USCA1 Opinion

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________

No. 97-1950

COASTAL OIL OF NEW ENGLAND, INC.,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

TEAMSTERS LOCAL A/W

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS,

Defendant, Appellee.

____________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Reginald C. Lindsay, U.S. District Judge]

___________________

____________________

Before

Torruella, Chief Judge,

___________

Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,

____________________

and Lynch, Circuit Judge.

_____________

_____________________

Alan S. Miller, with

_______________

whom Stoneman, Chandler & Miller LLP

________________________________

was on brief for appellant.

Christine L. Nickerson, with whom Matthew E. Dwyer and Dwyer

______________________
________________
_____
& Jenkins, P.C. were on brief for appellee.
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____________________

January 23, 1998

____________________

TORRUELLA, Chief Judge.

TORRUELLA, Chief Judge.
____________

Although this appeal presents

a somewhat novel question, the answer is more mundane.

Appellant employer

filed

an

Superior

Application

Court of

the

to

Coastal Oil

Vacate an

Commonwealth

of New

England, Inc.,

arbitration

of

award

Massachusetts

grounds that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority.

in the

on

the

Appellee

labor organization Teamsters Local Union No. 25 A/W International

Brotherhood of Teamsters removed the

District Court for the District

1441,

1331; 29

motions for summary

U.S.C.

matter to the United States

of Massachusetts.

185(a).

Both parties

judgment, whereupon the court

See 28 U.S.C.
___

filed cross

ruled against

appellant and denied vacation of the arbitration award.

the district court granted appellee's

enforced.

Instead,

request that the award

be

Final judgment was entered thereafter and this appeal

followed.

Appellant

operates

Massachusetts,

including one

Although

they

are

purposes

by

all

appellee,

three

in

separate

Revere

and

represented for

the

employees

facilities

one

in

collective

in

each

of

in

Chelsea.

bargaining

the

three

facilities belong to separate bargaining units and are covered by

discrete collective bargaining agreements.

Joseph

bargaining unit,

Abruzzese,

Mass.

under

Gen. Laws

yardman

within

the

Revere

was injured in a work-related accident in 1991,

forcing him to take a leave

benefits

the

of absence, during which he received

Massachusetts

ch. 152,

Worker's

et seq.
_______

-2-

In

Compensation

Act.

August 1995,

when

Abruzzese

sought

to

available

in the

Revere

appellee

to

return

to

unit.

same job

no

job

Nevertheless,

openings

were

appellant

and

reached an agreement that Abruzzese would be reinstated

the next available position.

that a

work,

yardman position was

that he

applied for

available in the Chelsea

had previously

that slot

refused the request,

Subsequently, Abruzzese learned

had in

through his union,

the Revere

appellee.

contending that Abruzzese only

unit, the

unit.

He

Appellant

had a right

to

reinstatement

in the

Revere

someone else to the Chelsea

unit.

After

appellant hired

position, appellee filed a grievance

pursuant to the Revere contract.

Eventually, the dispute was heard before an arbitrator.

After hearing

issue

to be

the evidence,

decided

was

the arbitrator

"whether

[Revere] Agreement when it refused

the

concluded that

Company

violated

."

Thereafter, the

Section 10(a)

of the

arbitrator concluded

Revere Agreement,

Massachusetts Worker's Compensation

that Article

which incorporated

. .

XIV,

the

Law, mandated the employment

of Abruzzese at the open position in Chelsea.

ordered to reinstate him to the

the

to place Joseph Abruzzese . .

. in a position of yardman at the Company's Chelsea terminal

the

Appellant was thus

Chelsea position and to make him

whole as to back pay and lost benefits.

Appellant's challenge

stems

from its

authority

under

contention

to the district

that

the Revere

the

court's rulings

arbitrator

exceeded

collective bargaining

his

agreement by

ordering the employment of a member of that unit into the Chelsea

-3-

unit.

As a corollary to

that issue, appellant

claims that the

arbitrator

lacked

authority

to

interpret

the

Worker's

Compensation Act.

Labor arbitration is the product of the private will of

voluntarily consenting parties.

Thus, the starting point, and in

a real sense the finishing one in

arbitration

contract.

this, as in most challenges to

awards, is the language of the collective bargaining

Such

language

establishes

the

parameters

of

the

arbitrator's authority.

We commence

raised by

our quest

this appeal with

Revere Agreement entitled

for the

a reading

answers to

of Article

the issues

XVIII of

"Grievance Procedure," which

the

provides

in Section 2, in effect, that in exchange for labor peace "during

the

life

of

interpretation,

this

Agreement[,]

enforcement,

adjustment

or

any

question

grievance

of

between the employer and the Union and his employees which cannot

be

adjusted[,]

. .

shall

be

arbitration[,] . . . [which] . . .

referred

. to

decision . . . shall be final

and binding upon both parties."

We

next proceed to

the arbitrator relied

It states that:

Company

compensation
employee,

upon which

for his ruling, Article XIV, Section 10(a)

of the Revere contract.

The

the specific provision

shall

either

or, in the event of

shall provide

same benefits
as provided
Compensation

carry

said

worker's

an injury to an

employee with

the

and payments and in the same manner

by
Law

the provisions
(Massachusetts

-4-

of

the

Worker's

G.L.,

Chapter

152) and Amendments thereto,

up to and

including

the date of the signing of this Agreement.

We

Worker's

thus come

Compensation

applicable

to

statute,

which

of

the

the

Massachusetts

arbitrator

which he interpreted to

reinstated to the Chelsea

his previous employment outside that

follows:

75A

found

to the submitted grievance under the previously cited

contractual provision, and

Abruzzese be

Section

require that

position notwithstanding

unit.

Section 75A reads as

Any person who

injury

has lost a job

compensable under

given preference
whom he worked at
over any
for

may

be

Actions

for the

An

the employee

the employee
such

injury

of application
such

employer;

suitable
filed

job

under

is
this

the alleged

employer found

lost wages,

attorney

shall grant

shall reimburse

fees incurred

rights granted

to have

exclusively liable

a suitable job, and

reasonable

protection of

for

county in which

occurred.

pay to

the employer

court department of the

violated this section shall be

to

be

by

that

section with the superior

violation

chapter shall

at the time

employed

however,

trial court

by

of an

the time of compensable

re-employment

available.

this

in hiring

persons not

provided,

as a result

in

by this section

the
as

shall be determined by the court.

In the

event that

section

is

collective
thirty- one,

any right

inconsistent
bargaining

set
with

agreement

the collective

forth in
an

this

applicable
or

chapter

bargaining agreement

or said chapter thirty-one shall prevail.

Although we have often stated

the following principle,

due to the number of groundless appeals that have come before

challenging

arbitration

awards,

it

bears

repeating

us

that:

"[j]udicial review of an arbitration award is among the narrowest

known

to the

law."

Maine Cent. R.R. Co.

______________________

Maintenance of Way Employees, 873

____________________________

v.

Brotherhood of
______________

F.2d 425, 428 (1st Cir. 1989).

-5-

For courts

"do not sit to hear claims

of factual or legal error

by

an arbitrator[,]

decisions

as

an appellate

of lower courts."

Misco, 484 U.S.

_____

of arbitral

deferential."

does in

reviewing

United Paperworkers Int'l Union v.

_______________________________

29, 38 (1987).

decisions

court

In fact, "[f]ederal court review

is extremely

narrow and

extraordinarily

Service Employees Int'l Union v. Local 1199, N.E.,

_____________________________
________________

70 F.3d 647, 651 (1st Cir. 1995).

"[A] court should

uphold an award that

arbitrator's interpretation of a

if it

can find, within

plausible

basis

the four

for that

depends on the

collective bargaining agreement

corners of the

agreement, any

interpretation." El Dorado Technical

____________________

Servs., Inc. v. Uni n General de Trabajadores de Puerto Rico, 961

____________
____________________________________________

F.2d 317,

319 (1st Cir. 1992).

That

a court would have decided

an issue differently is not

if the

arbitrator "even arguably

authority."

that the award is

well-defined, and dominant

Int'l Union, 70
___________

that

such a

that

of his

scope of review is

arbitrator's decision

is:

(2) based on reasoning so

or group of

ruling; or (3)

is concededly

against an explicit,

public policy, see Service Employees

___ __________________

F.3d at 652, the

the

reason and fact;

no judge,

acted within the scope

Misco, 484 U.S. at 38.

_____

Absent a claim

claims

a basis for overruling an arbitrator

"(1)

limited to

unfounded in

palpably faulty that

judges, ever could conceivably

mistakenly based on a

a non-fact."

crucial assumption

Local 1445 United Food and

____________________________

Commercial Workers Int'l Union v. Stop & Shop Cos., 776

______________________________
________________

21 (1st Cir. 1985).

And,

have made

F.2d 19,

of course, "[a]n arbitrator's view

of

-6-

the scope

of the

deference

interpretation of

Larocque v.
________

on

issue .

. .

normally

is entitled

accorded

the collective

to

to the

the

same .

arbitrator's

bargaining agreement

R.W.F., Inc., 8 F.3d 95, 97

____________

. .

itself."

(1st Cir. 1993).

Based

these well-established principles, the outcome of this appeal

is preordained.

Although the scope of the reinstatement remedy provided

through an arbitral

bargaining

result

unit

is not

award is usually limited

from

unheard of

grant the arbitrator

collective

which the

where the

such power.

bargaining

grievance

arises,

parties have

See supra.
___ _____

agreement,

the

any

bargained to

The parties to the

presently

final and binding

any question of interpretation of that agreement, or

grievance involving

contended

that

litigated

before, the

interpretation

a grievance

a contrary

same entities

before us, voluntarily contracted to submit to

arbitration

to the contractual

the

employees.

It

cannot

underlying controversy

arbitrator

does

not

be

seriously

submitted

to,

and

concern

both

the

of the collective bargaining agreement as well as

involving an employee.

How can the

arbitrator, in

determining

whether

obligations

mandated

appellant

lived

by Section

Revere Agreement, fail to address

Massachusetts Worker's

up

10(a)

to

the

contractual

of Article

XIV

of the

whether the provisions of

Compensation Law, incorporated

the

into that

agreement by Section 10(a), have been met?

The response to this question as well as to appellant's

challenge

to

the

arbitrator's

-7-

authority

to

interpret

the

aforementioned Massachusetts statute is self-evident.

the

arbitrator

acted

delegated authority.

properly

and

the

scope of

We can perceive of no valid reason

parties

could not also

before

an

arbitral

agree to have

forum.

Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500

______________________________

ADEA

within

Obviously,

his

why the

statutory rights enforced

See,
___

e.g.,
____

U.S. 20, 35

Gilmer
______

v.

(1991) (holding

claims to be arbitrable); Bercovitch v. Baldwin Sch., Inc.,

__________
__________________

1998 WL 5845, __ F.3d __

arbitration);

(8th Cir. 1997)

(1st Cir. 1998) (ADA claims subject

to

(Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832

_________
______________________

(extending Gilmer to Title VII

______

Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932, 935

_____________________________

claims); Mago v.
____

(9th Cir. 1992)

(extending Gilmer to Title VII

______

Co., 883 F.2d 184, 186 (1st

___

claims); Utley v. Goldman Sachs &

_____
_______________

Cir. 1989) (holding inter alia Title

__________

VII claims to be arbitrable); cf. Shearson/American Express, Inc.

___ _______________________________

v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1987) (holding Securities Exchange

_______

Act and RICO claims to be arbitrable); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.

_______________________

Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 640 (1985) (holding

______________________________

Sherman Act claims to be arbitrable).

cursory

reading

inevitable conclusion that

was not

only clearly

of

the Massachusetts

statute

leads

the arbitrator's ruling in

within the

collective bargaining agreement, it

that

that

powers granted

to

the

this case

to him

in the

is substantially the

remedy

Superior Court

would

likely have

felt

required to grant Joseph Abruzzese

given that the appellant is a

single, unitary employer, for workman's compensation purpose.

a result, its

trinary profile, for labor

As

relations purposes, is

-8-

presently

irrelevant.

We note that

our views as

to the legal

soundness of the arbitrator's conclusions are largely gratuitous,

for as previously stated, even an erroneous interpretation of the

law by an

arbitrator is not subject

to judicial review

if that

authority has been delegated to the arbitrator, as it was in this

case.

The

decision of the district court is AFFIRMED.

AFFIRMED
________

are granted to appellee.

Costs

-9-