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UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE
LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.
IN THE
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Father contends he was denied due process because DCS did
not give him notice until July 11, 2014, the day of the hearing, that it was
alleging nine months out-of-home placement as a ground for severance.
Due process means providing notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action
and to inform them an opportunity to present their objections. Maricopa
Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-734, 25 Ariz. App. 333, 339, 543 P.2d 454, 460 (App.
1975) (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314
(1950)).
14
In its motion for termination of parent-child relationship filed
in February 2014 - four months before the termination hearing - DCS
alleged as a ground for severance that the children had been in an out-ofhome placement for nine months. DCS cited the out-of-home placement
statute and stated that Father has substantially neglected or willfully
refused to remedy the circumstances that cause the children to be in an outof-home placement. DCS therefore complied with the requirements of due
process.
15
Father contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion
and violated his due process rights by admitting a report from a
psychological evaluation even though the author, Dr. James Thal, Ph.D.,
was not at the hearing to be cross-examined. This court ordered
supplemental briefing regarding the applicable statutes, rules, and
common law principles regarding the admissibility of Dr. Thals evaluation
report (Thal report). We have reviewed the parties supplemental
briefing and the record. We apply an abuse of discretion standard when
reviewing the juvenile courts evidentiary rulings. Ruben M. v. Ariz. Dept
of Econ. Sec., 230 Ariz. 236, 239, 13, 282 P.3d 437, 440 (App. 2012). We
review de novo the interpretation and application of statutes and rules.
Ariz. Dept of Econ. Sec. v. Ciana H., 191 Ariz. 339, 341, 11, 955 P.2d 977, 979
(App. 1998).
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Rule 44(B)(2)(e),2 through Rule 44(D)(2),3 impacts the
admissibility of documentary evidence in a juvenile termination
2
21
The juvenile court must meet two elements in order to sever
parental rights under state law. First, the juvenile court must find by clear
and convincing evidence that the facts of the case fulfill at least one of the
statutory grounds for termination that are enumerated in A.R.S. 8-533(B).
Shawanee S. v. Ariz. Dept of Econ. Sec., 234 Ariz. 174, 17677, 9, 319 P.3d
236, 23839 (App. 2014). Next, the juvenile court must find by a
preponderance of the evidence that the termination would be in the childs
best interests. Id. Father does not challenge the court's finding that
severance was in the childrens best interests, and we therefore do not
address that issue.
22
Fathers rights were severed under the abuse ground of A.R.S.
8-533(B)(2), the substance abuse ground of A.R.S. 8-533(B)(3), and the
nine months out-of-home placement ground of A.R.S. 8-533(B)(8)(a). If
clear and convincing evidence supports any one of the statutory grounds
on which the juvenile court ordered severance, we need not address claims
pertaining to the other grounds. Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 203
Ariz. 278, 280, 3, 53 P.3d 203, 205 (App. 2002). Because sufficient evidence
supports the juvenile courts findings on the abuse ground under A.R.S.
8-533(B)(2) and the substance abuse ground under A.R.S. 8-533(B)(3), we
:ama
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