[G.R. No. 155635. November 7, 2008.
] the real property and all the improvements and personal
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE MADRIGAL
BAYOT, respondents.
[G.R. No. 163979. November 7, 2008.]
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner, vs.
VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J p:
The Case
Before us are these two petitions interposed by petitioner
Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot impugning certain issuances
handed out by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
68187. STDEcA
In the first, a petition for certiorari 1 under Rule 65 and
docketed as G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca assails and seeks to
nullify the April 30, 2002 Resolution 2 of the CA, as reiterated
in another Resolution of September 2, 2002, 3 granting a writ
of preliminary injunction in favor of private respondent
Vicente Madrigal Bayot staving off the trial court's grant of
support pendente lite to Rebecca.
The second, a petition for review under Rule 45, 4 docketed
G.R. No. 163979, assails the March 25, 2004 Decision 5 of the
CA, (1) dismissing Civil Case No. 01-094, a suit for declaration
of absolute nullity of marriage with application for support
commenced by Rebecca against Vicente before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Muntinlupa City; and (2) setting aside
certain orders and a resolution issued by the RTC in the said
case.
Per its Resolution of August 11, 2004, the Court ordered the
consolidation of both cases.
The Facts
Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in
Sanctuario de San Jose, Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. On its
face, the Marriage Certificate 6 identified Rebecca, then 26
years old, to be an American citizen 7 born in Agaña, Guam,
USA to Cesar Tanchiong Makapugay, American, and Helen
Corn Makapugay, American. aTEADI
On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California, Rebecca
gave birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra or Alix. From then
on, Vicente and Rebecca's marital relationship seemed to
have soured as the latter, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce
proceedings in the Dominican Republic. Before the Court of
the First Instance of the Judicial District of Santo Domingo,
Rebecca personally appeared, while Vicente was duly
represented by counsel. On February 22, 1996, the
Dominican court issued Civil Decree No. 362/96, 8 ordering
the dissolution of the couple's marriage and "leaving them to
remarry after completing the legal requirements", but giving
them joint custody and guardianship over Alix. Over a year
later, the same court would issue Civil Decree No. 406/97, 9
settling the couple's property relations pursuant to an
Agreement 10 they executed on December 14, 1996. Said
agreement specifically stated that the "conjugal property
which they acquired during their marriage consist[s] only of
properties therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Alabang,
Muntinlupa". 11
Meanwhile, on March 14, 1996, or less than a month from
the issuance of Civil Decree No. 362/96, Rebecca filed with
the Makati City RTC a petition 12 dated January 26, 1996,
with attachments, for declaration of nullity of marriage,
docketed as Civil Case No. 96-378. Rebecca, however, later
moved 13 and secured approval 14 of the motion to
withdraw the petition. TAHIED
On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of
Acknowledgment 15 stating under oath that she is an
American citizen; that, since 1993, she and Vicente have been
living separately; and that she is carrying a child not of
Vicente.
On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time
before the Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage 16 on the ground of Vicente's alleged
psychological incapacity. Docketed as Civil Case No. 01-094
and entitled as Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot v. Vicente
Madrigal Bayot, the petition was eventually raffled to Branch
256 of the court. In it, Rebecca also sought the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership of gains with application for support
pendente lite for her and Alix. Rebecca also prayed that
Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent monthly support for
their daughter Alix in the amount of PhP220,000.
On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss 17 on,
inter alia, the grounds of lack of cause of action and that the
petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce. Earlier, on
June 5, 2001, Rebecca filed and moved for the allowance of
her application for support pendente lite. HIESTA
To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition,
insisting on her Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and that, therefore, there is no
valid divorce to speak of.
Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim contracted
another marriage, and Rebecca commenced several criminal
complaints against each other. Specifically, Vicente filed
adultery and perjury complaints against Rebecca. Rebecca, on
the other hand, charged Vicente with bigamy and
concubinage.
Ruling of the RTC on the Motion to Dismiss and Motion for
Support Pendente Lite
On August 8, 2001, the RTC issued an Order 18 denying
Vicente's motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 01-094 and
granting Rebecca's application for support pendente lite,
disposing as follows:
Wherefore, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss filed
by the respondent is DENIED. Petitioner's Application in
Support of the Motion for Support Pendente Lite is hereby
GRANTED. Respondent is hereby ordered to remit the
amount of TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(Php220,000.00) a month to Petitioner as support for the
duration of the proceedings relative to the instant Petition.
HCITAS
SO ORDERED. 19
The RTC declared, among other things, that the divorce
judgment invoked by Vicente as bar to the petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is a matter of
defense best taken up during actual trial. As to the grant of
support pendente lite, the trial court held that a mere
allegation of adultery against Rebecca does not operate to
preclude her from receiving legal support.
Following the denial 20 of his motion for reconsideration of
the above August 8, 2001 RTC order, Vicente went to the CA
on a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. 21 His petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
68187. CcSEIH
Grant of Writ of Preliminary Injunction by the CA
On January 9, 2002, the CA issued the desired TRO. 22 On
April 30, 2002, the appellate court granted, via a Resolution,
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the decretal
portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, pending final resolution of
the petition at bar, let the Writ of Preliminary Injunction be
ISSUED in this case, enjoining the respondent court from
implementing the assailed Omnibus Order dated August 8,
2001 and the Order dated November 20, 2001, and from
conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. 01-094, upon
the posting of an injunction bond in the amount of
P250,000.00. DEcTCa
SO ORDERED. 23
Rebecca moved 24 but was denied reconsideration of the
aforementioned April 30, 2002 resolution. In the meantime,
on May 20, 2002, the preliminary injunctive writ 25 was
issued. Rebecca also moved for reconsideration of this
issuance, but the CA, by Resolution dated September 2, 2002,
denied her motion.
The adverted CA resolutions of April 30, 2002 and September
2, 2002 are presently being assailed in Rebecca's petition for
certiorari, docketed under G.R. No. 155635.
Ruling of the CA
Pending resolution of G.R. No. 155635, the CA, by a Decision
dated March 25, 2004, effectively dismissed Civil Case No. 01-
094, and set aside incidental orders the RTC issued in relation
to the case. The fallo of the presently assailed CA Decision
reads: HSaIDc
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The
Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001 and the Order dated
November 20, 2001 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new
one entered DISMISSING Civil Case No. 01-094, for failure to
state a cause of action. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 26
To the CA, the RTC ought to have granted Vicente's motion to
dismiss on the basis of the following premises: EcIaTA
(1) As held in China Road and Bridge Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, the hypothetical-admission rule applies in
determining whether a complaint or petition states a cause of
action. 27 Applying said rule in the light of the essential
elements of a cause of action, 28 Rebecca had no cause of
action against Vicente for declaration of nullity of marriage.
(2) Rebecca no longer had a legal right in this
jurisdiction to have her marriage with Vicente declared void,
the union having previously been dissolved on February 22,
1996 by the foreign divorce decree she personally secured as
an American citizen. Pursuant to the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, such divorce restored Vicente's
capacity to contract another marriage. CacEIS
(3) Rebecca's contention about the nullity of a divorce,
she being a Filipino citizen at the time the foreign divorce
decree was rendered, was dubious. Her allegation as to her
alleged Filipino citizenship was also doubtful as it was not
shown that her father, at the time of her birth, was still a
Filipino citizen. The Certification of Birth of Rebecca issued by
the Government of Guam also did not indicate the nationality
of her father.
(4) Rebecca was estopped from denying her American
citizenship, having professed to have that nationality status
and having made representations to that effect during
momentous events of her life, such as: (a) during her
marriage; (b) when she applied for divorce; and (c) when she
applied for and eventually secured an American passport on
January 18, 1995, or a little over a year before she initiated
the first but later withdrawn petition for nullity of her
marriage (Civil Case No. 96-378) on March 14, 1996. EASIHa
(5) Assuming that she had dual citizenship, being born
of a purportedly Filipino father in Guam, USA which follows
the jus soli principle, Rebecca's representation and assertion
about being an American citizen when she secured her
foreign divorce precluded her from denying her citizenship
and impugning the validity of the divorce.
Rebecca seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the
above Decision, but this recourse was denied in the equally
assailed June 4, 2004 Resolution. 29 Hence, Rebecca's
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, docketed
under G.R. No. 163979.
The Issues
In G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca raises four (4) assignments of
errors as grounds for the allowance of her petition, all of
which converged on the proposition that the CA erred in
enjoining the implementation of the RTC's orders which
would have entitled her to support pending final resolution of
Civil Case No. 01-094. cHaCAS
In G.R. No. 163979, Rebecca urges the reversal of the assailed
CA decision submitting as follows:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
MENTIONING AND NOT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION IN ITS
APPRECIATION OF THE FACTS THE FACT OF PETITIONER'S
FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AS CATEGORICALLY STATED AND
ALLEGED IN HER PETITION BEFORE THE COURT A QUO.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING ONLY
ON ANNEXES TO THE PETITION IN RESOLVING THE MATTERS
BROUGHT BEFORE IT.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO
CONSIDER THAT RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING
THAT HIS MARRIAGE TO PETITIONER HAD ALREADY BEEN
DISSOLVED BY VIRTUE OF HIS SUBSEQUENT AND
CONCURRENT ACTS. HITAEC
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT
THERE WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE
TRIAL COURT, MUCH LESS A GRAVE ABUSE. 30
We shall first address the petition in G.R. No. 163979, its
outcome being determinative of the success or failure of the
petition in G.R. No. 155635.
Three legal premises need to be underscored at the outset.
First, a divorce obtained abroad by an alien married to a
Philippine national may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided the decree of divorce is valid according to the
national law of the foreigner. 31 Second, the reckoning point
is not the citizenship of the divorcing parties at birth or at the
time of marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid
divorce is obtained abroad. And third, an absolute divorce
secured by a Filipino married to another Filipino is contrary to
our concept of public policy and morality and shall not be
recognized in this jurisdiction. 32
Given the foregoing perspective, the determinative issue
tendered in G.R. No. 155635, i.e., the propriety of the
granting of the motion to dismiss by the appellate court,
resolves itself into the questions of: first, whether petitioner
Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce
judgment was rendered in the Dominican Republic on
February 22, 1996; and second, whether the judgment of
divorce is valid and, if so, what are its consequent legal
effects? AIDTSE
and (3) she was, and may still be, a holder of an American
passport. 33
And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently
professed, asserted, and represented herself as an American
citizen, particularly: (1) during her marriage as shown in the
marriage certificate; (2) in the birth certificate of Alix; and (3)
when she secured the divorce from the Dominican Republic.
Mention may be made of the Affidavit of Acknowledgment 34
in which she stated being an American citizen. HIAESC
It is true that Rebecca had been issued by the Bureau of
Immigration (Bureau) of Identification (ID) Certificate No. RC
9778 and a Philippine Passport. On its face, ID Certificate No.
RC 9778 would tend to show that she has indeed been
recognized as a Filipino citizen. It cannot be over-emphasized,
however, that such recognition was given only on June 8,
2000 upon the affirmation by the Secretary of Justice of
Rebecca's recognition pursuant to the Order of Recognition
issued by Bureau Associate Commissioner Edgar L. Mendoza.
For clarity, we reproduce in full the contents of ID Certificate
No. RC 9778:
To Whom It May Concern:
This is to certify that *MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT*
whose photograph and thumbprints are affixed hereto and
partially covered by the seal of this Office, and whose other
particulars are as follows:
Place of Birth: Guam, USA Date of Birth: March 5, 1953 Sex:
female Civil Status: married Color of Hair: brown Color of
Eyes: brown Distinguishing marks on face: none was —
recognized — as a citizen of the Philippines as per pursuant to
Article IV, Section 1, Paragraph 3 of the 1935 Constitution per
order of Recognition JBL 95-213 signed by Associate
Commissioner Jose B. Lopez dated October 6, 1995, and duly
affirmed by Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero in his 1st
Indorsement dated June 8, 2000. THaCAI
Issued for identification purposes only. NOT VALID for travel
purposes.
Given under my hand and seal this 11th day of October, 1995
(SGD.) EDGAR L. MENDOZA
ASSO. COMMISSIONER

The Court's Ruling Official Receipt No. 5939988

The petition is bereft of merit. issued at Manila

Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This Case dated Oct. 10, 1995 for P2,000

There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she

applied for and obtained her divorce from Vicente, was an
American citizen and remains to be one, absent proof of an
effective repudiation of such citizenship. The following are
compelling circumstances indicative of her American
citizenship: (1) she was born in Agaña, Guam, USA; (2) the
principle of jus soli is followed in this American territory
granting American citizenship to those who are born there;
From the text of ID Certificate No. RC 9778, the following
material facts and dates may be deduced: (1) Bureau
Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez issued the Order of
Recognition on October 6, 1995; (2) the 1st Indorsement of
Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero affirming Rebecca's
recognition as a Filipino citizen was issued on June 8, 2000 or
almost five years from the date of the order of recognition;
and (3) ID Certificate No. RC 9778 was purportedly issued on
October 11, 1995 after the payment of the PhP2,000 fee on
October 10, 1995 per OR No. 5939988. AScHCD
What begs the question is, however, how the above
certificate could have been issued by the Bureau on October
11, 1995 when the Secretary of Justice issued the required
affirmation only on June 8, 2000. No explanation was given
for this patent aberration. There seems to be no error with
the date of the issuance of the 1st Indorsement by Secretary
of Justice Tuquero as this Court takes judicial notice that he
was the Secretary of Justice from February 16, 2000 to
January 22, 2001. There is, thus, a strong valid reason to
conclude that the certificate in question must be spurious.
Under extant immigration rules, applications for recognition
of Filipino citizenship require the affirmation by the DOJ of
the Order of Recognition issued by the Bureau. Under
Executive Order No. 292, also known as the 1987
Administrative Code, specifically in its Title III, Chapter 1, Sec.
3 (6), it is the DOJ which is tasked to "provide immigration
and naturalization regulatory services and implement the
laws governing citizenship and the admission and stay of
aliens". Thus, the confirmation by the DOJ of any Order of
Recognition for Filipino citizenship issued by the Bureau is
required.
Pertinently, Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-002 35 on
Recognition as a Filipino Citizen clearly provides: DHcESI
The Bureau [of Immigration] through its Records Section shall
automatically furnish the Department of Justice an official
copy of its Order of Recognition within 72 days from its date
of approval by the way of indorsement for confirmation of
the Order by the Secretary of Justice pursuant to Executive
Order No. 292. No Identification Certificate shall be issued
before the date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice
and any Identification Certificate issued by the Bureau
pursuant to an Order of Recognition shall prominently
indicate thereon the date of confirmation by the Secretary of
Justice. (Emphasis ours.)
Not lost on the Court is the acquisition by Rebecca of her
Philippine passport only on June 13, 2000, or five days after
then Secretary of Justice Tuquero issued the 1st Indorsement
confirming the order of recognition. It may be too much to
attribute to coincidence this unusual sequence of close
events which, to us, clearly suggests that prior to said
affirmation or confirmation, Rebecca was not yet recognized
as a Filipino citizen. The same sequence would also imply that
ID Certificate No. RC 9778 could not have been issued in
1995, as Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-002 mandates
that no identification certificate shall be issued before the
date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice. Logically,
therefore, the affirmation or confirmation of Rebecca's
recognition as a Filipino citizen through the 1st Indorsement
issued only on June 8, 2000 by Secretary of Justice Tuquero
corresponds to the eventual issuance of Rebecca's passport a
few days later, or on June 13, 2000 to be exact. aEDCSI
When Divorce Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not a Filipino
Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as One
The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a
Filipino citizen. But from the foregoing disquisition, it is
indubitable that Rebecca did not have that status of, or at
least was not yet recognized as, a Filipino citizen when she
secured the February 22, 1996 judgment of divorce from the
Dominican Republic.
The Court notes and at this juncture wishes to point out that
Rebecca voluntarily withdrew her original petition for
declaration of nullity (Civil Case No. 96-378 of the Makati City
RTC) obviously because she could not show proof of her
alleged Filipino citizenship then. In fact, a perusal of that
petition shows that, while bearing the date January 26, 1996,
it was only filed with the RTC on March 14, 1996 or less than
a month after Rebecca secured, on February 22, 1996, the
foreign divorce decree in question. Consequently, there was
no mention about said divorce in the petition. Significantly,
the only documents appended as annexes to said original
petition were: the Vicente-Rebecca Marriage Contract (Annex
"A") and Birth Certificate of Alix (Annex "B"). If indeed ID
Certificate No. RC 9778 from the Bureau was truly issued on
October 11, 1995, is it not but logical to expect that this piece
of document be appended to form part of the petition, the
question of her citizenship being crucial to her case? aHSCcE
As may be noted, the petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage under Civil Case No. 01-094, like the
withdrawn first petition, also did not have the ID Certificate
from the Bureau as attachment. What were attached
consisted of the following material documents: Marriage
Contract (Annex "A") and Divorce Decree. It was only through
her Opposition (To Respondent's Motion to Dismiss dated 31
May 2001) 36 did Rebecca attach as Annex "C" ID Certificate
No. RC 9778.
At any rate, the CA was correct in holding that the RTC had
sufficient basis to dismiss the petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage as said petition, taken together
with Vicente's motion to dismiss and Rebecca's opposition to
motion, with their respective attachments, clearly made out a
case of lack of cause of action, which we will expound later.
Validity of Divorce Decree
Going to the second core issue, we find Civil Decree Nos.
362/96 and 406/97 valid. SETAcC
First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca
was still to be recognized, assuming for argument that she
was in fact later recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but
represented herself in public documents as an American
citizen. At the very least, she chose, before, during, and
shortly after her divorce, her American citizenship to govern
her marital relationship. Second, she secured personally said
divorce as an American citizen, as is evident in the text of the
Civil Decrees, which pertinently declared:
IN THIS ACTION FOR DIVORCE in which the parties expressly
submit to the jurisdiction of this court, by reason of the
existing incompatibility of temperaments . . . . The parties
MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT, of United States nationality, 42
years of age, married, domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia
Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Philippines, . . ., who
personally appeared before this court, accompanied by DR.
JUAN ESTEBAN OLIVERO, attorney, . . . and VICENTE
MADRIGAL BAYOT, of Philippine nationality, of 43 years of
age, married and domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave.,
Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Filipino, appeared before this
court represented by DR. ALEJANDRO TORRENS,
attorney, . . ., revalidated by special power of attorney given
the 19th of February of 1996, signed before the Notary Public
Enrico L. Espanol of the City of Manila, duly legalized and
authorizing him to subscribe all the acts concerning this case.
37 (Emphasis ours.) DaScAI
Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the
national laws of the United States of America, a country
which allows divorce. Fourth, the property relations of
Vicente and Rebecca were properly adjudicated through their
Agreement 38 executed on December 14, 1996 after Civil
Decree No. 362/96 was rendered on February 22, 1996, and
duly affirmed by Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued on March 4,
1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca was
valid.
To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia
v. Recio that a foreign divorce can be recognized here,
provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid
under the national law of the alien spouse. 39 Be this as it
may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen
when she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized
and allowed in any of the States of the Union, 40 the
presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly
authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as
here, sufficient.
It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce decree has
not been denied, but in fact admitted by both parties. And
neither did they impeach the jurisdiction of the divorce court
nor challenge the validity of its proceedings on the ground of
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit both
appeared to have the opportunity to do so. The same holds
true with respect to the decree of partition of their conjugal
property. As this Court explained in Roehr v. Rodriguez:
AETcSa
Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a
foreign judgment [of divorce] . . ., it must be shown that the
parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample
opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39,
Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:
SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. –– The effect of a
judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the
judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment
is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and
their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the
judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact. EaScHT
It is essential that there should be an opportunity to
challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this
jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this
jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with
respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions
in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie
evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such,
is subject to proof to the contrary. 41
As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally
secured the foreign divorce while Vicente was duly
represented by his counsel, a certain Dr. Alejandro Torrens, in
said proceedings. As things stand, the foreign divorce decrees
rendered and issued by the Dominican Republic court are
valid and, consequently, bind both Rebecca and Vicente.
Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized
as a Filipino citizen by force of the June 8, 2000 affirmation by
Secretary of Justice Tuquero of the October 6, 1995 Bureau
Order of Recognition will not, standing alone, work to nullify
or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an
American citizen on February 22, 1996. For as we stressed at
the outset, in determining whether or not a divorce secured
abroad would come within the pale of the country's policy
against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the
citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is
obtained. 42 TEcAHI
Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce
Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca,
the same shall be given a res judicata effect in this
jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce decree
obtained, the marital vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente
is considered severed; they are both freed from the bond of
matrimony. In plain language, Vicente and Rebecca are no
longer husband and wife to each other. As the divorce court
formally pronounced: "[T]hat the marriage between MARIA
REBECCA M. BAYOT and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT is hereby
dissolved . . . leaving them free to remarry after completing
the legal requirements". 43
Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could
no longer be subject to a husband's obligation under the Civil
Code. He cannot, for instance, be obliged to live with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to Rebecca.
44
The divorce decree in question also brings into play the
second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code, providing as
follows: ISTCHE
Art. 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by E.O. 227)
In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements
for the applicability of the second paragraph of Art. 26, thus:
. . . [W]e state the twin elements for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship
at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. 45 SEHACI
Both elements obtain in the instant case. We need not
belabor further the fact of marriage of Vicente and Rebecca,
their citizenship when they wed, and their professed
citizenship during the valid divorce proceedings.
Not to be overlooked of course is the fact that Civil Decree
No. 406/97 and the Agreement executed on December 14,
1996 bind both Rebecca and Vicente as regards their property
relations. The Agreement provided that the ex-couple's
conjugal property consisted only their family home, thus:
9. That the parties stipulate that the conjugal property
which they acquired during their marriage consists only of the
real property and all the improvements and personal
properties therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Ayala
Alabang, Muntinlupa, covered by TCT No. 168301 dated Feb.
7, 1990 issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati, Metro
Manila registered in the name of Vicente M. Bayot, married
to Rebecca M. Bayot, . . . . 46 (Emphasis ours.) HCDAac
This property settlement embodied in the Agreement was
affirmed by the divorce court which, per its second divorce
decree, Civil Decree No. 406/97 dated March 4, 1997,
ordered that, "THIRD: That the agreement entered into
between the parties dated 14th day of December 1996 in
Makati City, Philippines shall survive in this Judgment of
divorce by reference but not merged and that the parties are
hereby ordered and directed to comply with each and every
provision of said agreement". 47 aCHcIE
Rebecca has not repudiated the property settlement
contained in the Agreement. She is thus estopped by her
representation before the divorce court from asserting that
her and Vicente's conjugal property was not limited to their
family home in Ayala Alabang. 48
No Cause of Action in the Petition for Nullity of Marriage
Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly clear to the
Court that Rebecca lacks, under the premises, cause of
action. Philippine Bank of Communications v. Trazo explains
the concept and elements of a cause of action, thus:
A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in
violation of the legal right of the other. A motion to dismiss
based on lack of cause of action hypothetically admits the
truth of the allegations in the complaint. The allegations in a
complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of action against
the defendants if, hypothetically admitting the facts alleged,
the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in
accordance with the prayer therein. A cause of action exists if
the following elements are present, namely: (1) a right in
favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever
law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the
named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and
(3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative
of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the
obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the
latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. 49
2005jur
One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebecca's underlying
petition before the RTC, Vicente's motion to dismiss and
Rebecca's opposition thereof, with the documentary
evidence attached therein: The petitioner lacks a cause of
action for declaration of nullity of marriage, a suit which
presupposes the existence of a marriage.
To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the
movant must show that the claim for relief does not exist
rather than that a claim has been defectively stated or is
ambiguous, indefinite, or uncertain. 50 With the valid foreign
divorce secured by Rebecca, there is no more marital tie
binding her to Vicente. There is in fine no more marriage to
be dissolved or nullified.
The Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legal
obligation of Vicente and Rebecca to support the needs of
their daughter, Alix. The records do not clearly show how he
had discharged his duty, albeit Rebecca alleged that the
support given had been insufficient. At any rate, we do note
that Alix, having been born on November 27, 1982, reached
the majority age on November 27, 2000, or four months
before her mother initiated her petition for declaration of
nullity. She would now be 26 years old. Hence, the issue of
back support, which allegedly had been partly shouldered by
Rebecca, is best litigated in a separate civil action for
reimbursement. In this way, the actual figure for the support
of Alix can be proved as well as the earning capacity of both
Vicente and Rebecca. The trial court can thus determine what
Vicente owes, if any, considering that support includes
provisions until the child concerned shall have finished her
education. HESIcT
Upon the foregoing considerations, the Court no longer need
to delve into the issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, that is,
Rebecca's right to support pendente lite. As it were, her
entitlement to that kind of support hinges on the tenability of
her petition under Civil Case No. 01-094 for declaration of
nullity of marriage. The dismissal of Civil Case No. 01-094 by
the CA veritably removed any legal anchorage for, and
effectively mooted, the claim for support pendente lite.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 155635 is
hereby DISMISSED on the ground of mootness, while the
petition for review in G.R. No. 163979 is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit. Accordingly, the March 25, 2004 Decision and
June 4, 2004 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187 are
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. caADSE
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Carpio-Morales, Tinga and Brion, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 138322           October 2, 2001
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner,
vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in
our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the
national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree
and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who
obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment; hence, like any
other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of
the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on
evidence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, seeking to nullify the January 7, 1999 Decision 1 and
the March 24, 1999 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026-AF. The
assailed Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage
between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio
solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City
as dissolved and both parties can now remarry under
existing and applicable laws to any and/or both
parties."3
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-
quoted Decision.
The Facts
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson,
an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. 4
They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May
18, 1989,5 a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the
marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen,
as shown by a "Certificate of Australian Citizenship" issued by
the Australian government.6 Petitioner – a Filipina – and
respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of
Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City. 7 In their
application for a marriage license, respondent was declared
as "single" and "Filipino."8
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived
separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage.
While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets
were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their
Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.9
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage10 in the court a quo, on the
ground of bigamy – respondent allegedly had a prior
subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January 12,
1994. She claimed that she learned of respondent's marriage
to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993,
he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its
subsequent dissolution.11 He contended that his first marriage
to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a
divorce decree obtained in Australian in 1989; 12 thus, he was
legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.1âwphi1.nêt
On July 7, 1998 – or about five years after the couple's
wedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullity was
pending – respondent was able to secure a divorce decree
from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the
"marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down." 13
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complained be
dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause of action. 14
The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent. 15
The court marked and admitted the documentary evidence of
both parties.16 After they submitted their respective
memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution. 17
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and
Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground
that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized
in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on
the basis of any defect in an essential element of the
marriage; that is, respondent's alleged lack of legal capacity
to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree
obtained by respondent. The Australian divorce had ended
the marriage; thus, there was no more martial union to nullify
or annual.
Hence, this Petition.18
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
"I
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the
divorce decree obtained in Australia by the
respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage
to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to
contract a second marriage with the petitioner.
"2
The failure of the respondent, who is now a
naturalized Australian, to present a certificate of
legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a
substantial requisite voiding the petitioner' marriage
to the respondent.
"3
The trial court seriously erred in the application of
Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case.
"4
 The trial court patently and grievously erred in
disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of the
Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.
"5
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the
divorce gravely erred in pronouncing that the
divorce decree obtained by the respondent in
Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to
remarry, without first securing a recognition of the
judgment granting the divorce decree before our
courts."19
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this
Decision, we shall concentrate on two pivotal ones: (1)
whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson
was proven, and (2) whether respondent was proven to be
legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Because of our ruling
on these two, there is no more necessity to take up the rest.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha
Samson
Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of the divorce
between respondent and Editha Samson. Citing Adong v.
Cheong Seng Gee,20 petitioner argues that the divorce decree,
like any other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in
this jurisdiction only upon proof of the existence of (1) the
foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the alleged
divorce decree itself. She adds that respondent miserably
failed to establish these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code, marriages solemnized abroad are
governed by the law of the place where they were celebrated
(the lex loci celebrationist). In effect, the Code requires the
presentation of the foreign law to show the conformity of the
marriage in question to the legal requirements of the place
where the marriage was performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as
the take-off points for our discussion. Philippine law does not
provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant
it.21 A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved
even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 22
and 1723 of the Civil Code.24 In mixed marriages involving a
Filipino and a foreigner, Article 2625 of the Family Code allows
the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the
divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry." 26 A divorce obtained
abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their
respective national laws.27
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as
pleading and proof are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v.
Romillo Jr. decrees that "aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are
valid according to their national law." 28 Therefore, before a
foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the
party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. 29
Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be
admitted in evidence, it must first comply with the
registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the
Family Code. These articles read as follows:
"ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each
of the contracting parties shall file separately a
sworn application for such license with the proper
local civil registrar which shall specify the following:
x x x     x x x     x x x
"(5) If previously married, how, when and where the
previous marriage was dissolved or annulled;
x x x      x x x      x x x
"ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has
been previously married, the applicant shall be
required to furnish, instead of the birth of baptismal
certificate required in the last preceding article, the
death certificate of the deceased spouse or the
judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity
of his or her previous marriage. x x x.
"ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute
nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution
of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of
the children's presumptive legitimes shall be
recorded in the appropriate civil registry and
registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not
affect their persons."
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian
divorce decree is a public document – a written official act of
an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further
proof of its authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign
judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the
document must first be presented and admitted in
evidence.30 A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the
divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment
is the judgment itself.31 The decree purports to be a written
act or record of an act of an officially body or tribunal of a
foreign country.32
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a
writing or document may be proven as a public or official
record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication
or (2) a copy thereof attested33 by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer
in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by
the seal of his office.34
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson
appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family
court.35 However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance
with the aforemetioned rules on evidence must be
demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree
of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for
petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the
fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry
of Cabanatuan City.36 The trial court ruled that it was
admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification. 37 Hence, it
was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge.
Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the
divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court
of Sydney, Australia.38
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the
Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer
bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired
Australian citizenship in 1992.39 Naturalization is the legal act
of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and
civil rights belonging to a citizen.40 Naturalized citizens, freed
from the protective cloak of their former states, don the
attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian,
respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the
vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian
divorce law falls upon petitioner, because she is the party
challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends
that petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce
decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia,
because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a
long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly
known by Philippine courts: thus, judges may take judicial
notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with "the
party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in
the prosecution or defense of an action." 41 In civil cases,
plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations
of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and
defendants have the burden of proving the material
allegations in their answer when they introduce new
matters.42 Since the divorce was a defense raised by
respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian
law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws.43 Like any other facts, they
must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not
among those matters that judges are supposed to know by
reason of their judicial function.44 The power of judicial notice
must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt
upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.
Second Issue:
Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of
the divorce, respondent was legally incapacitated to marry
her in 1994.
Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which
was validly admitted in evidence, adequately established his
legal capacity to marry under Australian law.
Respondent's contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense,
divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a
cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different
types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a
vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et
thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the
second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.45 There
is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was
procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory
decree – a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is
in effect the same as a separation from bed and board,
although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of
the prescribed period during which no reconciliation is
effected.46
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may
under some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict
remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may
be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which
was granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited
from remarrying again. The court may allow a remarriage
only after proof of good behavior.47
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a
restriction that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before
this decree becomes absolute (unless the other
party has died) commits the offence of bigamy."48
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce
obtained by respondent may have been restricted. It did not
absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to
his national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the
trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian
divorce ipso facto restored respondent's capacity to remarry
despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce
decree raises a disputable presumption or presumptive
evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39 49
of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no proof has
been presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree
obtained under Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity
required by Article 21 of the Family Code was not submitted
together with the application for a marriage license.
According to her, its absence is proof that respondent did not
have legal capacity to remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage
is determined by the national law of the party concerned. The
certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would
have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of
respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly
authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence
of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant
for a marriage license.50
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves
respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner. A review of
the records before this Court shows that only the following
exhibits were presented before the lower court: (1) for
petitioner: (a) Exhibit "A" – Complaint;51 (b) Exhibit "B" –
Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recto (Filipino-
Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994
in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;52 (c) Exhibit "C" – Certificate
of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha
D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro
Manila;53 (d) Exhibit "D" – Office of the City Registrar of
Cabanatuan City Certification that no information of
annulment between Rederick A. Recto and Editha D. Samson
was in its records;54 and (e) Exhibit "E" – Certificate of
Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto;55 (2) for
respondent: (Exhibit "1" – Amended Answer;56 (b) Exhibit "S"
– Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage
in the Family Court of Australia;57 (c) Exhibit "3" – Certificate
of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto; 58 (d) Exhibit "4"
– Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of
Australia Certificate;59 and Exhibit "5" – Statutory Declaration
of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recto and Grace
J. Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995.60
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that
respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen,
was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12,
1994. We agree with petitioner's contention that the court a
quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed
respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without
requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the
Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very
least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second
marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her
marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of
bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law,
he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result
of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the most
judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to
receive evidence, if any, which show petitioner's legal
capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a
quo may declare a nullity of the parties' marriage on the
ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two
existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in
the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March
1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12,
1994.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and
substantial justice, we REMAND the case to the court a quo
for the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively
show respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner; and
failing in that, of declaring the parties' marriage void on the
ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Puno, Vitug, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
[A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001]
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, Petitioner, vs. JUDGE ROQUE
R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta, Pangasinan, respondent.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting
parties who were both bound by a prior existing marriage is
the bone of contention of the instant complaint against
respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court,
Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act, complainant Herminia Borja-
Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance of
the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of
the Court Administrator on 12 May 1999.
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late
David Manzano, having been married to him on 21 May 1966
in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan
City. [1] Four children were born out of that marriage. [2] On
22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted another
marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent
Judge. [3] When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage,
he knew or ought to know that the same was void and
bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both
contracting parties were separated.
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment
that when he officiated the marriage between Manzano and
Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married.
What he knew was that the two had been living together as
husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit
of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit. [4]
According to him, had he known that the late Manzano was
married, he would have advised the latter not to marry again;
otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. He
then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit
and for being designed merely to harass him.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the
Court Administrator recommended that respondent Judge be
found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to
pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning that a repetition of the
same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.
On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to
manifest whether they were willing to submit the case for
resolution on the basis of the pleadings thus filed.
Complainant answered in the affirmative.
For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation
reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the complaint and
setting aside his earlier Comment. He therein invites the
attention of the Court to two separate affidavits [5] of the
late Manzano and of Payao, which were allegedly unearthed
by a member of his staff upon his instruction. In those
affidavits, both David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao
expressly stated that they were married to Herminia Borja
and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since their
respective marriages had been marked by constant quarrels,
they had both left their families and had never cohabited or
communicated with their spouses anymore. Respondent
Judge alleges that on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed
to solemnize the marriage in question in accordance with
Article 34 of the Family Code. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
We find merit in the complaint.
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a
woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and without any legal impediment to marry
each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing
facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state
under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the
contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the
marriage.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation
to apply, the following requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as
husband and wife for at least five years before the
marriage;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each
other;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the
parties must be present at the time of
marriage;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have
lived together for at least five years [and are without legal
impediment to marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement
that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and
that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.[6]
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It
is significant to note that in their separate affidavits executed
on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge
himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly
stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their
marriage contract, it was indicated that both were separated.
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting
previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which would
make the subsequent marriage null and void. [7] In fact, in his
Comment, he stated that had he known that the late
Manzano was married he would have discouraged him from
contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot
deny knowledge of Manzanos and Payaos subsisting previous
marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their separate
affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before him.
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from
their respective spouses for a long time already is immaterial.
Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have
obtained a decree of legal separation to live separately from
each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not
severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve
the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry.
This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de
facto, as in the case at bar. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint
Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that
they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven
years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation
with another person for at least five years does not severe
the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation
for a long period of time between two individuals who are
legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground
for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a
justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent
marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing
marriage. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of
the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.
The maxim ignorance of the law excuses no one has special
application to judges, [8] who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of competence,
integrity, and independence. It is highly imperative that
judges be conversant with the law and basic legal principles.
[9] And when the law transgressed is simple and elementary,
the failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
[10]
ACCORDINGLY , the recommendation of the Court
Administrator is hereby ADOPTED, with the MODIFICATION
that the amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent
Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to P20,000.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SO ORDERED. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000]
ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the
minors BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL &
PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., petitioners, vs. NORMA BAYADOG,
respondent. NcmmisÓ
DECISION
YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death?
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September
26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners.
Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April
24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December
11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married
without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and
Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986
stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a
marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car
accident. After their father’s death, petitioners filed a petition
for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma
alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage
license. The case was filed under the assumption that the
validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect
petitioner’s successional rights. Norma filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of
action since they are not among the persons who could file
an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the
Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of
Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition after
finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure,
insufficient" to resolve the following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action
against defendant in asking for the declaration of the
nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G.
Niñal, with her specially so when at the time of the filing
of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is already
dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs’
deceased father with defendant is null and void ab
initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing
the validity of the second marriage after it was dissolved
due to their father’s death.
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed
the action to declare null and void their father’s marriage to
respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47
of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the
persons who could initiate an action for annulment of
marriage. Hence, this petition for review with this Court
grounded on a pure question of law. Scncä m
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance
with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
and because "the verification failed to state the basis of
petitioner’s averment that the allegations in the petition are
‘true and correct’." It was thus treated as an unsigned
pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule
7, of the 1997 Rules. However, upon motion of petitioners,
this Court reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the
petition for review.
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable
law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the
law in effect at the time of their celebration. A valid marriage
license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil
Code, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab
initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58. The
requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State’s
demonstration of its involvement and participation in every
marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is
interested. This interest proceeds from the constitutional
mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life
and of affording protection to the family as a basic
"autonomous social institution." Specifically, the Constitution
considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is
the foundation of family life which shall be protected by the
State. This is why the Family Code considers marriage as "a
special contract of permanent union" and case law considers
it "not just an adventure but a lifetime commitment."
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil
Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of
which is that provided in Article 76, referring to the marriage
of a man and a woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before
the marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such
case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame
and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous
cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the
publication of every applicant’s name for a marriage license.
The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage
such persons from legitimizing their status. To preserve peace
in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public
exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the
publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to
preserve their privacy and exempt them from that
requirement. SdaaÓ miso
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners’ father to
respondent Norma was celebrated without any marriage
license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that
"they have attained the age of majority, and, being
unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years, and that we now desire to marry each other."
The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what
nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of
the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year period
in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a
marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both
parties are capacitated to marry each other during the entire
five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation
wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with
each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year
continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal
impediment to their being lawfully married, which
impediment may have either disappeared or intervened
sometime during the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived
together as husband and wife for five years without the
benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be
computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and
wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of
marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year
common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back
from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period
of legal union had it not been for the absence of the
marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately
before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity – meaning no third
party was involved at any time within the 5 years and
continuity – that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-
year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to
whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other
during the entire five years, then the law would be
sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have
common law relationships and placing them on the same
footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.
Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as
such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The
presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves
as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the
requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded
any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and
later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived
escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no
exemption from securing a marriage license unless the
circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It
should be noted that a license is required in order to notify
the public that two persons are about to be united in
matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge
of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it
known to the local civil registrar. The Civil Code provides:
Article 63: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons
having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage
to advice the local civil registrar thereof. x x x."
Article 64: "Upon being advised of any alleged
impediment to the marriage, the local civil registrar
shall forthwith make an investigation, examining
persons under oath. x x x" Sdaad
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Article 17 provides in part: "x x x. This notice shall
request all persons having knowledge of any
impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil
registrar thereof. x x x."
Article 18 reads in part: "x x x. In case of any
impediment known to the local civil registrar or
brought to his attention, he shall note down the
particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the
application for a marriage license. x x x."
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present,
absolutely prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages
by the same person during the same period. Thus, any
marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the
first spouse shall be illegal and void, subject only to the
exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage
was dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code
complements the civil law in that the contracting of two or
more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are
considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and
adultery. The law sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent’s marriage,
it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as
husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding
day. From the time Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to
the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty
months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first
wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and
respondent had started living with each other that has
already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-
year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect
union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only
by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a
subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting
with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with
each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from
his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even
where there was actual severance of the filial companionship
between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either
spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and
wife". Scsä daad
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this
case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a
marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of
such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the
personality to file a petition to declare their father’s marriage
void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judge’s ruling, Article 47 of the Family
Code cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for
annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which
allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at any
time before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article
47 pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file
an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of
marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to
declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages
are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until
otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is
void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken
place and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be
generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or
prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable
marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct
proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally.
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after
the death of either party but voidable marriages can be
assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after
death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring
will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is
why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike
voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the
parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper
interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages
have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning
the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-
ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution,
and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as
provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well
as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary,
the property regime governing voidable marriages is
generally conjugal partnership and the children conceived
before its annulment are legitimate. SupÓ rema
Contrary to the trial court’s ruling, the death of petitioner’s
father extinguished the alleged marital bond between him
and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds
from a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that
was dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their
marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at
all and the death of either extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial
decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a
marriage. "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree
to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the
marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be
absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of
society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is
expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be
ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of
competent jurisdiction." "Under ordinary circumstances, the
effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of
legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had
ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal
purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in
which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or
collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time,
whether before or after the death of either or both the
husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts
rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or
treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable
marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in
direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties
so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be
impeached, and is made good ab initio. But Article 40 of the
Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void,
before a party can enter into a second marriage and such
absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that
effect. For the same reason, the law makes either the action
or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
imprescriptible. Corollarily, if the death of either party would
extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then
the same cannot be considered imprescriptible. Jurisä
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial
action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.
For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination
of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for
that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage
even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so
long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is
without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case.
When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of
nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to
remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the
Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be
obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of
the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59,
dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The said case is ordered REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Puno, and Kapunan, JJ., concur. Sc
Pardo, J., on official business abroad.
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C.
VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH
EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a
foreign absolute divorce, only to be followed by a criminal infidelity
suit of the latter against the former, provides Us the opportunity to
lay down a decisional rule on what hitherto appears to be an
unresolved jurisdictional question.
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a
Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a
German national, were married before the Registrar of Births,
Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of
Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple
lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only
child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. 1
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations
between the spouses, followed by a separation de facto between
them.
After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial
disharmony eventuated in private respondent initiating a divorce
proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg
Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was failure of
their marriage and that they had been living apart since April, 1982. 2
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation,
support and separation of property before the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the same is still
pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court,
Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on
the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the
child was granted to petitioner. The records show that under
German law said court was locally and internationally competent for
the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was
legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that
foreign jurisdiction. 4
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the
divorce decree, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery
before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to
said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia
as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua
sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after
the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the
cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon
review, the respondent city fiscal approved a resolution, dated
January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints for adultery
against the petitioner. 6 The complaints were accordingly filed and
were eventually raffled to two branches of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila. The case entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda
Pilapil and William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435,
was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the respondent judge;
while the other case, "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and
James Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to the
sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the same court. 7
On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of
Justice asking that the aforesaid resolution of respondent fiscal be
set aside and the cases against her be dismissed. 8 A similar petition
was filed by James Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-
52434. The Secretary of Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor,
gave due course to both petitions and directed the respondent city
fiscal to inform the Department of Justice "if the accused have
already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer
further proceedings" and to elevate the entire records of both cases
to his office for review. 9
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer
her arraignment and to suspend further proceedings thereon. 10 As a
consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the other hand, respondent judge
merely reset the date of the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-
52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such scheduled date, petitioner
moved for the cancellation of the arraignment and for the
suspension of proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until
after the resolution of the petition for review then pending before
the Secretary of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the
same case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, 12 which motion was
denied by the respondent judge in an order dated September 8,
1987. The same order also directed the arraignment of both accused
therein, that is, petitioner and William Chia. The latter entered a
plea of not guilty while the petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such
refusal of the petitioner being considered by respondent judge as
direct contempt, she and her counsel were fined and the former was
ordered detained until she submitted herself for arraignment. 13
Later, private respondent entered a plea of not guilty. 14
On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining
order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court
denying her motion to quash. The petition is anchored on the main
ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide the
charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be
prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a
foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a
final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the
criminal complaint." 15
On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining the respondents from implementing the aforesaid
order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with
Criminal Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988
Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez acted on the aforesaid
petitions for review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations, issued
a resolution directing the respondent city fiscal to move for the
dismissal of the complaints against the petitioner. 16
We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall
accordingly issue.
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of
adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be
prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the
offended spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering
consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not
merely a formal, requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the
jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in it by the
Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn written complaint is just
as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint which starts the
prosecutory proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot
exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery
and concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint
should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses
of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no
provision is made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery and
concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of the
offended party. The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the
prosecution of the first four offenses above mentioned do not apply
to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that while the State, as
parens patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action for a
deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of
seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of
her parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not
include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other words, only
the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate
the action therefor.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to
institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must
have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time
of the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule
in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a
motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the
complaint or petition.
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of
criminal cases does not mean that the same requirement and
rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been
found necessary since criminal actions are generally and
fundamentally commenced by the State, through the People of the
Philippines, the offended party being merely the complaining
witness therein. However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those
which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution
for adultery is of such genre, the offended spouse assumes a more
predominant role since the right to commence the action, or to
refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and
option.
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party
who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go
through the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently argued by
petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes
that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the
institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This is a logical
consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would
be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the
spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the
criminal case. 21
In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and
capacity of the complainant to commence the action be definitely
established and, as already demonstrated, such status or capacity
must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. It would
be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would be determined by
his status before or subsequent to the commencement thereof,
where such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased before, or
was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the
institution of the case. We would thereby have the anomalous
spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is without
the legal capacity to do so.
To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential
jurisprudence on the specific issue as to when precisely the status of
a complainant as an offended spouse must exist where a criminal
prosecution can be commenced only by one who in law can be
categorized as possessed of such status. Stated differently and with
reference to the present case, the inquiry ;would be whether it is
necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery
that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be
unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by
the former against the latter.
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that
jurisdiction which are in pari materia with ours, yields the rule that
after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has
the right to institute proceedings against the offenders where the
statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive
right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where, however,
proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce
subsequently granted can have no legal effect on the prosecution of
the criminal proceedings to a conclusion. 22
In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that —
'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on
the complaint of the husband or wife.' Section 4932, Code.
Though Loftus was husband of defendant when the offense
is said to have been committed, he had ceased to be such
when the prosecution was begun; and appellant insists
that his status was not such as to entitle him to make the
complaint. We have repeatedly said that the offense is
against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in
explaining the reason for this provision in the statute; and
we are of the opinion that the unoffending spouse must be
such when the prosecution is commenced. (Emphasis
supplied.)
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in
this case and in our jurisdiction, considering our statutory law and
jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such
nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be
determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person
who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by
this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the
time of the filing of the complaint.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid
divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted.
Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in view of
the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of
persons.
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a
divorce was granted by a United States court between Alice Van
Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed a civil
case in a trial court here alleging that her business concern was
conjugal property and praying that she be ordered to render an
accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the
business. Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously
demonstrated the error of such stance, thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada
divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree
is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For
instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her
husband, in any State of the Union. ...
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in
Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. ...
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no
longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing
to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to
exercise control over conjugal assets. ... 25
Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent,
being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to
commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought
this case before the decree of divorce for lack of knowledge, even if
true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case. When
said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew
that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect
once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there
be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is
said to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our
law on adultery, 26 since there would thenceforth be no spousal
relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the
effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the
actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.
The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully
relied upon by private respondent. In applying Article 433 of the old
Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of the Revised
Penal Code, which punished adultery "although the marriage be
afterwards declared void", the Court merely stated that "the
lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the infidelity of a married
woman to her marital vows, even though it should be made to
appear that she is entitled to have her marriage contract declared
null and void, until and unless she actually secures a formal judicial
declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred
therefrom that the complaint can still be filed after the declaration
of nullity because such declaration that the marriage is void ab initio
is equivalent to stating that it never existed. There being no
marriage from the beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after
said declaration of nullity would no longer have a leg to stand on.
Moreover, what was consequently contemplated and within the
purview of the decision in said case is the situation where the
criminal action for adultery was filed before the termination of the
marriage by a judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same
rule and requisite would necessarily apply where the termination of
the marriage was effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.
Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta,
hereinbefore cited, 27 must suffer the same fate of inapplicability. A
cursory reading of said case reveals that the offended spouse
therein had duly and seasonably filed a complaint for adultery,
although an issue was raised as to its sufficiency but which was
resolved in favor of the complainant. Said case did not involve a
factual situation akin to the one at bar or any issue determinative of
the controversy herein.
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to
quash is SET ASIDE and another one entered DISMISSING the
complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The
temporary restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987
is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., concurring:
It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider
the German absolute divorce as valid also in the Philippines, the fact
is that the husband in the instant case, by the very act of his
obtaining an absolute divorce in Germany can no longer be
considered as the offended party in case his former wife actually has
carnal knowledge with another, because in divorcing her, he already
implicitly authorized the woman to have sexual relations with
others. A contrary ruling would be less than fair for a man, who is
free to have sex will be allowed to deprive the woman of the same
privilege.
In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme
Court considered the absolute divorce between the American
husband and his American wife as valid and binding in the
Philippines on the theory that their status and capacity are governed
by their National law, namely, American law. There is no decision
yet of the Supreme Court regarding the validity of such a divorce if
one of the parties, say an American, is married to a Filipino wife, for
then two (2) different nationalities would be involved.
In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private
International Law and precisely because of the National law
doctrine, he considers the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the
American husband is concerned but void insofar as the Filipino wife
is involved. This results in what he calls a "socially grotesque
situation," where a Filipino woman is still married to a man who is
no longer her husband. It is the opinion however, of the undersigned
that very likely the opposite expresses the correct view. While under
the national law of the husband the absolute divorce will be valid,
still one of the exceptions to the application of the proper foreign
law (one of the exceptions to comity) is when the foreign law will
work an injustice or injury to the people or residents of the forum.
Consequently since to recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the
part of the husband would be injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino
wife whose marriage would be still valid under her national law, it
would seem that under our law existing before the new Family Code
(which took effect on August 3, 1988) the divorce should be
considered void both with respect to the American husband and the
Filipino wife.
The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA [1985]) cannot
apply despite the fact that the husband was an American can with a
Filipino wife because in said case the validity of the divorce insofar
as the Filipino wife is concerned was NEVER put in issue.
 Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., concurring:
It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider
the German absolute divorce as valid also in the Philippines, the fact
is that the husband in the instant case, by the very act of his
obtaining an absolute divorce in Germany can no longer be
considered as the offended party in case his former wife actually has
carnal knowledge with another, because in divorcing her, he already
implicitly authorized the woman to have sexual relations with
others. A contrary ruling would be less than fair for a man, who is
free to have sex will be allowed to deprive the woman of the same
privilege.
In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme
Court considered the absolute divorce between the American
husband and his American wife as valid and binding in the
Philippines on the theory that their status and capacity are governed
by their National law, namely, American law. There is no decision
yet of the Supreme Court regarding the validity of such a divorce if
one of the parties, say an American, is married to a Filipino wife, for
then two (2) different nationalities would be involved.
In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private
International Law and precisely because of the National law
doctrine, he considers the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the
American husband is concerned but void insofar as the Filipino wife
is involved. This results in what he calls a "socially grotesque
situation," where a Filipino woman is still married to a man who is
no longer her husband. It is the opinion however, of the undersigned
that very likely the opposite expresses the correct view. While under
the national law of the husband the absolute divorce will be valid,
still one of the exceptions to the application of the proper foreign
law (one of the exceptions to comity) is when the foreign law will
work an injustice or injury to the people or residents of the forum.
Consequently since to recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the
part of the husband would be injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino
wife whose marriage would be still valid under her national law, it
would seem that under our law existing before the new Family Code
(which took effect on August 3, 1988) the divorce should be
considered void both with respect to the American husband and the
Filipino wife.
The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA [1985]) cannot
apply despite the fact that the husband was an American can with a
Filipino wife because in said case the validity of the divorce insofar
as the Filipino wife is concerned was NEVER put in issue.
[G.R. No. 124862.  December 22, 1998]
FE D. QUITA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
BLANDINA DANDAN,* respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J .:
FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were
married in the Philippines on 18 May 1941.  They were not
however blessed with children.   Somewhere along the way
their relationship soured.   Eventually Fe sued Arturo for
divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.  She submitted in
the divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19 July 1950
evidencing their agreement to live separately from each
other and a settlement of their conjugal properties.  On 23
July 1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce.  Three (3)
weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the
same locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce.  children assigned as one of the errors allegedly committed by
Still in the U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a certain
Wernimont.
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died.  He left no will.  On 31 August
1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of administration
concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine
Trust Company.  Respondent Blandina Dandan (also referred
to as Blandina Padlan), claiming to be the surviving spouse of
Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida
and Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the petition as
surviving children of Arturo Padlan, opposed the petition and
prayed for the appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo
Cabasal, which was resolved in favor of the latter.  Upon
motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later
replaced by Higino Castillon.  On 30 April 1973 the oppositors
(Blandina and the Padlan children) submitted certified
photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private writing and the final
judgment of divorce between petitioner and Arturo.  Later
Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of
the deceased Arturo, intervened.
On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate
declaration of heirs of the decedent and the distribution of
his estate.  At the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987,
private respondent as well as the six (6) Padlan children and
Ruperto failed to appear despite due notice.  On the same
day, the trial court required the submission of the records of
birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the
issue on the declaration of heirs would be considered
submitted for resolution.  The prescribed period lapsed
without the required documents being submitted.
The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escaño which held that
"a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens sought and
decreed  after  the  effectivity  of the present Civil Code (Rep.
Act 386) was not entitled to recognition as valid in this
jurisdiction," disregarded the divorce between petitioner and
Arturo.  Consequently, it expressed the view that their
marriage subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972.  Neither
did it consider valid their extrajudicial settlement of conjugal
properties due to lack of judicial approval. On the other hand,
it opined that there was no showing that marriage existed
between private respondent and Arturo, much less was it
shown that the alleged Padlan children had been
acknowledged by the deceased as his children with her.  As
regards Ruperto, it found that he was a brother of Arturo.  On
27 November 1987 only petitioner and Ruperto were
declared the intestate heirs of Arturo.  Accordingly, equal
adjudication of the net hereditary estate was ordered in favor
of the two intestate heirs.
On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan
children were allowed to present proofs that the recognition
of the children by the deceased as his legitimate children,
except Alexis who was recognized as his illegitimate child, had
been made in their respective records of birth.  Thus on 15
February 1988 partial reconsideration was granted declaring
the Padlan children, with the exception of Alexis, entitled to
one-half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and
petitioner to the other half. Private respondent was not
declared an heir.  Although it was stated in the
aforementioned records of birth that she and Arturo were
married on 22 April 1947, their marriage was clearly void
since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous
marriage to petitioner.
In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her
the trial court the circumstance that the case was decided
without a hearing, in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules
of Court, which provides that if there is a controversy before
the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased
person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is
entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and
decided as in ordinary cases.
Respondent appellate court found this ground alone
sufficient to sustain the appeal; hence, on 11 September 1995
it declared null and void the 27 November 1987 decision and
15 February 1988 order of the trial court, and directed the
remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
On 18 April 1996 it denied reconsideration.
Should this case be remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings?  Petitioner insists that there is no need because,
first, no legal or factual issue obtains for resolution either as
to the heirship of the Padlan children or as to their respective
shares in the intestate estate of the decedent; and, second,
the issue as to who between petitioner and private
respondent is the proper heir of the decedent is one of law
which can be resolved in the present petition based on
established facts and admissions of the parties.
We cannot sustain petitioner.  The provision relied upon by
respondent court is clear:  If there is a controversy before the
court as  to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person
or as to the distributive shares to which each person is
entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and
decided as in ordinary cases.
We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to
the right of the six (6) Padlan children to inherit from the
decedent because there are proofs that they have been duly
acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even recognizes
them as heirs of Arturo Padlan; nor as to their respective
hereditary shares.  But controversy remains as to who is the
legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo.  The trial court, after
the parties other than petitioner failed to appear during the
scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987 of the motion for
immediate declaration of heirs and distribution of estate,
simply issued an order requiring the submission of the
records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days
from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the
documents, the issue on declaration of heirs would be
deemed submitted for resolution.
We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion private
respondent raised, among others, the issue as to whether
petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent
considering that she had secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and
in fact had twice remarried.  She also invoked the above
quoted procedural rule. To this, petitioner replied that Arturo
was a Filipino and as such remained legally married to her in
spite of the divorce they obtained. Reading between the
lines, the implication is that petitioner was no longer a
Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo.   This
should have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to
establish her citizenship.  The purpose of a hearing is to
ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid of
documentary and testimonial evidence as well as the
arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing the
evidence.  Instead, the lower court perfunctorily settled her
claim in her favor by merely applying  the ruling in Tenchavez
v. Escaño.
Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or
reconsider the lower court's decision she stressed that the
citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling
in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. that aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
they are valid according to their national law.  She prayed
therefore that the case be set for hearing. Petitioner opposed
the motion but failed to squarely address the issue on her
citizenship. The trial court did not grant private respondent's
prayer for a hearing but proceeded to resolve her motion
with the finding that both petitioner and Arturo were
"Filipino citizens and were married in the Philippines." It
maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954 in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine
jurisdiction.  We deduce that the finding on their citizenship  The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt
pertained  solely  to  the time of  their  marriage  as  the  trial
court was not supplied with a basis to determine petitioner's
citizenship at the time of their  divorce.  The  doubt  persisted 
as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their
divorce was decreed.  The trial court must have overlooked
the materiality of this aspect.  Once proved that she was no
longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn
would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose
her right to inherit from Arturo.
Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on
petitioner's citizenship; it did not merit enlightenment
however from petitioner. In the present proceeding,
petitioner's citizenship is brought anew to the fore by private
respondent.   She even furnishes the Court with the transcript
of stenographic notes taken on 5 May 1995 during the
hearing for the reconstitution of the original of a certain
transfer certificate title as well as the issuance of new
owner's duplicate copy thereof before another trial court.  separation of property between spouses during the marriage
When asked whether she was an American citizen petitioner
answered that she was since 1954. Significantly, the decree of
divorce of petitioner and Arturo was obtained in the same
year.  Petitioner however did not bother to file a reply
memorandum to erase the uncertainty about her citizenship
at the time of their divorce, a factual issue requiring hearings
to be conducted by the trial court.  Consequently, respondent
appellate court did not err in ordering the case returned to
the trial court for further proceedings.
We emphasize however that the question to be determined
by the trial court should be limited only to the right of
petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse.  widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the
Private respondent's claim to heirship was already resolved
by  the trial court.  She and Arturo were married on 22 April
1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo was   
subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage
considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of
the Civil Code.  Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse
that can inherit from him as this status presupposes a
legitimate relationship.
As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner
and her counsel to be declared in contempt of court and that
the present petition be dismissed for forum shopping, the
same lacks merit.  For forum shopping to exist the actions
must involve the same transactions and same essential facts
and circumstances.  There must also be identical causes of
action, subject matter and issue. The present petition deals
with declaration of heirship while the subsequent petitions
filed before the three (3) trial courts concern the issuance of
new owner's duplicate copies of titles of certain properties
belonging to the estate of Arturo.  Obviously, there is no
reason to declare the existence of forum shopping.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.  The decision of
respondent Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the case
to the court of origin for further proceedings and declaring
null and void its decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and
Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is  AFFIRMED.   The order
of the appellate court modifying its previous decision by
granting one-half (1/2) of the net hereditary estate to the
Padlan children, namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida
and Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis, all surnamed
Padlan, instead of Arturo's brother  Ruperto Padlan, is
likewise AFFIRMED.  The Court however emphasizes that the
reception of  evidence by the trial court should be limited to
the hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving spouse of
Arturo Padlan.
of court and to dismiss the present petition for forum
shopping is  DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Mendoza, and Martinez, JJ., concur.
* The name of private respondent Blandina Dandan   appears
as Blandina Padlan  in the proceedings before the lower
courts.
No. L-19671, 29 November 1965, 15 SCRA 355.
Id.,  p. 367.
Then Art. 190 of the Civil Code provided that in the absence
of an express declaration in the marriage settlement, the
shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order.  Quite in
relation thereto, then Art. 191, par. 4 of the same Code
provided that the husband and the wife may agree upon the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage,
subject to judicial approval.
Decision penned by Judge Tomas V. Tadeo Jr. of RTC-Br. 105,
Quezon City; Appendix "A" of Brief for the Oppositors-
Appellants; CA Rollo, p. 15.
Article 1001 of the Civil Code provides that should brothers
and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to
the other half.
Appendix "B" of Brief for the Oppositors-Appellants; See Note
4.
Article 998 of the Civil Code provides that if a widow or
widower survives with illegitimate children, such widow or
widower shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and
the illegitimate children or their descendants, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, to the other half.
Decision penned by Justice Pacita Cañizares-Nye with the
concurrence of Justices Romeo J. Callejo Jr. and Delilah
Vidallon-Magtolis; Rollo, p. 39.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSE A. DAYOT,
Respondent.
[G.R. No. 179474]
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner,vs. JOSE A. DAYOT,
Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581
and G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions for Review under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines
and Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both
challenging the Amended Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals,
dated 7 November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which
declared the marriage between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa
void ab initio.
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and
Felisa were married at the Pasay City Hall. The marriage was
solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza.[2] In lieu of a marriage
license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit, [3] also
dated 24 November 1986, attesting that both of them had
attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they
had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint [4] for Annulment and/or
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that
his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage
ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he did
not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had
lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that his
consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.
In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led
to his filing of the same. According to Jose, he was introduced
to Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to live as a
boarder in Felisa's house, the latter being his landlady. Some
three weeks later, Felisa requested him to accompany her to
the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a package
sent to her by her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay
City Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man
bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them. They
were told that Jose needed to sign the papers so that the
package could be released to Felisa. He initially refused to do
so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his refusal
could get both of them killed by her brother who had learned
about their relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of
paper, and gave them to the man who immediately left. It
was in February 1987 when he discovered that he had
contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a
piece of paper lying on top of the table at the sala of Felisa's
house. When he perused the same, he discovered that it was
a copy of his marriage contract with Felisa. When he
confronted Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Jose's allegations
and defended the validity of their marriage. She declared that
they had maintained their relationship as man and wife
absent the legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but
that she had deferred contracting marriage with him on
account of their age difference.[5] In her pre-trial brief, Felisa
expounded that while her marriage to Jose was subsisting,
the latter contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual
(Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an
action for bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she filed an
administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the
Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both employees of
the National Statistics and Coordinating Board.[6] The
Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for disgraceful
and immoral conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of
suspension from service for one year without emolument. [7]
On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision [8] dismissing the
Complaint. It disposed:
WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the
evidence presented by both parties, this Court finds and so
holds that the [C]omplaint does not deserve a favorable
consideration. Accordingly, the above-entitled case is hereby
ordered DISMISSED with costs against [Jose]. [9]
The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence
presented, the marriage celebrated between Jose and Felisa
on 24 November 1986 was valid. It dismissed Jose's version of
the story as implausible, and rationalized that:
Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect
any attempt to make him or her sign a blank sheet of paper.
[Jose] could have already detected that something was amiss,
unusual, as they were at Pasay City Hall to get a package for
[Felisa] but it [was] he who was made to sign the pieces of
paper for the release of the said package. Another indirect
suggestion that could have put him on guard was the fact
that, by his own admission, [Felisa] told him that her brother
would kill them if he will not sign the papers. And yet it took
him, more or less, three months to "discover" that the pieces
of paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage
contract. [Jose] does not seem to be that ignorant, as
perceived by this Court, to be "taken in for a ride" by [Felisa.]
[Jose's] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was
belied by the fact that he acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his
wife when he wrote [Felisa's] name in the duly notarized
statement of assets and liabilities he filled up on May 12,
1988, one year after he discovered the marriage contract he
is now claiming to be sham and false. [Jose], again, in his
company I.D., wrote the name of [Felisa] as the person to be
contacted in case of emergency. This Court does not believe
that the only reason why her name was written in his
company I.D. was because he was residing there then. This is
just but a lame excuse because if he really considers her not
his lawfully wedded wife, he would have written instead the
name of his sister.
When [Jose's] sister was put into the witness stand, under
oath, she testified that she signed her name voluntarily as a
witness to the marriage in the marriage certificate (T.S.N.,
page 25, November 29, 1996) and she further testified that
the signature appearing over the name of Jose Dayot was the
signature of his [sic] brother that he voluntarily affixed in the
marriage contract (page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29,
1996), and when she was asked by the Honorable Court if
indeed she believed that Felisa Tecson was really chosen by
her brother she answered yes. The testimony of his sister all
the more belied his claim that his consent was procured
through fraud.[10]
Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Jose's
action had prescribed. It cited Article 87[11] of the New Civil
Code which requires that the action for annulment of
marriage must be commenced by the injured party within
four years after the discovery of the fraud. Thus:
That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent
was obtained by [Felisa] through fraud, trickery and
machinations, he could have filed an annulment or
declaration of nullity of marriage at the earliest possible
opportunity, the time when he discovered the alleged sham
and false marriage contract. [Jose] did not take any action to
void the marriage at the earliest instance. x x x. [12]
Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC
Decision to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 11
August 2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be
without merit. The dispositive portion of the appellate court's
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. [13]
The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage
between Jose and Felisa as it was solemnized prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate court observed
that the circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for
annulment of marriage under Article 86[14] of the Civil Code
did not exist in the marriage between the parties. Further, it
ruled that the action for annulment of marriage on the
ground of fraud was filed beyond the prescriptive period
provided by law. The Court of Appeals struck down Jose's
appeal in the following manner:
Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation
was employed on Jose in giving his consent to the marriage,
the action for the annulment thereof had already prescribed.
Article 87 (4) and (5) of the Civil Code provides that the action
for annulment of marriage on the ground that the consent of
a party was obtained by fraud, force or intimidation must be
commenced by said party within four (4) years after the
discovery of the fraud and within four (4) years from the time
the force or intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was
allegedly discovered by Jose in February, 1987 then he had
only until February, 1991 within which to file an action for
annulment of marriage. However, it was only on July 7, 1993
that Jose filed the complaint for annulment of his marriage to
Felisa.[15]
Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose's assertion
that his marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a
marriage license. It ruled that the marriage was solemnized
under Article 76[16] of the Civil Code as one of exceptional
character, with the parties executing an affidavit of marriage
between man and woman who have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years. The Court of Appeals
concluded that the falsity in the affidavit to the effect that
Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife for
the period required by Article 76 did not affect the validity of
the marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled
by the statements contained therein. In this manner, the
Court of Appeals gave credence to the good-faith reliance of
the solemnizing officer over the falsity of the affidavit. The
appellate court further noted that on the dorsal side of said
affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing
officer, stated that he took steps to ascertain the ages and
other qualifications of the contracting parties and found no
legal impediment to their marriage. Finally, the Court of
Appeals dismissed Jose's argument that neither he nor Felisa
was a member of the sect to which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza
belonged. According to the Court of Appeals, Article 56 [17] of
the Civil Code did not require that either one of the
contracting parties to the marriage must belong to the
solemnizing officer's church or religious sect. The prescription
was established only in Article 7[18] of the Family Code which
does not govern the parties' marriage.
Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a
Motion for Reconsideration thereof. His central opposition
was that the requisites for the proper application of the
exemption from a marriage license under Article 76 of the
Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar. In
particular, Jose cited the legal condition that the man and the
woman must have been living together as husband and wife
for at least five years before the marriage. Essentially, he
maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed
by him and Felisa was false.
The Court of Appeals granted Jose's Motion for
Reconsideration and reversed itself. Accordingly, it rendered
an Amended Decision, dated 7 November 2006, the fallo of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is
RECALLED and SET ASIDE and another one entered declaring
the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void
ab initio.
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil
Registrar of Pasay City.[19]
In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the
ruling of this Court in Niñal v. Bayadog,[20] and reasoned
that:
In Niñal v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a
marriage solemnized without a marriage license on the basis
of their affidavit that they had attained the age of majority,
that being unmarried, they had lived together for at least five
(5) years and that they desired to marry each other, the
Supreme Court ruled as follows:
"x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation
period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of
marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been
for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be
the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it
should be a period of cohabitation characterized by
exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved at any time
within the 5 years and continuity - that is unbroken.
Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is
computed without any distinction as to whether the parties
were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five
years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and
encouraging parties to have common law relationships and
placing them on the same footing with those who lived
faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special
relationship must be respected as such and its requirements
must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based
on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The
parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with
every single requirement and later use the same missing
element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their
marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a
marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within
the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is
required in order to notify the public that two persons are
about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is
aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of
the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage
solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of
exceptional character, shall be void from the beginning.
Inasmuch as the marriage between Jose and Felisa is not
covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage
license, it is, therefore, void ab initio because of the absence
of a marriage license.[21]
Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but
to no avail. The appellate court rendered a Resolution [22]
dated 10 May 2007, denying Felisa's motion.
Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Petition for
Review before this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the
Court of Appeals' Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006
be reversed and set aside for lack of merit, and that the
marriage between Jose and Felisa be declared valid and
subsisting. Felisa filed a separate Petition for Review,
docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly assailing the appellate
court's Amended Decision. On 1 August 2007, this Court
resolved to consolidate the two Petitions in the interest of
uniformity of the Court rulings in similar cases brought before
it for resolution.[23]
The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following
arguments for the allowance of its Petition, to wit:
I the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their
RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF
THE VALIDITY OF HIS MARRIAGE TO FELISA.
II
RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN
HANDS AND SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS
OWN FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.
III
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY
OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E.[24]
Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of
Appeals misapplied Niñal.[25] She differentiates the case at
bar from Niñal by reasoning that one of the parties therein
had an existing prior marriage, a circumstance which does not
obtain in her cohabitation with Jose. Finally, Felisa adduces
that Jose only sought the annulment of their marriage after a
criminal case for bigamy and an administrative case had been
filed against him in order to avoid liability. Felisa surmises
that the declaration of nullity of their marriage would
exonerate Jose from any liability.
For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose
and Felisa. To reach a considered ruling on the issue, we shall
jointly tackle the related arguments vented by petitioners
Republic of the Philippines and Felisa.
The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several
circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid
marriage exists between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa
echoes the claim that any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the validity of the marriage by citing this Court's ruling in
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals.[26] To buttress its assertion, the
Republic points to the affidavit executed by Jose and Felisa,
dated 24 November 1986, attesting that they have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, which
they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the Republic's
position that the falsity of the statements in the affidavit does
not affect the validity of the marriage, as the essential and
formal requisites were complied with; and the solemnizing
officer was not required to investigate as to whether the said
affidavit was legally obtained. The Republic opines that as a
marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that
the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not
be invalidated by the fact that the parties incorporated a
fabricated statement in their affidavit that they cohabited as
husband and wife for at least five years. In addition, the
Republic posits that the parties' marriage contract states that
their marriage was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil
Code. It also bears the signature of the parties and their
witnesses, and must be considered a primary evidence of
marriage. To further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces
the following documents: (1) Jose's notarized Statement of
Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988 wherein he wrote
Felisa's name as his wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July 1993
issued by the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of
Pasay City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had lived together as
husband and wife in said barangay; and (3) Jose's company ID
card, dated 2 May 1988, indicating Felisa's name as his wife.
The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the
issue of the effect of a false affidavit under Article 76 of the
Civil Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in order.
It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was
celebrated on 24 November 1986, prior to the effectivity of
union. Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential
requisites of marriage as a contract:
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these
requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional
character. (Emphasis ours.)
Article 58[27] makes explicit that no marriage shall be
solemnized without a license first being issued by the local
civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting
party habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional
character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under
Article 75.[28] Article 80(3)[29] of the Civil Code makes it clear
that a marriage performed without the corresponding
marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the
legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the license
is the essence of the marriage contract. [30] This is in stark
contrast to the old Marriage Law, [31] whereby the absence of
a marriage license did not make the marriage void. The
rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license
under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the
State to the contracting parties, after the proper government
official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.
[32]
Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are
covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. To
wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at
the point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in
remote places, (2) consular marriages,[33] (3) ratification of
marital cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil
marriage, (5) Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (6)
mixed marriages.[34]
The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital
cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil Code, which
provides:
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man
and a woman who have attained the age of majority and
who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer
oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the
marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to
ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting
parties and that he found no legal impediment to the
marriage.
The reason for the law,[35] as espoused by the Code
Commission, is that the publicity attending a marriage license
may discourage such persons who have lived in a state of
cohabitation from legalizing their status. [36]
It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa
was performed without a marriage license. In lieu thereof,
they executed an affidavit declaring that "they have attained
the age of maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years; and that
because of this union, they desire to marry each other." [37]
One of the central issues in the Petition at bar is thus:
whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation,
where the parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum
five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void
ab initio for lack of a marriage license.
We answer in the affirmative.
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the
exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the formal
requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory
construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be
strictly[38] but reasonably construed.[39] They extend only so far
as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be
resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the
exception.[40] Where a general rule is established by statute
with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former or add
to the latter by implication.[41] For the exception in Article 76
to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the
woman must have attained the age of majority, and that,
being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us
with no other expediency but to read the law as it is plainly
written. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76
applies only to those who have lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years and desire to marry each other.
The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum
period requirement of five years of cohabitation. No other
reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article
76 is precise. The minimum requisite of five years of
cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of
the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be
valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is
embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as
one that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy to
mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting
parties shall state the requisite facts [42] in an affidavit before
any person authorized by law to administer oaths; and that
the official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage
shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain
the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties
and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived
together for five years at the time they executed their sworn
affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that
Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or
barely five months before the celebration of their marriage.
[43]
The Court of Appeals also noted Felisa's testimony that
Jose was introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel,
sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA
Revolution.[44] The appellate court also cited Felisa's own
testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose
commenced to live in her house.[45]
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether
they satisfied the minimum five-year requisite is factual in
nature. A question of fact arises when there is a need to
decide on the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. [46] Under
Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to this
Court's review.[47] It is already well-settled that:
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of
Appeals are binding on this Court. A recognized exception to
this rule is when the Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in
this case the administrative body, make contradictory
findings. However, the exception does not apply in every
instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court or
administrative body disagree. The factual findings of the
Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if such
findings are supported by the record or based on substantial
evidence.[48]
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November
1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt them from the
requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the
falsity of the statements in the parties' affidavit will not affect
the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal
requisites were complied with. The argument deserves scant
merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage
between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal
requisite of a marriage license. Neither did Jose and Felisa
meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they
should have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of a
marriage license.
Anent petitioners' reliance on the presumption of marriage,
this Court holds that the same finds no applicability to the
case at bar. Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of
marriage, it is with reference to the prima facie presumption
that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband
and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. [49]
Restated more explicitly, persons dwelling together in
apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in
fact married.[50] The present case does not involve an
apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs to be
applied. There is no question that Jose and Felisa actually
entered into a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986,
hence, compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for
Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which
spawned the instant consolidated Petitions.
In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code [51] that
every intendment of law or fact leans towards the validity of
marriage will not salvage the parties' marriage, and extricate
them from the effect of a violation of the law. The marriage
of Jose and Felisa was entered into without the requisite
marriage license or compliance with the stringent
requirements of a marriage under exceptional circumstance.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a
clear violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at
least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and
unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law
sought to prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for
a valid marriage.[52] The protection of marriage as a sacred
institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine
union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.[53] To permit
a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to
allow an abject circumvention of the law. If this Court is to
protect the fabric of the institution of marriage, we must be
wary of deceptive schemes that violate the legal measures set
forth in our laws.
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the
Republic that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated
by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must
a marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that
the parties have cohabited for at least five years as required
by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference
to an irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the
absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license at all.
Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn
affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisa's
cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an
exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot
be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact
that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to
by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn
affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without
force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.
In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the
argument that based on equity, Jose should be denied relief
because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby
profit from his wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It
must be stated that equity finds no room for application
where there is a law.[54] There is a law on the ratification of
marital cohabitation, which is set in precise terms under
Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are
consistent that the declaration of nullity of the parties'
marriage is without prejudice to their criminal liability. [55]
The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error
that Jose is deemed estopped from assailing the legality of his
marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose
and Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990,
notwithstanding Jose's subsequent marriage to Rufina
Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years
before he sought the declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel
had set in.
This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is
imprescriptible.[56] Jose and Felisa's marriage was celebrated
sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached
except that it is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn
a void marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised any
time.
Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the
rule that the five-year common-law cohabitation period
under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back
from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a
period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a
marriage.[57] It covers the years immediately preceding the
day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity - meaning no
third party was involved at any time within the five years -
and continuity that is unbroken.[58]
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended
Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot
to Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without
prejudice to their criminal liability, if any. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez, (Acting Chairperson), Tinga*, Velasco, Jr.,**
and Reyes, JJ., concur.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. IYOY
G.R. No. 152577
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES , petitioner Vs. CRASUS L.
IYOY, respondent
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General,
prays for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001,[1] affirming the
Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City,
Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October
1998,[2] declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus
L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void on the basis of
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. 
          The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the
filing of a Complaint[3] for declaration of nullity of marriage
by respondent Crasus on 25 March 1997.  According to the
said Complaint, respondent Crasus married Fely on 16
December 1961 at Bradford Memorial Church, Jones Avenue,
Cebu City.  As a result of their union, they had five children –
Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos – who are
now all of legal ages.  After the celebration of their marriage,
respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was “hot-tempered, a
nagger and extravagant.”  In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for
the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five
children, the youngest then being only six years old, to the
care of respondent Crasus.  Barely a year after Fely left for the
U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from her
requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he
disregarded the said request.  Sometime in 1985, respondent
Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their
children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom
she eventually had a child.  In 1987, Fely came back to the
Philippines with her American family, staying at Cebu Plaza
Hotel in Cebu City.  Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk
to Fely because he was afraid he might not be able to bear
the sorrow and the pain she had caused him.  Fely returned
to the Philippines several times more: in 1990, for the
wedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain
operation of their fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995, for
unknown reasons.  Fely continued to live with her American
family in New Jersey, U.S.A.  She had been openly using the
surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in
the U.S.A.  For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had
invitations made in which she was named as “Mrs. Fely Ada
Micklus.”  At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13
years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and
there was no more possibility of reconciliation between
them.  Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that
Fely’s acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and
clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform
the essential obligations of marriage.  Such incapacity, being
incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration
of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles
68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.  
Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim[4] with the RTC on 05
June 1997.  She asserted therein that she was already an
American citizen since 1988 and was now married to Stephen
Micklus.  While she admitted being previously married to
respondent Crasus and having five children with him, Fely
refuted the other allegations made by respondent Crasus in
his Complaint.  She explained that she was no more hot-
tempered than any normal person, and she may had been
indignant at respondent Crasus on certain occasions but it
was because of the latter’s drunkenness, womanizing, and
lack of sincere effort to find employment and to contribute to
the maintenance of their household.  She could not have
been extravagant since the family hardly had enough money
for basic needs.  Indeed, Fely left for abroad for financial
reasons as respondent Crasus had no job and what she was
then earning as the sole breadwinner in the Philippines was
insufficient to support their family.  Although she left all of
her children with respondent Crasus, she continued to
provide financial support to them, as well as, to respondent
Crasus.  Subsequently, Fely was able to bring her children to
the U.S.A., except for one, Calvert, who had to stay behind for
medical reasons.  While she did file for divorce from
respondent Crasus, she denied having herself sent a letter to
respondent Crasus requesting him to sign the enclosed
divorce papers.  After securing a divorce from respondent
Crasus, Fely married her American husband and acquired
American citizenship.  She argued that her marriage to her
American husband was legal because now being an American
citizen, her status shall be governed by the law of her present
nationality.  Fely also pointed out that respondent Crasus
himself was presently living with another woman who bore
him a child.   She also accused respondent Crasus of misusing
the amount of P90,000.00 which she advanced to him to
finance the brain operation of their son, Calvert.  On the basis
of the foregoing, Fely also prayed that the RTC declare her
marriage to respondent Crasus null and void; and that
respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely the P90,000.00
she advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses.  there at the time of the marriage in question is shown
          After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their
respective Pre-Trial Briefs,[5] the RTC afforded both parties
the opportunity to present their evidence.  Petitioner
Republic participated in the trial through the Provincial
Prosecutor of Cebu.[6]      the essential marital obligations which already existed
          Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of
evidence in support of his Complaint: (1) his own testimony
on 08 September 1997, in which he essentially reiterated the
allegations in his Complaint;[7] (2) the Certification, dated 13
April 1989, by the Health Department of Cebu City, on the
recording of the Marriage Contract between respondent
Crasus and Fely in the Register of Deeds, such marriage
celebration taking place on 16 December 1961;[8] and (3) the
invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son,
wherein Fely openly used her American husband’s surname,
Micklus.[9]    That such incapacity was already there at the time of
          Fely’s counsel filed a Notice,[10] and, later on, a Motion,
[11] to take the deposition of witnesses, namely, Fely and her
children, Crasus, Jr. and Daphne, upon written
interrogatories, before the consular officers of the Philippines
in New York and California, U.S.A, where the said witnesses
reside.  Despite the Orders[12] and Commissions[13] issued
by the RTC to the Philippine Consuls of New York and
California, U.S.A., to take the depositions of the witnesses
upon written interrogatories, not a single deposition was ever
submitted to the RTC.   Taking into account that it had been
over a year since respondent Crasus had presented his
evidence and that Fely failed to exert effort to have the case
progress, the RTC issued an Order, dated 05 October 1998,
[14] considering Fely to have waived her right to present her
evidence.  The case was thus deemed submitted for decision. 
          Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC
promulgated its Judgment declaring the marriage of
respondent Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio, on the
basis of the following findings –
 The ground bearing defendant’s psychological incapacity
deserves a reasonable consideration.  As observed, plaintiff’s
testimony is decidedly credible.  The Court finds that
defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of
psychological incapacity to comply with her marital duties
such as striving for family unity, observing fidelity, mutual
love, respect, help and support.  From the evidence
presented, plaintiff adequately established that the
defendant practically abandoned him.  She obtained a divorce
decree in the United States of America and married another
man and has establish [sic] another family of her own. 
Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation, wherein he is married to
a wife who is already married to another man in another
country. 
Defendant’s intolerable traits may not have been
apparent or manifest before the marriage, the
FAMILY CODE nonetheless allows the annulment of
the marriage provided that these were eventually
manifested after the wedding.  It appears to be the
case in this instance.
 
Certainly defendant’s posture being an irresponsible
wife erringly reveals her very low regard for that
sacred and inviolable institution of marriage which is
the foundation of human society throughout the
civilized world.  It is quite evident that the defendant
is bereft of the mind, will and heart to comply with
her marital obligations, such incapacity was already
by defendant’s own attitude towards her marriage to
plaintiff.
 
In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is
defendant’s psychological incapacity to comply with
at the time of the marriage in question has been
satisfactorily proven.  The evidence in herein case
establishes the irresponsibility of defendant Fely Ada
Rosal Iyoy, firmly.
 
Going over plaintiff’s testimony which is decidedly
credible, the Court finds that the defendant had
indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of such
psychological incapacity to comply with her marital
obligations.  These are her excessive disposition to
material things over and above the marital stability. 
the marriage in question is shown by defendant’s own
attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff.  And for
these reasons there is a legal ground to declare the
marriage of plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and defendant Fely
Ada Rosal Iyoy null and void ab initio.[15]
  
          Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted
Judgment of the RTC was contrary to law and evidence, filed
an appeal with the Court of Appeals.  The appellate court,
though, in its Decision, dated 30 July 2001, affirmed the
appealed Judgment of the RTC, finding no reversible error
therein.  It even offered additional ratiocination for declaring
the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely null and
void, to wit – 
Defendant secured a divorce from
plaintiff-appellee abroad, has remarried, and is
now permanently residing in the United States. 
Plaintiff-appellee categorically stated this as one
of his reasons for seeking the declaration of
nullity of their marriage…
…
 
Article 26 of the Family Code
provides:
 
“Art. 26.  All marriages solemnized outside
the Philippines in accordance with the laws
in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except those
 prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38.
 
“WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO
CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY
CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER
VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE ALIEN
SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO
REMARRY, THE FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL
LIKEWISE HAVE CAPACITY TO REMARRY
UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW.”
The rationale behind the second paragraph of the
above-quoted provision is to avoid the absurd and
unjust situation of a Filipino citizen still being married
to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse because he or
she has obtained a divorce abroad.  In the case at
bench, the defendant has undoubtedly acquired her
American husband’s citizenship and thus has become
an alien as well.  This Court cannot see why the
benefits of Art. 26 aforequoted can not be extended
to a Filipino citizen whose spouse eventually
embraces another citizenship and thus becomes
herself an alien.
It would be the height of unfairness if, under these
circumstances, plaintiff would still be considered as
married to defendant, given her total incapacity to
honor her marital covenants to the former.  To
condemn plaintiff to remain shackled in a marriage
that in truth and in fact does not exist and to remain
married to a spouse who is incapacitated to discharge
essential marital covenants, is verily to condemn him
to a perpetual disadvantage which this Court finds
abhorrent and will not countenance.  Justice dictates
that plaintiff be given relief by affirming the trial
court’s declaration of the nullity of the marriage of
the parties.[16]  that the intendment of the law has been to confine
 
After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08 March
2002,[17] denied its Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner
Republic filed the instant Petition before this Court, based on
the following arguments/grounds –
I.    Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of
respondent’s wife do not per se constitute
psychological incapacity.
 
II.   The Court of Appeals has decided questions of
substance not in accord with law and
jurisprudence considering that the Court of
Appeals committed serious errors of law in ruling
that Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code is
inapplicable to the case at bar.[18]  the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage;
          In his Comment[19] to the Petition, respondent Crasus
maintained that Fely’s psychological incapacity was clearly
established after a full-blown trial, and that paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines was indeed
applicable to the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely,
because the latter had already become an American citizen.  More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and
He further questioned the personality of petitioner Republic,
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, to institute
the instant Petition, because Article 48 of the Family Code of
the Philippines authorizes the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned to the trial court, not the Solicitor General, to
intervene on behalf of the State, in proceedings for
annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages. 
          After having reviewed the records of this case and the
applicable laws and jurisprudence, this Court finds the instant
Petition to be meritorious. 
I 
The totality of evidence presented during
trial is insufficient to support the finding of
psychological incapacity of Fely. 
Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial
provisions of the Family Code of the Philippines, reads – 
ART. 36.  A marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization. 
Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes
psychological incapacity.  In a series of cases, this Court laid
down guidelines for determining its existence.   
          In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[20] the term psychological
incapacity was defined, thus – 
            “. . . [P]sychological incapacity” should refer to
no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly cognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support.  There is hardly any doubt
the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage.  This
psychological condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated…[21] 
The psychological incapacity must be characterized
by –
(a)              Gravity – It must be grave or serious such
that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in a marriage;
(b)             Juridical Antecedence – It must be rooted
in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although
and
(c)              Incurability – It must be incurable or, even
if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of
the party involved.[22] 
application of Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines
were handed down by this Court in Republic v. Court of
Appeals and Molina,[23] which, although quite lengthy, by its
significance, deserves to be reproduced below – 
   (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of
the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution
and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and
unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an
entire Article on the Family, recognizing it “as the
foundation of the nation.”  It decrees marriage as
legally “inviolable,” thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family
and marriage are to be “protected” by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on
marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
 
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity
must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological - not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that
the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof.  Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application
of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence
may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing
at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage.  nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity.  Such
The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their “I
do's.” The manifestation of the illness need not
be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself
must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
 
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related
to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job…
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure
that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
 
(6) The essential marital obligations must be
those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as
well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must
also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling
or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts…
 
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision
shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the
case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney,
shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. 
The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095.[24] 
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,[25] further clarified
that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent
spouse should be personally examined by a physician or
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of
psychological incapacity, however, must be established by
the totality of the evidence presented during the trial.   
Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned
jurisprudence, this Court finds that the totality of evidence
presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish
the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife Fely;
therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage null
and void under Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines. 
The only substantial evidence presented by respondent
Crasus before the RTC was his testimony, which can be easily
put into question for being self-serving, in the absence of any
other corroborating evidence.  He submitted only two other
pieces of evidence: (1) the Certification on the recording with
the Register of Deeds of the Marriage Contract between
respondent Crasus and Fely, such marriage being celebrated
on 16 December 1961; and (2) the invitation to the wedding
of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used her
American husband’s surname.  Even considering the
admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to respondent
Crasus’s Complaint filed with the RTC, the evidence is not
enough to convince this Court that Fely had such a grave
mental illness that prevented her from assuming the essential
obligations of marriage.   
          It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family
Code of the Philippines contemplates downright incapacity or
inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic
marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she
much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.[26]  obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after
Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married
immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual her American husband in 1985.  In the same Answer, she
alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988.  At
by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen,
incapacity under the said Article.[27]    and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article
15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by
          As has already been stressed by this Court in previous Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition,
cases, Article 36 “is not to be confused with a divorce law that and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad. 
cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and
manifest themselves.  It refers to a serious psychological recognize divorce between Filipino spouses.  Thus, Fely could
illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.  
marriage.  It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of III
the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.”[28]   The Solicitor General is authorized to
intervene, on behalf of the Republic, in
          The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts proceedings for annulment and declaration
that hurt and embarrassed respondent Crasus and the rest of of nullity of marriages. 
the family.  Her hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her
abandonment of respondent Crasus; her marriage to an Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines,
American; and even her flaunting of her American family and respondent Crasus argued that only the prosecuting attorney
her American surname, may indeed be manifestations of her or fiscal assigned to the RTC may intervene on behalf of the
alleged incapacity to comply with her marital obligations; State in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of
nonetheless, the root cause for such was not identified.  If the marriages; hence, the Office of the Solicitor General had no
root cause of the incapacity was not identified, then it cannot personality to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State. 
be satisfactorily established as a psychological or mental Article 48 provides –
defect that is serious or grave; neither could it be proven to
be in existence at the time of celebration of the marriage; nor ART. 48.  In all cases of annulment or
that it is incurable.  While the personal examination of Fely by declaration of absolute nullity of marriage,
a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer mandatory for the the Court shall order the prosecuting
declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on
Family Code of the Philippines, by virtue of this Court’s ruling behalf of the State to take steps to prevent
in Marcos v. Marcos,[29] respondent Crasus must still have collusion between the parties and to take
complied with the requirement laid down in Republic v. Court care that the evidence is not fabricated or
of Appeals and Molina[30] that the root cause of the suppressed. 
incapacity be identified as a psychological illness and that its
incapacitating nature be fully explained.             That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor
General does not bar him or his Office from intervening in
          In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of
validity of the marriage.[31]  No less than the Constitution of marriages. Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the
1987 sets the policy to protect and strengthen the family as Administrative Code of 1987, appoints the Solicitor General
the basic social institution and marriage as the foundation of as the principal law officer and legal defender of the
the family.[32]    Government.[33]  His Office is tasked to represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
II instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation,
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of
of the Philippines is not applicable to the lawyers.  The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute
case at bar.  the law office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge
duties requiring the services of lawyers.[34]  
According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the
Philippines –            The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the
Philippines is to ensure that the interest of the State is
Where a marriage between a represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and
Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing collusion
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter between the parties, or the fabrication or suppression of
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse evidence; and, bearing in mind that the Solicitor General is
capacitating him or her to remarry, the the principal law officer and legal defender of the land, then
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity his intervention in such proceedings could only serve and
to remarry under Philippine law.  contribute to the realization of such intent, rather than
thwart it.   
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special
situation wherein one of the couple getting married is a           Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor
Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the General is authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of
marriage was celebrated.  By its plain and literal the People or the Republic of the Philippines once the case is
interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the brought before this Court or the Court of Appeals.[35]  While
case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal who actively
time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino participates, on behalf of the State, in a proceeding for
citizen.  Although the exact date was not established, Fely annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage before the
RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General takes over when the
case is elevated to the Court of Appeals or this Court.  Since it
shall be eventually responsible for taking the case to the
appellate courts when circumstances demand, then it is only
reasonable and practical that even while the proceeding is
still being held before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor
General can already exercise supervision and control over the
conduct of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal therein to better
guarantee the protection of the interests of the State.  support of their claims within fifteen days from
          In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed
the role of the Solicitor General in several cases for
annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages that were
appealed before it, summarized as follows in the case of
Ancheta v. Ancheta[36] –  court.  After the lapse of the period herein
            In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals
[268 SCRA 198 (1997)], this Court laid down the
guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which concerns
the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
State:
 
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state.  No decision
shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition.  The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney,
shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case
is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court.  The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095. [Id., at 213]
 
This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin
[355 SCRA 285 (2001)] reiterated its
pronouncement in Republic v. Court of Appeals
[Supra.] regarding the role of the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the State…[37]  fifteen days from notice of denial of the motion
          Finally, the issuance of this Court of the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages,[38] which became effective on 15
March 2003, should dispel any other doubts of
respondent Crasus as to the authority of the
Solicitor General to file the instant Petition on
behalf of the State.  The Rule recognizes the
authority of the Solicitor General to intervene
and take part in the proceedings for annulment
and declaration of nullity of marriages before
the RTC and on appeal to higher courts.  The
pertinent provisions of the said Rule are
reproduced below –  this is one of those situations where neither law nor society
Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition. –  
…
 
(4) It shall be filed in six copies.  The petitioner
shall serve a copy of the petition on the Office
of the Solicitor General and the Office of the
City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days
from the date of its filing and submit to the
court proof of such service within the same
period.
…
 
Sec. 18.  Memoranda. – The court may require
the parties and the public prosecutor, in
consultation with the Office of the Solicitor
General, to file their respective memoranda in
the date the trial is terminated.  It may require
the Office of the Solicitor General to file its own
memorandum if the case is of significant
interest to the State.  No other pleadings or
papers may be submitted without leave of
provided, the case will be considered
submitted for decision, with or without the
memoranda. 
 
Sec. 19.  Decision. – 
…
 
(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General
and the public prosecutor, shall be served with
copies of the decision personally or by
registered mail.  If the respondent summoned
by publication failed to appear in the action,
the dispositive part of the decision shall be
published once in a newspaper of general
circulation.
 
(3) The decision becomes final upon the
expiration of fifteen days from notice to the
parties.  Entry of judgment shall be made if no
motion for reconsideration or new trial, or
appeal is filed by any of the parties, the public
prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.
… 
 
Sec. 20.  Appeal. – 
…
 
(2) Notice of Appeal. – An aggrieved party or
the Solicitor General may appeal from the
decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within
for reconsideration or new trial.  The appellant
shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal on
the adverse parties. 
          Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion
contrary to those of the RTC and the Court of Appeals, and
sustains the validity and existence of the marriage between
respondent Crasus and Fely.  At most, Fely’s abandonment,
sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give respondent Crasus grounds
to file for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code
of the Philippines, but not for declaration of nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the same Code.  While this Court
commiserates with respondent Crasus for being continuously
shackled to what is now a hopeless and loveless marriage,
can provide the specific answer to every individual problem.
[39]   
          WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539,
dated 30 July 2001, affirming the Judgment of the RTC of
Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No.  CEB-20077,  dated  30
October 1998, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. 
The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-
Iyoy remains valid and subsisting.   Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry. TaDSCA
SO ORDERED.  DECISION
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
[G.R. No. 154380. October 5, 2005.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; STATUTES;
INTERPRETATION THEREOF; STATUTE CONSTRUED
ACCORDING TO ITS SPIRIT AND REASON WHEN ITS EXACT
AND LITERAL IMPORT WOULD SANCTION ABSURDITY AND
INJUSTICE; CASE AT BAR. — Where the interpretation of a
statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the
legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and
reason disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A
statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the
literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its
spirit or intent.
2. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; PARAGRAPH 2, ARTICLE
26; APPLICATION; FILIPINO SPOUSE SHOULD ALSO BE
ALLOWED TO REMARRY IF ALIEN SPOUSE OBTAINS A
DIVORCE. — Taking into consideration the legislative intent
and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving
parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage
were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains as divorce decree.
The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as
if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to
sanction absurdity and injustice. DaIAcC
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ELEMENTS. — We state the twin
elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as
follows: 1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner, and 2. A valid
divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RECKONING POINT IS THE
CITIZENSHIP OF THE PARTIES WHEN DIVORCE IS OBTAINED
ABROAD BY ALIEN SPOUSE CAPACITATING THE LATTER TO
REMARRY; CASE AT BAR. — The reckoning point is not the
citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to
remarry. In this case, when Cipriano's wife was naturalized as
an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has
been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would
have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a
valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin
requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are
both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced"
QUISUMBING, J p:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where
one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a
valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can
the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court
to make a definite ruling on this apparently novel question,
presented as a pure question of law. EDHCSI
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the
Decision 1 dated May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution 2
dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration.
The court a quo had declared that herein respondent
Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry. The fallo of
the impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second
paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code and by reason of the
divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife,
the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the
Philippine Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 3
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as
follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros
M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines
in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son
and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady
Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Cipriano's wife left for the United States bringing
along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano
discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American
citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife
had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain
Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently
live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for
authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the
petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein
petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
sought reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER
ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE 4
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code is not applicable to the instant case because it only
applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper
remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for
annulment or for legal separation. 5 Furthermore, the OSG
argues there is no law that governs respondent's situation.
The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of
judicial determination. 6
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly
applicable to his case but insists that when his naturalized
alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to
remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law
pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. 7
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to
remarry filed before the trial court actually constituted a
petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1,
Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petition — Any person
interested under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute,
executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other
governmental regulation may, before breach or violation
thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial
Court to determine any question of construction or validity
arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties,
thereunder.
xxx xxx xxx
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there
must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be
between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the
party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy;
and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination. 8
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article
26 to a marriage between two Filipino citizens where one
later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree,
and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties
are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts
its duty to protect the institution of marriage while
respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his
capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal
interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for
judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent
remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity
of his second marriage. SCHIcT
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code apply to the case of
respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this
provision had come about in the first place, and what was the
intent of the legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into
law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family
Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof
states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid
in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37,
and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original
Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed
into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code.
A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended,
it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid
in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1),
(4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to
govern the situation presented by the case at hand. It seems
to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.
The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was
solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later
on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and
subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to
remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while
residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings 9 on the
Family Code, the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the
Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to
Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against
those whose spouses are Filipinos who divorce them abroad.
These spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry,
while the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them
abroad can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity
of divorce even for Filipino citizens. For those whose foreign
spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be considered
to be validly divorced here and can re-marry. We propose
that this be deleted and made into law only after more
widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations
showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according
to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code
Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where
the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who,
after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse. AETcSa
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the
1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 10 The Van Dorn case
involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly
obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and
consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry
under Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of
the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign
citizenship by naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of
Quita v. Court of Appeals. 11 In Quita, the parties were, as in
this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife
became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained
a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way
of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized
foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and
can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and
applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving
parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage
were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree.
The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as
if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to
sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of
a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead
to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the
legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and
reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law.
A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the
literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its
spirit or intent. 12
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be
deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2
of Article 26. AHDTIE
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship
at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Cipriano's wife was naturalized as an
American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has
been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would
have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a
valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin
requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are
both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced"
Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSG's theory that the
proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file either a
petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation.
Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this
particular case, not even feasible, considering that the
marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of
validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a
sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie;
hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain
married to the naturalized alien spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent
evidence duly submitted by respondent concerning the
divorce decree and the naturalization of respondent's wife. It
is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it and mere allegation is not evidence. 13
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must
prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an
American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree
can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it
must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it. 14 Such foreign law
must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice
of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged
and proved. 15 Furthermore, respondent must also show that
the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as
specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be
no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to
enter into another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as
amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a
Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had
acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry.
However, considering that in the present petition there is no
sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable
to declare, based on respondent's bare allegations that his
wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had
obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American,
that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such
declaration could only be made properly upon respondent's
submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor. CcAHEI
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines
is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and
Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET
ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ.,
concur.
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of
Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice
Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside the Orders, dated
September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No.
1075-P, issued by respondent Judge, which denied her
Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for
Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of
the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the
United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972;
that, after the marriage, they established their residence in
the Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4,
1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties
were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that
petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to
Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against
petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in
Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal
property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered
to render an accounting of that business, and that private
respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal
property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground
that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the
divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein
respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no
community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below
denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the
ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines
so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The
denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is
interlocutory and is not subject to appeal. certiorari and
Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the
propriety of an interlocutory order of the trial Court.
However, when a grave abuse of discretion was patently
committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously and
whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court in a certiorari
proceeding to exercise its supervisory authority and to
correct the error committed which, in such a case, is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie
since it would be useless and a waste of time to go ahead
with the proceedings. 2 Weconsider the petition filed in this
case within the exception, and we have given it due course.
For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the
parties and their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying
claim on the alleged conjugal property because of the
representation he made in the divorce proceedings before
the American Court that they had no community of property;
that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal
funds, and that respondent's claim is barred by prior
judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued
by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws
of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the
acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if
the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts
of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to
determine whether the property relations between petitioner
and private respondent, after their marriage, were upon
absolute or relative community property, upon complete
separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal
fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had
obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in person
before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained
jurisdiction over private respondent who, giving his address
as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California, authorized
his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree
to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the
understanding that there were neither community property
nor community obligations. 3 As explicitly stated in the Power
of Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of KARP &
GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in
the divorce proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
You are hereby authorized to accept service of
Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my behalf and
do an things necessary and proper to represent me,
without further contesting, subject to the following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of
incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be
adjudicated by the Court.
3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be
adjudicated by the court.
xxx xxx xxx 4
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada
divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree
is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For
instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her
husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in
this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this
jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public
policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in
Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public police and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. 6 In this case, the divorce in
Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from
the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves
the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the
United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from

the bond of matrimony by a court of competent
jurisdiction are to change the existing status or
domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free
them both from the bond. The marriage tie when
thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A
husband without a wife, or a wife without a
husband, is unknown to the law. When the law
provides, in the nature of a penalty. that the guilty
party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the
other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the
former marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no

longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing
to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to
exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not
repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before
said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our

laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private
respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under
Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner
should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect
and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The
latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible
rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is

hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint filed in Civil Case
No. 1075-P of his Court.

Without costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la

Fuente and Patajo, JJ., concur.