ADOPTION

G.R. No. 143989

July 14, 2003

ISABELITA S. LAHOM, petitioner,

vs.
JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (previously referred to as "DR. MELVIN S.
LAHOM"), respondent.
VITUG, J.:
The bliss of marriage and family would be to most less than complete without
children. The realization could have likely prodded the spouses Dr. Diosdado
Lahom and Isabelita Lahom to take into their care Isabelita's nephew Jose
Melvin Sibulo and to bring him up as their own. At the tender age of two, Jose
Melvin enjoyed the warmth, love and support of the couple who treated the child
like their own. Indeed, for years, Dr. and Mrs. Lahom fancied on legally adopting
Jose Melvin. Finally, in 1971, the couple decided to file a petition for adoption.
On 05 May 1972, an order granting the petition was issued that made all the
more intense than before the feeling of affection of the spouses for Melvin. In
keeping with the court order, the Civil Registrar of Naga City changed the name
"Jose Melvin Sibulo" to "Jose Melvin Lahom."
A sad turn of events came many years later. Eventually, in December of 1999,
Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, of Naga City. In her petition, she averred

"7. That x x x despite the proddings and pleadings of said spouses,

respondent refused to change his surname from Sibulo to Lahom, to the
frustrations of petitioner particularly her husband until the latter died,
and even before his death he had made known his desire to revoke
respondent's adoption, but was prevented by petitioner's supplication,
however with his further request upon petitioner to give to charity
whatever properties or interest may pertain to respondent in the future.

"13. That herein petitioner being a widow, and living alone in this city
with only her household helps to attend to her, has yearned for the care
and show of concern from a son, but respondent remained indifferent
and would only come to Naga to see her once a year.
"14. That for the last three or four years, the medical check-up of
petitioner in Manila became more frequent in view of a leg ailment, and
those were the times when petitioner would need most the care and
support from a love one, but respondent all the more remained callous
and utterly indifferent towards petitioner which is not expected of a son.
"15. That herein respondent has recently been jealous of petitioner's
nephews and nieces whenever they would find time to visit her,
respondent alleging that they were only motivated by their desire for
some material benefits from petitioner.
"16. That in view of respondent's insensible attitude resulting in a
strained and uncomfortable relationship between him and petitioner, the
latter has suffered wounded feelings, knowing that after all respondent's
only motive to his adoption is his expectancy of his alleged rights over
the properties of herein petitioner and her late husband, clearly shown
by his recent filing of Civil Case No. 99-4463 for partition against
petitioner, thereby totally eroding her love and affection towards
respondent, rendering the decree of adoption, considering respondent
to be the child of petitioner, for all legal purposes, has been negated for
which reason there is no more basis for its existence, hence this petition
1
for revocation,"
Prior to the institution of the case, specifically on 22 March 1998, Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 8552, also known as the Domestic Adoption Act, went into effect. The
new statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of
adoption.
Section 19 of Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 now reads:

xxx

xxx

xxx

"10. That respondent continued using his surname Sibulo to the utter
disregard of the feelings of herein petitioner, and his records with the
Professional Regulation Commission showed his name as Jose Melvin
M. Sibulo originally issued in 1978 until the present, and in all his
dealings and activities in connection with his practice of his profession,
he is Jose Melvin M. Sibulo.
xxx

xxx

xxx

"SEC. 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. Upon petition of the

adoptee, with the assistance of the Department if a minor or if over
eighteen (18) years of age but is incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the
adoption may be rescinded on any of the following grounds committed
by the adopter(s): (a) repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the
adopter(s) despite having undergone counseling; (b) attempt on the life
of the adoptee; (c) sexual assault or violence; or (d) abandonment and
failure to comply with parental obligations.

ADOPTION

"Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to
rescission by the adopter(s). However, the adopter(s) may disinherit the
adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code." (emphasis
supplied)
Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition, contending principally (a)
that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case and (b) that the petitioner
had no cause of action in view of the aforequoted provisions of R.A. No. 8552.
Petitioner asseverated, by way of opposition, that the proscription in R.A. No.
8552 should not retroactively apply, i.e., to cases where the ground for
2
rescission of the adoption vested under the regime of then Article 348 of the
3
Civil Code and Article 192 of the Family Code.
In an order, dated 28 April 2000, the trial court held thusly:
"On the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit, Section
5(c) of R.A. No. 8369 confers jurisdiction to this Court, having been
designated Family Court in A.M. No. 99-11-07 SC.
"On the matter of no cause of action, the test on the sufficiency of the
facts alleged in the complaint, is whether or not, admitting the facts
alleged, the Court could render a valid judgment in accordance with the
prayer of said complaint (De Jesus, et al. vs. Belarmino, et al., 95 Phil.
365).
"Admittedly, Section 19, Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 deleted the right of
an adopter to rescind an adoption earlier granted under the Family
Code. Conformably, on the face of the petition, indeed there is lack of
cause of action.
"Petitioner however, insists that her right to rescind long acquired under
the provisions of the Family Code should be respected. Assuming for
the sake of argument, that petitioner is entitled to rescind the adoption of
respondent granted on May 5, 1972, said right should have been
exercised within the period allowed by the Rules. From the averments in
the petition, it appears clear that the legal grounds for the petition have
been discovered and known to petitioner for more than five (5) years,
prior to the filing of the instant petition on December 1, 1999, hence, the
action if any, had already prescribed. (Sec. 5, Rule 100 Revised Rules
of Court)
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the petition is
4
ordered dismissed."

Via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court,
petitioner raises the following questions; viz:
1. May the subject adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972, still be revoked
or rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552?
2. In the affirmative, has the adopter's action prescribed?
A brief background on the law and its origins could provide some insights on the
subject. In ancient times, the Romans undertook adoption to assure male heirs
5
in the family. The continuity of the adopter's family was the primary purpose of
adoption and all matters relating to it basically focused on the rights of the
6
adopter. There was hardly any mention about the rights of the adopted.
Countries, like Greece, France, Spain and England, in an effort to preserve
7
inheritance within the family, neither allowed nor recognized adoption. It was
only much later when adoption was given an impetus in law and still later when
8
the welfare of the child became a paramount concern. Spain itself which
previously disfavored adoption ultimately relented and accepted the Roman law
concept of adoption which, subsequently, was to find its way to the archipelago.
The Americans came and introduced their own ideas on adoption which, unlike
most countries in Europe, made the interests of the child an overriding
9
consideration. In the early part of the century just passed, the rights of children
invited universal attention; the Geneva Declaration of Rights of the Child of 1924
10
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, followed by the United
11
Nations Declarations of the Rights of the Child, were written instruments that
would also protect and safeguard the rights of adopted children. The Civil Code
12
of the Philippines of 1950 on adoption, later modified by the Child and Youth
13
14
Welfare Code and then by the Family Code of the Philippines, gave
immediate statutory acknowledgment to the rights of the adopted. In 1989, the
United Nations initiated the Convention of the Rights of the Child. The
Philippines, a State Party to the Convention, accepted the principle that adoption
was impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent
was geared to favor the adopted child. R.A. No. 8552 secured these rights and
privileges for the adopted. Most importantly, it affirmed the legitimate status of
the adopted child, not only in his new family but also in the society as well. The
new law withdrew the right of an adopter to rescind the adoption decree and
gave to the adopted child the sole right to sever the legal ties created by
adoption.
Petitioner, however, would insist that R.A. No. 8552 should not adversely affect
her right to annul the adoption decree, nor deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction
to hear the case, both being vested under the Civil Code and the Family Code,
the laws then in force.

ADOPTION

The concept of "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of

15
due process that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and
16
natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action; it includes not only
legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but also exemptions from
17
new obligations created after the right has become vested. Rights are
18
considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a present interest, absolute,
19
unconditional, and perfect or fixed and irrefutable.
20

In Republic vs. Court of Appeals, a petition to adopt Jason Condat was filed by
Zenaida C. Bobiles on 02 February 1988 when the Child and Youth Welfare
Code (Presidential Decree No. 603) allowed an adoption to be sought by either
spouse or both of them. After the trial court had rendered its decision and while
the case was still pending on appeal, the Family Code of the Philippines
(Executive Order No. 209), mandating joint adoption by the husband and wife,
took effect. Petitioner Republic argued that the case should be dismissed for
having been filed by Mrs. Bobiles alone and without being joined by the
husband. The Court concluded that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by
the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. The
petition to adopt Jason, having been filed with the court at the time when P.D.
No. 603 was still in effect, the right of Mrs. Bobiles to file the petition, without
being joined by her husband, according to the Court had become vested. In
21
Republic vs. Miller, spouses Claude and Jumrus Miller, both aliens, sought to
adopt Michael Madayag. On 29 July 1988, the couple filed a petition to formalize
Michael's adoption having theretofore been taken into their care. At the time the
action was commenced, P.D. No. 603 allowed aliens to adopt. After the decree
of adoption and while on appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Family Code
was enacted into law on 08 August 1988 disqualifying aliens from adopting
Filipino children. The Republic then prayed for the withdrawal of the adoption
decree. In discarding the argument posed by the Republic, the Supreme Court
ruled that the controversy should be resolved in the light of the law governing at
the time the petition was filed.
It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner filed an
22
action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law,
had already abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter under the Civil Code
and the Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. Consistently with its earlier
pronouncements, the Court should now hold that the action for rescission of the
adoption decree, having been initiated by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had
come into force, no longer could be pursued.
Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside the
23
adoption is subject to the five-year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of
Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree
after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive
period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right

entitled to protection. It must also be acknowledged that a person has no vested

24
right in statutory privileges. While adoption has often been referred to in the
context of a "right," the privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate or
25
fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. It is a privilege that is
governed by the state's determination on what it may deem to be for the best
26
interest and welfare of the child. Matters relating to adoption, including the
withdrawal of the right of an adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to
27
regulation by the State. Concomitantly, a right of action given by statute may
28
be taken away at anytime before it has been exercised.
While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a
consequential right to rescind the adoption decree even in cases where the
adoption might clearly turn out to be undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the
bounden duty of the Court to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex would be the
hackneyed truism that those caught in the law have to live with. It is still
noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties
of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits
otherwise accruing to an undeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds
recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an adopted child his legitime and, by
a will and testament, may freely exclude him from having a share in the
disposable portion of his estate.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is AFFIRMED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Ynares-Santiago, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ ., concur.

ADOPTION

G.R. No. L-30576

February 10, 1976
ROBIN FRANCIS RADLEY DUNCAN and MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN,
petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL (Branch X) PRESIDED OVER BY
HON. JUDGE HERMINIO C. MARIANO, respondent.
Susano A. Velasquez for petitioners.
Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Acting Assistant Solicitor General Hector C.
Fule and Trial Attorney Herminio Z. Florendo for respondent.
ESGUERRA, J.:
Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of respondent court, dated June
27, 1968, dismissing petitioners' petition to adopt the minor, Colin Berry
Christensen Duncan. It seeks to have the findings and conclusions of law
contained in -the decision annulled and revoked and to declare the petition for
adoption meritorious and the child sought to be adopted, the minor Colin Berry
Christensen Duncan, declared the child by adoption and heir of herein
petitioners-Appellants. Robin Francis Radley Duncan and Maria Lucy
1
Christensen.
Petitioners Robin Francis Radley Duncan and Maria Lucy Christensen are
husband and wife, the former a British national residing in the Philippines for the
last 17 years and the latter an American citizen born in and a resident of the
Philippines. Having no children of their own but having previously adopted
another child, said spouses filed a petition with respondent court (Sp. Proc. No.
5457) for the adoption of a child previously baptized and named by them as
Colin Berry Christensen Duncan. The petition is filed and denominated as Sp.
Proc. No. 5457.
In the decision rendered by respondent Court dated June 27, 1968, the petition
2
for adoption was dismissed.
The principal reason given for the dismissed al of the petition was that ... the
consent given in this petition Exhibit "J" is improper and falls short of the express
3
requirement of the law.
Rationalizing its action respondent Judge said:
Art. 340 (of the Civil Code) provides that the written consent of
the following to the adoption shall be necessary:
2. The guardian or person in charge of the person to be
adopted.
"Under the law aforementioned, it will be noted that the law is couched in
mandatory terms by the word SHALL be necessary, and it enumerates the
persons who will give the consent to the adoption in the order as follows:
parents, guardian, or the person in charge of the person to be adopted.
It is admitted by witness Velasquez that she knew the identity of
the mother who gave her the child. This being the case, the
proper person who is supposed to give the parental consent to
the adoption should first be, in the order of preference, the
4
parent or the mother herself.

On the allegation of petitioners that their principal witness, Atty. Corazon de

Leon Velasquez, under whose care the newly-born child was entrusted by the
unwedded mother, could not reveal the identity of the mother because it would
violate the privileged communications between the attorney and client,
respondent Judge explained: "The contention that for her (Atty. Corazon de
Leon Velasquez, the witness for the petitioners who gave the written consent to
the adoption of the child in her capacity as loco parentis to said child) to reveal
the identity of the mother would be violative of the client-attorney relationship
existing between her and the mother cannot hold water, because in the first
place, there was no such relationship existing between them in so far as this
case is concerned and secondly, it is not only a question of revealing the identity
of the mother but rather, of giving consent to adoption by that alleged unwed
5
mother."
Taking exception to respondent Judge's decision and the ratio decidendi
thereof, appellants-petitioners alleged the following as errors committed by the
6
trial court:
1) The inviolability of privileged communication between
attorney and client is only binding upon the attorney in the same
case where such relationship of attorney and client arose when
the client imparted the privileged communication and that
elsewhere or in another case the attorney is not bound to the
secrecy;
2) The infant that was given away by the natural mother, even
without the latter providing for the child's maintenance and
support, could not be considered as abandoned;
3) The stranger who received the baby or child, in this case,
Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez, could not be considered as
the guardian de facto and in loco parentis of the child, and
therefore, is not empowered by law to give written consent to
the adoption;
4) That whenever and as long as the natural mother is known to
anybody, only said natural mother can give the written consent
to the adoption;
5) That the term "person in charge of the person to be adopted",
one of those who can give consent to the adoption under Article
340 of the Civil Code, means or refers to institutions or
orphanages established for the purpose of rearing orphans,
foundlings and destitute children.
The facts of this case are few and simple.
a) Sometime in May, 1967, a child, less than a week old (only 3
7
days old)
was given to petitioners Robin Francis Radley
Duncan and his wife Maria Lucy Christensen, for them to adopt,
by Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez. The child was later on
baptized as Colin Berry Christensen Duncan with the

ADOPTION

aforementioned espouses appearing in the records of said

8
baptism as the parents of said child;
b) Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez on the other hand,
received the infant from the child's unwed mother who told the
former never to reveal her (the mother's) identity because she
wanted to get married and did not want to destroy her future.
The mother instructed Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez to look
for a suitable couple who will adopt the child. The mother did
9
not provide for the maintenance and support of her child;
c) In the petition for adoption filed by petitioners in September,
1967, Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez, as the de facto
guardian or loco parentis of the child subject of the adoption
10
petition, gave the written consent required by law;
d) Learning, from the testimony of witness Atty. Corazon de
Leon Velasquez that the natural mother of the child sought to be
adopted was still alive, the court then pressed upon the witness
to reveal the identity of said mother. The witness refused to
divulge the same on the ground that there existed an attorney
and client relationship between them. She had been instructed
by her client not to reveal the latter's identity. She could not now
11
violate such privilege communication.
After examining the facts and the arguments presented, it appears to this Court
that there is only one principal issue involved, i.e., whether or not the person
who gave the consent for adoption, which in this case is Atty. Corazon de Leon
Velasquez, is the proper person required by law to give such consent.
The law applicable is. Art. 340 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 340. The written consent of the following to adoption shall
be necessary:
(1) The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of age or over;
(2) The parents, guardian or person in charge of the person to
be adopted.
On the other hand, the Rules of Court (Rule 99) has this to say on those who
are required to give consent in adoption:
Sec. 3. Consent to adoption. There shall be filed with the
petition a written consent to the adoption signed by the child, if
fourteen years of age or over and not incompetent, and by the
child's spouse, if any, and by each of its known living parents
who is not an insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not
abandoned such child, or if there are no such parents by the
general guardian, or guardian ad litem of the child, or if the child
is in the custody of an orphan asylum, children's home, or
benevolent society or person, by the proper officer or officers of
such asylum, home, or society, or by such person; but if the
child is illegitimate and has not been recognized, the consent of
its father to the adoption shall not be required.

Going by the set of facts in this case, only one of two persons particularly
described by law may be considered here as legally capable of giving the
required written consent. They are:
Under Art. 340 of the Civil 'Code, the "parent, guardian or person in charge of
the person to be adopted" while the other one is that mentioned in Section 3,
Rule 99 of the Rules of Court, describing it as each of the known living parents
"who has not abandoned such child." The father's consent here is out of the
question as the child is illegitimate and unrecognized.
Since the person whose written consent to the adoption (Atty: Corazon de Leon
Velasquez) is assailed by the trial court as being unauthorized and had
consequently caused the rejection of the petition, this Tribunal will now look into
her alleged authority or lack thereof to give the controverted consent.
Sometime in May of 1967, the child subject of this adoption petition,
undisputedly declared as only three days old then, was turned over by its mother
to witness Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez. The natural and unwedded
mother, from that date on to the time of the adoption proceedings in court which
started in mid- year of said 1967, and up to the present, has not bothered to
inquire into the condition of the child, much less to contribute to the livelihood,
maintenance and care of the same. In short, this parent is the antithesis of that
described in the law as "known living parent who is not insane Or hopelessly
intemperate or has not abandoned such child." We are convinced that in fact
said mother had completely and absolutely abandoned her child. This Court has
previously declared that abandonment imports any conduct on the part of the
parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental claims to the child.
12
Applying this legal yardstick, the unidentified mother of the child in this case
can be declared, as she is hereby declared, as having abandoned her child with
all legal consequences attached thereto.
Having declared that the child was an abandoned one by an unknown parent,
there appears to be no more legal need to require the written consent of such
parent of the child to the adoption. As had been said by this Court in the
aforecited case of Santos vs. Aranzanso, the parental consent required by the
law in adoption proceedings refers to parents who have not abandoned their
13
child. The question now is whether or not Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez,
the undisputed custodian of the abandoned waif may be considered as the
guardian under Art. 340 or the person standing in loco parentis of said infant
contemplated in Art. 349 of the Civil Code.
It seems to Us that when the 3-day old baby was left to and placed in the hands
of Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez, the helpless infant was in dire need of
someone who could give it protection and sustain its delicate and fragile life.
Atty. Velasquez was under no legal compulsion to accept the child and to extend
to it the protection and care it badly needed. Since there had been no showing
that the identity of the natural mother was made known to the trial court or to the
herein petitioners, nor had said mother seen fit to present herself before the
court despite the public notice given to the proceedings as required by law, there
clearly appears only one person who could be considered as the guardian

ADOPTION

exercising patria potestas over such abandoned child. Since there was no
guardian ad litem appointed by the court and the child not being in the custody
of an orphan asylum, children's home or any benevolent society, there could not
have been anyone other than Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez who could, with
reason, be called the guardian of said infant. It was she who had actual. physical
custody of the infant and who, out of compassion and motherly instinct,
extended the mantle of protection over the hapless and helpless infant which
otherwise could have suffered a tragic fate, like being thrown into some garbage
heap as had often happened to some unwanted illegitimate babies. The least
this Court could do to recognize and acknowledge her good Samaritan deed is
to extend, as it hereby extends, to her the recognition that she was a de facto
guardian exercising patria potestas over the abandoned child.
The trial court in its decision had sought refuge in the ancient Roman legal
maxim "Dura lex sed lex" to cleanse its hands of the hard and harsh decision it
rendered. While this old adage generally finds apt application in many other
legal cases, in adoption of children, however, this should be softened so as to
apply the law with less severity and with compassion and humane
understanding, for adoption is more for the benefit of unfortunate children,
particularly those born out of wedlock, than for those born with a silver spoon in
their mouths. All efforts or acts designed to provide homes, love, care and
education for unfortunate children, who otherwise may grow from cynical street
urchins to hardened criminal offenders and become serious social problems,
should be given the widest attitude of sympathy, encouragement and
assistance. The law is not, and should not be made, an instrument to impede
the achievement of a salutary humane policy. As often as is legally and lawfully
possible, their texts and intendments should be construed so as to give all the
chances for human life to exist with a modicum promise of a useful and
constructive existence.
The herein petitioners, the spouses Robin Francis Radley Duncan and Maria
Lucy Christensen, appear to be qualified to adopt the child. There is no showing
that they suffer from any of the disqualifications under the law. Above all, they
have the means to provide the child with the proper support, care, education and
love that a growing child needs, even if they have previously adopted another
child as theirs. The fact that even before they have applied for legal custody and
adoption of the infant they have already showered it with love and care and had
it baptized, with them appearing in the records of the baptism as the parents of
the child, speaks well of the genuine desire of petitioners to have the child as
their very own. The child was born in May, 1967, and he will be at this time,
1976, about 9 years of age. In all the years, from the time he was turned over to
the herein petitioners when he was only about a week old (there is no showing
that the said child was ever placed at any' time in the care and custody of some
other persons) he had been cared for and loved by the spouses Robin Francis
RadLey Duncan and Maria Lucy Christensen. He must have known no other
parents than these persons. If we are now to sustain the decision of the court
below, this Tribunal will be doing a graver injustice to all concerned particularly

to said spouses, and worse, it will be imposing a cruel sanction on this innocent
child and on all other children who might be similarly situated. We consider it to
be justifiable and more humane to formalize a factual relation, that of parents
and son, existing between the herein petitioning spouses and the minor child
baptized by them as Colin Berry Christensen Duncan, than to sustain the hard,
harsh and cruel interpretation of the law that was done by the respondent court
and Judge. It is Our view that it is in consonance with the true spirit and purpose
of the law, and with the policy of the State, to uphold, encourage and give life
and meaning to the existence of family relations.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the decision of the respondent
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch X, in Sp. Proc. No. 5457,
dated June 27, 1968, is hereby annulled, and We declare that the minor Colin
Berry Christensen Duncan is the adopted child and the heir of petitioners Robin
Francis Radley Duncan and Maria Lucy Christensen.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Muoz Palma and Martin, JJ., concur.

ADOPTION

ROMERO, J.:
Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural
parent on the ground that the latter has abandoned them? The answer to this
interesting query, certainly not one of first impression, would have to be
reached, not solely on the basis of law and jurisprudence, but also the hard
reality presented by the facts of the case.
This is the question posed before this Court in this petition for review on
1
certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decree of
2
adoption issued by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 14, in Special
Proceedings No. 1744-CEB, "In the Matter of the Petition for Adoption of the
minors Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang, Spouses
Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano, petitioners."
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married on January
27, 1973, begot three children, namely: Keith, born on July 3, 1973; Charmaine,
born on January 23, 1977, and Joseph Anthony, born on January 3, 1981.
During the early years of their marriage, the Cang couple's relationship was
undisturbed. Not long thereafter, however, Anna Marie learned of her husband's
alleged extramarital affair with Wilma Soco, a family friend of the Clavanos.
Upon learning of her husband's alleged illicit liaison, Anna Marie filed a petition
3
for legal separation with alimony pendente lite with the then Juvenile and
4
5
Domestic Relations Court of Cebu which rendered a decision approving the
joint manifestation of the Cang spouses providing that they agreed to "live
separately and apart or from bed and board." They further agreed:
(c) That the children of the parties shall be
entitled to a monthly support of ONE
THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) effective from
the date of the filing of the complaint. This shall
constitute a first lien on the net proceeds of the
house and lot jointly owned by the parties
situated at Cinco Village, Mandaue City;
G.R. No. 105308

September 25, 1998

HERBERT CANG, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses RONALD V. CLAVANO and MARIA
CLARA CLAVANO, respondents.

(d) That the plaintiff shall be entitled to enter

into any contract or agreement with any person
or persons, natural or juridical without the
written consent of the husband; or any
undertaking or acts that ordinarily requires
husband's consent as the parties are by this
6
agreement legally separated;

ADOPTION

Petitioner then left for the United States where he sought a divorce from Anna
Marie before the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada. Said
court issued the divorce decree that also granted sole custody of the three minor
children to Anna Marie, reserving "rights of visitation at all reasonable times and
7
places" to petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner took an American wife and thus became a naturalized
American citizen. In 1986, he divorced his American wife and never remarried.
While in the United States, petitioner worked in Tablante Medical Clinic earning
8
P18,000.00 to P20,000.00 a month a portion of which was remitted to the
Philippines for his children's expenses and another, deposited in the bank in the
name of his children.
Meanwhile, on September 25, 1987, private respondents Ronald V. Clavano
and Maria Clara Diago Clavano, respectively the brother and sister-in-law of
Anna Marie, filed Special Proceedings No. 1744-CEB for the adoption of the
three minor Cang children before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. The petition
bears the signature of then 14-year-old Keith signifying consent to his adoption.
Anna Marie likewise filed an affidavit of consent alleging that her husband had
"evaded his legal obligation to support" his children; that her brothers and sisters
including Ronald V. Clavano, had been helping her in taking care of the children;
that because she would be going to the United States to attend to a family
business, "leaving the children would be a problem and would naturally hamper
(her) job-seeking venture abroad;" and that her husband had "long forfeited his
parental rights" over the children for the following reasons:
1. The decision in Civil Case No. JD-707 allowed her to enter
into any contract without the written consent of her husband;
2. Her husband had left the Philippines to be an illegal alien in
the United States and had been transferring from one place to
another to avoid detection by Immigration authorities, and
3. Her husband had divorced her.
Upon learning of the petitioner for adoption, petitioner immediately returned to
the Philippines and filed an opposition thereto, alleging that, although private
respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano were financially capable of
supporting the children while his finances were "too meager" compared to theirs,
he could not "in conscience, allow anybody to strip him of his parental authority
over his beloved children."

Pending resolution of the petition for adoption, petitioner moved to reacquire

custody over his children alleging that Anna Marie had transferred to the United
States thereby leaving custody of their children to private respondents. On
January 11, 1988, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 19, issued an
order finding that Anna Marie had, in effect, relinquished custody over the
children and, therefore, such custody should be transferred to the father. The
court then directed the Clavanos to deliver custody over the minors to petitioner.
On March 27, 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 14, issued a
decree of adoption with a dispositive portion reading as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for adoption of
the minors Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony all surnamed
Cang, by the petitioner-spouses Ronald V. Clavano and Maria
Clara Diago Clavano is hereby granted and approved. These
children shall henceforth be known and called as Keith D.
Clavano, Charmaine D. Clavano and Joseph Anthony D.
Clavano respectively. Moreover, this Decree of Adoption shall:
(1) Confer upon the adopted children the same
rights and duties as though they were in fact the
legitimate children of the petitioners;
(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the parents
by nature, of the children; and,
(3) Vest the same authority in the petitioners.
Furnish the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, Philippines with a
copy of this Decree of Adoption for registration purposes.
SO ORDERED.
In so ruling, the lower court was "impelled" by these reasons:
(1) The Cang children had, since birth,
developed "close filial ties with the Clavano
family, especially their maternal uncle,"
petitioner Ronald Clavano.
(2) Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano were
childless and, with their printing press, real
estate business, export business and gasoline

ADOPTION

station and mini-mart in Rosemead, California,

U.S.A., had substantial assets and income.
(3) The natural mother of the children, Anna
Marie, nicknamed "Menchu," approved of the
adoption because of her heart ailment, nearfatal accident in 1981, and the fact that she
could not provide them a secure and happy
future as she "travels a lot."
(4) The Clavanos could provide the children
moral and spiritual direction as they would go to
church together and had sent the children to
Catholic schools.
(5) The children themselves manifested their
desire to be adopted by the Clavanos Keith
had testified and expressed the wish to be
adopted by the Clavanos while the two younger
ones were observed by the court to have
"snuggled" close to Ronald even though their
natural mother was around.
On the other hand, the lower court considered the opposition of petitioner to rest
on "a very shaky foundation" because of its findings that:
(1) Petitioner was "morally unfit to be the father
of his children" on account of his being "an
improvident father of his family" and an
"undisguised Lothario." This conclusion is
based on the testimony of his alleged
paramour, mother of his two sons and close
friend of Anna Marie, Wilma Soco, who said
that she and petitioner lived as husband and
wife in the very house of the Cangs in Opao,
Mandaue City.
(2) The alleged deposits of around $10,000 that
were of "comparatively recent dates" were
"attempts at verisimilitude" as these were joint
deposits the authenticity of which could not be
verified.

(3) Contrary to petitioner's claim, the possibility

of his reconciliation with Anna Marie was "dim if
not nil" because it was petitioner who "devised,
engineered and executed the divorce
proceedings at the Nevada Washoe County
court."
(4) By his naturalization as a U.S. citizen,
petitioner "is now an alien from the standpoint
of Philippine laws" and therefore, how his "new
attachments and loyalties would sit with his
(Filipino) children is an open question."
Quoting with approval the evaluation and recommendation of the RTC Social
Worker in her Child Study Report, the lower court concluded as follows:
Simply put, the oppositor Herbert Cang has abandoned his
children. And abandonment of a child by its (sic) parent is
commonly specified by statute as a ground for dispensing with
his consent to its (sic) adoption (Re Cozza, 163 Cal. 514 P. 161,
Ann. [As. 1914A, 214]). Indeed, in such case, adoption will be
allowed not only without the consent of the parent, but even
against his opposition (Re McKeag, 141 Cal. 403, 74 P. 1039,
99 Am. St. Rep. 80; Re Camp. 131 Gal. 469,63 P. 736, 82 Am.
St. Rep. 371; Graham v. Francis, 83 Colo. 346, 265 P. 690,
citing R.C.L.; Seibert, 170 Iowa, 561, 153 N.W. 160, citing
R.C.L.; Steams v. Allen, 183 Mass. 404, 67 N.E. 349; 97 Am.
St. Rep. 441; Wilson v. Otis, 71 N.H. 483, 53 A. 439, 93 Am. St.
Rep. 564; Nugent v. Powell, 4 Wyo, 173, 33 P. 23, 20 L.R.A.
9
199, 62 Am. St. Rep. 17.)
Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner contended that the lower court erred in
holding that it would be in the best interest of the three children if they were
adopted by private respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano. He asserted
that the petition for adoption was fatally defective and tailored to divest him of
parental authority because: (a) he did not have a written consent to the
adoption; (b) he never abandoned his children; (c) Keith and Charmaine did not
properly give their written consent; and (d) the petitioners for adoption did not
present as witness the representative of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development who made the case study report required by law.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decree of adoption stating:

ADOPTION

Art. 188 of the Family Code requires the written consent of the
natural parents of the child to be adopted. It has been held
however that the consent of the parent who has abandoned the
child is not necessary (Dayrit vs. Piccio, 92 Phil. 729; Santos vs.
Ananzanso, 16 SCRA 344). The question therefore is whether
or not oppositor may be considered as having abandoned the
children. In adoption cases, abandonment connotes any
conduct on the part of the parent to forego parental duties and
relinquish parental claims to the child, or the neglect or refusal
to perform the natural and legal obligations which parents owe
their children (Santos vs. Ananzanso, supra), or the withholding
of the parent's presence, his care and the opportunity to display
voluntary affection. The issue of abandonment is amply covered
by the discussion of the first error.

1) 118-606437-4 July 23, 1985 $5,018.50 Great Western

Savings,

Oppositor argues that he has been sending dollar remittances

to the children and has in fact even maintained bank accounts
in their names. His duty to provide support comes from two
judicial pronouncements. The first, the decision in JD-707 CEB,
supra, obliges him to pay the children P1,000.00 a month. The
second is mandated by the divorce decree of the Nevada,
U.S.A. Federal Court which orders him to pay monthly support
of US$50.00 for each child. Oppositor has not submitted any
evidence to show compliance with the decision in JD-101 CEB,
but he has submitted 22 cancelled dollar checks (Exhs. 24 to
45) drawn in the children's names totalling $2,126.98. The last
remittance was on October 6, 1987 (Exh. 45). His obligation to
provide support commenced under the divorce decree on May
5, 1982 so that as of October 6, 1987, oppositor should have
made 53 remittances of $150.00, or a total of $7,950.00. No
other remittances were shown to have been made after October
6, 1987, so that as of this date, oppositor was woefully in
arrears under the terms of the divorce decree. And since he
was totally in default of the judgment in JD-707 CEB, the
inevitable conclusion is oppositor had not really been
performing his duties as a father, contrary to his protestations.

Oct. 29, 1987 Bank, Daly City, Cal.,

True, it has been shown that oppositor had opened three

accounts in different banks, as follows
Acct. No. Date Opened Balance Name of Bank

Oct. 29, 1987 Daly City, Cal., U.S.A.

2) 73-166-8 March 5, 1986 3,129.00 Matewan National Bank
Oct. 26, 1987 of Williamson, West
Virginia, U.S.A.
3) 564-146883 December 31, 1986 2,622.19 Security Pacific
National

U.S.A.
The first and third accounts were opened however in oppositor's
name as trustee for Charmaine Cang and Joseph Anthony
Cang, respectively. In other words, the accounts are operated
and the amounts withdrawable by oppositor himself and it
cannot be said that they belong to the minors. The second is an
"or" account, in the names of Herbert Cang or Keith Cang.
Since Keith is a minor and in the Philippines, said account is
operable only by oppositor and the funds withdrawable by him
alone.
The bank accounts do not really serve what oppositor claimed
in his offer of evidence "the aim and purpose of providing for a
10
better future and security of his family."
Petitioner moved to reconsider the decision of the Court of Appeals. He
emphasized that the decree of legal separation was not based on the merits of
the case as it was based on a manifestation amounting to a compromise
agreement between him and Anna Marie. That he and his wife agreed upon the
plan for him to leave for the United States was borne out by the fact that prior to
his departure to the United States, the family lived with petitioner's parents.
Moreover, he alone did not instigate the divorce proceedings as he and his wife
initiated the "joint complaint" for divorce.
Petitioner argued that the finding that he was not fit to rear and care for his
children was belied by the award to him of custody over the children in Civil

10

ADOPTION

Case No. JD-707. He took exception to the appellate court's findings that as an
American citizen he could no longer lay claim to custody over his children
because his citizenship would not take away the fact that he "is still a father to
his children." As regards his alleged illicit relationship with another woman, he
had always denied the same both in Civil Case No. JD-707 and the instant
adoption case. Neither was it true that Wilma Soco was a neighbor and family
friend of the Clavanos as she was residing in Mandaue City seven (7) kilometers
away from the Clavanos who were residents of Cebu City. Petitioner insisted
that the testimony of Wilma Soco should not have been given weight for it was
only during the hearing of the petition for adoption that Jose Clavano, a brother
of Ronald, came to know her and went to her residence in Iligan City to convince
her to be a witness for monetary considerations. Lastly, petitioner averred that it
would be hypocritical of the Clavanos to claim that they could love the children
11
much more than he could.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner is now before this
Court, alleging that the petition for adoption was fatally defective as it did not
have his written consent as a natural father as required by Article 31 (2) of
Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code, and Article 188
(2) of the Family Code.
Art. 31 of P.D. No. 603 provides
Art. 31. Whose Consent is Necessary. The written consent of
the following to the adoption shall be necessary:
(1) The person to be adopted, if fourteen years
of age or, over;
(2) The natural parents of the child or his legal
guardian of the Department of Social Welfare or
any duly licensed child placement agency under
whose care the child may be;
(3) The natural children, fourteen years and
above, of the adopting parents. (Emphasis
supplied)
On December 17, 1986, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive
Order No. 91 amending Articles 27, 28, 29, 31, 33 and 35 of the Child and Youth
Welfare Code. As thus amended, Article 31 read:
Art. 31. Whose Consent is Necessary. The written consent of
the following to the adoption shall be necessary:

(1) The person to be adopted, if fourteen years

of age or over;
(2) The natural parents of the child or his legal
guardian after receiving counselling and
appropriate social services from the Ministry of
Social Services and Development or from a
duly licensed child-placement agency;
(3) The Ministry of Social Services and
Development or any duly licensed childplacement agency under whose care and legal
custody the child may be;
(4) The natural children, fourteen years and
above, of the adopting parents. (Emphasis
supplied)
Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the
statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action determines the
12
jurisdiction of the court. As such, when private respondents filed the petition
for adoption on September 25, 1987, the applicable law was the Child and Youth
Welfare Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 91.
During the pendency of the petition for adoption or on August 3, 1988, the
Family Code which amended the Child and Youth Welfare Code took effect.
Article 256 of the Family Code provides for its retroactivity "insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code
or other laws." As amended by the Family Code, the statutory provision on
consent for adoption now reads:
Art. 188. The written consent of the following to the adoption
shall be necessary:
(1) The person to be adopted, if ten years of
age or over;
(2) The parents by nature of the child, the legal
guardian,
or
the
proper
government
instrumentality;
(3) The legitimate and adopted children, ten
years of age or over, of the adopting parent or
parents;

11

ADOPTION

(4) The illegitimate children, ten years of age or

over, of the adopting parents, if living with said
parent and the latter's spouse, if any; and
(5) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting
or to be adopted. (Emphasis supplied)
Based on the foregoing, it is thus evident that notwithstanding the amendments
to the law, the written consent of the natural parent to the adoption has
remained a requisite for its validity. Notably, such requirement is also embodied
in Rule 99 of the Rules of Court as follows:
Sec. 3. Consent to adoption. There shall be filed with the
petition a written consent to the adoption signed by the child, if
fourteen years of age or over and not incompetent, and by the
child's spouse, if any, and by each of its known living parents
who is not insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not
abandoned the child, or if the child is in the custody of an
orphan asylum, children's home, or benevolent society or
person, by the proper officer or officers of such asylum, home,
or society, or by such persons; but if the child is illegitimate and
has not been recognized, the consent of its father to the
adoption shall not be required. (Emphasis supplied)
As clearly inferred from the foregoing provisions of law, the written consent of
the natural parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption.
Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the
13
parent has abandoned the child or that such parent is "insane or hopelessly
intemperate." The court may acquire jurisdiction over the case even, without the
written consent of the parents or one of the parents provided that the petition for
adoption alleges facts sufficient to warrant exemption from compliance
therewith. This is in consonance with the liberality with which this Court treats
the procedural aspect of adoption. Thus, the Court declared:
. . . . The technical rules of pleading should not be stringently
applied to adoption proceedings, and it is deemed more
important that the petition should contain facts relating to the
child and its parents, which may give information to those
interested, than that it should be formally correct as a pleading.
Accordingly, it is generally held that a petition will confer
jurisdiction if it substantially complies with the adoption statute,
14
alleging all facts necessary to give the court jurisdiction.

In the instant case, only the affidavit of consent of the natural mother was
attached to the petition for adoption. Petitioner's consent, as the natural father is
lacking. Nonetheless, the petition sufficiently alleged the fact of abandonment of
the minors for adoption by the natural father as follows:
3. That the children's mother, sister of petitioner RONALD V.
CLAVANO, has given her express consent to this adoption, as
shown by Affidavit of Consent, Annex "A". Likewise, the written
consent of Keith Cang, now 14 years of age appears on page 2
of this petition; However, the father of the children, Herbert
Cang, had already left his wife and children and had already
divorced the former, as evidenced by the xerox copy of the
DECREE OF DIVORCE issued by the County of Washoe, State
of Nevada, U.S.A. (Annex "B") which was filed at the instance of
Mr. Cang, not long after he abandoned his family to live in the
15
United States as an illegal immigrant.
The allegations of abandonment in the petition for adoption, even absent the
written consent of petitioner, sufficiently vested the lower court with jurisdiction
since abandonment of the child by his natural parents is one of the
16
circumstances under which our statutes and jurisprudence dispense with the
requirement of written consent to the adoption of their minor children.
However, in cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily because his
consent thereto was not sought, the matter of whether he had abandoned his
child becomes a proper issue for determination. The issue of abandonment by
the oppositor natural parent is a preliminary issue that an adoption court must
first confront. Only upon, failure of the oppositor natural father to prove to the
satisfaction of the court that he did not abandon his child may the petition for
adoption be considered on its merits.
As a rule, factual findings of the lower courts are final and binding upon this
17
Court. This Court is not expected nor required to examine or contrast the oral
18
and documentary evidence submitted by the parties. However, although this
Court is not a trier of facts, it has the authority to review and reverse the factual
findings of the lower courts if it that these do not conform to the evidence on
19
record.
20

In Reyes v. Court of Appeals, this Court has held that the exceptions to the
rule that factual findings of the trial court are final and conclusive and may not be
reviewed on appeal are the following: (1) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or
conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on

12

ADOPTION

misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when
the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case
and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7)
when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence
on which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion and (10) when the findings of
fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are
contradicted by the evidence on record.
This Court finds that both the lower court and the Court of Appeals failed to
appreciate facts and circumstances that should have elicited a different
21
conclusion on the issue of whether petitioner has so abandoned his children,
thereby making his consent to the adoption unnecessary.
In its ordinary sense, the word "abandon'' means to forsake entirely, to forsake
or renounce utterly. The dictionaries trace this word to the root idea of "putting
under a ban." The emphasis is on the finality and publicity with which a thing or
body is thus put in the control of another, hence, the meaning of giving up
22
absolutely, with intent never to resume or claim one's rights or interests.
In
reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment
imports "any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all
parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child." It means "neglect
or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which
23
parents owe their children."
In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner's conduct did not manifest a
settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims
over his children as to, constitute abandonment. Physical estrangement alone,
24
without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment.
While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was then in the United
States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and
support for his children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and
children through letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail and
catered to their whims.
Petitioner's testimony on the matter is supported by documentary evidence
consisting of the following handwritten letters to him of both his wife and
children:
1. Exh. 1 a 4-page updated letter of Menchu (Anna Marie)
addressed to "Dear Bert" on a C. Westates Carbon Phil. Corp.
stationery. Menchu stated therein that it had been "a long time

since the last time you've heard from me excluding that of the
phone conversation we've had." She discussed petitioner's
intention to buy a motorbike for Keith, expressing apprehension
over risks that could be engendered by Keith's use of it. She
said that in the "last phone conversation" she had with petitioner
on the birthday of "Ma," she forgot to tell petitioner that Keith's
voice had changed; he had become a "bagito" or a teen-ager
with many "fans" who sent him Valentine's cards. She told him
how Charmaine had become quite a talkative "almost dalaga"
who could carry on a conversation with her angkong and how
pretty she was in white dress when she won among the
candidates in the Flores de Mayo after she had prayed so hard
for it. She informed him, however, that she was worried
because Charmaine was vain and wont to extravagance as she
loved clothes. About Joeton (Joseph Anthony), she told
petitioner that the boy was smart for his age and "quite spoiled"
being the youngest of the children in Lahug. Joeton was
mischievous but Keith was his idol with whom he would sleep
anytime. She admitted having said so much about the childrenbecause they might not have informed petitioner of "some
happenings and spices of life" about themselves. She said that
it was "just very exciting to know how they've grown up and very
pleasant, too, that each of them have (sic) different characters."
She ended the letter with the hope that petitioner was "at the
best of health." After extending her regards "to all," she signed
her name after the word "Love." This letter was mailed on July
9, 1986 from Cebu to petitioner whose address was P.O. Box
2445, Williamson, West Virginia 25661 (Exh. 1-D).
2. Exh. 2 letter dated 11/13/84 on a green stationery with
golden print of "a note from Menchu" on the left upper corner.
Anna Marie stated that "we" wrote to petitioner on Oct. 2, 1984
and that Keith and Joeton were very excited when petitioner
"called up last time." She told him how Joeton would grab the
phone from Keith just so petitioner would know what he wanted
to order. Charmaine, who was asleep, was so disappointed that
she missed petitioner's call because she also wanted something
that petitioner should buy. Menchu told petitioner that
Charmaine wanted a pencil sharpener, light-colored T-shirts for
her walking shorts and a (k)nap sack. Anna Marie informed
petitioner that the kids were growing up and so were their
needs. She told petitioner to be "very fatherly" about the
children's needs because those were expensive here. For
herself, Anna Marie asked for a subscription of Glamour and
Vogue magazines and that whatever expenses he would incur,

13

ADOPTION

she would "replace" these. As a postscript, she told petitioner

that Keith wanted a size 6 khaki-colored "Sperry topsider
shoes."
3. Exh. 3 an undated note on a yellow small piece of paper
that reads:
Dear Herbert,
Hi, how was Christmas and New Year? Hope you had a
wonderful one.
By the way thanks for the shoes, it was a nice one. It's nice to
be thought of at X'mas. Thanks again.
Sincerely,
Menchu

4. Exh. 4 a two-page undated letter of Keith on stationery of

Jose Clavano, Inc. addressed to "Dear Dad." Keith told his
father that they tried to tell their mother "to stay for a little while,
just a few weeks after classes start(s)" on June 16. He informed
petitioner that Joeton would be in Kinder I and that, about the
motorbike, he had told his mother to write petitioner about it and
"we'll see what you're (sic) decision will be." He asked for
chocolates, nuts, basketball shirt and shorts, rubber shoes,
socks, headband, some clothes for outing and perfume. He told
petitioner that they had been going to Labug with their mother
picking them up after Angkong or Ama had prepared lunch or
dinner. From her aerobics, his mother would go for them in
Lahug at about 9:30 or 10:00 o'clock in the evening. He wished
his father "luck and the best of health" and that they prayed for
him and their other relatives. The letter was ended with "Love
Keith."
5. Exh. 5 another undated long letter of Keith. He thanked his
father for the Christmas card "with $40.00, $30.00 and $30.00"
and the "card of Joeton with $5.00 inside." He told petitioner the
amounts following his father's instructions and promise to send

money through the mail. He asked his father to address his

letter directly to him because he wanted to open his own letters.
He informed petitioner of activities during the Christmas season
that they enjoyed eating, playing and giving surprises to their
mother. He apprised him of his daily schedule and that their
mother had been closely supervising them, instructing them to
fold their blankets and pile up their pillows. He informed
petitioner that Joeton had become very smart while Charmaine,
who was also smart, was very demanding of their mother.
Because their mother was leaving for the United States on
February 5, they would be missing her like they were missing
petitioner. He asked for his "things" and $200.00. He told
petitioner more anecdotes about Joeton like he would make the
sign of the cross even when they would pass by the Iglesia ni
Cristo church and his insistence that Aquino was not dead
because he had seen him on the betamax machine. For Keith,
Charmaine had become "very maldita" who was not always
satisfied with her dolls and things but Joeton was full of
surprises. He ended the letter with "Love your son, Keith." The
letter was mailed on February 6, 1985 (Exh. 5-D).
6. Exh. 6 an undated letter Charmaine. She thanked
petitioner for the bathing suit, key chain, pencil box, socks, half
shirt, pencil sharpener and $50.00. She reminded him of her
birthday on January 23 when she would turn 9 years old. She
informed him that she wore size 10 and the size of her feet was
IM. They had fun at Christmas in Lahug but classes would start
on January 9 although Keith's classes had started on January 6.
They would feel sad again because Mommy would be leaving
soon. She hoped petitioner would keep writing them. She
signed, "Love, Charmaine."
7. Exh . 7 an undated letter of Keith. He explained to
petitioner that they had not been remiss in writing letters to him.
He informed him of their trip to Manila they went to
Malacaang, Tito Doy Laurel's house, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, the executive house, Tagaytay for three days and
Baguio for one week. He informed him that he got "honors,"
Charmaine was 7th in her class and Joeton had excellent
grades. Joeton would be enrolled in Sacred Heart soon and he
was glad they would be together in that school. He asked for his
"reward" from petitioner and so with Charmaine and Joeton. He
asked for a motorbike and dollars that he could save. He told
petitioner that he was saving the money he had been sending

14

ADOPTION

them. He said he missed petitioner and wished him the best. He

added that petitioner should call them on Sundays.
8. Exh. 8 a letter from Joeton and Charmaine but apparently
written by the latter. She asked for money from petitioner to buy
something for the school and "something else." She, promised
not to spend so much and to save some. She said she loved
petitioner and missed him. Joeton said "hi!" to petitioner. After
ending the letter with "Love, Joeton and Charmaine," she asked
for her prize for her grades as she got seventh place.
9. Exh. 9 undated letter of Keith. He assured petitioner that
he had been writing him; that he would like to have some
money but he would save them; that he learned that petitioner
had called them up but he was not around; that he would be
going to Manila but would be back home May 3; that his
Mommy had just arrived Thursday afternoon, and that he would
be the "official altar boy." He asked petitioner to write them
soon.
10. Exh. 10 Keith thanked petitioner for the money he sent.
He told petitioner that he was saving some in the bank and he
was proud because he was the only one in his group who saved
in the bank. He told him that Joeton had become naughty and
would claim as his own the shirts sent to Keith by petitioner. He
advised petitioner to send pants and shirts to Joeton, too, and
asked for a pair of topsider shoes and candies. He informed
petitioner that he was a member of the basketball team and that
his mom would drive for his group. He asked him to call them
often like the father of Ana Christie and to write them when he
would call so that they could wait for it. He informed petitioner
that they had all grown bigger and heavier. He hoped petitioner
would be happy with the letter that had taken him so long to
write because he did not want to commit any mistakes. He
asked petitioner to buy him perfume (Drakkar) and, after
thanking petitioner, added that the latter should buy something
for Mommy.
11. Exh. 11 a Christmas card "For My Wonderful Father"
dated October 8, 1984 from Keith, Charmaine and Joeton.
12. Exh. 12 another Christmas card, "Our Wish For You" with
the year '83 written on the upper right hand corner of the inside
page, from Keith, Charmaine and Joeton.

13. Exh. 13 a letter of Keith telling petitioner that he had

written him even when their Mom "was there" where she bought
them clothes and shoes. Keith asked petitioner for $300.00.
Because his mother would not agree to buy him a motorbike, he
wanted a Karaoke unit that would cost P12,000.00. He informed
petitioner that he would go to an afternoon disco with friends but
their grades were all good with Joeton receiving "stars" for
excellence. Keith wanted a bow and arrow Rambo toys and G.I.
Joe. He expressed his desire that petitioner would come and
visit them someday.
14. Exh. 14 a letter of Keith with one of the four pages
bearing the date January 1986. Keith told his father that they
had received the package that the latter sent them. The clothes
he sent, however, fitted only Keith but not Charmaine and
Joeton who had both grown bigger. Keith asked for grocery
items, toys and more clothes. He asked, in behalf of his mother,
for low-heeled shoes and a dress to match, jogging pants, tights
and leotards that would make her look sexy. He intimated to
petitioner that he had grown taller and that he was already
ashamed to be asking for things to buy in the grocery even
though his mother had told him not to be shy about it.
Aside from these letters, petitioner also presented certifications of banks in the
U.S.A. showing that even prior to the filing of the petition for adoption, he had
25
deposited amounts for the benefit of his children. Exhibits 24 to 45 are copies
of checks sent by petitioner to the children from 1985 to 1989.
These pieces of evidence are all on record. It is, therefore, quite surprising why
the courts below simply glossed over these, ignoring not only evidence on
financial support but also the emotional exchange of sentiments between
petitioner and his family. Instead, the courts below emphasized the meagerness
of the amounts he sent to his children and the fact that, as regards the bank
deposits, these were "withdrawable by him alone." Simply put, the courts below
attached a high premium to the prospective adopters' financial status but totally
brushed aside the possible repercussion of the adoption on the emotional and
psychological well-being of the children.
True, Keith had expressed his desire to be adopted by his uncle and aunt.
However, his seeming steadfastness on the matter as shown by his testimony is
contradicted by his feelings towards his father as revealed in his letters to him. It
is not at all farfetched to conclude that Keith's testimony was actually the effect
of the filing of the petition for adoption that would certainly have engendered
confusion in his young mind as to the capability of his father to sustain the
lifestyle he had been used to.

15

ADOPTION

The courts below emphasized respondents' emotional attachment to the

children. This is hardly surprising for, from the very start of their young lives, the
children were used to their presence. Such attachment had persisted and
certainly, the young ones' act of snuggling close to private respondent Ronald
Clavano was not indicative of their emotional detachment from their father.
Private respondents, being the uncle and aunt of the children, could not but
come to their succor when they needed help as when Keith got sick and private
respondent Ronald spent for his hospital bills.
In a number of cases, this Court has held that parental authority cannot be
entrusted to a person simply because he could give the child a larger measure
26
of material comfort than his natural parent. Thus, in David v. Court of Appeals,
the Court awarded custody of a minor illegitimate child to his mother who was a
mere secretary and market vendor instead of to his affluent father who was a
married man, not solely because the child opted to go with his mother. The
Court said:
Daisie and her children may not be enjoying a life of affluence
that private respondent promises if the child lives with him. It is
enough, however, that petitioner is earning a decent living and
is able to support her children according to her means.
27

In Celis v. Cafuir where the Court was confronted with the issue of whether to
award custody of a child to the natural mother or to a foster mother, this Court
said:
This court should avert the tragedy in the years to come of
having deprived mother and son of the beautiful associations
and tender, imperishable memories engendered by the
relationship of parent and child. We should not take away from
a mother the opportunity of bringing up her own child even at
the cost of extreme sacrifice due to poverty and lack of means;
so that afterwards, she may be able to look back with pride and
a sense of satisfaction at her sacrifices and her efforts, however
humble, to make her dreams of her little boy come true. We
should not forget that the relationship between a foster mother
and a child is not natural but artificial. If the child turns out to be
a failure or forgetful of what its foster parents had done for him,
said parents might yet count and appraise (sic) all that they
have done and spent for him and with regret consider all of it as
a dead loss, and even rue the day they committed the blunder
of taking the child into their hearts and their home. Not so with a
real natural mother who never counts the cost and her
sacrifices, ever treasuring memories of her associations with

her child, however unpleasant and disappointing. Flesh and

blood count. . . . .
28

In Espiritu v. Court of Appeals,

the Court stated that "(I)n ascertaining the
welfare and best interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family Code
to take into account all relevant considerations." Thus, in awarding custody of
the child to the father, the Court said:
A scrutiny of the pleadings in this case indicates that Teresita,
or at least, her counsel are more intent on emphasizing the
"torture and agony" of a mother separated from her children and
the humiliation she suffered as a, result of her character being
made a key issue in court rather than the feelings and future,
the best interests and welfare of her children. While the bonds
between a mother and her small child are special in nature,
either parent, whether father or mother, is bound to suffer agony
and pain if deprived of custody. One cannot say that his or her
suffering is greater than that of the other parent. It is not so
much the suffering, pride, and other feelings of either parent but
the welfare of the child which is the paramount consideration.
29
(Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, it would be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were to
be the paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person of
parental authority over his children. There should be a holistic approach to the
matter, taking into account the physical, emotional, psychological, mental, social
30
and spiritual needs of the child.
The conclusion of the courts below that
petitioner abandoned his family needs more evidentiary support other than his
inability to provide them the material comfort that his admittedly affluent in-laws
could provide. There should be proof that he had so emotionally abandoned
them that his children would not miss his guidance and counsel if they were
given to adopting parents. The letters he received from his children prove that
petitioner maintained the more important emotional tie between him and his
children. The children needed him not only because he could cater to their
whims but also because he was a person they could share with their daily
activities, problems and triumphs.
The Court is thus dismayed that the courts below did not look beyond
petitioner's "meager" financial support to ferret out other indications on whether
petitioner had in fact abandoned his family. The omission of said courts has led
us to examine why the children were subjected to the process of adoption,
notwithstanding the proven ties that bound them to their father. To our
consternation, the record of the case bears out the fact that the welfare of the
children was not exactly the "paramount consideration" that impelled Anna Marie
to consent to their adoption.

16

ADOPTION

In her affidavit of consent, Anna Marie expressly said that leaving the children in
the country, as she was wont to travel abroad often, was a problem that would
naturally hamper her job-seeking abroad. In other words, the adoption appears
to be a matter of convenience for her because Anna Marie herself is financially
31
capable of supporting her children.
In his testimony, private respondent
Ronald swore that Anna Marie had been out of the country for two years and
32
came home twice or three times, thereby manifesting the fact that it was she
who actually left her children to the care of her relatives. It was bad enough that
their father left their children when he went abroad, but when their mother
followed suit for her own reasons, the situation worsened. The Clavano family
must have realized this. Hence, when the family first discussed the adoption of
the children, they decided that the prospective adopter should be Anna Marie's
brother Jose. However, because he had children of his own, the family decided
33
to devolve the task upon private respondents.

irresponsible act visits on his family. Neither may the Court place a premium on
the inability of a man to distinguish between siring children and parenting them.
Nonetheless, the actuality that petitioner carried on an affair with a paramour
cannot be taken as sufficient basis for the conclusion that petitioner was
41
necessarily an unfit father.
Conventional wisdom and common human
experience show that a "bad" husband does not necessarily make a "bad"
father. That a husband is not exactly an upright man is not, strictly speaking, a
sufficient ground to deprive him as a father of his inherent right to parental
42
authority over the children. Petitioner has demonstrated his love and concern
43
for his children when he took the trouble of sending a telegram
to the lower
court expressing his intention to oppose the adoption immediately after learning
about it. He traveled back to this country to attend to the case and to testify
about his love for his children and his desire to unite his family once more in the
44
United States.

This couple, however, could not always be in Cebu to care for the children. A
businessman, private respondent Ronald Clavano commutes between Cebu
and Manila while his wife, private respondent Maria Clara, is an international
34
flight stewardess. Moreover, private respondent Ronald claimed that he could
35
"take care of the children while their parents are away," thereby indicating the
evanescence of his intention. He wanted to have the children's surname
changed to Clavano for the reason that he wanted to take them to the United
States as it would be difficult for them to get a visa if their surname were
36
different from his.
To be sure, he also testified that he wanted to spare the
children the stigma of being products of a broken home.

Private respondents themselves explained why petitioner failed to abide by the

agreement with his wife on the support of the children. Petitioner was an illegal
alien in the United States. As such, he could not have procured gainful
employment. Private respondents failed to refute petitioner's testimony that he
45
did not receive his share from the sale of the conjugal home, pursuant to their
manifestation/compromise agreement in the legal separation case. Hence, it can
be reasonably presumed that the proceeds of the sale redounded to the benefit
of his family, particularly his children. The proceeds may not have lasted long
but there is ample evidence to show that thereafter, petitioner tried to abide by
his agreement with his wife and sent his family money, no matter how "meager."

Nevertheless, a close analysis of the testimonies of private respondent Ronald,

his sister Anna Marie and their brother Jose points to the inescapable
conclusion that they just wanted to keep the children away from their father. One
of the overriding considerations for the adoption was allegedly the state of Anna
Marie's health she was a victim of an almost fatal accident and suffers from a
heart ailment. However, she herself admitted that her health condition was not
37
that serious as she could still take care of the children. An eloquent evidence
of her ability to physically care for them was her employment at the Philippine
38
Consulate in Los Angeles she could not have been employed if her health
were endangered. It is thus clear that the Clavanos' attempt at depriving
petitioner of parental authority apparently stemmed from their notion that he was
an inveterate womanizer. Anna Marie in fact expressed fear that her children
39
would "never be at ease with the wife of their father."

The liberality with which this Court treats matters leading to adoption insofar as it
carries out the beneficent purposes of the law to ensure the rights and privileges
of the adopted child arising therefrom, ever mindful that the paramount
consideration is the overall benefit and interest of the adopted child, should be
understood in its proper context and perspective. The Court's position, should
not be misconstrued or misinterpreted as to extend to inferences beyond the
46
contemplation of law and jurisprudence.
The discretion to approve adoption
proceedings is not to be anchored solely on best interests of the child but
47
likewise, with due regard to the natural rights of the parents over the child.

Petitioner, who described himself as single in status, denied being a womanizer

40
and father to the sons of Wilma Soco. As to whether he was telling the truth is
beside the point. Philippine society, being comparatively conservative and
traditional, aside from being Catholic in orientation, it does not countenance
womanizing on the part of a family man, considering the baneful effects such

In this regard, this Court notes private respondents' reliance on the

manifestation/compromise agreement between petitioner and Anna Marie which
became the basis of the decree of legal separation. According to private
48
respondents' counsel,
the authority given to Anna Marie by that decree to
49
enter into contracts as a result of the legal separation was "all embracing"
and, therefore, included giving her sole consent to the adoption. This conclusion
is however, anchored on the wrong premise that the authority given to the
innocent spouse to enter into contracts that obviously refer to their conjugal
properties, shall include entering into agreements leading to the adoption of the

17

ADOPTION

children. Such conclusion is as devoid of a legal basis as private respondents'

apparent reliance on the decree of legal separation for doing away with
petitioner's consent to the adoption.

The father and mother, being the natural guardians of

unemancipated children, are duty-bound and entitled to keep
52
them in their custody and company. (Emphasis supplied)

The transfer of custody over the children to Anna Marie by virtue of the decree
of legal separation did not, of necessity; deprive petitioner of parental authority
for the purpose of placing the children up for adoption. Article 213 of the Family
Code states: ". . . in case of legal separation of parents, parental authority shall
be exercised by the parent designated by the court." In awarding custody, the
court shall take into account "all relevant considerations, especially the choice of
the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit."

As such, in instant case, petitioner may not be deemed as having been

completely deprived of parental authority, notwithstanding the award of custody
to Anna Marie in the legal separation case. To reiterate, that award was arrived
at by the lower court on the basis of the agreement of the spouses.

If should be noted, however, that the law only confers on the innocent spouse
the "exercise" of parental authority. Having custody of the child, the innocent
spouse shall implement the sum of parental rights with respect to his rearing and
care. The innocent spouse shall have the right to the child's services and
earnings, and the right to direct his activities and make decisions regarding his
50
care and control, education, health and religion.
In a number of cases, this Court has considered parental authority, the joint
51
exercise of which is vested by the law upon the parents, as
. . . a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to
parents for the purpose of the children's physical preservation
and development, as well as the cultivation of their intellect and
the education of their hearts and senses. As regards parental
authority, "there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights,
but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the
welfare of the minor."
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not
be transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law.
The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal,
the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of
adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an
orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a
minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a
document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it
does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if
a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the
same.

While parental authority may be waived, as in law it may be subject to a

53
compromise,
there was no factual finding in the legal separation case that
petitioner was such an irresponsible person that he should be deprived of
custody of his children or that there are grounds under the law that could deprive
him of parental authority. In fact, in the legal separation case, the court
thereafter ordered the transfer of custody over the children from Anna Marie
back to petitioner. The order was not implemented because of Anna Marie's
motion for reconsideration thereon. The Clavano family also vehemently
objected to the transfer of custody to the petitioner, such that the latter was
54
forced to file a contempt charge against them.
The law is clear that either parent may lose parental authority over the child only
for a valid reason. No such reason was established in the legal separation case.
In the instant case for adoption, the issue is whether or not petitioner had
abandoned his children as to warrant dispensation of his consent to their
adoption. Deprivation of parental authority is one of the effects of a decree of
55
adoption. But there cannot be a valid decree of adoption in this case precisely
because, as this Court has demonstrated earlier, the finding of the courts below
on the issue of petitioner's abandonment of his family was based on a
misappreciation that was tantamount to non-appreciation, of facts on record.
As regards the divorce obtained in the United States, this Court has ruled in
56
Tenchavez v. Escao
that a divorce obtained by Filipino citizens after the
effectivity of the Civil Code is not recognized in this jurisdiction as it is contrary to
State policy. While petitioner is now an American citizen, as regards Anna Marie
who has apparently remained a Filipino citizen, the divorce has no legal effect.
Parental authority is a constitutionally protected State policy borne out of
established customs and tradition of our people. Thus, in Silva v. Court of
57
Appeals, a case involving the visitorial rights of an illegitimate parent over his
child, the Court expressed the opinion that:
Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and legal
duty, to care for their children, see to their upbringing and
safeguard their best interest and welfare. This authority and

18

ADOPTION

responsibility may not be unduly denied the parents; neither

may it be renounced by them. Even when the parents are
estranged and their affection for each other is lost, the
attachment and feeling for their offsprings invariably remain
unchanged. Neither the law not the courts allow this affinity to
suffer absent, of course, any real, grave and imminent threat to
the well being of the child.

guidance in the exercise by the child of the rights recognized in

63
the present Convention.

Since the incorporation of the law concerning adoption in the Civil Code, there
has been a pronounced trend to place emphasis in adoption proceedings, not so
much on the need of childless couples for a child, as on the paramount interest,
of a child who needs the love and care of parents. After the passage of the Child
and Youth Welfare Code and the Family Code, the discernible trend has
impelled the enactment of Republic Act No. 8043 on Intercountry,
58
Adoption
and Republic Act No. 8552 establishing the rules on the domestic
59
adoption of Filipino children.

A child whose parents reside in different States shall have the

right to maintain on a regular basis, save in exceptional
circumstances personal relations and direct contacts with both
65
parents . . .

The case at bar applies the relevant provisions of these recent laws, such as the
following policies in the "Domestic Adoption Act of 1998":
(a) To ensure that every child remains under
the care and custody of his/her parent(s) and
be provided with love, care, understanding and
security towards the full and harmonious
60
development of his/her personality.
(b) In all matters relating to the care, custody
and adoption of a child, his/her interest shall be
the paramount consideration in accordance with
the tenets set forth in the United Nations (UN)
61
Convention on the Rights of the Child.
(c) To prevent the child from unnecessary
62
separation from his/her biological parent(s).
Inasmuch as the Philippines is a signatory to the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of the Child, the government and its officials are duty bound to
comply with its mandates. Of particular relevance to instant case are the
following provisions:
States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and
duties of parents . . . to provide, in a manner consistent with the
evolving capacities of the child, appropriate direction and

States Parties shall respect the right of the child who is

separated from one or both parents to maintain personal
relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis,
64
except if it is contrary to the child's best interests.

States Parties shall respect the rights and duties of the parents .
. . to provide direction to the child in the exercise of his or her
right in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the
66
child.
Underlying the policies and precepts in international conventions and the
domestic statutes with respect to children is the overriding principle that all
actuations should be in the best interests of the child. This is not, however, to be
implemented in derogation of the primary right of the parent or parents to
exercise parental authority over him. The rights of parents vis--vis that of their
children are not antithetical to each other, as in fact, they must be respected and
harmonized to the fullest extent possible.
Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony have all grown up. Keith and Charmaine
are now of legal age while Joseph Anthony is approaching eighteen, the age of
majority. For sure, they shall be endowed with the discretion to lead lives
independent of their parents. This is not to state that this case has been
rendered moot and academic, for their welfare and best interests regarding their
adoption, must be determined as of the time that the petition for adoption was
67
filed. Said petition must be denied as it was filed without the required consent
of their father who, by law and under the facts of the case at bar, has not
abandoned them.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED.
The questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, as well as the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, are SET ASIDE thereby denying
the petition for adoption of Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed
Cang, by the spouse respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano. This
Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

19

ADOPTION

Narvasa, C.J., Kapunan and Purisima, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-20927

July 26, 1966
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF THE MINOR ROSSANA E. CRUZ.
ROSALINA E. CRUZ, petitioner and appellee,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor and appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General F. R.
Rosete and T. M. Dilig for oppositor and appellant.
Monico E. Luna for petitioner and appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from the decree of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City, in its
Special Case No. 609, granting a petition for adoption on the sole issue of the
said court's jurisdiction.
Petitioner-appellee Rosalina E. Cruz filed with the court a quo a petition to adopt
a minor. Satisfied as to the sufficiency of the petition, and it appearing that the
child's parents, Lucilo Bucoy and Ana E. Bucoy, had given their written consent
to the adoption, the court, in an order on 11 January 1962, set the petition for
hearing and directed the publication of the order once a week for three
consecutive weeks in the "Zamboanga Times".
The court a quo found the following facts:
The petitioner, Rosalina E. Cruz, of 39 years of age, is the childless wife of
Francisco de la Cruz and is a resident of Zamboanga. Francisco de la Cruz
gave his consent to the adoption by his wife, in an affidavit attached to the
petition, and also testified thereabout. The minor child sought to be adopted was
born on 26 December 1959 and recorded in the local civil registrar's office as
Rossana Esperat Bucoy (Ext "E"); but said child was baptized on 19 September
1960 as Rossana E. Cruz (Exh. "C"), already following the surname of the
would-be adopting parent, who reared and took care of the girl since birth, and

who has developed a strong maternal love for her. The child's parents by nature,
aside from their written consent, testified in court on their consent to the
1
adoption.
The child's name in the petition for adoption, and as published in the newspaper,
is Rossana E. Cruz, her baptismal name, instead of Rossana E. Bucoy her
name in the record of birth; thus oppositor-appellant Republic of the Philippines
claims that "the lower court erred in taking cognizance of the instant petition for
adoption despite the fact that it did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by
reason of a substantial defect in the petition and the published order of hearing".
We agree with the view taken by the Solicitor General.
The name of a person as recorded in the civil register, and not his baptismal
name, is, for legal purposes, his real name, baptismal names having never been
legally recognized, nor the practice of using baptismal names sanctioned by the
law (Chomi vs. Local Civil Register of Manila, 99 Phil. 1004). It follows,
therefore, that the use of the baptismal name of the child to be adopted, instead
of its name in the civil register, would countenance or permit that which has
always been frowned upon.1wph1.t
A proceeding in adopting is a proceeding in rem (Ellis, et al. vs. Republic, L16922, 30 April 1963; Van Matre vs. Sankey 148 III. 536; 36 NE 628) in which
notice is made through publication (Sec. 4 of former Rule 100, now Section 4 of
Rule 99) to protect the interests of all persons concerned (3 Moran 534, 1963
Ed.). Said interests will not be protected if the notice by publication does not
carry the true name of the child to be adopted because the persons to be served
by the notice have the right to expect the use of the child's officially recorded
name. The defect, in the present case, amounts to a failure of service by
publication, and the court a quo acquired no jurisdiction over the case (Cf.
Yuseco vs. Republic, L-13441, 30 June 1960).
For the foregoing reasons, the appealed decision is hereby reversed; and the
petition for adoption dismissed, but without prejudice to reinstituting the
proceedings in conformity with law. Costs against the petitioner-appellee.
Concepcion, C.J., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar,
Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur

20

ADOPTION

G.R. No. L-18753

March 26, 1965

VICENTE B. TEOTICO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
ANA DEL VAL, ETC., oppositor-appellant.
Antonio Gonzales for petitioner-appellant.
J.C. Zulueta, G. D. David and N. J. Quisumbing for oppositor-appellant.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died on July 14, 1955 in the City of
Manila leaving properties worth P600,000.00. She left a will written in Spanish
which she executed at her residence at No. 2 Legarda St., Quiapo, Manila. She
affixed her signature at the bottom of the will and on the left margin of each and
every page thereof in the presence of Pilar Borja, Pilar C. Sanchez, and
Modesto Formilleza, who in turn affixed their signatures below the attestation
clause and on the left margin of each and every page of the will in the presence
of the testatrix and of each other. Said will was acknowledged before Notary
Public Niceforo S. Agaton by the testatrix and her witnesses.
In said will the testatrix made the following preliminary statement: that she was
possessed of the full use of her mental faculties; that she was free from illegal
pressure or influence of any kind from the beneficiaries of the will and from any
influence of fear or threat; that she freely and spontaneously executed said will
and that she had neither ascendants nor descendants of any kind such that she
could freely dispose of all her estate.
Among the many legacies and devises made in the will was one of P20,000.00
to Rene A. Teotico, married to the testatrix's niece named Josefina Mortera. To
said spouses the testatrix left the usufruct of her interest in the Calvo building,
while the naked ownership thereof she left in equal parts to her grandchildren
who are the legitimate children of said spouses. The testatrix also instituted
Josefina Mortera as her sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her
properties not otherwise disposed of in the will.
On July 17, 1955, Vicente B. Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will
before the Court of First Instance of Manila which was set for hearing on
September 3, 1955 after the requisite publication and service to all parties
concerned.

Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a

deceased sister of the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of
Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the same testatrix, filed on September 2,
1955 an opposition to the probate of the will alleging the following grounds: (1)
said will was not executed as required by law; (2) the testatrix was physically
and mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of its execution; and (3)
the will was executed under duress, threat or influence of fear.
Vicente B. Teotico, filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the
oppositor had no legal personality to intervene. The probate court, after due
hearing, allowed the oppositor to intervene as an adopted child of Francisca
Mortera, and on June 17, 1959, the oppositor amended her opposition by
alleging, the additional ground that the will is inoperative as to the share of Dr.
Rene Teotico because the latter was the physician who took care of the testatrix
during her last illness.
After the parties had presented their evidence, the probate court rendered its
decision on November 10, 1960, admitting the will to probate but declaring the
disposition made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico void with the statement that the
portion to be vacated by the annulment should pass to the testatrix's heirs by
way of intestate succession.
Petitioner Teotico, together with the universal heir Josefina Mortera, filed a
motion for reconsideration of that part of the decision which declares the portion
of the estate to be vacated by the nullity of the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico
as passing to the legal heirs, while the oppositor filed also a motion for
reconsideration of the portion of the judgment which decrees the probate of the
will. On his part, Dr. Rene Teotico requested leave to intervene and to file a
motion for reconsideration with regard to that portion of the decision which
nullified the legacy made in his favor.
The motions for reconsideration above adverted to having been denied, both
petitioner and oppositor appealed from the decision, the former from that portion
which nullifies the legacy in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico and declares the vacated
portion as subject of succession in favor of the legal heirs, and the latter from
that portion which admits the will to probate. And in this instance both petitioner
and oppositor assign several errors which, stripped of non-essentials, may be
boiled down to the following: (1) Has oppositor Ana del Val Chan the right to
intervene in this proceeding?; (2) Has the will in question been duly admitted to
probate?; (3) Did the probate court commit an error in passing on the intrinsic
validity of the provisions of the will and in determining who should inherit the
portion to be vacated by the nullification of the legacy made in favor of Dr. Rene
Teotico?

21

ADOPTION

These issues will be discussed separately.

1. It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene
in a probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or
in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the
estate (Ngo The Hua v. Chung Kiat Hua, et al., L-17091, September 30, 1963);
and an interested party has been defined as one who would be benefited by the
estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor
(Idem). On the other hand, in Saguinsin v. Lindayag, et al., L-17750, December
17, 1962, this Court said:
According to Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, a petition for
letters of administration must be filed by an "interested person." An
interested party has been defined in this connection as one who would
be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim
against the estate, such as a creditor (Intestate Estate of Julio
Magbanwa 40 O.G. 1171). And it is well settled in this jurisdiction that in
civil actions as well as special proceedings, the interest required in order
that a person may be a party thereto must be material and direct, and
not merely indirect or contingent (Trillana vs. Crisostomo, G.R. No. L3370, August 22, 1951; Rapinosa vs. Barrion, 70 Phil. 311).
The question now may be asked: Has oppositor any interest in any of the
provisions of the will, and, in the negative, would she acquire any right to the
estate in the event that the will is denied probate?
Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no right to intervene because she has
no interest in the estate either as heir, executor, or administrator, nor does she
have any claim to any property affected by the will, because it nowhere appears
therein any provision designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of any portion
of the estate. She has also no interest in the will either as administratrix or
executrix. Neither has she any claim against any portion of the estate because
she is not a co-owner thereof, and while she previously had an interest in the
Calvo building located in Escolta, she had already disposed of it long before the
execution of the will.1wph1.t
In the supposition that, the will is denied probate, would the oppositor acquire
any interest in any portion of the estate left by the testatrix? She would acquire
such right only if she were a legal heir of the deceased, but she is not under our
Civil Code. It is true that oppositor claims to be an acknowledged natural child of
Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the deceased, and also an adopted
daughter of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the testatrix, but such claim
cannot give her any comfort for, even if it be true, the law does not give her any
right to succeed to the estate of the deceased sister of both Jose Mortera and

Francisca Mortera. And this is so because being an illegitimate child she is

prohibited by law from succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural
father. Thus, Article 992 of our Civil Code provides: "An illegitimate child has no
right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father
or mother; ... ." And the philosophy behind this provision is well expressed in
Grey v. Fabie, 68 Phil. 128, as follows:
Between the natural child and the legitimate relatives of the father or
mother who acknowledged it, the Code denies any right of succession.
They cannot be called relatives and they have no right to inherit. Of
course, there is a blood tie, but the law does not recognize it. On this,
article 943 is based upon the reality of the facts and upon the
presumption will of the interested parties; the natural child is
disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the legitimate
family is, in turn, hated by the natural child; the latter considers the
privileged condition of the former and the resources of which it is
thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the natural child nothing
but the product of sin, a palpable evidence of a blemish upon the family.
Every relation is ordinarily broken in life; the law does no more than
recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment. (7
Manresa, 3d., p. 110.)
The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted
child of Francisca Mortera because under our law the relationship established by
adoption is limited solely to the adopter and the adopted and does not extend to
the relatives of the adopting parents or of the adopted child except only as
expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is created between the
adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the
adopted is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.
The relationship established by the adoption, however, is limited to the
adopting parent, and does not extend to his other relatives, except as
expressly provided by law. Thus, the adopted child cannot be
considered as a relative of the ascendants and collaterals of the
adopting parents, nor of the legitimate children which they may have
after the adoption, except that the law imposes certain impediments to
marriage by reason of adoption. Neither are the children of the adopted
considered as descendants of the adopter. The relationship created is
exclusively between the adopter and the adopted, and does not extend
to the relatives of either. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1,
p. 652).
Relationship by adoption is limited to adopter and adopted, and does
not extend to other members of the family of either; but the adopted is
prohibited to marry the children of the adopter to avoid scandal. (An

22

ADOPTION

Outline of Philippine Civil Law by Justice Jose B. L. Reyes and Ricardo

C. Puno, Vol. 1, p. 313; See also Caguioa, Comments and Cases on
Civil Law 1955, Vol 1, pp. 312-313; Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines,
1959 ed., Vol. 1, p. 515)
It thus appears that the oppositor has no right to intervene either as
testamentary or as legal heir in this probate proceeding contrary to the ruling of
the court a quo.
2. The next question to be determined is whether the will Exhibit A was duly
admitted to probate. Oppositor claims that the same should not have been
admitted not only because it was not properly attested to but also because it
was procured thru pressure and influence and the testatrix affixed her signature
by mistake believing that it contained her true intent.
The claim that the will was not properly attested to is contradicted by the
evidence of record. In this respect it is fit that we state briefly the declarations of
the instrumental witnesses.
Pilar Borja testified that the testatrix was in perfect state of health at the time she
executed the will for she carried her conversation with her intelligently; that the
testatrix signed immediately above the attestation clause and on each and every
page thereof at the left-hand margin in the presence of the three instrumental
witnesses and the notary public; that it was the testatrix herself who asked her
and the other witnesses to act as such; and that the testatrix was the first one to
sign and later she gave the will to the witnesses who read and signed it.
Pilar G. Sanchez also testified that she knew the testatrix since 1945; that it was
the testatrix herself who asked her to be a witness to the will; that the testatrix
was the first one to sign and she gave the will later to the witnesses to sign and
afterwards she gave it to the notary public; that on the day of the execution of
the will the testatrix was in the best of health.
Modesto Formilleza also testified that he was asked by the testatrix to be one of
the witnesses to the will; that he read and understood the attestation clause
before he signed the document, and all the witnesses spoke either in Spanish or
in Tagalog. He finally said that the instrumental witnesses and the testatrix
signed the will at the same time and place and identified their signatures.
This evidence which has not been successfully refuted proves conclusively that
the will was duly executed because it was signed by the testatrix and her
instrumental witnesses and the notary public in the manner provided for by law.

The claim that the will was procured by improper pressure and influence is also
belied by the evidence. On this point the court a quo made the following
observation:
The circumstance that the testatrix was then living under the same roof
with Dr. Rene Teotico is no proof adequate in law to sustain the
conclusion that there was improper pressure and undue influence. Nor
is the alleged fact of isolation of the testatrix from the oppositor and her
witnesses, for their supposed failure to see personally the testatrix,
attributable to the vehemence of Dr. Rene Teotico, to exclude visitors,
took place years after the execution of the will on May 17, 1951.
Although those fact may have some weight to support the theory of the
oppositor, yet they must perforce yield to the weightier fact that nothing
could have prevented the testatrix, had she really wanted to from
subsequently revoking her 1951 will if it did not in fact reflect and
express her own testamentary dispositions. For, as testified to by the
oppositor and her witnesses, the testatrix was often seen at the Escolta,
in Quiapo and Sta. Cruz, Manila, walking and accompanied by no one.
In fact, on different occasions, each of them was able to talk with her.
We have examined the evidence on the matter and we are fully in accord with
the foregoing observation. Moreover, the mere claim that Josefina Mortera and
her husband Rene Teotico had the opportunity to exert pressure on the testatrix
simply because she lived in their house several years prior to the execution of
the will and that she was old and suffering from hypertension in that she was
virtually isolated from her friends for several years prior to her death is
insufficient to disprove what the instrumental witnesses had testified that the
testatrix freely and voluntarily and with full consciousness of the solemnity of the
occasion executed the will under consideration. The exercise of improper
pressure and undue influence must be supported by substantial evidence and
must be of a kind that would overpower and subjugate the mind of the testatrix
as to destroy her free agency and make her express the will of another rather
than her own (Coso v. Deza, 42 0. G. 596). The burden is on the person
challenging the will that such influence was exerted at the time of its execution,
a matter which here was not done, for the evidence presented not only is
insufficient but was disproved by the testimony of the instrumental witnesses.
3. The question of whether the probate court could determine the intrinsic
validity of the provisions of a will has been decided by this Court in a long line of
decisions among which the following may be cited:
Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will
cannot be entertained in Probate proceeding because its only purpose
is merely to determine if the will has been executed in accordance with
the requirements of the law." (Palacios v. Palacios, 58 0. G. 220)

23

ADOPTION

... The authentication of a will decides no other questions than such as

touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those
requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of wills.
It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or
efficiency of the provisions, these may be impugned as being vicious or
null, notwithstanding its authentication. The questions relating to these
points remain entirely unaffected, and may be raised even after the will
has been authenticated. ...
From the fact that the legalization of a will does not validate the
provisions therein contained, it does not follow that such provision lack
the efficiency, or fail to produce the effects which the law recognizes
when they are not impugned by anyone. In the matter of wills it is a
fundamental doctrine that the will of the testator is the law governing the
interested parties, and must be punctually complied with in so far as it is
not contrary to the law or to public morals. (Montaano v. Suesa, 14
Phil. 676, 679-680)
To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts
that a will was executed with the formalities required by law and that the
testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the
proceedings under the new code for the probate of a will. (Sec. 625.)
The judgment in such proceedings determines and can determine
nothing more. In them the court has no power to pass upon the validity
of any provisions made in the will. It can not decide, for example, that a
certain legacy is void and another one is valid. (Castaeda v. Alemany,
3 Phil. 426, 428)
Pursuant to the foregoing precedents the pronouncement made by the court a
quo declaring invalid the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico in the will Exhibit A
must be set aside as having been made in excess of its jurisdiction. Another
reason why said pronouncement should be set aside is that the legatee was not
given an opportunity to defend the validity of the legacy for he was not allowed
to intervene in this proceeding. As a corollary, the other pronouncements
touching on the disposition of the estate in favor of some relatives of the
deceased should also be set aside for the same reason.
WHEREFORE, with the exception of that portion of the decision which declares
that the will in question has been duly executed and admitted the same to
probate, the rest of the decision is hereby set aside. This case is ordered
remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings. No pronouncement as to
costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Regala,

Makalintal,
Bengzon,
J.P.,
and
Zaldivar,
JJ.,
concur.
Dizon, J., took no part.

24

ADOPTION

G.R. No. L-32181

March 5, 1986
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
LEONOR VALENCIA, as Natural mother and guardian of her minor
children, BERNARDO GO and JESSICA GO; and THE HON. AGAPITO
HONTANOSAS, Judge of the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU,
Branch XI.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of respondent Judge Agapito
Hontanosas of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XI who ordered the
Local Civil Registrar of Cebu to make the necessary cancellation and/or
correction in the entries of birth of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go in the Civil
Registry of the City of Cebu.
Respondent Leonor Valencia, for and in behalf of her minor children, Bernardo
Go and Jessica Go filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu a petition for
the cancellation and/or correction of entries of birth of Bernardo Go and Jessica
Go in the Civil Registry of the City of Cebu. The case was docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 3043-R.
The Solicitor General filed an opposition to the petition alleging that the petition
for correction of entry in the Civil Registry pursuant to Article 412 of the New
Civil Code of the Philippines in relation to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of
Court, contemplates a summary proceeding and correction of mere clerical
errors, those harmless and innocuous changes such as the correction of a name
that is merely mispelled, occupation of parents, etc., and not changes or
corrections involving civil status, nationality, or citizenship which are substantial
and controversial.
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the trial court issued
an order directing the publication of the petition and the date of hearing thereof
in the Cebu Advocate, a newspaper of general circulation in the city and
province of Cebu, once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, and notice
thereof, duly served on the Solicitor General, the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu
City and Go Eng.
Respondent Leonor Valencia, filed her reply to the opposition wherein she
admitted that the present petition seeks substantial changes involving the civil
status and nationality or citizenship of respondents, but alleged that substantial
changes in the civil registry records involving the civil status of parents, their
nationality or citizenship may be allowed if- (1) the proper suit is filed, and (2)
evidence is submitted, either to support the allegations of the petition or to
disprove the same; that respondents have complied with these requirements by
filing the present special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in
the civil registry pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court and that

they have caused reasonable notice to be given to the persons named in the
petition and have also caused the order for the hearings of their petition to be
published for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation
in the province.
Subsequently, the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground that since the petition seeks to change the nationality or citizenship
of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go from "Chinese" to "Filipino" and their status from
"Legitimate" to Illegitimate", and changing also the status of the mother from
"married" to "single" the corrections sought are not merely clerical but
substantial, involving as they do the citizenship and status of the petitioning
minors and the status of their mother.
The lower court denied the motion to dismiss.
After trial on the merits during which the parties were given all the opportunity to
present their evidence and refute the evidence and arguments of the other side,
the lower court rendered a decision the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered granting the
instant petition and ordering the Local Civil Registrar of the City
of Cebu to make the necessary cancellation and/or correction
on the following entries:
A. In the Record of Birth of BERNARDO GO, to register said
Bernardo Go as 'FILIPINO' instead of 'CHINESE'; as
'ILLEGITIMATE instead of LEGITIMATE', and his father's (GO
ENG) and mother's (LEONOR VALENCIA) civil status as
'SINGLE instead of MARRIED';
B. In the Record of Birth of JESSICA GO to register said
Jessica Go as 'FILIPINO' instead of 'CHINESE'; as
'ILLEGITIMATE' instead of 'LEGITIMATE' and father's (GO
ENG) and mother's (LEONOR VALENCIA) civil status as
'SINGLE instead of MARRIED': and
C. In both Records of Birth of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go to
change the entry on Petitioner's Citizenship from 'CHINESE to
FILIPINO'.
Pursuant to Section 6, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, the Clerk
of Court is hereby directed to furnish a copy of this decision to
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, who shall
forthwith enter the cancellation and/'or correction of entries of
birth of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go in the Civil Registry as
adverted to above.
From the foregoing decision, oppositor-appellant Republic of the Philippines
appealed to us by way of this petition for review on certiorari.
The petitioner Republic of the Philippines raises a lone error for the grant of this
petition, stating that:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE
CORRECTION OF THE PETITIONER'S CITIZENSHIP AND
CIVIL STATUS AND THE CITIZENSHIP AND CIVIL STATUS

25

ADOPTION

OF HER MINOR CHILDREN BERNARDO GO AND JESSICA

GO.
The petitioner premises its case on precedents from the 1954 case of Ty Kong
Tin v. Republic (94 Phil. 321) to the 1981 case of Republic v. Caparosso (107
SCRA 67), that entries which can be corrected under Article 412 of the New Civil
Code as implemented by Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court refer to those
mistakes that are clerical in nature or changes that are harmless and innocuous
(Wong v. Republic, 115 SCRA 496). In Republic v. Medina (119 SCRA 270)
citing the case of Chua Wee, et al, v. Republic (38 SCRA 409), there was this
dicta:
From the time the New Civil Code took effect on August 30,
1950 until the promulgation of the Revised Rules of Court on
January 1, 1964, there was no law nor rule of court prescribing
the procedure to secure judicial authorization to effect the
desired innocuous rectifications or alterations in the civil register
pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil Code. Rule 108 of the
Revise Rules of Court now provides for such a procedure which
should be limited solely to the implementation of Article 412, the
substantive law on the matter of correcting entries in the civil
register. Rule 108, lie all the other provisions of the Rules of
Court, was promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its
rule- making authority under Sec. 13 of Art. VIII of the
Constitution, which directs that such rules of court 'shall not
diminish or increase or modify substantive rights.' If Rule 108
were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or
corrections of errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to
the understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and
controversial alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy or
paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, said Rule 108
would thereby become unconstitutional for it would be
increasing or modifying substantive rights, which changes are
not authorized under Article 412 of the New Civil Code.
xxx xxx xxx
It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the
correction of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one
involving nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well as
controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in
nature. However, it is also true that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong
may be remedied as long as the appropriate remedy is used. This Court
adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be
corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the
error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. As a matter of
fact, the opposition of the Solicitor General dated February 20, 1970 while
questioning the use of Article 412 of the Civil Code in relation to Rule 108 of the

Revised Rules of Court admits that "the entries sought to be corrected should be
threshed out in an appropriate proceeding.
What is meant by "appropriate adversary proceeding?" Black's Law Dictionary
defines "adversary proceeding as follows:
One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from
an ex parte application, one of which the party seeking relief
has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the
latter an opportunity to contest it. Excludes an adoption
proceeding." (Platt v. Magagnini, 187 p. 716, 718, 110 Was. 39).
The private respondent distinguishes between summary proceedings
contemplated under Article 412 of the Civil Code and fullblown adversary
proceedings which are conducted under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
She states:
It will please be considered that the nature of the matters that
may be changed or corrected are of two kinds. It may either be
mistakes that are clerical in nature or substantial ones. Under
the first category are those 'harmless and innocuous changes,
such as correction of a name that is clearly misspelled,
occupation of the parents, etc.,' (Ansaldo v. Republic, No. L10276, Feb. 14, 1958, 54 O.G. 5886) or 'one' that is visible to
the eyes or obvious to the understanding'. (Black v. Republic,
No. L-10869, Nov. 28, 1958, 104 Phil. 848).
To the second category falls those which affect the civil status
or citizenship or nationality of a party (Ty Kong Tin v. Republic,
No. L-5609, Feb. 5, 1954, 94 Phil. 321: Tan Su v. Republic, No.
L-12140, April 29, 1959, 105 Phil. 578: Black v. Republic, No. L10869, Nov. 28, 1958, 104 Phil. 848; Bantoco Coo v. Republic,
No. L-14978, May 23,1961, 2 SCRA 42: Barillo v. Republic, No.
L-14823, Dec. 28, 1961, 3 SCRA 725).
Changes or corrections in the entries in the civil registry were
governed, at first, by Act No. 3753 (Civil Registry Law) which
placed these matters exclusively upon the sound judgment and
discretion of the civil registrars. With the effectivity of the New
Civil Code on August 30, 1950, these matters were governed by
Article 412 thereof which prescribes judicial order before an
entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected. This
requirement was deemed necessary to forestall the commission
of fraud or other mischief in these matters.
But even then, it is not any correction that can be considered
under Article 412 of he Civil Code. The nature of the corrections
sought has to be considered and if found to refer only to clerical
errors the same may be allowed under said article which was
construed to contemplate only a summary proceeding.
And so in the Ty Kong Tin case, this Honorable Court took
occasion to draw a distinction between what entries in the civil

26

ADOPTION

register could be corrected under Article 412 of the New Civil

Code and what could not. In the process, to our mind, this
Honorable Court set down propositions which hold true not only
in that case but also in the subsequent cases for the latter
merely reiterated the Ty Kong Tin decision. These are:
First, that proceedings under Article 412 of the New Civil Code
are summary:
Second, that corrections in the entires in the civil register may
refer to either mere mistakes that are clerical in nature or
substantial ones which affects the civil status or -the nationality
or citizenship of the persons involved; and
Third, that if the change or correction sought refers to mere
correction of mistakes that are clerical in nature the same may
be done, under Article 412 of the Civil Code; otherwise, if it
refers to a substantial change which affects the civil status or
citizenship of a party. the matter should be threshed out in a
proper action.
To our humble estimation, these propositions do not altogether
bar or preclude substantial changes or corrections involving
such details as the civil status or nationality of a party. As a
matter of fact, just three years after the Ty Kong Tin decision,
this Honorable Court allowed a party to correct mistakes
involving such substantial matters as his birthplace and
citizenship in the birth certificates of his two sons. (Lim v.
Republic, No. L-8932, May 31, 1957, 101 Phil. 1235)
Only that where the correction pertains to matters which are
important and controversial certain conditions sine que non
have to be complied with. Thus it was held:
If it refers to a substantial change which affects the status or
citizenship of a party, the matter should be threshed out in a
proper action ... .' (Ty Kong Tin v. Republic, supra)
. . . . for changes involving the civil status of the parents, their
nationality or citizenship, those are grave and important matters
which may have a bearing and effect on the citizenship and
nationality not only of said parents, but of the offsprings, and to
seek said changes, it is not only the State, but also all parties
concerned and affected should be made parties defendants or
respondents, and evidence should be submitted, either to
support the allegations of the petition or complaint, or also to
disprove the same so that any order or decision in the case may
be made in the entry in a civil register that will affect or even
determine conclusively the citizenship or nationality of a person
therein involved. (Ansaldo v. Republic, 54 O.G. 5886; Emphasis
supplied; Reiterated in the cases of: Tan Su v. Republic, supra;
Bantoto Coo v. Republic, supra; Barillo v. Republic, supra; San

Luis de Castro v. Republic, L-17431, April 30, 1963; Ilu Lin v.

Republic, L- 18213, Dec. 24, 1963; Reyes v. Republic, No.
L-17642, Nov. 27, 1964; Calicdan Baybayan v. Republic, L20707, March 18, 1966; Tan v. Republic, L-19847, April 29,
1966).
If at all what is forbidden is, in the words of Mr. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, 'only the entering of material corrections or amendments
in the record of birth by virtue of a judgment in a summary
action against the Civil Registrar. (Matias v. Republic, No.
L-26982, May 8, 1969.
It will thus be gleaned from the foregoing that corrections
involving such matters as the civil status of the parents, their
nationality or citizenship may be allowed provided the proper
suit is filed.
The court's role in hearing the petition to correct certain entries in the civil
registry is to ascertain the truth about the facts recorded therein. Under our
system of administering justice, truth is best ascertained or approximated by trial
conducted under the adversary system,
Excerpts from the Report on Professional Responsibility issued jointly by the
Association of American Law Schools and the American Bar Association explain
why:
An adversary presentation seems the only effective means for
combatting this natural human tendency to judge too swiftly in
terms of the familiar that which is not yet fully known. The
arguments of counsel hold the case, as it were, in suspension
between two opposing interpretations of it. While the proper
classification of the case is thus kept unresolved, there is time
to explore all of its peculiarities and nuances.
These are the contributions made by partisan advocacy during
the public hearing of the cause. When we take into account the
preparation that must precede the hearing, the essential quality
of the advocate's contribution becomes even more apparent.
Preceding the hearing inquiries must be instituted to determine
what facts can be proved or seem sufficiently established to
warrant a formal test of their truth during the hearing. There
must also be a preliminary analysis of the issues, so that the
hearing may have form and direction. These preparatory
measures are indispensable whether or not the parties involved
in the controversy are represented by advocates.
Where that representation is present there is an obvious
advantage in the fact that the area of dispute may be greatly
reduced by an exchange of written pleadings or by stipulations
of counsel. Without the participation of someone who can act
responsibly for each of the parties, this essential narrowing of
the issues becomes impossible. But here again the true

27

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significance of partisan advocacy lies deeper, touching once

more the integrity of the adjudicative process itself. It is only
through the advocate's participation that the hearing may
remain in fact what it purports to be in theory; a public trial of the
facts and issues. Each advocate comes to the hearing prepared
to present his proofs and arguments, knowing at the same time
that his arguments may fail to persuade and that his proofs may
be rejected as inadequate. It is a part of his role to absorb these
possible disappointments. The deciding tribunal, on the other
hand, comes to the hearing uncommitted. It has not represented
to the public that any fact can be proved, that any argument is
sound, or that any particular way of stating a litigant's case is
the most effective expression of its merits.
xxx xxx xxx
These, then, are the reasons for believing that partisan
advocacy plays a vital and essential role in one of the most
fundamental procedures of a democratic society. But if we were
to put all of these detailed considerations to one side, we should
still be confronted by the fact that, in whatever form adjudication
may appear, the experienced judge or arbitrator desires and
actively seeks to obtain an adversary presentation of the issues.
Only when he has had the benefit of intelligent and vigorous
advocacy on both sides can he feel fully confident of his
decision.
Viewed in this light, the role of the lawyer as a partisan
advocate appears, not as a regrettable necessity, but as an
indispensable part of a larger ordering of affairs. The institution
of advocacy is not a concession to the frailties of human nature,
but an expression of human insight in the design of a social
framework within which man's capacity for impartial judgment
can attain its fullest realization. (44 American Bar Association
Journal (1160-1161, 1958)
Provided the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have
been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given
opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and where the evidence has
been thoroughly weighed and considered, the suit or proceeding is appropriate.
The pertinent sections of Rule 108 provide:
SEC. 3. Parties When cancellation or correction of an entry
in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons
who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby
shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition,
the court shall, by an orde, fix the time and place for the hearing
of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to
the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause

the order to be published once in a week for three (3)

consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province.
SEC, 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having
or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or
correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice,
file his opposition thereto.
Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the
cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register are-(1) the civil registrar,
and (2) all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected
thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes the duty of the court to-(l)
issue an order fixing the time and place for the hearing of the petition, and (2)
cause the order for hearing to be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. The
following are likewise entitled to oppose the petition: (I) the civil registrar, and (2)
any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or
correction is sought.
If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction
and/or cancellation of entries in the record of birth even if filed and conducted
under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be described as
"summary". There can be no doubt that when an opposition to the petition is
filed either by the Civil Registrar or any person having or claiming any interest in
the entries sought to be cancelled and/or corrected and the opposition is actively
prosecuted, the proceedings thereon become adversary proceedings.
In the instant case, a petition for cancellation and/or correction of entries of birth
of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go in the Civil Registry of the City of Cebu was filed
by respondent Leonor Valencia on January 27, 1970, and pursuant to the order
of the trial court dated February 4, 1970, the said petition was published once a
week for three (3) consecutive weeks in the, Cebu Advocate, a newspaper of
general circulation in the City of Cebu. Notice thereof was duly served on the
Solicitor General. the Local Civil Registrar and Go Eng. The order likewise set
the case for hearing and directed the local civil registrar and the other
respondents or any person claiming any interest under the entries whose
corrections were sought, to file their opposition to the said petition. An opposition
to the petition was consequently filed by the Republic on February 26, 1970.
Thereafter a full blown trial followed with respondent Leonor Valencia testifying
and presenting her documentary evidence in support of her petition. The
Republic on the other hand cross-examined respondent Leonor Valencia.
We are of the opinion that the petition filed by the respondent in the lower court
by way of a special proceeding for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the
civil register with the requisite notice and publication and the recorded
proceedings that actually took place thereafter could very well be regarded as
that proper suit or appropriate action.
In Matias v. Republic (28 SCRA 31), we held that:

28

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xxx xxx xxx

. . . In the case of petitioner herein, however, the proceedings
were not summary, considering the publication of the petition
made by order of the court in order to give notice to any person
that might be interested, including direct service on the Solicitor
General himself. Considering the peculiar circumstances of this
particular case, the fact that no doubt is cast on the truth of
petitioner's allegations, or upon her evidence in support thereof,
the absence of any showing that prejudice would be caused to
any party interested (since petitioner's own father testified in her
favor), and the publicity given to the petition, we are of the
opinion that the Ty Kong Tin doctrine is not controlling this case.
"
Only last year, we had occasion to clarify the Ty Kong Tin doctrine, further. In
Republic v. Macli-ing (135 SCRA 367, 370-371), this Court ruled:
The principal ground relied upon in this appeal is that Rule 108
of the Rules of Court upon which private respondents anchor
their Petition is applicable only to changes contemplated in
Article 412 of the Civil Code, which are clerical or innocuous
errors, or to corrections that are not controversial and are
supported by indubitable evidence. (Tiong v. Republic, 15
SCRA 262 [1965]).
It is true that the change from Esteban Sy to Sy Piao would
necessarily affect the Identity of the father. (Barillo v. Republic,
3 SCRA 725 [1961]) In that sense, it can be said to be
substantial. However, we find indubitable evidence to support
the correction prayed for. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
In the case of Ty Kong Tin v. Republic, 94 Phil. 321 (1954), as
well as subsequent cases predicated thereon, we forbade only
the entering of material corrections in the record of birth by
virtue of a judgment in a summary action. the proceedings
below, although filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, were
not summary. The Petition was published by order of the lower
Court once a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper
of general circulation in accordance with law. The Solicitor
General was served with copy of the Petition as well as with
notices of hearings. He filed his Opposition to the Petition. The
Local Civil Registrar of the City of Baguio was likewise duly
served with copy of the Petition. A Fiscal was always in
attendance at the hearings in representation of the Solicitor
General. He participated actively in the proceedings,
particularly, in the cross-examination of witnesses. And,
notwithstanding that all interested persons were cited to appear
to show cause why the petition should not be granted, no one

appeared to oppose except the State through the Solicitor

General. But neither did the State present evidence in support
of its Opposition.
To follow the petitioner's argument that Rule 108 is not an appropriate
proceeding without in any way intimating what is the correct proceeding or if
such a proceeding exists at all, would result in manifest injustice.
Apart from Bernardo Go and Jessica Go, there are four (4) other sisters and one
(1) other brother born of the same father and mother. Not only are all five
registered as Filipino citizens but they have pursued careers which require
Philippine citizenship as a mandatory pre-requisite. To emphasize the strict
policy of the government regarding professional examinations, it was the law
until recently that to take the board exams for pharmacist, the applicant should
possess natural born citizenship. (See. 18, Republic Act 5921 and Sec. 1, P.D.
1350)
The sisters and brother are:
1. Sally Go, born on April 29, 1934 was licensed as a Pharmacist after passing
the government board examinations in 1956.
2. Fanny Go, born on July 12, 1936 is a Registered Nurse who passed the
government board examinations in 1960.
3. Corazon Go, born on June 20, 1939, during the trial of this case in 1970 was
a fourth year medical student, qualified to take the government board
examinations after successfully completing the requirements for a career in
medicine, and presumably is a licensed physician now.
4. Antonio Go, born February 14, 1942 was an engineering student during the
1970 trial of the case and qualified by citizenship to take government board
examinations.
5. Remedios Go, born October 4, 1945 was a licensed Optometrist after passing
the government board examinations in 1967.
The above facts were developed and proved during trial. The petitioner failed to
refute the citizenship of the minors Bernardo and Jessica Go.
In this petition, it limits itself to a procedural reason to overcome substantive
findings by arguing that the proper procedure was not followed.
There are other facts on the record. Leonor Valencia is a registered voter and
had always exercised her right of suffrage from the time she reached voting age
until the national elections immediately preceding the filing of her petition. The
five other sisters and brother are also registered voters and likewise exercised
the right of suffrage.
An uncle of the mother's side had held positions in the government having been
elected twice as councilor and twice as vice-mayor of Victorias, Negros
Occidental. Respondent Leonor Valencia has purchased and registered two (2)
parcels of land as per Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-46104 and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-37275. These allegations are well documented and
were never contradicted by the Republic. As correctly observed by the lower
court.

29

ADOPTION

The right of suffrage is one of the important rights of a citizen.

This is also true with respect to the acquisition of a real
property. The evidence further shows that her children had been
allowed to take the Board Examinations given by the
Government for Filipino citizens only.
It would be a denial of substantive justice if two children proved by the facts to
be Philippine citizens, and whose five sisters and brother born of the same
mother and father enjoy all the rights of citizens, are denied the same rights on
the simple argument that the "correct procedure" not specified or even intimated
has not been followed.
We are, therefore, constrained to deny the petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
The decision of the lower court is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin,
De la Fuente, Cuevas, Alampay and Patajo, JJ., concur.
Aquino, C.J., took no part.

G.R. No. 115640

March 15, 1995
REYNALDO ESPIRITU and GUILLERMA LAYUG, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TERESITA MASAUDING, respondents.
MELO, J.:
This case concerns a seemingly void marriage and a relationship which went
sour. The innocent victims are two children horn out of the same union. Upon
this Court now falls the not too welcome task of deciding the issue of who,
between the father and mother, is more suitable and better qualified in helping
the children to grow into responsible, well-adjusted, and happy young adulthood.
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met
sometime in 1976 in Iligan City where Reynaldo was employed by the National
Steel Corporation and Teresita was employed as a nurse in a local hospital. In
1977, Teresita left for Los Angeles, California to work as a nurse. She was able
to acquire immigrant status sometime later. In 1984, Reynaldo was sent by his
employer, the National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as its
liaison officer and Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a common law
relationship of husband and wife. On August 16, 1986, their daughter, Rosalind
Therese, was born. On October 7, 1987, while they were on a brief vacation in
the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon their return to the
United States, their second child, a son, this time, and given the name Reginald
Vince, was born on January 12, 1988.
The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate
sometime in 1990. Teresita blamed Reynaldo for the break-up, stating he was
always nagging her about money matters. Reynaldo, on the other hand,
contended that Teresita was a spendthrift, buying expensive jewelry and antique
furniture instead of attending to household expenses.
Instead of giving their marriage a second chance as allegedly pleaded by
Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California.
She claims, however, that she spent a lot of money on long distance telephone
calls to keep in constant touch with her children.
Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but because his
assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent back by his
company to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his sister, co-petitioner
Guillerma Layug and her family.
Teresita claims that she did not immediately follow her children because
Reynaldo filed a criminal case for bigamy against her and she was afraid of

30

ADOPTION

being arrested. The judgment of conviction in the bigamy case was actually
rendered only on September 29, 1994. (Per Judge Harriet O. Demetriou, Branch
70, RTC, Pasig, pp. 210-222, Rollo). Teresita, meanwhile, decided to return to
the Philippines and on December 8, 1992 and filed the petition for a writ of
habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody over the children,
thus starting the whole proceedings now reaching this Court.
On June 30, 1993, the trial court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus. It
suspended Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind and Reginald and
declared Reynaldo to have sole parental authority over them but with rights of
visitation to be agreed upon by the parties and to be approved by the Court.
On February 16, 1994, the Court of Appeals per Justice Isnani, with Justices de
Pano and Ibay-Somera concurring, reversed the trial court's decision. It gave
custody to Teresita and visitation rights on weekends to Reynaldo.
Petitioners now come to this Court on a petition for review, in the main
contending that the Court of Appeals disregarded the factual findings of the trial
court; that the Court of Appeals further engaged in speculations and
conjectures, resulting in its erroneous conclusion that custody of the children
should be given to respondent Teresita.
We believe that respondent court resolved the question of custody over the
children through an automatic and blind application of the age proviso of Article
363 of the Civil Code which reads:
Art. 363. In all questions on the care, custody, education and
property of the children, the latter's welfare shall be paramount.
No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years
of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such
measure.
and of Article 213 of the Family Code which in turn provides:
Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents parental authority
shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The
Court shall take into account all relevant considerations,
especially the choice of the child over seven years of age
unless the parent chosen is unfit.
The decision under review is based on the report of the Code Commission
which drafted Article 213 that a child below seven years still needs the loving,
tender care that only a mother can give and which, presumably, a father cannot
give in equal measure. The commentaries of a member of the Code
Commission, former Court of Appeals Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy, in a textbook
on the Family Code, were also taken into account. Justice Diy believes that a
child below seven years should still be awarded to her mother even if the latter
is a prostitute or is unfaithful to her husband. This is on the theory that moral
dereliction has no effect on a baby unable to understand such action.
(Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, 1988 Ed., p. 297.)
The Court of Appeals was unduly swayed by an abstract presumption of law
rather than an appreciation of relevant facts and the law which should apply to
those facts. The task of choosing the parent to whom custody shall be awarded

is not a ministerial function to be determined by a simple determination of the

age of a minor child. Whether a child is under or over seven years of age, the
paramount criterion must always be the child's interests. Discretion is given to
the court to decide who can best assure the welfare of the child, and award the
custody on the basis of that consideration. In Unson III vs. Navarro (101 SCRA
183 [1980]), we laid down the rule that "in all controversies regarding the
custody of minors, the sole and foremost consideration is the physical,
education, social and moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into account
the respective resources and social and moral situations of the contending
parents", and in Medina vs. Makabali (27 SCRA 502 [1969]), where custody of
the minor was given to a non-relative as against the mother, then the country's
leading civilist, Justice J.B.L. Reyes, explained its basis in this manner:
. . . While our law recognizes the right of a parent to the custody
of her child, Courts must not lose sight of the basic principle that
"in all questions on the care, custody, education and property of
children, the latter's welfare shall be paramount" (Civil Code of
the Philippines. Art. 363), and that for compelling reasons, even
a child under seven may be ordered separated from the mother
(do). This is as it should be, for in the continual evolution of
legal institutions, the patria potestas has been transformed from
the jus vitae ac necis (right of life and death) of the Roman law,
under which the offspring was virtually a chattel of his parents
into a radically different institution, due to the influence of
Christian faith and doctrines. The obligational aspect is now
supreme. As pointed out by Puig Pena, now "there is no power,
but a task; no complex of rights (of parents) but a sum of duties;
no sovereignty, but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor."
As a result, the right of parents to the company and custody of
their children is but ancillary to the proper discharge of parental
duties to provide the children with adequate support, education,
moral, intellectual and civic training and development (Civil
Code, Art. 356).
(pp. 504-505.)
In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are mandated
by the Family Code to take into account all relevant considerations. If a child is
under seven years of age, the law presumes that the mother is the best
custodian. The presumption is strong but it is not conclusive. It can be overcome
by "compelling reasons". If a child is over seven, his choice is paramount but,
again, the court is not bound by that choice. In its discretion, the court may find
the chosen parent unfit and award custody to the other parent, or even to a third
party as it deems fit under the circumstances.
In the present case, both Rosalind and Reginald are now over seven years of
age. Rosalind celebrated her seventh birthday on August 16, 1993 while
Reginald reached the same age on January 12, 1995. Both are studying in
reputable schools and appear to be fairly intelligent children, quite capable of

31

ADOPTION

thoughtfully determining the parent with whom they would want to live. Once the
choice has been made, the burden returns to the court to investigate if the
parent thus chosen is unfit to assume parental authority and custodial
responsibility.
Herein lies the error of the Court of Appeals. Instead of scrutinizing the records
to discover the choice of the children and rather than verifying whether that
parent is fit or unfit, respondent court simply followed statutory presumptions
and general propositions applicable to ordinary or common situations. The
seven-year age limit was mechanically treated as an arbitrary cut off period and
not a guide based on a strong presumption.
A scrutiny of the pleadings in this case indicates that Teresita, or at least, her
counsel are more intent on emphasizing the "torture and agony" of a mother
separated from her children and the humiliation she suffered as a result of her
character being made a key issue in court rather than the feelings and future,
the best interests and welfare of her children. While the bonds between a
mother and her small child are special in nature, either parent, whether father or
mother, is bound to suffer agony and pain if deprived of custody. One cannot
say that his or her suffering is greater than that of the other parent. It is not so
much the suffering, pride, and other feelings of either parent but the welfare of
the child which is the paramount consideration.
We are inclined to sustain the findings and conclusions of the regional trial court
because it gave greater attention to the choice of Rosalind and considered in
detail all the relevant factors bearing on the issue of custody.
When she was a little over 5 years old, Rosalind was referred to a child
psychologist, Rita Flores Macabulos, to determine the effects of uprooting her
from the Assumption College where she was studying. Four different tests were
administered. The results of the tests are quite revealing. The responses of
Rosalind about her mother were very negative causing the psychologist to delve
deeper into the child's anxiety. Among the things revealed by Rosalind was an
incident where she saw her mother hugging and kissing a "bad" man who lived
in their house and worked for her father. Rosalind refused to talk to her mother
even on the telephone. She tended to be emotionally emblazed because of
constant fears that she may have to leave school and her aunt's family to go
back to the United States to live with her mother. The 5-1/2 page report deals at
length with feelings of insecurity and anxiety arising from strong conflict with the
mother. The child tried to compensate by having fantasy activities. All of the 8
recommendations of the child psychologist show that Rosalind chooses
petitioners over the private respondent and that her welfare will be best served
by staying with them (pp. 199-205, Rollo).
At about the same time, a social welfare case study was conducted for the
purpose of securing the travel clearance required before minors may go abroad.
Social Welfare Officer Emma D. Estrada Lopez, stated that the child Rosalind
refused to go back to the United States and be reunited with her mother. She felt
unloved and uncared for. Rosalind was more attached to her Yaya who did
everything for her and Reginald. The child was found suffering from emotional

shock caused by her mother's infidelity. The application for travel clearance was
recommended for denial (pp. 206-209, Rollo).
Respondent Teresita, for her part, argues that the 7-year age reference in the
law applies to the date when the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is filed, not
to the date when a decision is rendered. This argument is flawed.
Considerations involving the choice made by a child must be ascertained at the
time that either parent is given custody over the child. The matter of custody is
not permanent and unalterable. If the parent who was given custody suffers a
future character change and becomes unfit, the matter of custody can always be
re-examined and adjusted (Unson III v. Navarro, supra, at p. 189). To be sure,
the welfare, the best interests, the benefit, and the good of the child must be
determined as of the time that either parent is chosen to be the custodian. At the
present time, both children are over 7 years of age and are thus perfectly
capable of making a fairly intelligent choice.
According to respondent Teresita, she and her children had tearful reunion in
the trial court, with the children crying, grabbing, and embracing her to prevent
the father from taking them away from her. We are more inclined to believe the
father's contention that the children ignored Teresita in court because such an
emotional display as described by Teresita in her pleadings could not have been
missed by the trial court. Unlike the Justices of the Court of Appeals Fourth
Division, Judge Lucas P. Bersamin personally observed the children and their
mother in the courtroom. What the Judge found is diametrically opposed to the
contentions of respondent Teresita. The Judge had this to say on the matter.
And, lastly, the Court cannot look at petitioner [Teresita] in
similar light, or with more understanding, especially as her
conduct and demeanor in the courtroom (during most of the
proceedings) or elsewhere (but in the presence of the
undersigned presiding judge) demonstrated her ebulent temper
that tended to corroborate the alleged violence of her physical
punishment of the children (even if only for ordinary disciplinary
purposes) and emotional instability, typified by her failure (or
refusal?) to show deference and respect to the Court and the
other parties (pp. 12-13, RTC Decision)
Respondent Teresita also questions the competence and impartiality of the
expert witnesses. Respondent court, in turn, states that the trial court should
have considered the fact that Reynaldo and his sister, herein petitioner
Guillerma Layug, hired the two expert witnesses. Actually, this was taken into
account by the trial court which stated that the allegations of bias and unfairness
made by Teresita against the psychologist and social worker were not
substantiated.
The trial court stated that the professional integrity and competence of the
expert witnesses and the objectivity of the interviews were unshaken and
unimpeached. We might add that their testimony remain uncontroverted. We
also note that the examinations made by the experts were conducted in late
1991, well over a year before the filing by Teresita of the habeas corpus petition

32

ADOPTION

in December, 1992. Thus, the examinations were at that time not intended to
support petitioners' position in litigation, because there was then not even an
impending possibility of one. That they were subsequently utilized in the case a
quo when it did materialize does not change the tenor in which they were first
obtained.
Furthermore, such examinations, when presented to the court must be
construed to have been presented not to sway the court in favor of any of the
parties, but to assist the court in the determination of the issue before it. The
persons who effected such examinations were presented in the capacity of
expert witnesses testifying on matters within their respective knowledge and
expertise. On this matter, this Court had occasion to rule in the case of Sali vs.
Abukakar, et al. (17 SCRA 988 [1966]).
The fact that, in a particular litigation, an NBI expert examines
certain contested documents, at the request, not of a public
officer or agency of the Government, but of a private litigant,
does not necessarily nullify the examination thus made. Its
purpose, presumably, to assist the court having jurisdiction over
said litigation, in the performance of its duty to settle correctly
the issues relative to said documents. Even a non-expert private
individual may examine the same, if there are facts within his
knowledge which may help, the court in the determination of
said issue. Such examination, which may properly be
undertaken by a non-expert private individual, does not,
certainly become null and void when the examiner is an expert
and/or an officer of the NBI.
(pp. 991-992.)
In regard to testimony of expert witnesses it was held in Salomon, et al. vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, et al. (185 SCRA 352 [1990]):
. . . Although courts are not ordinarily bound by expert
testimonies, they may place whatever weight they choose upon
such testimonies in accordance with the facts of the case. The
relative weight and sufficiency of expert testimony is peculiarly
within the province of the trial court to decide, considering the
ability and character of the witness, his actions upon the witness
stand, the weight and process of the reasoning by which he has
supported his opinion, his possible bias in favor of the side for
whom he testifies, the fact that he is a paid witness, the relative
opportunities for study and observation of the matters about
which he testifies, and any other matters which reserve to
illuminate his statements. The opinion of the expert may not be
arbitrarily rejected; it is to be considered by the court in view of
all the facts and circumstances in the case and when common
knowledge utterly fails, the expert opinion may be given
controlling effect (20 Am. Jur., 1056-1058). The problem of the
credibility of the expert witness and the evaluation of his

testimony is left to the discretion of the trial court whose ruling

thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of an abuse of that
discretion.
(p. 359)
It was in the exercise of this discretion, coupled with the opportunity to assess
the witnesses' character and to observe their respective demeanor that the trial
court opted to rely on their testimony, and we believe that the trial court was
correct in its action.
Under direct examination an February 4, 1993, Social Worker Lopez stated that
Rosalind and her aunt were about to board a plane when they were off-loaded
because there was no required clearance. They were referred to her office, at
which time Reginald was also brought along and interviewed. One of the regular
duties of Social Worker Lopez in her job appears to be the interview of minors
who leave for abroad with their parents or other persons. The interview was for
purposes of foreign travel by a 5-year old child and had nothing to do with any
pending litigation. On cross-examination, Social Worker Lopez stated that her
assessment of the minor's hatred for her mother was based on the disclosures
of the minor. It is inconceivable, much less presumable that Ms. Lopez would
compromise her position, ethics, and the public trust reposed on a person of her
position in the course of doing her job by falsely testifying just to support the
position of any litigant.
The psychologist, Ms. Macabulos, is a B.S. magna cum laude graduate in
Psychology and an M.A. degree holder also in Psychology with her thesis
graded "Excellent". She was a candidate for a doctoral degree at the time of the
interview. Petitioner Reynaldo may have shouldered the cost of the interview but
Ms. Macabulos services were secured because Assumption College wanted an
examination of the child for school purposes and not because of any litigation.
She may have been paid to examine the child and to render a finding based on
her examination, but she was not paid to fabricate such findings in favor of the
party who retained her services. In this instance it was not even petitioner
Reynaldo but the school authorities who initiated the same. It cannot be
presumed that a professional of her potential and stature would compromise her
professional standing.
Teresita questions the findings of the trial court that:
1. Her morality is questionable as shown by her marrying
Reynaldo at the time she had a subsisting marriage with
another man.
2. She is guilty of grave indiscretion in carrying on a love affair
with one of the Reynaldo's fellow NSC employees.
3. She is incapable of providing the children with necessities
and conveniences commensurate to their social standing
because she does not even own any home in the Philippines.
4. She is emotionally unstable with ebullient temper.
It is contended that the above findings do not constitute the compelling reasons
under the law which would justify depriving her of custody over the children;

33

ADOPTION

worse, she claims, these findings are non-existent and have not been proved by
clear and convincing evidence.
Public and private respondents give undue weight to the matter of a child under
7 years of age not to be separated from the mother, without considering what
the law itself denominates as compelling reasons or relevant considerations to
otherwise decree. In the Unson III case, earlier mentioned, this Court stated that
it found no difficulty in not awarding custody to the mother, it being in the best
interest of the child "to be freed from the obviously unwholesome, not
to say immoral influence, that the situation where [the mother] had placed
herself . . . might create in the moral and social outlook of [the child] who was in
her formative and most impressionable stage . . ."
Then too, it must be noted that both Rosalind and Reginald are now over 7
years of age. They understand the difference between right and wrong, ethical
behavior and deviant immorality. Their best interests would be better served in
an environment characterized by emotional stability and a certain degree of
material sufficiency. There is nothing in the records to show that Reynaldo is an
"unfit" person under Article 213 of the Family Code. In fact, he has been trying
his best to give the children the kind of attention and care which the mother is
not in a position to extend.
The argument that the charges against the mother are false is not supported by
the records. The findings of the trial court are based on evidence.
Teresita does not deny that she was legally married to Roberto Lustado on
December 17, 1984 in California (p. 13, Respondent's Memorandum; p. 238,
Rollo; pp. 11, RTC Decision). Less than a year later, she had already driven
across the continental United States to commence living with another man,
petitioner Reynaldo, in Pittsburgh. The two were married on October 7, 1987. Of
course, to dilute this disadvantage on her part, this matter of her having
contracted a bigamous marriage later with Reynaldo, Teresita tried to picture
Reynaldo as a rapist, alleging further that she told Reynaldo about her marriage
to Lustado on the occasion when she was raped by Reynaldo. Expectedly,
Judge Harriet Demetriou of the Pasig RTC lent no weight to such tale. And even
if this story were given credence, it adds to and not subtracts from the conviction
of this Court about Teresita's values. Rape is an insidious crime against privacy.
Confiding to one's potential rapist about a prior marriage is not a very convincing
indication that the potential victim is averse to the act. The implication created is
that the act would be acceptable if not for the prior marriage.
More likely is Reynaldo's story that he learned of the prior marriage only much
later. In fact, the rape incident itself is unlikely against a woman who had driven
three days and three nights from California, who went straight to the house of
Reynaldo in Pittsburgh and upon arriving went to bed and, who immediately
thereafter started to live with him in a relationship which is marital in nature if not
in fact.
Judge Bersamin of the court a quo believed the testimony of the various
witnesses that while married to Reynaldo, Teresita entered into an illicit
relationship with Perdencio Gonzales right there in the house of petitioner

Reynaldo and respondent Teresita. Perdencio had been assigned by the

National Steel Corporation to assist in the project in Pittsburgh and was staying
with Reynaldo, his co-employee, in the latter's house. The record shows that the
daughter Rosalind suffered emotional disturbance caused by the traumatic
effect of seeing her mother hugging and kissing a boarder in their house. The
record also shows that it was Teresita who left the conjugal home and the
children, bound for California. When Perdencio Gonzales was reassigned to the
Philippines, Teresita followed him and was seen in his company in a Cebu hotel,
staying in one room and taking breakfast together. More significant is that letters
and written messages from Teresita to Perdencio were submitted in evidence
(p.12, RTC Decision).
The argument that moral laxity or the habit of flirting from one man to another
does not fall under "compelling reasons" is neither meritorious nor applicable in
this case. Not only are the children over seven years old and their clear choice is
the father, but the illicit or immoral activities of the mother had already caused
emotional disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral
values, at least in Rosalind. This is not to mention her conviction for the crime of
bigamy, which from the records appears to have become final (pp. 210-222,
Rollo).
Respondent court's finding that the father could not very well perform the role of
a sole parent and substitute mother because his job is in the United States while
the children will be left behind with their aunt in the Philippines is misplaced. The
assignment of Reynaldo in Pittsburgh is or was a temporary one. He was sent
there to oversee the purchase of a steel mill component and various equipment
needed by the National Steel Corporation in the Philippines. Once the
purchases are completed, there is nothing to keep him there anymore. In fact, in
a letter dated January 30, 1995, Reynaldo informs this Court of the completion
of his assignment abroad and of his permanent return to the Philippines (ff.
p. 263, Rollo).
The law is more than satisfied by the judgment of the trial court. The children are
now both over seven years old. Their choice of the parent with whom they prefer
to stay is clear from the record. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person,
thus meeting the two requirements found in the first paragraph of Article 213 of
the Family Code. The presumption under the second paragraph of said article
no longer applies as the children are over seven years. Assuming that the
presumption should have persuasive value for children only one or two years
beyond the age of seven years mentioned in the statute, there are compelling
reasons and relevant considerations not to grant custody to the mother. The
children understand the unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and have been
affected in their emotional growth by her behavior.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals is reversed and set aside, and the decision of Branch 96 of the
Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Quezon
City and presided over by the Honorable Lucas P. Bersamin in its Civil Case No.
Q-92-14206 awarding custody of the minors Rosalind and Reginald Espiritu to

34

ADOPTION

their father, Reynaldo Espiritu, is reinstated. No special pronouncement is made

as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Romero, Vitug and Francisco, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 118870

March 29, 1996

NERISSA Z. PEREZ, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (Ninth Division) and RAY C. PEREZ,
respondents.
ROMERO, J.:p
Parties herein would have this Court duplicate the feat of King Solomon who
was hailed in Biblical times for his sagacious, if, at times unorthodox, manner of
resolving conflicts, the most celebrated case being that when his authority was
invoked to determine the identity of the real mother as between two women

35

ADOPTION

claiming the same infant. Since there could only be one mother, the daunting
task that confronted the king/judge was to choose the true one.
In the instant case, we are faced with the challenge of deciding, as between
father and mother, who should have rightful custody of a child who bears in his
person both their genes.
While there is a provision of law squarely in point, the two courts whose
authority have been invoked to render a decision have arrived at diametrically
opposite conclusions.
It has fallen upon us now to likewise act as judge between the trial court, on the
one hand, and the appellate, on the other.
On the issue of custody over the minor Ray Perez II, respondent Court of
Appeals ruled in favor of the boy's father Ray C. Perez, reversing the trial court's
decision to grant custody to Nerissa Z. Perez, the child's mother.
Ray Perez, private respondent, is a doctor of medicine practicing in Cebu while
Nerissa, his wife who is petitioner herein, is a registered nurse. They were
married in Cebu on December 6, 1986. After six miscarriages, two operations
and a high-risk pregnancy, petitioner finally gave birth to Ray Perez II in New
York on July 20, 1992.
Petitioner who began working in the United States in October 1988, used part of
her earnings to build a modest house in Mandaue City, Cebu. She also sought
medical attention for her successive miscarriages in New York. She became a
resident alien in February 1992.
Private respondent stayed with her in the U.S. twice and took care of her when
she became pregnant. Unlike his wife, however, he had only a tourist visa and
was not employed.
On January 17, 1993, the couple and their baby arrived in Cebu. After a few
weeks, only Nerissa returned to the U.S. She alleged that they came home only
for a five-week vacation and that they all had round-trip tickets. However, her
husband stayed behind to take care of his sick mother and promised to follow
her with the baby. According to Ray, they had agreed to reside permanently in
the Philippines but once Nerissa was in New York, she changed her mind and
continued working. She was supposed to come back immediately after winding
up her affairs there.
When Nerissa came home a few days, before Ray II's first birthday, the couple
was no longer on good terms. That their love for each other was fading became

apparent from their serious quarrels. Petitioner did not want to live near her in1
laws and rely solely on her husband's meager income of P5,000.00. She
longed to be with her only child but he was being kept away from her by her
husband. Thus, she did not want to leave RJ (Ray Junior) with her husband and
in-laws. She wished for her son to grow up with his mother.
On the other hand, Ray wanted to stay here, where he could raise his son even
as he practiced his profession. He maintained that it would not be difficult to live
here since they have their own home and a car. They could live comfortably on
2
his P15,000.00 monthly income as they were not burdened with having to pay
any debts.
Petitioner was forced to move to her parents' home on Guizo Street in Mandaue.
Despite mediation by the priest who solemnized their marriage, the couple failed
to reconcile.
3

On July 26, 1993, Nerissa Z. Perez filed a petition for habeas corpus asking
respondent Ray C. Perez to surrender the custody of their son, Ray Z. Perez II,
to her.
On August 27, 1993, the court a quo issued an Order awarding custody of the
one-year old child to his mother, Nerissa Perez, citing the second paragraph of
Article 213 of the Family Code which provides that no child under seven years of
age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling
reasons to order otherwise. The dispositive portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, Order
is hereby issued ordering the respondent to turn over
the custody of their child Ray Cortes Perez II, his
passport and round trip ticket to herein petitioner with a
warning that if he will escape together with the child for
the purpose of hiding the minor child instead of
complying with this Order, that warrant for his arrest will
be issued.
SO ORDERED.

Upon appeal by Ray Perez, the Court of Appeals, on September 27, 1994,
5
reversed the trial court's order and awarded custody of the boy to his father.
6

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been denied, she filed the instant
petition for review where the sole issue is the custody of Ray Perez II, now three
years old.

36

ADOPTION

Respondent court differed in opinion from the trial court and ruled that there
were enough reasons to deny Nerissa Perez custody over Ray II even if the
child is under seven years old. It held that granting custody to the boy's father
7
would be for the child's best interest and welfare.
Before us is the unedifying situation of a husband and wife in marital discord,
struggling for custody of their only child. It is sad that petitioner and private
respondent have not found it in their hearts to understand each other and live
together once again as a family. Separated in fact, they now seek the Court's
assistance in the matter of custody or parental authority over the child.
The wisdom and necessity for the exercise of joint parental authority need not
be belabored. The father and the mother complement each other in giving
nurture and providing that holistic care which takes into account the physical,
emotional, psychological, mental, social and spiritual needs of the child. By
precept and example, they mold his character during his crucial formative years.
However, the Court's intervention is sought in order that a decision may be
made as to which parent shall be given custody over the young boy. The Court's
duty is to determine whether Ray Perez II will be better off with petitioner or with
private respondent. We are not called upon to declare which party committed
the greater fault in their domestic quarrel.
When the parents of the child are separated, Article 213 of the Family Code is
the applicable law. It provides:
Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental
authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by
the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant
considerations, especially the choice of the child over
seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
No child under seven years of age shall be separated
from the mother. unless the court finds compelling
reasons to order otherwise. (Emphasis supplied).
Since the Code does not qualify the word "separation" to mean legal separation
decreed by a court, couples who are separated in fact, such as petitioner and
8
private respondent, are covered within its terms.
The Revised Rules of Court also contains a similar provision. Rule 99, section 6
(Adoption and Custody of Minors) provides:

Sec. 6. Proceedings as to child whose parents are

separated. Appeal. When husband and wife are
divorced or living separately, and apart from each other,
and the questions as to the care, custody, and control
of a child or children of their marriage is brought before
a Court of First Instance by petition or as an incident to
any other proceeding, the court, upon hearing the
testimony as may be pertinent, shall award the care,
custody, and control of each such child as will be for its
best interest, permitting the child to choose which
parent it prefers to live with if it be over ten years of
age, unless the parent chosen be unfit to take charge of
the child by reason of moral depravity, habitual
drunkenness, incapacity, or poverty. . . . No child under
seven years of age shall be separated from its mother,
unless the court finds there are compelling reasons
therefor. (Emphasis supplied)
The provisions of law quoted above clearly mandate that a child under seven
years of age shall not be separated from his mother unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise. The use of the word "shall" in Article 213
of the Family Code and Rule 99, section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court
9
connotes a mandatory character. In the case of Lacson v. San Jose-Lacson,
the Court declared:
10

The use of the word shall in article 363

of the Civil
Code, coupled with the observations made by the Code
Commission in respect to the said legal provision,
underscores its mandatory character. It prohibits in no
uncertain terms the separation of a mother and her
child below seven years, unless such separation is
grounded upon compelling reasons as determined by a
11
court.
The rationale for awarding the custody of children younger than seven years of
age to their mother was explained by the Code Commission:
The general rule is recommended in order to avoid
many a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn
away from her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of
a mother who is deprived of her child of tender age. The
exception allowed by the rule has to be for "compelling
reasons" for the good of the child; those cases must
indeed be rare, if the mother's heart is not to be unduly
hurt. If she has erred, as in cases of adultery, the

37

ADOPTION

penalty of imprisonment and the divorce decree

(relative divorce) will ordinarily be sufficient punishment
for her. Moreover, moral dereliction will not have any
effect upon the baby who is as yet unable to understand
12
her situation. (Report of the Code Commission, p. 12)
The Family Code, in reverting to the provision of the Civil Code that a child
below seven years old should not be separated from the mother (Article 363),
has expressly repealed the earlier Article 17, paragraph three of the Child and
Youth Welfare Code (Presidential Decree No. 603) which reduced the child's
13
age to five years.
The general rule that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated
from his mother finds its raison d'tre in the basic need of a child for his mother's
14
loving care.
Only the most compelling of reasons shall justify the court's
awarding the custody of such a child to someone other than his mother, such as
her unfitness to exercise sole parental authority. In the past the following
grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive a mother of
15
custody and parental authority: neglect, abandonment,
unemployment and
16
1
immorality, habitual drunkenness, 7 drug addiction, maltreatment of the child,
18
insanity and being sick with a communicable disease.
19

It has long been settled that in custody cases, the foremost consideration is
always the welfare and best interest of the child. In fact, no less than an
international instrument, the Convention on the Rights of the Child provides: "In
all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies,
20
the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration."
Courts invariably look into all relevant factors presented by the contending
parents,
such
as
their
material resources,
social and
moral
21
situations.
In the case at bench, financial capacity is not a determinative factor inasmuch as
both parties have demonstrated that they have ample means.
Respondent court stated that petitioner has no permanent place of work in the
U.S.A. and has taken this point against her. The records, however, show that
22
she is employed in a New York hospital and was, at the time the petition was
23
filed, still abroad. She testified that she intends to apply for a job elsewhere,
presumably to improve her work environment and augment her income, as well
24
as for convenience. The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that a registered
nurse, such as petitioner, is still very much in demand in the United States.
Unlike private respondent, a doctor who by his own admission could not find

employment there, petitioner immediately got a job in New York. Considering

her skill and experience petitioner should find no difficulty in obtaining work
elsewhere, should she desire to do so.
The decision under review casts doubt on petitioner's capability to take care of
the child, particularly since she works on twelve-hour shifts thrice weekly, at
times, even at night. There being no one to help her look after the child, it is
alleged that she cannot properly attend to him. This conclusion is as
unwarranted as it is unreasonable. First, her present work schedule is not so
unmanageable as to deprive her of quality time for Ray II. Quite a number of
working mothers who are away from home for longer periods of time are still
able to raise a family well, applying time management principles judiciously.
Second, many a mother, finding herself in such a position, has invited her own
mother or relative to join her abroad, providing the latter with plane tickets and
liberal allowances, to look after the child until he is able to take care of himself.
Others go on leave from work until such time as the child can be entrusted to
day-care centers. Delegating child care temporarily to qualified persons who run
day-care centers does not detract from being a good mother, as long as the
latter exercises supervision, for even in our culture, children are often brought up
by housemaids or "yayas" under the eagle eyes of the mother. Third, private
respondent's work schedule was not presented in evidence at the trial. Although
he is a general practitioner, the records merely show that he maintains a clinic,
25
works for several companies on retainer basis and teaches part-time. Hence,
respondent court's conclusion that "his work schedule is flexible (and h)e can
26
always find time for his son" is not well-founded. Fourth, the fact that private
respondent lives near his parents and sister is not crucial in this case. Fifth,
petitioner's work schedule cited in the respondent court's decision is not
necessarily permanent. Hospitals work in shifts and, given a mother's instinctive
desire to lavish upon her child the utmost care, petitioner may be expected to
arrange her schedule in such a way as to allocate time for him. Finally, it does
not follow that petitioner values her career more than her family simply because
she wants to work in the United States. There are any number of reasons for a
person's seeking a job outside the country, e.g. to augment her income for the
family's benefit and welfare, and for psychological fulfillment, to name a few. In
the instant case, it has been shown that petitioner earned enough from her job
to be able to construct a house for the family in Mandaue City. The record
describes sketchily the relations between Ray and Nerissa Perez. The
transcripts of the three hearings are inadequate to show that petitioner did not
exert earnest efforts and make sacrifices to save her marriage.
It is not difficult to imagine how heart-rending it is for a mother whose attempts
at having a baby were frustrated several times over a period of six years to
finally bear one, only for the infant to be snatched from her before he has even
reached his first year. The mother's role in the life of her child, such as Ray II, is
well-nigh irreplaceable. In prose and poetry, the depth of a mother's love has

38

ADOPTION

been immortalized times without number, finding as it does, its justification, not
in fantasy but in reality.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals dated September 27, 1994 as well as its Resolution dated January 24,
1995 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order of the trial court dated
August 27, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED. Custody over the minor Ray Z. Perez
II is awarded to his mother, herein petitioner Nerissa Z. Perez. This decision is
immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Torres, Jr., J., is on leave.

G.R. No. 167405

February 16, 2006

ANA JOYCE S. REYES, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. CESAR M. SOTERO, Presiding Judge, RTC of Paniqui, Tarlac,
Branch 67, ATTY. PAULINO SAGUYOD, the Clerk of Court of Branch 67 of
the RTC at Paniqui, Tarlac in his capacity as Special Administrator,
CORAZON CHICHIOCO, ANGELITO LISING, ERLINDA ESPACIO,
GONZALO ZALZOS and ERNESTO LISING, Respondents.
DECISION

39

ADOPTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

December 21, 1968 and duly registered with the Office of the Civil Registrar on
January 29, 1969.

This petition for review seeks to modify the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated May 14, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 74047 as well as the Resolution dated
May 14, 2005 denying the motion for reconsideration. In the assailed judgment,
the Court of Appeals annulled and set aside the September 18, 2002 and
November 12, 2002 Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paniqui,
Tarlac, Branch 67 in Spec. Proc. No. 204 but refrained from dismissing the
petition for letters of administration and settlement of estate on the ground that
petitioner must first prove that she was legally adopted by the decedent, Elena
Lising.
On September 15, 1998, respondent Corazon L. Chichioco filed a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration and settlement of estate of the late Elena
Lising before the RTC of Paniqui, Tarlac, where it was docketed as Spec. Proc.
No. 204 and raffled to Branch 67. Chichioco claimed that she was the niece and
heir of Lising who died intestate on July 31, 1998. Named as co-heirs of
Chichioco were Rosario L. Zalzos, Florante Zalzos, Erlinda Lising, Manuel
Lising, Evelyn Lising, Josephine Lising, Alfredo Lising and respondents Ernesto
Lising and Erlinda Espacio.
According to Chichioco, the deceased left real properties located in the
municipalities of Ramos and Paniqui, Tarlac, as well as assorted pieces of
jewelry and money which were allegedly in the possession of petitioner Ana
Joyce S. Reyes, a grandniece of the deceased. Chichioco prayed that she be
appointed administrator of the estate, upon payment of a bond, pending
1
settlement and distribution of Lisings properties to the legal heirs.
2

On November 6, 1998, petitioner Reyes filed an Opposition to the petition,

claiming that she was an adopted child of Lising and the latters husband,
Serafin Delos Santos, who died on November 30, 1970. She asserted that the
petition should be dismissed and that the appointment of an administrator was
unnecessary, since she was the only heir of Lising who passed away without
leaving any debts. She further asserted that Chichioco is unfit to serve as
administrator of Lisings estate because of her "antagonistic interests" against
the decedent. Chichioco and her alleged co-heirs have questioned the
decedents title to a piece of real property which forms a large part of the estate.
3

On November 11, 1998, petitioner filed a Supplement to the Opposition

4
attaching thereto the Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Paniqui, Tarlac stating that on page 76, Book No. 01 of the Register of Court
Decrees, Reyes was adopted by Elena Lising and Serafin Delos Santos
pursuant to a decision rendered in Spec. Proc. No. 1410 by Judge Julian Lustre
of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Tarlac, Branch 3, promulgated on

Petitioner also submitted a Certification issued by the Clerk of Court of the

RTC-Tarlac City, stating that a judgment was rendered in Spec. Proc. No. 1410
on December 21, 1968 decreeing petitioners adoption by Elena Lising and
6
Serafin Delos Santos. She also presented a copy of Judicial Form No. 43
indicating that the adoption decree was on file in the General Docket of the
RTC-Tarlac City, wherein the dispositive portion of the adoption decree was
recorded as follows:
In view of the foregoing, the court finds this petition a proper case for adoption
and therefore grants the same. Consequently, the Court declares that
henceforth, the child Ana Joyce C. Zalzos is freed from all legal obligations of
obedience and maintenance with respect to her natural parents Orlando Zalzos
and May C. Castro, and is to all legal intents and purposes the child of the
7
petitioners Serafin delos Santos and Elena Lising.
8

Petitioner likewise submitted a Decree of Final Distribution issued by the

Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (PVAO) showing that, upon the death of
Serafin Delos Santos, death benefits were paid to his widow, Elena Lising, and
his "daughter", Ana Joyce Delos Santos, in accordance with pertinent provisions
of law.
On April 5, 1999, the RTC ordered respondents to submit documentary
evidence to prove the jurisdictional facts of the case and to comment on
9
petitioners opposition. Only Rosario L. Zalsos appears to have filed a
10
Comment/Reply to Oppositors Opposition, after which the RTC ordered the
11
parties to submit memoranda thereon. On July 22, 1999, the case was
12
deemed submitted for resolution.
Meanwhile, on June 30, 1999, Chichioco and her alleged co-heirs filed before
the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the adoption decree docketed
13
as SP No. 53457. They claimed that no proceedings for the adoption of
petitioner took place in 1968 since the Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac and the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) had no records of the adoption case.
Petitioners natural mother supposedly connived with the court personnel to
make it appear that petitioner was adopted by the Delos Santos spouses and
that the CFIs order for initial hearing was published in a weekly newspaper
which was not authorized to publish court orders in special proceedings.
Upon motion of Chichioco, the RTC ordered on October 4, 1999, the suspension
14
of hearings in Spec. Proc. No. 204 pending the outcome of SP No. 53457.
15
Subsequently, however, the Court of Appeals dismissed SP No. 53457 for

40

ADOPTION

failure to comply with the third paragraph of Section 4, Rule 47 of the Rules of
16
17
Court. The said dismissal became final and executory on March 8, 2000.
Thereafter, on August 22, 2000, petitioner filed a motion before the RTC praying
that the opposition to Spec. Proc. No. 204 be finally resolved and that the
18
19
petition be dismissed. This was followed by an Urgent Ex Parte Motion filed
by petitioner on October 17, 2000 praying for the immediate resolution of her
opposition.
20

On November 16, 2000, respondents filed a Comment to the opposition stating

that reasonable doubts have been cast on petitioners claim that she was legally
adopted due allegedly to certain "badges of fraud." Respondents also informed
the RTC that they have filed a criminal complaint against petitioner before the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Tarlac City, for alleged falsification of the
adoption decree and Judicial Form No. 43, docketed as I.S. No. 00-1016.
21

Subsequently, the RTC issued a Resolution dated December 12, 2000

deferring resolution of petitioners opposition to Spec. Proc. No. 204, pending
the outcome of the criminal case filed against the latter. In the meantime, the
parties were enjoined from dissipating or disposing any or all of the properties
included in the estate of Elena Lising without order from this Court.
On December 13, 2000, Chichioco filed an Urgent Motion to Appoint Special
22
Administrator before the RTC on the ground that there was yet no true
determination and appraisal of the decedents universal estate. It was prayed
therein that the Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Paulino Saguyod, be appointed
special administrator as he was "an experienced and able person in the
management of properties" and is "honest, impartial, competent and acceptable
to the majority of the interested parties."
In the meantime, the Provincial Prosecutor found probable cause to charge
petitioner with falsification of public documents per resolution dated January 5,
23
2001. Petitioner thus appealed the said finding to the Office of the Regional
State Prosecutor.
On August 8, 2001, the RTC granted respondents motion for the appointment of
24
a special administrator and appointed its branch clerk of court, Atty. Saguyod.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration on the grounds that the branch clerk of
court was disqualified from taking on the task of special administrator, and that
Atty. Saguyod was appointed without being required to file a bond. Petitioner
also reiterated that the petition should be dismissed because she is the sole heir
25
of the decedent.
However, the RTC denied petitioners motion for
26
reconsideration on November 5, 2001.

On January 14, 2002, the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor reversed the
findings of the Provincial Prosecutor and dismissed the criminal complaint
27
against petitioner. Undaunted, Chichioco filed a petition for review before the
Department of Justice (DOJ).
Simultaneously, Chichioco and the other alleged co-heirs filed a motion before
the RTC to enjoin petitioner from conducting business in a property belonging to
the estate. Respondent Chichioco alleged that petitioner converted the
basement of Lisings residence into a billiard hall without authority of the special
28
administrator.
Acting on said motion, the RTC issued a resolution on September 18, 2002, the
dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Oppositor Ana Joyce Reyes is hereby enjoined from
conducting business activity in any of the properties left by the decedent. The
Special Administrator is also empowered to take control and possession of the
listed personal and real properties of the decedent and those that may be found
to be owned or registered in the name of the same.
SO ORDERED.

29

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the above resolution which was
denied by the RTC on November 12, 2002. On even date, the DOJ also issued
a resolution dismissing respondent Chichiocos petition for review in the criminal
30
case.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari before the Court
31
of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74047, assailing the September 18,
2002 and November 12, 2002 resolutions of the RTC. Petitioner alleged that
said resolutions were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
in excess of jurisdiction since as sole heir, she had the right to possess and use
the decedents property, title over which automatically passed on to her upon the
latters death. Moreover, the special administrator, Atty. Saguyod, had yet to file
a bond and submit an inventory of the decedents estate.
Additionally, petitioner insisted that Spec. Proc. No. 204 should be dismissed
since the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of SP No. 53457 constituted res
judicata as to the former. There was likewise no valid challenge to her adoption
and she consequently remains to be the sole heir of the decedent. Thus, she
stressed that there was no need for the appointment of an administrator or for
the settlement proceedings.

41

ADOPTION
32

In due course, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment nullifying the

resolutions of the trial court. It held that the presiding judge, Judge Cesar M.
Sotero, gravely abused his discretion in appointing his branch clerk of court as
33
special administrator. Citing Balanay, Jr. v. Martinez, the appellate court
reasoned that such act could engender a suspicion that Judge Sotero and his
clerk are in cahoots in milking the decedents estate. Moreover, Atty. Saguyod
failed to comply with the requirements of a bond and inventory and could not
therefore take control and possession of any of the decedents properties.
However, the appellate court refused to dismiss Spec. Proc. No. 204 since the
dismissal of SP No. 53457 was not a judgment on the merits and did not operate
as res judicata to the former. It was also incumbent upon petitioner to prove
before the trial court that she was indeed adopted by the Delos Santos spouses
since, according to the appellate court, "imputations of irregularities permeating
the adoption decree render its authenticity under a cloud of doubt."
Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied on March 15, 2005,
hence this petition on the following assigned errors:

34

A. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

PETITIONER HAD TO PROVE THE VALIDITY OF HER ADOPTION
DUE TO IMPUTATIONS OF IRREGULARITIES IN VIEW OF SECTION
35
47 OF RULE 39.
B. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
DISMISSAL IN SP NO. 53457 WAS NOT A DISMISSAL ON THE
36
MERITS.
The petition is meritorious.

individuals, is the local civil registrars office as well as the court which rendered
the judgment.
Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a
39
duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. As
such, the certifications issued by the local civil registrar and the clerk of court
regarding details of petitioners adoption which are entered in the records kept
under their official custody, are prima facie evidence of the facts contained
therein. These certifications suffice as proof of the fact of petitioners adoption by
the Delos Santos spouses until contradicted or overcome by sufficient evidence.
Mere "imputations of irregularities" will not cast a "cloud of doubt" on the
adoption decree since the certifications and its contents are presumed valid until
proof to the contrary is offered.
In this regard, it must be pointed out that such contrary proof can be presented
only in a separate action brought principally for the purpose of nullifying the
adoption decree. The latter cannot be assailed collaterally in a proceeding for
the settlement of a decedents estate, as categorically held in Santos v.
40
Aranzanso. Accordingly, respondents cannot assail in these proceedings the
validity of the adoption decree in order to defeat petitioners claim that she is the
sole heir of the decedent. Absent a categorical pronouncement in an appropriate
proceeding that the decree of adoption is void, the certifications regarding the
matter, as well as the facts stated therein, should be deemed legitimate, genuine
and real. Petitioners status as an adopted child of the decedent remains
unrebutted and no serious challenge has been brought against her standing as
such. Therefore, for as long as petitioners adoption is considered valid,
respondents cannot claim any interest in the decedents estate. For this reason,
we agree with petitioner that Spec. Proc. No. 204 should be dismissed.
As succinctly held in Santos v. Aranzanso:

On the first assigned error, we agree with petitioner that she need not prove her
legal adoption by any evidence other than those which she had already
presented before the trial court. To recall, petitioner submitted a certification
from the local civil registrars office that the adoption decree was registered
therein and also a copy of Judicial Form No. 43 and a certification issued by the
clerk of court that the decree was on file in the General Docket of the RTCTarlac City. Both certifications were issued under the seal of the issuing offices
and were signed by the proper officers. These are thus presumed to have been
37
regularly issued as part of the official duties that said public officers perform.
38

It should be borne in mind that an adoption decree is a public document

required by law to be entered into the public records, the official repository of
which, as well as all other judicial pronouncements affecting the status of

41

From all the foregoing it follows that respondents - x x x and those who, like
them x x x, claim an interest in the estate x x x as alleged first cousins, cannot
intervene, as such, in the settlement proceedings, in view of the fact that in the
order of intestate succession adopted children exclude first cousins (Articles 979
and 1003, New Civil Code). The same holds true as long as the adoption must
be - as in the instant case - considered valid. (Emphasis added)
Petitioner, whose adoption is presumed to be valid, would necessarily exclude
respondents from inheriting from the decedent since they are mere collateral
relatives of the latter. To allow the proceedings below to continue would serve
no salutary purpose but to delay the resolution of the instant case. After all, the
dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 204 is the logical consequence of our
pronouncement relative to the presumed validity of petitioners adoption.

42

ADOPTION

Moreover, it must be stressed that all the evidence pertinent to the resolution of
the petitioners opposition, which is actually a motion to dismiss the petition for
letters of administration and settlement of the estate, is a matter of record in the
instant case. The same has in fact been submitted for resolution before the RTC
more than six years ago and is so far the only pending incident before the RTC.
The parties have likewise amply ventilated their positions on the matter through
their respective pleadings filed before the lower courts. No useful purpose will
thus be served if we let the RTC resolve the matter, only for its ruling to be
elevated again to the Court of Appeals and subsequently to this Court. The
remand of the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not
necessary where the Court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the
42
evidence before it. This is in keeping with the avowed purpose of the rules of
procedure which is to secure for the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive
43
determination of every action or proceeding. Hence, since the grounds for the
dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 204 are extant in the records and there is no
cogent reason to remand the case to the RTC, Spec. Proc. No. 204 should be
dismissed.
Based on the foregoing, the Court sees no need to discuss petitioners second
assigned error.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Special Proceedings No. 204
pending before the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City, Branch 67 is
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 164948

June 27, 2006

DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
1
Court is the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77826 which

43

ADOPTION
2

reversed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City, Branch
63 in Civil Case No. 2733 granting the Petition for Adoption of the petitioner
herein.
The Antecedents

Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, and to submit a report thereon not
11
later than April 4, 2002, the date set for the initial hearing of the petition. The
12
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance but deputized the
13
City Prosecutor of Tarlac to appear in its behalf. Since her petition was
14
unopposed, petitioner was allowed to present her evidence ex parte.

On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United States of

America (USA), of Filipino parentage and a resident of Guam, USA, filed a
3
petition for the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos who was born on
4
5
August 31, 1986; Elma Dizon Ramos, who was born on September 7, 1987;
6
and Eugene Dizon Ramos who was born on August 5, 1989. The minors are
the natural children of Manuel Ramos, petitioners brother, and Amelia Ramos.

The petitioner testified in her behalf. She also presented Elaine Ramos, the
eldest of the adoptees, to testify on the written consent executed by her and her
15
siblings. The petitioner marked in evidence the Affidavit of Consent purportedly
executed by her children Ann, Errol, Dennis and Ricfel Branitley, all surnamed
Landingin, and notarized by a notary public in Guam, USA, as proof of said
16
consent.

Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her petition that when Manuel died on May
7
19, 1990, the children were left to their paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc
Ramos; their biological mother, Amelia, went to Italy, re-married there and now
has two children by her second marriage and no longer communicated with her
children by Manuel Ramos nor with her in-laws from the time she left up to the
institution of the adoption; the minors are being financially supported by the
petitioner and her children, and relatives abroad; as Maria passed away on
November 23, 2000, petitioner desires to adopt the children; the minors have
8
given their written consent to the adoption; she is qualified to adopt as shown
by the fact that she is a 57-year-old widow, has children of her own who are
already married, gainfully employed and have their respective families; she lives
alone in her own home in Guam, USA, where she acquired citizenship, and
works as a restaurant server. She came back to the Philippines to spend time
9
with the minors; her children gave their written consent to the adoption of the
minors. Petitioners brother, Mariano Ramos, who earns substantial income,
signified his willingness and commitment to support the minors while in
petitioners custody.

On May 24, 2002, Elizabeth Pagbilao, Social Welfare Officer II of the DSWD,
Field Office III, Tarlac, submitted a Child Study Report, with the following
recommendation:

Petitioner prayed that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered in her favor, as
follows:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed to this Honorable Court that after
publication and hearing, judgment be rendered allowing the adoption of the
minor children Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos, and Eugene Dizon
Ramos by the petitioner, and ordering that the minor childrens name follow the
family name of petitioner.
Petitioner prays for such other reliefs, just and equitable under the premises.

10

On March 5, 2002, the court ordered the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD) to conduct a case study as mandated by Article 34 of

In view of the foregoing, undersigned finds minors Elaine, Elma & Eugene all
surnamed Ramos, eligible for adoption because of the following reasons:
1. Minors surviving parent, the mother has voluntarily consented to their
adoption by the paternal aunt, Diwata Landingin this is in view of her
inability to provide the parental care, guidance and support they need.
An Affidavit of Consent was executed by the mother which is hereto
attached.
2. The three minors subject for adoption have also expressed their
willingness to be adopted and joins the petitioners in Guam, USA in the
future. A joint Affidavit of consent is hereto attached. The minors
developed close attachment to the petitioners and they regarded her as
second parent.
3. The minors are present under the care of a temporary guardian who
has also family to look after. As young adolescents they really need
parental love, care, guidance and support to ensure their protection and
well being.
In view of the foregoing, it is hereby respectfully recommended that minors
Elaine D. Ramos, Elma D. Ramos and Eugene D. Ramos be adopted by their
maternal aunt Diwata Landingin. Trial custody is hereby further recommended to
be dispensed with considering that they are close relatives and that close
17
attachments was already developed between the petitioner and the 3 minors.
Pagbilao narrated what transpired during her interview, as follows:

44

ADOPTION

The mother of minors came home together with her son John Mario, this May
2002 for 3 weeks vacation. This is to enable her appear for the personal
interview concerning the adoption of her children.

20

The OSG appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals on December 2, 2002.
21
In its brief for the oppositor-appellant, the OSG raised the following arguments:
I

The plan for the adoption of minors by their paternal aunt Diwata Landingin was
conceived after the death of their paternal grandmother and guardian. The
paternal relatives including the petitioner who attended the wake of their mother
were very much concerned about the well-being of the three minors. While
preparing for their adoption, they have asked a cousin who has a family to stay
with minors and act as their temporary guardian.
The mother of minors was consulted about the adoption plan and after weighing
the benefits of adoption to her children, she voluntarily consented. She realized
that her children need parental love, guidance and support which she could not
provide as she already has a second family & residing in Italy. Knowing also that
the petitioners & her children have been supporting her children up to the
present and truly care for them, she believes her children will be in good hands.
She also finds petitioners in a better position to provide a secured and bright
18
future to her children.
However, petitioner failed to present Pagbilao as witness and offer in evidence
the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption; petitioner, likewise,
failed to present any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assents to the
adoption.
On November 23, 2002, the court, finding merit in the petition for adoption,
rendered a decision granting said petition. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that henceforth, minors Elaine Dizon
Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos, Eugene Dizon Ramos be freed from all legal
obligations obedience and maintenance from their natural parents and that they
be declared for all legal intents and purposes the children of Diwata Ramos
Landingin. Trial custody is dispensed with considering that parent-children
relationship has long been established between the children and the adoptive
parents. Let the surnames of the children be changed from "Dizon-Ramos" to
"Ramos-Landingin."
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Tarlac, Tarlac
for him to effect the corresponding changes/amendment in the birth certificates
of the above-mentioned minors.
SO ORDERED.

19

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION

DESPITE THE LACK OF CONSENT OF THE PROPOSED ADOPTEES
BIOLOGICAL MOTHER.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION
DESPITE THE LACK OF THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF THE PETITIONERS
CHILDREN AS REQUIRED BY LAW.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION
DESPITE PETITIONERS FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THAT SHE IS IN A
POSITION TO SUPPORT THE PROPOSED ADOPTEES.
22

On April 29, 2004, the CA rendered a decision reversing the ruling of the RTC.
It held that petitioner failed to adduce in evidence the voluntary consent of
Amelia Ramos, the childrens natural mother. Moreover, the affidavit of consent
of the petitioners children could not also be admitted in evidence as the same
was executed in Guam, USA and was not authenticated or acknowledged
before a Philippine consular office, and although petitioner has a job, she was
not stable enough to support the children. The dispositive portion of the CA
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision dated November
25, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, Tarlac City in Spec. Proc. No.
2733 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

23

24

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on May 21, 2004, which the CA
25
denied in its Resolution dated August 12, 2004.
Petitioner, thus, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari
7, 2004, assigning the following errors:

26

on September

45

ADOPTION

1. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT HAS OVERLOOKED

AND MISAPPLIED SOME FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH
ARE OF WEIGHT AND IMPORTANCE AND WHICH IF CONSIDERED
WOULD HAVE AFFECTED THE RESULT OF THE CASE.
2. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
CONCLUDING THAT THE PETITIONER-APPELLEE IS NOT
27
FINANCIALLY CAPABLE TO SUPPORT THE THREE CHILDREN.
The issues raised by the parties in their pleadings are the following: (a) whether
the petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors without the written consent of their
biological mother, Amelia Ramos; (b) whether or not the affidavit of consent
purportedly executed by the petitioner-adopters children sufficiently complies
with the law; and (c) whether or not petitioner is financially capable of supporting
the adoptees.
The Courts Ruling

Sec. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. - After being properly

counseled and informed of his/her right to give or withhold his/her approval of
the adoption, the written consent of the following to the adoption is hereby
required:
(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;
(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal guardian,
or the proper government instrumentality which has legal custody of the
child;
(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or
over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any;
(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the
adopter, if living with said adopter and the latters souse, if any;
(e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.

The petition is denied for lack of merit.

It has been the policy of the Court to adhere to the liberal concept, as stated in
28
Malkinson v. Agrava, that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold
the interest and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration and are
designed to provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy
or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family in the
person of the adopter as well as to allow childless couples or persons to
experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of
the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every
reasonable intendment should thus be sustained to promote and fulfill these
29
noble and compassionate objectives of the law.
30

However, in Cang v. Court of Appeals, the Court also ruled that the liberality
with which this Court treats matters leading to adoption insofar as it carries out
the beneficent purposes of the law to ensure the rights and privileges of the
adopted child arising therefrom, ever mindful that the paramount consideration is
the overall benefit and interest of the adopted child, should be understood in its
proper context and perspective. The Courts position should not be
misconstrued or misinterpreted as to extend to inferences beyond the
contemplation of law and jurisprudence. Thus, the discretion to approve
adoption proceedings is not to be anchored solely on best interests of the child
31
but likewise, with due regard to the natural rights of the parents over the child.
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption
Act of 1998, provides:

The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended
to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by
interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the
32
child in the manner of the proposed adoption.
Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the
validity of a decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child
requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties
may be terminated and re-established in adoptive parents. In this case,
petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.
We note that in her Report, Pagbilao declared that she was able to interview
Amelia Ramos who arrived in the Philippines with her son, John Mario in May
2002. If said Amelia Ramos was in the Philippines and Pagbilao was able to
interview her, it is incredible that the latter would not require Amelia Ramos to
execute a Written Consent to the adoption of her minor children. Neither did the
petitioner bother to present Amelia Ramos as witness in support of the petition.
Petitioner, nonetheless, argues that the written consent of the biological mother
is no longer necessary because when Amelias husband died in 1990, she left
for Italy and never came back. The children were then left to the guidance and
care of their paternal grandmother. It is the paternal relatives, including
petitioner, who provided for the childrens financial needs. Hence, Amelia, the
biological mother, had effectively abandoned the children. Petitioner further
contends that it was by twist of fate that after 12 years, when the petition for

46

ADOPTION

adoption was pending with the RTC that Amelia and her child by her second
marriage were on vacation in the Philippines. Pagbilao, the DSWD social
worker, was able to meet her, and during the meeting, Amelia intimated to the
social worker that she conformed to the adoption of her three children by the
petitioner.

A I do not know, sir.

Petitioners contention must be rejected. When she filed her petition with the trial
court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was already in effect. Section 9 thereof provides that if
the written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained, the written
consent of the legal guardian of the minors will suffice. If, as claimed by
petitioner, that the biological mother of the minors had indeed abandoned them,
she should, thus have adduced the written consent of their legal guardian.

Q From whom did you learn that?

Ordinarily, abandonment by a parent to justify the adoption of his child without

his consent, is a conduct which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental
33
duties. The term means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal
obligations of love and support. If a parent withholds presence, love, care, the
opportunity to display filial affection, and neglects to lend support and
34
maintenance, the parent, in effect, abandons the child.

A Yes, sir, she got two kids.

Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others
35
is not such an abandonment. To dispense with the requirement of consent, the
36
abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of adoption.
In this case, petitioner relied solely on her testimony and that of Elaine Ramos to
prove her claim that Amelia Ramos had abandoned her children. Petitioners
testimony on that matter follows:

Q Did you receive any news about Amelia Ramos?

A What I know, sir, was that she was already married with another man.

A From others who came from Italy, sir.

Q Did you come to know whether she has children by her second marriage?
37

Elaine, the eldest of the minors, testified, thus:

Q Where is your mother now?
A In Italy, sir.
Q When did your mother left for Italy?
A After my father died, sir.
Q How old were you when your mother left for Italy in 1990?

Q Where is the mother of these three children now?

A Two years old, sir.

A She left for Italy on November 20, 1990, sir.

Q At the time when your mother left for Italy, did your mother communicate with
you?

Q At the time when Amelia Ramos left for Italy, was there an instance where she
communicated with the family?

A No, sir.

A None, sir.

However, the Home Study Report of the DSWD Social Worker also stated the
following:

Q How about with her children?

A None, sir.
Q Do you know what place in Italy did she reside?

38

IV. Background of the Case:

xxxx

47

ADOPTION

Since the mother left for Italy, minors siblings had been under the care and
custody of their maternal grandmother. However, she died in Nov. 2001 and an
uncle, cousin of their deceased father now serves as their guardian. The
petitioner, together with her children and other relatives abroad have been
supporting the minor children financially, even during the time that they were still
living with their natural parents. Their mother also sends financial support but
39
very minimal.

Thus, when Amelia left for Italy, she had not intended to abandon her children,
or to permanently sever their mother-child relationship. She was merely impelled
to leave the country by financial constraints. Yet, even while abroad, she did not
surrender or relinquish entirely her motherly obligations of rearing the children to
her now deceased mother-in-law, for, as claimed by Elaine herself, she
consulted her mother, Amelia, for serious personal problems. Likewise, Amelia
continues to send financial support to the children, though in minimal amounts
as compared to what her affluent in-laws provide.

xxxx
V. Background Information about the Minors Being Sought for Adoption:
xxxx
As the eldest she tries her best to be a role model to her younger siblings. She
helps them in their lessons, works and has fun with them. She also encourages
openness on their problems and concerns and provides petty counseling. In
40
serious problems she already consult (sic) her mother and petitioner-aunt.
xxxx
In their 5 years of married life, they begot 3 children, herein minors, Amelia
recalled that they had a happy and comfortable life. After the death of her
husband, her in-laws which include the petitioner had continued providing
support for them. However being ashamed of just depending on the support of
her husbands relatives, she decided to work abroad. Her parents are also in
need of financial help as they are undergoing maintenance medication. Her
parents mortgaged their farm land which she used in going to Italy and worked
as domestic helper.

Let it be emphasized, nevertheless, that the adoption of the minors herein will
have the effect of severing all legal ties between the biological mother, Amelia,
42
and the adoptees, and that the same shall then be vested on the adopter. It
would thus be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were to be
the paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person of parental
authority over his/her children. More proof has to be adduced that Amelia has
emotionally abandoned the children, and that the latter will not miss her
43
guidance and counsel if they are given to an adopting parent. Again, it is the
best interest of the child that takes precedence in adoption.
Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that the Court shall consider
no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the
evidence is offered must be specified. The offer of evidence is necessary
because it is the duty of the Court to rest its findings of fact and its judgment
only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties. Unless and until
admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or purposes for which such
document is offered, the same is merely a scrap of paper barren of probative
weight. Mere identification of documents and the markings thereof as exhibits do
44
not confer any evidentiary weight on documents unless formally offered.

When she left for Italy in November 1990, she entrusted her 3 children to the
care & custody of her mother-in-law who returned home for good, however she
died on November 2000.

Petitioner failed to offer in evidence Pagbilaos Report and of the Joint Affidavit
of Consent purportedly executed by her children; the authenticity of which she,
45
likewise, failed to prove. The joint written consent of petitioners children was
notarized on January 16, 2002 in Guam, USA; for it to be treated by the Rules of
Court in the same way as a document notarized in this country it needs to
46
comply with Section 2 of Act No. 2103, which states:

While working in Italy, she met Jun Tayag, a married man from Tarlac. They
became live-in partners since 1995 and have a son John Mario who is now 2
years old. The three of them are considered Italian residents. Amelia claimed
that Mr. Tayag is planning to file an annulment of his marriage and his wife is
amenable to it. He is providing his legitimate family regular support.

Section 2. An instrument or document acknowledged and authenticated in a

foreign country shall be considered authentic if the acknowledgment and
authentication are made in accordance with the following requirements:

Amelia also sends financial support ranging from P10,000-P15,000 a month

through her parents who share minimal amount of P3,000-P5,000 a month to his
(sic) children. The petitioner and other paternal relatives are continuously
41
providing support for most of the needs & education of minors up to present.

(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before (1) an ambassador,

minister, secretary of legation, charg d affaires, consul, vice-consul, or
consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, acting within the
country or place to which he is accredited, or (2) a notary public or

48

ADOPTION

officer duly authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of

instruments or documents in the place where the act is done.
(b) The person taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person
acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him, and that he
is the same person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is
his free act and deed. The certificate shall be under his official seal, if he
is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.
In case the acknowledgment is made before a notary public or an officer
mentioned in subdivision (2) of the preceding paragraph, the certificate
of the notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall be
authenticated by an ambassador, minister, secretary of legation, charg
de affaires, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the
Philippines, acting within the country or place to which he is accredited.
The officer making the authentication shall certify under his official seal
that the person who took the acknowledgment was at the time duly
authorized to act as notary public or that he was duly exercising the
functions of the office by virtue of which he assumed to act, and that as
such he had authority under the law to take acknowledgment of
instruments or documents in the place where the acknowledgment was
taken, and that his signature and seal, if any, are genuine.
As the alleged written consent of petitioners legitimate children did not comply
with the afore-cited law, the same can at best be treated by the Rules as a
private document whose authenticity must be proved either by anyone who saw
the document executed or written; or by evidence of the genuineness of the
47
signature or handwriting of the makers.
Since, in the instant case, no further proof was introduced by petitioner to
authenticate the written consent of her legitimate children, the same is
inadmissible in evidence.
In reversing the ruling of the RTC, the CA ruled that petitioner was not stable
enough to support the children and is only relying on the financial backing,
48
support and commitment of her children and her siblings. Petitioner contradicts
this by claiming that she is financially capable as she has worked in Guam for 14
years, has savings, a house, and currently earns $5.15 an hour with tips of not
less than $1,000.00 a month. Her children and siblings have likewise committed
themselves to provide financial backing should the need arise. The OSG, again
in its comment, banks on the statement in the Home Study Report that
"petitioner has limited income." Accordingly, it appears that she will rely on the
financial backing of her children and siblings in order to support the minor
adoptees. The law, however, states that it is the adopter who should be in a
position to provide support in keeping with the means of the family.

Since the primary consideration in adoption is the best interest of the child, it
follows that the financial capacity of prospective parents should also
be carefully evaluated and considered. Certainly, the adopter should be in a
position to support the would-be adopted child or children, in keeping with the
means of the family.
49

According to the Adoption Home Study Report forwarded by the Department of

Public Health & Social Services of the Government of Guam to the DSWD,
petitioner is no longer supporting her legitimate children, as the latter are already
adults, have individual lives and families. At the time of the filing of the petition,
petitioner was 57 years old, employed on a part-time basis as a waitress,
earning $5.15 an hour and tips of around $1,000 a month. Petitioners main
intention in adopting the children is to bring the latter to Guam, USA. She has a
house at Quitugua Subdivision in Yigo, Guam, but the same is still being
amortized. Petitioner likewise knows that the limited income might be a
hindrance to the adoption proceedings.
Given these limited facts, it is indeed doubtful whether petitioner will be able to
sufficiently handle the financial aspect of rearing the three children in the US.
She only has a part-time job, and she is rather of age. While petitioner claims
that she has the financial support and backing of her children and siblings, the
OSG is correct in stating that the ability to support the adoptees is personal to
the adopter, as adoption only creates a legal relation between the former and
the latter. Moreover, the records do not prove nor support petitioners allegation
that her siblings and her children are financially able and that they are willing to
support the minors herein. The Court, therefore, again sustains the ruling of the
CA on this issue.
While the Court recognizes that petitioner has only the best of intentions for her
nieces and nephew, there are legal infirmities that militate against reversing the
ruling of the CA. In any case, petitioner is not prevented from filing a new
petition for adoption of the herein minors.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice

49

ADOPTION

G.R. No. 125932

April 21, 1999

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners

vs.
CLAUDE A. MILLER and JUMRUS S. MILLER, respondents.
PARDO, J
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, appealed
originally to the Court of Appeals from a decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 59, Angeles City, granting the petition of respondent spouses to adopt
the minor Michael Magno Madayag.
In its decision promulgated on April 17, 1996, the Court of Appeals certified the
case to the Supreme Court because the petition raised only questions of law.
By resolution adopted on September 23, 1996, we accepted the appeal. We
shall treat the appeal as one via certiorari from a decision of the regional trial

50

ADOPTION

court under Supreme Court Circular 2-90, dated March 9, 1990, on pure
questions of law.
The facts are undisputed and may be related as follows:
On July 29, 1988, the spouses Claude A. Miller and Jumrus S. Miller, filed with
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Angeles City, a verified petition to adopt the
minor Michael Magno Madayag.
The trial court scheduled the petition for hearing on September 9, 1988, at 9:00
in the morning. At the hearing, with the attendance of an assistant city fiscal of
Angeles City, in representation of the Solicitor General, respondents adduced
evidence showing that:
Claude A. Miller, 38 years old and Jumrus S. Miller, 40 years of
age, both American citizens, are husband and wife, having been
married on June 21, 1982.
They were childless and "do not expect to have sibling out of
their union on account of a medical problem of the wife."
Claude A. Miller was a member of the United States Air Force,
as airman first class, assigned at Clark Air Base since January
26, 1985.
The family maintains their residence at Don Bonifacio
1
Subdivision, Balibago, Angeles City, since 1985.

On May 12, 1989, the trial court rendered decision granting the petition for
adoption, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding that petitioners possess all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications for adoption, the
instant petition is hereby Granted, and this Court decrees the
minor MICHAEL MAGNO MADAYAG freed from all obligation of
obedience and support with respect to natural parents and is
hereby declared the child of the herein petitioners by adoption.
The minor's surname shall be changed from "MADAYAG" to
"MILLER", which is the surname of the herein
3
petitioners.
In due time, the Solicitor General, in behalf of the Republic, interposed an
appeal to the Court of Appeals. As heretofore stated, the Court of Appeals
certified the case to this Court.
The issue raised is whether the court may allow aliens to adopt a Filipino child
4
5
despite the prohibition under the Family Code, effective on August 3, 1988
when the petition for adoption was filed on July 29, 1988, under the provision of
6
the Child and Youth Welfare Code which allowed aliens to adopt.
The issue is not new. This Court has ruled that an alien qualified to adopt under
the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which was in force at the time of the filing of
the petition, acquired a vested right which could not be affected by the
7
subsequent enactment of a new law disqualifying him.

The minor Michael Magno Madayag is the legitimate son of

Marcelo S. Madayag, Jr. and Zenaida Magno. Born on July 14,
1987, at San Fernando, La Union, the minor has been in the
custody of respondents since the first week of August 1987.
Poverty and deep concern for the future of their son prompted
the natural parents who have no visible means of livelihood to
have their child adopted by respondents. They executed
affidavits giving their irrevocable consent to the adoption by
respondents.

Consequently, the enactment of the Family Code, effective August 3, 1988, will
not impair the right of respondents who are aliens to adopt a Filipino child
because the right has become vested at the time of filing of the petition for
adoption and shall be governed by the law then in force. "A vested right is one
whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon events foreign to
the will of the holder. The term expresses the concept of present fixed interest
which in right reason and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary
State action, or an innately just and imperative right which enlightened free
8
society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny."
"Vested rights include not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a
demand, but also an exemption from new obligations created after the right has
9
vested.

The Department of Social Welfare and Development, through its

Regional office at San Fernando, Pampanga, recommended
approval of the petition on the basis of its evaluation that
respondents were morally, emotionally and financially fit to be
adoptive parents and that the adoption would be to the minor's
2
best interest and welfare.

As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient in form and substance in
accordance with the law in governance at the time it was filed, the court acquires
jurisdiction and retains it until it fully disposes of the case. To repeat, the
jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the

51

ADOPTION

commencement of the action. Such jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or

civil cases, once it attaches cannot be ousted by a subsequent happenings or
events, although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from
10
attaching in the first instance.
Therefore, an alien who filed a petition for adoption before the effective of the
Family Code, although denied the right to adopt under Art. 184 of said Code,
may continue with his petition under the law prevailing before the Family Code.
11

Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of
the child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to provide
homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children
and give them the protection of society and family in the person of the adopter,
as well as childless couples or persons to experience the joy of parenthood and
give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of
their natural parent instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained
12
to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objective of the law.
WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM the appealed decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 59, Angeles City, in SP. Proc. No. 3562.1wphi1.nt
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Kapunan and Nares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-23828

February 28, 1966

PAULINA SANTOS and AURORA SANTOS, petitioners,

vs.
GREGORIA ARANZANSO and DEMETRIA VENTURA, respondents.
Jose W. Diokno for the petitioners.
Eulogio Rafael for the respondents.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
A petition for adoption of Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos was filed by
Simplicio Santos and Juliana Reyes in the Court of First Instance of Manila on
1
June 4, 1949. Paulina Santos was then 17 years old and Aurora Santos, 8
years old. The petition, which was under oath, alleged inter alia, that the
whereabouts of the minors' nearest of kin, particularly their parents, were
unknown; that since the outbreak of the war said minors have been abandoned
by their respective parents; and that for years, since their infancy, said children
have continuously been in petitioners' care and custody. A guardian ad litem
Crisanto de Mesa, was thereafter appointed for the minors. Said guardian ad

52

ADOPTION

litem forthwith gave his written consent to the adoption. Paulina Santos, being
2
over fourteen years of age, likewise gave her written consent thereto.
After due publication and hearing, the adoption court (CFI) rendered on August
25, 1949 a decision, hereunder quoted in full:
This is a petition for the adoption of the minors Paulina Santos Reyes
and Aurora Santos Reyes by the spouses Simplicio Santos and Juliana
R. Santos. After due publication in the "National Weekly", a newspaper
of general circulation in the City of Manila, once a week for three
consecutive weeks, the case was then set for trial. The office of the
Solicitor General was duly notified of the petition and at the hearing did
not offer any objection.1wph1.t
From the evidence presented at the hearing, it appears that the
petitioners have been married for the past twenty-seven years and have
no children of their own. They desire to adopt the minors Paulina Santos
Reyes and Aurora Santos Reyes, both of whom are and for years have
been living under their care and custody; that the former, since she was
barely three months old has already been taken care of by them up to
the present time, and the latter has been cared for since she was only
fifteen days old. Paulina Santos Reyes is now seventeen years old and
has given her consent to the adoption as shown by her signature at the
foot of the petition. She ratified the same in open Court. Both parents of
the minors have long been unheard from and in spite of diligent efforts
of the petitioners to locate them, they could not be found. The consent
to the adoption has been given by the guardian ad litem appointed by
the Court. The petitioners are both proprietors and have substantial
income, more than enough to support and educate the minors. The
Court is of the opinion that this adoption will be for the best interest and
welfare of the minors.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby grants the petition of the spouses
Simplicio Santos and Juliana R. Santos to adopt the minors Paulina
Santos Reyes and Aurora Santos Reyes and in accordance with Rule
100 of the Rules of Court in the Philippines, hence forth, the minors are
freed from all legal obligations to their natural parents and are, to all
legal intents and purposes the children of the petitioners.
NOW, ORDERED.
Manila, Philippines, August 25, 1949.
No appeal was taken from the aforesaid decision.

Subsequently eight years later on October 21, 1957, Juliana Reyes died,
in Manila, without testament. On November 25, 1957 Simplicio Santos filed in
the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for the settlement of the intestate
3
estate of Juliana Reyes. In said petition he stated among other things that the
surviving heirs of the deceased are: he, as surviving spouse, Paulina Santos
and Aurora Santos, 27 and 17 years of age, respectively. In the same petition,
he asked that he be appointed administrator of the estate.
Gregoria Aranzanso, alleging that she is first cousin to the deceased, filed on
January 2, 1958 an opposition to the petition for appointment of administrator.
For her grounds she asserted that Simplicio Santos" marriage to the late Juliana
Reyes was bigamous and thus void: and that the adoption of Paulina Santos
and Aurora Santos was likewise void ab initio for want of the written consent of
their parents, who were then living and had not abandoned them. An answer to
the opposition was filed by Simplicio Santos on March 7, 1958 and oppositor
Aranzanso filed a reply thereto on March 17, 1958.
Demetria Ventura, alleging likewise that she is the first cousin of the deceased
Juliana Reyes and adding that she is the mother of the child Paulina Santos,
filed on March 19, 1959 an opposition to the petition of Simplicio Santos to be
named administrator, and, moreover, thereunder adopted, as her own, the
pleadings filed by Gregoria Aranzanso.
By order of April 6, 1959, the Court of First Instance decided the point in dispute,
ruling that the validity of the adoption in question could not be assailed
collaterally in the intestate proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. 34354). From the order
Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura appealed to the Court of Appeals.
In its decision, promulgated on September 14, 1964, the Court of Appeals
reversed the appealed order, finding instead that the adoption was null and void
ab initio due to the absence of consent thereto by the natural parents of the
minor children, which it deemed a jurisdictional defect still open to collateral
attack.
After denial of their motion for reconsideration by the Court of Appeals, Paulina
Santos and Aurora Santos appealed to this Court by way of petition for review,
filed on November 18, 1964, to which due course was given. Five months after
submission of this case for decision or on October 14, 1965 petitioners
herein filed a petition for preliminary injunction, and later, on October 26, 1965, a
supplemental petition therefor, to stop the trial court from allowing Gregorio
Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura, as well as of two other persons, namely,
Consuelo and Pacita Pasion, to intervene in the settlement proceedings or to
withdraw cash advances from the estate.

53

ADOPTION

It was alleged in the petition and supplemental petition for preliminary injunction
that on September 22, 1965 the probate court issued an order allowing Gregoria
Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura to intervene in the settlement proceedings of
Juliana Reyes' estate (Sp. Proc. No. 34354); that on October 2, 1965 said court
issued an order allowing, on previous motions therefor, withdrawal of the sum of
P7,000 each, under bond, to all the parties, including Gregoria Aranzanso and
Demetria Ventura; that on October 7, 1965 two strangers to the proceedings
the aforesaid sisters Consuelo and Pacita Pasion filed a motion, stating that
they are also first cousins of the decedent and praying that an order be issued
allowing them to withdraw the sum of P7,000 each under bond; that on October
13, 1965 the same Pasion sisters filed a supplemental motion in the same
proceedings praying that their motion of October 7 be treated as a motion to
intervene; that on October 18, 1965 the probate court issued an order allowing
the Pasion sisters to intervene in the settlement proceedings and allowing them
to withdraw under bond the sum of P7,000 each from the funds of the estate.
On November 4, 1965 respondents, together with Consuelo and Pacita Pasion
who thereby submitted themselves to this Court's jurisdiction and stated that
they, "for purposes of expediency, are also denominated respondents" filed
their "Comment", as required by this Court, opposing the aforesaid petition for
preliminary injunction. On November 15, 1965 this Court granted the prayer for
preliminary injunction and the writ was issued upon posting of a bond of P5,000
on November 20, 1965. Respondents however moved for reconsideration or
modification thereof on November 23, 1965, stating inter alia that they would
now be precluded from taking part in the scheduled hearing for settlement of the
accounts of the special administratrix (Araceli A. Pilapil). On November 26, 1965
we ordered modification of the preliminary injunction, so that on November 29,
the writ was modified so as to enjoin the probate court, until further orders: (1)
from hearing and/or approving the settlement of special administratrix's
accounts; (2) from allowing any sale, disposition or disbursement of the estate
except when essential for strictly maintenance purposes; and (3) from allowing
respondents, Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura, or Consuelo and
Pacita Pasion, or any of them, to receive any advance, cash or otherwise, from
the funds of the intestate estate.
The principal issue on the merits in this appeal is whether respondentsoppositors Aranzanso and Ventura, could assail in the settlement proceedings
the adoption decree in favor of Paulina and Aurora Santos. In sustaining their
right to make such a collateral attack, the respondent Court of Appeals rested as
abovementioned on the premise that failure to obtain the consent of the natural
parents was a jurisdictional defect rendering the adoption void ab initio. In its
view, said consent was not properly dispensed with, not only because the
evidence adduced in the adoption proceedings was insufficient to support a
finding that the parents had abandoned the children, but also since the adoption

court fatally omitted to expressly and specifically find that such abandonment in
fact occurred.
In this regard it should be stated that the Court of Appeals completely relied on
American jurisprudence and authorities to the effect that parental consent to the
adoption is a jurisdictional requisite (E.g., 2 C.J.S., Adoption of Children, Section
45[a] p. 435; Whetmore vs. Fratello, 282 P2d 667, 670). The point to remember,
however, is that under our law on the matter, consent by the parents to the
adoption is not an absolute requisite:
SEC. 3. Consent to adoption.There shall be filed with the petition a
written consent to the adoption signed by the child if over fourteen years
of age and not incompetent, and by each of its known living parents who
is not insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned such
child, or if there are no such parents by the general guardian or
guardian ad litem of the child, or if the child is in the custody of an
orphan asylum, children's home, or benevolent society or person, by the
proper officer or officers of such asylum, home, or society, or by such
person; but if the child is illegitimate and has not been recognized, the
consent of its father to the adoption shall not be required. (Rule 100, Old
4
Rules of Court.)
Stated otherwise, if the natural parents have abandoned their children, consent
to the adoption by the guardian ad litem suffices. This brings as to the question
whether in the proceedings at bar the Court of Appeals can still review the
evidence in the adoption case and conclude that it was not sufficiently
established therein that the parents of Paulina and Aurora Santos had
abandoned them.
First of all, it is not quite accurate to say that the adoption court made no
determination of the fact of abandonment. As quoted earlier, it is stated in the
decision of the adoption court, that:
From the evidence presented at the hearing it appears that the
petitioners have been married for the past twenty-seven years and have
no children of their own. They desire to adopt the minors Paulina Santos
[y] Reyes and Aurora Santos [y] Reyes, both of whom are and for years
have been living under their care and custody; that the former, since she
was barely three months old has already been taken care of by them up
to the present time, and the latter has been cared for since she was only
fifteen days old. Paulina Santos [y] Reyes is now seventeen years old. .
. . Both parents of the minors have long been unheard from and in spite
of diligent efforts of the petitioners to locate them, they could not be

54

ADOPTION

found. The consent to the adoption has been given by the guardian ad
litem appointed by the Court. . . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
Abandonment under persuasive American rulings imports "any conduct on
the part of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forgo all parental duties
and relinquish all parental claims to the child". It means "neglect or refusal to
perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe
to their children." (2 Am. Jur. 2d, Adoption, Sec. 32, pp. 886-887.) It can thus
readily be seen that altho the CFI judgment approving the adoption does not use
the word "abandoned", its findings sufficiently contain a set of facts and
circumstances which truly constitutes a finding of abandonment.
Coming now to the power of the Court of Appeals to review in this case the
finding of abandonment made by the adoption court, we find that even under
American jurisprudence relied upon, as stated, by said Court the settled
rule is that even when the jurisdiction of an inferior or special tribunal depends
upon the existence of a fact to be established before it, the determination of that
fact by the tribunal cannot be questioned in a collateral attack upon its order (In
re McKaeg's Estate, 141 Cal. 403, 74 Pac. 1039, 1040; In re Camp's Estate, 131
Cal. 469, 63 Pac. 736).
Anent this point the rulings are summed up in 2 American Jurisprudence, 2nd
Series, Adoption, Sec. 75, p. 922, thus:
An adoption order implies the finding of the necessary facts and the
burden of proof is on the party attacking it; it cannot be considered void
merely because the fact needed to show statutory compliance is
obscure. While a judicial determination of some particular fact, such as
the abandonment of his next of kin to the adoption, may be essential to
the exercise of jurisdiction to enter the order of adoption, this does not
make it essential to the jurisdictional validity of the decree that the fact
be determined upon proper evidence, or necessarily in accordance with
the truth; a mere error cannot affect the jurisdiction, and the
determination must stand until reversed on appeal, and hence cannot
be collaterally attacked. If this were not the rule, the status of adopted
children would always be uncertain, since the evidence might not be the
same at all investigations, and might be regarded with different effect by
different tribunals, and the adoption might be held by one court to have
been valid, while another court would hold it to have been of no avail.
Freeman on Judgments says the same thing:
In general, therefore, where the right of the court to assume jurisdiction
of a cause and proceed to judgment depends upon the ascertainment of

facts in pais and the court retains jurisdiction it thereby impliedly

adjudges that the requisite jurisdictional facts exist and having found
such facts in favor of jurisdiction, its decision in this respect, whether
erroneous or not, cannot be questioned in a collateral proceedings, for a
presumption arises in such cases, when the validity of the judgment is
attacked, that the necessary jurisdictional facts were proven. . . . . (Vol.
I, Sec. 350, pp. 719-720.)
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, construing a statute akin to our law in this
regard, said in Parsons vs. Parsons, 101 Wis. 76, 77 N.W. 147, 148:
The statute to be considered is section 4022, Rev. St. 1878, which
reads as follows: "No such adoption shall be made without the written
consent of the living parents of such child unless the court shall find that
one of the parents has abandoned the child or gone to parts unknown."
Thus it will be seen that upon the fact being established that the living
parent has abandoned his child, he is deemed by the statute to have
thereby relinquished all parental right to be consulted in respect to the
child's welfare, and his consent to the adoption is therefore dispensed
with. The term "abandon" obviously means no more than neglect or
refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support
which parents owe to their children. The fact of abandonment, judicially
determined, was essential to the jurisdiction; not essential that it should
be determined on proper evidence, necessarily, or in accordance with
the truth, because mere error in that regard does not affect jurisdicition.
If jurisdiction be obtained to determine a fact, its determination wrong or
on insufficient or improper evidence is immaterial oh the question of
legal right to proceed judicially to the next step. That is deemed to be
elementary... A judicial determination may be contrary to conclusive
evidence, or legal evidence, or without any evidence, yet cannot be
impeached for want of jurisdiction. Van Fleet, Coll. Attack, Secs. 663,
665. That rule applies to all judicial proceedings. . . . .
It follows, therefore, that the Court of Appeals erred in reviewing, under a
collateral attack, the determination of the adoption court that the parents of
Paulina and Aurora Santos had abandoned them. This is so even if such fact of
abandonment is deemed jurisdictional, a point which we need not and do not
rule upon in this case.
For the same reason, it is not in point to argue here that Simplicio Santos in fact
concealed the adoption proceedings from the natural parents, thereby rendering
the judgment obtained therein null and void or being secured by extrinsic fraud.
The rule is well recognized that a judgment can be set aside on the ground of
extrinsic fraud only in a separate action brought for that purpose; not by way of

55

ADOPTION

collateral attack (Gomez vs. Concepcion, 47 Phil. 717; Ramos vs. Maalac, 89
Phil. 270).
Anent the alleged lack of notice of the adoption proceedings on the natural
5
parents, suffice it to mark that adoption is a proceeding in rem and that
constructive notice, such as the publication duly made as aforesaid, is enough
where the residence of the parents is unknown (2 Am. Jur., 2d, Adoption, Sec.
56, p. 906). Notice, moreover, is not required in adoption cases in regard to the
abandoning parent (Parsons vs. Parsons, supra).
Assuming that Simplicio Santos was not validly married to Juliana Reyes, it will
not make any difference as far as the right of respondents to intervene in the
intestate proceedings is concerned. Juliana Reyes should then be deemed to
have filed the petition for adoption as a person whose status is single, not
married. The defect would then lie only as to Simplicio Santos, who, as allegedly
married to another person (a point that we do not decide in this case), could not
6
adopt without joining his wife in the petition. It being the estate of Juliana Reyes
that is the subject matter of the settlement proceedings, the flaw, if any, would
not affect the consideration of the right of Paulina and Aurora Santos to succeed
as adopted children of Juliana Reyes, to the exclusion of respondents.

of Juliana Reyes as alleged first cousins, cannot intervene, as such, in the

settlement proceedings, in view of the fact that in the order of intestate
succession adopted children exclude first cousins (Articles 979 and 1003, New
Civil Code). The same holds true as long as the adoption must be as in the
instant case considered valid.
Wherefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and the
order of the probate court a quo sustaining the adoption, dated April 6, 1959, is
affirmed. Respondents Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura as well as
Consuelo and Pacita Pasion are declared without right to intervene as heirs in
the settlement of the intestate estate of Juliana Reyes. The preliminary
injunction heretofore issued is dissolved, except insofar as it enjoins the
intervention or allowance of withdrawals of properly from the estate by Gregoria
Aranzanso, Demetria Ventura, Consuelo and Pacita Pasion, in the concept of
heirs, as to which it is hereby made permanent. No costs. So ordered.
Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal,
Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, JJ., took no part.

It must not be forgotten that the philosophy behind adoption statutes is to

promote the welfare of the child. Accordingly, the modern trend is to encourage
adoption (Prasnik vs. Republic, 5 O.G. 1942) and every reasonable intendment
should be sustained to promote that objective.
From 2 Corpus Juris Secundum 375-376 we quote:
Accordingly, as the main purpose of adoption statutes is the promotion
of the welfare of children, bereft of the benefits of the home and care of
their real parents, wherever possible without doing violence to the terms
of the statute, such a construction should be given adoption laws as will
sustain, rather than defeat, this purpose.
Although, as against the interests of the child, the proceedings must be
strictly in accordance with the statute, there is a tendency on the part of
the courts, however, where the adoption has been fully consummated,
to construe the statute with a reasonable degree of liberality, to the end
that the assumed relationship and the intention of the parties be upheld,
particularly as against strangers to the proceedings collaterally attacking
them . . . .
From all the foregoing it follows that respondents-oppositors Aranzanso and
Ventura and those who, like them (Pasion sisters), claim an interest in the estate

G.R. No. 117209

February 9, 1996

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig City and SPOUSES VAN MUNSON y
NAVARRO and REGINA MUNSON y ANDRADE, respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
Indeed, what's in a name, as the Bard of Avon has written, since a rose by any
other name would smell as sweet?

56

ADOPTION

This could well be the theme of the present appeal by certiorari which
challenges, on pure questions of law, the order of the Regional Trial Court,
1
Branch 158, Pasig City, dated September 13, 1994 in JDRC Case No. 2964.
Said court is faulted for having approved the petition for adoption of Kevin Earl
Bartolome Moran and simultaneously granted the prayer therein for the change
of the first name of said adoptee to Aaron Joseph, to complement the surname
Munson y Andrade which he acquired consequent to his adoption.

At this juncture, it should be noted that no challenge has been raised by

petitioner regarding the fitness of herein private respondents to be adopting
parents nor the validity of the decree of adoption rendered in their favor. The
records show that the latter have commendably established their qualifications
6
under the law to be adopters, and have amply complied with the procedural
7
requirements for the petition for adoption, with the findings of the trial court
being recited thus:

The facts are undisputed. On March 10, 1994, herein private respondent
spouses, Van Munson y Navarro and Regina Munson y Andrade, filed a p
2
petition to adopt the minor Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran, duly alleging therein
the jurisdictional facts required by Rule 99 of the Rules of Court for adoption,
their qualifications as and fitness to be adoptive parents, as well as the
circumstances under and by reason of which the adoption of the aforenamed
minor was sought. In the very same petition, private respondents prayed for the
change of the first name or said minor adoptee to Aaron Joseph, the same being
the name with which he was baptized in keeping with religious tradition and by
which he has been called by his adoptive family, relatives and friends since May
3
6, 1993 when he arrived at private respondents' residence.

To comply with the jurisdictional requirements, the Order of this Court

dated March 16, 1994 setting this petition for hearing (Exh. "A") was
published in the March 31, April 6 and 13, 1994 issues of the Manila
Chronicle, a newspaper of general circulation (Exhs. "B" to "E" and
submarkings). . . .

At the hearing on April 18, 1994, petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for
change of name in the same petition for adoption. In its formal opposition dated
4
May 3, 1995, petitioner reiterated its objection to the joinder of the petition for
adoption and the petitions for change of name in a single proceeding, arguing
that these petition should be conducted and pursued as two separate
proceedings.
After considering the evidence and arguments of the contending parties, the trial
court ruled in favor of herein private respondents in this wise:
WHEREFORE, minor child Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran is freed from all
legal obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to his
natural parents, and for all legal intents and purposes shall be known as
Aaron Joseph Munson y Andrade, the legally adopted child of Van
Munson and Regina Munson effective upon the filing of the petition on
March 10, 1994. As soon as the decree of adoption becomes final and
executory, it shall be recorded in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
Pasig, Metro Manila pursuant to Section 8, Rule 99 and Section 6, Rule
103, respectively, of the Rules of Court, and shall be annotated in the
record of birth of the adopted child, which in this case is in Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, where the child was born. Likewise, send a copy of this
Order to the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila, for its
5
appropriate action consisten(t) herewith.

xxx

xxx

xxx

Petitioners apart from being financially able, have no criminal nor

derogatory record (Exhs. "K" to "V"); and are physically fit to be the
adoptive parents of the minor child Kevin (Exh. "W"). Their qualification
to become the adoptive parents of Kevin Earl finds support also in the
Social Case Study Report prepared by the DSWD through Social
Worker Luz Angela Sonido, the pertinent portion of which reads:
"Mr. and Mrs. Munson are very religious, responsible, mature
and friendly individuals. They are found physically healthy;
mentally fit, spiritually and financially capable to adopt Kevin
Earl Moran aka Aaron Joseph.
"Mr. and Mrs. Munson have provided AJ with all his needs.
They unselfishly share their time, love and attention to him.
They are ready and willing to continuously provide him a happy
and secure home life.
"Aaron Joseph, on the other hand, is growing normally under
the care of the Munsons. He had comfortably settled in his new
environment. His stay with the Munsons during the six months
trial custody period has resulted to a close bond with Mr. and
Mrs. Munson and vice-versa.
"We highly recommend to the Honorable Court that the adoption
of Kevin Earl Moran aka Aaron Joseph by Mr. and Mrs. Van
8
Munson be legalized."

57

ADOPTION

It has been said all too often enough that the factual findings of the lower court,
when sufficiently buttressed by legal and evidential support, are accorded high
9
respect and are binding and conclusive upon this Court. Accordingly, we fully
uphold the propriety of that portion of the order of the court below granting the
petition, for adoption.
The only legal issues that need to be resolved may then be synthesized mainly
as follows. (1) whether or not the court a quo erred in granting the prayer for the
change of the registered proper or given name of the minor adoptee embodied
in the petition for adoption; and (2) whether or not there was lawful ground for
the change of name.
I. It is the position of petitioner that respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction
when he additionally granted the prayer for the change of the given or proper
name of the adoptee in a petition for adoption.
Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change of name
are two special proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are different from
and are not related to each other, being respectively governed by distinct sets of
law and rules. In order to be entitled to both reliefs, namely, a decree of adoption
and an authority to change the giver or proper name of the adoptee, the
respective proceedings for each must be instituted separately, and the
substantive and procedural requirements therefor under Articles 183 to 193 of
the Family Code in relation to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court for adoption, and
Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code in relation to Rule 103 of the Rules of Court
10
for change of name, must correspondingly be complied with.
A perusal of the records, according to petitioner, shows that only the laws and
rules on adoption have been observed, but not those for a petition for change of
11
name. Petitioner further contends that what the law allows is the change of the
surname of the adoptee, as a matter of right, to conform with that of the adopter
and as a natural consequence of the adoption thus granted. If what is sought is
the change of the registered given or proper name, and since this would involve
a substantial change of one's legal name, a petition for change of name under
Rule 103 should accordingly be instituted, with the substantive and adjective
12
requisites therefor being conformably satisfied.
Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for adoption
with a prayer for change of name predicated upon Section 5, Rule 2 which
allows permissive joinder of causes of action in order to avoid multiplicity of suits
and in line with the policy of discouraging protracted and vexatious litigations. It
is argued that there is no prohibition in the Rules against the joinder of adoption
and change of name being pleaded as two separate but related causes of action
in a single petition. Further, the conditions for permissive joinder of causes of

action, i.e., jurisdiction of the court, proper venue and joinder of parties, have
13
been met.
Corollarily, petitioner insists on strict adherence to the rule regarding change of
name in view of the natural interest of the State in maintaining a system of
14
identification of its citizens and in the orderly administration of justice. Private
respondents argue otherwise and invoke a liberal construction and application of
the Rules, the welfare and interest of the adoptee being the primordial concern
15
that should be addressed in the instant proceeding.
On this score, the trial court adopted a liberal stance in holding that Furthermore, the change of name of the child from Kevin Earl Bartolome
to Aaron Joseph should not be treated strictly, it appearing that no rights
have been prejudiced by said change of name. The strict and
meticulous observation of the requisites set forth by Rule 103 of the
Rules of Court is indubitably for the purpose of preventing fraud,
ensuring that neither State nor any third person should be prejudiced by
the grant of the petition for change of name under said rule, to a
petitioner of discernment.
The first name sought to be changed belongs to an infant barely over a
year old. Kevin Earl has not exercised full civil rights nor engaged in any
contractual obligations. Neither can he nor petitioners on his behalf, be
deemed to have any immoral, criminal or illicit purpose for seeking said
cha(n)ge of name. It stands to reason that there is no way that the state
or any person may be so prejudiced by the action for change of Kevin
Earl's first name. In fact, to obviate any possible doubts on the intent of
petitioners, the prayer for change of name was caused to be published
16
together with the petition for adoption.
Art. 189 of the Family Code enumerates in no uncertain terms the legal effects
of adoption:
(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate
child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and
obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the
right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;
(2) The parental authority of the parents by nature over the adopted
shall terminate and be vested in the adopters, except that if the adopter
is the spouse of the parent by nature of the adopted, parental authority
over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses; and

58

ADOPTION

(3) The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his parents and other
blood relatives.
Clearly, the law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear
the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the
change of the adoptee's surname to follow that of the adopter which is the
natural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption and must specifically
be contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner.
However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name,
of the adoptee must remain as it was originally registered in the civil register.
The creation of an adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a
license to change the adoptee's registered Christian or first name. The
automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus granted, is
beyond the purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor
an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively
inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted.
The name of the adoptee as recorded in the civil register should be used in the
adoption proceedings in order to vest the court with jurisdiction to hear and
17
determine the same, and shall continue to be so used until the court orders
otherwise. Changing the given or proper name of a person as recorded in the
civil register is a substantial change in one's official or legal name and cannot be
authorized without a judicial order. The purpose of the statutory procedure
authorizing a change of name is simply to have, wherever possible, a record of
the change, and in keeping with the object of the statute, a court to which the
18
application is made should normally make its decree recording such change.
The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the
name appearing therein. If a change in one's name is desired, this can only be
done by filing and strictly complying with the substantive and procedural
requirements for a special proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of the
Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can
be threshed out and accordingly determined.
Under Rule 103, a petition for change of name shall be filed in the regional trial
court of the province where the person desiring to change his name resides. It
shall be signed and verified by the person desiring his name to be changed or
by some other person in his behalf and shall state that the petitioner has been a
bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at least three
years prior to such filing, the cause for which the change of name is sought, and
the name asked for. An order for the date and place of hearing shall be made
and published, with the Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city
prosecutor appearing for the Government at such hearing. It is only upon

satisfactory proof of the veracity of the allegations in the petition and the
reasonableness of the causes for the change of name that the court may
adjudge that the name be changed as prayed for in the petition, and shall furnish
a copy of said judgment to the civil registrar of the municipality concerned who
shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register.
A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance with
all the requirements therefor is indispensable in order to vest the court with
19
jurisdiction for its adjudication.
It is an independent and discrete special
proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of rules. A fortiori, it cannot
be granted by means of any other proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident
or an offshoot of another special proceeding would be to denigrate its role and
significance as the appropriate remedy available under our remedial law system.
The Solicitor General correctly points out the glaring defects of the subject
20
petition insofar as it seeks the change of name of the adoptee,
all of which
taken together cannot but lead to the conclusion that there was no petition
sufficient in form and substance for change of name as would rightfully deserve
an order therefor. It would be procedurally erroneous to employ a petition for
adoption to effect a change of name in the absence of the corresponding petition
for the latter relief at law.
Neither can the allowance of the subject petition, by any stretch of imagination
and liberality, be justified under the rule allowing permissive joinder of causes of
action. Moreover, the reliance by private respondents on the pronouncements in
21
22
Briz vs. Brit, et al. and Peyer vs. Martinez, et al. is misplaced. A restatement
of the rule and jurisprudence on joinder of causes of action would, therefore,
appear to be called for.
By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action, is meant
the uniting of two or more demands or rights of action in one action; the
23
statement of more than one cause of action in a declaration. It is the union of
two or more civil causes of action, each of which could be made the basis of a
separate suit, in the same complaint, declaration or petition. A plaintiff may
under certain circumstances join several distinct demands, controversies or
24
rights of action in one declaration, complaint or petition.
As can easily be inferred from the above definitions, a party is generally not
required to join in one suit several distinct causes of action. The joinder of
separate causes of action, where allowable, is permissive and not mandatory in
the absence of a contrary statutory provision, even though the causes of action
arose from the same factual setting and might under applicable joinder rules be
25
joined. Modern statutes and rules governing joinders are intended to avoid a
multiplicity of suits and to promote the efficient administration of justice wherever

59

ADOPTION

this may be done without prejudice to the rights of the litigants. To achieve these
26
ends, they are liberally construed.
While joinder of causes of action is largely left to the option of a party litigant,
Section 5, Rule 2 of our present Rules allows causes of action to be joined in
one complaint conditioned upon the following requisites: (a) it will not violate the
rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties; and (b) the causes of action
arise out of the same contract, transaction or relation between the parties, or are
for demands for money or are of the same nature and character.
The objectives of the rule or provision are to avoid a multiplicity of suits where
the same parties and subject matter are to be dealt with by effecting in one
action a complete determination of all matters in controversy and litigation
between the parties involving one subject matter, and to expedite the disposition
of litigation at minimum cost. The provision should be construed so as to avoid
such multiplicity, where possible, without prejudice to the rights of the litigants.
Being of a remedial nature, the provision should be liberally construed, to the
end that related controversies between the same parties may be adjudicated at
27
one time; and it should be made effectual as far as practicable, with the end in
28
view of promoting the efficient administration of justice.
The statutory intent behind the provisions on joinder of causes of action is to
encourage joinder of actions which could reasonably be said to involve kindred
rights and wrongs, although the courts have not succeeded in giving a standard
definition of the terms used or in developing a rule of universal application. The
dominant idea is to permit joinder of causes of action, legal or equitable, where
29
there is some substantial unity between them. While the rule allows a plaintiff
to join as many separate claims as he may have, there should nevertheless be
some unity in the problem presented and a common question of law and fact
involved, subject always to the restriction thereon regarding jurisdiction, venue
30
and joinder of parties. Unlimited joinder is not authorized.
Our rule on permissive joinder of causes of action, with the proviso subjecting it
31
to the correlative rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties
and
requiring a conceptual unity in the problems presented, effectively disallows
32
unlimited joinder.
Turning now to the present petition, while it is true that there is no express
prohibition against the joinder of a petition for adoption and for change of name,
we do not believe that there is any relation between these two petitions, nor are
they of the same nature or character, much less do they present any common
question of fact or law, which conjointly would warrant their joinder. In short,
these petitions do not rightly meet the underlying test of conceptual unity
demanded to sanction their joinder under our Rules.

As keenly observed and correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General A petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two special
proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are different from each
other. Each action is individually governed by particular sets of laws and
rules. These two proceedings involve disparate issues. In a petition for
adoption, the court is called upon to evaluate the proposed adopter's
fitness and qualifications to bring up and educate the adoptee properly
(Prasnick vs. Republic, 99 Phil. 665). On the other hand, in a petition for
change of name, no family relations are created or affected for what is
looked into is the propriety and reasonableness of the grounds
supporting the proposed change of name (Yu vs. Republic, 17 SCRA
253).
xxx

xxx

xxx

. . . Hence, the individual merits of each issue must be separately

assessed and determined for neither action is dependent on the other.
33

The rule on permissive joinder of: causes of action is clear. Joinder may
be allowed only if the actions show a commonality of relationship and
conform to the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties
(Section 5, Rule 2, Rules of Court).
These conditions are wanting in the instant case. As already pointed out
in our Petition (pp. 9-10), an action for adoption and an action for
change of name are, in nature and purpose, not related to each other
and do not arise out of the same relation between the parties. While
what is cogent in an adoption proceeding is the proposed adopter's
fitness and qualifications to adopt, a petition for change of first name
may only prosper upon proof of reasonable and compelling grounds
supporting the change requested. Fitness to adopt is not determinative
of the sufficiency of reasons justifying a change of name. And similarly,
a change of first name cannot be justified in view of a finding that the
proposed adopter was found fit to adopt. There is just no way that the
two actions can connect and find a common ground, thus the joinder
would be improper.
In contending that adoption and change of name may be similarly
sought in one petition, private respondents rely upon Peyer vs. Martinez
and Briz vs. Briz (p. 4, Comment)

60

ADOPTION

We however submit that these citations are non sequitur. In both cases,
the fact of intimacy and relatedness of the issues is so pronounced. In
Peyer, an application to pronounce the husband an absentee is
obviously intertwined with the action to transfer the management of
conjugal assets to the wife. In Briz, an action for declaration of heirship
was deemed a clear condition precedent to an action to recover the land
subject of partition and distribution proceeding. However, the
commonality of relationship which stands out in both cases does not
characterize the present action for adoption and change of name. Thus
the rulings in Peyer and Briz find no place in the case at bar.
Besides, it is interesting to note that although a joinder of the two
actions was, in Briz, declared feasible, the Supreme Court did not
indorse an automatic joinder and instead remanded the matter for
further proceedings, granting leave to amend the pleadings and implead
additional parties-defendants for a complete determination of the
controversy (Briz vs. Briz, 43 Phil. 763, 770). Such cautionary stance all
the more emphasizes that although joinders are generally accepted,
34
they are not allowed where the conditions are not satisfactorily met.
It furthermore cannot be said that the proposed joinder in this instance will make
for a complete determination of all matters pertaining to the coetaneous grant of
adoption and change of name of the adoptee in one petition. As already stated,
the subject petition was grossly insufficient in form and substance with respect
to the prayer for change of name of the adoptee. The policy of avoiding
multiplicity of suits which underscores the rule on permissive joinder of causes
of action is addressed to suits that are intimately related and also present
interwoven and dependent issues which can be most expeditiously and
comprehensively settled by having just one judicial proceeding, but not to suits
or actions whose subject matters or corresponding reliefs are unrelated or
diverse such that they are best taken up individually.

another action based on the remaining cause or causes of action within

the prescriptive period therefor. (Emphasis supplied.)
The situation presented in this case does not warrant exception from the Rules
under the policy of liberal construction thereof in general, and for change of
name in particular, as proposed by private respondents and adopted by
respondent judge. Liberal construction of the Rules may be invoked in situations
wherein there may be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading,
provided that the same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and
connotes at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the Rules. Utter
disregard of the Rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of
liberal construction.
The Court is not impervious to the frustration that litigants and lawyers alike
would at times encounter in procedural bureaucracy but imperative justice
requires correct observance of indispensable technicalities precisely designed to
36
ensure its proper dispensation.
It has long been recognized that strict
compliance with the Rules of Court is indispensable for the prevention of
needless delays and for the orderly and expeditious dispatch of judicial
37
business.
Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities that may be
ignored at will to suit the convenience of a party. Adjective law is important in
ensuring the effective enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and
speedy administration of justice. These rules are not intended to hamper
litigants or complicate litigation but, indeed to provide for a system under which
a suitor may be heard in the correct form and manner and at the prescribed time
38
in a peaceful confrontation before a judge whose authority they acknowledge.

the Court clarified the rule on permissive

It cannot be overemphasized that procedural rules have their own wholesome

rationale in the orderly administration of justice. Justice has to be administered
according to the Rules in order to obviate arbitrariness, caprice, or whimsicality.
39
40
We have been cautioned and reminded in Limpot vs. CA, et al. that:

The rule is clearly permissive. It does not constitute an obligatory rule,

as there is no positive provision of law or any rule of jurisprudence
which compels a party to join all his causes of action and bring them at
one and the same time. Under the present rules, the provision is still
that the plaintiff may, and not that he must, unite several causes of
action although they may be included in one of the classes specified.
This, therefore, leaves it to the plaintiff's option whether the causes of
action shall be joined in the same action, and no unfavorable inference
may be drawn from his failure or refusal to do so. He may always file

Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly administration of

justice and the protection of substantive rights in judicial and
extrajudicial proceedings. It is a mistake to propose that substantive law
and adjective law are contradictory to each other or, as has often been
suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules should never be
permitted if it will result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the
litigants. This is not exactly true; the concept is much misunderstood. As
a matter of fact, the policy of the courts is to give both kinds of law, as
complementing each other, in the just and speedy resolution of the
dispute between the parties. Observance of both substantive rights is

In Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,

joinder of causes of action:

35

61

ADOPTION

equally guaranteed by due process, whatever the source of such rights,

be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court.
xxx

xxx

. . . The procedure set by law should be delimited. One should not

confuse or misapply one procedure for another lest we create confusion
in the application of the proper remedy.

xxx

. . . (T)hey are required to be followed except only when for the most
persuasive of reasons they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an
injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in
not complying with the procedure prescribed. . . . While it is true that a
litigation is not a game of technicalities, this does not mean that the
Rules of Court may be ignored at will and at random to the prejudice of
the orderly presentation and assessment of the issues and their just
resolution. Justice eschews anarchy.
Only exceptionally in very extreme circumstances, when a rule deserts its proper
office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy
such that rigid application thereof frustrates rather than promotes substantial
justice, will technicalities deserve scant consideration from the court. In such
situations, the courts are empowered, even obligated, to suspend the operation
41
of the rules.
We do not perceive any injustice that can possibly be visited upon private
respondents by following the reglementary procedure for the change in the
proper or given name that they seek for their adopted child. We are hard put to
descry the indispensability of a change of the first name of the adoptee to his
welfare and benefit. Nor is the said change of such urgency that would justify an
exemption from or a relaxation of the Rules. It is the State that stands to be
prejudiced by a wanton disregard of Rule 103 in this case, considering its
natural interest in the methodical administration of justice and in the efficacious
maintenance of a system of identification of its citizens.
The danger wrought by non-observance of the Rules is that the violation of or
failure to comply with the procedure prescribed by law prevents the proper
determination of the questions raised by the parties with respect to the merits of
the case and makes it necessary to decide, in the first place, such questions as
relate to the form of the action. The rules and procedure laid down for the trial
42
court and the adjudication of cases are matters of public policy.
They are
matters of public order and interest which can in no wise be changed or
regulated by agreements between or stipulations by parties to an action for their
43
singular convenience.
44

In Garcia vs. Republic, we are reminded of the definiteness in the application

of the Rules and the importance of seeking relief under the appropriate
proceeding:

Respondent judge's unmindful disregard of procedural tenets aimed at achieving

stability of procedure is to be deplored. He exceeded his prerogatives by
granting the prayer for change of name, his order being unsupported by both
statutory and case law. The novel but unwarranted manner in which he
adjudicated this case may be characterized as a regrettable abdication of the
duty to uphold the teachings of remedial law and jurisprudence.
II. Petitioner avers that it was error for the lower court to grant the petition for
change of name without citing or proving any lawful ground. Indeed, the only
justification advanced for the change of name was the fact of the adoptee's
baptism under the name Aaron Joseph and by which he has been known since
45
he came to live with private respondents.
Private respondents, through a rather stilted ratiocination, assert that upon the
grant of adoption, the subject minor adoptee ipso facto assumed a new
identification and designation, that is, Aaron Joseph which was the name given
to him during the baptismal rites. Allowing the change of his first name as
prayed for in the petition, so they claim, merely confirms the designation by
which he is known and called in the community in which he lives. This largely
echoes the opinion of the lower court that naming the child Aaron Joseph was
symbolic of naming him at birth, and that they, as adoptive parents, have as
much right as the natural parents to freely select the first name of their adopted
46
child.
The lower court was sympathetic to herein private respondents and ruled on this
point in this manner:
As adoptive parents, petitioner like other parents may freely select the
first name given to his/her child as it is only the surname to which the
child is entitled that is fixed by law. . . .
xxx

xxx

xxx

The given name of the minor was Kevin Earl, a name given for no other
purpose than for identification purposes in a birth certificate by a woman
who had all intentions of giving him away. The naming of the minor as
Aaron Joseph by petitioners upon the grant of their petition for adoption
47
is symbolic of naming the minor at birth.

62

ADOPTION

We cannot fathom any legal or jurisprudential basis for this attenuated ruling of
respondent judge and must thus set it aside.
It is necessary to reiterate in this discussion that a person's name is a word or
combination of words by which he is known and identified, and distinguished
from others, for the convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or in
speaking of or dealing with him. It is both of personal as well as public interest
that every person must have a name. The name of an individual has two parts:
the given or proper name and the surname or family name. The giver or proper
name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish
him from other individuals. The surname or family name is that which identifies
the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given
name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to
48
which the child is entitled is fixed by law.
By Article 408 of the Civil Code, a person's birth must be entered in the civil
register. The official name of a person is that given him in the civil register. That
49
is his name in the eyes of the law. And once the name of a person is officially
entered in the civil register, Article 376 of the same Code seals that identity with
its precise mandate: no person can change his name or surname without judicial
authority. This statutory restriction is premised on the interest of the State in
50
names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification.
By reason thereof, the only way that the name of person can be changed legally
51
is through a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.
For purposes of an application for change of name under Article 376 of the Civil
Code and correlatively implemented by Rule 103, the only name that may be
changed is the true or official name recorded in the civil register. As earlier
mentioned, a petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, impressed
as it is with public interest, strict compliance with all the requisites therefor in
order to vest the court with jurisdiction is essential, and failure therein renders
52
the proceedings a nullity.
It must likewise be stressed once again that a change of name is a privilege, not
a matter of right, addressed to the sound discretion of the court which has the
duty to consider carefully the consequences of a change of name and to deny
the same unless weighty reasons are shown. Before a person can be authorized
to change his name, that is, his true or official name or that which appears in his
birth certificate or is entered in the civil register, he must show proper and
53
reasonable cause or any convincing reason which may justify such change.
Jurisprudence has recognized, inter alia, the following grounds as being
sufficient to warrant a change of name: (a) when the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change

results as a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption; (c) when the change

will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since
childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) when the
change is based on a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of
former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudice to anybody; and (f) when
the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired
change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would
54
prejudice public interest.
Contrarily, a petition for change of name grounded on the fact that one was
baptized by another name, under which he has been known and which he used,
55
has been denied inasmuch as the use of baptismal names is not sanctioned.
56
For, in truth, baptism is not a condition sine qua non to a change of name.
Neither does the fact that the petitioner has been using a different name and has
become known by it constitute proper and reasonable cause to legally authorize
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a change of name.
A name given to a person in the church records or
elsewhere or by which be is known in the community - when at variance with
that entered in the civil register - is unofficial and cannot be recognized as his
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real name.
The instant petition does not sufficiently persuade us to depart from such rulings
of long accepted wisdom and applicability. The only grounds offered to justify
the change of name prayed for was that the adopted child had been baptized as
Aaron Joseph in keeping with the religious faith of private respondents and that
it was the name by which he had been called and known by his family, relatives
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and friends from, the time he came to live with private respondents.
Apart
from suffusing their pleadings with sanctimonious entreaties for compassion,
none of the justified grounds for a change of name has been alleged or
established by private respondents. The legal bases chosen by them to bolster
their cause have long been struck down as unavailing for their present
purposes. For, to allow the adoptee herein to use his baptismal name, instead of
his name registered in the civil register, would be to countenance or permit that
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which has always been frowned upon.
The earlier quoted posturing of respondent judge, as expressed in his assailed
order that (a)s adoptive parents, petitioners like other parents may freely select the
first name given to his/her child as it is only the surname to which the
child is entitled that is fixed by law. . . .
The given name of the minor was Kevin Earl, a name given for no other
purpose than for identification purposes in a birth certificate by a woman
who had all the intentions of giving him away. The naming of the minor

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ADOPTION

as Aaron Joseph by petitioners upon grant of their petition for adoption

is symbolic of naming the minor at birth.
and supposedly based on the authority of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and
Maximo Wong, supra, painfully misapplies the ruling therein enunciated.
The factual backdrop of said case is not at all analogous to that of the case at
bar. In the Wong case, therein petitioner Maximo Wong sought the change of his
surname which he acquired by virtue of the decree of adoption granted in favor
of spouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong. Upon reaching the age of
majority, he filed a petition in court to change his surname from Wong to Alcala,
which was his surname prior to the adoption. He adduced proof that the use of
the surname Wong caused him embarrassment and isolation from friends and
relatives in view of a suggested Chinese ancestry when in reality he is a Muslim
Filipino residing in a Muslim community, thereby hampering his business and
social life, and that his surviving adoptive mother consented to the change of
name sought. This Court granted the petition and regarded the change of the
surname as a mere incident in, rather than the object of, the adoption.
It should be noted that in said case the change of surname, not the given name,
and the legal consequences thereof in view of the adoption were at issue. That it
was sought in a petition duly and precisely filed for that purpose with ample
proof of the lawful grounds therefor only serves to reinforce the imperative
necessity of seeking relief under and through the legally prescribed procedures.
Here, the Solicitor General meritoriously explained that:
Respondent Judge failed to distinguish between a situation wherein a
child is being named for the first time by his natural parent, as against
one wherein, a child is previously conferred a first name by his natural
parent, and such name is subsequently sought to be disregarded and
changed by the adoptive parents. In the first case, there is no dispute
that natural parents have the right to freely select and give the child's
first name for every person, including juridical persons, must have a
name (Tolentino, A., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil
Code, Vo. I, 1987 edition, page 721). In the second case, however, as in
the case at bar, private respondents, in their capacities as adopters,
cannot claim a right to name the minor adoptee after such right to name
the child had already been exercised by the natural parent. Adopting
parents have not been conferred such right by law, hence, the right
assertes by private respondents herein remains but illusory. Renaming
the adoptee cannot be claimed as a right. It is merely a privilege
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necessitating judicial consent upon compelling grounds.

The liberality with which this Court treats matters leading up to adoption insofar
as it carries out the beneficent purposes of adoption and ensures to the adopted
child the rights and privileges arising therefrom, ever mindful that the paramount
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consideration is the overall benefit and interest of the adopted child, should be
understood in its proper context. It should not be misconstrued or misinterpreted
to extend to inferences beyond the contemplation of law and jurisprudence.
The practically unrestricted freedom of the natural parent to select the proper or
given name of the child presupposes that no other name for it has theretofore
been entered in the civil register. Once such name is registered, regardless of
the reasons for such choice and even if it be solely for the purpose of
identification, the same constitutes the official name. This effectively
authenticates the identity of the person and must remain unaltered save when,
for the most compelling reasons shown in an appropriate proceeding, its change
may merit judicial approval.
While the right of a natural parent to name the child is recognized, guaranteed
and protected under the law, the so-called right of an adoptive parent to re-name
an adopted child by virtue or as a consequence of adoption, even for the most
noble intentions and moving supplications, is unheard of in law and
consequently cannot be favorably considered. To repeat, the change of the
surname of the adoptee as a result of the adoption and to follow that of the
adopter does not lawfully extend to or include the proper or given name.
Furthermore, factual realities and legal consequences, rather than sentimentality
and symbolisms, are what are of concern to the Court.
Finally, it is understood that this decision does not entirely foreclose and is
without prejudice to, private respondents' privilege to legally change the proper
or given name of their adopted child, provided that the same is exercised, this
time, via a proper petition for change of name. Of course, the grant thereof is
conditioned on strict compliance with all jurisdictional requirements and
satisfactory proof of the compelling reasons advanced therefor.
WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the assailed order of respondent
judge is hereby MODIFIED. The legally adopted child of private respondents
shall henceforth be officially known as Kevin Earl Munson y Andrade unless a
change thereof is hereafter effected in accordance with law. In all other
respects, the order is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

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