THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 138053. May 31, 2000]

CORNELIO M. ISAGUIRRE, petitioner, vs. FELICITAS DE LARA,
respondent.

former sold a 250 square meter portion of Lot No. 502, together with the two-story
commercial and residential structure standing thereon, in favor of petitioner, for
and in consideration of the sum of P5,000.
Sometime in May, 1968, Apolonio and Rodolfo de Lara filed a complaint against
petitioner for recovery of ownership and possession of the two-story building.
[3]
However, the case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules
of Civil Procedure, petitioner Cornelio M. Isaguirre assails the October 5, 1998
decision[1] of the Court of Appeals[2] and its Resolution promulgated on March 5,
1999.

On August 21, 1969, petitioner filed a sales application over the subject property
on the basis of the deed of sale. His application was approved on January 17, 1984,
resulting in the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. P-11566 on February
13, 1984, in the name of petitioner. Meanwhile, the sales application of respondent
over the entire 1,000 square meters of subject property (including the 250 square
meter portion claimed by petitioner) was also given due course, resulting in the
issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. P-13038 on June 19, 1989, in the name
of respondent.[4]

The antecedent facts of the present case are as follows:

Alejandro de Lara was the original applicant-claimant for a Miscellaneous Sales
Application over a parcel of land identified as portion of Lot 502, Guianga
Cadastre, filed with the Bureau of Lands on January 17, 1942 and with an area of
2,342 square meters. Upon his death, Alejandro de Lara was succeeded by his wife
- respondent Felicitas de Lara, as claimant. On November 19, 1954, the
Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources amended the sales
application to cover only 1,600 square meters. Then, on November 3, 1961, by
virtue of a decision rendered by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources dated November 19, 1954, a subdivision survey was made and the area
was further reduced to 1,000 square meters. On this lot stands a two-story
residential-commercial apartment declared for taxation purposes under TD 43927
in the name of respondents sons - Apolonio and Rodolfo, both surnamed de Lara.
Sometime in 1953, respondent obtained several loans from the Philippine National
Bank. When she encountered financial difficulties, respondent approached
petitioner Cornelio M. Isaguirre, who was married to her niece, for assistance. On
February 10, 1960, a document denominated as "Deed of Sale and Special Cession
of Rights and Interests" was executed by respondent and petitioner, whereby the

Due to the overlapping of titles, petitioner filed an action for quieting of title and
damages with the Regional Trial Court of Davao City against respondent on May
17, 1990. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 20124-90. After trial on the
merits, the trial court rendered judgment on October 19, 1992, in favor of
petitioner, declaring him to be the lawful owner of the disputed property. However,
the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts decision, holding that the transaction
entered into by the parties, as evidenced by their contract, was an equitable
mortgage, not a sale.[5] The appellate courts decision was based on the inadequacy
of the consideration agreed upon by the parties, on its finding that the payment of a
large portion of the "purchase price" was made after the execution of the deed of
sale in several installments of minimal amounts; and finally, on the fact that
petitioner did not take steps to confirm his rights or to obtain title over the property
for several years after the execution of the deed of sale. As a consequence of its
decision, the appellate court also declared Original Certificate of Title No.P-11566
issued in favor of petitioner to be null and void. On July 8, 1996, in a case
docketed as G. R. No. 120832, this Court affirmed the decision of the Court of
Appeals and on September 11, 1996, we denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.

On May 5, 1997, respondent filed a motion for execution with the trial court,
praying for the immediate delivery of possession of the subject property, which
motion was granted on August 18, 1997. On February 3, 1998, respondent moved
for a writ of possession, invoking our ruling in G. R. No. 120832. Petitioner
opposed the motion, asserting that he had the right of retention over the property
until payment of the loan and the value of the improvements he had introduced on
the property. On March 12, 1998, the trial court granted respondents motion for
writ of possession. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial
court on May 21, 1998. Consequently, a writ of possession dated June 16, 1998,
together with the Sheriffs Notice to Vacate dated July 7, 1998, were served upon
petitioner.
Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction
to annul and set aside the March 12, 1998 and May 21, 1998 orders of the trial
court, including the writ of possession dated June 16, 1998 and the sheriffs notice
to vacate dated July 7, 1998.[6]
The appellate court summarized the issues involved in the case as follows: (1)
whether or not the mortgagee in an equitable mortgage has the right to retain
possession of the property pending actual payment to him of the amount of
indebtedness by the mortgagor; and (b) whether or not petitioner can be considered
a builder in good faith with respect to the improvements he made on the property
before the transaction was declared to be an equitable mortgage.
The Court of Appeals held that petitioner was not entitled to retain possession of
the subject property. It said that the mortgagee merely has to annotate his claim at the back of the
certificate of title in order to protect his rights against third persons
and thereby secure the debt. There is therefore no necessity for
him to actually possess the property. Neither should a mortgagee
in an equitable mortgage fear that the contract relied upon is not
registered and hence, may not operate as a mortgage to justify its
foreclosure. In Feliza Zubiri v. Lucio Quijano, 74 Phil 47, it was
ruled "that when a contract x x x is held as an equitable mortgage,

the same shall be given effect as if it had complied with the formal
requisites of mortgage. x x x by its very nature the lien thereby
created ought not to be defeated by requiring compliance with the
formalities necessary to the validity of a voluntary real estate
mortgage, as long as the land remains in the hands of the petitioner
(mortgagor) and the rights of innocent parties are not affected."
Proceeding from the foregoing, petitioners imagined fears that his
lien would be lost by surrendering possession are unfounded.
In the same vein, there is nothing to stop the mortgagor de Lara
from acquiring possession of the property pending actual payment
of the indebtedness to petitioner. This does not in anyway
endanger the petitioners right to security since, as pointed out by
private respondents, the petitioner can always have the equitable
mortgage annotated in the Certificate of Title of private respondent
and pursue the legal remedies for the collection of the alleged debt
secured by the mortgage. In this case, the remedy would be to
foreclose the mortgage upon failure to pay the debt within the
required period.
It is unfortunate however, that the Court of Appeals, in declaring
the transaction to be an equitable mortgage failed to specify in its
Decision the period of time within which the private respondent
could settle her account, since such period serves as the reckoning
point by which foreclosure could ensue. As it is, petitioner is now
in a dilemma as to how he could enforce his rights as a mortgagee.
...
Hence, this Court, once and for all resolves the matter by requiring
the trial court to determine the amount of total indebtedness and
the period within which payment shall be made.
Petitioners claims that he was a builder in good faith and entitled to reimbursement
for the improvements he introduced upon the property were rejected by the Court
of Appeals. It held that petitioner knew, or at least had an inkling, that there was a

defect or flaw in his mode of acquisition. Nevertheless, the appellate court

declared petitioner to have the following rights:
He is entitled to reimbursement for the necessary expenses which
he may have incurred over the property, in accordance with Art.
526 and Art. 452 of the Civil Code. Moreover, considering that the
transaction was merely an equitable mortgage, then he is entitled
to payment of the amount of indebtedness plus interest, and in the
event of non-payment to foreclose the mortgage. Meanwhile,
pending receipt of the total amount of debt, private respondent is
entitled to possession over the disputed property.

A.......THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

NOT RULING THAT THE RTC ACTED WITHOUT OR IN
EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN ISSUING A WRIT OF POSSESSION IN
FAVOR OF RESPONDENT.
A.1......The RTC patently exceeded the scope of its authority and
acted with grave abuse of discretion in ordering the immediate
delivery of possession of the Property to respondent as said order
exceeded the parameters of the final and executory decision and
constituted a variance thereof.

The case was finally disposed of by the appellate court in the following manner:
WHERFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED, and this case is
ordered remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Davao City for
further proceedings, as follows:
1) The trial court shall determine
a) The period within which the mortgagor must pay his total
amount of indebtedness.
b) The total amount of indebtedness owing the petitionermortgagee plus interest computed from the time when the
judgment declaring the contract to be an equitable mortgage
became final.
c) The necessary expenses incurred by petitioner over the property.
[7]

On March 5, 1999, petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the

appellate court.[8] Hence, the present appeal wherein petitioner makes the following
assignment of errors:

B.......THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

HOLDING THAT PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE
POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY PRIOR TO THE PAYMENT
OF RESPONDENTS MORTGAGE LOAN.
C.......THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
RULING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT A BUILDER IN
GOOD FAITH.
D.......THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
RULING THAT PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO INTEREST
COMPUTED ONLY FROM THE TIME WHEN THE
JUDGMENT DECLARING THE CONTRACT TO BE AN
EQUITABLE MORTGAGE BECAME FINAL.[9]
Basically, petitioner claims that he is entitled to retain possession of the subject
property until payment of the loan and the value of the necessary and useful
improvements he made upon such property.[10] According to petitioner, neither the
Court of Appeals decision in G.R. CV No. 42065 nor this Courts decision in G.R.
No. 120832 ordered immediate delivery of possession of the subject property to
respondent.

The dispositive portion of the March 31, 1995 decision of the Court of Appeals in
G.R. CV No. 42065, which was affirmed by this Court, provides that

or lessee.[15]Petitioner anchors his own claim to possession upon his declared status
as a mortgagee. In his Memorandum, he argues that

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed

from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered:
(1) dismissing the complaint; (2) declaring the "Document of Sale
and Special Cession of Rights and Interests" (Exhibit B) dated
February 10, 1960, to be an equitable mortgage not a sale; (3)
upholding the validity of OCT No. P-13038 in the name of
Felicitas de Lara; and (3) declaring null and void OCT No. P11566 in the name of plaintiff Cornelio Isaguirre. All other
counterclaims for damages are likewise dismissed. Costs against
the appellee.[11]

4.8 It was respondent who asserted that her transfer of the

Property to petitioner was by way of an equitable mortgage and
not by sale. After her assertion was sustained by the Courts,
respondent cannot now ignore or disregard the legal effects of
such judicial declaration regarding the nature of the transaction.

Petitioner argues that the abovementioned decision merely settled the following
matters: (1) that the transaction between petitioner and respondent was not a sale
but an equitable mortgage; (2) that OCT No. P-13038 in the name of respondent is
valid; and (3) that OCT No. P-11566 in the name of petitioner is null and void.
Since the aforementioned decision did not direct the immediate ouster of petitioner
from the subject property and the delivery thereof to respondent, the issuance of
the writ of possession by the trial court on June 16, 1998 constituted an
unwarranted modification or addition to the final and executory decision of this
Court in G.R. No. 120832.[12]
We do not agree with petitioners contentions. On the contrary, the March 31, 1995
decision of the appellate court, which was affirmed by this Court on July 8, 1996,
served as more than adequate basis for the issuance of the writ of possession in
favor of respondent since these decisions affirmed respondents title over the
subject property. As the sole owner, respondent has the right to enjoy her property,
without any other limitations than those established by law.[13] Corollary to such
right, respondent also has the right to exclude from the possession of her property
any other person to whom she has not transmitted such property.[14]
It is true that, in some instances, the actual possessor has some valid rights over the
property enforceable even against the owner thereof, such as in the case of a tenant

xxx......xxx......xxx
4.13 Having delivered possession of the Property to petitioner as
part of the constitution of the equitable mortgage thereon,
respondent is not entitled to the return of the Property unless and
until the mortgage loan is discharged by full payment thereof.
Petitioners right as mortgagee to retain possession of the Property
so long as the mortgage loan remains unpaid is further supported
by the rule that a mortgage may not be extinguished even though
then mortgagor-debtor may have made partial payments on the
mortgage loan:
"Art. 2089. A pledge or mortgage is indivisible,
even though the debt may be divided among the
successors in interest of the debtor or the creditor.
"Therefore, the debtors heir who has paid a part of
the debt cannot ask for the proportionate
extinguishment of the pledge or mortgage as long
as the debt is not completely satisfied.
"Neither can the creditors heir who has received
his share of the debt return the pledge or cancel
the mortgage, to the prejudice of the other heirs
who have not been paid."
(Emphasis supplied.)

xxx......xxx......xxx
4.14 ......To require petitioner to deliver possession of the Property
to respondent prior to the full payment of the latters mortgage loan
would be equivalent to the cancellation of the mortgage. Such
effective cancellation would render petitioners rights ineffectual
and nugatory and would constitute unwarranted judicial
interference.
xxx......xxx......xxx
4.16 The fact of the present case show that respondent delivered
possession of the Property to petitioner upon the execution of the
Deed of Absolute Sale and Special Cession of Rights and Interest
dated 10 February 1960. Hence, transfer of possession of the
Property to petitioner was an essential part of whatever agreement
the parties entered into, which, in this case, the Supreme Court
affirmed to be an equitable mortgage.
xxx......xxx......xxx
4.19 Petitioner does not have the mistaken notion that the
mortgagee must be in actual possession of the mortgaged property
in order to secure the debt. However, in this particular case, the
delivery of possession of the Property was an integral part of the
contract between petitioner and respondent. After all, it was
supposed to be a contract of sale. If delivery was not part of the
agreement entered into by the parties in 1960, why did respondent
surrender possession thereof to petitioner in the first place?
4.20 Now that the Courts have ruled that the transaction was not a
sale but a mortgage, petitioners entitlement to the possession of
the Property should be deemed as one of the provisions of the
mortgage, considering that at the time the contract was entered
into, possession of the Property was likewise delivered to
petitioner. Thus, until respondent has fully paid her mortgage loan,

petitioner should be allowed to retain possession of the subject

property.[16]
Petitioners position lacks sufficient legal and factual moorings.
A mortgage is a contract entered into in order to secure the fulfillment of a
principal obligation.[17] It is constituted by recording the document in which it
appears with the proper Registry of Property, although, even if it is not recorded,
the mortgage is nevertheless binding between the parties. [18] Thus, the only right
granted by law in favor of the mortgagee is to demand the execution and the
recording of the document in which the mortgage is formalized. [19] As a general
rule, the mortgagor retains possession of the mortgaged property since a mortgage
is merely a lien and title to the property does not pass to the mortgagee.
[20]
However, even though a mortgagee does not have possession of the property,
there is no impairment of his security since the mortgage directly and immediately
subjects the property upon which it is imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to
the fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was constituted. [21] If the
debtor is unable to pay his debt, the mortgage creditor may institute an action to
foreclose the mortgage, whether judicially or extrajudicially, whereby the
mortgaged property will then be sold at a public auction and the proceeds
therefrom given to the creditor to the extent necessary to discharge the mortgage
loan. Apparently, petitioners contention that "[t]o require [him] to deliver
possession of the Property to respondent prior to the full payment of the latters
mortgage loan would be equivalent to the cancellation of the mortgage" is without
basis. Regardless of its possessor, the mortgaged property may still be sold, with
the prescribed formalities, in the event of the debtors default in the payment of his
loan obligation.
Moreover, this Court cannot find any justification in the records to uphold
petitioners contention that respondent delivered possession of the subject property
upon the execution of the "Deed of Sale and Special Cession of Rights and
Interests" on February 10, 1960 and that the transfer of possession to petitioner
must therefore be considered an essential part of the agreement between the
parties. This self-serving assertion of petitioner was directly contradicted by
respondent in her pleadings.[22] Furthermore, nowhere in the Court of Appeals
decisions promulgated on March 31, 1995 (G.R. CV No. 42065) and on October 5,

1998 (G.R. SP No. 48310), or in our own decision promulgated on July 8, 1996
(G.R. No. 120832) was it ever established that the mortgaged properties were
delivered by respondent to petitioner.

total amount of the loan, the necessary expenses incurred by petitioner, and the
period within which respondent must pay such amount. [28] However, no interest is
due on the loan since there has been no express stipulation in writing. [29]

In Alvano v. Batoon,[23] this Court held that "[a] simple mortgage does not give the
mortgagee a right to the possession of the property unless the mortgage should
contain some special provision to that effect." Regrettably for petitioner, he has not
presented any evidence, other than his own gratuitous statements, to prove that the
real intention of the parties was to allow him to enjoy possession of the mortgaged
property until full payment of the loan.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 5,

1998 and its Resolution dated March 5, 1999 are hereby AFFIRMED. Respondent
is entitled to delivery of possession of the subject property. This case is hereby
REMANDED to the trial court for determination of the amount of the loan, the
necessary expenses incurred by petitioner and the period within which the
respondent must pay the same.

Therefore, we hold that the trial court correctly issued the writ of possession in
favor of respondent. Such writ was but a necessary consequence of this Courts
ruling in G.R. No. 120832 affirming the validity of the original certificate of title
(OCT No. P-13038) in the name of respondent Felicitas de Lara, while at the same
time nullifying the original certificate of title (OCT No. P-11566) in the name of
petitioner Cornelio Isaguirre. Possession is an essential attribute of ownership;
thus, it would be redundant for respondent to go back to court simply to establish
her right to possess subject property. Contrary to petitioners claims, the issuance of
the writ of possession by the trial court did not constitute an unwarranted
modification of our decision in G.R. No. 120832, but rather, was a necessary
complement thereto.[24] It bears stressing that a judgment is not confined to what
appears upon the face of the decision, but also those necessarily included therein or
necessary thereto.[25]

SO ORDERED.

With regard to the improvements made on the mortgaged property, we confirm the
Court of Appeals characterization of petitioner as a possessor in bad faith. Based
on the factual findings of the appellate court, it is evident that petitioner knew from
the very beginning that there was really no sale and that he held respondents
property as mere security for the payment of the loan obligation. Therefore,
petitioner may claim reimbursement only for necessary expenses; however, he is
not entitled to reimbursement for any useful expenses [26] which he may have
incurred.[27]
Finally, as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, this case should be
remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Davao City for a determination of the

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, and Purisima, JJ., concur.

Panganiban, J., on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 76217 September 14, 1989
GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO VILLEZA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-76216 September 14, 1989
GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ORLANDO GERNALE, respondents.
Alam, Verano & Associates for petitioner.
Francisco D. Lozano for private respondents.
FERNAN, C.J.:
Spouses Cynthia Cuyegkeng Jose and Manuel Rene Jose, residents of
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA are the owners of a parcel of land situated in
Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal, with an area of 232,942 square meters
and covered by TCT No. 50023 of the Register of Deeds of the province of Rizal
issued on September 11, 1980 which canceled TCT No. 56762/ T-560. The land
was originally registered on August 5, 1948 in the Office of the Register of Deeds
of Rizal as OCT No. 19, pursuant to a Homestead Patent granted by the President
of the Philippines on July 27, 1948, under Act No. 141.
On February 26, 1982, the spouses Jose executed a special power of attorney
authorizing petitioner German Management Services to develop their property
covered by TCT No. 50023 into a residential subdivision. Consequently, petitioner
on February 9,1983 obtained Development Permit No. 00424 from the Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission for said development. Finding that part of the
property was occupied by private respondents and twenty other persons, petitioner
advised the occupants to vacate the premises but the latter refused. Nevertheless,
petitioner proceeded with the development of the subject property which included
the portions occupied and cultivated by private respondents.

Private respondents filed an action for forcible entry against petitioner before the
Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, alleging that they are mountainside
farmers of Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal and members of the
Concerned Citizens of Farmer's Association; that they have occupied and tilled
their farmholdings some twelve to fifteen years prior to the promulgation of P.D.
No. 27; that during the first week of August 1983, petitioner, under a permit from
the Office of the Provincial Governor of Rizal, was allowed to improve the
Barangay Road at Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal at its expense,
subject to the condition that it shag secure the needed right of way from the owners
of the lot to be affected; that on August 15, 1983 and thereafter, petitioner deprived
private respondents of their property without due process of law by: (1) forcibly
removing and destroying the barbed wire fence enclosing their farmholdings
without notice; (2) bulldozing the rice, corn fruit bearing trees and other crops of
private respondents by means of force, violence and intimidation, in violation of
P.D. 1038 and (3) trespassing, coercing and threatening to harass, remove and eject
private respondents from their respective farmholdings in violation of P.D. Nos.
316, 583, 815, and 1028. 1
On January 7,1985, the Municipal Trial Court dismissed private respondents'
complaint for forcible entry. 2 On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo,
Rizal, Branch LXXI sustained the dismissal by the Municipal Trial Court. 3
Private respondents then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. On
July 24,1986, said court gave due course to their petition and reversed the
decisions of the Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court. 4
The Appellate Court held that since private respondents were in actual possession
of the property at the time they were forcibly ejected by petitioner, private
respondents have a right to commence an action for forcible entry regardless of the
legality or illegality of possession. 5 Petitioner moved to reconsider but the same
was denied by the Appellate Court in its resolution dated September 26, 1986. 6
Hence, this recourse.
The issue in this case is whether or not the Court of Appeals denied due process to
petitioner when it reversed the decision of the court a quo without giving petitioner

the opportunity to file its answer and whether or not private respondents are
entitled to file a forcible entry case against petitioner. 7
We affirm. The Court of Appeals need not require petitioner to file an answer for
due process to exist. The comment filed by petitioner on February 26, 1986 has
sufficiently addressed the issues presented in the petition for review filed by
private respondents before the Court of Appeals. Having heard both parties, the
Appellate Court need not await or require any other additional pleading. Moreover,
the fact that petitioner was heard by the Court of Appeals on its motion for
reconsideration negates any violation of due process.
Notwithstanding petitioner's claim that it was duly authorized by the owners to
develop the subject property, private respondents, as actual possessors, can
commence a forcible entry case against petitioner because ownership is not in
issue. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never determines the actual
title to an estate. Title is not involved. 8
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that at the time petitioner entered the property,
private respondents were already in possession thereof . There is no evidence that
the spouses Jose were ever in possession of the subject property. On the contrary,
private respondents' peaceable possession was manifested by the fact that they
even planted rice, corn and fruit bearing trees twelve to fifteen years prior to
petitioner's act of destroying their crops.

Both the Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court have rationalized
petitioner's drastic action of bulldozing and destroying the crops of private
respondents on the basis of the doctrine of self-help enunciated in Article 429 of
the New Civil Code. 11 Such justification is unavailing because the doctrine of selfhelp can only be exercised at the time of actual or threatened dispossession which
is absent in the case at bar. When possession has already been lost, the owner must
resort to judicial process for the recovery of property. This is clear from Article
536 of the Civil Code which states, "(I)n no case may possession be acquired
through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto.
He who believes that he has an action or right to deprive another of the holding of
a thing, must invoke the aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse to
deliver the thing."
WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to DENY the instant petition. The decision of
the Court of Appeals dated July 24,1986 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., concurs in the result.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Although admittedly petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the

muniments of title it presented, such evidence does not responsively address the
issue of prior actual possession raised in a forcible entry case. It must be stated that
regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable
quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. 9 Thus,
a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against
the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has
in his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the
property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. 10

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-28716 November 18, 1970

FELIX CAISIP, IGNACIO ROJALES and FEDERICO
VILLADELREY, petitioners,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.

Godofredo F. Trajano and Rafael A. Francisco for petitioners.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General
Antonio G. Ibarra and Solicitor Conrado T. Limcaoco for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
This case is before Us upon petition of defendants Felix Caisip, Ignacio Rojales
and Federico Villadelrey, for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals which affirmed that of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, convicting
them of the crime of Grave Coercion, with which they are charged, and sentencing
each to four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor and to pay a fine of
P200.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, not to exceed onethird of the principal penalty, as well as one-third of the costs.
As set forth in the trial court's decision, the background of the present case is this:

The complainant Gloria Cabalag is the wife of Marcelino

Guevarra who cultivated a parcel of land known as Lot 105-A of
Hacienda Palico situated in sitio Bote-bote, barrio Tampisao,
Nasugbu, Batangas. The said parcel of land used to be tenanted by
the deceased father of the complainant. Hacienda Palico is owned
by Roxas y Cia. and administered by Antonio Chuidian. The
overseer of the said hacienda is Felix Caisip, one of the accused
herein. Even before the occurrence of the incident presently
involved, there had been a series of misunderstandings and
litigations involving the complainant and her husband, on one
hand, and the men of Hacienda Palico on the other.
It appears that on December 23, 1957, Marcelino Guevarra filed
an action with the Court of Agrarian Relations seeking recognition
as a lawful tenant of Roxas y Cia. over lot No. 105-A of Hacienda
Palico. In a decision dated February 22, 1958, the Court of
Agrarian Relations declared it has no jurisdiction over the case,
inasmuch as Guevarra is not a tenant on the said parcel of land. An
appeal was taken by Guevarra to the Supreme Court, but the
appeal was dismissed in a resolution dated April 10, 1958.
On May 17, 1958, Roxas y Cia. filed an action against Marcelino
Guevarra in the justice of the peace court of Nasugbu, Batangas,
for forcible entry, praying therein that Guevarra be ejected from
the premises of Lot No. 105-A. After due hearing, the said Court
in a decision dated May 2, 1959 ordered Guevarra to vacate the lot
and to pay damages and accrued rentals. A writ of execution was
issued by Justice of the Peace Rodolfo A. Castillo of Nasugbu,
which was served on Guevarra on June 6, 1959, and the return of
which was made by Deputy Sheriff Leonardo R. Aquino of this
Court on June 23, 1959 (Exhibit "10"). The writ recites among
other things that the possession of the land was delivered to the
Roxas y Cia. thru Felix Caisip, the overseer, and Guevarra was
given twenty days from June 6, 1959 within which to leave the
premises.

The record before Us does not explain why said decision was executed. According
to the complainant, her husband's counsel had appealed from said decision. The
justice of the peace who rendered it, Hon. Rodolfo Castillo, said that there really
had been an attempt to appeal, which was not given due course because the
reglementary period therefor had expired; that a motion to reconsider his order to
this effect was denied by him; and that a second motion for reconsideration was
"still pending consideration," and it was October 19, 1959 when such testimony
was given.
Continuing the narration of the antecedent facts, His Honor, the Trial Judge, added:
On June 15, 1959, some trouble occurred between the complainant
and Caisip regarding the cutting of sugar cane on Lot 105-A. The
following day June 16, 1959, the complainant allegedly again
entered the premises of Lot 105-A and refused to be driven out by
Felix Caisip. Due to the aforementioned incidents, Gloria Cabalag
was charged in the justice of the peace court of Nasugbu,
Batangas, with grave coercion for the incident of June 15, 1959,
docketed in the said court as Criminal Case No. 968 (Exhibit "3");
and with the crime of unjust vexation for the incident of June 16,
1959, docketed in the said court as Criminal Case No. 970. Both
cases, however, were filed only on June 25, 1959.
In other words, these criminal cases, Nos. 968 and 970, against Gloria Cabalag,
were filed eight (8) days after the incident involved in the case at bar. It is, also,
noteworthy that both cases were on motion of the prosecution, filed after a
reinvestigation thereof provisionally dismissed, on November 8, 1960, by the
Court of First Instance of Batangas, upon the ground "that the evidence of
record ... are insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt." The decision of said court, in the case at bar, goes on to say:
It further appears that due to the tenacious attitude of Gloria
Cabalag to remain in the premises, Caisip sought the help of the
chief of police of Nasugbu who advised him to see Deputy Sheriff
Aquino about the matter. The latter, however, informed Caisip that
he could not act on the request to eject Gloria Cabalag and to stop

her from what she was doing without a proper court order. Caisip
then consulted Antonio Chuidian, the hacienda administrator, who,
in turn, went to the chief of police and requested for the detail of
policemen in sitio Bote-bote. The chief of police, acting on said
request, assigned the accused Ignacio Rojales and Federico
Villadelrey, police sergeant and police corporal, respectively, of
the Nasugbu Police Force, to sitio Bote-bote. 1
On June 17, 1959, at about 5:00 p.m., Gloria Cabalag was seen weeding the
portion of Lot 105-A which was a ricefield. Appellant Caisip approached her and
bade her to leave, but she refused to do so, alleging that she and her husband had
the right to stay there and that the crops thereon belong to them. She having stuck
to this attitude, even when he threatened to call the police, Caisip went to his codefendants, Sgt. Rojales and Cpl. Villadelrey, both of the local police, who were
some distance away, and brought them with him. Rojales told Gloria, who was
then in a squatting position, to stop weeding. As Gloria insisted on her right to stay
in said lot, Rojales grabbed her right hand and, twisting the same, wrested
therefrom the trowel she was holding. Thereupon, Villadelrey held her left hand
and, together with Rojales, forcibly dragged her northward towards a forested
area, where there was a banana plantation as Caisip stood nearby, with a drawn
gun.
Inasmuch as Gloria shouted "Ina ko po! Ina ko po!" 2her neighbors, Librada
Dulutan, followed, soon later, by Francisca Andino, came and asked the policemen
why they were dragging her. The policemen having answered that they would take
Gloria to town which was on the west Francisca Andino pleaded that Gloria be
released, saying that, if their purpose was as stated by them, she (Gloria) would
willingly go with them. By this time, Gloria had already been dragged about eight
meters and her dress, as well as her blouse 3were torn. She then agreed to proceed
westward to the municipal building, and asked to be allowed to pass by her house,
within Lot 105-A, in order to breast-feed her nursing infant, but, the request was
turned down. As they passed, soon later, near the house of Zoilo Rivera, head of
the tenant organization to which she was affiliated, in the barrio of Camachilihan,
Gloria called out for him, whereupon, he went down the house and accompanied
them to the municipal building. Upon arrival thereat, Rojales and Villadelrey
turned her over to the policeman on duty, and then departed. After being

interrogated by the chief of police, Gloria was, upon representations made by Zoilo
Rivera, released and allowed to go home.
The foregoing is the prosecution's version. That of the defense is to the effect that,
upon being asked by the policemen to stop weeding and leave the premises, Gloria,
not only refused to do so, but, also, insulted them, as well as Caisip. According to
the defense, she was arrested because of the crime of slander then committed by
her. Appellants Rojales and Villadelrey, moreover, testified that, as they were
heading towards the barrio of Camachilihan, Gloria proceeded to tear her clothes.
His Honor, the Trial Judge, accepted, however, the version of the prosecution and
found that of the defense unworthy of credence. The findings of fact of the Court
of Appeals, which fully concurred in this view, are "final," and our authority to
review on certiorari its appealed decision is limited to questions purely of
law. 4Appellants maintain that the Court of Appeals has erred: (1) in not finding
their acts "justified under Article 429 of the New Civil Code"; (2) in holding that
the 20-day period of grace given to Marcelino Guevarra and his wife, Gloria
Cabalag, by the sheriff, to vacate Lot 105-A, was valid and lawful; (3) in finding
that the elements of the crime of grave coercion are present in the case at bar; and
(4) in finding appellants guilty as charged. This pretense is clearly untenable.
Art. 429 of our Civil Code, reading:
The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude
any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this
purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to
repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion
or usurpation of his property.
upon which appellants rely is obviously inapplicable to the case at
bar, for, having been given 20 days from June 6, 1959, within
which to vacate Lot 105-A, complainant did not, on June 17, 1959
or within said period invade or usurp said lot. She had
merely remained in possession thereof, even though the hacienda
owner may have become its co-possessor. Appellants did not
"repel orprevent in actual or threatened ... physical invasion or

usurpation." They expelled Gloria from a property of which she

and her husband were in possession even before the action for
forcible entry was filed against them on May 17, 1958, despite the
fact that the Sheriff had explicitly authorized them to stay in said
property up to June 26, 1959, and had expressed the view that he
could not oust them therefrom on June 17, 1959, without a judicial
order therefor.
It is urged, that, by weeding and refusing to leave Lot 105-A, Gloria had
committed a crime in the presence of the policemen, despite the aforementioned
20-day period, which, appellants claim, the sheriff had no authority to grant. This
contention is manifestly untenable, because: (1) said period was granted in the
presence of the hacienda owner's representative, appellant Caisip, who, by not
objecting thereto, had impliedly consented to or ratified the act performed by the
sheriff; (2) Gloria and her husband were thereby allowed to remain, and had, in
fact, remained, in possession of the premises, perhaps together with the owner of
the hacienda or his representative, Caisip; (3) the act of removing weeds from the
ricefield was beneficial to its owner and to whomsoever the crops belonged, and,
even if they had not authorized it, does not constitute a criminal offense; and (4)
although Gloria and her husband had been sentenced to vacate the land, the
judgment against them did not necessarily imply that they, as the parties who had
tilled it and planted thereon, had no rights, of any kind whatsoever, in or to the
standing crops, inasmuch as "necessary expenses shall be refunded to every
possessor,"5 and the cost of cultivation, production and upkeep has been held to
partake of the nature of necessary expenses. 6
It is, accordingly, clear that appellants herein had, by means of violence, and
without legal authority therefor, prevented the complainant from "doing something
not prohibited by law," (weeding and being in Lot 105-A), and compelled her "to
do something against" her will (stopping the weeding and leaving said lot),
"whether it be right or wrong," thereby taking the law into their hands, in violation
of Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code. 7
Appellant Caisip argues that, not having used violence against the complaining
witness, he should be acquitted of the charge. In this connection, His Honor, the
Trial Judge, correctly observed:

... While it is true that the accused Caisip did not lay hands on the
complainant, unlike the accused Rojales and Villadelrey who were
the ones who used force against Gloria, and while the Court is also
inclined to discredit the claim of the complainant that Felix Caisip
drew a gun during the incident, it sufficiently appears from the
record that the motivation and inducement for the coercion
perpetrated on the complainant came from the accused Caisip. It
was his undisguised and particular purpose to prevent Gloria from
entering the land and working on the same. He was the one who
first approached Gloria with this objective in mind, and tried to
prevent her from weeding the land. He had tried to stop Gloria
from doing the same act even the day previous to the present
incident. It was Caisip who fetched the policemen in order to
accomplish his purpose of preventing Gloria from weeding the
land and making her leave the premises. The policemen obeyed
his bidding, and even when the said policemen were already overasserting their authority as peace officers, Caisip simply stood by
without attempting to stop their abuses. He could be hardly said to
have disapproved an act which he himself induced and initiated. 8
In other words, there was community of purpose between the policemen and
Caisip, so that the latter is guilty of grave coercion, as a co-conspirator, apart from
being a principal by induction. 9
In the commission of the offense, the aggravating circumstances of abuse of
superior strength 10 and disregard of the respect due the offended party, by reason
of her sex, 11 were present, insofar as the three appellants herein are concerned. As
regards appellants Rojales and Villadelrey, there was the additional aggravating
circumstance of having taken advantage of their positions as members of the local
police force. Hence, the penalty of imprisonment meted out to appellants herein,
which is the minimum of the maximum prescribed in said Art. 286, 12 and the fine
imposed upon them, are in accordance with law.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against
the defendants-appellants. It is so ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and Barredo,

JJ., concur.
Dizon, J., is on leave.
Makasiar and Villamor, JJ., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 116100

February 9, 1996

SPOUSES CRISTINO and BRIGIDA CUSTODIO and SPOUSES LITO and

MARIA CRISTINA SANTOS,petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF PACIFICO C. MABASA and
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA, BRANCH
181, respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the decision of respondent Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 29115, promulgated on November 10, 1993, which
affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court, as well as its resolution
dated July 8, 1994 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 1
On August 26, 1982, Civil Case No. 47466 for the grant of an easement of right of
way was filed by Pacifico Mabasa against Cristino Custodio, Brigida R. Custodio,
Rosalina R. Morato, Lito Santos and Maria Cristina C. Santos before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig and assigned to Branch 22 thereof. 2

The generative facts of the case, as synthesized by the trial court and adopted by
the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
Perusing the record, this Court finds that the original plaintiff Pacifico
Mabasa died during the pendency of this case and was substituted by
Ofelia Mabasa, his surviving spouse [and children].
The plaintiff owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment erected
thereon situated at Interior P. Burgos St., Palingon, Tipas, Tagig, Metro
Manila. The plaintiff was able to acquire said property through a contract
of sale with spouses Mamerto Rayos and Teodora Quintero as vendors last
September 1981. Said property may be described to be surrounded by
other immovables pertaining to defendants herein. Taking P. Burgos Street
as the point of reference, on the left side, going to plaintiff's property, the
row of houses will be as follows: That of defendants Cristino and Brigido
Custodio, then that of Lito and Maria Cristina Santos and then that of
Ofelia Mabasa. On the right side (is) that of defendant Rosalina Morato
and then a Septic Tank (Exhibit "D"). As an access to P. Burgos Street
from plaintiff's property, there are two possible passageways. The first
passageway is approximately one meter wide and is about 20 meters
distan(t) from Mabasa's residence to P. Burgos Street. Such path is passing
in between the previously mentioned row of houses. The second
passageway is about 3 meters in width and length from plaintiff Mabasa's
residence to P. Burgos Street; it is about 26 meters. In passing thru said
passageway, a less than a meter wide path through the septic tank and with
5-6 meters in length, has to be traversed.
When said property was purchased by Mabasa, there were tenants
occupying the remises and who were acknowledged by plaintiff Mabasa as
tenants. However, sometime in February, 1982, one of said tenants
vacated the apartment and when plaintiff Mabasa went to see the
premises, he saw that there had been built an adobe fence in the first
passageway making it narrower in width. Said adobe fence was first
constructed by defendants Santoses along their property which is also
along the first passageway. Defendant Morato constructed her adobe fence
and even extended said fence in such a way that the entire passageway was

enclosed. (Exhibit "1-Santoses and Custodios, Exh. "D" for plaintiff, Exhs.
"1-C", "1-D" and "1-E") And it was then that the remaining tenants of said
apartment vacated the area. Defendant Ma. Cristina Santos testified that
she constructed said fence because there was an incident when her
daughter was dragged by a bicycle pedalled by a son of one of the tenants
in said apartment along the first passageway. She also mentioned some
other inconveniences of having (at) the front of her house a pathway such
as when some of the tenants were drunk and would bang their doors and
windows. Some of their footwear were even lost. . . . 3 (Emphasis in
original text; corrections in parentheses supplied)
On February 27, 1990, a decision was rendered by the trial court, with this
dispositive part:
Accordingly, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Ordering defendants Custodios and Santoses to give plaintiff permanent
access ingress and egress, to the public street;
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendants Custodios and Santoses the sum
of Eight Thousand Pesos (P8,000) as indemnity for the permanent use of
the passageway.
The parties to shoulder their respective litigation expenses. 4
Not satisfied therewith, therein plaintiff represented by his heirs, herein private
respondents, went to the Court of Appeals raising the sole issue of whether or not
the lower court erred in not awarding damages in their favor. On November 10,
1993, as earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming the
judgment of the trial court with modification, the decretal portion of which
disposes as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the lower court is hereby
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION only insofar as the herein grant of
damages to plaintiffs-appellants. The Court hereby orders defendantsappellees to pay plaintiffs-appellants the sum of Sixty Five Thousand

(P65,000) Pesos as Actual Damages, Thirty Thousand (P30,000) Pesos as

Moral Damages, and Ten Thousand (P10,000) Pesos as Exemplary
Damages. The rest of the appealed decision is affirmed to all respects. 5
On July 8, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.6 Petitioners then took the present recourse to us, raising two
issues, namely, whether or not the grant of right of way to herein private
respondents is proper, and whether or not the award of damages is in order.
With respect to the first issue, herein petitioners are already barred from raising the
same. Petitioners did not appeal from the decision of the court a quo granting
private respondents the right of way, hence they are presumed to be satisfied with
the adjudication therein. With the finality of the judgment of the trial court as to
petitioners, the issue of propriety of the grant of right of way has already been laid
to rest.
For failure to appeal the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals,
petitioners cannot obtain any affirmative relief other than those granted in the
decision of the trial court. That decision of the court below has become final as
against them and can no longer be reviewed, much less reversed, by this Court.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that whenever an appeal is taken in a civil case, an
appellee who has not himself appealed may not obtain from the appellate court any
affirmative relief other than what was granted in the decision of the lower court.
The appellee can only advance any argument that he may deem necessary to defeat
the appellant's claim or to uphold the decision that is being disputed, and he can
assign errors in his brief if such is required to strengthen the views expressed by
the court a quo. These assigned errors, in turn, may be considered by the appellate
court solely to maintain the appealed decision on other grounds, but not for the
purpose of reversing or modifying the judgment in the appellee's favor and giving
him other affirmative reliefs.7
However, with respect to the second issue, we agree with petitioners that the Court
of Appeals erred in awarding damages in favor of private respondents. The award
of damages has no substantial legal basis. A reading of the decision of the Court of
Appeals will show that the award of damages was based solely on the fact that the
original plaintiff, Pacifico Mabasa, incurred losses in the form of unrealized rentals

when the tenants vacated the leased premises by reason of the closure of the
passageway.
However, the mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right
to recover damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a
right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting
to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does
not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy
allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong. 8
There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal
invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the
injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage
suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the
loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are
often called damnum absque injuria.9
In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he
complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty
which the defendant owed to the plaintiff a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff
and legal responsibility by the person causing it. 10 The underlying basis for the
award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in
contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be the breach of some duty and the
imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded; it is not
sufficient to state that there should be tort liability merely because the plaintiff
suffered some pain and suffering.11
Many accidents occur and many injuries are inflicted by acts or omissions which
cause damage or loss to another but which violate no legal duty to such other
person, and consequently create no cause of action in his favor. In such cases, the
consequences must be borne by the injured person alone. The law affords no
remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury
or wrong.12
In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage,
that act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et

injuria.13 If, as may happen in many cases, a person sustains actual damage, that is,
harm or loss to his person or property, without sustaining any legal injury, that is,
an act or omission which the law does not deem an injury, the damage is regarded
as damnum absque injuria.14
In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary
to the claim of private respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated
the principle of abuse of right. In order that the principle of abuse of right provided
in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be applied, it is essential that the following
requisites concur: (1) The defendant should have acted in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy; (2) The acts should be willful; and (3)
There was damage or injury to the plaintiff.15
The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of
their right as owners, hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without
other limitations than those established by law.16 It is within the right of petitioners,
as owners, to enclose and fence their property. Article 430 of the Civil Code
provides that "(e)very owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means
of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment to
servitudes constituted thereon."
At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any
servitudes. There was no easement of way existing in favor of private respondents,
either by law or by contract. The fact that private respondents had no existing right
over the said passageway is confirmed by the very decision of the trial court
granting a compulsory right of way in their favor after payment of just
compensation. It was only that decision which gave private respondents the right
to use the said passageway after payment of the compensation and imposed a
corresponding duty on petitioners not to interfere in the exercise of said right.
Hence, prior to said decision, petitioners had an absolute right over their property
and their act of fencing and enclosing the same was an act which they may
lawfully perform in the employment and exercise of said right. To repeat, whatever
injury or damage may have been sustained by private respondents by reason of the
rightful use of the said land by petitioners is damnum absque injuria.17

A person has a right to the natural use and enjoyment of his own property,
according to his pleasure, for all the purposes to which such property is usually
applied. As a general rule, therefore, there is no cause of action for acts done by
one person upon his own property in a lawful and proper manner, although such
acts incidentally cause damage or an unavoidable loss to another, as such damage
or loss is damnum absque injuria. 18 When the owner of property makes use
thereof in the general and ordinary manner in which the property is used, such as
fencing or enclosing the same as in this case, nobody can complain of having been
injured, because the incovenience arising from said use can be considered as a
mere consequence of community life. 19
The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an
action will lie, 20 although the act may result in damage to another, for no legal
right has been invaded. 21 One may use any lawful means to accomplish a lawful
purpose and though the means adopted may cause damage to another, no cause of
action arises in the latter's favor. An injury or damage occasioned thereby
is damnum absque injuria. The courts can give no redress for hardship to an
individual resulting from action reasonably calculated to achieve a lawful means. 22
WHEREFORE, under the compulsion of the foregoing premises, the appealed
decision of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and the judgment of the trial court is correspondingly REINSTATED.
Romero and Puno, JJ., concur.
Mendoza, J., took no part.

plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their
laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other
improvements to destruction.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990
NATIVIDAD V. ANDAMO and EMMANUEL R. ANDAMO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (First Civil Cases Division) and
MISSIONARIES OF OUR LADY OF LA SALETTE, INC., respondents.
Lope E. Adriano for petitioners.
Padilla Law Office for private respondent.
FERNAN, C.J.:
The pivotal issue in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is
whether a corporation, which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water
conductors and contrivances within its land, thereby causing inundation and
damage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly liable for damages under Articles
2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts such that the resulting civil case
can proceed independently of the criminal case.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of
land situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private
respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation.
Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including
an artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded
petitioners' land, caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and

In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action, docketed as Criminal Case

No. TG-907-82, before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 4 (Tagaytay
City), against Efren Musngi, Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin, officers and
directors of herein respondent corporation, for destruction by means of inundation
under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code.
Subsequently, on February 22, 1983, petitioners filed another action against
respondent corporation, this time a civil case, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-748,
for damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction before
the same court. 1
On March 11, 1983, respondent corporation filed its answer to the complaint and
opposition to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Hearings were
conducted including ocular inspections on the land. However, on April 26, 1984,
the trial court, acting on respondent corporation's motion to dismiss or suspend the
civil action, issued an order suspending further hearings in Civil Case No, TG-748
until after judgment in the related Criminal Case No. TG-907-82.
Resolving respondent corporation's motion to dismiss filed on June 22, 1984, the
trial court issued on August 27, 1984 the disputed order dismissing Civil Case No.
TG-748 for lack of jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was instituted ahead of
the civil case was still unresolved. Said order was anchored on the provision of
Section 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules of Court which provides that "criminal and civil
actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the
criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final
judgment has been rendered in the criminal action." 2
Petitioners appealed from that order to the Intermediate Appellate Court. 3
On February 17, 1986, respondent Appellate Court, First Civil Cases Division,
promulgated a decision 4 affirming the questioned order of the trial court. 5 A

motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied by the Appellate Court
in its resolution dated May 19, 1986. 6
Directly at issue is the propriety of the dismissal of Civil Case No. TG-748 in
accordance with Section 3 (a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners
contend that the trial court and the Appellate Court erred in dismissing Civil Case
No. TG-748 since it is predicated on a quasi-delict. Petitioners have raised a valid
point.

likewise connected by defendant to the cemented mouth of a big

canal, also constructed by defendant, which runs northward
towards a big hole or opening which was also built by defendant
thru the lower portion of its concrete hollow-blocks fence which
separates the land of plaintiffs from that of defendant (and which
serves as the exit-point of the floodwater coming from the land of
defendant, and at the same time, the entrance-point of the same
floodwater to the land of plaintiffs, year after year, during rainy or
stormy seasons.

It is axiomatic that the nature of an action filed in court is determined by the facts
alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of action. 7 The purpose of an
action or suit and the law to govern it, including the period of prescription, is to be
determined not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his argument or
brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief. 8 The
nature of an action is not necessarily determined or controlled by its title or
heading but the body of the pleading or complaint itself. To avoid possible denial
of substantial justice due to legal technicalities, pleadings as well as remedial laws
should be liberally construed so that the litigants may have ample opportunity to
prove their respective claims. 9

5) That moreover, on the middle-left portion of its land just beside

the land of plaintiffs, defendant also constructed an artificial lake,
the base of which is soil, which utilizes the water being channeled
thereto from its water system thru inter-connected galvanized iron
pipes (No. 2) and complimented by rain water during rainy or
stormy seasons, so much so that the water below it seeps into, and
the excess water above it inundates, portions of the adjoining land
of plaintiffs.

Quoted hereunder are the pertinent portions of petitioners' complaint in Civil Case
No. TG-748:

6) That as a result of the inundation brought about by defendant's

aforementioned water conductors, contrivances and manipulators,
a young man was drowned to death, while herein plaintiffs
suffered and will continue to suffer, as follows:

4) That within defendant's land, likewise located at Biga (Biluso),

Silang, Cavite, adjacent on the right side of the aforesaid land of
plaintiffs, defendant constructed waterpaths starting from the
middle-right portion thereof leading to a big hole or opening, also
constructed by defendant, thru the lower portion of its concrete
hollow-blocks fence situated on the right side of its cemented gate
fronting the provincial highway, and connected by defendant to a
man height inter-connected cement culverts which were also
constructed and lain by defendant cross-wise beneath the tip of the
said cemented gate, the left-end of the said inter-connected
culverts again connected by defendant to a big hole or opening
thru the lower portion of the same concrete hollowblocks fence on
the left side of the said cemented gate, which hole or opening is

a) Portions of the land of plaintiffs were eroded

and converted to deep, wide and long canals, such
that the same can no longer be planted to any crop
or plant.
b) Costly fences constructed by plaintiffs were, on
several occasions, washed away.
c) During rainy and stormy seasons the lives of
plaintiffs and their laborers are always in danger.

d) Plants and other improvements on other

portions of the land of plaintiffs are exposed to
destruction. ... 10
A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is
one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the
elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff,
(b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he
must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. 11
Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by
respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There
is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these
waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven
constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of damages.
In the case of Samson vs. Dionisio, 12 the Court applied Article 1902, now Article
2176 of the Civil Code and held that "any person who without due authority
constructs a bank or dike, stopping the flow or communication between a creek or
a lake and a river, thereby causing loss and damages to a third party who, like the
rest of the residents, is entitled to the use and enjoyment of the stream or lake, shall
be liable to the payment of an indemnity for loss and damages to the injured party.
While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and
the property subject of the instant case is privately owned, the fact remains that
petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and will
continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances built by
respondent corporation. Indeed, the recitals of the complaint, the alleged presence
of damage to the petitioners, the act or omission of respondent corporation
supposedly constituting fault or negligence, and the causal connection between the
act and the damage, with no pre-existing contractual obligation between the parties
make a clear case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana.
It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article
431 of the Civil Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof

in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT
ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and
reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable
manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we
recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such structures must
be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be
dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected
forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner
or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage
suffered.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage
caused by his act or omission constituting fault or negligence, thus:
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.
Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only acts "not
punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and
voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the
offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found
guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the
tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover damages on both scores,
and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. 13
The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which
states:
Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the
preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the

plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or

omission of the defendant.
According to the Report of the Code Commission "the foregoing provision though
at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact
nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal
law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, which is a "culpa
aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation
and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between
criminal negligence and "culpa extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been
sustained by decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain ... 14

Court of Cavite, Branch 18 (Tagaytay City) dated August 17, 1984 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial court is ordered to reinstate Civil Case No.
TG-748 entitled "Natividad V. Andamo and Emmanuel R. Andamo vs.
Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette Inc." and to proceed with the hearing of the
case with dispatch. This decision is immediately executory. Costs against
respondent corporation.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr. and Bidin, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.

In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, 15 this Court held that a quasi-delict or
culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a
substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent
from a delict or crime a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from
a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The
same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime
under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extracontractual under the Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the
criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of course, in the event
of an acquittal where the court has declared that the fact from which the civil
action arose did not exist, in which case the extinction of the criminal liability
would carry with it the extinction of the civil liability.
In Azucena vs. Potenciano, 16 the Court declared that in quasi-delicts, "(t)he civil
action is entirely independent of the criminal case according to Articles 33 and
2177 of the Civil Code. There can be no logical conclusion than this, for to
subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said articles to the result of the
criminal prosecution whether it be conviction or acquittal would render
meaningless the independent character of the civil action and the clear injunction
in Article 31, that his action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter."
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated February 17, 1986 of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court affirming the order of dismissal of the Regional Trial

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 125018
April 6, 2000
REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CRISPIN E. LAT, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC. (REMMAN), and CRISPIN E. LAT are
adjoining landowners in Barangay Bugtong Na Pulo, Lipa City. The land of Lat
containing an area of 1.8 hectares is agricultural and planted mostly with fruit trees
while REMMAN occupies a land area of fifteen (15) hectares six (6) hectares of
which are devoted to its piggery business. REMMAN's land is one and a half (1
1/2) meters higher in elevation than that of respondent Lat.
Sometime in July 1984 Lat noticed that REMMAN's waste disposal lagoon was
already overflowing and inundating one-fourth (1/4) of Lat's plantation. He made
several representations with REMMAN but they fell on deaf ears. On 14 March
1985, after almost one (1) hectare of Lat's plantation was already inundated with

water containing pig manure, as a result of which the trees growing on the flooded
portion started to wither and die, Lat filed a complaint for damages with
preliminary mandatory injunction against REMMAN. Lat alleged that the acidity
of the soil in his plantation increased because of the overflow of the water heavy
with pig manure from REMMAN's piggery farm.

REMMAN denied all the allegations of Lat and raised as an affirmative defense
that measures such as the construction of additional lagoons were already adopted
to contain the waste water coming from its piggery to prevent any damage to the
adjoining estates.
After conducting an ocular inspection and evaluating the evidence of both parties
the Regional Trial Court found that indeed REMMANs waste disposal lagoon
overflowed with the contaminated water flooding one (1) hectare of Lat's
plantation. The waste water was ankle-deep and caused death and destruction to
one (1) jackfruit tree, fifteen (15) coconut trees, one hundred twenty-two (122)
coffee trees, and an unspecified number of mango trees, bananas and vegetables.
As a consequence, the trial court ordered REMMAN to indemnify Lat
P186,975.00 for lost profits for three (3) crop years and P30,000.00 as attorney's
fees.1
The decision of the court a quo was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals.

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari REMMAN prays that we pass upon the
findings of the trial court as well as of the appellate court. REMMAN insists that
factual findings of lower courts may be passed upon, reviewed and reversed: (a)
when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion; (f) when the conclusions of the
Court of Appeals are not supported by the evidence on record; (g) when facts of
substance were overlooked which, if correctly considered, might have changed the

outcome of the case; and, (h) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are not in
accord with what reasonable men would readily accept are the correct inferences
from the evidence extant in the records.3
Indeed, in the abovementioned instances, the factual milieu of a particular case
may be passed upon, reversed or modified by this Court. But examination of the
record reveals that all the above instances are unavailing. From this point of view
alone the instant petition is dismissible. Nevertheless, we shall discuss them
hereunder to dispose finally of the contentions of REMMAN.
First, REMMAN argues that its liability for the damages suffered by Lat was not
clearly established.
We disagree. During the ocular inspection conducted by the lower court where
representatives of both parties were present, it was established that the waste water
containing pig manure was continuously flowing from REMMAN's piggery farm
to Lat's plantation. The water was ankle-deep and flooded one (1) hectare of Lat's
plantation. The overflow of the "acidic, malodorous and polluted water" continued
from June 1984 to March 1985 thus destroying one (1) jackfruit tree, fifteen (15)
coconut trees, one hundred an twenty-two (122) coffee trees, and an unspecified
number of mango trees, bananas and vegetables. 4
In addition, the appellate court found that there was indeed negligence on the part
of REMMAN which directly caused the damage to the plantation of Lat. Thus
. . . Negligence was clearly established. It is uncontroverted that the land
of appellee was flooded on account of the overflow of acidic, malodorous
and polluted water coming from the adjacent piggery farm of appellant
sometime in May 1984. This resulted in the impairment of the productivity
of appellee's land as well as the eventual destruction and death of several
fruit trees, such as coconuts, coffee, jackfruits, bananas and other
plants . . . . Appellant cannot avoid liability because their negligence was
the proximate cause of the damage. Appellee's property was practically
made a catch-basin of polluted water and other noxious substances
emptying from appellant's piggery which could have been prevented had it
not been for the negligence of appellant arising from its: (a) failure to

monitor the increases in the level of water in the lagoons before, during
and after the heavy downpours which occurred during the rainy months of
1984; (b) failure to augment the existing lagoons prior to the incident,
notwithstanding the fact that at the time of the flooding, the piggery had
grown to a capacity of 11,000 heads, and considering that it was
reasonably forseeable that the existing waste disposal facilities were no
longer adequate to accomodate the increasing volume of waste matters in
such a big farm; and more importantly, (c) the repeated failure to comply
with their promise to appellee.5
Second, REMMAN argues that the trial court as well as the Court of Appeals
should not have rejected its request for the production of Lat's income tax returns.
According to REMMAN had Lat's income tax returns been produced, the issue of
the alleged damages suffered by Lat would have been settled.
This argument is moot, if not trite. For this matter has been laid to rest when we
affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision in an earlier case involving the same
parties.6 In sustaining the trial court's quashal of the subpoenaduces
tecum previously issued compelling Lat to produce his income tax returns for the
years 1982-1986, the appellate court explained that the production of the income
tax returns would not necessarily serve to prove the special and affirmative
defenses set up by REMMAN nor rebut Lat's testimony regarding the losses he
sustained due to the piggery. The tax returns per se could not reflect the total
amount of damages suffered by Lat, as income losses from a portion of the
plantation could be offset by any profit derived from the rest of the plantation or
from other sources of income. Conversely, losses incurred from other sources of
income would be totally unrelated to the income from the particular portion of the
plantation flooded with waste matter coming from REMMAN's piggery.7
Third, REMMAN contends that the damages allegedly sustained by Lat have not
been satisfactorily established.1wphi1
We a not convinced. The factual findings of the court a quo rightly support its
conclusions on this respect

Coming now to the issue of damages, We find appellant's allegations not

well-taken. Appellant contends that actual and compensatory damages
require evidentiary proof, and there being no evidence presented as to the
necessity of the award for damages, it was erroneous for the lower court to
have made such award. It must be remembered that after the ocular
inspection, the court a quo rendered an inventory of dead and rotten trees
and plants found in appellee's property. Appellee also testified on the
approximate annual harvest and fair market value thereof. Significantly, no
opposition or controverting evidence was presented by appellant on the
matter. Hence, appellant is bound thereby and cannot now be heard to
complain. As correctly held by the court a quo:
An ocular inspection has been conducted by the trial court. The
inventory of the trees damaged and the itemized valuation placed
therein by private respondent after the ocular inspection which is
not rebutted by the petitioner, is the more accurate indicator of the
said amount prayed for as damages. If the valuation is indeed
unreasonable, petitioner should present controverting evidence of
the fair market value of the crops involved. The trial court held
that the private respondent himself had been subjected to extensive
cross and re-cross examination by the counsel for the petitioner on
the amount of damages.8
Finally, REMMAN complains that the damages, if any, were due to a
fortuitous event.
Again, we cannot agree with petitioner. We defer instead to the findings opinions
expressed by the lower courts
Even assuming that the heavy rains constituted an act of God, by reason of
their negligence, the fortuitous event became humanized, rendering
appellants liable for the ensuing damages. In National Power Corporation
v. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 649 (1993), the Supreme Court held:
Accordingly, petitioners cannot be heard to invoke the act of God
or force majeure to escape liability for the loss or damage

sustained by private respondents since they, the petitioners, were

guilty of negligence. This event then was not occasioned
exclusively by an act of God or force majeure; a human factor
negligence or imprudence had intervened. The effect then of
the force majeure in question may be deemed to have, even if only
partly, resulted from the participation of man. Thus, the whole
occurrence was thereby humanized, as it were, and removed from
the rules applicable to acts of God.
As regards the alleged natural easement imposed upon the property of
appellee, resort to pertinent provisions of applicable law is imperative.
Under the Civil Code, it is provided:
Art. 637. Lower estates are obliged to receive the waters which
naturally and without the intervention of man descend from the
higher estates, as well as the stones or earth which they carry with
them.
The owner of the lower estate cannot construct works which will
impede this easement; neither can the owner of the higher estate
make works which will increase the burden.
A similar provision is found in the Water Code of the Philippines (P.D. No.
1067), which provides:
Art. 50. Lower estates are obliged to receive the water which
naturally and without the intervention of man flow from the higher
estates, as well as the stone or earth which they carry with them.
The owner of the lower estate cannot construct works which will
impede this natural flow, unless he provides an alternative method
of drainage; neither can the owner of the higher estate make works
which will increase this natural flow.
As worded, the two (2) aforecited provisions impose a natural easement
upon the lower estate to receive the waters which naturally and without the

intervention of man descend from higher states. However, where the

waters which flow from a higher state are those which are artificially
collected in man-made lagoons, any damage occasioned thereby entitles
the owner of the lower or servient estate to compensation. 9
On the basis of the foregoing discussion, it is crystal clear that REMMAN is
directly accountable to Lat for the damages sustained by him. The negligence of
REMMAN in maintaining the level of waste water in its lagoons has been
satisfactorily established. The extent of damages suffered by Lat remains
unrebutted; in fact, has been proved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The 19 October 1995 Decision of the
Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court-Br. 16, Lipa City,
holding petitioner Remman Enterprises, Inc. (REMMAN) liable to private
respondent Crispin E. Lat for damages and to indemnify the latter P186,975.00 for
lost profits for three (3) crop years and P30,000.00 as attorneys fees, is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

BENJAMIN and EDUARDO, all surnamed DE LA ROSA, represented by

their father, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-43938 April 15, 1988
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF FOREST
DEVELOPMENT), petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) and JOSE Y. DE LA
ROSA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-44081 April 15, 1988
BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORIA,
BENJAMIN and EDUARDO, all surnamed DE LA ROSA, represented by
their father JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-44092 April 15, 1988
ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORlA,

The Regalian doctrine reserves to the State all natural wealth that may be found in
the bowels of the earth even if the land where the discovery is made be private. 1 In
the cases at bar, which have been consolidated because they pose a common issue,
this doctrine was not correctly applied.
These cases arose from the application for registration of a parcel of land filed on
February 11, 1965, by Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf and on behalf of his three
children, Victoria, Benjamin and Eduardo. The land, situated in Tuding, Itogon,
Benguet Province, was divided into 9 lots and covered by plan Psu-225009.
According to the application, Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose de la Rosa and Lots 6-9 to
his children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto, respectively, in 1964. 2
The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots
1-5, Atok Big Wedge Corporation, as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9,
and by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Bureau of Forestry
Development, as to lots 1-9. 3
In support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they had
acquired the subject land by virtue of prescription Balbalio claimed to have
received Lots 1-5 from her father shortly after the Liberation. She testified she was
born in the land, which was possessed by her parents under claim of
ownership. 4 Alberto said he received Lots 6-9 in 1961 from his mother, Bella
Alberto, who declared that the land was planted by Jaime and his predecessors-ininterest to bananas, avocado, nangka and camote, and was enclosed with a barbedwire fence. She was corroborated by Felix Marcos, 67 years old at the time, who
recalled the earlier possession of the land by Alberto's father. 5 Balbalio presented
her tax declaration in 1956 and the realty tax receipts from that year to
1964, 6 Alberto his tax declaration in 1961 and the realty tax receipts from that
year to 1964. 7

Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5
was sold to it on September 22, 1934, by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly,
who located the claim in September 1909 and recorded it on October 14, 1909.
From the date of its purchase, Benguet had been in actual, continuous and
exclusive possession of the land in concept of owner, as evidenced by its
construction of adits, its affidavits of annual assessment, its geological mappings,
geological samplings and trench side cuts, and its payment of taxes on the land. 8
For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were
covered by the Emma and Fredia mineral claims located by Harrison and Reynolds
on December 25, 1930, and recorded on January 2, 1931, in the office of the
mining recorder of Baguio. These claims were purchased from these locators on
November 2, 1931, by Atok, which has since then been in open, continuous and
exclusive possession of the said lots as evidenced by its annual assessment work
on the claims, such as the boring of tunnels, and its payment of annual taxes
thereon. 9
The location of the mineral claims was made in accordance with Section 21 of the
Philippine Bill of 1902 which provided that:
SEC. 21. All valuable mineral deposits in public lands in the
philippine Islands both surveyed and unsurveyed are hereby
declared to be free and open to exploration, occupation and
purchase and the land in which they are found to occupation and
purchase by the citizens of the United States, or of said islands.
The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection, arguing that the
land sought to be registered was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve
under Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16, 1929. Moreover, by reason of its
nature, it was not subject to alienation under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973. 10
The trial court * denied the application, holding that the applicants had failed to
prove their claim of possession and ownership of the land sought to be
registered. 11 The applicants appealed to the respondent court, * which reversed the
trial court and recognized the claims of the applicant, but subject to the rights of
Benguet and Atok respecting their mining claims. 12 In other words, the Court of

Appeals affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the
same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their
mining claims.
Both Benguet and Atok have appealed to this Court, invoking their superior right
of ownership. The Republic has filed its own petition for review and reiterates its
argument that neither the private respondents nor the two mining companies have
any valid claim to the land because it is not alienable and registerable.
It is true that the subject property was considered forest land and included in the
Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, but this did not impair the rights already vested
in Benguet and Atok at that time. The Court of Appeals correctly declared that:
There is no question that the 9 lots applied for are within the June
Bug mineral claims of Benguet and the "Fredia and Emma"
mineral claims of Atok. The June Bug mineral claim of plaintiff
Benguet was one of the 16 mining claims of James E. Kelly,
American and mining locator. He filed his declaration of the
location of the June Bug mineral and the same was recorded in the
Mining Recorder's Office on October 14, 1909. All of the Kelly
claims ha subsequently been acquired by Benguet Consolidated,
Inc. Benguet's evidence is that it had made improvements on the
June Bug mineral claim consisting of mine tunnels prior to 1935.
It had submitted the required affidavit of annual assessment. After
World War II, Benguet introduced improvements on mineral claim
June Bug, and also conducted geological mappings, geological
sampling and trench side cuts. In 1948, Benguet redeclared the
"June Bug" for taxation and had religiously paid the taxes.
The Emma and Fredia claims were two of the several claims of
Harrison registered in 1931, and which Atok representatives
acquired. Portions of Lots 1 to 5 and all of Lots 6 to 9 are within
the Emma and Fredia mineral claims of Atok Big Wedge Mining
Company.

The June Bug mineral claim of Benguet and the Fredia and Emma
mineral claims of Atok having been perfected prior to the approval
of the Constitution of the Philippines of 1935, they were removed
from the public domain and had become private properties of
Benguet and Atok.
It is not disputed that the location of the mining
claim under consideration was perfected prior to
November 15, 1935, when the Government of the
Commonwealth was inaugurated; and according
to the laws existing at that time, as construed and
applied by this court in McDaniel v. Apacible and
Cuisia (42 Phil. 749), a valid location of a mining
claim segregated the area from the public domain.
Said the court in that case: The moment the
locator discovered a valuable mineral deposit on
the lands located, and perfected his location in
accordance with law, the power of the United
States Government to deprive him of the
exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment of
the located claim was gone, the lands had become
mineral lands and they were exempted from lands
that could be granted to any other person. The
reservations of public lands cannot be made so as
to include prior mineral perfected locations; and,
of course, if a valid mining location is made upon
public lands afterwards included in a reservation,
such inclusion or reservation does not affect the
validity of the former location. By such location
and perfection, the land located is segregated from
the public domain even as against the
Government. (Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U.S.
337; Van Mess v. Roonet, 160 Cal. 131; 27 Cyc.
546).

"The legal effect of a valid location of a mining

claim is not only to segregate the area from the
public domain, but to grant to the locator the
beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to
a patent therefor upon compliance with the terms
and conditions prescribed by law. Where there is a
valid location of a mining claim, the area becomes
segregated from the public domain and the
property of the locator." (St. Louis Mining &
Milling Co. v. Montana Mining Co., 171 U.S.
650; 655; 43 Law ed., 320, 322.) "When a
location of a mining claim is perfected it has the
effect of a grant by the United States of the right
of present and exclusive possession, with the right
to the exclusive enjoyment of all the surface
ground as well as of all the minerals within the
lines of the claim, except as limited by the
extralateral right of adjoining locators; and this is
the locator's right before as well as after the
issuance of the patent. While a lode locator
acquires a vested property right by virtue of his
location made in compliance with the mining
laws, the fee remains in the government until
patent issues."(18 R.C.L. 1152) (Gold Creek
Mining Corporation v. Hon. Eulogio Rodriguez,
Sec. of Agriculture and Commerce, and Quirico
Abadilla, Director of the Bureau of Mines, 66
Phil. 259, 265-266)
It is of no importance whether Benguet and Atok had secured a
patent for as held in the Gold Creek Mining Corp. Case, for all
physical purposes of ownership, the owner is not required to
secure a patent as long as he complies with the provisions of the
mining laws; his possessory right, for all practical purposes of
ownership, is as good as though secured by patent.

We agree likewise with the oppositors that having complied with

all the requirements of the mining laws, the claims were removed
from the public domain, and not even the government of the
Philippines can take away this right from them. The reason is
obvious. Having become the private properties of the oppositors,
they cannot be deprived thereof without due process of law. 13
Such rights were not affected either by the stricture in the Commonwealth
Constitution against the alienation of all lands of the public domain except those
agricultural in nature for this was made subject to existing rights. Thus, in its
Article XIII, Section 1, it was categorically provided that:
SEC. 1. All agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils,
all forces of potential energy and other natural resources of the
Philipppines belong to the State, and their disposition,
exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to
citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at
least 60% of the capital of which is owned by such citizens,
subject to any existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time
of the inauguration of the government established under this
Constitution. Natural resources with the exception of public
agricultural lands, shall not be alienated, and no license,
concession, or lease for the exploitation, development or
utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a
period exceeding 25 years, except as to water rights for irrigation,
water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, in which case beneficial use may be
the measure and the limit of the grant.
Implementing this provision, Act No. 4268, approved on November 8, 1935,
declared:
Any provision of existing laws, executive order, proclamation to
the contrary notwithstanding, all locations of mining claim made
prior to February 8, 1935 within lands set apart as forest reserve

under Sec. 1826 of the Revised Administrative Code which would

be valid and subsisting location except to the existence of said
reserve are hereby declared to be valid and subsisting locations as
of the date of their respective locations.
The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and
under the laws then in force removed it from the public domain. 14 By such act, the
locators acquired exclusive rights over the land, against even the government,
without need of any further act such as the purchase of the land or the obtention of
a patent over it. 15 As the land had become the private property of the locators, they
had the right to transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok.
It is true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that such private property was subject
to the "vicissitudes of ownership," or even to forfeiture by non-user or
abandonment or, as the private respondents aver, by acquisitive prescription.
However, the method invoked by the de la Rosas is not available in the case at bar,
for two reasons.
First, the trial court found that the evidence of open, continuous, adverse and
exclusive possession submitted by the applicants was insufficient to support their
claim of ownership. They themselves had acquired the land only in 1964 and
applied for its registration in 1965, relying on the earlier alleged possession of their
predecessors-in-interest. 16 The trial judge, who had the opportunity to consider the
evidence first-hand and observe the demeanor of the witnesses and test their
credibility was not convinced. We defer to his judgment in the absence of a
showing that it was reached with grave abuse of discretion or without sufficient
basis. 17
Second, even if it be assumed that the predecessors-in-interest of the de la Rosas
had really been in possession of the subject property, their possession was not in
the concept of owner of the mining claim but of the property asagricultural land,
which it was not. The property was mineral land, and they were claiming it as
agricultural land. They were not disputing the lights of the mining locators nor
were they seeking to oust them as such and to replace them in the mining of the
land. In fact, Balbalio testified that she was aware of the diggings being

undertaken "down below" 18 but she did not mind, much less protest, the same
although she claimed to be the owner of the said land.
The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is "no conflict of interest"
between the owners of the surface rights and the owners of the sub-surface rights.
This is rather doctrine, for it is a well-known principle that the owner of piece of
land has rights not only to its surface but also to everything underneath and the
airspace above it up to a reasonable height. 19 Under the aforesaid ruling, the land
is classified as mineral underneath and agricultural on the surface, subject to
separate claims of title. This is also difficult to understand, especially in its
practical application.
Under the theory of the respondent court, the surface owner will be planting on the
land while the mining locator will be boring tunnels underneath. The farmer cannot
dig a well because he may interfere with the operations below and the miner
cannot blast a tunnel lest he destroy the crops above. How deep can the farmer, and
how high can the miner, go without encroaching on each other's rights? Where is
the dividing line between the surface and the sub-surface rights?
The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself
cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical;
the land must be either completely mineral or completely agricultural. In the
instant case, as already observed, the land which was originally classified as forest
land ceased to be so and became mineral and completely mineral once the
mining claims were perfected. 20 As long as mining operations were being
undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did not cease to be so and become
agricultural, even if only partly so, because it was enclosed with a fence and was
cultivated by those who were unlawfully occupying the surface.
What must have misled the respondent court is Commonwealth Act No. 137,
providing as follows:
Sec. 3. All mineral lands of the public domain and minerals belong
to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development or
utilization, shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to
corporations, or associations, at least 60% of the capital of which

is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant,

lease or concession at the time of the inauguration of government
established under the Constitution.
SEC. 4. The ownership of, and the right to the use of land for
agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential, or for any purpose
other than mining does not include the ownership of, nor the right
to extract or utilize, the minerals which may be found on or under
the surface.
SEC. 5. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the
minerals included within all areas for which public agricultural
land patents are granted are excluded and excepted from all such
patents.
SEC. 6. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the
minerals included within all areas for which Torrens titles are
granted are excluded and excepted from all such titles.
This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies, is
intended for the benefit of the State, not of private persons. The rule simply
reserves to the State all minerals that may be found in public and even private land
devoted to "agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential or (for) any purpose
other than mining." Thus, if a person is the owner of agricultural land in which
minerals are discovered, his ownership of such land does not give him the right to
extract or utilize the said minerals without the permission of the State to which
such minerals belong.
The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that the rights
over the land could be used for both mining and non-mining
purposes simultaneously. The correct interpretation is that once minerals are
discovered in the land, whatever the use to which it is being devoted at the time,
such use may be discontinued by the State to enable it to extract the minerals
therein in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The land is thus converted to
mineral land and may not be used by any private party, including the registered
owner thereof, for any other purpose that will impede the mining operations to be

undertaken therein, For the loss sustained by such owner, he is of course entitled to
just compensation under the Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation
proceedings. 21

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court dated April 30, 1976, is SET
ASIDE and that of the trial court dated March 11, 1969, is REINSTATED, without
any pronouncement as to costs.

Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in
question by virtue of their respective mining claims which they validly acquired
before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public
domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at the time of its
adoption. The land was not and could not have been transferred to the private
respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could its use be shared
simultaneously by them and the mining companies for agricultural and mineral
purposes.

SO ORDERED.