds that the right of action of the minor child has
been vested by the filing of the complaint in court
under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code. We herein adopt our
ruling in the recent case of Republic of the
Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al. where we
held that the fact of filing of the petition already
vested in the petitioner her right to file it and to have
the same proceed to final adjudication in accordance
with the law in force at the time, and such right can
no longer be prejudiced or impaired by the
enactment of a new law.
Renren Geremia
124) John Paul E. Fernandez, et al., vs. Court of
Appeals
G.R. No. 108366 February 16, 1994
FACTS:
Violeta P. Esguerra, single, is the mother and
guardian ad litem of the two petitioners, Claro
Antonio Fernandez and John Paul Fernandez, met
sometime in 1983, at the Meralco Compound tennis
courts. A Meralco employee and a tennis enthusiast,
Carlito used to spend his week-ends regularly at
said courts, where Violeta's father served as tennis
instructor. Violeta pointed to Carlito as the father of
her two sons. She claimed that they started their
illicit sexual relationship six (6) months after their first
meeting. The tryst resulted in the birth of petitioner
Claro Antonio on March 1, 1984, and of petitioner
John Paul on not know that Carlito was married until
the birth of her two children. She averred they were
married in civil rites in October, 1983. In March,
1985, however, she discovered that the marriage
license which they used was spurious. Petitioners
presented the following documentary evidence: their
certificates of live birth, identifying respondent Carlito
as their father; the baptismal certificate of petitioner
Claro which also states that his father is respondent
Carlito; photographs of Carlito taken during the
baptism of petitioner Claro; and pictures of
respondent Carlito and Claro taken at the home of
Violeta Esguerra. In defense, respondent Carlito
denied Violeta's allegations that he sired the two
petitioners. He averred he only served as one of the

sponsors in the baptism of petitioner Claro. This
claim was corroborated by the testimony of Rodante
Pagtakhan, an officemate of respondent Carlito who
also stood as a sponsor of petitioner Claro during his
baptism.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Claro Antonio and John Paul
are children of Carlito and are entitled for support.
HELD:
No. The rule is well-settled that findings of
facts of the Court of Appeals may be reviewed by
this court only under exceptional circumstances.
One such situation is when the findings of the
appellate court clash with those of the trial court as
in the case at bench. It behooves us therefore to
exercise our extraordinary power, and settle the
issue of whether the ruling of the appellate court that
private respondent is not the father of the petitioners
is substantiated by the evidence on record. The
evidence offered by the petitioners is insufficient to
prove their filiation. Petitioners cannot rely on the
photographs showing the presence of the private
respondent in the baptism of petitioner Claro. These
photographs are far from proofs that private
respondent is the father of petitioner Claro. As
explained by the private respondent, he was in the
baptism as one of the sponsors of petitioner Claro.
The pictures taken in the house of Violeta showing
private respondent showering affection to Claro fall
short of the evidence required to prove paternity.
The baptismal certificates of petitioner Claro naming
private respondent as his father has scant
evidentiary value. There is no showing that private
respondent participated in its preparation. The
certificates of live birth of the petitioners identifying
private respondent as their father are not also
competent evidence on the issue of their paternity.
Again, the records do no show that private
respondent had a hand in the preparation of said
certificates. Also, there is no proof that Father
Fernandez is a close friend of Violeta Esguerra and
the private respondent which should render
unquestionable his identification of the private
respondent during petitioner Claro's baptism. In the
absence of this proof, we are not prepared to
concede that Father Fernandez who officiates
numerous baptismal ceremonies day in and day out
can remember the parents of the children he has
baptized.
Renren Geremia
125) Camelo Cabatania vs. Court of Appeals
122

G.R. No. 124814 October 21, 2004
FACTS:
Florencias version was that she was the mother of
private respondent who was born on September 9,
1982 and that she was the one supporting the child.
She recounted that after her husband left her in the
early part of 1981, she went to Escalante, Negros
Occidental to look for work and was eventually hired
as petitioners household help. It was while working
there as a maid that, on January 2, 1982, petitioner
brought her to Bacolod City where they checked in
at the Visayan Motel and had sexual intercourse.
Petitioner promised to support her if she got
pregnant. Florencia claimed she discovered she was
carrying petitioners child 27 days after their sexual
encounter. The sexual intercourse was repeated in
March 1982 in San Carlos City. Later, on suspicion
that Florencia was pregnant, petitioners wife sent
her home. But petitioner instead brought her to
Singcang, Bacolod City where he rented a house for
her. On September 9, 1982, assisted by a hilot in her
aunts house in Tiglawigan, Cadiz City, she gave
birth to her child, private respondent Camelo
Regodos.
Petitioner Camelo Cabatanias version was that he
was a sugar planter and a businessman. Sometime
in December, 1981, he hired Florencia as a servant
at home. During the course of her employment, she
would often go home to her husband in the
afternoon and return to work the following morning.
This displeased petitioners wife, hence she was told
to look for another job. In the meantime, Florencia
asked permission from petitioner to go home and
spend New Years Eve in Cadiz City. Petitioner met
her on board the Ceres bus bound for San Carlos
City and invited her to dinner. While they were
eating, she confided that she was hard up and
petitioner offered to lend her save money. Later, they
spent the night in San Carlos City and had sexual
intercourse. While doing it, he felt something jerking
and when he asked her about it, she told him she
was pregnant with the child of her husband. They
went home the following day. In March 1982,
Florencia, then already working in another
household, went to petitioners house hoping to be
re-employed as a servant there. Since petitioners
wife was in need of one, she was re-hired. However
petitioners wife noticed that her stomach was
bulging and inquired about the father of the unborn
child. She told petitioners wife that the baby was by
her husband. Because of her condition, she was
again told to go home and they did not see each
other anymore. Petitioner was therefore surprised
when summons was served on him by Florencias
counsel. She was demanding support for private

respondent Camelo Regodos. Petitioner refused,
denying the alleged paternity. He insisted she was
already pregnant when they had sex. He denied
going to Bacolod City with her and checking in at the
Visayan Motel. He vehemently denied having sex
with her on January 2, 1982 and renting a house for
her in Singcang, Bacolod City.
The trial court gave probative weight to the
testimony of Florencia despite its discovery that she
misrepresented herself as a widow when, in reality,
her husband was alive. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Camelo should be entitled to
support as Camelo Cabatanias child.
HELD:
No. Clearly, this petition calls for a review of the
factual findings of the two lower courts. As a general
rule, factual issues are not within the province of this
Court. Factual findings of the trial court, when
adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals,
become final and conclusive and may not be
reviewed on appeal. However, the Court is
convinced that this case falls within one of the
exceptions. Time and again, this Court has ruled that
a high standard of proof is required to establish
paternity and filiation. An order for recognition and
support may create an unwholesome situation or
may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the
parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or
filiation is established by clear and convincing
evidence. The applicable provisions of the law are
Articles 172 and 175 of the Civil Code which states
that: the filiation of legitimate children is established
by any of the following: (1) The record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of
the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall
be proved by: (1) The open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2)
Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws; Illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children. Private respondents
copy of his birth and baptismal certificates, the
preparation of which was without the knowledge or
consent of petitioner. A certificate of live birth
purportedly identifying the putative father is not
123

competent evidence of paternity when there is no
showing that the putative father had a hand in the
preparation of said certificate. The local civil registrar
has no authority to record the paternity of an
illegitimate child on the information of a third person.
Also, while a baptismal certificate may be
considered a public document, it can only serve as
evidence of the administration of the sacrament on
the date specified but not the veracity of the entries
with respect to the childs paternity. Thus, certificates
issued by the local civil registrar and baptismal
certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as
proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted
indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the
same. Private respondent failed to present sufficient
proof of voluntary recognition. On the other hand,
the fact that Florencias husband is living and there
is a valid subsisting marriage between them gives
rise to the presumption that a child born within that
marriage is legitimate even though the mother may
have declared against its legitimacy or may have
been sentenced as an adulteress. The presumption
of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration
in the statute but is based on the broad principles of
natural justice and the supposed virtue of the
mother. The presumption is grounded on the policy
to protect innocent offspring from the odium of
illegitimacy. In this age of genetic profiling and
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the extremely
subjective test of physical resemblance or similarity
of features will not suffice as evidence to prove
paternity and filiation before the courts of law.
Renren Geremia
126) SAYSON VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. Nos. 89224-25, January 23, 1992
Cruz, J.:
FACTS: Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five
children namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa,
Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died in 1952 and
Rafaela in 1976.
One of their children, Teodoro married to
Isabel died on 1972. The wife of Teodoro, Isabel
then after died in 1981. The properties of the couple
Teodoro and Isabel were left with private
respondents Delia, Edmundo and Doribel, who were
their children.
On April 25, 1983, Maurico, Rosario,
Basilisa, Remedios and Juana (mother of Isabel)
filed for partition of the estate of Teodoro and Isabel,
which was opposed by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel,

who claimed successional rights to the estate.
Likewise, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own
complaint for the partition of Eleno and Rafaelas
estate through representation.
Both cases were decided in favor of the
private respondents. Judge Rafael declared that
Delia and Edmundo were the legally adopted
children of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson by virtue of
the decree of adoption. Doribel was their legitimate
daughter as evidenced by her birth certificate.
Consequently, the three children were entitled to
inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by right of
representation. On the other case, Judge Saez
held that being the legitimate heirs of Teodoro and
Isabel as established by the aforementioned
evidence, the same excluded the plaintiffs from
sharing in their estate.
The Court of Appeals modified the decision
in that Delia and Edmundo Sayson are disqualified
from inheriting from the estate of the deceased
spouses Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, but affirmed all
other respects. Hence, this petition for review by
certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondents are
entitled to inherit from their parents and their
grandparents.
HELD: A challenge to the validity of the adoption
cannot be made collaterally in an action for partition
but in a direct proceeding frontally addressing the
issue.
On the question of Doribel's legitimacy, the
findings of the trial courts as affirmed by the
respondent court must be sustained. Doribel's birth
certificate is a formidable piece of evidence. It is one
of the prescribed means of recognition under Article
265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family
Code. It is true, as the petitioners stress, that the
birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence of
filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence.
However, such evidence is lacking in the case at bar.
Doribel, as the legitimate daughter of
Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and Delia and
Edmundo, as their adopted children, are the
exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of the
deceased couple, conformably to the following
Article 979 of the Civil Code:
Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants
succeed the parents and other ascendants, without
124

distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should
come from different marriages.
An adopted child succeeds to the property of the
adopting parents in the same manner as a legitimate
child.
The philosophy underlying this article is that
a person's love descends first to his children and
grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and
thereafter spreads among his collateral relatives. It is
also supposed that one of his purposes in acquiring
properties is to leave them eventually to his children
as a token of his love for them and as a provision for
their continued care even after he is gone from this
earth.
There is no question that as the legitimate
daughter of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter of
Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent
her deceased father in the distribution of the
intestate estate of her grandparents. Under Article
981, quoted above, she is entitled to the share her
father would have directly inherited had he survived,
which shall be equal to the shares of her
grandparents' other children.
But a different conclusion must be reached in
the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the
grandparents were total strangers. While it is true
that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a
legitimate child and have the same right as the latter,
these rights do not include the right of
representation. The relationship created by the
adoption is between only the adopting parents and
the adopted child and does not extend to the blood
relatives of either party.
127) LIYAO vs. TANHOTI-LIYAO
378 SCRA 563
FACTS: This is a petition for compulsory recognition
of William Liyao Jr. as the illegitimate (spurious)
child of the late Willima Liyao against Juanita
Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L.
Tan and Linda Christina Liyao (children and wife of
William).
According to Corazon G. Garcia, William
Liyao Jr.s mother and representative, she was
married to but living separately from Ramon M. Yulo
for more than ten (10) years and cohabited with late
William Liyao from 1965 to the time of Williams
untimely demise on December 2, 1975. They lived
together with the knowledge of William Liyaos
legitimate children, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda

Christina Liyao-Ortiga, who were both employed at
the Far East Realty Investment, Inc. of which
Corazon and William were the vice president and
president, respectively. On June 9, 1975, Corazon
gave birth to William Liyao Jr. (Billy). Since then, he
had been in continuous possession and enjoyment
of the status of a recognized and/or acknowledged
child of William Liyao by the latters direct and overt
acts which among others, the payment of medical
and hospital expenses, food and clothing and
bringing him to vacations and various social
gatherings as evidenced by the pictures taken on the
said occasions.
On the other hand, according to Linda
Christina Liyao-Ortiga, her parents, William Liyao
and Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, were legally married.
She grew up and lived with her parents at San
Lorenzo Village , Makati until she got married. Her
parents were not separated legally or in fact and that
there was no reason why any of her parents would
institute legal separation proceedings in court. Her
father came home regularly even during out of town
to change cloths until he suffered from two strokes
before the fatal attack which led to his death on
December 2, 1975. She further testified that she
knew Corazon Garcia is still married to Ramon Yulo
and was not legally separated from her husband and
the records from Local Civil Registrar do not indicate
that the couple obtained any annulment of their
marriage. Tita Rose Liyao-Tan testimony was similar
to Ms. Linda that their parents were legally married
and had never been separated. They resided at San
Lorenzo Village until the time of their fathers death.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of
the William, Jr. and Corazon. However, the Court of
Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court and
ruled in favor of Juanita, Pearl and Linda.
Issue: Whether or not William, Jr. is entitled to
inherit.
Held: The Court sustained the decision of the Court
of Appeals stating that the fact that Corazon had
been living separately from Ramon at the time
petitioner was conceived and born has no bearing to
the legitimacy of the child. While the physical
impossibility for the husband to have sexual
intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds in
impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears
emphasis that the grounds for impugning the
legitimacy of the child mentioned in Art. 255 of the
Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband or in
125

proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth
under Art. 262 of the Civil Code. It is therefore clear
that the present petition initiated by petitioner, to
compel recognition by respondents of petitioner
William Liyao Jr., as the illegitimate son of late
William Liyao cannot prosper. It is settled that a
child born within a valid marriage is presumed
legitimate even though the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as an adulteress. The Court cannot allow
petitioner to maintain his present petition and
subvert the clear mandate of the law that only the
husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs could
impugn the legitimacy of a child born in a valid and
subsisting marriage. The child himself cannot
choose his own filiation. If the husband presumed to
be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the
child, then the status of the child is fixed, and the
latter cannot choose to be the child of his mothers
alleged paramour.
128) DE JESUS vs. ESTATE OF DIZON
366 SCRA 499
Vitug, J.:
FACTS: Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de
Jesus got married on 23 August 1964. It was during
this marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie
Christie A. de Jesus, herein petitioners, were born.
In a notarized document, dated 07 June
1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and
Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children
by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died
intestate on 12 March 1992, leaving behind
considerable assets consisting of shares of stock in
various corporations and some real property. It was
on the strength of his notarized acknowledgement
that petitioners filed a complaint for "Partition with
Inventory and Accounting" of the Dizon estate with
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
Respondents, the surviving spouse and
legitimate children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon,
including the corporations of which the deceased
was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case,
arguing that the complaint, even while denominated
as being one for partition, would nevertheless call for
altering the status of petitioners from being the
legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus
and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate
children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan
Dizon.
The trial court denied, due to lack of merit.

However. the appellate court upheld the decision of
the lower court and ordered the case to be
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
The Trial Court decreed that the declaration of
heirship could only be made in a special proceeding
inasmuch as petitioners were seeking the
establishment of a status or right.
In the instant petition for review on certiorari,
the petitioners maintain that their recognition as
being illegitimate children of the decedent, embodied
in an authentic writing, is in itself sufficient to
establish their status as such and does not require a
separate action for judicial approval.
ISSUE: Whether an action for partition is proper to
ascertain the question of paternity & filiation or
whether it should be taken in an independent suit.
HELD: The filiation of illegitimate children, like
legitimate children, is established by (1) the record
of birth appearing the civil register or a final
judgement; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation
in a public document or a private handwritten and
signed by the parent concerned. In the absence
thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and
continuos possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws. The due recognition of an
illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court or record, or in any
authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act
of acknowledgement of the child, and no further
court action is required. In fact, any writing is
treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition;
it is in itself voluntary recognition that does not
require
a
separate
action
for
judicial
approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition
is predicted on other evidence merely tending to
prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth,
a will, a statement before a court or record or an
authentic writing, judicial action within the
applicable statue of limitations is essential in
order to establish the child's acknowledgement.
Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their
illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon,
petitioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate
status as being children of Danilo de Jesus and
Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step cannot be aptly
done because the law itself establishes the
legitimacy of children conceived or born during the
marriage of the parents. The presumption of
legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in
126

wedlock, and only the father, or in exceptional
instances the latter's heirs, can contest in an
appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born
to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy
of a child has been successfully impugned that
the paternity of the husband can be rejected.
The rule that the written acknowledgement
made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon establishes
petitioners' alleged illegitimate filiation to the
decedent cannot be validly invoked to be of any
relevance in this instance. This issue, i.e whether
petitioners are indeed the acknowledge illegitimate
offsprings of the decedent, cannot be aptly
adjudicated without an action having been first
instituted to impugn their legitimacy as being the
children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de
Jesus born in lawful wedlock. Jurisprudence is
strongly settled that the paramount declaration of
legitimacy
by
law
cannot
be
attacked
collaterally, one that can only be repudiated or
contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that
purpose. Indeed, a child so born in such wedlock
shall be considered legitimate although the mother
may have declared against its legitimacy or may
have been sentenced as having been an adulteress.
129) LABAGALA vs. SANTIAGO
G.R. No. 132305; December 4, 2001
Quisumbing, J.:
FACTS: Jose T. Santiago owned a parcel of land
located in Sta. Cruz, Manila . Alleging that Jose had
fraudulently registered it in his name alone, his
sisters Nicolasa and Amanda (now respondents
herein) sued Jose for recovery of 2/3 share of the
property.
The trial court in that case decided in favor of
the sisters, recognizing their right of ownership over
portions of the property. The Register of Deeds of
Manila was required to include the names of
Nicolasa and Amanda in the certificate of title to said
property.
Jose died intestate. The respondents filed a
complaint for recovery of title, ownership, and
possession against herein petitioner, Ida C.
Labagala, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
to recover from her the 1/3 portion of said property
pertaining to Jose but which came into petitioner's
sole possession upon Jose's death.
Respondents alleged that Jose's share in the
property belongs to them by operation of law,
because they are the only legal heirs of their brother,

who died intestate and without issue. They claimed
that the purported sale of the property made by their
brother to petitioner sometime in March 1979 was
executed through petitioner's machinations and with
malicious intent, to enable her to secure the
corresponding transfer certificate of title (TCT No.
172334) in petitioner's name alone.
Respondents insisted that the deed of sale
was a forgery .The deed showed that Jose affixed
his thumbmark thereon but respondents averred
that, having been able to graduate from college,
Jose never put his thumb mark on documents he
executed but always signed his name in full.
On the other hand, petitioner claimed that
her true name is not Ida C. Labagala as claimed by
respondent but Ida C. Santiago. She claimed not to
know any person by the name of Ida C. Labagala.
She claimed to be the daughter of Jose and thus
entitled to his share in the subject property. She
maintained that she had always stayed on the
property, ever since she was a child. She argued
that the purported sale of the property was in fact a
donation to her, and that nothing could have
precluded Jose from putting his thumbmark on the
deed of sale instead of his signature. She pointed
out that during his lifetime, Jose never
acknowledged respondents' claim over the property
such that respondents had to sue to claim portions
thereof. She lamented that respondents had to
disclaim her in their desire to obtain ownership of the
whole property.
Trial court ruled in favor of petitioner which
was reversed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUES: (1) whether or not respondents may
impugn petitioner's filiation in this action for recovery
of title and possession; and (2) whether or not
petitioner is entitled to Jose's 1/3 portion of the
property he co-owned with respondents, through
succession, sale, or donation.
HELD: Petitioner's reliance on Article 263 of the Civil
Code is misplaced. This article should be read in
conjunction with the other articles in the same
chapter on paternity and filiation in the Civil Code. A
careful reading of said chapter would reveal that it
contemplates situations where a doubt exists that a
child is indeed a man's child by his wife, and the
husband (or, in proper cases, his heirs) denies the
child's filiation. It does not refer to situations where a
child is alleged not to be the child at all of a
particular couple.
Article 263 refers to an action to impugn
the legitimacy of a child, to assert and prove that a
127

person is not a man's child by his wife. However, the
present case is not one impugning petitioner's
legitimacy. Respondents are asserting not merely
that petitioner is not a legitimate child of Jose, but
that she is not a child of Jose at all. Moreover, the
present action is one for recovery of title and
possession, and thus outside the scope of Article
263 on prescriptive periods.
Petitioner's reliance on Sayson is likewise
improper. The factual milieu present in Sayson does
not obtain in the instant case. What was being
challenged by petitioners in Sayson was (1) the
validity of the adoption of Delia and Edmundo by the
deceased Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and (2) the
legitimate status of Doribel Sayson. While asserting
that Delia and Edmundo could not have been validly
adopted since Doribel had already been born to the
Sayson couple at the time, petitioners at the same
time made the conflicting claim that Doribel was not
the child of the couple. The Court ruled in that case
that it was too late to question the decree of
adoption that became final years before. Besides,
such a challenge to the validity of the adoption
cannot be made collaterally but in a direct
proceeding.
Petitioner, who claims to be Ida Santiago,
has the same birthdate as Ida Labagala. The
similarity is too uncanny to be a mere coincidence.
During her testimony before the trial court,
petitioner denied knowing Cornelia Cabrigas, who
was listed as the mother in the birth certificate of Ida
Labagala. In her petition before this Court, however,
she stated that Cornelia is the sister of her mother,
Esperanza. It appears that petitioner made
conflicting statements that affect her credibility and
could cast along shadow of doubt on her claims of
filiation.
Thus, we are constrained to agree with the
factual finding of the Court of Appeals that petitioner
is in reality the child of Leon Labagala and Cornelia
Cabrigas, and contrary to her averment, not of Jose
Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas. Not being a child
of Jose, it follows that petitioner can not inherit from
him through intestate succession. It now remains to
be seen whether the property in dispute was validly
transferred to petitioner through sale or donation.
Jose did not have the right to transfer
ownership of the entire property to petitioner since
2/3 thereof belonged to his sisters. Petitioner could
not have given her consent to the contract, being a
minor at the time. Consent of the contracting parties
is among the essential requisites of a contract,
including one of sale, absent which there can be no
valid contract. Moreover, petitioner admittedly did not
pay any centavo for the property, which makes the

sale void. Article 1471 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1471. If the price is simulated, the sale is void,
but the act may be shown to have been in reality a
donation, or some other act or contract.
Neither may the purported deed of sale be a valid
deed of donation.
130) ESTATE OF LOCSIN vs. JUAN C. LOCSIN
G.R. No. 146737, December 10, 2001
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.:
FACTS: Eleven months after Juan "Jhonny" Locsin,
Sr. died intestate on December 11, 1990, respondent
Juan E. Locsin, Jr. filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Iloilo City , a "Petition for Letters of Administration"
praying that he be appointed Administrator of the
Intestate Estate of the deceased. He alleged that he
is an acknowledged natural child. The trial court
issued an order setting the petition for hearing which
order was duly published, thereby giving notice to all
persons who may have opposition to the said
petition.
Before the scheduled hearing, the heirs of
Jose Locsin, Jr., the heirs of Maria Locsin, Manuel
Locsin and Ester Jarantilla, claiming to be the lawful
heirs of the deceased, filed an opposition. They
averred that respondent is not a child or an
acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C.
Locsin, who during his lifetime, never affixed "Sr." in
his name.
On January 5, 1993, another opposition to
the petition was filed by Lucy Salinop (sole heir of
the late Maria Locsin Vda. De Araneta, sister of the
deceased), Manuel Locsin and the successors of the
late Lourdes C. Locsin alleging that respondent's
claim as a natural child is barred by prescription or
the statute of limitations.
The Intestate Estate of the late Jose Locsin,
Jr. (brother of the deceased) also entered its
appearance in the estate proceedings, joining the
earlier oppositors. This was followed by an
appearance and opposition of Ester Locsin Jarantilla
(another sister of Juan C. Locsin), likewise stating
that there is no filial relationship between herein
respondent and the deceased.
To support his claim that he is an
acknowledged natural child of the deceased,
respondent submitted a machine copy of his
Certificate of Live Birth found in the bound volume of
birth records in the Office of the Local Clerk
Registrar of Iloilo City which contains the information
that respondent's father is Juan C. Locsin, Sr. and
128

that he was the informant of the facts stated therein,
as evidenced by his signatures. To prove the
existence and authenticity of Certificate of Live Birth,
respondent presented the Local Civil Registrar of
Iloilo City. Respondent also offered in evidence a
photograph showing him and his mother, Amparo
Escamilla, in front of a coffin bearing Juan C.
Locsin's dead body. The photograph, respondent
claims, shows that he and his mother have been
recognized as family members of the deceased.
Petitioners claimed that Certificate of Live
Birth is spurious. They submitted a certified true
copy of Certificate of Live Birth found in the Civil
Registrar General, Metro Manila indicating that the
birth of respondent was reported by his mother,
Amparo Escamilla, and that the same does not
contain the signature of the late Juan C. Locsin.
They observed as anomalous the fact that while
respondent was born on October 22, 1956 and his
birth was recorded on January 30, 1957, however,
his Certificate of Live Birth was recorded on
a December 1, 1958 revised form.
The trial court found that the Certificate of
Live Birth and the photograph are sufficient proofs of
respondent's illegitimate filiation. The Court of
Appeals affirmed in toto the order of the trial court.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, while
respondent filed a motion for execution pending
appeal. Both motions were denied by the Appellate
Court.
ISSUE: Which of the two documents Certificate of
Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") and Certificate of
Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "8") is genuine.
HELD: Exhibit 8 for the petitioners.
With respect to Local Civil Registries, access
thereto by interested parties is obviously easier.
Thus, in proving the authenticity of Exhibit "D," more
convincing evidence than those considered by the
trial court should have been presented by
respondent.
The event about which she testified on
March 7, 1994 was the record of respondent's birth
which took place on October 22, 1956, on 37 or 38
years ago. The Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City at
that time was Emilio G. Tomesa. Necessarily,
Vencer's knowledge of respondent's birth record
allegedly made and entered in the Local Civil
Registry in January, 1957 was based merely on her
general impressions of the existing records in that
Office.
When entries in the Certificate of Live Birth

recorded in the Local Civil Registry vary from those
appearing in the copy transmitted to the Civil
Registry General, pursuant to the Civil Registry Law,
the variance has to be clarified in more persuasive
and rational manner. In this regard, we find Vencer's
explanation not convincing.
Respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No.
477 (Exhibit "D") was recorded in a December 1,
1958 revised form. Asked how a 1958 form could be
used in 1957 when respondent's birth was recorded,
Vencer answered that "x x x during that time, maybe
the forms in 1956 were already exhausted so the
former Civil Registrar had requested for a new form
and they sent us the 1958 Revised Form." The
answer is a "maybe", a mere supposition of an
event. It does not satisfactorily explain how
a Revised Form dated December 1, 1958 could
have been used on January 30, 1957 or almost (2)
years earlier.
Upon the other hand, Exhibit "8" of the
petitioners found in the Civil Registrar General in
Metro Manila is on Municipal Form No 102, revised
in July, 1956. We find no irregularity here. Indeed, it
is logical to assume that the 1956 forms would
continue to be used several years thereafter. But for
a 1958 form to be used in 1957 is unlikely.
There are other indications of irregularity
relative to Exhibit "D." The back cover of the 1957
bound volume in the Local Civil Registry of Iloilo is
torn. Exhibit "D" is merely pasted with the bound
volume, not sewn like the other entries.
The documents bound into one volume are
original copies. Exhibit "D" is a carbon copy of the
alleged original and sticks out like a sore thumb
because the entries therein are typewritten, while the
records of all other certificates are handwritten.
Unlike the contents of those other certificates,
Exhibit "D" does not indicate important particulars,
such as the alleged father's religion, race,
occupation, address and business. The space which
calls for an entry of the legitimacy of the child is
blank. On the back page of Exhibit "D", there is a
purported signature of the alleged father, but the
blanks calling for the date and other details of his
Residence Certificate were not filled up.
When asked to explain the torn back cover of
the bound volume, Vencer had no answer except to
129

state, "I am not aware of this because I am not a
bookbinder."
The records of the instant case adequately
support a finding that Exhibit "8" for the petitioners,
not respondent's Exhibit "D", should have been
given more faith and credence by the courts below.
In this connection, we echo this Court's
pronouncement
in Roces
vs.
Local
Civil
Registrar that:
"Section 5 of Act No. 3753 and Article 280 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines . . . explicitly prohibit,
not only the naming of the father of the child born out
of wedlock, when the birth certificate, or the
recognition, is not filed or made by him, but also, the
statement of any information or circumstances by
which he could be identified. Accordingly, the Local
Civil Registrar had no authority to make or record
the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the
information of a third person and the certificate of
birth of an illegitimate child, when signed only by the
mother of the latter, is incompetent evidence of
fathership of said child."
The Roces ruling regarding illegitimate
filiation is further elucidated in Fernandez vs. Court
of Appeals where this Court said that "a birth
certificate not signed by the alleged father (who had
no hand in its preparation) is not competent
evidence of paternity."
A birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence
prescribed by both the Civil Code and Article 172 of
the Family Code for purposes of recognition and
filiation. However, birth certificate offers only prima
facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by
contrary evidence. Its evidentiary worth cannot be
sustained where there exists strong, complete and
conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity. In this case,
respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477
entered in the records of the Local Civil Registry
(from which Exhibit "D" was machine copied) has all
the badges of nullity. Without doubt, the authentic
copy on file in that office was removed and
substituted with a falsified Certificate of Live Birth.
131) EDGARDO TIJING & BIENVENIDA TIJING
vs. COURT OF APPEALS
(G.R. No. 125901; March 8, 2001)
Quisumbing, J.:
FACTS: Petitioners are husband and wife. They
have six children. The youngest is Edgardo Tijing,
Jr., who was born on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of
midwife and registered nurse Lourdes Vasquez in
Sta. Ana, Manila . Petitioner Bienvenida served as
the laundrywoman of private respondent Angelita

Diamante, then a resident of Tondo, Manila .
According to Bienvenida in August 1989,
Angelita went to her house to fetch her for an urgent
laundry job. Since Bienvenida was on her way to do
some marketing, she asked Angelita to wait until she
returned. She also left her four-month old son,
Edgardo, Jr., under the care of Angelita as she
usually let Angelita take care of the child while
Bienvenida was doing laundry.
Upon her return, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr.,
were gone. Bienvenida forthwith proceeded to
Angelita's house in Tondo, Manila , but did not find
them there. Angelita's maid told Bienvenida that her
employer went out for a stroll and told Bienvenida to
come back later. She returned to Angelita's house
after three days, only to discover that Angelita had
moved to another place. Bienvenida then
complained to her barangay chairman and also to
the police who seemed unmoved by her pleas for
assistance.
Four years later or in October 1993,
Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death of
Tomas Lopez, allegedly the common-law husband of
Angelita, and whose remains were lying in state in
Hagonoy, Bulacan.
Bienvenida lost no time in going to Hagonoy,
Bulacan, where she allegedly saw her son Edgardo,
Jr., for the first time after four years. She claims that
the boy, who was pointed out to her by Benjamin
Lopez, a brother of the late Tomas Lopez, was
already named John Thomas Lopez. She avers that
Angelita refused to return to her the boy despite her
demand to do so.
Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition
for habeas corpus with the trial court in order to
recover their son. Petitioners presented two
witnesses. The 1st, witness is Vasquez who testified
that she assisted in the delivery of one Edgardo
Tijing, Jr. on April 27, 1989 at her clinic. The 2nd,
Benjamin Lopez who declared that his brother
admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only
an adopted son and that he and Angelita were not
blessed with children.
For her part, Angelita claimed that she is the
natural mother of the child. She asserts that at age
42, she gave birth to John Thomas Lopez on April
27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife Zosima Panganiban
in Singalong, Manila . She added, though, that she
has two other children with her real husband, Angel
Sanchez. She said the birth of John Thomas was
130

registered by her common-law husband, Tomas
Lopez, with the local civil registrar of Manila on
August 4, 1989.
On March 10, 1995, the trial court concluded
that since Angelita and her common-law husband
could not have children, the alleged birth of John
Thomas Lopez is an impossibility. The trial court also
held that the minor and Bienvenida showed strong
facial similarity. Accordingly, it ruled that Edgardo
Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the
same person who is the natural child of petitioners.
The sheriff implemented the order of the trial
court by taking custody of the minor. In his report,
the sheriff stated that Angelita peacefully
surrendered the minor and he turned over the
custody of said child to petitioner Edgardo Tijing.
The Court of Appeals reversed and
expressed its doubts on the propriety of the habeas
corpus. In its view, the evidence adduced by
Bienvenida was not sufficient to establish that she
was the mother of the minor. It ruled that the lower
court erred in declaring that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and
John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not habeas corpus is the
proper remedy?
(2) Whether or not Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John
Thomas Lopez are one and the same person and is
the son of petitioners?
HELD: The writ of habeas corpus extends to all
cases of illegal confinement or detention by which
any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the
person entitled thereto. Thus, it is the proper legal
remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a
minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a
third person of his own free will. It may even be said
that in custody cases involving minors, the question
of illegal and involuntary restraint of liberty is not the
underlying rationale for the availability of the writ as
a remedy. Rather, it is prosecuted for the purpose of
determining the right of custody over a child. It must
be stressed too that in habeas corpusproceedings,
the question of identity is relevant and material,
subject to the usual presumptions including those as
to identity of the person.
A close scrutiny of the records of this case
reveals that the evidence presented by Bienvenida is
sufficient to establish that John Thomas Lopez is
actually her missing son, Edgardo Tijing, Jr.
First, there is evidence that Angelita could no longer

bear children. From her very lips, she admitted that
after the birth of her second child, she underwent
ligation at the Martinez Hospital in 1970, before she
lived with Tomas Lopez without the benefit of
marriage in 1974. Second, there is strong evidence
which directly proves that Tomas Lopez is no longer
capable of siring a son. Benjamin Lopez declared in
court that his brother, Tomas, was sterile because of
the accident and that Tomas admitted to him that
John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son.
Moreover, Tomas Lopez and his legal wife, Maria
Rapatan Lopez, had no children after almost fifteen
years together. Though Tomas Lopez had lived with
private respondent for fourteen years, they also bore
no offspring. Third, we find unusual the fact that the
birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez was filed by
Tomas Lopez instead of the midwife. Under the law,
the attending physician or midwife in attendance at
birth should cause the registration of such birth. Only
in default of the physician or midwife, can the parent
register the birth of his child. Fourth, the trial court
observed several times that when the child and
Bienvenida were both in court, the two had strong
similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head
shapes. Resemblance between a minor and his
alleged parent is competent and material evidence
to establish parentage. Needless to stress, the trial
court's conclusion should be given high respect, it
having had the opportunity to observe the physical
appearances of the minor and petitioner concerned.
Fifth, Lourdes Vasquez testified that she assisted in
Bienvenida's giving birth to Edgardo Tijing, Jr., at her
clinic. Unlike private respondent, she presented
clinical records consisting of a log book, discharge
order and the signatures of petitioners.
All these considered, we are constrained to
rule that subject minor is indeed the son of
petitioners. The writ of habeas corpus is proper to
regain custody of said child.
132) AGUSTIN vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND
PROLLAMANTE
G.R. No. 162571. June 15, 2005
Corona, J.:
FACTS: Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin
Prollamante sued Martins alleged biological father,
petitioner Arnel L. Agustin, for support and
support pendente lite before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City . In their complaint,
respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe in 1992,
after which they entered into an intimate relationship.
131

Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th
birthday on November 10, 1999. Despite Arnels
insistence on abortion, Fe decided otherwise and
gave birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin, on
August 11, 2000 at the Capitol Medical Hospital in
Quezon City . The babys birth certificate was
purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel
shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but
later refused Fes repeated requests for Martins
support despite his adequate financial capacity and
even suggested to have the child committed for
adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the
child.
Arnel denied having sired Martin because his
affair and intimacy with Fe had allegedly ended in
1998, long before Martins conception. He claimed
that Fe had at least one other secret lover. Arnel
admitted that their relationship started in 1993 but
"he never really fell in love with (Fe) not only
because (she) had at least one secret lover, a
certain Jun, but also because she proved to be
scheming and overly demanding and possessive.
Unable to bear the prospect of losing his wife and
children, Arnel terminated the affair although he still
treated her as a friend such as by referring potential
customers to the car aircon repair shop" where she
worked. Later on, Arnel found out that Fe had
another erstwhile secret lover. In May 2000, Arnel
and his entire family went to the United States for a
vacation. Upon their return in June 2000, Arnel
learned that Fe was telling people that he had
impregnated her. Arnel refused to acknowledge the
child as his because their "last intimacy was
sometime in 1998." Exasperated, Fe started calling
Arnels wife and family. On January 19, 2001, Fe
followed Arnel to the Capitol Hills Golf and Country
Club parking lot to demand that he acknowledge
Martin as his child. According to Arnel, he could not
get through Fe and the discussion became so
heated that he had no "alternative but to move on
but without bumping or hitting any part of her
body." Finally, Arnel claimed that the signature and
the community tax certificate (CTC) attributed to him
in the acknowledgment of Martins birth certificate
were falsified. The CTC erroneously reflected his
marital status as single when he was actually
married and that his birth year was 1965 when it
should have been 1964.
Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an
order directing all the parties to submit themselves to
DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the
Rules of Court. Arnel opposed said motion by
invoking his constitutional right against self-
incrimination. He also moved to dismiss the

complaint for lack of cause of action, considering
that his signature on the birth certificate was a
forgery and that, under the law, an illegitimate child
is not entitled to support if not recognized by the
putative father. He attached the certification of the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory that his
signature in the birth certificate was forged.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss
the complaint and ordered the parties to submit
themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense
of the applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court.
ISSUES: (1) whether a complaint for support can be
converted to a petition for recognition and (2)
whether DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a
proceeding for support without violating petitioners
constitutional right to privacy and right against selfincrimination.
HELD: The assailed resolution and order did not
convert the action for support into one for recognition
but merely allowed the respondents to prove their
cause of action against petitioner who had been
denying the authenticity of the documentary
evidence of acknowledgement. But even if the
assailed resolution and order effectively integrated
an action to compel recognition with an action for
support, such was valid and in accordance with
jurisprudence. In Tayag v. Court of Appeals,20 we
allowed the integration of an action to compel
recognition with an action to claim ones inheritance:
In Paulino, we held that an illegitimate child, to be
entitled to support and successional rights from the
putative or presumed parent, must prove his filiation
to the latter. We also said that it is necessary to
allege in the complaint that the putative father had
acknowledged and recognized the illegitimate child
because such acknowledgment is essential to and is
the basis of the right to inherit. There being no
allegation of such acknowledgment, the action
becomes one to compel recognition which cannot be
brought after the death of the putative father. The
ratio decidendi in Paulino, therefore, is not the
absence of a cause of action for failure of the
petitioner to allege the fact of acknowledgment in the
complaint, but the prescription of the action.
Applying the foregoing principles to the case
at bar, although petitioner contends that the
complaint filed by herein private respondent merely
alleges that the minor Chad Cuyugan is an
illegitimate child of the deceased and is actually a
claim for inheritance, from the allegations therein the
132

same may be considered as one to compel
recognition. Further, that the two causes of action,
one to compel recognition and the other to claim
inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is not
new in our jurisprudence.
Although the instant case deals with support
rather than inheritance, as in Tayag, the basis or
rationale for integrating them remains the same.
Whether or not respondent Martin is entitled to
support depends completely on the determination of
filiation. A separate action will only result in a
multiplicity of suits, given how intimately related the
main issues in both cases are. To paraphrase Tayag,
the declaration of filiation is entirely appropriate to
these proceedings.
On the second issue, petitioner posits that
DNA is not recognized by this Court as a conclusive
means of proving paternity. He also contends that
compulsory testing violates his right to privacy and
right against self-incrimination as guaranteed under
the 1987 Constitution. These contentions have no
merit.
The kernel of the right is not against all
compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion. The
right against self-incrimination is simply against the
legal process of extracting from the lips of the
accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply
where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an
incrimination but as part of object evidence.
Over the years, we have expressly excluded
several kinds of object evidence taken from the
person of the accused from the realm of selfincrimination. These include photographs,28 hair,29
and other bodily substances.30We have also
declared as constitutional several procedures
performed on the accused such as pregnancy tests
for women accused of adultery,31 expulsion of
morphine from ones mouth32 and the tracing of
ones foot to determine its identity with bloody
footprints.33 In Jimenez v. Caizares,34 we even
authorized the examination of a womans genitalia,
in an action for annulment filed by her husband, to
verify his claim that she was impotent, her orifice
being too small for his penis. Some of these
procedures were, to be sure, rather invasive and
involuntary, but all of them were constitutionally
sound. DNA testing and its results, per our ruling in
Yatar,35 are now similarly acceptable.
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore
that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions
into individual privacy. The right is not intended to
stifle scientific and technological advancements that

enhance public service and the common good...
Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by
proper safeguards that enhance public service and
the common good.
133) In re: Petition for Change of Name of Julian
Lim
G.R. No. 159966 March 30, 2005
Facts:
On 22 September 2002, petitioner Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang, a minor, represented by his
mother Anna Lisa Wang, filed a petition for change
of name and/or cancellation of entry in the Civil
Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. Petitioner
sought to drop his middle name and have his
registered name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan
Wang to Julian Lin Wang.
The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to
stay in Singapore for a long time because they will
let him study there together with his sister named
Wang Mei Jasmine who was born in Singapore.
Since in Singapore middle names or the maiden
surname of the mother are not carried in a persons
name, they anticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan
Wang will be discriminated against because of his
current registered name which carries a middle
name. Julian and his sister might also be asking
whether they are brother and sister since they have
different surnames. Carulasan sounds funny in
Singapores Mandarin language since they do not
have the letter R but if there is, they pronounce it
as L. It is for these reasons that the name of Julian
Lin Carulasan Wang is requested to be changed to
Julian Lin Wang.
The RTC rendered a decision denying the petition.
The trial court found that the reason given for the
change of name sought in the petitionthat is, that
petitioner Julian may be discriminated against when
studies in Singapore because of his middle name
did not fall within the grounds recognized by law.
The trial court ruled that the change sought is merely
for the convenience of the child. Since the State has
an interest in the name of a person, names cannot
be changed to suit the convenience of the bearers.
Under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate
children have the right to bear the surnames of the
father and the mother, and there is no reason why
this right should now be taken from petitioner Julian,
considering that he is still a minor. The trial court
added that when petitioner Julian reaches the age of
133

majority, he could then decide whether he will
change his name by dropping his middle name.
Issue: Whether or not dropping the middle name of
a minor child is contrary to Article 174 of the Family
Code
Held: The touchstone for the grant of a change of
name is that there be proper and reasonable cause
for which the change is sought. To justify a request
for change of name, petitioner must show not only
some proper or compelling reason therefore but also
that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and
official name. Among the grounds for change of
name which have been held valid are: (a) when the
name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change
results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation;
(c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when
one has continuously used and been known since
childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of
alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a
Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in
good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f)
when the surname causes embarrassment and there
is no showing that the desired change of name was
for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name
would prejudice public interest.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced
by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is
convenience. However, how such change of name
would make his integration into Singaporean society
easier and convenient is not clearly established.
That the continued use of his middle name would
cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute
proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his
registered complete name.
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering
the nebulous foundation on which his petition for
change of name is based, it is best that the matter of
change of his name be left to his judgment and
discretion when he reaches the age of majority. As
he is of tender age, he may not yet understand and
appreciate the value of the change of his name and
granting of the same at this point may just prejudice
him in his rights under our laws.
134) Briones vs. Miguel

G.R. No. 156343 October 18, 2004
Facts:
Petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas
Corpus against respondents Maricel Pineda Miguel
and Francisca Pineda Miguel, to obtain custody of
his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda. Later,
petitioner filed an Amended Petition to include Loreta
P. Miguel, the mother of the minor, as one of the
respondents.
The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael Kevin
Pineda is his illegitimate son with respondent Loreta
P. Miguel.
The petitioner further alleges that he caused the
minor child to be brought to the Philippines so that
he could take care of him and send him to school.
That respondents Maricel P. Miguel and Francisca P.
Miguel came to the house of the petitioner in
Caloocan City on the pretext that they were visiting
the minor child and requested that they be allowed
to bring the said child for recreation at the SM
Department store. They promised him that they will
bring him back in the afternoon, to which the
petitioner agreed. However, the respondents did not
bring him back as promised by them. The petitioner
went several times to respondent Maricel P. Miguel
at Tanza, Tuguegarao City but he was informed that
the child is with the latters mother at Batal Heights,
Santiago City. When he went there, respondent
Francisca P. Miguel told him that Michael Kevin
Pineda is with her daughter at Tuguegarao City.
He sought the assistance of the police and the
Department of Social Welfare to locate his son and
to bring him back to him, but all his efforts were
futile. Hence, he was constrained to file a Petition for
Habeas Corpus.
The petitioner prays that the custody of his son
Michael Kevin Pineda be given to him as his
biological father and as he has demonstrated his
capability to support and educate him.
The respondents filed their Comment, in their
Comment, the respondent Loreta P. Miguel denies
the allegation of the petitioner that he was the one
who brought their child to the Philippines and stated
that she was the one who brought him here pursuant
to their agreement. She likewise denies petitioners
allegation that respondents Maricel P. Miguel and
Francisca P. Miguel were the ones who took the
child from the petitioner or the latters parents. She
averred that she was the one who took Michael
Kevin Pineda from the petitioner when she returned
to the Philippines and that the latter readily agreed
and consented.
Respondent Loreta P. Miguel alleges that the
petitioner was deported from Japan under the
assumed name of Renato Juanzon when he was
found to have violated or committed an infraction of
134

the laws of Japan. She further stated that since the
time the petitioner arrived in the Philippines, he has
not been gainfully employed. The custody of the
child was entrusted to petitioners parents while they
were both working in Japan. She added that even
before the custody of the child was given to the
petitioners parents, she has already been living
separately from the petitioner in Japan because the
latter was allegedly maintaining an illicit affair with
another woman until his deportation.
Respondent Loreta P. Miguel prays that the custody
of her minor child be given to her and invokes Article
213, Paragraph 2 of the Family Code and Article 363
of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Issue:
Who Should Have Custody of the Child?
Held: Under the Family Code there are only two
classes of children -- legitimate (and those who, like
the legally adopted, have the rights of legitimate
children) and illegitimate. All children conceived and
born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless
the law itself gives them legitimate status.
Obviously, Michael is a natural ("illegitimate," under
the Family Code) child, as there is nothing in the
records showing that his parents were suffering from
a legal impediment to marry at the time of his birth.
Both acknowledge that Michael is their son. As
earlier explained and pursuant to Article 176,
parental authority over him resides in his mother,
Respondent Loreta, notwithstanding his fathers
recognition of him.
There is thus no question that Respondent Loreta,
being the mother of and having sole parental
authority over the minor, is entitled to have custody
of him. She has the right to keep him in her
company. She cannot be deprived of that right, and
she may not even renounce or transfer it "except in
the cases authorized by law.
Article 213 of the Family Code that, generally, no
child under seven years of age shall be separated
from the mother, except when the court finds cause
to order otherwise.
Only the most compelling of reasons, such as the
mothers unfitness to exercise sole parental
authority, shall justify her deprivation of parental
authority and the award of custody to someone else.
In the past, the following grounds have been
considered ample justification to deprive a mother of
custody and parental authority: neglect or
abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual
drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the
child, insanity, and affliction with a communicable
disease.
135) de Santos vs. Hon. Angeles and Conchita

Talag de Santos
G.R. No. 105619 December 12, 1995
Facts:
On February 7, 1941, Dr. Antonio de Santos
married Sofia Bona, which union was blessed with a
daughter, herein petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos.
After some time, their relationship became strained
to the breaking point. Thereafter, Antonio fell in love
with a fellow doctor, Conchita Talag, private
respondent herein. Antonio sought a formal
dissolution of his first marriage by obtaining a
divorce decree from a Nevada court in 1949.
Aware that said decree was a worthless scrap of
paper in our jurisdiction which then, as now, did not
recognize divorces, Antonio proceeded to Tokyo,
Japan in 1951 to marry private respondent, with
whom he had been cohabiting since his de facto
separation from Sofia. This union produced eleven
children. On March 30, 1967, Sofia died in
Guatemala. Less than a month later, on April 23,
1967, Antonio and private respondent contracted a
marriage in Tagaytay City celebrated under
Philippine laws. On March 8, 1981, Antonio died
intestate leaving properties with an estimated value
of P15,000,000.00.
On May 15, 1981, private respondent went to court
asking for the issuance of letters of administration in
her favor in connection with the settlement of her
late husband's estate. She alleged, among other
things, that the decedent was survived by twelve
legitimate heirs, namely, herself, their ten surviving
children, and petitioner. There being no opposition,
her petition was granted.
After six years of protracted intestate proceedings,
however, petitioner decided to intervene. Thus, in a
motion she filed she argued that private
respondent's children were illegitimate. This was
challenged by private respondent although the latter
admitted during the hearing that all her children were
born prior to Sofia's death in 1967.
After approval of private respondent's account of her
administration, the court a quo passed upon
petitioner's motion. The court declared private
respondent's ten children legitimated and instituted
and declared them, along with petitioner and private
respondent, as the heirs of Antonio de Santos.
Petitioner sought a reconsideration of said order but
this was denied. Hence, she filed the instant petition
for certiorari on June 16, 1992, contending that since
135

only natural children can be legitimized, the trial
court mistakenly declared as legitimated her half
brothers and sisters.
Issue:
Can natural children by legal fiction be
legitimized?
Held:
Article 269 of the Civil Code expressly
states:
Art. 269. Only natural children can be legitimated.
Children born outside wedlock of parents who, at the
time of the conception of the former, were not
disqualified by any impediment to marry each other,
are natural.
In other words, a child's parents should not have
been disqualified to marry each other at the time of
conception for him to qualify as a "natural child."
In the case at bench, there is no question that all the
children born to private respondent and deceased
Antonio de Santos were conceived and born when
the latter's valid marriage to petitioner's mother was
still subsisting. That private respondent and the
decedent were married abroad after the latter
obtained in Nevada, U.S.A. a decree of divorce from
his legitimate wife does not change this fact, for a
divorce granted abroad was not recognized in this
jurisdiction at the time. Evidently, the decedent was
aware of this fact, which is why he had to have the
marriage solemnized in Tokyo, outside of the
Philippines. It may be added here that he was
likewise aware of the nullity of the Tokyo marriage
for after his legitimate, though estranged wife died,
he hastily contracted another marriage with private
respondent, this time here in Tagaytay.
136

XV. ADOPTION
136) Republic vs CA and Zenaida Bobiles
G.R. No. 92326 January 24, 1992
Facts:
On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Corteza
Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat, then
six (6) years old and who had been living with her
family since he was four (4) months old, before the
Regional Trial Court.
The trial court rendered the minor child,
JASON CONDAT, be freed from all legal obligations
of obedience and maintenance with respect to his
natural parents, and be, to all intents and purposes,
the child of the spouses Dioscoro and Zenaida
Bobiles, and the surname of the child be changed to
"Bobiles" which is the surname of the petitioner.
The petition for adoption was filed by private
respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles on February 2, 1988,
when the law applicable was Presidential Decree
No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code. Under
said code, a petition for adoption may be filed by
either of the spouses or by both of them. However,
after the trial court rendered its decision and while
the case was pending on appeal in the Court of
Appeals, Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code,
took effect on August 3, 1988. Under the said new
law, joint adoption by husband and wife is
mandatory.
On the foregoing consideration, petitioner contends
that the petition for adoption should be dismissed
outright for it was filed solely by private respondent
without joining her husband, in violation of Article
185 of the Family Code which requires joint adoption
by the spouses. It argues that the Family Code must
be applied retroactively to the petition filed by Mrs.
Bobiles, as the latter did not acquire a vested right to
adopt Jason Condat by the mere filing of her petition
for adoption.
Issue: Can the Family Code be applied
retroactively to the petition for adoption filed by
Zenaida Bobiles and granting that the Family Code
should not apply retroactively, should the CA have
modified the trial courts decision by granting the
adoption in favor of private respondent only, her
husband not being a petitioner?
Held:
Article 246 of the Family Code provides for
retroactive effect of appropriate relevant provisions
thereof, subject to the qualification that such
retrospective application will not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws.
A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and
extent does not depend upon events foreign to the
will of the holder. Vested rights include not only legal
or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand,
but also an exemption from new obligations created
after the right has vested.
Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, private
respondent had the right to file a petition for adoption
by herself, without joining her husband therein.
When Mrs. Bobiles filed her petition, she was
exercising her explicit and unconditional right under
said law. Upon her filing thereof, her right to file such
petition alone and to have the same proceed to final
adjudication, in accordance with the law in force at
the time, was already vested and cannot be
prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new
law.
When private respondent filed her petition in Special
Proceeding, the trial court acquired jurisdiction there
over in accordance with the governing law.
Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the
established rule is that the jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action.
Although Dioscoro Bobiles was not named
as one of the petitioners in the petition for adoption
filed by his wife, his affidavit of consent attached to
the petition and expressly made an integral part
thereof, shows that he himself actually joined his
wife in adopting the child. Those declarations, and
his subsequent confirmatory testimony in open court,
are sufficient to make him a co-petitioner. Under the
circumstances then obtaining, and by reason of his
foreign residence, he must have yielded to the legal
advice that an affidavit of consent on his part
sufficed to make him a party to the petition. This is
evident from the text of his affidavit. Punctiliousness
in language and pedantry in the formal requirements
should yield to and be eschewed in the higher
considerations of substantial justice. The future of an
innocent child must not be compromised by arbitrary
insistence of rigid adherence to procedural rules on
the form of pleadings.
137

137) Cang vs. CA
G.R. No. 105308 September 25, 1998
Facts:
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie
Clavano who were married on January 27, 1973,
begot three children, namely: Keith, born on July 3,
1973; Charmaine, born on January 23, 1977, and
Joseph Anthony, born on January 3, 1981.
During the early years of their marriage, the Cang
couple's relationship was undisturbed. However,
Anna Marie learned of her husband's alleged
extramarital affair with Wilma Soco, a family friend of
the Clavanos. Upon learning of her husband's
alleged illicit liaison, Anna Marie filed a petition for
legal separation with alimony pendente lite with the
then Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court which
rendered
a
decision
approving
the
joint
manifestation of the Cang spouses providing that
they agreed to live separately and apart or from bed
and board.
Petitioner then left for the United States where he
sought a divorce from Anna Marie before the Second
Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada. Said
court issued the divorce decree that also granted
sole custody of the three minor children to Anna
Marie, reserving rights of visitation at all reasonable
times and places to petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner
took an American wife and thus became a
naturalized American citizen. In 1986, he divorced
his American wife and never remarried.
While in the United States, petitioner worked in
Tablante Medical Clinic earning P18,000.00 to
P20,000.00 a month a portion of which was remitted
to the Philippines for his children's expenses and
another, deposited in the bank in the name of his
children.
Meanwhile, on September 25, 1987, private
respondents Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara
Diago Clavano, respectively the brother and sisterin-law of Anna Marie, filed Special Proceedings for
the adoption of the three minor Cang children before
the Regional Trial Court. The petition bears the
signature of then 14-year-old Keith signifying
consent to his adoption. Anna Marie likewise filed an
affidavit of consent alleging that her husband had
"evaded his legal obligation to support his children;
that her brothers and sisters including Ronald V.
Clavano, had been helping her in taking care of the
children; that because she would be going to the
United States to attend to a family business, leaving
the children would be a problem and would naturally
hamper her job-seeking venture abroad; and that her
husband had long forfeited his parental rights over

the children.
Upon learning of the petitioner for adoption,
petitioner immediately returned to the Philippines
and filed an opposition thereto, alleging that,
although private respondents Ronald and Maria
Clara Clavano were financially capable of supporting
the children while his finances were "too meager"
compared to theirs, he could not "in conscience,
allow anybody to strip him of his parental authority
over his beloved children."
Pending resolution of the petition for adoption,
petitioner moved to reacquire custody over his
children alleging that Anna Marie had transferred to
the United States thereby leaving custody of their
children to private respondents. The Regional Trial
Court issued an order finding that Anna Marie had, in
effect, relinquished custody over the children and,
therefore, such custody should be transferred to the
father. The court then directed the Clavanos to
deliver custody over the minors to petitioner.
Issue:
Can minor children be legally adopted
without the written consent of a natural parent on the
ground that the latter has abandoned them?
Held:
It is evident that notwithstanding the amendments to
the law, the written consent of the natural parent to
the adoption has remained a requisite for its validity.
The written consent of the natural parent is
indispensable for the validity of the decree of
adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement of written
consent can be dispensed with if the parent has
abandoned the child or that such parent is insane or
hopelessly intemperate. The court may acquire
jurisdiction over the case even without the written
consent of the parents or one of the parents
provided that the petition for adoption alleges facts
sufficient to warrant exemption from compliance
therewith.
However, in cases where the father opposes the
adoption primarily because his consent thereto was
not sought, the matter of whether he had abandoned
his
child
becomes
a
proper
issue
for
determination.The issue of abandonment by the
oppositor natural parent is a preliminary issue that
an adoption court must first confront. Only upon
failure of the oppositor natural father to prove to the
satisfaction of the court that he did not abandon his
child may the petition for adoption be considered on
its merits. In its ordinary sense, the word abandon
means to forsake entirely, to forsake or renounce
138

utterly. In reference to abandonment of a child by his
parent, the act of abandonment imports any
conduct of the parent which evinces a settled
purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish
all parental claims to the child. It means neglect or
refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of
care and support which parents owe their children.
In the instant case, records disclose that petitioners
conduct did not manifest a settled purpose to forego
all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims
over his children as to constitute abandonment.
Physical estrangement alone, without financial and
moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment.
While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as
he was then in the United States, he was not remiss
in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and
support for his children. He maintained regular
communication with his wife and children through
letters and telephone. He used to send packages by
mail and catered to their whims.
Wherefore, the questioned Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals, as well as the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, are SET ASIDE
thereby denying the petition for adoption of Keith,
Charmaine and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang,
by the spouse respondents Ronald and Maria Clara
Clavano.
138) In the matter of the petition for a writ of
habeas corpus of a minor Angelie Anne
Cervantes, Nelson Cervantes and Zenaida
Cervantes vs. Gina Carreon Fajardo and
Conrado Fajardo
G.R. No. 79955 January 27, 1989
Facts:
This is a petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus
filed with this Court over the person of the minor
Angelie Anne Cervantes.
The minor was born on 14 February 1987 to
respondents Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon,
who are common-law husband and wife.
Respondents offered the child for adoption to Gina
Carreon's sister and brother-in-law, the herein
petitioners Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes and Nelson
Cervantes, spouses, who took care and custody of
the child when she was barely two (2) weeks old. An
Affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child by
herein petitioners, was also executed by respondent
Gina Carreon
The appropriate petition for adoption was
filed by petitioners over the child before the Regional
Trial Court and rendered a decision granting the

petition. The child was then known as Angelie Anne
Fajardo. The court ordered that the child be freed
from parental authority of her natural parents as well
as from legal obligation and maintenance to them
and that from now on shall be, for all legal intents
and purposes, known as Angelie Anne Cervantes, a
child of petitioners and capable of inheriting their
estate .
Thereafter, adoptive parents, Nelson and Zenaida
Cervantes, received a letter from the respondents
demanding to be paid the amount of P150,000.00,
otherwise, they would get back their child.
Petitioners refused to accede to the demand.
As a result, while petitioners were out at work, the
respondent Gina Carreon took the child from her
yaya at the petitioners' residence on the pretext that
she was instructed to do so by her mother.
Respondent Gina Carreon brought the child to her
house. Petitioners thereupon demanded the return
of the child, but Gina Carreon refused, saying that
she had no desire to give up her child for adoption
and that the affidavit of consent to the adoption she
had executed was not fully explained to her. She
sent word to the petitioners that she will, however,
return the child to the petitioners if she were paid the
amount of P150,000.00.
Issue:
Who has the right to the custody of Angelie
Ann Cervantes?
Held:
In all cases involving the custody, care,
education and property of children, the latter's
welfare is paramount. The provision that no mother
shall be separated from a child under five (5) years
of age, will not apply where the Court finds
compelling reasons to rule otherwise.
In all
controversies regarding the custody of minors, the
foremost consideration is the moral, physical and
social welfare of the child concerned, taking into
account the resources and moral as well as social
standing of the contending parents. Never has this
Court deviated from this criterion.
It is undisputed that respondent Conrado Fajardo is
legally married to a woman other than respondent
Gina Carreon, and his relationship with the latter is a
common-law husband and wife relationship. His
open cohabitation with co-respondent Gina Carreon
will not accord the minor that desirable atmosphere
139

where she can grow and develop into an upright and
moral-minded person. Besides, respondent Gina
Carreon had previously given birth to another child
by another married man with whom she lived for
almost three years but who eventually left her and
vanished. For a minor (like Angelie Anne C.
Cervantes) to grow up with a sister whose father is
not her true father, could also affect the moral
outlook and values of said minor. Upon the other
hand, petitioners who are legally married appear to
be morally, physically, financially, and socially
capable of supporting the minor and giving her a
future better than what the natural mother who is not
only jobless but also maintains an illicit relation with
a married man, can most likely give her.
spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a

petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc in
Special Proceedings before the then Court of First
Instance. This petition for adoption was grunted on,
18 November 1982, that is, after Adelberto had shot
and killed Jennifer.
Besides, the minor has been legally adopted by

petitioners with the full knowledge and consent of
respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect,
among others, of dissolving the authority vested in
natural parents over the adopted child, except where
the adopting parent is the spouse of the natural
parent of the adopted, in which case, parental
authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly
by both spouses. The adopting parents have the
right to the care and custody of the adopted child
and exercise parental authority and responsibility
over him.
Petitioners in their Reply contended that since

Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living with his
natural parents, parental authority had not ceased
nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting
of a petition for adoption.
The custody and care of the minor Angelie Anne

Cervantes are hereby granted to petitioners to whom
they properly belong, and respondents are ordered
(if they still have not) to deliver said minor to the
petitioners immediately upon notice hereof.
139) Macario Tamargo, Celso Tamargo and
Aurelia Tamargo vs. CA and Hon. Rubio and
Victor Bunduc and Clara Bunduc
G.R. No.85044 June 3, 1992
Facts:
On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc,
then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer
Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which
resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint
for damages was filed with the Regional Trial Court
by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting
parent, and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia
Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents against
respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc,
Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living
at the time of the tragic incident.
Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the
In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc,

Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the result of the
foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that not they,
but rather the adopting parents, namely the spouses
Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable
parties to the action since parental authority had
shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the
successful petition for adoption was filed.
The trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint,

ruling that respondent natural parents of Adelberto
indeed were not indispensable parties to the action.
Petitioners, then went to the Court of Appeals on a
petition for mandamus and certiorari questioning the
trial court's Decision. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition, ruling that petitioners had lost
their right to appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not Adelbertos natural parents
are indispensable parties to the action?
Held: This principle of parental liability is a species
of what is frequently designated as vicarious liability,
or the doctrine of "imputed negligence, where a
person is not only liable for torts committed by
himself, but also for torts committed by others with
whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he
is responsible. Thus, parental liability is made a
natural or logical consequence of the duties and
responsibilities of parents their parental authority
which includes the instructing, controlling and
disciplining of the child.
The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts
of their minor children living with them, may be seen
to be based upon the parental authority vested by
the Civil Code upon such parents. The civil law
assumes that when an unemancipated child living
with its parents commits a tortious acts, the parents
140

were negligent in the performance of their legal and
natural duty closely to supervise the child who is in
their custody and control. Parental liability is, in other
words, anchored upon parental authority coupled
with presumed parental dereliction in the discharge
of the duties accompanying such authority. The
parental dereliction is, of course, only presumed and
the presumption can be overtuned under Article
2180 of the Civil Code by proof that the parents had
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent the damage.
In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by
Adelberto with an air rifle occured when parental
authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc
spouses, the natural parents of the minor Adelberto.
It would thus follow that the natural parents who had
then actual custody of the minor Adelberto, are the
indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
The basis of parental liability for the torts of a minor
child is the relationship existing between the parents
and the minor child living with them and over whom,
the law presumes, the parents exercise supervision
and control.
We do not consider that retroactive effect may be
giver to the decree of adoption so as to impose a
liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time
when adopting parents had no actual or physically
custody over the adopted child. Retroactive affect
may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition
for adoption where such is essential to permit the
accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the
adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold
that parental authority had been retroactively lodged
in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with
liability for a tortious act that they could not have
foreseen and which they could not have prevented
(since they were at the time in the United States and
had no physical custody over the child Adelberto)
would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a result,
moreover, would be inconsistent with the
philosophical and policy basis underlying the
doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little differently, no
presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the
adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have
arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their
control at the time the tort was committed.
140) LAHOM vs. SIBULO
G.R. No. 143989 July 14, 2003

Facts:
Spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita
Lahom filed in 1971 a petition to adopt Melvin
Sibulo, Isabelita Lahom`s nephew. The petition was
granted in 1972. Hence, the Civil Registrar of Naga
City changed the name "Jose Melvin Sibulo" to
"Jose Melvin Lahom."
However, in 1999, the petitioner filed a petition to
rescind the adoption on the ground of the continuous
refusal of the respondent to change his surname
from Sibulo to Lahom and for his indifference
towards the petitioner by failing to visit her in Naga.
In 1998, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8552, also known
as the Domestic Adoption Act, went into effect which
deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind
a decree of adoption.
Issue: Whether or not the adoption of respondent
may still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter.
Held: The new law withdrew the right of an adopter
to rescind the adoption decree and gave to the
adopted child the sole right to sever the legal ties
created by adoption.
It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552
that herein petitioner filed an action to revoke the
decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the
new law, had already abrogated and repealed the
right of an adopter under the Civil Code and the
Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption.
Consistently with its earlier pronouncements, the
Court should now hold that the action for rescission
of the adoption decree, having been initiated by
petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force,
no longer could be pursued.
Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute,
an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the
five-year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of
Court and that the adopter would lose the right to
revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that
period. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive
period is a condition that could not fulfill the
requirements of a vested right entitled to protection.
It must also be acknowledged that a person has no
vested right in statutory privileges. While adoption
has often been referred to in the context of a "right,"
the privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate or
fundamental but rather a right merely created by
statute. It is a privilege that is governed by the
141

state's determination on what it may

Язык

Добро пожаловать в Scribd!

Civil Law Review I Case Digests

Загружено:

Сведения о документе

Описание:

Дата загрузки

Авторское право

Доступные форматы

Поделиться этим документом

Поделиться или встроить документ

Параметры публикации

Этот документ был вам полезен?

Это неприемлемый материал?

Описание:

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

Civil Law Review I Case Digests

Загружено:

Описание:

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

Похожие издания

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

Atty. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan

Prof. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

CASES ASSIGNED for DIGEST

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS

THE FAMILY AS AN INSTITUTION--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 108

PATERNITY AND FILIATIOIN---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 116

PARENTAL AUTHORITY----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 143

CASES IN PROPERTY-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 152

CASES IN SUCCESSION----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 193

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

1) TAADA VS. TUVERA

administrative orders and proclamations, except

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

upon approval, or on any other date, without its

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

procedure. Consequently, we have no

d. Circulars issued by the Monetary Board if

3) PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT and

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

Issue: Whether or not POEA Memorandum Circular

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

doctrine is applied prospectively, and should not

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

On 29 November 1989, the students

The trial court issued a temporary restraining order

Held: No, the Non doctrine should not be applied to

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

below denied the motion to dismiss since the

*The accused were acquitted for through their

Held: It is true that owing to the nationality principle

7) Van Dorn vs. Romillio

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private

Issue: Whether the foreign divorce on the parties

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

Held: There is no specific provision as to who can

10) SAN LUIS vs. SAN LUIS

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

Issue: Whether or not the Philippine Law shall

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

a testator to dispose of all his property according to

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

Chapter 2 of the PRELIMINARY TITLE of the Civil

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

17) GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

including interest with 25% attorneys fees,

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

billeted. When she arrived, several persons were

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

The CFI ordered rendered decision in favor of