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Before
Lynch, Selya and Lipez,
Circuit Judges.
So it is here.
we
affirm
his
conviction
and
sentence.
We
BACKGROUND
We
recite
the
background
facts
"in
the
light
most
June
Rodrguez-Milin
of
became
2009,
defendant-appellant
involved
with
scheme
Carlos
to
fly
E.
drug
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Dominican Republic.
Spotted on radar
Marrero-
Martell
that
testified
that
Junior
Cpsula
had
told
him
he
When
The appellant
told the guard (falsely) that Prez and Nieves had arrived by
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parachute.
suggested
that
the
landing
at
Arecibo
was
due
The
to
electrical problems and that his real destination was Isla Grande
Airport.
Nez) unloaded bags filled with cocaine from the aircraft and
stashed them in a waiting automobile.
due
season,
federal
grand
jury
returned
an
indictment that targeted, among other things, the broad drugtrafficking conspiracy headed by Junior Cpsula.
See 21 U.S.C.
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II.
ANALYSIS
The appellant, represented on appeal by new counsel,
segregated
into
four
We
address
each
tranche
did not at any time move for judgment of acquittal below, see Fed.
R. Crim. P. 29, we review this claim only for clear and gross
injustice, see United States v. Gobbi, 471 F.3d 302, 309 (1st Cir.
2006); United States v. Greenleaf, 692 F.2d 182, 185 (1st Cir.
1982); see also Magee v. BEA Constr. Corp., 797 F.3d 88, 90 & n.2
(1st Cir. 2015).
take
the
facts
in
the
light
most
hospitable
to
the
We
See
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1992).
To sustain a conviction for conspiracy, the government
must show "beyond a reasonable doubt that a conspiracy existed and
that a particular defendant agreed to participate in it, intending
to commit the underlying substantive offense."
United States v.
The existence of
United
"The
knew
all
of
the
details
of
the
conspiracy
or
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showing
that
the
defendant
had
This, of course,
knowledge
of
the
knowingly
entered
into
an
agreement
with
other
drug
kingpin
(Junior
Cpsula),
and
knowingly
agreed
to
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guard at the airport while the cargo was unloaded, and lied to
both the guard and a customs official.
Though it is possible
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reality.
B.
Prejudicial Variance.
See United
States v. Seng Tan, 674 F.3d 103, 110-11 (1st Cir. 2012).
To clear
fairness,
proceedings."
2001).
integrity,
or
public
reputation
of
judicial
See id.
Although the appellant also hints that there may have been
a "constructive amendment" of the indictment, he never developed
that argument in his brief. Consequently, we deem any such claim
waived. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir.
1990).
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The
appellant says that although the government charged him with the
narrower conspiracy (involving the smuggling activity that took
place on August 22, 2009), it only proved the broader conspiracy.
We do not agree.
The evidence presented by the government and admitted
against the appellant at trial pertained directly to the particular
conspiracy charged against him.
See
United States v. Fisher, 3 F.3d 456, 463 (1st Cir. 1993); United
States v. Innamorati, 996 F.2d 456, 477-78 (1st Cir. 1993).
Here,
all
events,
claim
of
prejudicial
variance
by
the indictment and the proof could not conceivably have affected
the appellant's substantial rights.
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C.
We
come
within
801(d)(2)(E).
the
hearsay
proscription.
Fed.
R.
Evid.
See Bourjaily
such
determination,
the
trial
court
to
use
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is
In
The record is
respect
to
the
admitted
evidence
itself,
the
See United
He has, with
Marrero-Martell's
testimony
about
what
Junior
Cpsula
The admission of
As
said,
the
government
introduced
an
abundance
of
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Rodriguez, 525 F.3d 85, 101 (1st Cir. 2008); United States v.
Marino, 277 F.3d 11, 26 (1st Cir. 2002).
There is one last claim of trial error.
The appellant
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challenge.
This
dimension
involves
the
district
Montero-Montero, ___ F.3d ___, ___ (1st Cir. 2016) [No. 15-1405,
slip op. at 3]; United States v. Ruiz-Huertas, 792 F.3d 223, 226
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 258 (2015).
On plain error
See United
See
of
the
appellant's
culpability
with
Nez's
F.3d 1, 30-32 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 467 (2014).
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Clogston,
662 F.3d at 592. Though the explanation here is lean, the district
court specifically referenced the appellant's personal history,
the
nature
punishment
of
the
in
offense,
imposing
the
and
the
sentence.
goals
of
The
deterrence
court
also
heard
and
On
we
sometimes
consider
disparities
between
on the disparity between his 235-month sentence and Nez's 120month sentence.
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We reject, without
A Loose End.
motion.
At the time that it acted, the district court lacked
jurisdiction to enter an order reducing the appellant's sentence.
See United States v. Cardoza, 790 F.3d 247, 248 (1st Cir. 2015)
(per curiam); United States v. Maldonado-Rios, 790 F.3d 62, 64
(1st Cir. 2015) (per curiam).
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We therefore
We caution,
States,
560
U.S.
817,
831
(2010)
Dillon v.
(quoting
USSG
1B1.10(b)(1), p.s.).
III.
CONCLUSION
We need go no further.
We remand,
So Ordered.
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