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People of the Philippines v. Hon. Judge Palma and Romulo Intia y Morada Primicias v. Municipality of Urdaneta
Case No. 219 Case No. 244
G.R. No. L-44113 (March 31, 1977) G.R. No. L-26702 (October 18, 1979)
Chapter I, Page 2, Footnote No.3 Chapter I, Page 4, Footnote No.14

Private Respondent Romulo, 17 years of age, was charged with vagrancy. Petitioner, while driving his car in the jurisdiction of Urdaneta, was charged
Respondent Judge dismissed the case on the ground that her court “has no with violation of Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, “particularly, for overtaking a truck”.
jurisdiction to take further cognizance of this case” without prejudice to the re-filing Petitioner initiated an action for annulment of said ordinance and prayed for the
thereof in the Juvenile Court, because he believed that jurisdiction over 16 years olds issuance of preliminary injunction for restraining Respondent from enforcing the said
up to under 21 was transferred to the Juvenile Court by the issuance of PD 603 or the ordinance.
Child and Youth Welfare Code, which defines youthful offenders as those over 9
years of age but under 21 at the time of the commission of the offense. ISSUE:
W/N Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, by the Municipality of Urdaneta,
ISSUE: Pangasinan is valid.
W/N the issuance of PD 603 transferred the case of the accused from the
regular courts to the Juvenile Court. HELD:
No. Ordinance No. 3 is said to be patterned after and based on Section 53 of
HELD: Act No. 3992. However, Act No. 3992 has been explicitly repealed by RA No. 4136
The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court expressly confers upon it a special (The Land and Transportation Code). By this express repeal, the general rule is that a
and limited jurisdiction over “criminal cases wherein the accused is under 16 years of later law prevails over an earlier law. Also, an essential requisite for a valid ordinance
age at the time of the filing of the case”. The subsequent issuance of PD 603 known is that it “must not contravene … the statute” for it is fundamental principle that
as the Child and Youth Welfare Code and defines a youth offender as “one who is municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state.
over 9 years of age but under 21 at the time of the commission of the offense” did
not by such definition transfer jurisdiction over criminal cases involving accused who LATIN MAXIM:
are 16 and under 21 years of age from the regular courts to the Juvenile Court. 4, 6c, 49


Casco Philippine Chemical Co. Inc., v. Hon. Pedro Gimenez Astorga v. Villegas
Case No. 48 Case No. 23
G.R. No. L-17931 (February 28, 1963) G.R. No. L-23475 (April 30, 1974)
Chapter I, Page 9, Footnote No.31 Chapter I, Page 11, Footnote No.37

Petitioner was engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues. It sought House Bill No. 9266 was passed from the House of Representatives to the
the refund of the margin fees relying on RA 2609 (Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law) Senate. Senator Arturo Tolentino made substantial amendments which were
stating that the Central Bank of the Philippines fixed a uniform margin fee of 25% on approved by the Senate. The House, without notice of said amendments, thereafter
foreign exchange transactions. However, the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in signed its approval until all the presiding officers of both houses certified and attested
audit and approved the said refunds upon the ground that Petitioner’s separate to the bill. The President also signed it and thereupon became RA 4065. Senator
importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions of Sec. 2, Tolentino made a press statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 was a
par. 18 of RA 2609. The pertinent portion of this statute reads: “The margin wrong version of the bill because it did not embody the amendments introduced by
established by the Monetary Board … shall be imposed upon the sale of foreign him and approved by the Senate. Both the Senate President and the President
exchange for the importation of the following: “XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the withdrew their signatures and denounced RA 4065 as invalid. Petitioner argued that
manufacture of plywood and hardwood when imported by and for the exclusive use the authentication of the presiding officers of the Congress is conclusive proof of a
of end-users.” bill’s due enactment.

W/N “urea” and “formaldehyde” are exempt by law from the payment of the W/N House Bill No. 9266 is considered enacted and valid.
margin fee.
HELD: Since both the Senate President and the Chief Executive withdrew their
The term “urea formaldehyde” used in Sec. 2 of RA 2609 refers to the finished signatures therein, the court declared that the bill was not duly enacted and
product as expressed by the National Institute of Science and Technology, and is therefore did not become a law.
distinct and separate from “urea and formaldehyde” which are separate chemicals The Constitution requires that each House shall keep a journal. An importance
used in the manufacture of synthetic resin. The one mentioned in the law is a finished of having a journal is that in the absence of attestation or evidence of the bill’s due
product, while the ones imported by the Petitioner are raw materials. Hence, the enactment, the court may resort to the journals of the Congress to verify such.
importation of “urea” and “formaldehyde” is not exempt from the imposition of the “Where the journal discloses that substantial amendment were introduced and
margin fee. approved and were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President for
signature, the court can declare that the bill has not been duly enacted and did not
LATIN MAXIM: become a law.”
2a, 6c, 25a

Ichong, etc., et al. v. Hernandez, etc., and Sarmiento Municipality of Jose Panganiban v. Shell Co. of the Philippines
Case No. 133 Case No. 181
G.R. No. L-7995 (May 31, 1957) G.R. No. L-25716 (July 28, 1966)
Chapter I, Page 11, Footnote No.42 Chapter I, Page 11, Footnote No.42

Petitioner is a Chinese merchant who questions the constitutionality of RA This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila
1180 “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business” on the following grounds: a) It is a dismissing the Plaintiff’s complaint for the collection of sales taxes from Defendant on
violation of the Equal Protection of the Law Clause, denies them of their liberty, the ground that the law which authorizes collection of the same is unconstitutional.
property and due process of law 2) It is a violation of the constitutional requirement Defendant Company refused to pay taxes accruing from its sales because
that a bill’s title must reflect the subject matter of the same because “regulate” does according to them the taxable sites of the property sought to be taxed is not the said
not really mean “nationalize” and “prohibit” 3) the Act violates International treaties Municipality. According to the Defendant, RA 1435 or Act to Provide Means for
and Laws Increasing Highway Special Fund is unconstitutional because it embraces two
subjects which are 1)amendment of the tax code, and 2) grant of taxing power to
ISSUE: the local government, and makes reference to Road and Bridge Fund.
W/N RA 1180 is constitutional.
HELD: W/N RA 1435 is constitutional.
RA 1180 is constitutional. In the abovementioned case, what has been
pointed out is the constitutional requirement that “A bill shall embrace only one HELD:
subject as expressed in its title.” This is to prohibit duplicity in legislation because the RA 1435 is constitutional because it embraces only one subject reflected by its
title must be able to apprise legislators and the public about the nature, scope, and title “Road and Bridge Fund.” Statutory definition prevails over ordinary usage of the
consequences of that particular law. Constitution precludes the encroaching of one term. The constitutional requirement as to the title of the bill must be liberally
department to the responsibilities of the other departments. The legislature is primarily construed. It should not be technically or narrowly construed as to impede the power
the judge of necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness, and expediency of the of legislation. When there is doubt as to its validity, it must be resolved against the
law, and the courts have no jurisdiction to question this. doubt and in favor of its validity. In the abovementioned cases, what is pointed out is
the constitutional requirement that “A bill shall embrace only one subject, expressed
LATIN MAXIM: in its title.” This is to prohibit duplicity in legislation because the title must be able to
9a, 24a, d apprise legislators and the public about the nature, scope, and consequences of
that particular law.

12a, 37, d

People of the Philippines v. Buenviaje Alalayan v. National Power Corporation

Case No. 203 Case No. 8
G.R. No. L-22945 (March 3, 1925) G.R. No. L-24396 (July 29, 1968)
Chapter I, Page 12, Footnote No.46 Chapter I, Page 12, Footnote No.46

Defendant appeals the ruling of the trial court finding her guilty for the Republic Act No. 3043 is entitled “An Act to Further Amend Commonwealth
violation of “illegal practice of medicine” and “illegally advertising oneself as a Act No. 121”. In Section 3 of the same act, Respondent is empowered, in any
doctor.” Defendant practices chiropractic although she has not secured a franchise contract for the supply of electric power constituting 50% of the electric
certificate to practice medicine. She ‘treated and manipulated’ the head and body power and energy of that franchisee, to realize a net profit of not more than 12%
of Regino Noble. She also contends that practice of chiropractic has nothing to do annually of its investments plus 2-month operating expenses; and NPC is allowed to
with medicine and that unauthorized use of title of “doctor” should be understood to renew all existing franchise contracts so that the provisions of the act could be given
refer to “doctor of medicine” and not to doctors of chiropractic, and lastly, that Act effect.
3111 is unconstitutional as it does not express its subject.
ISSUE: W/N Section 3 is a subject which the bill title “An Act to Further Amend
W/N “chiropractic” is included in the term “practice of medicine” under Commonwealth Act No. 121” does not embrace, thus making it a rider because it is
Medical laws provided in the Revised Administrative Code. violative of the constitutional provision requiring that “a bill, which may be enacted
into law, cannot embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its
HELD: title.”
Act 3111 is constitutional as the title “An Act to Amend (enumeration of
sections to be amended)” is sufficient and it need not include the subject matter of HELD:
each section. ‘Chiropractic’ is included in the ‘practice of medicine.’ Statutory Section 3 is constitutional.
definition prevails over ordinary usage of the term. The constitutional requirement as Republic Act 3043 is an amendatory act. It is sufficient that the title makes
to the title of the bill must be liberally construed. It should not be technically or reference to the legislation to be amended (in this case Commonwealth Act 121).
narrowly construed as to impede the power of legislation. When there is doubt as to Constitutional provision is satisfied if title is comprehensive enough to include the
its validity, it must be resolved against the doubt and in favor of its validity. “A bill shall general object which the statute seeks to effect without expressing each and every
embrace only one subject, expressed in its title,” to prohibit duplicity in legislation by ends and means necessary for its accomplishment. Title doesn’t need to be a
apprising legislators and the public about the nature, scope, and consequences of complete index of the contents of the act.
the law.
LATIN MAXIM: 24a, 37, d
2a, 7a, 25c, 37, d

Cordero v. Hon. Cabatuando Tobias v. Abalos

Case No. 81 Case No. 291
G.R. No. L-14542 (October 31, 1962) G.R. No. L-114783 (December 8, 1994)
Chapter I, Page 12, Footnote No.47 Chapter I, Page 12, Footnote No.47

Republic Act No. 1199 is the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise
Section 54 of this act expressed that indigent tenants should be represented by known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly
Public Defendant of Department of Labor. Congress then amended this in Republic Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong” because Article VIII,
Act No. 2263: “An Act Amending Certain Sections of Republic Act No. 1199.” Section Section 49 of this act provided that the congressional district of San Juan/
19 of the amendatory act says that mediation of tenancy disputes falls under Mandaluyong shall be split into two separate districts.
authority of Secretary of Justice. Section 20 also provides that indigent tenants shall
be represented by trial attorney of the Tenancy Mediation Commission. ISSUE:
W/N the aforestated subject is germane to the subject matter of R.A. No.
ISSUE: 7675.
W/N Sections 19 and 20 of Rep. Act No. 2263 is unconstitutional because of
the constitutional provision that “No bill which may be enacted into law shall HELD:
embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.” RA 7675 is constitutional.
Contrary to Petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional
HELD: district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its
Sections 19 and 20 are constitutional. conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its
The constitutional requirement is complied with as long the law has a single conversion into a highly urbanized city
general subject, which is the Agricultural Tenancy Act, and the amendatory Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been
provisions no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation. The
with or foreign to the general subject, will be regarded as valid. Constitutional Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment,
provisions relating to subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and
construed as to cripple or impede proper legislation. the minute details therein.


24a, 37, d 20a, d

Ayson and Ignacio v. Provincial Board of Rizal Lidasan v. Commission on Elections

Case No. 11 Case No. 148
G.R. No. 14019 (July 26, 1919) G.R. No. L-28089 (October 25, 1967)
Chapter I, Page 13, Footnote No.51

The municipal council of Navotas, Rizal adopted its Ordinance No. 13, section Petitioner challenged Republic Act 4790, which is entitled “An Act Creating
2 of which provided that “all owners and proprietors of the industry known as fishing, the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur” as unconstitutional on
with nets denominated ‘cuakit’ and ‘pantukos,’ before engaging in fishing in the bay the ground that it includes barrios located in another province, which is Cotabato,
of this jurisdiction within three leagues from the shore-line of this municipality, are violating the constitutional mandate that “No bill which may be enacted into law
obliged to provide themselves with a license issued by this municipal government, shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.”
after payment of a fee of P50 annually, payable every three months.” The authority This question was initially presented to the Respondents, which adopted a resolution
for the enactment of the ordinance was from section 2270 of the Administrative in favor of RA 4790, prompted by the upcoming elections.
ISSUE: W/N Republic Act 4790 is constitutional.
W/N Section 2270 of the Administrative Code of 1916, now Section 2324 of the
Administrative Code of 1917, is invalid. HELD:
Republic Act 4790 is null and void. The title “An Act Creating the Municipality
HELD: of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur” projects the impression that solely the
Section 2270 of the Administrative Code of 1916, now section 2323 of the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest
Administrative Code of 1917 is valid. It does not violate Paragraph 17, section 5 of intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are
the Philippine Bill which provided “that no private or local bill which may be enacted incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase “in the Province of Lanao
into law shall embrace more than one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in del Sur” makes the title misleading and deceptive. The title did not inform the
the title of the bill” because the Administrative Code is neither a private nor a local members of the Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the
bill. people in the towns of Cotabato that were affected by the law, and the province of
The Administrative Code of 1917 has for its title, “An Act amending the Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and
Administrative Code.” It does not violate Paragraph 17, section 3 of the Jones Law, provinces and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in
which provided “that no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill. These
than one subject and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill,” because are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of Republic Act
it was merely a revision of the provisions of the Administrative Code enacted for the 4790.
purpose of adapting it to the Jones Law and the Reorganization Act.

Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Reyes People of the Philippines v. Ferrer
Case No. 169 Case No. 208
G.R. No. 43263 (October 31, 1935) G.R. No. L-32613-14 (December 27, 1972)
Chapter I, Page 13, Footnote No. 53 Chapter I, Page 13, Footnote No.50

Respondent executed a chattel mortgage in favor of Petitioner. He failed to Private Respondents were respectively charged with a violation of Republic
pay some of the installments. Petitioner proceeded to foreclose its chattel mortgage. Act No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Act. RA 1700 outlaws the
The mortgaged property was sold at a public auction by the sheriff of the City of Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and other “subversive associations” and
Manila. After applying this sum, with interest, costs, and liquidated damages to punishes any person who “knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliates himself with,
Respondent’s indebtedness, the latter owed the company a balance of P275.47 with becomes or remains a member” of the CPP or any other organization “subversive” in
interest. The company instituted an action for recovery when he failed to pay the nature. Tayag filed a motion challenging the validity of the statute due to its
deficiency of the debt. He pleaded as a defense that the company, having chosen constitutional violations. The lower court declared the statute void on the grounds
to foreclose its chattel mortgage, had no further action against him for the recovery that it was a bill of attainder and that it is vague and overbroad. The cases were
of the unpaid balance owed by him, as provided by Act No. 4122. dismissed, to which the Government appealed.

W/N Act No. 4122, entitled “An Act to amend the Civil Code by inserting W/N the title of the act satisfies the constitutional provision on bill titles.
between Sections fourteen hundred and fifty-four and fourteen hundred and fifty-five
thereof a new section, to be known as section fourteen hundred and fifty-four-A,” is HELD:
valid. Yes. The title of the bill need not be a catalogue or an index of its contents,
and need not recite the details of the Act. It is a valid title if it indicates in clear terms
HELD: the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. A
Act No. 4122 is valid and enforceable. The controlling purpose of Act No. narrow and technical construction is to be avoided, and the statute will be read fairly
4122 is revealed to be to close the door to abuses committed in connection with the and reasonably in order not to thwart the legislative intent. The Anti-Subversion act
foreclosure of chattel mortgages when sales were payable in installments. fully satisfies these requirements.
The general rule is adopted in this jurisdiction to the effect that a title which
declares a statute to be an act to amend a specified code is sufficient and the LATIN MAXIM:
precise nature of the amendatory act need not be further stated. The proper 9a, 9d, 51d
approach in cases of this character should be to resolve all presumptions in favor of
the validity of an act in the absence of a clear conflict between it and the

9a, 37

Del Rosario v. Carbonell, et al. People of the Philippines v. Valeriano Valensoy y Masa
Case No. 33 Case No. 230
G.R. No. L-32476 (October 20, 1970) G.R. No. L-9659 (May 29, 1957)
Chapter I, Page 14, Footnote No. 55

Petitioner questions the constitutionality of RA 6132. The said Act purportedly Defendant was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila for violation of
encompasses more than one subject for the title of the Act allegedly fails to include Section 26 of Act No. 1780 by concealment of a bolo. The defendant moved to
the phrase “TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES.” quash the information on the ground that the title of the act, which was “an Act to
The statute plainly reads: “An Act Implementing Resolution to Both Houses Numbered regulate the importation, acquisition, possession, use, and transfer of firearms, and to
Two as Amended by Resolution of Both Houses Numbered Four of the Congress of the prohibit the possession of same except in compliance with the provisions of this Act,”
Philippines Calling for a Constitutional Convention, Providing for Proportional did not include weapons other than firearms, and that Section 26 violated the
Representation Therein and Other Details Relating to the Election of Delegates to and constitutional provision that “no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace
the Holding of the Constitutional Convention, Repealing for the Purpose Republic Act more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.”
Four Thousand Nine Hundred Fourteen, and for Other Purposes.”
ISSUE: 1. W/N Act No. 1780 violated the one subject-one title rule
W/N RA 6132 is unconstitutional for embracing more than one subject. 2. W/N it was inconsistent with the Constitution.

No. The inclusion of the title is superfluous and therefore unnecessary because No. At the time of the enactment of Act No. 1780 on October 12, 1907, the
the title expressly indicates that the act implements Resolutions on both Houses Nos. 2 one subject-one title rule referred to private and local bills only, and to bills to be
and 4 respectively of 1967 and 1969, and both Resolutions No. 2 and 4 likewise enacted into a law and not to law that was already in force and existing at the time
categorically state in their titles that the Constitutional Convention called for therein is the 1935 Constitution took effect. The provision of Section 26 germane to the subject
“to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines,” which phrase is expressed in the title of the Act remained operative because it was not inconsistent
reiterated in Sec. 1 of both Resolutions. with the Constitution, pursuant to Section 2 of Article XVI of the 1935 Constitution.
The power to propose amendments to the Constitution is implied in the call
for the convention itself, whose raison d’etre is to revise the present Constitution. It is LATIN MAXIM:
not required that the title of the bill be an index to the body of the act or be 30a, 36a, 46a, 50
comprehensive in matters of detail. It is enough that it fairly indicates the general
subject and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act so as not to mislead
Congress or the people. All the details provided for in RA 6132 are germane to and
are comprehended by its title.

9a, 9d, 51d

People of the Philippines v. Apolonio Carlos People of the Philippines v. Leoncio Lim
Case No. 204 Case No. 210
G.R. No. L-239 (June 30, 1947) G.R. No. L-14432 (July 26, 1960)
Chapter I, Page 16, Footnote No.63 Chapter I, Page 19, Footnote No.83

The People’s Court found the Appellant, guilty of treason. Appellant attacked In March 1954, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources pursuant to
the constitutionality of the People’s Court Act on the ground that it contained the authority granted him by Sections 3 and 4 of Act No. 4003 (Fisheries Act) issued
provisions which deal on matters entirely foreign to the subject matter expressed in its Fisheries Administrative Order No. 37. Section 2 of said order prohibits trawl fishing in
title, such as: (1) a provision which retains the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance; certain areas in Samar. FAO No. 37 was subsequently amended with FAO No. 37–1.
(2) a provision which adds to the disqualification of Justices of the Supreme Court Leoncio Lim, the accused in violation of said order, challenged its legality on the
and provides a procedure for their substitution; (3) a provision which changed the ground that FAO No. 37–1 was contrary to Act No. 4003, the former having no fixed
existing Rules of Court on the subject of bail, and (4) a provision which suspends period and thus establishing a ban for all time while the latter stating that prohibition
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. “was for any single period of time not exceeding five years’ duration.”

W/N the People’s Court Act was unconstitutional. W/N Section 2 of FAO No. 37–1 was invalid.

No. The People’s Court was intended to be a full and complete scheme with Section 2 of FAO No. 37–1 was valid. Although FAO No. 37–1 was defective
its own machinery for the indictment, trial and judgment of treason cases. The because it failed to specify a period for the ban, it was ruled that in case of
provisions mentioned were allied and germane to the subject matter and purposes discrepancy between a basic law and a rule issued to implement it, the basic law
of the People’s Court Act. The Congress is not expected to make the title of an prevails because the rule cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the law. FAO
enactment a complete index of its contents. The constitutional rule is satisfied if all No. 37–1 would be inoperative in so far as it exceeded the period of five years for any
parts of a law relate to the subject expressed in its title. single period of time, but it was not necessarily rendered void by the omission.


9a 37, 38a

KMU Labor Center v. Garcia Jr. Hijo Plantation, Inc. v. Central Bank
Case No. 68 Case No. 57
G.R. No. 115381 (December 23, 1994) G.R. No. L-34526 (August 9, 1988)

DOTC Memorandum Order No. 90-395 was filed asking the LTFRB to allow Congress approved RA No. 6125 entitled “An act imposing STABILIZATION TAX
provincial bus operators to charge passengers rates within a range of 15% above ON CONSIGNMENTS ABROAD TO ACCELERATE THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE
and below the LTFRB official rate for a period of one year. LTFRB issued Memorandum PHILIPPINES FOR OTHER PURPOSES” Petitioners expected to pay 4% of the aggregate
Circular No.92-009 allowing for a range of plus 20% and minus 25% of the prescribed value from July 1, 1972- June 30, 1973, as provided in the Act. The Central bank
fares. PBOAP, without a public hearing and permission from LTFRB, availed of the released Monetary Resolution No. 1995 which states that: For exports of bananas
deregulatory policy and announced 20% increase in existing fares. Petitioner filed a shipped during the period from January 1, 1972- June 30, 1972; the stabilization tax
petition opposing the increase in fares. SC issued a temporary restraining order to shall be at the rate of 6%. For exports of bananas shipped during the period from July
prevent PBOAP from implementing fare increase. 1, 1972 to June 30, 1973; the stabilization tax shall be at the rate of 4%. For exports of
bananas shipped during the period from July 1, 1973- June 30, 1974; the stabilization
ISSUES: tax shall be at the rate of 2%.
1. W/N authority given by LTFRB to PBOAP to increase prices at 20% instead of 15% is
unconstitutional on the ground that there was no filing for a petition of purpose in the ISSUE:
said increase. W/N Central bank acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
2. W/N PBOAP proved that there was a public necessity for the increase thus violating jurisdiction when it issued Monetary Board Resolution No. 1995.
the Public Service Act and Rules of the Court.
HELD: Central Bank acted with grave abuse of discretion. In case of discrepancy
1. LTFRB did not have authority to delegate its powers to PBOAP. between the basic law and the rule or regulation issued to implement the said law,
2. PBOAP was not able to prove and provide such public necessity as reason for the the basic law prevails. The rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms of the basic
fare increase. law.


None 9c

China Banking Corp. v. CA Santos v. Honorable Estenzo

Case No. 59 Case No. 140
G.R. No. 121158 (December 5, 1996) G.R. No. L-14740 (September 26, 1960)
Chapter I, Page 19, Footnote No.84

Petitioner extended loans to Native West Corp. and its president, So Ching, in The decedent is a driver for People’s Land Transportation Company, of which
return for promissory notes to pay the loans. Two extra mortgages were additionally Petitioners are manager and proprietor. The Workmen’s Compensation Commission
executed by So Ching and his wife on July and August 1989. The loans matured but awarded the decedent’s widow the amount of P3,494.40, plus burial expenses not
So Ching was not able to repay the said loans. This caused Petitioner to file for extra exceeding P200. After 5 years, Respondent, in a civil case filed by the mother of the
judicial foreclosures of the two mortgaged properties. The properties were to be decedent, ordered Petitioners to pay the award plus P500 as attorney’s fees for
sold/auctioned on April 3, 1993. On April 28, 1989 the court ruled on the side of So failure to comply. Petitioners pray that the decision be annulled or modified based
Ching. The issuance of the preliminary injunction was granted; therefore the sale of on Section 1 Rule 11 the Rules of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission and
the two mortgaged properties was stopped. Petitioner sought for reconsideration prays further that the P500 in atty’s fees exceeded the allowed fees according to
and elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. They were appealing that Act No. Sec.6 Rule 26 of the said Rules.
3135 was the governing rule in their case, instead of Administrative Order No. 3 as So
Ching was contending. ISSUE:
1. W/N the Rules of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission amended R.A. No.
ISSUE: 772 and as a result deprived the court of its jurisdiction over the case.
1. W/N Petitioner can extra-judicially foreclose the properties. 2. W/N the court committed a grave abuse of discretion in awarding the P500 in
2. W/N Administrative Order No. 3 should govern the extra judicial foreclosure. attorney’s fees.

1. Petitioner can foreclose the properties. Petition was dismissed.
2. Act No. 3135 is the governing law. Administrative Order No. 3 cannot prevail over 1. The Commission, or any of its rules, cannot amend an act of Congress.
Act 3135. It is an elementary principle that a stature is superior to an administrative Furthermore, the Rule was promulgated more than 2 years after the court had
directive. Thus, the statute cannot be repealed or amended by the administrative acquired jurisdiction over the main case.
directive. 2. The court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in awarding the P500 since the
said rule only applies to the Commission and not the Court.
30, 35, 46a

Grego v. Commission on Elections Santos v. Municipal of Caloocan

Case No. 120 Case No. 141
G.R. No. 125955 (June 19, 1997) G.R. No. L-15807 (April 22, 1963)
Chapter I, Page 23, Footnote No.98

One of the Respondents was elected for his 3 and final term as councilor of the Respondent issued Ordinance No. 24 charging slaughterhouses in the
2nd District of Manila. His qualifications are being questioned by herein Petitioner, who is municipality certain fees including “slaughterhouse fees,” “meat inspection fees,”
also asking for the suspension of his proclamation. Petitioner brings into consideration “corral fees,” “and internal organ fees,” pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 655.
the fact that Respondent was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff upon finding Petitioners questioned the validity or said Ordinance.
of serious misconduct in an administrative case held on October 31, 1981. Petitioner
argues that Respondent should be disqualified under Section 40(b) of the Local ISSUE:
Government Code. Petitioner further argues that the Local Government Code should W/N Respondent, in the issuance of Ordinance No. 24, exceeded the limits of its
be applied retroactively. jurisdiction provided by Commonwealth Act 655.

W/N or not the Section 40 of the Local Government Code should be applied Respondent exceeded its jurisdiction in the issuance of the said ordinance. The
retroactively due to its wording. Commonwealth Act only allowed Respondent to charge slaughterhouse fees. When
Respondent ordained the payment of other said fees, it overstepped the limits of its
HELD: statutory grant. The only other fees that would be acceptable were veterinary or
Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code should not be applied sanitary inspection fees since it was mentioned in the statute. Incidentally, the court
retroactively. It is understood that statutes are not to be construed as intended to have ordered Respondent to refund the fees with the exception of “slaughterhouse fees.”
a retroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings, unless such intent is expressly One of the rules of statutory construction is that “certain sections or parts of sections of
declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the language of the enactment. The an ordinance may be held invalid without affecting the validity of what remains, if the
fact that the provision of the Code in question does not qualify the date of a parts are not so interblended and dependent that the vice of one necessarily vitiates
candidate’s removal and that it is couched in the past tense should not deter the court the others.”
from applying the law prospectively.
The term to be looked at in the issue is REINSTATEMENT, which has a technical LATIN MAXIM:
meaning, referring only to an appointive position. Since Respondent was reelected, this 15a, 37
does not fall under the scope of the term.

25a, 46c

National Housing Authority v. Reyes Francisco Lao Lim v. CA and Benito Villavicencio Dy
Case No. 85 Case No. 73
G.R. No. 49439 (June 29, 1983) G.R. No. 87047 (October 31, 1990)

Private Respondents owned a parcel of land of 25,000 sq/rn, subject of an Private Respondent entered into a contract of lease with Petitioner for a
expropriation proceedings granted by the court in favor NHA. Respondents claimed period of 3 years. After it expired, Private Respondent refused to vacate the premises,
they should be paid the assessed value of P6,600.00 pursuant to PD 42. Petitioner and hence, the filing of an ejectment suit against the Respondent. The case was
opposed the payment claiming that it was too excessive. He cited PD 464 which terminated by a compromise agreement, and the lease continued from 1979 to
provides just compensation not to exceed the market value declared by the owner 1982, then from 1982 to 1985. The Petitioner filed another ejectment suit. The trial court
in the amount of P1,400.00. Respondent Judge granted the payment of P6,600.00, dismissed the complaint on the grounds that (1) the lease contract has not expired;
but Petitioner had opposed it pursuant to PD 1224 which states that the government and (2) the compromise agreement entered into constitutes res judicata. Petitioner
shall choose between the value of real property as declared by the owner x x x or appealed to the RTC of Manila and then to the CA which also affirmed the decision
the market value determined by the City or Provincial Assessor, whichever is lower. of the trial court.

W/N PD 464 as amended by PD 1224 determines the valuation on just 1. W/N the continuance of lease is made to depend upon the will of the lessee?
compensation. 2. W/N the action for ejectment is barred by compromise agreement on res
Courts accord the presumption of validity to executive acts and legislative HELD:
enactments, x x x because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution x This is untenable because the continuance of lease is not dependent upon
x x. The Respondent Judge should have followed just compensation in expropriation the will of the lessee. On the compromise agreement, the lease is not for perpetual
cases, that the lower value made by the landowner should be the basis for fixing the renewals unless the language employed indicates that it was the intention of the
price. The petition for Certiorari is granted. parties.
On the second issue, the compromise agreement does not apply because
LATIN MAXIM: the present case requires a different set of evidence. The compromise agreement
37 does not foreclose any cause of action arising from a violation of the terms thereof,
and hence, res judicata does not apply.

1, 11a, 26,

Hon. Alfredo S. Lim v. Felipe G. Pacquing; Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union
Case No. 74 Case No. 169
G.R. No. 115044 (January 27, 1995) G.R. No. L-25246 (September 12, 1974)

Executive Order No. 392 was issued transferring the authority to regulate Jai- Petitioner, an “Iglesia ni Cristo”, was a member of the Respondent Union
Alai from local governments to the Games and Amusements Board (GAB). The City of which had with their Company a collective bargaining agreement containing a
Manila passed an Ordinance No. 7065 authorizing the mayor to allow the Associated closed shop provision allowed under R.A. 875: “Membership in the Union shall be
Development Corporation (ADC) to operate a JAI-ALAI. Then President Marcos required as a condition of employment for all permanent employees workers
issued a PD 771 revoking all powers and authority of local governments to grant covered by this Agreement “
franchise, license or permit, to Jai-Alai and other forms of gambling. Then President RA 3350 amended RA 875: “but such agreement shall not cover members of
Aquino issued an E.O. No. 169 expressly repealing PD. No. 810 which revokes and any religious sect which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor
cancels the franchise granted to the Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporation. organization.” Petitioner resigned from Respondent Union, which wrote a formal letter
In 1998, ADC tried to operate a Jai-Alai, but the Games and Amusement Board to the Company asking to separate the Petitioner from service.
intervened and invoked P.D. 771 which expressly revoked all existing franchises and
permits to operate all forms of gambling issued by local governments. ISSUE:
1. W/N RA 3350 violates right to form or join association?
ISSUE: 2. W/N RA 3350 is constitutional?
1. W/N the franchise granted by the City of Manila to ADC is valid in view of E. 0. 3. W/N the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion when ruling that
No. 392 which transferred from local governments to the GAB the power to the Union should pay 500 and attorney’s fee.
regulate Jai-Alai.
2. W/N the ADC is correct in assailing that P.D. 771 is violative of equal HELD:
protection and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution. The right to join associations includes the right not to join or to resign from a
labor organization. Section 1 960 of Art III of the 1935 Constitution, as well as Section 7
HELD: of Art IV of the 1973 Constitution, provide that the right to form associations for
R.A. 409 provides that Congress did not delegate to the City of Manila the purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
power “to franchise” the operation of Jai-Alai. And E.O. 392 removes the power of Article 2208 of the Civil Code provides that attorney’s fees and expenses of
local governments to issue license and permit. litigation may be awarded “when the defendant’s act has compelled the Plaintiff to
All laws are presumed valid and constitutional. PD 771 was not repealed or incur expenses to protect his interest” and “in any other case where the court deems
amended by any subsequent law. It did not violate the equal protection clause of it just and equitable that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation should be
the Constitution because the said decree had revoked all franchises issued by the recovered”.
local governments without exceptions.
LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 40b
5a, 6c, 37, 44, 50

Tañada v. Tuvera Gutierrez v. Carpio

Case No. 287 Case No. 55
G.R. No. L-63915 (December 29, 1986) G.R. No. 31025 (August 15, 1929)
Chapter I, Page 37, Footnote No.159

Due process was invoked by the Petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a The Litigants here compromised a civil case on July 13, 1928, agreeing that if
number of Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as within a month from the date thereof the Plaintiffs failed to repurchase a certain
required by law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a land, the ownership would vest in the Defendants. But when the Plaintiffs duly
rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise provided” as when the decrees themselves tendered the amount, the Defendants appealed that by that time, August 13, 1928,
declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. the time when the Plaintiffs tendered it, the stipulated or fixed period had already
W/N the clause “otherwise provided” in Article 2 of Civil Code pertains to the ISSUE:
necessity of publication. W/N the stipulated period elapsed on the time of tendering.

No, the clause “otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not No. The repurchase of the land was made within the stipulated period. The
to the requirement of publication per se, which cannot in any event be omitted. above issue depends upon the kind of month agreed upon by the parties, and on
Publication in full should be indispensable. Without such notice or publication, the day from which it should be counted. Article 7 of the Civil Code had been
there would be no basis for the application of the maxim “ignorantia Legis non modified by Sec. 13 of the Administrative Code, according to which “month” now
excusat”. The court, therefore, declares that presidential issuances of general means the civil month and not the regular-30-day month. In computing any fixed
application which have not been published shall have no force and effect, and the period of time, with reference to the performance of an act required by law or
court ordered that the unpublished decrees be published in the Official Gazette contract to be done within a certain limit of time, the day from which the time is
immediately. reckoned is to be excluded and the date of performance included, unless otherwise
provided. There is nothing in the agreement providing otherwise.
2a, 39a

Guzman v. Lichauco U.S. v. Paniaga

Case No. 56 Case No. 161
G.R. No. L-17986 (October 21, 1921) G.R. No. 8223 (March 4, 1914)

Plaintiff filed two actions of unlawful detainer to recover possession of certain
properties in Manila. The trial court decided in favor of the Plaintiff. The unsuccessful This is an appeal by the government from an order of the court, setting aside
Defendants having appealed in both cases on Dec. 9, 1920 to the Court of First the forfeiture of a bail bond. Judgment was rendered against the principal on
Instance of Manila, it is their duty to conform with the provisions of Sec. 88 of the CCP, February 7, and the sureties were notified on the same day to produce the thereof
as amended by Act No. 2588, in case they desire to avoid the immediate execution their principal. On Feb 28, the court ordered that the Defendant’s bond be forfeited
of the judgment pending the appeal, to pay the Plaintiff, or to deposit in court, “on or and the execution issued against the principal and the sureties for the amount
before the TENTH day of each Calendar month”, the sums of money fixed by the thereof, and that an alias warrant be issued for the arrest of the Defendant. By
Justice of the Peace as the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the various orders of the court, the sale was postponed from time to time, and finally
property held by them. The Defendants made such dilatory payments however they occurred on July 8, 1912, with government as the purchaser. On July 10, 1912, the
failed to make such payments on or before the tenth day of the month. As a result, principal was arrested. On July 13, 1912, the court, on application of the sureties, set
the Plaintiff moved the court to execute the judgments. The court ordered the aside the order of forfeiting the bond, and ordered the sheriff to annul the sale.
immediate execution of the judgment.
ISSUE: W/N the execution sale occurred on the date directed by the court.
W/N the payments were made on or before the Tenth day of each month.
HELD: Sec. 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: “unless otherwise specially
The payment made on August 11, 1921 was one day late. The term “month” provided, the time within which an act is required by law to be done shall be
must now be understood to refer to calendar month, inasmuch as Sec 13 of the computed by excluding the first day and including the last; if the last be a Sunday or
Administrative Code has modified Art. 7 of the civil code in so far as the latter fixes a legal holiday, it shall be excluded.” This section is only applicable if there is a
the length of a month at thirty days. computation needed to be done. However, in this case, there is no necessity for such
computation for the date is fixed for when the act be performed. It is also directed
LATIN MAXIM: that the sale should take place on a named future date. The sale here of the
25a, 25c property must stand.


PNB v. CA Hidalgo v. Hidalgo

Case No. 238 Case No. 124
G.R. No. 98382 (May 17, 1993) G.R. No. L-25326 (May 29, 1970) and G.R. No. L-25327 (May 29, 1970)
Chapter I, Page 47, Footnote No.195 Chapter II, Page 52, Footnote No.19

To secure payments of his loans, Private Respondent mortgages two lots to Petitioners pray to Agrarian Court to be entitled as share tenants to redeem
Petitioner bank. For failure to pay the obligation, Petitioner bank extrajudicially parcel of land they are working from the purchasers where no notice was previously
foreclosed the mortgaged property and won the highest bidder at the auction sale. given to them by the vendor of the latter’s intention to sell the property and where
Then, a final deed of sale was registered in the Buacan Registry of Property in favor of the vendor did not execute the affidavit required by Sec. 13 of the Agricultural Land
the Petitioner bank and later sold the said lots to a third party. Reform Code before the registration of the deed of sale. Agrarian Court dismissed
The notices of sale of Appellant’s foreclosed properties were published on petitions, stating that the right of redemption granted by Sec. 12 of the same code is
March 28, April 11 and April 12, 1969 issues of the newspaper Daily Record”. The date only for leasehold tenants and not for share tenants, claiming that share tenancy and
March 28, 1969 falls on a Friday, while the dates April 11 and 12 fall on a Friday and leasehold tenancy are within the jurisdiction of the code – that the code expressly
Saturday, respectively. Section 3 of Act No. 3135 requires that the notice of auction grants said right to leaseholders only and nobody else. Moreover, the court held that
sale shall be “published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks”. if the intention of Congress was to extend the right of redemption to share tenants
through judicial legislation, the section would have expressly said so.
W/N the Petitioner bank complied with the requirements of weekly ISSUE:
publication of notice of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages. W/N not the right of redemption granted by Sec. 12 of the Agrarian Reform
Code addresses only leaseholders and not share tenants.
It must be conceded that that Article 13 is completely silent as to the HELD:
definition of what is “week”. In Concepcion v. Andueta, the term “week” was Agrarian Court fell into several erroneous assumptions and premises, reducing
interpreted to mean as a period of time consisting of seven consecutive days. The “agricultural lessee” to only “leasehold tenants”. The purpose of the Agricultural
Defendant-Appellee bank failed to comply with the legal requirement of publication. Land Reform Code is the abolition of agricultural share tenancy. The policy of the
State is to establish owner cultivatorship. Adherence to the letter would result in
LATIN MAXIM: absurdity, injustice and contradictions and would defeat the plain and vital purpose
1, 9a, 9b of the statute.

9a, 9c, 11a, 12a, 36a, 37, 40a
Maxims invoked by lower court: 6c, 30b, 43

U.S. v. Navarro Litex Employees Association v. Eduvala

Case No. 300 Case No. 149
G.R. No. 6160 (March 21, 1911) G.R. No. L-41106 (September 22, 1977)
Chapter II, Page 52, Footnote No.20 Chapter II, Page 53, Footnote No.22

They made an oath before an election officer in the municipality of Piddig (in Respondent, Officer-in-Charge of Bureau of Labor Relations, required
proceedings in connection with the general election held on Nov. 2, 1909) that they referendum election among Petitioners to ascertain their wishes as to their affiliation
owned real property with the value of P500. Evidence showed that the Appellants, with Federation of Free Workers. Petitioners contended that there was no statutory
except for Daniel Navarro and Genaro Calixtro, did not own property of the assessed authorization for the Respondent to require referendum election and that
value of P500. Respondent and the Bureau were beyond jurisdiction.

W/N the said statute’s true test of property qualification to vote is the W/N there is a statute authorizing Respondents and giving them jurisdiction.
actual/market value of the property owned or the assessed value thereof.
HELD: Article 226 of the Labor Code addresses this. Respondent and the Bureau
It was the intention of the legislator as proved from an examination of the were within jurisdiction. Petition denied. Article 226 of Labor Code is very clear
immediate context of provisions of the statute defining “property qualifications” of a concerning executive department’s “original and exclusive authority to act”.
voter, and of the statute as a whole. In the statute, property qualification is an
alternative to qualification based upon an annual payment. Both qualifications are LATIN MAXIM:
under a single head, suggesting an intimate relation between the two in the mind of 9a, 9c, 20a, 24a
the legislator. Another section of the statute disqualifies people who are delinquent in
the payment of public taxes assessed since Aug. 13, 1898, from voting. This provision
was directed to the case of delinquency in the payment of land taxes as well as all
other taxes. The statute as a whole (as an election law) is intended to secure purity of
the ballot box. If the property qualification is actual/market value, it would be highly
improbable to enforce the statute within a reasonable time because it will be difficult
to determine.

10, 11a, 12a, 28, 36a, 37

Regalado v. Yulo B.E. San Diego Inc. v. CA

Case No. 255 Case No. 26
G.R. No. L-42293 (February 13, 1935) G.R. No. 80223 (February 5, 1993)
Chapter II, Page 55, Footnote No.25 Chapter II, Page 56, Footnote No. 27

Petitioner was Justice of Peace of Malinao, Albay. On November 16, 1931, On March 3, 1986, Petitioner instituted an action in the RTC of Valenzuela
Act No. 3899 which provided for the age retirement among justices was approved. A against Private Respondent De Jesus for recovery of possession of a parcel of land in
few years later, Petitioner became 65 years of age (age retirement as provided by said area. In her defense, De Jesus argued that the land in question was covered by
Sec. 203 of the Administrative Code, amended further by Act. No. 3899). Shortly PD 2016 (a complementary provision of PD 1517, which aims to protect tenants from
thereafter, Esteban T. Villar was appointed as Justice of Peace to take the place of unjust eviction.)
Petitioner. On December 17, 1934, Villar assumed office.
ISSUE: W/N PD 2016 is a valid defense of De Jesus in upholding her rights as a lessee.
W/N under the provisions of Section 203 of the Administrative Code, as further
amended by Act No. 3899, the Justices of Peace and auxiliary justices appointed HELD:
prior to the approval of the Act shall cease to hold office upon reaching the age of PD 2016 is a valid ground for De Jesus in invoking her rights as a tenant. While
65. it may depart from its source, PD 1517, said provision still aims to protect the tenants
from unscrupulous landowners from demanding a steep price for the land, as well as
HELD: unjust eviction.
Justices appointed prior to the approval of the Act will not be affected by
said amendment (Act No. 3899). LATIN MAXIM:
12a, 25a
1, 46a

Araneta v. Dinglasan Endencia and Jugo v. David

Case No. 84 Case No. 98
G.R. No. L-2044 (August 26, 1949) G.R. No. L-6355-56 (August 31, 1953)
Chapter II, Page 56, Footnote No. 29 Chapter II, Page 56, Footnote No.33

Executive Orders, in pursuance of Commonwealth Act No. 671 (Emergency RA 590 declares that no salary received by a public officer shall be
Powers Act), were questioned for its validity until the National Assembly Convention considered exempt from income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be
of 1942 a diminution of his compensation fixed by law. While Art. 8, Sec. 9 of the Constitution
states that judges shall receive compensation as fixed by law, which shall not be
ISSUE: diminished during their continuance in office. Petitioners question the legality of RA
W/N the proclamations are valid. 590.

These Executive Orders are valid because they have been enacted during W/N RA 590 unconstitutional.
the time of the inability of the Congress to function. That when Congress convened
again on Jan. 1, 1942, said proclamations were also terminated. HELD:
No. Saying that the taxing of the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease in
LATIN MAXIM: compensation is a clear interpretation of “Which shall not be diminished during their
2a, 9a continuance in office”, by the Legislature. Through the separation of powers, such a
task must be done by the Judiciary. Judicial officers are exempt from taxes on his
salary not for his own benefit but for the public, to secure and preserve his
independence of judicial thought and action.

1, 6c, 7a, 24a

Daoang v. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte CIR v. Limpan Investment Corporation
Case No. 84 Case No. 77
G.R. No. L-34568 (March 28, 1988) G.R. No. L-28571 and L-28644 (July 31, 1970)
Chapter II, Page 61, Footnote No.50 Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote No.55

Prior to this case, Petitioners contested the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and In 1959 and 1960, Respondent Corporation filed income tax returns which
Wilson Marcos by, Antero Agonoy and Amanda Agonoy, stating that under Art. 335 later were bases for deficiency due to disallowance by the BIR. Brought to the Court
of the Civil Code, that those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged of Tax Appeals, the deficiencies on both cases were decided upon at P26,137 and
natural children, or children by legal fiction, cannot adopt. Petitioners stated that the P7,240.48, resolved at September 20, 1967 (L-28571) and December 11, 1967 (L-28644)
Agonoys already had a daughter of the Estrella Agonoy, who is the deceased respectively.
mother of the Petitioners, and that the Agonoys also have the Petitioners as
grandchildren. Furthermore, the Petitioners argued that the adopting would ISSUE:
introduce a foreign element into the family unit, and would result in the reduction of W/N the CTA committed an error in its fixed date of the payment of
their legitimes in terms of inheritance. The Respondent Court ruled in favor for surcharges and interests.
ISSUE: The CTA’s decision on the date of payment of surcharges and interests are in
W/N the Respondent Court erred in their decision. error. Section 51 of the NIRC provides the following- On Tax shown on the return, in
failure to pay the required amount on or before the date prescribed, interest upon
HELD: such unpaid amount shall be collected as part of the tax, at the rate of one per
No, the court was correct. In enumerating the persons who cannot adopt in centum a month, from the date prescribed for the payment until paid, provided that
Art. 335, the children mentioned therein have a clearly defined meaning in law and, the maximum amount for the interest doesn’t exceed the amount corresponding to
do not include grandchildren. To add grandchildren in this article where no a period of 3 years. The same goes with deficiencies, except that the additional tax
grandchild is included would violate the legal maxim that, what is expressly included must be paid within 30 days of the notice, else the same interests apply. With regard
would naturally exclude what is not included. to surcharge, if the amount in the notice isn’t paid within 30 days, a surcharge of 5
per centum of the amount of tax unpaid. In L-28571, the interest shall be computed
LATIN MAXIM: from September 7, 1962 to September 6, 1965, at 1% for 3 years, plus the surcharge of
6c, 9a, 30a 5% on failure to pay the deficiency tax. In L-28644, from April 4, 1963 to April 3, 1966,
the interest shall be at 1% a month for 3 years, plus the 5% surcharge.

1, 6c, 7a, 24a, 26

Cebu Portland Cement v. Municipality of Naga, Cebu Resins, Inc. v. Auditor General
Case No. 53 Case No. 260
G.R. Nos. 24116-17 (August 22, 1968) G.R. No. L-17888 (October 29, 1968)
Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote No.56 Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote No.57

Efforts of defendant Treasurer to collect from Plaintiff municipal license tax Petitioner seeks a refund from Respondent Central Bank on the claim that it
from 1960, 1961, as well as penalties, amounting to a total sum of P204,300, have all was exempt from the margin fee under RA 2609 for the importation of “UREA AND
been met with rebuff. Municipal tax imposed by Amended Ordinance No. 21. Finally FORMALDEHYDE”, as separate units used for the production of synthetic glue. The
on June 26, 1961, defendant Treasurer decides to avail of Civil remedies as provided specific language of the Act speaks of “UREA FORMALDEHYDE”, a finished product
for under Sec. 2304 of the Revised Administrative Code; he gives Plaintiff a period of which is distinct and different from “UREA” and “FORMALDEHYDE”. Petitioner argues
ten (10) days within which to settle the account from receipt thereof. On July 6, 1961, his view, citing the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during consideration
defendant Treasurer notified the Plant Manager of the Plaintiff that he was distraining of the bill before said House, by members thereof (referring to the Journal). Petitioner
100,000 bags of Apo Cement in satisfaction of Plaintiff’s delinquency in municipal would assail as devoid of support in law the action taken by the Respondent Auditor
license tax; notice was received by Plant Officer-in-Charge Vicente T. Garagay, who General in an endorsement to Central Bank causing it to overrule its previous
acknowledged the distraint. Said articles (the cement bags) will be sold by public resolution and to adopt the view in such endorsement to the effect that the
auction to the highest bidder on July 27, 1961, proceeds thereof will in part be utilized importation of urea and formaldehyde, as separate units, did not come within the
to settle the account. Despite notice of sale, it did not take place on July 27, 1961 purview of the statutory language that granted such exemption.
but on January 30, 1962
ISSUE: W/N Petitioner’s allegations are valid.
W/N the distraint and public auction were valid.
HELD: The Act clearly states “UREA FORMALDEHYDE” as a finished product and not
Both actions are valid. According to the Revised Administrative Code: “The “UREA” and “FORMALDEHYDE” as separate units. Individual statements made by
remedy by distraint shall proceed as follows: Upon failure of the person owing any Senators do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate
municipal tax or revenue to pay the same, at the time required, the municipal the view of the House of Representatives. If there was any mistake in the printing of
treasurer may seize and distraint any personal property belonging to such person or the bill, it should be corrected by legislation and not by judicial decree. The Auditor
any property subject to the tax lien, in sufficient quantity to satisfy the tax or charge in General was just doing his duty, following what was written in the statute.
question, together with any increment thereto incident to delinquency and the
expenses of the distraint.” The clear and explicit language of the law leaves no room LATIN MAXIM:
for doubt. Also, this being a direct appeal to the Supreme Court, Plaintiff must be 6c, 7a, 43
deemed to have accepted as conclusive the findings of the lower court which
upheld the validity of the auction.

6c, 7a, 43

Quijano v. Development Bank of the Philippines KMMRC Credit Union v. Manila Railroad Company
Case No. 248 Case No. 66
G.R. No. L-26419 (October 16, 1970) G.R. No. L-25316 (February 28, 1979)
Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote No.58

Petitioners filed an application for an urban estate loan with the Rehabilitation The Petitioner filed a case for mandamus which the lower court has denied.
Finance Corporation (RFC), predecessor-in-intent of Respondent. They mortgaged Petitioner seeks to overturn the ruling relying on a right that, according to the
real estate properties to secure the loan; loan was approved on April 30, 1953. Petitioner, RA 2023 grants to them. Paragraphs 1 & 2 of section 62 of RA 2023 compels
Mortgage contract was executed by Petitioners in favor of DBP on March 23, 1954. employers to deduct from the salaries or wages of members of credit unions the
As of July 31, 1965, outstanding obligation of the Petitioners with DBP was P13, 983.59. debts of the employees and pay it to said credit union. The lower court has already
Petitioner wrote Respondent offering to pay P14, 000 for his outstanding obligation granted there is no such right granting first priority to the loan to credit unions in the
out of his back pay pursuant to RA 897 (Back Pay Law). Respondent advised payroll collection.
Petitioners of the non-acceptance of this offer on the ground that the loan was not
incurred before or subsisting on June 20, 1953, when RA 897 was approved. ISSUE:
Respondent filed on October 14, 1965 an application for the foreclosure of real W/N RA 2023 converts KMMRC credit union’s credit into a first priority credit.
estate mortgage executed by the Petitioners; Respondent Sheriff scheduled the
public auction after advising Petitioner of the application for foreclosure filed by DBP. HELD:
No. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. The RA
ISSUE: Petitioner relies on clearly does not state the loans shall be granted first priority in the
W/N the obligation of the Petitioners was subsisting at the time of the salary collections. According to Justice Recto in a subsequent opinion, “it is well
approval of RA 897, the Amendatory Act of June 20, 1953, to RA 304, the original established that only specific legal rights are enforceable by mandamus, that the
Back Pay Law. right sought to be enforced must be certain and clear, and the writ not issue in cases
W/N the trial court erred in declaring that the loan of the Petitioners was not where the right is doubtful”. Justice Barrera adds: ”… the writ never issues in doubtful
subsisting when RA 897 was enacted on June 20, 1953. cases. It neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to
exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed.
RA 897 has clear provisions that expressly require that the obligations for which LATIN MAXIM:
back pay certificates may be accepted as payments must be subsisting at the time 7a
RA 897 was approved (June 20, 1953). While Petitioner’s loan was approved on April
30, 1953, they only availed of it much later on March 23, 1954. The obligation
therefore attaches only on March 23, 1954. It cannot be said that there was an
obligation subsisting at the time of the approval of RA 897.

6c, 7a, 43

Davao Light & Power Co. v. Commissioner of Customs Alfredo Ramos v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 29 Case No. 252
G.R. No. L-28739 (March 29, 1972) G.R. No. L-41295 (December 4, 1989)
Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote No.60

Petitioner is the grantee of a legislative franchise to install, operate and The municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan sued Ramos et al for the recovery of its
maintain an electric light, heat and power plant in the municipality of Davao. On two 74 hectare fishpond. Atty. Angel Cruz, a private lawyer and head of the Cruz, Durian
different occasions it imported materials and equipment for installation in its facilities. and Academia law firm, volunteered himself and his firm to serve as counsel for the
Petitioner is arguing that the taxes levied against its imports should be waived by the municipality. He stipulated in the complaint that the municipality is obliged to pay
collector of customs in Cebu (the materials were delivered at the port of Cebu) them not less than 20% of the amount to be recovered. Petitioners move to disqualify
pursuant to section 17 of (pre-commonwealth) Act 3636 (Standard Electric Power said private law firm as counsel on the ground that it is illegal for the municipality to
and Light Franchise Law) which states that if any competing company should be hire a private counsel.
granted franchise more favorable than the one previously granted to another
company, the latter shall enjoy the same advantages given in the other franchise. ISSUE:
W/N it is legal for the municipality to hire a private counsel in filing a case.
W/N section 17 of act 3636 applies to the case of Petitioner. HELD:
No. Under section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code, the provincial
HELD: fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality or municipal thereof in any
No. Firstly, the provision cited by Petitioner states that the franchise must be court. Furthermore, under section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act, the municipal
granted to a ‘competing party’. NPC, to which the contract with tax exemptions was attorney shall act as legal counsel for the municipality and perform such duties and
given, is not a competing party to Petitioner. Secondly, Petitioner cannot rely on RA exercise such powers as may be assigned to them by the council. The municipality’s
358 as amended by RA 987 to support its tax exemption. Exemption from taxation is interest would be best protected if the municipal attorney handles its litigation. These
never presumed, it is always explicitly stated. laws are implemented as well so as not to burden the municipality with the expense
of hiring a private lawyer.

Floresca v. Philex Mining Corporation Enrile v. Salazar

Case No. 47 Case No. 40
G.R. No. L- 30642 (April 30, 1985) G.R. No. 92163 (June 5, 1990)

Petitioners are the surviving family of deceased employees of Respondent Petitioner was arrested and charged with the crime of rebellion with murder
Corporation who died as a result of a cave-in while working in underground mining and multiple frustrated murders allegedly committed during a failed coup attempt
operations. Petitioners, with the exception of Floresca, recovered damages under the from November 29 to December 10, 1990.
Workmen’s Compensation Act. However, a later report on the accident showed Petitioners contend that they are being charged for a criminal offense that
there was negligence on the part of Respondent Corporation. Thereafter, Petitioners does not exist in the statute books because technically, the crime of rebellion cannot
filed a civil suit to recover damages for Respondent Corporation’s reckless and be complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof.
wanton negligence.
ISSUE: W/N case of Petitioners falls under the Hernandez doctrine.
W/N Petitioners have the right to choose between availing of the worker’s
right under the Workmen’s Compensation Act or suing in the regular courts under the HELD:
Civil Code for higher damages. The doctrine in the case People v. Hernandez remains as the binding doctrine
operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed
HELD: on the occasion thereof. The charges of murder and multiple frustrated murders are
Petitioners may sue in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher absorbed in the crime of simple rebellion. Therefore, charges against Petitioners in the
damages. However, in light of the fact that they have already recovered damages information should be understood as that of simple rebellion under the RPC.
from the Workmen’s Compensation Act, if they are awarded a greater amount in the Furthermore, in a concurring opinion, Justice Feliciano states that if the court ruled
regular courts, the amount received from this Act shall be deducted to prevent the that the charges of murder could be prosecuted separately from rebellion, then the
instance of double recovery. An injured party cannot pursue both courses of action principle of non-retroactivity would be violated.
simultaneously. In allowing Petitioners to sue in regular courts, the Court stated that it
did not legislate in this case but rather, applied and gave effect to the constitutional LATIN MAXIM:
guarantees of social justice. 1, 46a, 48

1, 17, 40a

Manikad v. Tanodbayan Senarillos v. Hermosisimo

Case No. 162 Case No. 278
G.R. No. 65097 (February 20, 1984) G.R. No. L-10662 (December 14, 1956)
Chapter II, Page 63, Footnote No.65 Chapter II, Page 67, Footnote No.74

Petitioners were members of the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) Petitioner was appointed as Chief of Police in Sibonga, Cebu. Upon the
Police Force and were charged with crimes of smuggling, theft and violations of Anti- charges filed by Petitioner, Senarillos was suspended by Municipal Mayor of Sibonga
Graft Law and Anti-Fencing Law before the Respondent. Petitioners argue that the and investigated by a “police committee” composed of 3 councilors created by
power to investigate complaints of this nature are lodged exclusively upon the EPZA Resolution No.2 Series 1952 of the municipal council.
and is not in the Respondent’s jurisdiction. Section 7 of P.D. 1716-A states: “The EPZA in The committee came up with an adverse decision subsequently signed by
the exercise of its sole police authority over the export processing zones shall have the members of the council. This was appealed to and affirmed by the Commissioner
the power to receive and investigate complaints relative to violation of penal laws of Civil Service and by the Civil Service Board of Appeals.
committed inside the zones owned and administered by the Authority…”
ISSUE: W/N Sibonga had jurisdiction to investigate the Chief of Police Senarillos.
W/N Section 7 of P.D. 1716-A precludes the Respondent from investigating
complaints within the Export Processing Zone. HELD:
No. Under RA No.557 the investigation of police officers must be conducted
HELD: by council itself and not by a mere committee thereof. Sibonga therefore had no
No, the use of “sole” in P.D. 1716-A refers to police authority. Although the jurisdiction to investigate the Chief of Police Senarillos. RA No.557 has eliminated the
EPZA Police Force is the only police authority within the Zone, it is not the only provision authorizing investigation by a committee council. Hence, the decision
authority that may investigate complaints, especially those which fall under the against him was invalid, even if concurred in by the rest of the councilors.
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The fact that the decision of the Municipal Council was issued before the
decision of the Supreme Court cannot validate the action of the police committee.
LATIN MAXIM: The initial proceeding was illegal ab initio and the subsequent reaffirmation of the
6c, 7a, 35 decision of the municipal council by the civil service authorities could not validate
the proceeding.

1, 3a, 6b, 7a

People of the Philippines v. Moro Macarandang People of the Philippines v. Mapa

Case No. 211 Case No. 213
G.R. No. L-12088 (December 23, 1959) G.R. No. L-22301 (August 30, 1967)
Chapter II, Page 69, Footnote No.87 Chapter II, Page 69, Footnote No.89

Defendant was accused and convicted of illegal possession of firearms in Defendant was accused of illegal possession of firearms. He invokes in his
Lanao. Defendant, admitting the ownership and possession of the firearm and defense that he was an appointed Secret Agent of the provincial Governor of
ammunitions, invokes as his legal excuse the appointment issued to him by Governor Batangas. He sought to be acquitted as the case of People v. Macarandang used
Dimakuta as secret agent shown in the Governor’s letter which he presented as and the same defense providing evidences of his appointment.
evidence. He was granted this appointment for having shown good faith by
previously surrendering to the office of the Governor a firearm. He has then been ISSUE:
appointed as SECRET AGENT to assist on the maintenance of peace and order W/N a Secret Agent falls among those authorized to possess firearms.
campaigns and is authorized to hold and carry in his possession 1 Riot shotgun.
ISSUE: No. The court held that the law cannot be any clearer. The law does not
W/N a Secret Agent tasked to assist in the maintenance of peace and order contain any exception for secret agent therefore holding this position would not
falls among those authorized to possess firearms. constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for a crime of illegal possession of
firearm and ammunitions. Wherefore the conviction of the accused must stand. The
HELD: Court’s ruling overturned that of People v. Macarandang.
Yes. It may be true that the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm
license or permit but section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides the LATIN MAXIM:
“peace officers” are exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of 1, 6c, 7a, 30a, 35, 46c
license to possess firearms. The appointment sufficiently put him in the category of
“peace officer” equivalent even to a Municipal Police expressly covered by section
879. Wherefore the decision appealed from is reversed and the Defendant

9a, 24a

Co v. CA Sy Kiong v. Sarmiento
Case No. 65 Case No. 150
G.R. No. 100776 (October 28, 1993) G.R. No. L-2934 (November 29, 1951)
Chapter II, Page 69, Footnote No.91

Petitioner delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983 a check Petitioner is the owner of a duly licensed grocery store located in the City of
drawn against the Associated Citizens’ Bank, postdated November 30, 1983. The Manila and an importer of flour who sells either to bakeries or to retail dealers for
check was deposited on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days later, the purposes of retail. Sometime in September 1948, the Treasurer of the City of Manila
tersely-stated reason given by the bank being: “CLOSED ACCOUNT.” A criminal assessed against him the sum of 566.50php which represents the alleged deficiency
complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was filed by the salvage municipal license tax due from him on his gross sales of flour to bakeries after
company against Petitioner. At the time of the issuance of the check, the delivery of deducting the sales made to retail dealers for purposes of resale.
a “rubber” or “bouncing” check as a guarantee for an obligation was not ISSUE:
considered a punishable offense, an official promulgation made in a Circular of the W/N the sales of flour made by the Petitioner to bakeries to be manufactured
Ministry of Justice. into bread are retail or wholesale.

W/N Petitioner is criminally liable. The sale of flour to bakeries to be manufactured into bread and to be resold
to the public, in the absence of any express provision of law on the matter, should be
HELD: treated as a sale at retail and should subject the vendor to the retail tax law.
No. According to them, Que v. People should not be applied retroactively in
accordance with the prospectivity principle of judicial rulings and the operative fact LATIN MAXIM:
doctrine. The decision in Que should not be given retroactive effect to the prejudice 6c, 7a, 24a, 37, 43
of Co and others similarly situated who relied on the opinion of the Secretary of

1, 2a, 46a

Sumulong v. Commission on Elections Central Capiz v. Ramirez

Case No. 149 Case No. 56
G.R. No. 48634 (October 8, 1941) G.R. No. L-16197 (March 12, 1920)
Chapter III, Page 79, Footnote No.8

On September 15, 1941, Respondent granted the Popular Front Party of Abad Private Respondent contracted with Petitioner Corporation for a term of 30
Santos the exclusive right to propose the minority election inspector in the first years, a supply of all sugar cane produced on her plantation, which was to be
congressional district of Pampanga, and to the Popular Front Party of Petitioner, the converted later into a right in rem and recorded in the Registry of Property as an
minority inspector in the second congressional district of the said province. Eleven encumbrance upon the land, and binding to all future owners of the same. The
days later, Respondent modified its ruling and awarded the minority inspector to the Respondent refuses to push through with the contract thinking it might violate Act No.
Popular Front Party of Abad Santos. 2874, “An Act to amend and compile the laws relating to lands of public domain,
and for other purposes,” since more than 61 percent of the capital stock of the
ISSUE: corporation is held and owned by persons who are not citizens of the Philippine
W/N Respondent committed grave abuse of discretion. Islands or of the United States. The land involved is a private agricultural land.

Where the minimum number of votes required by law was polled by a mere W/N said Act no. 2874 is applicable to agricultural lands, in the Philippine
coalition or alliance of minority parties, the right to minority representation in the Islands which are privately owned.
board of election inspectors to which such coalition is entitled, cannot be claimed by
any of the component parties which have thereafter separated. Respondent shall HELD:
have the discretion to choose the minority inspector. The limit and purpose of the Legislature in adopting Act No. 2874 was and is to
limit its application to lands of public domain and that lands held in private ownership
LATIN MAXIM: are not included therein and are not affected in any manner whatsoever thereby.
36a, 37, d
Jones Law of 1916: “That no bill may be enacted into law shall embrace more
than one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill.”


Eugenio v. Drilon People of the Philippines v. Purisima

Case No. 104 Case No. 221
G.R. No. 109404 (January 22, 1996) G.R. Nos. L-42050-66 (November 20, 1978)
Chapter III, Page 81, Footnote No.20 Chapter III, Page 76, Footnote No.16

Private Respondent purchased on installment basis from Petitioner, two lots. Twenty-six petitions for review were filed charging the respective Defendant
Private respondent suspended payment of his amortizations because of non- with “illegal possession of deadly weapon” in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9.
development on the property. Petitioner then sold one of the two lots to spouses An order quashed the information because it did not allege facts which constitute
Relevo and the title was registered under their name. Respondent prayed for the offense penalized by P.D. No. 9. It failed to state one essential element of the
annulment of sale and reconveyance of the lot to him. Applying P.D. 957 “The crime, viz.: that the carrying outside of the residence of the accused of a bladed,
Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree”, the Human Settlements pointed, or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or
Regulatory Commission ordered Petitioner to complete the development, reinstate related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public
Private Respondent’s purchase contract over one lot and immediately refund him of disorder. Petitioners argued that a perusal of P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited acts
the payment (including interest) he made for the lot sold to the spouses. Petitioner need not be related to subversive activities and that they are essentially malum
claims that the Exec. Sec. erred in applying P.D. 957 saying it should have not been prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy.
given retroactive effect and that non-development does not justify the non-payment
of the amortizations. ISSUE:
W/N P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to
ISSUE: subversive activities.
W/N the Executive Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion when he
decided P.D. 957 will be given retroactive effect. HELD:
The primary rule in the construction and interpretation of a legislative measure
HELD: is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the
No. Respondent Executive Secretary did not act with grave abuse of controlling factor. Because of the problem of determining what acts fall under P.D. 9,
discretion and P.D. 957 is to given retroactive effect so as to cover even those it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can
contracts executed prior to its enactment in 1976. P.D. 957 did not expressly provide be found among others in the preamble or “whereas” clauses which enumerate the
for retroactivity in its entirety, but such can be plainly inferred from the unmistakable facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions
intent of the law. “The intent of the statute is the law.” stated therein.


9a 9a, b2

People of the Philippines v. Echaves Aboitiz Shipping Corporation v. City of Cebu

Case No. 207 Case No. 4
G.R. Nos. L-47757-61 (January 28, 1980) G.R. No. L-14526 (March 31, 1965)
Chapter III, Page 77, Footnote No.22 Chapter III, Page 82, Footnote No.23

The issue is whether or not P.D. 772, which penalizes squatting and similar acts The Petitioner contends that the ordinance implemented by Respondent
applies to agricultural lands. The lower court denied the motion and ruled that should be declared null and void because the ordinance seeks to generate revenue
agricultural land is not part of P.D. 772 on the basis of Ejusdem Generis (of the same by collecting wharfage from vessels which dock at the public wharves of piers
kind or species) since its preamble does not mention the Secretary of Agriculture. The located in the said City but owned by the National Government. According to
order of dismissal by Echaves was then appealed to the Supreme Court, thus bringing Respondent, the legislature made no distinction between those owned by the City of
the case at hand. Cebu and the National Government and that consequently, both fall within the
scope of the power granted. Petitioners assail this construction erroneous in the light
ISSUE: of the meaning of “public wharf” as it may have bearing on the right to charge
Whether or not P.D. 772 applies to agricultural lands wharfage.

The Supreme Court held the same ruling that the lower court did, declaring W/N the City of Cebu, through its ordinance, has the right to charge
that P.D. 772 does not apply to pasture lands because its preamble shows that “it wharfages from docks which are owned by the National Government.
was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to
illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals.” But the HELD:
Supreme Court disagreed to the lower court’s usage of the maxim Ejusdem Generis The term “public” refers to the nature of use of the pier or wharves. Hence,
because the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It stated that “the rule of Ejusdem the power to impose wharfage rests on a different basis and that is ownership. The
Generis is merely a tool for statutory construction which is resorted to when the Court also referred to the previous subsection of the questioned portion of the
legislative is uncertain.” ordinance pointing out that it implies a distinction with regard to those docks that are
owned by the City and those of the National Government. The Court states that only
LATIN MAXIM: those which are constructed by the City shall be considered as its property.
9a, 36b
9a, 25a, 36b

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. TMX Sales, Inc. Feliciano v. Aquino

Case No. 80 Case No. 105
G.R. No. 83736 (January 15, 1992) G.R. No. 10201 (September 23, 1957)
Chapter III, Page 83, Footnote No.25 Chapter III, Page 83, Footnote No.28

Respondent Company wants a refund to an erroneously collected tax as Respondent was proclaimed as elected Mayor of Concepcion, Tarlac. Four
provided in Sec. 292 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) which includes a days after the proclamation, defeated candidate Petitioner instituted quo warranto
two-year prescription. The Petitioner claims that the prescriptive period provided in proceedings, challenging Petitioner’s eligibility on the ground that Respondent was
the law for refund of such tax is already expired since it is already more than two not yet 23 years old at the time of his election. Aquino claimed that age requirement
years from the date the quarterly income tax was paid. The Respondent contends, refers only to the age at assumption of office. He appealed that the existence of a
on the other hand, that the date of filing of the final payment (Final Adjustment semi-colon, converted into a comma in the 1951 Revised Administrative Code, does
Return) is the one that should be considered with respect to the prescriptive period not require him to possess the remaining qualifications at the time of the election but
and not the quarterly payment made. rather at the time of the assumption of office, provided that he had fulfilled the first
two requirements.
W/N the two-year prescriptive period provided in Sec. 292 of the National ISSUE:
Internal Revenue Code commence to run from the date the quarterly income tax W/N the election of Aquino is unlawful and illegal.
was paid or from the date of filing of the Final Adjustment Return (final payment).
HELD: The primary rule of statutory construction is that punctuation marks cannot be
The date of filing of the final payment should be considered. The Supreme disregarded unless there is reason to do contrary. Punctuation marks are aids of low
Court said that, “Sec. 292 of the NIRC should be interpreted in relation to the other degree and can never control against the intelligible meaning of written words. No
provisions of the Tax Code in order to give effect the legislative intent and to avoid reason is shown why, after plainly and unequivocally requiring that the candidates of
an application of the law which may lead to inconvenience and absurdity. The other elective offices should possess the age qualification “at the time of the
intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law and election”, the law should suddenly change the requirement for the case of municipal
every part of the act is to be taken into view.” officers. No argument is needed to show that where the candidate is mentioned as
eligible or ineligible in the said section, taking part in the election is meant, not
LATIN MAXIM: capacity to assume office. Decision of the lower court is affirmed and the election of
11a, 36b, 36d Respondent is declared unlawful and illegal.

6c, 9d, 11a, 11e, 36b

US. v. Hart In re: Estate of Johnson

Case No. 159 Case No. 131
G.R. No. L-8327 (March 28, 1913) G.R. No. 12767 (November 16, 1918)
Chapter III, Page 86, Footnote No.38

Respondent was caught in a gambling house and was penalized under Act Petitioner was a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the United
No. 519 which punishes “every person found loitering about saloons or dram shops or States but died and left a will in Manila. Sec. 636 of the Code of the Civil Procedure
gambling houses, or tramping or straying through the country without visible means states “Will made here by an alien—will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen
of support”. The said portion of the law is divided into two parts, separated by the or subject of another state or country, which is executed in accordance with the law
comma, separating those caught in gambling houses and those straying through the of the state or country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved,
country without means of support. Though it was proven that Hart and the other allowed by the law of his own state or country, may be proved, allowed and
Defendants had “visible means of support”, it was under the first part of the portion of recorded in the Philippine Islands and shall have the same effect as if executed
law for which they were charged with. The prosecution persisted that the phrase according to the laws of these Islands.” The will of Johnson was probated and
“without visible means of support” was in connection to the second part of the said allowed in the lower court, but Petitioner contends that Sec. 636 is applicable only to
portion of Act No. 519, therefore was not a viable defense. wills of aliens; and in this connection, attention is directed to the fact that the
epigraph of this section speaks only of the will made here by an alien and to further
ISSUE: fact that the word “state” in the body of the section is not capitalized.
How should the provision be interpreted?
HELD: W/N the will of Petitioner, a citizen of the U.S and therefore an alien, is
The construction of a statute should be based upon something more covered by Sec. 636.
substantial than mere punctuation. If the punctuation gives it a meaning which is
reasonable and is in apparent accord with legislative will, it may be as an additional
argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words in the statute as thus HELD:
punctuated. An argument based on punctuations alone is not conclusive and the The fact that the words “state” and “country” are not capitalized does not
court will not hesitate to change the punctuation when necessary to give the act the mean that the United States is excluded from the phrase “another state or country”. It
effect intended by the legislature, disregarding superfluous and incorrect is a rule of hermeneutics that punctuation and capitalization are aids of low degree
punctuation marks, or inserting others when necessary. Inasmuch as defendant had, in interpreting the language of a statute and can never control against the intelligible
“visible means of support” and that the absence of such was necessary for the meaning of the written words. The epigraph, or heading, of a section being nothing
conviction for gambling and loitering in saloons and gambling houses, defendants more than a convenient index to the contents of the provision, cannot have the
are acquitted. effect of limiting the operative words contained in the body of the text. Petitioner,
being a US citizen, thus an alien, is covered by Sec. 636. The will duly probated.
11e, 33 LATIN MAXIM:
24a, 25a, 26, 37, 42a, 48

People of the Philippines v. Yabut People of the Philippines v. Mendoza

Case No. 231 Case No.112
G.R. No. 85472 (September 27, 1993) G.R. No. L-38076 (November 4, 1933)
Chapter III, Page 87, Footnote No.43

Defendant was convicted for homicide. While serving sentence, he killed Respondents were accused for violation of Section 2654 of the Administrative
another prisoner. He was consequently charged for murder. After conviction, he was Code for allegedly depositing in the official ballot box 51 official ballots which they
punished with the maximum period for murder, in accordance with Art. 160 of the prepared without the knowledge and consent of the voters. They were tried and
Revised Penal Code. convicted.

W/N the lower court erred in applying Art. 160. W/N the evidence is sufficient to convict.

No. Respondent relied on the word “another” appearing in the English No. What was presented and admitted was evidence in a previous election
translation of the head note of Art. 160, and suggests that the law is applicable only case which has no probative value to establish the guilt of the defendants in the
when the new crime committed by a person serving sentence is different from the criminal case. The English text of Section 2654 is defective as the head note clearly
crime for which he is serving sentence. According to him, his conviction for murder is shows that this section is only applicable when a person fraudulently deposit’s a
not different because it involved homicide. No such deduction is warranted from the ballot in the ballot box. The evidence presented was insufficient to convict that
text itself, or from the Spanish caption. When the text of the law is clear and defendants fraudulently deposited the ballots in question. Judgment was reversed.
unambiguous, there is no need to resort to the preamble, heading, epigram or head
note of a section for interpretation of the text, which are mere catchwords or LATIN MAXIM:
reference aids, consulted to remove, not create doubts. 50, d

6c, 7a

People of the Philippines v. Manaba U.S. v. Quintanar

Case No. 110 Case No. 162
G.R. No. L-39037 (October 30, 1933) G.R. No. 5654 (August 27, 1910)

Defendant was charged for rape. The complaint was signed by the Chief of Defendants, on the night of March 1, 1908 were caught in the act of smoking
Police. After trial, Defendant was convicted but the judgment was set aside and the opium, in violation of Sec. 32 of Act No. 1761, the “Opium Law”. On appeal,
case dismissed on his motion that the court had no jurisdiction over his person or the Defendants contend that they could not be legally convicted for they rely on the
subject matter, because the complaint was not signed by the offended party. Spanish translation of the Act which provides that it will take effect “despues del
Subsequently, the offended party signed a complaint charging Defendant of rape. primero de Marzo.” (after the first of March)
Defendant asked for dismissal on the ground of double jeopardy, but it was denied
and he was convicted. ISSUE:
W/N the Defendant should be punished under Act No 1761 which takes
ISSUE: effect “despues del primero de Marzo.”
W/N the Defendant was placed in double jeopardy.
HELD: The translation of the Defendant is not accurate. The English and original text
No. Whether or not Defendant was placed in double jeopardy depends on says: “on and after March 1, 1908”. Where the Act was originally promulgated in
whether or not he was tried on a valid complaint in the first case. Art. 334 of the English, it shall prevail over its translation.
Revised Penal Code requires the offended party to file the complaint. As the first
complaint was not signed by the offended party, it was not a valid complaint in LATIN MAXIM:
accordance with law, and the judgment of the court was void for lack of jurisdiction 6c
over subject matter, and defendant was never in jeopardy. The Spanish equivalent of
the word “filed” is not bound in the Spanish text which is controlling, because it was
the Spanish text approved by the legislature.

6c, 36a

Employees’ Club, Inc. v. China Banking Corporation McMicking v. Lichauco

Case No. 39 Case No. 175
G.R. No. 40188 (July 27, 1934) G.R. No. 7896 (March 30, 1914)
Chapter III, Page 88, Footnote No.49

Respondent Corporation contends that the order requires it to surrender the This is an appeal on a judgment in favor of current Respondent against
register of deeds of the City of Manila which is the duplicate of TCT No. 21192 so that Defendant Chu Chan Chac. However, there was another case pending in its
the contract lease might be noted and entered in the corresponding records. They duration: an appeal in the judgment in favor of Antonio Flor Mata – where judgment
argue that the contract lease cannot be registered in the register of deeds because execution is. And likewise, in the duration of Mata’s judgment, there was yet another
it is not a real right; and under the Civil Code and the Mortgage Law, only real rights pending appeal where Defendant Lichauco owed his Aunt Clara Lichauco
can be registered. The only exceptions, which it does not harbor, are a term P17,666.60.
exceeding three years, rent to corresponding years paid in advance, or an express
covenant requiring the lease to be registered. ISSUE:
With these two cases, who has preference over the funds owed by Lichauco.
W/N contract lease under the Mortgage law is not a real right and not be HELD:
registered. Preference should be secured to Mata notwithstanding the appeal. The
preference on Mata was based on Art. 1924 of the new Code of Civil Procedure,
HELD: which secures preference to sentencias firmes only (judgments which are final in the
The property in question is NOT under the Mortgage law but under Act No. sense that no appeal lies therefrom). Mata must have immediate recourse to the
496, or the Torrens system, Sec. 51 and 52. This act expressly provides that all interests property of Lichauco based on the first judgment. However, until the allotment of
must be registered in order to affect third persons, which includes the interest arising time for perfecting of a bill is not done yet and the appeal was not taken, the
from the contract of lease in favor of the Respondent. The Spanish text of the law was judgment, strictly, is not Sentencia Firme as used in Spanish legal terminology – where
relied upon by the Petitioner – the Mortgage Law. But the English enacted by the it would be explained that the right to share in the distribution of the debtor
Legislature, Act No. 496, should prevail. (Lichauco) could not accrue the judgment creditor (Mata) until he has the right to.
One must take into account that classification and the incidents of judgments, orders
LATIN MAXIM: and decrees that were once under Spanish Terminology have been modified under
9c, 49 the new Code of Civil Procedure, drawn in part from American and English
precedents. One should look rather to the spirit than the letter of the law. The lien of a
judgment is not necessarily destroyed by the perfecting of an appeal but simply
suspended. Even if there was a new judgment, it is simply reversed, not destroyed.

9c, 49

Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court Vda. De Macabenta v. Davao Stevedore Terminal Company
Case No. 11 Case No. 156
G.R. No. L-72873 (May 28, 1987) G.R. No. L-27489 (April 30, 1970)
Chapter III, Page 89, Footnote No.54 Chapter III, Page 89, Footnote No.57

Five siblings inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in At the time the decedent met the vehicular accident on September 12, 1961,
the name of their deceased parents. Two siblings sold their share to the same which led to his death 16 days later, the claimant-widow was not yet married to the
vendee. By virtue of such agreements, the Petitioners occupied after the said sales, decedent although they had already been living together as husband and wife for
2/5 of the lot, representing the portions bought. They subsequently enclosed their the past 3 months. However, on the day following the accident, they were lawfully
portion with a fence and built a semi-concrete house. One of the sisters filed a wedded. The claimant widow gave birth on April 8, 1962, to the posthumous
complaint invoking the right to redeem the area sold. The trial court dismissed this daughter of the deceased, Racquel.
complaint because the time had lapsed, not having been exercised within 30 days
from notice of the sales. ISSUE:
W/N the widow and posthumous child are considered dependents under the
ISSUE: Workmen’s Compensation Act.
1. W/N there was a valid notice.
2. W/N Art. 1088 of the Civil Code was interpreted correctly. HELD:
Yes. According to the Workmen’s Compensation Act, a widow living with the
HELD: deceased or actually dependent upon him totally or partly as well as her daughter, if
Although there was no written notice, there was actual knowledge of the under 18 years of age or incapable of supporting herself, and unmarried, whether or
sales satisfying the requirement of the law. It is unbelievable that the co-heirs were not actually dependent on the deceased are considered dependents. Although not
unaware of the sale, with the erection of a permanent semi-concrete structure. While his wife at the time of the accident but at the time of his death, are still considered
Art. 1088 of the Civil Code stresses the need for a written notice of sale; the Petitioners dependents under the Act.
claimed that because there was no written notice, despite their obvious knowledge
of it, the 30-day period for redemption had not yet begun. The intent of the LATIN MAXIM:
lawmakers was to ensure that the redemptioner was properly notified of the sale and 6c, 7a, 9c, 12a, 37
to indicate the date of such notice as the starting time of the 30-day period of
redemption. The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although
no notice in writing was given to them.

1, 8, 9a, 10, 11d, 11e, 12a, 17

Tinio, et al. v. Frances, et al. Home Insurance Company v. Eastern Shipping Lines
Case No. 290 Case No. 125
G.R. No. L-7747 (November 29, 1955) G.R. No. 34382 (July 20, 1983)
Chapter III, Page 90, Footnote No.61 Chapter III, Page 91, Footnote No.64

Sergio Nicolas applied for a parcel of land in Nueva Ecija and was approved Plaintiff Company instituted two cases of recovery of damages against
in 1917. In 1943, the final proof was approved by the Director of Lands who issued a Defendant Company. The Petitioner Company claimed for reimbursement with
patent in his favor, but because Sergio Nicolas died, he was substituted by his heirs, regard to the amounts of insurance paid to the consignees due to losses suffered by
represented by his widow. In 1947, the heirs transferred their rights to the homestead the cargoes and goods shipped. In this regard, the lower court dismissed the two
to the Defendants, with approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, cases on the ground that the Plaintiff failed to provide its legal capacity to sue.
and secured the issuance of a homestead patent in their favor. In 1953, heirs of the
deceased Sergio Nicolas wanted to annul the sale of a homestead and to recover ISSUE:
the land, together with the fruits of the land as damages. W/N the lower court is correct in holding that the Plaintiff lacks legal capacity
to sue which resulted in the dismissal of the two cases.
W/N the sale or transfer of right of the heirs of Sergio Nicolas over the parcel of HELD:
land was valid. Yes. The law on the matter is that a suing foreign company, such as Plaintiff
Company, must, in order to be capacitated to sue in the Philippine jurisdiction, prove
HELD: legal capacity by establishing either that its transaction upon which the complaint
No. Conveyances made by the heirs of the homesteader to the Defendants was based was an isolated one or that is was duly licensed or authorized by law to
do not comply with the first requirement of Sec. 20 of the Public Lands Act that the transact in the Philippines. Otherwise, no cause of action accrues in favor of the
Director of lands is satisfied from proofs submitted by the homesteader that he could Plaintiff as it has no legal right to seek relief from the court. In the case at bar, the
not continue with his homestead through no fault of his own, and that the insurance contracts between the Plaintiff and the Defendant were executed long
conveyance must be made with the prior or previous approval of the Secretary of before the Plaintiff secured its license to transact business in the Philippines. Therefore,
Agriculture and Commerce. Thus the conveyance made by the heirs of Nicolas was said insurance contracts were void from the beginning as the purpose was contrary
null and void. to public policy.


9a, 9b, 37, 38b, 48 4, 8, 9c, 11a, 36a, 37

Luzon Stevedoring Company v. Trinidad Go Chioco v. Martinez

Case No. 154 Case No. 113
G.R. No. 18316 (September 23, 1922) G.R. No. 19864 and 19685 (October 17, 1923)
Chapter III, Page 91, Footnote No.71 Chapter III, Page 93, Footnote No.93

Plaintiff is a corporation duly organized under the laws of the Philippine Petitioner made a loan of P40,000 to Respondent. They executed a promissory
Islands, doing business in the City of Manila. Engaging in a stevedoring business, note stipulating that Respondent Hermanos will pay back the loan within three
consisting of loading and unloading of cargo from vessels in ports, at certain rates of months. On the same day, Respondent Hermanos signed another promissory note
charge per unit of cargo, Plaintiff Company hopes to recover from Defendant, the and sent a check of P1,800 to Petitioner, which was cashed. After three months,
Internal Revenue Collector, the sum of P2,422.81, which had been paid under Respondent Hermanos was unable to pay the principal. He now executed a new
protest. Defendant alleged that during the first quarter of 1921, the Plaintiff was promissory note, again due within the next three months, and with this note,
engaged in business as a contractor, with its gross receipts from the said business Respondent Hermanos sent a check for P1,800. Again, he could not pay so they
amounting to P242, 281.33. Under the provisions of Sec. 1462 of Act No. 2711, the executed another promissory note and sent another check worth P1,800. This cycle
percentage tax amount was levied and assessed toward the stevedoring business. was repeated a total of 7 times, with the third cycle's promissory note bring due only
a month later and with a check for only P600. Then Respondent Hermanos paid
ISSUE: P25,000 for the principal and refused to pay for the remaining P15,000. Therefore,
W/N the Plaintiff is considered a "contractor" provided by Sec. 1462 of Act No. Petitioner filed a complaint. The trial court ruled that the interest rate of 18% was in
2711. violation of the Usury Law (Act 2655 as amended by Act No. 2992). Thus, he must give
back P11,850 from the interest and forfeits the remaining P15,000.
A contractor is defined as one who renders service in the course of an ISSUE:
independent occupation, representing the will of his employer only as to the result of W/N the charging of a usurious interest of 18% forfeits the principal loaned
his work, and not as to the means by which it is accomplished. Plaintiff is not a together with the interest.
"contractor" based on Sec. 1462 of Act No. 2711. Therefore, the tax paid by the
Plaintiff was illegally collected and should be repaid. HELD:
No, since only the interest is forfeited. Taking into consideration the history of
LATIN MAXIM: the Usury Law, the intent of the framers is clear. In a previous law RA 2073, the
2a, 4, 5b, 9c, 11a, 28 principal loan was forfeited together with the interest. However, unlike the previous
law, the current law RA 2655 provides for stricter rules and alternative punishments for
violations. The current law also does not expressly mention that the principal is also
forfeited. As a rule of construction, when the intent of a law is ambiguous, one may
consult the history of the law and its preamble to ascertain the framers intent.

9a, 9c, 36a, 37

US v. De Guzman Basiana v. Luna

Case No. 297 Case no. 31
G.R. No. L-9144 (March 27, 1915) G.R. Nos. L-34135-36 (February 24, 1981)
Chapter III, Page 94, Footnote No.95 Chapter III, Page 95, Footnote No.102

Defendant, along with Pedro and Serapio Macarling, was convicted of Petitioner entered into a private agreement with Cipriano Luna to prospect
asesinato (murder) and sentenced to life imprisonment. Defendant was discharged with Luna getting 60% and Petitioner receiving the rest. Petitioner prospected 183
before he pleaded on the condition that he promised to appear and testify as a claims, 93 were recorded for him with the rest going to Luna, a clear disregard of their
witness for the Government against his co-accused. Upon reaching the witness agreement. Realizing that there was something wrong with the declaration of
stand, Defendant denied all knowledge of the murder. He denied ever saying location records, Luna amended the declarations with the intention of clearing claim
anything that implicated his co-accused and swore that statements made by him names and tie points; Petitioner however, disclaimed such consent. Consequently,
were made in fear of the police officers. The Solicitor-General asks for the discharge Luna cancelled the registration and created their own groups of claims overlapping
of the Respondent though it may result in a palpable miscarriage of justice, Petitioner’s claims. Petitioner alleges that his claims were valid, and were merely
nevertheless, the law provides for his dismissal and expressly bars a future prosecution. abandoned for failure to pay occupation fees.

W/N Defendant should be discharged. W/N Petitioner’s mining claims are valid.

Sec. 19 and 20 are constitutional. There is no provision for perjury should the Sec. 47 par. 2 of the Mining Law (C.A. No. 137) provides: “For the purpose of
Defendant fail to comply with the agreement with the State. However, looking at the this section, a permanent and prominent object used as a tie point MAY be an
legislative history of the statute, it can be gleaned that faithful performance is intersection of known roads; a junction of known rivers or creeks, a known public or
necessary to avail of the bar to criminal prosecution. Failure of the Defendant in the private structure; a corner of approved public, private or mineral land survey; a
case at bar to faithfully and honestly carry out his undertaking to appear as witness kilometer post of public road; or location monument or triangulation station
and to tell the truth at the trial of his co-accused deprived him of the right to plead established by the Bureau of Lands, Bureau of Mines, Army Corps of engineers,
his formal dismissal as a bar to his prosecution. Finally, discharge cannot be an Bureau of Cost and Geodetic Survey, or other government agencies.” An initial post
acquittal since it was made prior to his trial. is not enumerated as a valid tie point. Petitioner’s contention that the word MAY
suggests non-exclusivity is untenable since it goes against the legislator’s intent to
LATIN MAXIM: eliminate claim jumping and overlapping claims.
9a, 22a, b2
6c, 30a, 33, 36b

Baga v. PNB De Villa v. CA

Case No. 27 Case No. 88
G.R. No. L-9695 (September 10, 1956) G.R. No. 87416 (April 8, 1991)
Chapter III, Page 95, Footnote No.103 Chapter III, Page 96, Footnote No.110

Petitioner was the recipient of benefits with Respondent as the guardian Petitioner was charged with a violation of BP 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) for
under RA 390 or the Uniform Veterans Guardianship Act which was passed with the issuing a worthless check. However, he contends that the check was drawn against a
intention of being modeled after the US version. RA 390 provides that a guardianship dollar account with a foreign bank, and is therefore, not covered by the said law.
can only be terminated upon reaching the age of majority. Petitioner alleges that
she has married and has become emancipated under Art. 399 of the New Civil Code ISSUE:
thus terminating the guardianship. W/N the Makati Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case in question.

W/N Art. 399 of the Civil Code shall prevail over RA 390. The Makati Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction. The determinative factor (in
determining venue) is the place of the issuance of the check. The offense was
HELD: committed in Makati and therefore, the same is controlling and sufficient to vest
No. The Civil Code does not prevail. It was the clear intent of the legislator to jurisdiction in the Makati Regional Trial Court. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the
create a uniform law for material aid. Inserting provisions of the Civil Code would case and over the person of the accused upon the filing of a complaint or
result in discordance with intent. RA 390 is a special law and thus must be taken to information in court which initiates a criminal action. With regard to Petitioner’s
constitute an exception to the general law which is the Civil Code. RA 390 Sec. 23 allegation that the check is not covered by BP 22, it will be noted that the law does
applies notwithstanding any other provisions of law relating to judicial restoration and not distinguish the currency involved in the case. Thus, the Court revealed that the
discharge of guardians. records of Batasan, Vol. III unmistakably show that the intention of the lawmakers is to
apply the law to whatever currency may be the subject thereof.
9a, 50, b2 LATIN MAXIM:
9a, 17, 24b, 26, 43, b2

National Police Commission v. De Guzman, Jr. China Banking Corporation v. Ortega

Case No. 185 Case No. 21
G.R. No. 106724 (February 9, 1994) G.R. No. L-34964 (January 31, 1973)
Chapter III, Page 96, Footnote No.110

RA 6975, otherwise known as “An Act Establishing the PNP Under a A complaint was filed against B&B Forest Development Corporation for the
Reorganized Dept. of the Interior and Local Government,” laid down the compulsory collection of a sum of money. The trial court declared the said corporation in default.
retirement age of PNP officers. Respondents argue that the age of retirement (56) of The Plaintiff sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of B&B Forest with current
said law cannot be applied to them since they are covered by Sec. 89 of the same Petitioner Bank. Thus, a notice of garnishment was issued by the Deputy Sheriff and
law (which temporarily extended the age of retirement). In other words, Respondents served on Petitioner Bank through its cashier, Tan Kim Liong. He refused to disclose
wanted to be extended the same privileges as the local police. Hence, they the sought information, citing the provisions of RA 1405 which prohibits the disclosure
contend that the term “INP” includes both the former members of the Philippine of any information relative to bank deposits to any person except upon written
Constabulary (PC) and the local police force who were earlier constituted as the permission of the depositor. Furthermore, RA 1405 also imposes criminal liability on any
Integrated National Police (INP). official or employee of a banking institution who breaks the confidential nature of this
W/N the legislative intent was to classify the INP as applicable only to the ISSUE:
local police force. W/N a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a court process
garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking RA 1405.
The intent was to classify the INP in such manner that Sec. 89 of RA 6975 is HELD:
applicable only to the local police force. The use of the term INP is not synonymous No. It was not the intention of the lawmakers to place bank deposits beyond
with the PC. Had it been otherwise, the statute could have just made a uniform the reach of execution to satisfy a final judgment. The discussion of the conference
reference to the members of the whole PNP for retirement purposes and not just the committee report of the two houses of Congress indicates that the prohibition
INP. Indeed, the law distinguishes INP from the PC and it cannot be construed that against examination of or inquiry into a bank deposit under RA 1405 does not
“INP” as used in Sec. 89 includes the members of the PC. The legislature did intend to preclude its being garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment.
exclude the members of the PC from the coverage of Sec. 89 insofar as the
retirement age is concerned. LATIN MAXIM:
9a, 11e, 12b, 30b, 35, 38b, 43, b2
9c, 11a, 12a, 27, b2

Mayon Motors v. Acting CIR Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato

Case No. 173 Case No. 67
G.R. No. 15000 (March 29, 1961) G.R. No. 118910 (November 16, 1995)
Chapter III, Page 96, Footnote No.111

Petitioner Company imported 17 Pontiac automobiles in three different Petitioners seek for reconsideration of Kilosbayan, et al. v. Guingona. The
shipments. Respondent assessed against Petitioner deficiency advance sales tax on Court has determined that Petitioner has no standing to sue but did not dismiss the
the automobiles. Petitioner requested for reconsideration and, this request having case. Petitioners insist that the PCSO cannot hold and conduct charity sweepstakes,
been denied, it recurred to the Court of Tax Appeals. After the hearing, said court lotteries and other similar activities in collaboration or joint venture with any other
modified Respondent’s decision by requiring Petitioner to pay a sum more than what party because of the clause “except for the activities mentioned in the preceding
the acting Commissioner on Internal Revenue assessed and denying its claim for a paragraph (A)” in paragraph (B) of Sec. 1 of RA 1169 as amended by BP 42.
refund. Hence this appeal. Petitioner assails the procedure adopted by the tax court
and insists the court’s interpretation of the Tax Code erroneous invoking a statement ISSUE:
made by then Congressman Ferdinand Marcos during the deliberations on the W/N under its charter (RA 1169, as amended) the Philippine Charity
amendments for the Tax Code. Sweepstakes Office can enter in any form of association or collaboration with any
party in operating an on-line lottery.
W/N the opinion of a legislator in the deliberations of a law, controlling in the HELD:
interpretation of the law. No. Petitioner’s interpretation fails to take into account not only the location
of the phrase in paragraph (B), when it should be in paragraph (A) had that been
HELD: the intention of the lawmaking authority, but also the phrase “by itself.” What the
No. Courts are not bound by a legislator’s opinion expressed in congressional PCSO is prohibited from doing is from investing in a business engaged in sweepstakes,
debates regarding the interpretation of a particular legislation. It is deemed to be a races, lotteries and other similar activities. It is prohibited from doing so “whether in
mere personal opinion of the legislator. collaboration, association or joint venture” with others or “by itself.”


b2 34, 36b

Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. v. Luzon Marine Department Union Commissioner of Customs v. Court of Tax Appeals
Case No. 77 Case No. 71
G.R. No. 9265 (April 29, 1957) G.R. Nos. 48886-8 (July 21, 1993)
Chapter III, Page 101, Footnote No.133

Petitioner files a case to review a resolution issued by the Court of Industrial Iligan Express Corporation maintains a berthing facility at Kiwalan, Iligan City.
Relations ruling that the 20 minutes’ rest given to employees after mealtime should Respondent Company availed of such facilities and as thus assessed berthing fees by
not be deducted from the four hours of overtime work. Employees of the company the Collector of Custom which were paid by the said shipping company under
are seamen working in tugboats from 6:00 am – 6:00 pm (12 hours of work, four hours protest.
overtime), given three free meals a day and 20 minutes’ rest after mealtime.
ISSUE: W/N a vessel berthing at a privately-owned wharf should be charged
1. W/N the definition for "hours of work" as presently applied to dry land berthing fees under Sec. 2901 of the Tariff and Custom Code, as amended by P.D.
laborers equally applicable to seamen. 34.
2. W/N a different criterion should be applied by virtue of the fact that the
seamen's employment is completely different in nature as well as in condition of work HELD:
from that of a dry land laborer. No. Liability does not attach if the port is privately-owned. Sec. 2901 of the
Tariff and Custom Code, as amended by P.D. 34 speaks of the “national ports” only.
HELD: Sec. 2901 did not distinguish between national ports and private ports until it was
The definition of “hours of work” equally applies to seamen and no need for a amended by the presidential decree, and this amendment indicates a legislative
different criterion. Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 444, known as the Eight-Hour Labor Law, provides intent to change the meaning of the provision from the original. Since the said law
that “when the work is not continuous, the time during which the laborer is not limits the berthing taxes to national ports only, it is obvious that the private ports are
working and can leave his working place and can reset completely, shall not be not included. Kiwalan is not a national port in the Custom memorandum circular
counted” in the eight working hours. A laborer need not leave the premises of the 33-73 or E.O. 72.
factory, shop or boat in order that his period of rest shall not be counted, it being
enough that he “cease to work,” and may rest completely. LATIN MAXIM:
6c, 25d, 30a
6c, 26

Buenaseda v. Secretary Flavier Carolina Industries Inc. v. CMS Stock Brokerage Inc.
Case No. 40 Case No. 47
G.R. No. 106719 (September 21, 1993) G.R. No. L-46908 (May 17, 1980)
Chapter III, Page 104, Footnote No.141 Chapter III, Page 106, Footnote No.146

The Private Respondents filed an administrative complaint with the Petitioner opened a margin account with Respondent for purchasing,
Ombudsman against the Petitioner for the violation of the Anti-graft and Corrupt carrying and selling stocks and securities listed in the Makati stock exchange. Within
Practices Act. In response, the Ombudsman filed an order directing the preventive three months, the Petitioner’s amount deposited was completely wiped out without
suspension of the Petitioners, who were employees of the national center for mental his permission. Respondent says there was consent but the evidence did not suffice
health. The Respondent argue that the preventive suspension laid by the to prove such consent. Respondent now question the appellate court’s ruling on their
Ombudsman under Sec. 24 of RA 6770 is contemplated in by Sec. 13(8) of Art. 9 of violation of the SEC rules and securities Act, and how these statutes are interpreted,
the 1987 Constitution, while the Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman can only the appellate court used foreign jurisprudence in coming up with this decision.
recommend to the Heads of Departments and other agencies the preventive
suspension of officials and employees facing administrative investigation conducted ISSUE:
by his office. W/N there is a violation of the rules and Regulations of stock trading.

W/N the Ombudsman has the power to preventively suspend government If the law renders the customers as incapable of protecting himself, it is the
officials working in other offices other than that of the Ombudsman pending the duty of the broker to do so. The courts use of a ruling in foreign case is only right
investigation of administrative complaints. because the prevailing laws are patterned after those of the United States.


Yes. The Ombudsman has the power to suspend the employees of the said 6d, 9
institution may it be in punitive or preventive suspension. Sec. 13(3) of the Constitution
refers to “suspension” in its punitive sense, as the same speaks of penalties in
administrative cases, while Sec. 24 of RA 6770 grants the Ombudsman the power to
preventively suspend public officials and employees facing administrative charges.
This statute is procedural and may arise in order to facilitate a speedy and efficient
investigation on cases filed against the officers. A preventive measure is not in itself a
punishment but a preliminary step in an administrative investigation.

27, 28

Zamora v. Collector of Internal Revenue Tamayo v. Gsell

Case No. 176 Case No. 282
G. R. No L-15290 (May 31, 1963) G. R. No 10765 (December 22, 1916)
Chapter III, Page 106, Footnote No.149

Mariano Zamora, owner of the Bay View Hotel and Farmacia Zamora Manila, This is an action for damages against the Defendant for personal injuries
filed his income tax returns for the years 1951 and 1952. The Collector of Internal suffered by Braulio Tamayo, 11-year old son of the Plaintiff. The injury was attributed to
Revenue found that he failed to file his return of the capital gains derived from the the boy’s inexperience in the work which he had been assigned for the first time and
sale of certain real properties and claimed deductions which were not allowable. without prior instruction.
Mariano Zamora and his deceased sister Felicidad Zamora, bought a piece
of land located in Manila on May 16, 1944, for P132,000.00 and sold it for P75,000.00 ISSUE:
on March 5, 1951. They also purchased a lot located in Q.C. for P68,959.00 on W/N the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages under the Employer’s Liability
January 19, 1944 which they sold for P94,000.00 on Feb. 9, 1951. The CTA ordered the Act.
estate of the late Felicidad Zamora, to pay the sum of P235.00, representing alleged
deficiency income tax and surcharge due from said estate. Esperanza Zamora HELD:
appealed and alleged that the CTA erred. Yes. The Legislature intended that the measure of damages in personal injury
cases brought under the Employer’s Liability Act to be the same as that in the
ISSUE: country from which the Act was taken, being of American origin.
W/N the CTA erred in computing the taxes due for payment by Mariano
No. The appraisal is correct and the court found no plausible reason to disturb
the same.


Ossorio v. Posadas Campos Rueda Corp. v. Sta. Cruz Timber Co. and Felix
Case No. 93 Case No. 17
G.R. No. L-31088 (December 3, 1929) G.R. No. L-6884 (March 21, 1956)

Plaintiff and appellant filed for the recovery from the Defendant Collector of The Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the case of Petitioner against
Internal Revenue the sum of P56,246.72, which the Defendant, according to the Respondent to recover the value of two promissory notes for the amounts of P1,125
complaint, collected from the Plaintiff in excess of what he should have collected by and P1,075, for lack of jurisdiction; holding that the two notes constitute two separate
way of income tax. causes of action involving less than P2,000. The Municipal Court likewise dismissed the
case of Petitioner Corporation against Respondents for collection of the same
ISSUE: promissory notes object of the former action, on the ground that the amount of two
W/N the paraphernal property of the Plaintiff’s wife constitutes her “separate notes, which Petitioner now consolidated under a single cause of action, was in
estate” within the scope and meaning of this phrase for the purposes of the excess of its jurisdiction.
additional income tax.
HELD: W/N the Municipal Court of Manila has jurisdiction over the subject matter of
Yes. It is ordered that the Defendant make two separate assessments of the appellant’s complaint.
additional income tax, one against the Plaintiff, and the other against his wife on her
paraphernal property, returning the sum of P56,203.59 to said plaintiff, without HELD:
prejudice to his levying against and collecting from said Plaintiff’s wife upon her own No. The jurisdiction of a court depends, not upon the value or demand in
separate individual declaration, in accordance with law, the additional income tax each single case of action contained in the complaint, but upon the totality of the
for the income from her paraphernal property. demand in all the causes of action.


b2 6c, 7a

Ang Giok Chio vs. Springfield Fire & Marine Insurance Co. Pando v. Kette and Sellner
Case No. 8 Case No. 99
G.R. No. 33637 (December 31, 1931) G.R. No. 32124 (March 27, 1930)

Petitioner’s warehouse was destroyed by fire while the policy taken out with This is a foreclosure of mortgage. In pursuant thereof, the sheriff on January 30,
Respondent for the amount of P10,000 was in force. The Respondent Company has 1929, posted notices of the sale of the land in said writ in 3 public places, to wit, upon
appealed claiming that Petitioner violated a rider on the insurance contract. the land itself, at the market, and on the municipal building of Pasay. Notice of the
sale was sent to the newspaper La Opinion for publication, and the editor certified
ISSUE: that he published it once a week for 3 consecutive weeks, more particularly on the
W/N a rider as forming part of the contract of insurance is null and void 2nd, 9th, and 15th of February, 1929 and the sale took place on February 19, 1929.
because it does not comply with the Philippine Insurance Act.
HELD: W/N the posted notices of the sale in 3 public places and publication in La
Yes. A rider attached to the face of the insurance policy and referred to in Opinion once a week for 3 consecutive weeks satisfied the requirements of the law
the contract of insurance, is valid and sufficient under Sec. 65 of the Philippine regarding the notice of the sale in question.
Insurance Act as it was taken verbatim from Sec. 2605 of the Civil Code of California
which states, “The section as it now reads is in harmony with the rule that a warranty HELD:
may be contained in another instrument than the policy when expressly referred to in Yes. The Provision of our Code of Civil Procedure having been adopted from
the policy as forming a part thereof.” Sec. 692 of the California Code, the requirements of the law regarding the notice of
the sale in question have been substantially complied with.
6c, 7a, b2 LATIN MAXIM:

Reyes v. Wells Phil. Educ. Co. v. Soriano

Case No. 135 Case No. 235
G.R. No. 30587 (December 4, 1929) G.R. No. L-22405 (June 30, 1971)
Chapter III, Page 107, Footnote No.156

Defendants offered to sell to Plaintiffs an installed maguey stripping machine Montinola sought to purchase money orders from Manila Post Office. He
and an International truck in a shed lot for P23,000. However, Plaintiff Guerrero said managed to leave the building without knowledge of the teller. Palomar received
that he could not do so for the lack of money to operate the machine. Respondent one money order as part of their sales receipt and subsequently deposited it in the
Rader promised to furnish said Plaintiff with the amount he would need. Plaintiff Bank of America. Respondent, Chief of the Money Order Division of the Manila Post
would just have to make out two promissory notes in favour of the mortgage. Office notified the Bank of irregularity, and deducted from the bank’s clearing
Defendant Rader and Plaintiff Guerrero went to J. Northcott, and on June 29, 1922, account the said amount, in the same way the bank of America debited Petitioner’s
the former endorsed the mortgage deed. However, neither the said amount nor any account with the same amount. Petitioner requested to reconsider the action but
part thereof was delivered to Plaintiff Guerrero, or to any of his co-Plaintiffs. Due to was denied.
the failure of J. E. Rader and J. Northcott to pay said amount of P12,000, the Plaintiff
sustained damages for default in the payment of the instalments due. ISSUE:
W/N the postal money order in question is a negotiable instrument.
W/N the promissory notes in question which have not been paid, are not HELD:
supported by the evidence in relation to the competence of the testimony of Postal statutes are patterned after similar statutes enforced in the US. These
Guerrero. are generally constructed and construed in accordance with construction of US’s
own postal statutes, in the absence of any special reason justifying departure from
HELD: the policy or practice. US held that postal money orders are not negotiable
There was evidence on the part of the promissory notes in question. These are instruments.
also in line with Sec. 4604 of the Code of Iowa. The prohibition contained in said law
against a witness’ testifying upon any transaction or communication between himself LATIN MAXIM:
and a deceased person, is substantially the same as that contained in Sec. 383(7) of 2b, 9a, b2
our Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2252. Therefore, we believe
that the construction placed upon it by the court in the cases cited is applicable to
the case at bar.

1, b2

Cruz v. Pahati Republic v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission

Case No. 28 Case No. 132
G.R. No. L-8257 (April 13, 1956) G.R. No. L-29019 (May 18, 1972)

Defendant bought an automobile from Bulahan, for P4,900 which he paid in Petitioners seek full compensation of P6,000.00 plus attorney’s fee of P600.00
check. He cancelled the sale and stopped the payment of the check upon under the WCC, without deducting the P3,000.00 as death benefit which they had
impoundment and as a result, he returned the automobile to Bulahan who in then been previously paid by virtue of the provisions of RA 610.
surrendered the check for cancellation. He set up a counterclaim for attorney's fees.
Bulahan claims that he bought the automobile from Belizo without having any ISSUE:
knowledge of any defect in the title. It was found out that Belizo falsified a letter that W/N the beneficiaries of military personnel who have received the death
enabled him to sell the car of Bulahan for profit. The court rendered judgment gratuity under RA 610 should still be paid the death compensation under the WCC.
declaring Defendant Bulahan entitled to the automobile in question and ordered the
Plaintiff to return it to said Defendant and, upon his failure to do so, to pay him the HELD:
sum of P4,900, with legal interest from the date of the decision. The claim for The resolution of the WCC is modified; the P3,000.00 received under RA 610
damages and attorney's fees of Bulahan was denied. Defendant Belizo was however should be deducted from the full grant received under the WCC. It is difficult to
ordered to indemnify the Plaintiff in the amount of P4,900 and pay the sum of P5,000 construe that the legislature intended to double the compensations received,
as moral damages. The counterclaim of Defendant was denied for lack of evidence. considering that at the times said laws were approved the finances of the
government could not have conceivably permitted the outlays needed for the
ISSUE: purpose. Furthermore, Sec. 9 of RA 610 and Sec. 5 of WCC bar payment under other
Who has a better right of the two over the car. laws. It was also contended that the phrase “or any other law granting similar
benefits to officers or employees, generally, of the national, provincial or municipal
HELD: government” in Sec. 9 is highly indicative of the legislative intent to prevent further
Plaintiff has a better right to the car than Bulahan and therefore can recover recovery of compensation benefits under other laws.
the said car. It was clear that the Plaintiff was unlawfully deprived because of the
scheme of Belizo even if both the Plaintiff and Bulahan acted in good faith. LATIN MAXIM:
17, 19b, 29, 38b, 39, 40b
6c, 7a

Garcia et al. v. Hipolito et al. ESSO Standard Eastern Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Case NO. 53 Case No. 41
G.R. No. L-1449 (November 30, 1903) G.R. No. 70037 (July 7, 1989)

Judgment was rendered for the Defendants on May 1, 1903. The Plaintiffs The case is an appeal on the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals denying
were notified thereof on May 21. Two days after, they excepted to the judgment the Petitioner’s claims for refund of the margin fees P102,246.00 for 1959 and
and presented a motion for a new trial, which was denied on July 23. On July 28, the P434,234.92 for 1960.
Plaintiffs presented their proposed bill of exceptions, which on August 5 was allowed
and signed by the court. The term of the court in which the case was tried expired on ISSUE:
May 30. W/N RA 2609, entitled “An Act to Authorize the Central Bank of the Philippines
to Establish a Margin over Banks’ Selling Rates of Foreign Exchange”, is a police
ISSUE: measure or a revenue measure.
W/N Sec. 143 of the Code of Civil Procedure allows the parties to consent to
or for the judge to order an extension of the 10-day period. HELD:
RA 2609 is a police measure as it is applied in order to strengthen our country’s
HELD: international reserve. Petitioner contended that margin fees are taxes and cited the
The period of 10 days and the subsequent period of 5 days have to do with background and the legislative history of the Margin Fee Law showing that RA 2609
the mechanical part of the appeal—the preparation of the papers for transmission to was nothing less than a revival of the 17% excise tax on foreign exchange imposed
the Supreme Court. The right of the parties to the appeal was already fixed by the by RA 601. This was a revenue measure formally proposed by President Carlos P.
notice of the intention to prepare a bill of exceptions entered of record in the clerk’s Garcia to Congress as part of, and in order to balance, the budget for 1959-1960.
office. If the period corresponds to the appeal or for suing out a writ of error found in The CTA stated that it is a well-settled jurisprudence that only in extremely
most other laws of American origin, it cannot be extended. But that period is entirely doubtful matters of interpretation does the legislative history of an act of Congress
different from the 10 days for allowing the preparation of papers, after the right to become important. As a matter of fact, there may be no resort to the legislative
remove the case has been secured. Therefore, it cannot be said that an extension of history of the enactment of a statute, the language of which is plain and
this time is an extension of the time to appeal. Moreover, considering when the law unambiguous, since such legislative history may only be resorted to for the purpose of
was adopted, it seems impossible that the Commission intended to deprive the court solving doubt, not for the purpose of creating it. Moreover, at least two cases had
and the parties of the power to extend the term, given the physical impossibility to been decided in which it was held that margin fee is not a tax.
comply with it in many cases.
11a, 19b, 27, 48

Commissioner of Customs v. ESSO Standard Eastern Inc. Pascual v. Director of Lands

Case No. 26 Case No. 100
G.R. No. L-28329 (August 17, 1975) G.R. No. L-15816 (February 29, 1964)

Petitioner contends that the special import tax under RA 1394 is separate and Petitioner filed with Respondents, pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 102 C.A.
distinct from the customs duty prescribed by the Tariff and Customs Code, and that No. 141, a petition for the cancellation of the lease contract aforesaid on the ground
the exemption enjoyed by Respondent from the payment of customs duties under that Ramos had failed to pay the rentals on the lands for seven years and the taxes
the Petroleum net of 1949 does not include exemption from the payment of the thereon since 1947, and on the further ground that he and his successors-in-interest
special import tax provided in RA 1394. had not cultivated the property nor introduced improvements thereon, in violation of
the terms and conditions of the lease. The policy in the disposition and concession of
ISSUE: public land is to give priority or preference to the actual occupant. Thus, in cases of
W/N the exemption enjoyed by Respondent from customs duties granted by lease the law requires that no lease shall be permitted to interfere with any prior
RA 387 should include the special import tax imposed by RA 1394, or the Special claim by settlement or by occupation, until the consent of the occupant or settler is
Import Tax Law. first had, or until such claim shall be legally extinguished (Sec. 33, C.A. No. 141). If
anyone should be given prior right of entry at all, it should be the actual occupants
HELD: who have presented several petitions for the subdivision or and sale of the land to
Petitioner took exception to the finding of the CTA that "The language of RA them.
1394 seems to leave no room for doubt that the law intends that the phrase 'Special
Import Tax' is taken to include customs duties". In order to determine the true intent of ISSUE:
the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken W/N the ruling of the trial court upholding Petitioner’s claim to a right of entry
as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be was correct.
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. In fact every statute should
receive such construction as will make it harmonize with the pre-existing body of laws. HELD:
Antagonism between the Acts to be interpreted and existing or previous laws is to be No. It is well settled that the contemporaneous interpretation given by
avoided, unless it was clearly the intention of the legislature that such antagonism administrative officials to a law they are bound to enforce or implement deserves
should arise and one amends or repeals the other, either expressly or by implication. great weight. In the present case, it appears that the trial court reversed not only the
Another rule applied by this Court is that the courts may take judicial notice of the decision of Respondent and of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
origin and history of the statutes which they are called upon to construe and but that of the Office of the President, without the record disclosing in our opinion,
administer, and of facts which affect their derivation, validity and operation. The that the same are clearly erroneous and unfounded. To the contrary, they appear to
Court examined the six statuettes repealed by RA 1394. be in consonance with the purpose of the law invoked by Petitioner, namely, to give
priority or preference to the actual occupant of public land which Petitioner is not.
9a, 36b, 38a, b2 LATIN MAXIM:

Orencia v. Enrile m i k iPeople of the Philippines v. Hernandez

Case No. 92 Case No. 107
G.R. No. L-28997 (February 22, 1974) G.R. Nos. L-39840 and L-39841 (December 23, 1933)

Petitioner is alleging that he is the deputy clerk of court of the Clerks of Court Respondent ran for governor in Camarines Norte and assumed office on
Division of the Land Registration Commission, and he has been performing functions October 16, 1931. At this time, he was a delinquent in the payment of P2,000 for land
of Assistant Chief of said division and has been considered and recognized as such taxes to the government. Two or three days before Respondent assumed office, the
until RA 4040, increasing the salaries of Assistant Chiefs of Divisions, among others, was municipal treasurer demanded him to pay said taxes but he failed to do so. The
implemented where he was left out while co-assistant chief of the nine other divisions Insular Auditor permitted Respondent to receive his salary as governor, on the
of the Land Registration Commission were so recognized and extended increased condition that it would be used to pay off the delinquent taxes. The Chief of
compensation. Respondents filed their answer, and after usual admissions and Executive Bureau and Attorney General agreed with Insular Auditor. By September,
denials, interposed a defense that Petitioner is unqualified for the position of Assistant 1932, taxes had been paid for. However, in April 1932, he was charged for violating
Chief, and being a new position created under RA 4040, the same can only be filed Sec. 2659 of the Administrative code and was found guilty and was deprived the
by a qualified person; that Respondent, being a lawyer, is more qualified than right to suffrage and public office.
Petitioner, who is only a high school graduate with second grade civil service
eligibility, and praying that the petition be dismissed ISSUE:
W/N Sec. 2659 can be applied to refrain Respondent from taking office as
ISSUE: Governor in Camarines Norte.
W/N the Petitioner should be recognized as the deputy clerk of court of the
Clerks of Court Division of the Land Registration Commission. HELD:
No. Sec. 2659 refers to a person who assumes office to which he had been
HELD: elected without possessing the necessary qualifications to hold public office as
For Respondent officials, the answer was not in doubt. Since there was a new provided by law. Delinquency of payment of taxes is no longer a disqualification for
legal provision to be construed, one which admittedly, to follow the approach of assuming a public office. Hence, even though Respondent did not pay his land
counsel for Petitioner, has an ambiguous aspect, they chose to follow the principle taxes, this does not incapacitate him from assuming office. Under these
that a public office is a public trust. Certainly, such a contemporaneous construction, circumstances, we should follow the doctrine laid down in the cases of Molina vs.
one moreover dictated by the soundest constitutional postulate, is entitled to the Rafferty: long continued administrative interpretation of a tax law, while not
highest respect from the judiciary. conclusive, should be followed unless clearly erroneous. And in this case, it was not.


2a 2a, 32, 42b

Sagun v. People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation Philippine Global Communications, Inc. v. Relova
Case No. 266 Case No. 236
G.R. No. 73603 (June 22, 1988) G.R. No. L-60548 (November 10, 1986)
Chapter III, Page 112, Footnote No.180 Chapter III, Page 112, Footnote No.181

Respondent Corporation was created to provide decent, low cost housing for In 1976, Petitioner filed with the Board of Communication, now NTC, an
those who are unable to provide themselves with this. In accordance with RA 3208, application for authority to establish a branch station in Cebu for the purpose of
the lots located in Block 330, LCH Project 3, Quezon City were meant to be used for rendering international telecommunication services from Cebu to any point outside
this purpose. However, the Petitioners first used the lots for store purposes, before the Philippines where it is authorized to operate. In 1977, Manila was designated as
converting these store units into their dwelling homes. In 1971, Petitioners decided the sole gateway for communications in the Philippines. In January 1979, BOC gave
that they wanted to buy these lots from Respondent Corporation but filed a petition Petitioners authority to establish a station in Cebu, subject to that as soon as domestic
for mandamus alleging that Respondent Corporation was selling the lots at P50/sq carriers have upgraded their facilities, applicant shall cease its operations.
m., which was in violation of RA 3802. Respondents filed a joint motion for reconsideration of said decision, which ruled in
favor of the Respondents claiming that Petitioner does not have the authority to
ISSUE: establish other stations aside from the station in Makati. This is a petition seeking to set
W/N Respondent Corporation can be compelled by mandamus to sell these aside the ruling rendered.
lots for not more than P10/sq m. to its registered tenants or their successors in interest,
in reference to Sec. 1 of RA 3802. ISSUE:
W/N Petitioner is authorized under RA 4617 to establish stations in places or
HELD: points outside Metro Manila?
No. For mandamus to lie, Petitioner’s rights should be well-defined, clear and
certain. In the case at bar, there is no showing of a clear and certain right to compel HELD:
Respondent Corporation to sell them the units for a price lower than what is being Yes. RA 4617 clearly authorizes Petitioner to construct, maintain, and operate,
offered. The Petitioners first leased these units for business purposes. Thus, the price of apart from its principal station in Makati, other stations or branches within the
P50 is not excessive or unreasonable considering that the market value for the lots is Philippines for purposes of its international communications operations. This can be
at least P120. The action of Respondent Corporation neither conflicts with the law nor seen in Sec. 3 and 4 wherein other stations may be established as long as it is
does it demonstrate any abuse of discretion to warrant its reversal. Moreover, there is approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The opinion of the
no obligation of Respondent Corporation, under RA 3802, aside from the fact that Secretary and Undersecretary of Justice which affirmed the authorization of other
the determination of the selling price requires exercise of discretion on their part. stations is material and must be considered in favor of the Petitioners.


2a, 9a 2a, 36b

Asturias Sugar Central v. Commissioner of Customs Phil. Sugar Central Agency v. Collector of Customs
Case No. 24 Case No. 241
No. L-19337 (September 30 1969) No. 27761 (Dec. 6 1927)
Chapter III, Page 112, Footnote No.183 Chapter III, Page 113, Footnote No.186

Petitioner filed a petition for review of the unfavorable decision of the CTA Petitioner acts as agency and attorney-in-fact of Ma-ao Sugar Central Co.
which denied the recovery of the sum of P28,629.42 which the Petitioner paid under Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. shipped 5,124,416 gross kilos of centrifugal sugar to United
protest in the concept of customs duties and special import tax. States in a wharf on Pulapandan, Occidental Negros on steamship Hannover. Wharf
Under the law in effect at that time, the Petitioner is entitled to recovery of was built and maintained solely by the Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. Defendant
taxes and duties paid for importation of containers provided importer re-exports said collected wharfage dues on petitioner’s wharf.
containers within a 1year period.
Also Asturias contends that they are entitled to an alternative recovery of the ISSUE:
said amount minus 1% under Sec. 106(b) of the Customs and Tariff Act. W/N the Defendant can collect wharfage dues on wharves not owned by
W/N Petitioner is entitled to recovery of import taxes and duties. HELD:
Yes. The Government can be allowed to collect because not to do so “would
HELD: overthrow and destroy the whole system of the Government, in and by which millions
No. The 1-year period mentioned in the Philippine Tariff Act contains no of pesos have been levied and collected and expended in the construction of
express mention of any extension or of any grounds for it to be extended. Government wharves, and it would have defeated the construction of the
The provisions invoked by the Petitioner to sustain his claim for refund, offer Government wharf at Pulapandan.”
two options to an importer. The first gives him the privilege of importing, free from
import duties, the containers mentioned therein as long as he exports them within Dissenting Opinion:
one year from the date of acceptance of the import entry, it is non-extendible. The Historically, wharves not owned nor operated by government cannot be
second contemplates a case where import duties are first paid subject to refund to taxed or levied upon.
the extent of 99% of the amount paid, provided the articles mentioned are exported
within three years from importation. LATIN MAXIM:
3a, 4, 37, 5b, 11d
2a, 4, 38b, 43

Manila Jockey Club Inc. v. Games and Amusement Board Ramos v. CA

Case No. 164 Case No. 253
No. L-12727 (February 29, 1960) G.R. No. L-22753 (December 18, 1967)
Chapter III, Page 114, Footnote No.190 Chapter III, Page 115, Footnote No.193

The Petitioner states that they are entitled to certain Sundays unreserved for The present case had its incipiency in a petition filed by the then National
any event and that reducing the number of said days is an infringement of their right. Rice and Corn Corporation (NARIC) workers for an obligation created by agreement
Petitioner relies on the strength of Sec. 4 of RA 309, as amended by RA 983, that the confirmed by the Court of Industrial Relations directing NARIC to pay 25% for
unreserved Sundays may be used by private individuals or groups duly licensed by additional compensation for overtime work, night work and work rendered on
the Games and Amusement Board (GAB). RA 1502 increased the sweepstakes draw Sundays and legal holidays by its laborers and employees. Rice and Corn
and races to 12 but without specifying the days on which they are to be run, the GAB Administration (RCA) claims that unlike NARIC, which was possessed with a distinct
reduced the number of racing days assigned to private individuals and entities by six. and separate corporate existence, they are merely an office directly under the
President, a governmental machinery to carry out a declared government policy to
ISSUE: stabilize the price of palay, rice, and corn, and not for profit. To carry out this
W/N the Petitioner has a right to the unreserved days. function, by law of the Commonwealth Act otherwise known as the Budget Act, RCA
depends for its continuous operation on appropriation yearly set aside by the
HELD: General Appropriations Act. There has been consistent administrative interpretation
No. From the wording of the RA 309 and RA 983, it is clear that the text is by the Office of the President as to what may, under law, be granted to RCA workers
permissive and is not mandatory. The private individuals and entities are not entitled and employees for overtime work and work on Sundays and holidays. Not a matter
to the use of such days. Petitioner’s claim that the intent of the legislature was to of right, such compensation was given upon authority of the Budgetary Act.
allow the races and sweepstakes to be run on the same day are untenable. The
words of members of Congress are not representative of the entire House of ISSUE:
Representatives or Senate. Also, Petitioner’s claim that to allow the PCSO to use their W/N RCA should be held answerable – when NARIC ceased to exist and RCA
equipment and property is deprivation of property is also untenable because they was created – for the said obligation.
have a rental agreement with the PCSO.
LATIN MAXIM: While executive construction is not necessarily binding upon courts, it is
6c, 6g, 37, 38b entitled to great weight and consideration. The reason for this is that such
construction comes from the particular branch of government called upon to
implement the particular law involved. Thus, unless the President specifically
appropriates the 25% compensation, RCA is not liable to the abovementioned

2a, 11a, 38b

Salaria v. Buenviaje University of the Philippines v. CA

Case No. 267 Case No. 305
G.R. No. L-45642 (February 28, 1978) G.R. No. L-28153 (January 28, 1971)
Chapter III, Page 115, Footnote No.193 Chapter III, Page 115, Footnote No.195

Petitioner has been staying on the land of Cailao when the latter sold the said With the filing of Petition for injunction in the Court of First Instance of Manila,
land to Private Respondent Mendiola. A formal letter of demand to vacate the Petitioners in the original case sought to restrain herein Respondent from dismissing
premises was sent by Respondent Mendiola to Petitioner. A complaint for unlawful them and to declare as a matter of legal right that they should not be dismissed from
detainer was filed by Mendiola against Petitioner Salaria. After the trial, the City Court the Philippine General Hospital by herein Respondent but by the Civil Service
ordered Petitioner to vacate the leased premises. On appeal, the CFI through Commissioner.
Respondent Judge Buenviaje affirmed the decision of the inferior court. Thus, a
petition for review on Certiorari was filed with the Supreme Court. ISSUE:
W/N the dismissal of original Petitioners in the case by the Board of Regents is
ISSUE: final, or requires further action by the Civil Service Commission.
W/N Respondent can eject Petitioner from the lot.
HELD: The management of Philippine General hospital was initially under the Office
No. Memorandum Circular No. 970 was issued by the President stating that of the President of the Philippines. Under RA 51 and E.O. 94, the President transferred
“except for the causes for judicial ejectment of lessees … bona fide tenants of them under herein Respondent. Thus, the Supreme Court ruled that the President and
dwelling places covered by said decree are not subject to eviction, particularly if the Board of Regents of the U.P. possess full and final authority in disciplining, suspension,
only cause of action thereon is personal use of the property by the owners or their and removal of the civil service employees of the University, including those of the
families.” Construction by Executive Branch of Government of a particular law Philippine General Hospital, independently of the Commissioner of the Civil Service
although not binding upon courts must be given weight as the construction comes and the Civil Service Board of Appeals.
from that branch called upon to implement the law. The ground relied upon by the
lessor in this case, namely, personal use of property by the owner or lessors or their
families is not one of the causes for judicial ejectment of lessees. LATIN MAXIM:
2a, 6c, 9b, 20c, 38b
2a, 30a, 38b

Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) v. Bureau of Labor Relations Everett v. Bautista
Case No. 120 Case No. 43
G.R. No. L-43760 (August 21, 1976) G.R. No. 46505 (November 7, 1939)

Petitioner lost to National Federation of Free Labor Unions (NAFLU) in the Petitioner and Respondent were partners who owned and managed
certification elections for the exclusive bargaining agent of the employees in Queen’s Theater during the first Quarter of 1937. The partnership charged admission
Philippine Blooming Mills, Company, Inc. fees of P0.40 per seat and at other times charged more than P0.40 but not more than
Tallied votes are as follows: P0.70 per seat. During the first Quarter of 1937, their receipts were P15, 881.41. At that
NAFLU 429 time, imposition tax is at 5% of the gross receipts of theaters, cinematographs, etc.
PAFLU 414 whose admission price exceeds P0.40 (Sec. 1&3 of C.A. No. 128). The law does not
Spoiled Ballots 17 (not counted) say how tax should be imposed in cases where the daily receipts are not made at
Abstained 4 the same rate. As such, the Collector of Internal Revenue issued Regulations No. 94,
Total Ballots 864 which states that the daily receipts of prices charged differently will be jointly taken
(Note: NAFLU didn’t obtain the majority vote, which is 432.) into account for computation purposes. Sec. 1458 of the Administrative Code states
Petitioner contends that the spoiled should be considered as in the ruling in a that penalty for late payment will be at 25% of the tax imposed. The parties failed to
previous case. Respondent answered that the ruling in the previous case was based pay the tax on time and therefore subject to Sec. 1458. They were asked to pay
on the Industrial Peace Act, which has been superseded by the present Labor Code P992.50, which they refused to pay.
and as such cannot apply to the case at bar.
ISSUE: 1. W/N the collection to said tax is in accordance with law.
W/N the Respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion by not allowing 2. W/N Regulations No. 94 is in accordance with law.
the spoiled ballots to be considered as in the previous case of Allied Workers
Association of the Philippines vs. CIR. HELD:
Yes to both. The interpretation given to a law by an officer charged by reason
HELD: of his office to carry out its provisions should be respected. It has also been held that
There was no grave abuse of discretion made by Respondent since the basis where there is ambiguity in the language of the law, contemporaneous construction
of the ruling in the Allied Workers case has been superseded by the present Labor is given weight.
Code. Also, the Rules and Regulations implementing the present Labor Code has
been already been made known to public and as such has the enforcing power in LATIN MAXIM:
the case at bar. 2a

1, 2a, 39a

Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees’ Union (IBAAEU) v. Inciong Philippine Apparel Workers Union vs. NLRC
Case No. 62 Case No. 119
G.R. No. L-52415 (October 23, 1984) G.R. No. L-50320 (March 30, 1988)

Petitioner first filed a complaint to the lower Court against Insular Bank of Asia A collective bargaining agreement was made between Petitioners and
and America (IBAA) for not paying the holiday pay. The Petition was granted and Management of Philippine Apparel Inc. (PAI) on April 2, 1977 and was signed on
IBAA paid for the holiday wage. Later, IBAA stopped paying the holiday wage in September 7, 1977. CBA stipulated a P22.00 increase in monthly wage of workers that
compliance to the issuance of Sec. 2 of the Rules and Regulations implementing the will retroact from April 1, 1977. However, on May of the same year, P.D. 1123 granted
Labor Code and the Policy Instruction No. 9 issued by Respondent (then Secretary of a P60.00 increase in living allowance which will take effect from January 1, 1977,
DOLE). Petitioner filed for a motion for a writ of execution to enforce the arbiter’s provided that those who were granted an increase of less that P60.00 will be given
decision of paying the holiday wages and the motion was granted. IBAA then the difference. Management argues that since on April 2, there has been an
appealed to NLRC and NLRC dismissed the appeal. At this point, IBAA filed a motion agreement to a P22.00 increase, PAI only had to pay the difference of P38.00.
for reconsideration to Respondent. Respondent granted IBAA’s motion for Moreover, PAI was able to get the opinion of the Undersecretary of Labor supporting
reconsideration. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari charging Respondent of the PAI Management. Labor contends that increase does not fall within the
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. exemption since the CBA was signed on September after P.D. 1123 has been passed.

1. W/N the decision of the Labor Arbiter can be set aside by Respondent W/N the case falls under the exception of P.D. 1123.
considering that it has become final and had been partially executed.
2. W/N Sec. 2 of Implementing Rules and Policy Instruction No. 9 are valid. HELD:
No. There was no formal agreement on April 2, 1977 regarding the increase.
HELD: Moreover, the opinion of the Undersecretary of Labor was based on a wrong premise
A judgment in a labor case that has become executory cannot be revoked and misinterpretation by PAI Management. It was unlawful and beyond the scope of
after finality of judgment. In the case at bar, IBAA waived its right to appeal by law.
paying the holiday wage and is therefore deemed to have accepted the judgment
as correct. Sec. 2 and Policy Instruction No. 9 are both null and void since they LATIN MAXIM:
amended the provisions of the Labor Code. It has been held that where the 2a
language of the law is clear and unequivocal the law must be taken to mean
exactly what it says. And also, if a contemporaneous construction is so erroneous, the
same must be declared null and void.

6c, 17, 37, 40c

United Christian Missionary Society vs. Social Security Commission Yra v. Abaño
Case No. 293 Case No. 316
G.R. No. L-26712-16 (December 27, 1969) G.R. No. 30187 (November 15, 1928)
Chapter III, Page 206, Footnote No.206 Chapter III, Page 118, Footnote No.214

Petitioner is a volunteer group that did not know that they had to pay tax for Respondent was running for office in Bulacan, his hometown. However, he is a
their operations. Nevertheless, upon knowledge thereof, they paid their premium registered voter in Manila and to be a candidate, one of the qualifications is that
remittances but refused to pay the incredible penalty fees since they did not know he/she who is running should be a “duly qualified elector therein”.
that they had to pay the aforementioned premium remittances, claiming that the
assessed penalties were inequitable. Respondent said that their organization is ISSUE:
embraced in the Social Security Act; therefore the assessed penalties are imposed W/N Respondent is an eligible to run as a local official of Bulacan.
on them.
ISSUE: Yes. He is qualified to run for local office. In a previous case contested in the
W/N Respondent erred in ruling that it has no authority under the Social Philippine Assembly, Fernando Ma. Guerrero a candidate for representative to the
Security Act to condone, waive or relinquish the penalty prescribed by law for late Phil. Assembly was alleged to be unqualified for the position on the ground that he
payment of remittances. was not registered in his electoral district. The conclusion to which was, “qualified
elector” meant that he has all the qualifications provided by the law to be a voter
HELD: and need not be register. The same was the case and decision of the Executive
Respondent has no such authority. Petition is dismissed on the ground that in Bureau on the qualifications of Senator Jose P. Laurel. It is sufficient that he possess
the absence of an express provision in the Social Security Act vesting Respondent the the qualifications stated in Sec. 431 and none of the disqualifications stated in Sec.
power to condone penalties, it has no legal authority to condone, waive, or 432 of the Election Law. However, it is not least to disregard the forcible argument
relinquish the penalty for late premium remittances mandatorily imposed under the advanced that when the law make use of the phrases, “qualified electors” and
SS Act. The reason of the law is “to develop, establish gradually and perfect a social “qualified voter” the law means what it says. It would be an absurdity to hold one a
security system which shall be suitable to the needs of the people… to provide qualified elector who was not eligible to vote in his own municipality.
employees against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age, and death.” Good
faith and bad faith are irrelevant since the law makes no distinction. Where the LATIN MAXIM:
language of the law is clear and the intent of the legislature is equally plain, there is 2a, 3a, 6c, 11a
no room for interpretation.

6a, 6b, 7a, 9a, 26

Interprovincial Autobus Co., Inc. v. CIR In re: McCulloch Dick

Case No. 134 Case No. 129
G.R. No. L-6741 (January 31, 1956) G.R. No. L-13862 (April 15, 1918)
Chapter III, Page 120-121, Footnote No.222 & 227 Chapter III, Page 120, Footnote No.223

Petitioner is engaged in transporting passengers and freight by means of TPU Petitioner, the editor and proprietor of the Philippines Free Press, filed for a writ
buses in Misamis Occidental and Northern Zamboanga. The provincial revenue of habeas corpus so that he may be discharged from detention by the acting chief
agent for Misamis Occidental examined the stubs of the freight receipts that had of police of the city of Manila. He is being detained because the Governor-General
been issued by Petitioner. The stubs and the daily reports of the conductor did not of the Philippines ordered his deportation. Before the Governor-General gave his
state the value of the goods transported. Pursuant to Sec. 121 and 127 of the Revised order, there was an investigation in the manner and form prescribed in Sec. 69 of the
Documentary Stamp Tax Regulations of the Department of Finance, the agent Administrative Code.
assumed that the value of the goods was more than P5. Petitioner asked for a refund
and the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental rendered a judgment in their ISSUE:
favor but the Court of Appeals reversed the decision. W/N the Governor-General has the power under Act No. 2113 and Sec. 69 of
the Administrative Code to institute and maintain deportation proceedings.
1. W/N the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the case. HELD:
2. W/N the Court of Appeals’ decision is erroneous. Yes, the Governor-General has the power to institute and maintain
deportation proceedings. “When the provisions of Act No. 2113 were enacted and
HELD: ‘continued in force’ by the enactment of the Administrative Code and again
The Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction because according to both the Judiciary ‘continued in force’ by the enactment of the Jones Law the construction theretofore
Act of 1948 and the Constitution the Supreme Court has the exclusive appellate placed upon it by this court became an integral part of these statutes having the
jurisdiction over all cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment or tolls, force and the effect of a legislative command.” In the interpretation of reenacted
or any penalty in relation thereto. The decision of the Court of Appeals however was statutes, the court will follow the construction which they received when previously in
not erroneous: force. The legislature will be presumed to know the effect which such statutes
a. Sec. 121 falls within the scope of administrative power of the Secretary of originally had, and by reenactment to intend that they should again have the same
Finance as authorized in Sec. 79 of the Revised Administrative Code. effect.
b. The regulation (Sec. 121) is valid also because of the principle of legislative
approval be re-enactment. The regulations were approved on September 16, LATIN MAXIM:
1924. When the National Internal Revenue Code was approved on February 1, 3a, 4, 9a
18, 1939, the same provisions of stamp tax, bills of landing and receipts were

2a, 4

Howden & Co., Ltd. v. Collector of Internal Revenue Laxamana v. Baltazar

Case No. 9 Case No. 144
G.R. No. L-19392 (April 14, 1965) G.R. No. L-5955 (September 19, 1952)
Chapter III, Page 120, Footnote No.222 and 224 Chapter III, Page 121, Footnote No.225

Commonwealth Insurance Co. (CIC), a domestic corporation, entered into The Mayor of Pampanga was suspended. By virtue of Sec. 2195 of the
reinsurance contracts with 32 British companies not engaged in business in the Revised Administrative Code, Respondent Vice Mayor assumed the office. However,
Philippines represented by herein Plaintiff. CIC remitted to Plaintiff reinsurance the Provincial Governor, by virtue of Sec. 21 of the Revised Election Code, appointed
premiums and, on behalf of Plaintiff, paid income tax on the premiums. Plaintiff filed herein Petitioner as the mayor.
a claim for a refund of the paid tax, stating that it was exempted from withholding
tax reinsurance premiums received from domestic insurance companies by foreign ISSUE:
insurance companies not authorized to do business in the Philippines. Plaintiffs stated W/N Respondent is the right person to assume office.
that since Sec. 53 and 54 were “substantially re-enacted” by RA 1065, 1291 and 2343,
said rulings should be given the force of law under the principle of legislative HELD:
approval by re-enactment. Yes, Respondent should assume the vacated position. Sec. 21 of the Revised
Election Code, which was taken from Sec. 2180 of the Revised Admin Code, applies
ISSUE: to municipal officers in general while Sec. 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code
W/N the tax should be withheld. applies to the office of mayor in particular. A special provision overrides a general
one. Also, the incorporation of Sec. 2180 in Sec. 21 does not enlarge its scope but
HELD: merely supplements it. It has also been consistently held in case of suspension of the
No. The principle of legislative enactment states that where a statute is mayor, the vice-mayor shall assume office; the legislature is presumed to be
susceptible of the meaning placed upon it by a ruling of the government agency acquainted with this contemporaneous interpretation. Hence, upon re-enacting Sec.
charged with its enforcement and the legislature thereafter re-enacts the provisions 2180, the interpretation is deemed to have been adopted.
without substantial changes, such action is confirmatory to an extent that the ruling
carries out the legislative purpose. This principle is not applicable for the LATIN MAXIM:
aforementioned sections were never re-enacted. Only the tax rate was amended. 1, 4, 38b, 50
The administrative rulings invoked by the CIR were only contained in unpublished
letters. It cannot be assumed that the legislature knew of these rulings. Finally, the
premiums remitted were to indemnify CIC against liability. This took place within the
Philippines, thus subject to income tax.

2a, 4

Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice NPC v. Province of Lanao del Sur

Case No. 32 Case No. 187
G.R. No. L-42821 (January 18, 1936) G.R. No. 96700 (November 19, 1996)
Chapter III, Page 121, Footnote No.226 Chapter III, Page 122, Footnote No.232

Petitioner was appointed justice of the peace for Lingayen, Pangasinan. He Petitioner Corporation was assessed real property taxes by Respondent since
relinquished his office after he had reached the age of 65 because of the provisions its tax exempt status was revoked by P.D. 1931. Because of the Petitioner’s failure to
of Act No. 3899. Petitioner claimed that he was entitled to the benefits under the pay, the properties were auctioned with the Respondent as the sole bidder.
vetoed Sec. 7 of the Retirement Gratuity Law which entitled justices of the peace to Petitioner contends that its status was never revoked but merely suspended. With the
gratuities. Petitioner was contesting the validity of the veto of the Governor-General Resolutions issued by the Fiscal Incentives Review Board (FIRB), the tax exemption
by claiming that the Act was not an appropriation bill and hence, was not subject to privileges of the Petitioners were restored. However, Respondent contends that the
item-veto. Resolutions issued by the said Board was void relying on an earlier case between the
Petitioner and the Province of Albay stating that FIRB does not have power to restore
ISSUE: tax exemptions and that the said Board can only recommend to the President or the
W/N the veto of the Governor-General of Sec. 7 was valid. Minister of Finance which subsidiary of the Government can be given exemptions.
Note however, that the Albay case was already superceded by the Maceda vs.
HELD: Macaraig case stating that the FIRB Resolution is in accordance with the
Yes. It is clear from reading Sec. 12 that the Legislature intended this Act to be requirements of the law if it was properly approved by the Minister of Finance. In the
an appropriation measure and that it anticipated the possibility of a future veto by present case, the FIRB Resolutions reinstating the status were properly approved by
the Chief Executive. Hence, the Governor can constitutionally veto certain items on the Minister of Finance.
this bill. Furthermore, the legislature accepted the veto and made no attempt to
override it. The executive department sustained the validity of the veto as well. ISSUE:
Contemporaneous construction is not decisive for the courts, but when two co-equal 1. W/N Respondent Province and provincial officials can validly and lawfully
branches of government have adopted and accepted the construction of statutes, assess RPT against, and thereafter sell at public auction the subject properties of the
they must be given great respect. Also, this practice of vetoing the separate items in Petitioner to effect collection of alleged deficiencies in the payment of such taxes.
a bill by the Chief Executive has long been allowed and to rule against it would 2. W/N Petitioner has ceased to enjoy its tax and duty exemption privileges,
require a clear showing of unconstitutionality. including its exemption from payment of RPT.


2a, 2b, 3a, 6c The Petitioner never lost its tax exempt status, but its privileges were only
suspended. Thus, the Respondent cannot assess deficiency RPT against the Petitioner.
Furthermore, since the Petitioner was never delinquent in paying RPT, the subsequent
auction and sale of the Petitioner’s assets is also considered void.

1, 5a, 5b, 9a, 20a, 37, 38a, 49

J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Mariano & Aquial & Cordova J.M. Tuason v. Land Tenure Administration
Case No. 64 Case No. 135
G.R. No. L-33140 (October 23, 1978) G.R. No. L-21064 (February 18, 1970)
Chapter XI, Page 434, Footnote No.7

Plaintiffs Aquial (herein Respondents) claimed ownership of a parcel of land Petitioner is the owner of a land called Tatalon Estate in Quezon City. They
located in QC having an area of 383 hectares. They alleged that it had been seek to nullify RA 2616 which directs the expropriation of two lots inside the estate.
fraudulently or erroneously included in OCT No. 735 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal Under Art. 8, Sec. 4 of the Constitution, “The Congress may authorize, upon payment
and that it was registered in the names of Defendants Tuason (herein Petitioners) of just compensation, the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots and
pursuant to a decree issued on July 6, 1914 in Case No. 7681 of the Court of Land conveyed at cost to individuals” Petitioner contends that said law is unconstitutional
Registration. Plaintiffs Aquial prayed that OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom because the provision in the Constitution refers to “lands” not landed estates.
be declared void due to certain irregularities in the land registration proceeding. The
Tuason’s prayed that the petition be dismissed on the ground that the court has no ISSUE:
jurisdiction over the case, improper venue, prescription, laches and prior judgment. W/N RA 2616 is unconstitutional.
Respondents Cordova spouses were allowed to intervene in the case since they
were able to purchase 11 hectares from the Aquials. HELD:
No. The question is one of constitutional construction. The Constitution clearly
ISSUE: states that “land” not “landed estates” can be expropriated. It has a broader scope,
W/N OCT No. 735 is valid. allowing the legislature to expropriate more types of land. The law does not
distinguish between different types regardless of how big or small it may be, as long
HELD: as there is a need to address a growing social problem such as inequality.
OCT No. 735 is valid. The validity of OCT No. 735 was already decided upon
by the Supreme Court in the cases of Benin vs. Tuason, Alcantara vs. Tuason and Pili LATIN MAXIM:
vs. Tuason. The ruling in these cases was also applied in other cases involving the 9a, 9c, 24a, 26, 37, 40c
validity of OCT No. 735.

5a, 5b

Tolentino v. Commission on Elections Aglipay v. Ruiz

Case No. 154 Case No. 4
G.R. No. L-34150 (October 16, 1971) G.R. No. 45459 (March 13, 1937)

The 1971 Constitutional Convention seeks to amend Sec. 1 of Art. 5 of the Respondent, who is the Director of Post, announced that he would order the
Constitution reducing the voting age from 21 to 18 years old. This proposal was to be issuance of postage stamps to commemorate the celebration of the 33rd
submitted to the people for ratification in a plebiscite coinciding with the November International Eucharistic Congress in accordance with Act No. 4052. Petitioner, who is
1971 elections relying on Sec. 1, Art. 15 of the Constitution: “The Congress in a joint the Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks prohibition of such
session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and because it violates Sec. 13, Art. 6 of the Constitution.
the House of Representatives voting separately may propose amendments to this
Constitution or call a convention for the purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as ISSUE:
part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election W/N the sale of such stamps is in violation of the constitutional mandate of
at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification.” religious freedom.

W/N there is a limitation or condition in Sec. 1 of Art. 15 of the Constitution Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the
calling for a plebiscite on the sole amendment contained in Organic Resolution No. Respondent is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special
1. postage stamps would be "advantageous to the Government. In this case, the
issuance of the postage stamps was not inspired by any sectarian feeling. Act. No.
HELD: 4052 grants the Respondent discretion to issue postage stamps with new designs "as
There was a violation. Because such amendments regardless of how many often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government.”
are to be submitted to the people for their ratification in an election, “An election”
only means one. Also, no fixed frame of reference is given to the voter. No one LATIN MAXIM:
knows what changes in the fundamental principles of the constitution would be 9a, 36a, 37
modified. The amendments being proposed by the convention in must be seen in
relation to the whole.

6c, 7a

U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho Ordillo v. COMELEC

Case No 295 Case No. 192
G.R. No. 17122 (February 27, 1922) G.R. No. 93054 (December 4, 1990)
Chapter XI, Page 435, Footnote No.12 Chapter XI, Page 437, Footnote No.24

Respondent was charged for violating E.O. 53 (which fixes the ceiling price at A plebiscite was held pursuant to R.A. No. 6766 (Organic Act creating the
which rice may be sold) when he sold rice at a price greater than that fixed by law. Cordillera Autonomous Region) with the votes of the people in the provinces of
E.O. 53 follows Act No. 2868 which penalizes monopoly and hoarding of products Benguet, Mountain Province, Kalinga-Apayao, Ifugao, Abra and the city of Baguio.
under extraordinary circumstances. Respondent contends that the Legislature has Out of the provinces, only Ifugao managed to get a majority vote. Resolutions and
not defined any basis for the order but has left it to the discretion of the Governor memorandum from the COMELEC and the Secretary of Justice states that only
General. Without leaving the discretion to say which extraordinary circumstances to provinces voting favorably in the plebiscite shall constitute the region.
the Governor General are, Defendant will not be charged.
ISSUE: W/N Ifugao being the only one which voted for the creation of CAR can
W/N Act No. 2868 is unconstitutional for undue delegation of legislative alone, legally and validly constitute a region.
HELD: Art. X, Sec. 15 of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that “there shall be
The act is unconstitutional. The Constitution is something solid, permanent and created autonomous regions… consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and
substantial. As known, no nation living under republican form of government can geographical areas…” From this, it can be derived that the term “region” used in its
enact a law delegating the power to fix the price at which rice should be sold. That ordinary sense means two or more provinces. The provisions of R.A. No. 6766 also
power can never be delegated under a republican form of government. This power show that the Congress never intended that a single province may constitute the
is exclusive to the legislative. In fixing the price, the law is dealing with private Autonomous Region.
property and private rights, which are sacred under the Constitution.
LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 11g, 25a, 28

De los Santos vs. Mallare Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary
Case No. 89 Case No. 64
G.R. Nos. L-3045-6 (August 31, 1950) G.R. No. 83896 (February 22, 1991)
Chapter XI, Page 440 and 450, Footnote No.33 and 54 Chapter XI, Pages 443, 450 and 454, Footnotes No. 41, 51 and 71

This case questions the legality of the Petitioner’s removal from the same Petitioners maintain that the Executive Order which, in effect, allows members
office which would be the effect of Respondent’s appointment. Petitioner contends of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other
that under the Constitution, he can not be removed against his will and without government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions. This runs counter
cause, citing Sec. 4, Art. 12 of the Constitution which reads: “No officer or employee to Art. 7, Sec. 13 of the Constitution which provides that the President, Vice-President,
of the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for a cause provided by the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants shall not, unless
law.” Respondent admits that the position of City Engineer “belongs to the otherwise provided by the Constitution, hold any other office or employment during
unclassified service”. According to Lacson vs. Romero, all officers or employees in the their tenure.
unclassified service are protected by the above provision; but notes that there is a
difference between this case and the Lacson case. Sec. 2545 of the Revised ISSUE:
Administration Code authorizes the President to remove at pleasure any of the W/N the prohibition in Art. 7, Sec. 13 admits of the broad exceptions made for
officers enumerated therein, one of who is the city engineer. The two provisions are appointive officials in general under Art. 9-B, Sec. 7, par. 2.
repugnant and absolutely irreconcilable.
ISSUE: No. A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention
W/N the position of City Engineer is an unclassified service. underlying the provision. The practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the
government would lead to abuses by unscrupulous public officials who took the
HELD: scheme for purposes of self-enrichment, particularly during the Marcos era. The
No. Reading Art. 12, Sec. 1 of the Constitution, it is clear that Sec. 4 protects qualifying phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution” of Sec. 13, Art. 7
those appointed into the service that do not fall as any of the following: “policy- cannot possibly refer to the broad exceptions of Sec. 7, Art. 9-B of the 1987
determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature”. The position of city Constitution. The former is meant to lay down the general rule of holding multiple
engineer is neither of the above-stated. This is confirmed by the enactment of C.A. offices applicable to all elective public officials and employees while the latter is
No. 177. As a contemporaneous construction, this Act affords an index to the meant for the exception of the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet,
meaning of Civil Service as conceived by the framers of the Constitution. their deputies and assistants. To construe otherwise would be to render nugatory and
Furthermore, the rules of construction inform us that the words used in construction meaningless the manifest intent and purpose of the framers of the Constitution. E.O.
are to be given the sense they have in common use. The Court therefore held that 284 is therefore declared null and void.
Petitioner De los Santos is entitled to remain in office as the City Engineer of Baguio
with all the emoluments, rights and privileges appurtenant thereto, until he resigns or LATIN MAXIM:
is removed for cause, and that Respondent’s appointment is ineffective in so far as it 6b, 9a, b2
may adversely affect those emoluments, rights and privileges.


People of the Philippines vs. Muñoz Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Case No. 217 Case No. 190
G.R. No. L-38969 (February 9, 1989) G.R. No. 78780 (July 23, 1987)
Chapter XI, Page 446, Footnote No.42 Chapter XI, Page 447, Footnote No.46

The Defendant was convicted of three counts of murder. The penalty for Petitioners submit that any tax withheld from their emoluments and
murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code was reclusion temporal in its compensations as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their
maximum period to death but this was modified by Art. 3, Sec. 19(1) of the 1987 salaries, contrary to the provision of Sec. 10, Art. 8 of the Constitution mandating that
Constitution providing that “…any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced “during their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased”, even as it is
to reclusion temporal.” anathema to the ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned by the Constitution.

W/N this Court would adhere to the Masangkay ruling that the abolition of the W/N the salary of the members of the judiciary is subject to the general
death penalty limited the penalty for murder to the remaining periods, to wit, the income tax applied to all taxpayers.
minimum and the medium.
HELD: Yes. The salary of the members of the judiciary is subject to the general
No. In the case at bar, the Court found that the applicable sentence would income tax. According to Perfecto vs. Meer, income taxes are part of the diminution
be the medium period of penalty prescribed in Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, of judges’ salaries because “the independence of judges is of far greater
which does not follow the Masangkay ruling, and that would be reclusion perpetua. importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries”. Endencia
vs. David confirmed Perfecto vs. Meer. However both decisions must be discarded
LATIN MAXIMS: because the framers of the fundamental law (i.e. Fox, Concepcion, and Bernas), as
1, 6c, 20a the alter ego of the people, have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the
meaning of Sec. 10 Art. 8 of the 1987 Constitution; that is, to make the salaries of the
members of the judiciary taxable.

3, b1

Tañada v. Cuenco, et al Aratuc v. COMELEC

Case No. 286 Case No. 19
G.R. No. L-10016 (February 28, 1957) G.R. No. L-49705-09 (February 8, 1979)
Chapter XI, Page No. 451, Footnote No.55 Chapter XI, Page 452, Footnote No.62

The Senate upon nomination of the Nacionalista Party chose Senator Laurel, Two petitions were filed against the Respondent claiming that it failed to
Lopez, and Primicias, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). Upon address irregularities in the Central Mindanao elections for the Interim Batasang
nomination of the Citizens Party, Petitioner was next chosen by the Senate as Pambansa.
member of SET. Then, the Senate chose Respondents as members of the same SET.
Petitioners maintain that after the nomination and election of Senator Laurel, Lopez, ISSUE:
and Primicias of the Nacionalista Party as members of the SET, the other Senators W/N the Supreme Court has the power to review decisions made by the
must be nominated by the Citizens Party. Respondents alleged, however, that six Respondent in handling the pre-proclamation controversies cited by the Petitioners.
members of the Electoral Tribunal “shall be members of the Senate or the House of
Representatives”, is mandatory. The word “shall” is imperative in nature relative to the HELD:
number of members of the Electoral Tribunal and this is borne in the opinion of the No. The Supreme Court may only review actions carried out with grave abuse
Secretary of Justice. of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court cited
differences in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions with regard to the Supreme Court’s
ISSUE: power over COMELEC decisions – in 1935, the Supreme Court may review
W/N the election of Respondents as members of the Electoral Tribunal was Respondents decisions on either review or certiorari; 1973, Respondent’s decisions
valid or lawful. may only be brought up on ground of certiorari alone. This highlights the 1973
Constitution’s intent to strengthen Respondent’s independence. Consequently, errors
HELD: of judgment that were based on substantial evidence are not reviewable in
No. “The application of the doctrine of contemporaneous construction is certiorari.
more restricted … except as to matters committed by the Constitution itself to the
discretion of some other department, contemporary or practical construction is not LATIN MAXIM:
necessarily binding upon the courts, even in a doubtful case.” Hence, “if the 6a, 9a, 25a
judgment of the court, such construction is erroneous and its further application is not
made imperative by any paramount considerations of public policy, it may be

2a, 6b, 9b, 11a

In Re: Appointment of Valenzuela and Vallarta Magtoto v. Manguera

Case No. 59 Case No. 159
A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC (November 9, 1998) G.R. Nos. L-37201-02 (March 3, 1975)
Chapter XI, Page 457, Footnote No.79

Judges were appointed to the RTC by the President on May 12 1998, within 2 The present cases involve the interpretation of Sec. 20 Art. 4 of the New
months before the election. There are two conflicting provisions in the 1987 Constitution which took effect on Jan. 17, 1973. The provision reads: “… Any person
Constitution, the former validating this action and the latter proscribing it. On the one under investigation…shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
hand, Art. 8, Sec. 4 requires that all vacancies in the judiciary be filled within 90 days informed of such right…. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be
of such vacancy. On the other hand, Art. 7, Sec. 15 prohibits the President from inadmissible.” Petitioner was accused in two criminal cases of murder in two
making any appointments two months before Presidential elections, except for informations both dated Feb. 23, 1973. During the trial, his extrajudicial confession
temporary appointments to executive positions when public interest is at stake. dated Nov. 15, 1972 was admitted in evidence over the objection that it was taken
while the accused was in the preventive custody of the PC without his having been
ISSUE: informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel.
W/N the appointments were valid.
HELD: 1. W/N the Petitioner’s extra-judicial confession dated on Nov. 15, 1972 is
No, the appointments were void. The general rule is that the President must fill admissible as evidence.
in vacancies in the Judiciary within 90 days, but this does not apply in the special 2. W/N Sec. 20, Art. 4 of the New Constitution can be applied retroactively.
circumstance of Presidential elections, which occurs only once every six years.
Temporary appointments to executive positions are the only exception. The HELD:
prohibition is for public policy purposes, to prevent “midnight appointments” – which 1. Yes. Petitioner’s confession is admissible. The court ruled that a confession
is more compelling than temporary vacancies in the judiciary. obtained from a person under investigation, who has not been informed of his right to
counsel, is admissible in evidence if the same had been obtained before the
LATIN MAXIM: effectivity of the New Constitution, since no law gave the accused the right to be so
6c, 9a, 35, 36b, 38a, 50, b informed before that date. Conversely, such confession is inadmissible if the same
had been obtained after the effectivity of the New Constitution.
2. No. The constitutional guarantee of right to counsel only has prospective
effect. Giving such provision a retroactive effect would invite unwarranted hardship
on the part of the prosecutor.

12a, 46a

Filoteo v. Sandiganbayan Co v. Electoral Tribunal, House of Representatives

Case No. 106 Case No. 66
G.R. No. 79543 (October 16, 1996) G.R. Nos. 92191-92 and 92202-03 (July 30, 1991)
Chapter XI, Page 457, Footnote No.80 Chapter XI, Page 457, Footnote No.82

Petitioners were held guilty by Respondent Court for the crime of robbery of a Respondents declared Jose Ong Jr., elected representative of Northern
postal delivery van. Upon the capture of his co-accused, he was pointed out as the Samar, as a natural born Filipino citizen. Petitioners contend that based on the 1987
mastermind. When Petitioner was captured, he admitted involvement in the crime Constitution, Jose Ong, Jr. who was born on June 19, 1948 (during which the 1935
and pointed his other confederates. On May 30, 1982, Petitioner executed sworn Constitution was operative), is not a natural born Filipino citizen having been born to
statements (confessing what had happened), without the presence of a counsel. The a Chinese father, Jose Ong Chuan and a Filipina mother Agrifina Lao.
1987 Constitution provides that the right to counsel of the accused cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of a counsel. Petitioner claims that such ISSUE:
proscription against an uncounselled waiver is applicable to him retroactively, even 1. W/N people who have elected Philippine citizenship under the 1935
though his custodial investigation took place in 1983. Constitution are to be considered natural born Filipino citizens.
2. W/N this provision should be applied retroactively.
1. W/N the Petitioner’s extra-judicial confession is admissible even without the HELD:
presence of a counsel. Yes. Under of Art. 4 Sec. 1 par. 3 of the Constitution, children born of Filipino
2. W/N the said provisions of 1987 Constitution can be applied retroactively. mothers before January 17, 1973 shall be accorded natural born status if they elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. They need not perform any
HELD: act of “election” granted that his father was naturalized and declared a Filipino
1. Yes, it is admissible under the 1973 Constitution. Accordingly, waivers of the citizen by 1957, when he was only 9 years old. The provision in question must be
right to counsel during custodial investigation without the benefit of counsel during applied retroactively since it seeks to remedy the inequitable situation under the 1935
the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution should, by such argumentation, be admissible. Constitution wherein people born of Filipino fathers and alien mothers were
2. No. The specific provision of the 1987 Constitution requiring that a waiver by considered natural born while children born of Filipino mothers and alien fathers were
an accused of his right to counsel during custodial investigation must be made with not.
the assistance of a counsel may not be applied to him retroactively or in cases where
the extrajudicial confession was made prior to the effectivity of the said constitution. LATIN MAXIM:
8a, 9a, 42a
1, 5a, 46a

Sarmiento v. Mison Domingo v. Commission on Audit

Case No. 277 Case No. 37
G.R. Nos. 80519-21 (December 17, 1987) G.R. No. 112371 (October 7, 1998)
Chapter XI, Page 458, Footnote No.84

Petitioners question the validity of appointment of Respondent as Petitioner was endorsed with several government vehicles for the use of the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs on the ground that it was not confirmed by personnel of the entire Region V of DSWD. Respondent sent a communication to the
the Commission on Appointments. The Court favored the Respondent based on Petitioner informing her that post-audit reports on the DSWD disbursement accounts
express provisions of the 1987 Constitution. showed that officials provided with government vehicles were still collecting
transportation allowances when they should not be. Petitioner asserted that even if
ISSUE: she was assigned a government vehicle, she was entitled to transportation
W/N Sec. 16, Art. 7 provides for officers other than the first group to be allowance on the days she did not use a government vehicle.
appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
HELD: W/N a commutable transportation allowance may still be claimed by a
No. Sec. 16 Art. 7 only provides for the appointment, by the President of government official provided with a government vehicle, for the days the official did
“heads of executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, not actually use the vehicle.
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution” with the HELD:
requirement of CA approval. Deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal The General Appropriations Act of 1988, 1990 and 1991 clearly provides that
that the framers of the 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the position “heads of transportation allowance will not be granted to officials who are assigned a
bureaus” from CA confirmation with the intent of reconciling the 1935 Constitution government vehicles except as approved by the President.
which turned the Commission into a venue for “horse-trading”, and that of the 1973
Constitution which placed absolute power of appointment in the President. The word LATIN MAXIM:
“also” in the second sentence of Sec. 16 Art. 7 must not be construed as to suppose 6c, 7a, 24a
that officers in the second sentence shall be appointed “in a like manner” as that of
the first group.

9a, 24b, 32, 39a, b

Globe-Mackay v. NLRC and Salazar Luzon Brokerage Co v. Public Service Commission

Case No. 112 Case No. 76
G.R. No. 82511 (March 3, 1992) G.R. No. L-37661 (November 16, 1932)
Chapter IV, Page 124, Footnote No.3

Petitioner placed Respondent Salazar under preventive suspension because it Petitioner has been operating a fleet of trucks utilized exclusively for the
appeared that she had full knowledge of the loss and whereabouts of an air carriage of goods or cargo of its particular customers. On May 9, 1932, Respondent
conditioner that Delfin Saldivar had stolen from the company but failed to inform her required the Petitioner to file with the commission within a period of thirty days an
employer. Respondent Salazar filed a complaint for illegal suspension and for other application for a certificate of public convenience for the operation of his trucks
damages. On appeal, the Respondent Court affirmed the decision of the Labor since they were said to be devoted to the transportation of cargo with
Arbiter with respect to the reinstatement of Private Respondent but limited back compensation as provided in Sec. 13 of the Public Service Law.
wages to 2 years and deleted award for moral damages.
ISSUE: W/N the amendments introduced into Sec. 13 of Act No. 3108 by Act No.
1. W/N the Labor Tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the 3316 conferred jurisdiction on the Respondents over the Petitioner’s business,
reinstatement of Respondent Salazar. although it is not a common carrier.
2. W/N there existed independent legal grounds to hold Respondent Salazar
answerable as well and, thereby, justify her dismissal. HELD:
The omission from Sec. 13 of the phrase “for public use” in the definition of a
HELD: public service does not mean that the Legislature meant to extend the jurisdiction of
The Labor Code clearly provides that an employee who is unjustly dismissed the PSC to private enterprises not devoted to public use. Public service is a service for
from work shall be entitled to reinstatement and to his full back wages. An exception public use. The insertion of the phrase “for hire or compensation” does not show the
to this is when the reinstatement may be inadmissible due to strained relations intent either. This is a stock phrase found in most definitions of a common carrier and
between the employer and the employee. The position of Private Respondent as a public utility. Also, notwithstanding the changes in the wording of the definition of
systems analyst is not one that may be characterized as such. Moreover, Petitioner the term “public service” introduced by Act No. 3316, there were no alterations
merely insinuated that since Respondent Salazar had a special relationship with made in the basic provisions of the other sections. Respondent has no jurisdiction
Saldivar, she might have had direct knowledge of Saldivar’s questionable activities. over Petitioner.


6c 6c, 36b


Aparri v. Court of Appeals People v. Quijada

Case No. 15 Case No.
G.R. No. L-30057 (January 31, 1984) G.R. Nos. 115008 (July 24, 1996)
Chapter IV, Page 124, Footnote No.4

R.A. 1160 created the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Respondent killed Diosdado Iroy using an unlicensed firearm. He was
Administration (NARRA). Said law also empowered its Board of Directors to appoint convicted of 2 offenses, which were separately filed:
and fix the term of office of the General Manager subject to approval of the 1) Murder under Art. 248 of the RPC
President. 2) Illegal possession of firearms in its aggravated form under PD 1866
On January 15, 1960, the Board approved Resolution No. 13 appointing Par 2 of Sec 1 of P.D. 1866 states that, “If homicide or murder is committed with the
Petitioner as General Manager of NARRA. use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed.”
On March 15, 1962, the Board approved Resolution No. 24 wherein the
President expressed his desire to fix the term of office of the incumbent General ISSUE:
Manager up to March 31, 1962. 1) W/N the trial court’s judgment should be sustained in conformity with the
doctrine laid down in People v. Tac-an, People v. Tiozon, People v. Caling,
ISSUE: etc. OR to modify the judgment and convict the appellant only of illegal
W/N Resolution No. 24 constitutes removal of Petitioner without cause. possession of firearm in its aggravated form pursuant to People v. Barros.
2) W/N the 2nd par of Sec 1 of PD1866 integrated illegal possession of firearm and
HELD: the resultant killing into a single integrated offense.
No, Petitioner’s term of office is deemed expired. R.A. 1160 expressly gives the
Board the power to appoint and fix the term of office of the General Manager. The HELD:
word ‘term’ describes the period that an office may hold office and upon expiration 1) The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
of such term, his rights, duties, and authority must cease. In this case, the term of 2) 2nd par of Sec 1 of P.D. 1866 does not support a conclusion that intended to
office is not fixed by law, but by the Board. treat said two offenses as a single and integrated offense of “illegal
possession with homicide or murder”. It does not use the clause “as a result” or
LATIN MAXIM: “on the occasion of ”to evince an intention to create a single integrated
6a, 6c crime, but rather it uses the clause “with the use of”.


Baranda v. Gustillo Basbacio v. Office of the Secretary, Dept. of Justice

Case No. 30 Case No.
G.R. No. L-81163 (September 26, 1988) G.R. No. 109445 (November 7, 1994)
Chapter IV, Page 125, Footnote No.5

Both parties claim that they own a parcel of land, Lot No. 4517. The Court, RA 7309, among other things, provides for compensation of persons unjustly
after discovering that private respondent’s TCT was fraudulently acquired, ordered a accused, convicted, and imprisoned. Petitioner and his son-in-law Balderrama were
writ of possession against them and issued a resolution denying with finality a motion charged with murder and frustrated murder for killing Boyon and wounding his wife
for reconsideration filed by Private Respondents. Another group filed a separate civil and son, due to a land dispute and thus imprisoned. However, on appeal to the CA,
case against Petitioners and applied for lis pendens on the TCT of said lot, which the Petitioner was acquitted on the ground that conspiracy between him and his son-in-
court found out to be privies of the Private Respondents tasked to delay the law was not proven. What was proven was that he was at the scene of the crime
implementation of the final decisions of the Court. with Petitioner when the shooting happened and left the place with his son-in-law.
Petitioner claims he was unjustly accused and is entitled to compensation.
1. W/N the pendency of the appeal in subsequent civil case with the Court of ISSUE:
Appeals prevents the court from canceling the notice of lis pendens in the W/N Petitioner is entitled to compensation pursuant to RA 7309.
certificate of titles of petitioners which were earlier declared valid and
subsisting by this Court. HELD:
2. What is the nature of the duty of the Register of Deeds to annotate or annul No, he is not. For one to be “unjustly accused” one must be wrongly accused
the notice of lis pendens in a Torrens Certificate of Title? from the very beginning, unjustly convicted (when a judge knowingly and
deliberately rendered an unjust judgment, whimsical and capricious devoid of any
HELD: basis for judgment) and imprisoned. In the case at bar, Petitioner was acquitted
1. Respondent Judge abused his discretion in sustaining the Acting Register of because the prosecution was unable to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
Deed’s stand. He forgot the 1st par of Sec. 77 of P.D. 1529 which provides: Petitioner was guilty. Thus, he does not fall under RA 7309.
Cancellation of lis pendens – “Before the final judgment, a notice of lis
pendens may be cancelled upon order of the Court after proper showing LATIN MAXIM:
that … it is necessary to protect the rights of those who caused it to be 9a, 11a, 25a
registered. …”
2. Sec 10 of PD 1529 states that, “It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to
immediately register an instrument presented for registration …. If the
instrument cannot be registered, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof
and inform the presenter of such denial in writing, stating the ground
therefore, and advising him of his rights to appeal by consulta.”


Segovia v. Sandiganbayan Tanada v. Yulo

Case No. Case No. 288
G.R. No. 124067 (March 27, 1998) No. 43575 (May 31, 1935)
Chapter IV, Page 127, Footnote No.11

FACTS: Petitioner is a Justice of Peace appointed by the Gov. Gen. with the consent
Petitioners were designated as members of the Contracts Committee for by the Philippine Commission, assigned to Alabat, Tayabas. Later in his service, he
NPC’s Mindanao project. The lowest bidder, Joint Venture was disqualified after the was transferred to Perez, Tayabas. He reached his 65 th birthday on October 35, 1934,
PCAB verified that Joint Venture as well as the 2nd lowest bidder, Urban Consolidated subsequent to the approval of Act No. 3899 which makes mandatory the retirement
Constructors, were “downgraded” thereby ineligible as bidders. Since all other bids of all justices who have reached 65 years of age at the time said Act takes effect on
exceeded the allowable government estimate on the project, the committee January 1, 1933. The judge of First instance, acting upon the directive of the Secretary
declared a failure of bidding and directed a re-bidding. NPC Board approved, but of Respondent Justice, directed Petitioner to cease holding office pursuant to Act
for reasons not on record. The project was eventually cancelled. Petitioners were No. 3899.
charged under RA 3019 for in “one way or the other, extending undue advantage to
Joint Venture through manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable ISSUE:
negligence.” For this, petitioners were suspended from office. 1. W/N Petitioner should cease to hold office.
2. W/N his transfer is considered a “new transfer” and requires confirmation by
ISSUE: the Philippine Commission.
W/N it is mandatory or discretionary for Sandiganbayan to place under
preventive suspension public officers who stand accused before it. HELD:
No, Petitioner should not cease to hold office as Act No. 3899 clearly states
HELD: that those who will cease to hold office are those 65 yrs of age at the time the Act
Yes, it is mandatory. Under the act, one accused of any offense involving takes effect, not thereafter. Therefore, Petitioner shall be a Justice of Peace for life as
fraud upon government public funds or property whether the crime is simple or long as he stays in good behavior or does not become incapacitated.
complex, regardless of stage of execution and mode of participation, shall be
suspended from office. Jurisprudence is clear that upon determination of the validity No, his transfer is not a new appointment. Hence, no confirmation is required
of the information, a court must issue a suspension order as held in Gonzaga v. as it is just an enlargement of the jurisdiction grounded on original appointment.
Sandiganbayan, Luciano, et al. v. Mariano, Socrates v. Sandiganbayan.
1, 5a, 7a

Eliseo Silva v. Belen Cabrera Radio Communications of the Philippines v. National Telecom. Com.
Case No. 146 Case No. 129
G.R. No. L-3629 (March 19, 1951) G.R. No. L-68729 (May 29, 1987)

Respondent filed an application with the Public Service Commission for a Petitioner was awarded legislative franchise in 1957 by RA 2036 to operate a
certificate of public convenience, to be able to operate an ice plant in the City of radio communications system, recognized by the Public Service Commission (PSC).
Lipa. Petitioner, owner of another ice plant already in the same area, opposed Petitioner then established services in Sorsogon, Mindoro, and Samar. In 1980, the
Respondent’s application, claiming that public convenience did not need another Respondent, which replaced the PSC, authorized Kayumanggi to set up radio
ice plant. Atty. Aspillera was delegated by the Commissioner to receive testimony systems in Mindoro and Samar too. Respondent, after conducting a hearing upon a
and conduct hearing of the contest; thereafter the Commission en banc rendered a complaint by Kayumanggi, ordered Petitioner to stop operating, because it didn’t
decision that Respondent was allowed to operate the ice plant. After which, have a certificate of public convenience, which is necessary under EO 546 for any
Petitioner claimed that under the law, no one except the Commissioner may hear public service to operate.
contested cases.
ISSUE: W/N Petitioner still needs a certificate of candidacy before it can validly
W/N delegation to Atty. Aspillera to hear the case is lawful. operate.

No, the delegation is unlawful. Although Sec. 32 of Public Service Act allows Yes, they need such certificates to validly operate.
the Commission to delegate to any of their attorneys the right to receive evidence or
take testimony, Sec. 3 of the same act provides that in (1) all contested cases and (2) Petitioner was created under RA 2036, governed by the Public Service
cases involving fixing of rates, the reception of evidence may only be delegated to Commission. Under it, radio companies did not need a certificate of public
one of the Commissioners. convenience to operate. However, P.D. 1 abolished the Public Service Commission
and EO 546 created the Respondent Commission. Under EO 546, Respondent must
Thus, though the law makes it inconvenient or cumbersome for the issue a certificate of public convenience for the operation of radio communications
Commission to handle contested cases, where the law is clear, the Commission nor systems. Petitioner did not avail of it when they should have.
the Court may not disregard, circumvent, or interpret the law any other way. Plus,
you have to look at the entire Act, and not just specific provisions, in applying the LATIN MAXIM:
law. 2a, 6c, 30, 46a, 49

6c, 7a, 8a, 36b

National Federation of Labor v. Hon. Eisma Pascual v. Pascual-Bautista

Case No. 84 Case No. 198
G.R. No. L-61236 (January 31, 1984) G.R. No. 84240 (March 25, 1992)
Chapter IV, Page 127, Footnote No.16

Zambowood Union went on strike because of the illegal termination of their Petitioners are the acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio Pascual,
union leader and underpayment of their monthly allowance. In the process, they the latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual, who died
blocked the roads and prevented customers and suppliers from entering the intestate without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious
premises. Thereafter, Respondent filed in court for damages for obstruction of private children.
property. Petitioners contended that jurisdiction over this case belongs to Labor
Arbiter and not for courts to decide. ISSUE:
W/N Art. 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which states that “An
ISSUE: illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
W/N courts may be labor arbiters that can pass on a suit for damages filed by relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same
an employer or is it the Labor Arbiter of the NLRC? manner from the illegitimate child”, can be interpreted to exclude recognized
natural children from the inheritance of the deceased.
Yes, the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction. HELD:
In Diaz v. IAC, this Court ruled that “Art. 992 of the Civil Code provides a
In the Labor Code, Sec. 217 vested Labor Arbiters with original jurisdiction. barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestate between
However, P.D. 1367 amended Sec. 217, vesting courts of first instance with original the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother
jurisdiction to award damages for illegal dismissal. But again P.D. 1691 amended Sec. of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not
217 to return the jurisdiction to Labor Arbiters. Additionally, BP 130 amended the same recognized by law for the purposes of Art. 992.”
section, but without changing original jurisdiction of LA over money claims arising Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children.
from employer-employee relations. Thus the law is clear, respondent Judge has no Petitioners herein cannot represent their father in the succession of the latter to the
jurisdiction to act on the case. intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood brother of their father.


1, 6c, 7a 6c, 7a, 7b, 36b

People v. Amigo People v. Santayana

Case No. 201 Case No. 115
G.R. No. 116719 (January 18, 1996) No. L-22291 (November 15, 1976)
Chapter IV, Page 127, Footnote No.16

The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision finding the Accused guilty Accused was found guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, and sentenced to the penalty of sentenced to an indeterminate penalty from one year and one day to two years,
reclusion perpetua. and to pay the costs.
Accused-Appellant argues that error was committed by the trial court in
imposing or meting out the penalty of reclusion perpetua against him despite the ISSUE:
fact that Sec. 19 (1), Art. 3 of the 1987 Constitution was already in effect when the W/N the appointment of the Appellant as a special agent of the CIS, which
offense was committed. apparently authorizes him to carry and possess firearms, exempts him from securing a
Accused-Appellant contends that under the 1987 Constitution and prior to license or permit corresponding thereto.
the promulgation of RA 7659, the death penalty had been abolished and hence, the
penalty that should have been imposed for the crime of murder committed by HELD:
Accused-Appellant should be reclusion temporal in its medium period to 20 years of Yes. At the time of appellant’s apprehension, the doctrine then prevailing was
reclusion temporal. enunciated in the case of People vs. Macarandang wherein it was held that the
appointment of a civilian as “secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and
ISSUE: order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within the category of
W/N Sec. 19 (1), Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution means to require a a ‘peace officer’ equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly
corresponding modification in the other periods as a result of the prohibition against covered by Section 879”.
the death penalty.
HELD: 46a
In People vs. Muñoz, the Court held that “A reading of Section 19 (1) of Article
III will readily show that there is really nothing therein which expressly declares the
abolition of the death penalty.”

5a, 7b

National Marketing Corp. (NAMARCO) v. Miguel D. Tecson Santiago v. Commission on Elections, et al.
Case No. 184 Case No. 90
G.R. No. L-29131 (August 27, 1969) G.R. No. 127325 (March 19, 1997)
Chapter 4, Page 127, Footnote No.18 Chapter IV, Page 129, Footnote No.26

On 14 November 1955, defendants were ordered by the Court of First On December 6, 1996, Private Respondents filed with Respondent
Instance of Manila to pay PRATRA, the sum of P7,200 plus 7% interest until the amount Commission a petition to amend the Constitution through a system of initiative Sec. 2,
was fully paid until May 25, 1960. On 21 December 1965, Plaintiff filed a complaint Art. 17 of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners filed a special civil action for prohibition
against the same defendants for the revival of the judgment rendered in the initial based on the argument that the constitutional provision on people’s initiative can
case. Defendants moved to dismiss the said complaint, on the ground of lack of only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress and no such law has been
jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof and prescription of action. The complaint passed. RA 6735 provides for three systems of initiative: initiative on the Constitution,
was dismissed as having prescribed. on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle on
initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are
ISSUE: specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates
W/N the date on which ten years from December 21, 1955 expired was that the matter of people's initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some
considered to be December 21, 1965. future law.

NO. "When the laws speak of years ... it shall be understood that years are of W/N RA 6735 is an adequate statute to implement Section 2, Article 17 of the
three hundred sixty-five days each" according to Art. 13 of our Civil Code. 1960 and 1987 Constitution.
1964 being leap years, the month of February in both had 29 days, so that ten (10)
years of 365 days each, or an aggregate of 3,650 days, from December 21, 1955, HELD:
expired on December 19, 1965. NO. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum
(Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided
LATIN MAXIM: for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means
6c, 7b that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws.
If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the
initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle
therefore, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy
of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution
is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws.

9a, 43

Villanueva v. COMELEC Mario R. Melchor v. Commission on Audit

Case No. 170 Case No. 177
No. L – 54718 (December 4, 1986) G.R. No. 95398 (August 16, 1991)
Chapter IV. Page 133, Footnote No.35

On January 25, 1980, Petitioner filed a certificate of candidacy for Vice Mayor On July 15, 1983, Petitioner, as school administrator of Alangalang Agro-Industrial
of Dolores for the January 30 elections in substitution for his companion Mendoza School of Leyte, entered into a contract with Cebu Diamond Construction for the
who withdrew candidacy without oath upon filing on January 4. Petitioner won in the construction of one of the school buildings. The school accountant issued a
election but Respondent Board disregarded all his votes and proclaimed Respondent certificate of availability of funds to cover the construction cost but failed to sign as a
Candidate as the winner on the presumption that Petitioner’s candidacy was not witness to the contract, which was approved by the Minister of Education. During
duly approved by Respondent. Petitioner filed a petition for the annulment of the construction, the contractor sought additional charges due to labor cost increase,
proclamation but was dismissed by Respondent Commission on the grounds that but eventually gave up the project to save itself from losses. Consequently, the
Mendoza’s unsworn withdrawal had no legal effect, and that assuming it was matter was referred to Respondent Commission who disallowed the payment in post-
effective, Petitioner’s candidacy was not valid since Mendoza did not withdraw after audit on the ground that the contract was null and void for lack of signature of the
January 4. chief accountant of the school as witness to it. For this reason the petitioner was
made personally liable for the amount paid to the contractor.
W/N Petitioner should be disqualified on the ground of formal or technical ISSUE:
defects. 1. W/N the contract was null and void.
2. W/N the petitioner should be held personally liable for the amount paid to the
HELD: contractor.
No. The fact that Mendoza’s withdrawal was not sworn is a technicality, which
should not be used to frustrate the people’s will in favor of Petitioner as the substitute HELD:
candidate. Also, his withdrawal right on the very same day that he filed his No. The chief accountant’s issuance of a certificate of fund availability served
candidacy should be considered as having been made substantially and in truth as substantial compliance with the requirements of LOI 968 in the execution of the
after the last day, even going by the literal reading of the provision by Respondent contract. The contract was also valid and enforceable because it already bore the
Commission. The spirit of the law rather than its literal reading should have guided approval of the Minister of Education. Also, it was highly inequitable for the Court to
Respondent Commission in resolving the issue of last-minute withdrawal and compel the Petitioner, who had substantially complied with the mandate of LOI 968,
substitution of other persons as candidates. to shoulder the construction cost of the building, which was being utilized by the
school when he was not reaping benefits from it.
1, 9a, 39c LATIN MAXIM:
8a, 9a, 12a

Mateo Casela v. Court of Appeals, and Exequiel Magsaysay De Jesus v. City of Manila
Case No. 50 Case No. 86
G.R. No. L – 26754 (October 16, 1970) G.R. No. L-9337 (December 24, 1914)
Chapter IV, Page 134, Footnote No.38 Chapter IV, Page 134, Footnote No.41

Petitioner was ordered, on Oct. 26, 1956, to vacate the premises and remove his In 1907, Petitioner bought from an original owner a piece of land in Manila
house. Petitioner refused to comply. Thus, the Court issued two more writs on May 6, which was under the Torrens system. Apparently, the original owner incorrectly
1958 and April 14, 1959. Instead of obeying the writs, the Petitioner filed a case before declared the size of the land. So, from 1901 – 1907, the original owner was paying
the Court of First Instance of Zambales, asking Private Respondent to pay him the lesser taxes than he should have and same for Petitioner from 1907 – 1910. Upon
value of his house in addition to damages. He also filed a motion for suspension of finding out that he was not paying the correct amount of taxes, Petitioner paid the
the implementation of the writ of execution. The Court granted the motion for taxes, fees, and interest of P2, 096.49 for the unpaid balance of the years 1901-1910.
suspension but the civil case was dismissed when it reached Respondent Court. For Soon after, he protested and filed an action to recover the same amount.
this reason, Magsaysay filed a motion for execution of the writ dated Dec. 6, 1963 Petitioner was awarded P1, 649.82.
and another on Feb. 11, 1964. CAR denied the motion holding that its decision dated Petitioner contends that the supposed taxes from before 1910 were not
Oct. 26, 1956 could no longer be executed on mere motion for the reason that a actually taxes because they had not yet been assessed. Taxes may not be due and
period of five years has already elapsed from the said date. payable until they are assessed.

W/N the motion for execution which was filed beyond the reglementary W/N Petitioner should still pay the taxes which were not assessed before.
period was time-barred.
HELD: Petitioner should only pay the taxes when he was the owner of the property.
No. From Dec. 17, 1956 when the decision in question became final and
executory, to Dec. 11, 1963, the date when Private Respondent’s motion for LATIN MAXIM:
execution was filed, a period of 6 years, 11 months and 24 days elapsed. From this 6, 9a, 38b, 43, 50
period, the time during which the writs of execution could not be served, or a period
of 3 years, 9 months and 25 days must be subtracted. Consequently, only 3 years, 1
month and 29 days can be charged against the reglementary period. Hence Private
Respondent’s motion for execution was not time-barred.

8a, 9c, 11a, 11d, 11e

Federation of Free Workers v. Inciong Morales v. Paredes

Case No. 45 Case No. 83
G.R. No. L-48848 (May 11, 1988) G.R. No. L-34428 (December 29, 1930)

In April 1977, PD 1123 was promulgated requiring all employers in the private Petitioner claimed to own a parcel of land in Pangasinan wherein two other
sector to pay their employees an extra P60/month as emergency allowance. The people have already registered such land as their own.
increase was set at May 1, 1977, as well as the rules issued on the same day. Sec. 6 Respondent Judge granted the registration of the land to the two claimants.
stated that Employers may apply for exemption with the Secretary of Labor within 30 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration in the Court of First Instance of
days from the effectivity of these rules. On September 27, 1977, the company filed Pangasinan. While the Motion was still pending, Petitioner brought the present action
with the Wage Commission its application for exemption from paying the increase. to the Supreme Court praying that the decision of Respondent Judge be set aside
Respondent approved both applications granting exemptions for the company. and a new trial should be granted in accordance with Sec. 513 if the Code of Civil
Petitioners argue that Respondent committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting Procedure.
to loss of jurisdiction by approving both applications.
ISSUE: W/N a new trial should be granted in accordance with Sec. 513 of the Code
1. W/N the first application was filed beyond the 30-day reglementary period. of Civil Procedure.
2. W/N the petitioners were in a financial position to pay the additional emergency
allowance. HELD:
Supreme Court cannot open a new trial. The Supreme Court does not have
HELD: jurisdiction to reopen judgments under Sec. 513 if there are other adequate remedies
No, the application was not a strict rule. The purpose of the PD is to protect available. Petitioner still has a pending Motion for Reconsideration case with the
wages and income. The law takes into consideration that there is a possibility that Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, therefore, that action should be finished first.
some employers are not financially capable to pay such wages and such
incapability may happen anytime within the year. LATIN MAXIM:
No, only the Department of Labor and Wage Commission can decide if the 9c
petitioner was in a financial position to pay. The Department is in a better position to
assess the matter. In absence of any grave abuse of discretion, their
recommendations will be respected by the courts. Moreover, the company was able
prove their financial situation by giving financial statements.

8, 9a, 42

Prasnik v. Republic of the Philippines De Guia v. COMELEC

Case No. 125 Case No. 30
G.R. No. L-8639 (March 23, 1956) G.R. No. 104712 (May 6, 1992)

Petitioner seeks to adopt four children which he claims to be his and Paz Petitioner contends that under Par (d) of Sec. 3 of RA 7166, members of the
Vasquez’ children without the benefit of marriage. The Solicitor General opposed this Sangguniang Panlulungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large.
stating that Art. 338 of the Civil Code allows a natural child to be adopted by his
father refers only to a child who has not been acknowledged as natural child. It ISSUE:
maintains that in order that a natural child may be adopted by his natural father or W/N par (d) Sec. 3 of RA 7166 should be interpreted to mean that elective
mother there should not be an acknowledgment of the status of the natural child for officials of the Sangguniang Panlulungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected
it will go against Art. 335. at large.

W/N the Civil Code allows for the adoption of acknowledged natural children No. Par (d) Sec.3 of the RA refers only to elective officials of the Sangguniang
of the father or mother. Panlulungsod of single district cities and elective officials of the Sangguniang Bayan
for municipalities outside Metro Manila. The law specifically stated that provinces with
HELD: only one legislative district should be divided into two and therefore should
The law intends to allow adoption whether the child be recognized or not. If necessarily be elected by districts. Par (d) should be interpreted in line with the rest of
the intention were to allow adoption only to unrecognized children, Article 338 would the statute and to follow the interpretation of the petitioner there would have been
be of no useful purpose. The rights of an acknowledged natural child are much less no reason for the RA to single out the single district provinces. The court realized that
than those of a legitimated child. Contending that this is unnecessary would deny the the language of the law in this case seems abstruse and the key to determine what
illegitimate children the chance to acquire these rights. The trend when it comes to legislature intended is the purpose or reason which induced it to enact the statute.
adoption of children tends to go toward the liberal. The law does not prohibit the The explanatory note in the proposed bill provided that the reason for the division
adoption of an acknowledged natural child which when compared to a natural into two legislative districts is to reduce the number of candidates to be voted for in
child is equitable. An acknowledged natural child is a natural child also and following the 1992 elections.
the words of the law, they should be allowed adoption.
LATIN MAXIM: 2, 9c, 11a, 36b, 37, b2
6c, 8a, 9, 12, 26, 36a, 37, 39b

Salenillas v. Court of Appeals Sarcos v. Castillo

Case No. 68 Case No. 276
G.R. No. 78687 (January 31, 1989) G.R. No. L-29755 (January 31, l969)
Chapter IV, Page 135, Footnote No.47 Chapter IV, Page 136, Footnote No. 48

On December 4, 1973, the property of Petitioners was mortgaged to Petitioner, the elected Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur, was charged with
Philippine National Bank as security for a loan of P2,500. For failure to pay their loan, misconduct and dishonesty in office by Respondent, the Provincial Governor of
the property was foreclosed by PNB and was bought at a public auction by Private Surigao del Sur. The act, constituting the alleged dishonesty and misconduct in office
Respondent. Petitioner maintains that they have a right to repurchase the property consisted in the alleged connivance of Petitioner with certain private individuals in
under Sec.119 of the Public Land Act. Respondent states that the sale of the property the cutting and selling of timber or logs for their own use and benefit, to the damage
disqualified Petitioners from being legal heirs vis-à-vis the said property. Respondent and prejudice of the public and of the government. And on the basis of such
also maintains that the period for repurchase has already prescribed based on administrative complaint, Petitioner was placed under preventive suspension by
Monge et al. vs. Angeles. Respondent pursuant to Sec. 5, of RA No. 5185, otherwise known as the
“Decentralization Act of l967”.
1. W/N petitioners have the right to repurchase the property under the said Act. ISSUE:
2. W/N the prescription period had already prescribed. W/N Respondent is vested with power to order such preventive suspension
under the Decentralization Act of l967.
The provision makes no distinction between the legal heirs. The distinction HELD:
made by Respondent contravenes the very purpose of the Act. Petitioners’ The new law explicitly stated that the power of suspension was vested on the
contention would be more in keeping with the spirit of the law. Provincial Board. The purpose of this was to prevent partisan considerations by
With regard to prescription, the Monge case involved a pacto de retro sale vesting the power on a board where no one person may have monopoly over the
and not a foreclosure sale and so the rules under the transaction would be different. power of suspension. The Provincial Governor may no longer have the power of
For foreclosure sales, the prescription period starts on the day after the expiration of preventive suspension over a Municipal Mayor.
the period of redemption when the deed of absolute sale was executed.
LATIN MAXIM: 1, 6c, 6d, 7a, 9a, 36b, 49
9b, 26, 27, 9b, 42a

Ala Mode Garments, Inc. v. NLRC Jose Comendador v. Renato S. De Villa

Case No. 7 Case No. 69
G. R. No. 122165 (February 17, l997) G.R. No. 93177 (August 2, 1991)
Chapter IV, Page 138, Footnote No. 53 Chapter IV, Page 142, Footnote No. 61

Respondents were both employees of Petitioner and holding position as line The petitioners are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing
leaders, tasked to supervise 36 sewers each. On May 5 and 6, l993, all the line leaders prosecution for their participation in the failed coup d’etat on December l to 9, l989.
did not report for work. On May 6, l993, Private Respondents were not allowed to In connection with their prosecution, a Pre-Investigation Panel and a Court
enter the premises of the Petitioner, and then required to submit written explanations Martial was formed. During their trial, petitioners invoked their right to peremptory
as to their absence. On May 10, l993, Private Respondents tendered their challenge. The same was denied by the Court Martial on the ground that the right
explanation letters. was discontinued when martial law was declared under a Presidential Decree.
Despite their explanation, they were not allowed to resume their work and
were advised to await the decision of the management whether or not the real ISSUE:
reason for their absence was intended to sabotage the operations of Petitioner. But 1. W/N there was substantial compliance in the conduct of pre-trial
other line leaders were allowed to resume their work despite their absence on May 5 investigation.
and 6, l993. 2. W/N there was a legal basis for the GCM No. 14 to deny the right of
petitioners to invoke a peremptory challenge.
ISSUE: 3. W/N there was a legal basis for the Regional Trial Courts to grant bail and
1. W/N the failure of Petitioner to allow Private Respondents from resuming their order for the release of petitioners.
work constitutes dismissal from the service?
2. W/N the Labor Arbiter erred in limiting the award of backwages for only a HELD:
period not exceeding three 3 years? The right to peremptory challenge was suspended when Martial Law was
declared. But when the same was lifted, the right to peremptory challenge was
HELD: effectively revived. The reason being, the right was suspended due to the creation of
Under the old doctrine, the backwages that can be awarded to illegally military tribunals to try cases of military personnel and other cases that may be
dismissed employees was not to exceed a period of three years. However, a new referred to them, so when martial law was lifted and the tribunals were abolished, the
doctrine allowed the awarding of “full” backwages and also prevented the right to peremptory challenge was revived.
company from deducting the earnings of the illegally dismissed employees
elsewhere during the pendency of their case. The Labor Arbiter was wrong in LATIN MAXIM:
awarding backwages for a period of not exceeding three years. 2a, 9a, 10

1, 5a, 6a, 6c, 7a, 49

Matabuena v. Cervantes Lopez & Sons, Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals

Case No. 172 Case No. 151
G.R. No. L-28771 (March 31, 1971) G.R. No. L-9274 (February 1, 1957)
Chapter IV, Page 143, Footnote No.69 Chapter IV, Page 144, Footnote No.76

Felix Matabuena cohabitated with Respondent. During this period, Felix Petitioner imported wire nettings from Germany. The Manila Customs
Matabuena donated to Respondent a parcel of land. Later the two were married. Collector assessed the customs duties on the basis of the suppliers invoice. The duties
After the death of Felix Matabuena, his sister, Petitioner, sought the nullification of the were paid and the shipment released. Thereafter, the Manila Customs Collector
donation citing Art.133 of the Civil Code “Every donation between the spouses reassessed the duties due on the basis of the dollar value of the importation and
during the marriage shall be void.” imposed additional duties.
The trial court ruled that this case was not covered by the prohibition because Petitioner appealed directly to Respondent Court but they dismissed it for lack
the donation was made at the time the deceased and Respondent were not yet of jurisdiction citing Sec. 7 of RA 1125 creating said Tax Court. Provision says that “the
married and were simply cohabitating. Court has jurisdiction to review decisions of Commissioner of Customs. However,
under Sec. 11 of same Act, the Court has jurisdiction to review rulings of the Collector
ISSUE: of Customs when brought by persons affected thereby.
W/N the prohibition applies to donations between live-in partners.
HELD: W/N Respondent Court has jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Collector
Yes. It is a fundamental principle in statutory construction that what is within of Customs.
the spirit of the law is as much a part of the law as what is written. Since the reason for
the ban on donations between spouses during the marriage is to prevent the HELD:
possibility of undue influence and improper pressure being exerted by one spouse on Yes, there is indeed a disparity between Sec. 7 and 11 of same RA. The
the other, there is no reason why this prohibition shall not apply also to common-law Supreme Court concurred with the positions of the Solicitor General that a clerical
relationships. error was committed in Sec. 11 and the word Collector should read Commissioner. To
The court, however, said that the lack of the donation made by the support this, the Supreme Court cited that under the Customs Law as found under
deceased to Respondent does not necessarily mean that the Petitioner will have Sec. 1137 to 1410 of the Revised Administrative Code, ‘the Collectors of Customs are
exclusive rights to the disputed property because the relationship between Felix and mere Subordinates of the Commissioner of Customs over whom he has supervision
Respondent were legitimated by marriage. and control.
In this ruling, the court did not engage in judicial legislation. It merely rectified
LATIN MAXIM: an apparent clerical error in the wordings of the statute to carry out the conspicuous
6c, 9a, 9c intention of the Legislature. Under the rule of statutory construction, it is not the letter,
but the spirit of the law and the intent of the legislature that is important.

9c, 16a, 16c, 36a

Lamb v. Phipps Com. of Internal Revenue v. ESSO

Case No. 143 Case No. 27
G.R. No. L-7806 (July 12, 1912) G.R. No. L-28502-03 (April 18, 1989)
Chapter 4, Page 144, Footnote No.78

Petitioner contends that he had rendered a proper account of all the funds Respondent overpaid its 1959 income tax. It was accordingly granted a tax
of the government which came to his possession as a superintendent of the Iwahig credit by Petitioner on August 5, 1964. However, Respondent’s payment for 1960 was
Penal Colony and that all of his accounts are balanced. Petitioner thus filed an found to be short. Thus, Petitioner demanded payment of the deficiency tax together
action for mandamus to compel the acting auditor of the Philippines to issue a with interest for the period of April 18, 1961 to April 18, 1964. On August 10, 1964,
clearance. However, it was contended that the action for mandamus cannot Respondent paid under protest the amount alleged to be due. It protested the
prosper since there is no showing that, as provided by law, “there is no plain, speedy computation of interest, arguing that it was more than what was properly due,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary courts of law.” claiming that it should only be required to pay interest for the amount of the
difference between the deficiency tax and Respondent’s overpayment.
W/N the legislature intended to limit the jurisdiction to cases where there is no ISSUE:
other adequate and speedy remedy in the ordinary “courts” of law. 1. W/N Respondent shall pay the deficiency tax of P367, 994 with interest.
2. W/N Respondent is entitled to a refund.
There appears to be a typographical error in the wording of Sec. 222 of Act HELD:
No. 190 which reads in part: “When the complaint in an action in a court of First The government already had in its hands the sum of P221, 033 representing
Instance alleges that any inferior tribunal, … it may if there is no other plain, speedy the excess payment of Respondent. Having been paid and received by mistake, the
and adequate remedy in the ordinary “courts” of law.” sum belonged to Respondent and the government had the obligation to return such
The phrase “courts of law” should read as “course of law”. Copied verbatim amount, which arises from the moment that payment is made, and not from the time
from the Code of Civil Procedure of California, the said section in the California Code that the payee admits the obligation to reimburse. Since the amount of P221, 033
reads “course of law” instead of “courts of law”. Spanish translation of said Sec. 222 was already in the hands of the government as of July, 1960, whatever obligation
more clearly indicates what the legislature intended. In Spanish, the other remedy is Respondent might subsequently incur in favor of the government would have to be
not limited to the ordinary “courts of law”. On its face, this evident typographical reduced by that sum, in respect of which no interest could be charged.
error, which, if uncorrected, would render the law nonsensical. It is therefore the duty It is well established that to interpret words of the statute in such a manner as
of the court to give the statute a sensible construction, such as will effectuate the to subvert these truisms simply cannot and should not be countenanced. Nothing is
legislative intent and to avoid injustice or an absurd conclusion. better settled than the rule that courts are not to give words a meaning which would
lead to absurd and unreasonable consequences. Moreover, a literal interpretation is
LATIN MAXIM: to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results. Statutes should receive a
9c, 9d, 11a, 11d, 12a, 36a, 36b, 36d, 36f, 37 sensible construction, such as will give effect to the legislative intention and so as to
avoid an unjust or absurd conclusion.

8a, 8b, 11a, 11d, 11e, 12a, 12b

People v. Villanueva People v. Duque

Case No. 116 Case No. 106
G. R. L-15014 (April 29, 1961) G. R. 100285 (August 13, 1992)
Chapter IV, Page 149, Footnote No.97

Defendant was accused of crime of serious and less serious physical injuries Accused was charged with illegal recruitment because he was not licensed
with damage to property in amount of P2,362 through reckless imprudence in the nor authorized by the proper government agency, POEA. The Labor Code provides
Justice of the Peace Court of Batangas. The case was considered beyond the that the offense shall prescribe in 3 years but does not contain any provision of how
court’s jurisdiction because of the fine imposable upon the accused. The case was to compute it. Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 provides that “prescription shall begin to run
forwarded to the Court of First Instance, which also declared itself without jurisdiction from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not
because the penalty for the more serious offense of physical injuries through reckless known at the time, from the discovery thereof and institution of judicial proceedings
imprudence is only arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, and even for its investigation and punishment”. According to Accused, a literal reading
applied to its maximum degree. It should remain within the jurisdiction of the Justice suggests that the prescriptive period would never begin to run.
of Peace.
ISSUE: What is the prescription of the criminal offense of the Accused?
Whether or not the Court of First Instance has jurisdiction.
HELD: Prescription began from the time the activities of the Accused were
Yes. Angeles et al vs. Jose, a similar case, held that jurisdiction was with the ascertained by the complainants and by the POEA to have been carried out without
Court of First Instance and not the municipal court. Also, since the Court of First any license or authority from the government. There is absurdity in Sec. 2 but
Instance would have jurisdiction if the only offense were the damage of property, it Accused does not benefit from a literal reading. It must be construed in such a way
would be absurd to say that the graver offense of serious and less serious physical as to give effect to the intention and avoid absurd results. “Institution of judicial
injuries combined with damage to property through reckless imprudence is in proceedings for its investigation and punishment” may be either disregarded as
jurisdiction of the Justice of Peace. surplusage or should be deemed preceded by the word “until”.
Moreover, there is the possibility that the prosecution will fail to prove the
physical injuries aspect of the case and establish only the damage to property. The LATIN MAXIM:
Justice of Peace, if given jurisdiction, would find itself without jurisdiction to impose 9, 11a, 11d, 12, 15, 38
the P2,636 fine for the damage to property committed, since such fine cannot be less
than the amount of the damage.

5, 11

Bello v. Court of Appeals Cesario Ursua v. Court of Appeals

Case No. 15 Case No. 306
G. R. L-38161 (March 29, 1974) G.R. No. 112170 (April 10, 1996)
Chapter 4, Page 152, Footnote No.112

Petitioners falsely appealed a case to the Court of First Instance, which should Petitioner was charged before the Office of the Ombudsman. He was
have been taken directly to Respondent Court. The Prosecutor filed a petition to requested by his lawyer to personally procure the complaint from the Ombudsman
dismiss appeal. Petitioners invoked an analogous provision (Rule 50, Sec. 3) directing because the law firm’s messenger, Oscar Perez, had to attend some personal
the Court of Appeals in cases erroneously brought to it to certify the case to the matters. At the Office of the Ombudsman, he wrote his name at the logbook as
proper court. The Court of First Instance still ordered the dismissal of the appeal. “Oscar Perez.” Petitioner’s real identity was eventually discovered by the employees
Petitioners then filed their petition for prohibition and mandamus to prohibit the of the Ombudsman. He was charged and convicted for violation of C.A. No. 142.
execution of judgment and elevate the appeal to Respondent Court. They dismissed
the petition. Although Respondent Court recognized that the Court of First Instance ISSUE:
may have exercised its inherent powers to direct appeal to Respondent Court, it held W/N the acts committed by the petitioner were among the evils sought to be
that Petitioners did not implead the Court of First Instance as “principal party remedied by C.A. No. 142
respondent” and thus it could not “grant any relief at all even on the assumption that
Petitioners can be said to deserve some equities”. HELD:
Petitioner was acquitted. Statutes are to be construed in the light of the
ISSUE: purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. The court may
W/N the case should be elevated to Respondent Court despite finality of consider the spirit of the statute where the literal meaning would lead to injustice and
judicial decision. absurdity. Likewise, C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute that should be construed strictly
against the state, and in favor of the accused.
Yes. The Court of First Instance acted with grave abuse of discretion. The LATIN MAXIM:
Supreme Court cautions against narrowly interpreting a statute, defeating its purpose 9a, 11a, 12a, 41a
and stressed that “it is the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes as to avoid
such a deplorable result of injustice or absurdity”. The provision should also be taken
within the context and spirit of Rule 50, Sec. 3 as an analogous provision. The
Supreme Court finds no reason as to why the court cannot act in all fairness and
justice to be bound by the same rule.

9a, 9c, 9d, 9e, 11a, 11g, 11h, 12, 36, 8b

Paat v. Court of Appeals Pritchard v. Republic

Case No. 95 Case No. 245
G.R. No. 111107 (January 10, 1997) G.R. No. L-1715 (July 17, 1948)
Chapter 4.16, Footnote No.114, page 156

Petitioner questioned the legality of the forfeiture of the truck used in illegal FACTS:
logging operations. He insists that only the Court can do so, citing Section 68 of PD The Solicitor General opposed the claim of the Petitioner for exemption from
705 as amended by EO 277 which reads “The court shall further the order of filing a declaration of intention on the ground that under the requirement for
confiscation in favor of the Government…as well as the machinery, equipment… exemption, it is imperative that Petitioner’s children should be enrolled during the
which are illegally used…” entire period of residence, and that the Petitioner having failed to enroll all of his
children in school, he failed to comply with one of the conditions required to entitle
ISSUE: him to exemption from filing a declaration of intention.
W/N the petition should be granted in light of Sec. 68 of P.D. 705.
HELD: W/N the Petitioner should be allowed to avail of the exemption by invoking
No. The above-quoted provision should be read together with Sec. 68a. the aforementioned provision.
Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil to
be suppressed, and they should be given such construction as will advance the HELD:
object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended. The provision of law invoked by appellant must be interpreted in the sense
that the enrollment required by law must be made at any time during the entire
LATIN MAXIM: period of the residence of the applicant. The drafters of the law could not have
9a, 36a intended to create an absurd or impossible situation.

11a, 19a

Salvacion v. Central Bank of the Philippines Demafiles v. Comelec

Case No. 245 Case No. 91
G.R. No. 94723 (August, 21, 1997) G.R. No. L-28396 (December 29, 1967)
Chapter 4.16, Footnote No.114, page 156 Chapter 4.18, Footnote 126, page 159

An American tourist raped 12 year old girl. In order to pay for moral damages, Respondent Galido won over Petitioner due to the Provincial Board voting to
the Deputy Sheriff of Makati sent a notice of garnishment to China Bank in order to reject returns. Petitioner challenged the right of 2 board members to sit, considering
draw from the American’s bank account to pay the fees. China Bank responded by that they were reelectionists. Respondent Commission ruled in favor of Petitioner.
invoking Sec. 113 of Circular 960 of Central Bank, which states that “foreign currency Galido then asked for reconsideration, stating that the 2 board members in question
deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment or any other process of any were disqualified only when the board was acting as a provincial but not as
court. Respondent Bank states that though the law is harsh, such is the law and stood municipal. In light of this, Respondent Commission reversed its previous decision.
firm on the policy.
ISSUES: 1. W/N this case is moot and the board had the authority to reject the returns from
W/N Section 13 of Central Bank Circular 960 and Section 8 of RA 6427, as Precinct 7.
amended by PD 1246 should be made applicable to a foreigner. 2. W/N the board members who were candidates for reelection were disqualified
from sitting in the board in its capacity as a municipal board of canvassers.
HELD: 3. W/N Respondent Commission can order the board of canvassers to count a return.
Central Bank contends that the reason for the exemption is to encourage the
deposit of foreign currency. RA 6424 was enacted during a period of economic crisis, HELD:
where foreign investments were minimal. As, some time has already passed since the RA 4970 reads “the first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the municipality
crisis that enacted RA 6424, the economy has now somewhat recovered from the of Sebaste shall be elected in the next general elections for local officials and shall
financial drought. have qualified.” The Supreme Court ruled that “and shall have qualified” is devoid of
Hence, the Court ruled that it is unthinkable that the guilty would be acquitted at the meaning. The term of office of municipals shall begin in the 1 st day of January
expense of the innocent, stating that if Circular 960 is to be followed, justice would be following their election, despite the fact that Sebaste was a newly created
undermined, stating Art. 10 of the Civil Code, in case of doubt as to the interpretation municipality.
or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and No, a canvassing board may not reject any returns due to whatever cause.
justice to prevail. However, since there is a possibility of fraud, the canvass made and proclamation
should be annulled. The law states “any member of a provincial board or of
LATIN MAXIM: municipal council who is a candidate for office in any election, shall be incompetent
2, 14, 39 to act on the said body.” Since Respondent Commission has the power to annul and
illegal canvass and proclamation, there is no reason as to why it cannot order
canvassing bodies to count all returns which are otherwise regular.

15, 35, 43, 26

National Housing Corporation v. Juco People v. Mejia

Case No. 86 Case No. 111
G.R. No. L-64313 (January 17, 1985) G.R. Nos. 118940-41 and G.R. No. 119407 (July 7, 1997)

For being declared guilty of stealing scrap iron owned by Petitioner, Private Sec. 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act reads:
Respondent was terminated. He filed a complaint with Respondent Court and • “Sec. 14. Any person who is found guilty of carnapping shall, irrespective of
Petitioner replied stating that the Respondent Court is without jurisdiction as the value of the motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not
Petitioner Corporation is a government owned corporation and the grounds for less than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years,
dismissal were for valid reasons. Respondent Court however, despite past decisions, when the carnapping is committed by means of violence or in intimidation of
decided in favor of the Private Respondent. persons or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death,
when the owner, driver, or occupant is killed or raped in the course of the
ISSUE: commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.”
W/N employees of Petitioner are covered by the Labor Code or by the laws
and regulations governing the civil service. ISSUE:
1. W/N the phrase “is killed” covers both homicide and murder.
HELD: 2. If the crime was frustrated murder, would the penalty be life imprisonment or
Petitioner is government owned as it never had any private stockholders. The reclusion perpetua to death?
1935 constitution’s section 1 article 12 states that “A civil service embracing all 3. W/N frustrated homicide would be treated as a separate offense.
branches and subdivisions of the government shall be provided by law.” While the
amendments in section 1 article 12b of the 1973 constitution states that “The civil HELD:
service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision and instrumentality of the The words “is killed” make no distinction between homicide and murder.
government, including every government owned or controlled corporation.” Whether it is one or the other which is committed “in the course of carnapping or on
Clearly, the inclusion of government owned or controlled corporation carries the occasion thereof” makes no difference in so far as the penalty is concerned. The
out a message that the coverage is broad and all-embracing. Furthermore, P.D. 807 killing, whether it is homicide or murder, cannot be treated as a separate offense and
Sec. 56 implements the said provision. In addition to this, the Labor Code states that only serves to qualify the carnapping.
the mentioned corporations shall be governed by the Civil Service Law. The phrase “is killed” refers only to consummated murder, and not frustrated
LATIN MAXIM: Frustrated homicide (or murder) is not treated as a separate offense as it is
6, 7, 24, 26, 38b deemed to fall under the clause of Sec. 14 “by means of violence or in intimidation of

6c, 7a, 26, 38a, 43, 48

City of Manila v. Judge Gomez and Esso Philippines Chua v. Civil Service Commission
Case No. 23 Case No. 60
G. R. No. L-37251 (August 31, 1981) G.R. No. 88979 (February 7, 1992)
Chapter IV, Page 164, Footnote No.146

The Revised Charter of Manila took effect on June 18, 1949. It fixes the annual RA 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation as
realty tax at one and one-half percent. The Special Education Fund Law (RA 5447), well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Section 2 covers those who
which took effect on Jan. 1, 1969, imposed an annual additional one percent tax are qualified:
and fixes the total realty tax at three percent. With the three percent maximum limit • Sec. 2. Coverage. – This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees
set by RA 5447, the municipal board of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7125, of the National Government. The benefits authorized under this Act shall
effective beginning the third quarter of 1972, imposing an additional one-half apply to all regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees, regardless
percent realty tax. Respondent Corporation paid the tax, but protested the of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of
Ordinance; the Court of First Instance of Manila ruled that the tax ordinance is void government service as of the date of separation…”
as it is not authorized by the city charter or by any law, and that the city of Manila Petitioner Lydia Chua, believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of
should reimburse Respondent Corporation said tax. the program, filed an application on January 30, 1989 with Respondent
Administration, which, however, denied the same. Recourse by the petitioner to
ISSUE: Respondent Commission yielded the same result.
W/N the tax ordinance is valid.
HELD: W/N Petitioner’s status as a co-terminus employee is excluded from the
The Court holds that the doctrine of implications in Statutory Construction benefits of RA 6683 (Early Retirement Law).
sustains the City of Manila’s contention that the additional one-half percent realty tax
is sanctioned by the provision of the Special Education Fund Law that “the total real HELD:
property tax shall not exceed a maximum of three per centum”. While the 1949 The petition is granted. The Early Retirement Law would violate the equal
Revised Charter of Manila fixed the realty tax at one and one-half percent, the 1969 protection clause of the constitution if the Supreme Court were to sustain
Special Education Fund Law fixed three percent as the maximum real property tax. Respondent’s submission that the benefits of said law are to be denied a class of
The obvious implication is that an additional one-half percent tax could be imposed government employees who are similarly situated as those covered by the said law.
by municipal corporations. Inferentially, that law fixed at two percent the realty tax The court applied the doctrine of necessary implication in deciding this case.
that would accrue to the city or municipality. The fact that the 1974 Real Property
Tax Code specially fixes the real property tax at two percent confirms the prior LATIN MAXIM:
intention of the lawmaker to impose two percent as the realty tax proper. That was 2a, 11e, 12a, 20a, 20b, 37
also the avowed intent of the questioned ordinance.

2a, 20a, 38b, 43, 49

Solid Homes Inc. v. Teresita Payawal Richard Gordon v. Regino Veridiano II

Case No. 280 Case No. 116
G.R. No. 84811 (Aug. 29, 1989) G.R. No. L-55230 (Nov. 8, 1988)
Chapter IV, Page 169, Footnote No.164 Chapter IV, Page 170, Footnote No.171

The Court of Appeals sustained that the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Respondent Yambao owns a San Sebastian Drugstore and an Olongapo City
has jurisdiction over the case filed by the Respondent against Petitioner for failure to Drugstore. A ‘test buy’ operation at San Sebastian Drugstore, wherein agents were
deliver a land title after payment of the agreed amount. Petitioner contends that the sold 200 tablets of Valium without a doctor’s prescription, gave rise to the closure
case should have been heard by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board and ordered by the FDA. Before such order was promulgated, the Mayor revoked the
not the RTC. Mayor’s Permits issued to San Sebastian Drugstore and subsequently, a signboard
was posted by the Vice-Mayor at the drugstore announcing its permanent closure.
ISSUE: On May 7, 1980, FDA approved Respondent’s request to exchange the locations of
1. W/N the RTC has jurisdiction over the case. the two drugstores (which were 5m apart and in the same building). Upon
2. W/N the applicable law is the general law (BP 129) or the special law (PD 1344) knowledge of this, Petitioner then revoked the Mayor’s Permit issued to Olongapo
City Drugstore.
The RTC has no jurisdiction over the case since the respondent’s argument ISSUE:
relies on the general statute where in fact it is the special statute that should prevail. The conflict between the FDA’s and the mayor’s power to grant and revoke
licenses for the operation of drugstores.
1, 20c, 50 RULING:
The FDA had the authority to order the closure of San Sebastian Drugstore, the
Mayor however did not. In the case of Olongapo City Drugstore however, the
authority rested on the Mayor (local jurisdiction).

20c, 38b

Eufronio Llanto v. Mohamad Ali Dimaporo People v. Concepcion

Case No. 155 Case No. 205
G.R. No. L-21905 (Mar, 31, 1966) G.R. No. 19190 (November 29, 1922)
Chapter IV, Page 171, Footnote No.178 Chapter IV, Page 176, Footnote No.202

The Provincial Board of Lanao del Norte reverted the ’60-’61 salary Defendant authorized an extension of credit in favor of Puno Y Concepcion,
appropriation for the position of Assistant Provincial Assessor to the general fund. The S. en C, a co-partnership. Defendant’s wife was a director of this co-partnership.
position, then held by the Petitioner, was abolished. Petitioner came to the court on Defendant was found guilty of violating Sec. 35 of Act No. 2747 which says that “The
mandamus, wherein the Respondent’s motion to dismiss was granted hence the National Bank shall not, directly or indirectly, grant loans to any of the members of the
current action. Board of Directors of the bank nor to agents of the branch banks.” This Section was in
effect in 1919 but was repealed in Act No. 2938 approved on January 30, 1921.
1. Was the dismissal order issued without hearing on the motion to dismiss? ISSUE:
2. Is it void? W/N Defendant can be convicted of violating Sections of Act No. 2747, which
were repealed by Act No. 2938.
There is no need for a hearing and no, it is not void. The motion to dismiss is HELD:
grounded on lack of cause of action, which can be determined by reference to the In the interpretation and construction, the primary rule is to ascertain and give
facts in the averred pleading. The question raised is purely one of law. The legal issue effect to the intention of the Legislature. Section 49 in relation to Sec. 25 of Act No.
was fully discussed in the motion and opposition thereto. Oral arguments are then 2747 provides a punishment for any person who shall violate any provisions of the Act.
reduced to unnecessary ceremonies. Further, petitioner contends that the stamp of Defendant contends that the repeal of these Sections by Act No. 2938 has served to
approval of the Secretary of Finance is needed in abolishing his position. Such action take away basis for criminal prosecution. The Court holds that where an act of the
was, however, done away with by the Local Autonomy Act (Sec. 3a of RA2264). Legislature which penalizes an offense repeals a former act which penalized the
same offense, such repeal does not have the effect of thereafter depriving the
LATIN MAXIM: Courts of jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence offenders charged with violations of
6c, 20a, 32, 37, 49 the old law.

6a, 6b, 9a, 37, 38b

Tantuico, Jr. v. Domingo Alpha Investigation and Security Agency, Inc. v. NLRC
Case No. 285 Case No. 12
G. R. No. 96422 (February 28, 1994) G.R. No. 111722 (May 27, 1997)
Chapter IV, Page 176, Footnote No.205 Chapter V, Page 177, Footnote No.2

The petition questions the withholding of one-half of Petitioner’s retirement Petitioner provides security services. One of its clients is Don Mariano Marcos
benefits. Petitioner was Chairman of the COA from 1976 to 1986. On December 1985, State University (DMMSU). Security guards working in DMMSU filed before the Regional
he applied for and obtained clearance, which covered the period from 1976 to Office of the DOLE a complaint against Petitioner for noncompliance with the current
1985, from all money, property, and other accountabilities in preparation for his minimum wage order. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision holding Petitioner and
retirement. After the EDSA Revolution, he submitted his resignation and sought a DMMSU solidarily liable for the salary differential owed to the security guards.
second clearance for the period from January 1, 1986 to March 9, 1986. Respondent, Petitioner alleges that payment of the wage increase should be borne by DMMSU.
who took over as Chairman, created an inventory/audit of all equipment acquired
during the tenure of his 2 predecessors. After the committee recommended ISSUE:
Petitioner’s clearance from accountability and after another special audit, W/N Petitioner may be held jointly and severally liable with DMMSU for non-
Respondent approved Petitioner’s application for retirement but added that ½ of the payment of minimum wage.
money value of benefits due would be withheld subject to the findings of the audit.
ISSUE: Yes, Petitioner is jointly and severally liable with DMMSU for the payment of
W/N Respondent can authorize that half of Petitioner’s retirement benefits wage increases. Section 6 of RA 6727 (Wage Rationalization Act) provides that in
may be withheld. case of wage increases resulting in a salary differential, the liability of the principal
and contractor shall be joint and several. The same liability attaches under Articles
HELD: 106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code. Petitioner contends that the matter involved in
No. Under Section 4 of RA 1568 providing for life pension to the Auditor the case at bar hinges on wage differentials and wage increases, as prescribed in
General and members of COMELEC, the benefits granted shall not be subject to Section 6 of RA 6727, and not wages in general as provided by the Labor Code. This
garnishment, levy or execution. Likewise, under Section 33 of P.D. 1146 (Revised interpretation is not acceptable. It is a cardinal rule in statutory construction that in
Government Service Insurance Act), the benefits granted “shall not be subject, interpreting the meaning and scope of a term used, a careful review of the whole
among others, to attachment, garnishment, levy or other processes.” Withholding law, as well as the intendment of the law, must be made. Legislative intent must be
Petitioner’s benefits is not allowed in this case. Well-settled is the rule that retirement ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole and not of an isolated
laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree because the intention is to provide part or a particular provision alone.
for the retiree’s well-being.
LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 25a, 36a, 36c, 38b
9a, 9b, 9d, 11f, 11g, 11h, 11i, 38b, 42a

Alfon v. Republic Espino v. Cleofe

Case No. 6 Case No. 102
G.R. No. L-51201 (May 29, 1980) G.R. No. L-33410 (July 13, 1973)
Chapter V, Page 182, Footnote No.25

Petitioner files a petition to have her named changed from Maria Estrella Petitioners appeal a decision involving a petition for declaratory relief filed by
Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella Alfon. 18 Respondents for a judicial declaration of their rights under RA 1862 as amended
by RA 4902 in the matter of conversion lump sum gratuity to annual retirement
The reasons she gave on why she was petitioning to have her name changed are the pension.
1. She has been using the name Estrella Alfon from infancy. ISSUE:
2. She has been enrolled from Grade school to College in the same name. W/N the provision applies to military personnel who retire even after its June
3. All acquaintances know her as Estrella Alfon. 17, 1967.
4. She exercised her right to suffrage under the same name.
ISSUE: No. Looking at the legislative intent through the explanatory note the persons
W/N legitimate and legitimated children are required to use the referred to are those who had retired and received the gratuity in lump sum after
surname of their father. June 22, 1957 but prior to the approval of the act on June 17, 1967.
A contrary interpretation which would allow or authorize retired military
HELD: personnel present or future to convert lump sum gratuity to annual pension would
No. The word "principally" as used in Article 364 is not equivalent to virtually abolish the essential distinction between the two types of retirement benefits
"exclusively" so that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child and render the ‘option’ under the law meaningless and nugatory.
should choose to use the surname of its mother to which he or she is equally entitled.
Petitioner is therefore allowed to change her name from Maria Estrella Veronica LATIN MAXIM:
Primitiva Alfon Duterte to Estrella Alfon 6c, 7a, 9a, 25a

1, 17, 42a

Republic Flour Mills, Inc v. Commissioner of Customs Asiatic Petroleum Co. v. Collector of Internal Revenue
Case No: 258 Case No. 10
G. R. No. L-28463 (May 31, 1971) G.R. No. 12687 (August 27, 1918)
Chapter V, Page 184, Footnote No.39 Chapter V, Page 187, Footnote No.47

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals in which The Defendant, under threat of penalty, compelled the Plaintiff to pay the
they found in Sec. 2802 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Internal Revenue Tax provided for under Sec. 17 of Act No. 2432 upon all such oils
Petitioner was assessed wharfage dues for the exportation of bran (ipa) and which the plaintiff had on hand on the 1st day of January, 1915. The tax was paid
pollard (darak) under Sec. 2802 of the Tariff and Customs Code which states: under protest. The Plaintiff contends that the tax collected was illegal. Sec. 17 Par 72a
“There shall be levied collected and paid on products of the of Act No. 2432 provides that “no tax (imposed by this law) shall be collected on such
Philippines… exported from the Philippines, a charge of 2 pesos per articles which, before the taking effect of this Act, shall have been disposed of to
gross metric ton as a fee for wharfage” consumers or persons other than manufacturers or wholesale dealers.” Said Act took
effect upon the 1st day of January, 1915.
W/N the words “products of the Philippines” excludes bran and pollard on the ISSUE:
ground that they are from wheat grain, which is imported into the Philippines. W/N a dealer is required to pay the Internal Revenue Tax, provided for under
Sec. 17 Par 72a of Act No. 2432, upon mineral oils, composed of kerosene and
HELD: gasoline which had been sold, but not delivered, prior to the 1st day of January 1915.
No. Even without undue scrutiny it does appear quite obvious that as long as
the goods are produced in the country, they fall within the terms of the above HELD:
section. The law is clear; it must be obeyed. The Term “product of the Philippines” No. The Legislature evidently intended, by said phrase, to mean that
should be taken in its usual signification to mean any product produced in the merchandise “dispose of” had been sold. The Legislature, by Act No. 2445, fully
country; hence, bran(ipa) and pollard(darak) produced from wheat imported into recognized that the phrase “disposed of” meant nothing more or less than a
the country are “products of the Philippines. contract whereby the vendor was bound to furnish an article, because in said Act it
provided that the purchaser, and not the vendor, was subject to pay such tax in the
LATIN MAXIM: absence of stipulations to the contrary. The phrase “disposed of” as used in Sec. 17 of
6c, 6d, 7a, 24a, 24b Act No. 2432, should be given its commercial sense and not a technical

3, 6c, 25a, 43

Wil Wilhemsen, Inc v. Baluyut Calder & Co v. The United States

Case No. 173 Case No. 44
G.R. Nos. L-27350-51 (May 11, 1978) G.R. No. 2839 (August 15, 1907)
Chapter V, Page 187, Footnote No.46

Empty cargo vans were used by Plaintiffs to facilitate the carriage and sale The following were imported into the Philippines "One steam turbine,
storage of merchandise loaded on their vessels for delivery from foreign ports of condensing machinery, hot well and pumps, complete with parts and accessories"
Manila among others. After the merchandise had arrived at the port and the cargo the steam turbine was classified under Par 257b as other machinery and detached
vans had been emptied of their contents, they were left along Muelle de San parts not otherwise provided for". The trial court reversed the classification made by
Francisco Stalag. The Defendant applied to the Surveyor of Port for the transfer of customs authorities and classified it under Par 250 as "Dynamos, generators, exciters,
these empty sea vans. The request was based on the Memorandum Order No. 19 and all other machinery for the generation of power."
and the Memorandum Order dated April 20, 1964. The trial court held that the
transfer of Appellants’ empty cargo vans to the warehouse of Appellee was done by ISSUE:
authority of Customs Memorandum of April 20, 1964 and Customs Administrative W/N the machinery in question should be classified under Par 257b or Par 250.
Order No. 22-64, and that the said objects were lawfully detained by Appellee in his
warehouse pending the payment of storage charges. HELD:
A turbine engine and generator, although intended for use as a power-
ISSUE: generating device, does not constitute a complete power generation machine.
W/N the decision of the trial court is legally valid. Component parts must still be added for that purpose to be achieved it should be
classified as "other machinery" under Par 257b.
Yes. As plainly worded in the administrative order, it becomes necessary for all LATIN MAXIM:
empty sea vans to be removed from the pier premises by their owners or shipping 6b, 9c, 25a, 43
agents within ten days after the vans have been completely emptied of all their
contents. This is in order to make available at all times adequate space in all ports for
the loading and unloading of cargoes. In addition, the administrative order has no
requirement similar to that found in Memorandum Order No. 130-63 whereby the
owners of the impounded vans should be notified in writing. The two customs
regulations under consideration are in pari materia so far as both operate under the
flexible cargo system.

9a, 25a, 32, 35, 38a, 50

Manila Herald Publishing Co v. Ramos Malanyaon v. Lising et. al

Case No. 163 Case No. 160
G. R. No. L-4268 (January 18, 1951) GR No. L-56028 (July 30,1981)
Chapter V, Page 188, Footnote No.51 Chapter V, Page 188, Footnote No.52

Respondent filed a libel suit, docketed as Civil Case No. 11531, against A Municipal Mayor was charged with violation of RA 3019 (Anti Graft and
Aproniano G. Borres, Pedro Padilla and Loreto Pastor, editor, managing editor and Corrupt Practices Act). He was suspended from office but he died during his
reporter, respectively, of the Daily Record, a daily newspaper, asking damages incumbency, and while the case was pending. The case was dismissed due to his
aggregating P90,000. With the filing of this suit, the Plaintiff secured a writ of death. Petitioner sought payment of his salary during his period of suspension
preliminary attachment upon putting up a P50,000 bond. The Sheriff of the City of pursuant to Sec 13 of RA 3019 which provides, “Should he be convicted by final
Manila levied an attachment upon certain office and printing equipment found in judgment he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is
the premises of the Daily Record. Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc. and Printers, Inc. acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits w/c
commenced a joint suit against the sheriff, Respondent Quirino and Respondent he failed to receive during suspension”.
Corporation, in which the former sought (1) to enjoin the defendants from
proceeding with the attachment of the properties above mentioned and (2) P45,000 ISSUE:
damages. This suit was docketed as Civil Case No. 12263. Respondent Judge W/N the dismissal of the case due to death of the accused constitutes
declared that the suit, in case No. 12263, was "unnecessary, superfluous and illegal" acquittal.
and so dismissed the same. He held that what Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc., and
Printers, Inc., should do was intervene in Case No. 11531. HELD:
No. It is obvious that when the statute speaks of the suspended officer being
ISSUE: "acquitted" it means that after due hearing and consideration of the evidence
W/N Respondent Judge has authority to dismiss Case No. 12263 at the stage against him the court found that his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable
when it was thrown out of court. doubt. Dismissal of the case is not equal to acquittal of the accused. In People vs.
Salico (84 Phil. 722), " Acquittal is always based on the merits but dismissal does not
HELD: decide the case on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty.
Yes, the right to intervene, unlike the right to bring a new action, is not
absolute but left to the sound discretion of the court to allow. LATIN MAXIM:
6c, 7a, 25a
9a, 25a, 30, 36a, 36b

Rura v. Lopena Krivenko v. Register of Deeds

Case No. 139 Case No. 139
G. R. No. L-69810-14 (June 19, 1985) G.R. No. L-360 (November 15, 1947)
Chapter 5, Page 189, Footnote No.53 Chapter 5, Page 190, Footnote No.60

Petitioner was accused, tried and convicted of five (5) counts of estafa Petitioner, an alien, bought a residential lot but its registration was interrupted
committed on different dates. The counts were consolidated and tried jointly. Only a by the war. In 1945, he sought to accomplish the registration but was denied by the
single decision was rendered. The Petitioner then applied for probation but was register of deeds of Manila on the ground that he cannot acquire land in this
denied by the fiscal on the ground that he had been previously convicted by final jurisdiction. Petitioner brought the case to the Court of First Instance of Manila which
judgment of an offense. The fiscal invoked Sec. 9 of the Probation Law, which ruled in favor of sustaining the refusal of the register of deeds.
disqualifies persons who have previously been convicted by final judgment from
applying for probation. The trial court denied his application on the belief that since ISSUE:
the crimes were committed on different dates, he was guilty on each of those dates. W/N “residential land” falls under the phrase “agricultural lands” as stated in Article
Petitioner however contends that since there is only one decision, he has not yet XIII of the 1935 Constitution.
been previously convicted.
ISSUE: Under the Constitution, aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural
How should the word “previously” be construed? lands, which includes residential lands. It may safely be presumed that what the
members of the Constitutional Convention had in mind when they drafted the
HELD: Constitution was this well-known classification and its technical meaning then
The word “previously” refers to the date of the conviction and not to the prevailing. Soon after, the National Assembly revised the Public Land Law and passed
dates of the crimes involved. Although he was guilty of five counts of estafa, they C.A. No. 141 which permits the sale of residential lots to Filipino citizens or to
were tried jointly and only one decision was handed down. Hence, when Petitioner corporations controlled by such citizens. Such revision is equivalent to a declaration
applied for Probation he had not yet had a final judgment of conviction on his that residential lots are considered as agricultural lands, for under the Constitution,
record. He is eligible for probation under such circumstances. only agricultural lands may be alienated. In addition, the interpretation given by the
Secretary of Justice (1939) also supports the claim that “residential land” is part of
LATIN MAXIM: “public agricultural lands”.
6c, 7a, 48 It is clear that the three branches of the Government have always maintained that
“residential lots” are included in “agricultural lands”. If the term "private agricultural
lands" is to be construed as not including lands not strictly agricultural, the result
would not be in line with the conservative spirit of the Constitution.

1, 2a, 5a, 9a, 25a, 30a, b

Chang Yung Fa, et al. v. Gianzon, etc. and De la Cruz, etc. Garcia v. COMELEC
Case No. 19 Case No. 109
G.R. No. L-7785 (November 25, 1955) G.R. No. 111511 (October 5, 1993)
Chapter V, Footnote No.67, Page No. 192

Petitioners were admitted to the Philippines on pre-arranged employment as In its Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan ng
immigrants under C.A. No. 613 with the express condition that their stay shall be Morong, Bataan agreed to the inclusion of the municipality of Morong as part of the
limited to two years. An amendatory law was then passed which changes the Subic Special Economic Zone in accord with Republic Act No. 7227. Respondent
classification of pre-arranged employees from immigrants to non-immigrants. Commission issued two resolutions denying the petition for initiative and referendum
Petitioners contend that having been classified as “non-quota immigrants”, they on the ground that its subject is merely a resolution and not an ordinance. It
should have been admitted for permanent residence in this country because the contends through the Office of the Solicitor General that under the Local
word “immigrant” is defined to be a person who comes into a country for a Government Code of 1991, a resolution cannot be the subject of a local initiative.
permanent residence. The same is being asserted by the respondent Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong.

W/N the word “immigrant” only refers to a person who comes into a country W/N a local resolution of a municipal council can be the subject of an
for a permanent residence.
initiative and referendum.
The only definition given by our law to the term "immigrant" is: "any alien
departing from any place outside the Philippines destined for the Philippines, other HELD:
than a nonimmigrant." The law gives no definition to the term "nonimmigrant" from
which we may imply that the term "immigrant" is merely intended to include any alien The petition to review and set aside the issued COMELEC resolutions is
coming to this country for permanent residence as now contended by appellants. A granted because resolutions are appropriate subjects for initiative and referendum
review of the whole law would disclose no such intention which denotes that the (Sec. 32 of Art. VI of the Constitution). Also, RA 6735, the law providing for a system on
purpose of the law is to give broad power to the Commissioner of Immigration on initiative and referendum, includes resolutions as among the subjects of initiative.
matters pertaining to the admission of immigrants into the Philippines. Although the Local Government Code does not include the word resolution in its
definition, the court holds that the definition does not limit the coverage of local
LATIN MAXIM: initiatives to ordinances alone. Resolutions are still proper subjects of an initiative
6b, 9a, 36b according to the Constitution and RA 6735.

6a, 9c, 11a, 50

Motoomull v. dela Paz People v. Nazario

Case No. 180 Case No. 218
G.R. No. L-45302 (July 24, 1990) G.R. No. L-44143 (August 31, 1988)
Chapter V, Footnote No.73, Page No. 195 Chapter V, Footnote No.81, Page No. 197

The Petitioners and the Respondents were the initial directors of the Sarkara Accused was charged with violating a municipal ordinance requiring him to
Trading Corporation. The Corporation issued a resolution authorizing the issuance of pay municipal taxes worth P362.52 as a fishpond operator in spite of repeated
unissued stocks on a one is to one basis to its stockholders. The resolution was then demands. Sec. 1 Ordinance No. 4 Series of 1995 provides: “Any owner or manager of
amended authorizing the issuance of unissued shares of stock on a two is to one basis fishponds in places within the territorial limits of Pagbilao, Quezon, shall pay a
to its stockholders payable on Aug. 31, 1974. Petitioner sought issuance of a municipal tax in the amount of P3.00 per hectare of fishpond on part thereof per
preliminary injunction by the Court of Appeals to stop the enforcement of the SEC annum.” He admits to the non-payment of the taxes but contends that the
decision pending resolution of the appeal. The Court however held that it had no ordinance is unconstitutional, or assuming its constitutionality that it does not apply to
jurisdiction according to RA 5434 which reads: Appeal shall not stay the award, order, him as he is a lessee not an owner or manager.
ruling, decision or judgment unless the officer or body rendering the same or the
court, on motion, after hearing, and on such terms as it may deem just, should ISSUE:
provide otherwise. The propriety of a stay granted by the officer or body rendering 1. W/N the ordinance is null and void because it is ambiguous and uncertain.
the award, order, ruling, decision or judgment may be raised only by motion in the 2. W/N the ordinance applies to Accused.
main case.

1. W/N the word “court” refers to a trial court and not the Court of Appeals No, the ordinance is constitutional. In no way may the ordinance at bar be said
2. W/N the Court of Appeals can grant a stay in the execution of the decision. to be tainted with vagueness. It is unmistakable from the above provision that the
Accused falls within the coverage. As the actual operator of the fishponds, he comes
HELD: within the term “manager”. While it appears that the National Government is the
Yes, the word court refers to the trial court. “The law unequivocally stated its owner of the fishpond, the Government never shared in the profits they generated. It
declared objection that appeal shall not stay the appealed decision, award, order.” is therefore, logical that Accused alone shoulders the burden of the taxes under the
The exception is given where the officer or body rendering the same, or the court on ordinance. And obviously, the word owner cannot be construed to include the
motion, after hearing should provide otherwise. The law provides further that the Government because of the ancient principle that the government is immune from
propriety of a stay granted by the officer or body rendering the award, order, taxes.
decision or ruling may be raised only by motion in the main case. More importantly
where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of LATIN MAXIM:
various meanings, its obscurity or doubt may be reviewed by reference to associate 2a, 6c, 37
words. Accordingly, an interpretation which leads to patent inconsistency must be
rejected as not in accordance with the legislative intent.

9a, 12a, 36a

People v. Evangelista Banco de Oro Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Equitable Banking Corporation
Case No. 106 Case No. 12
G.R. No. 84332-33 (May 8, 1996) G.R. No. 74917 (January 20, 1988)

Private Respondent was charged and convicted of frustrated homicide. Respondent Bank filed a case against Petitioner Bank for reimbursement of
Private Respondent filed a petition for probation. However, Chief Probation and P45,982.23 as a consequence of six crossed Manager’s checks which turned out to
Parole Officer recommended denial of Private respondent’s application for have forged and/or unauthorized endorsements appearing at the back of each
probation on the ground that by appealing the sentence of the trial, he had already check. Philippine Clearing House Corp. (PCHC) ordered Petitioner Bank to pay the
waived his right to make his application for probation. The RTC set aside the said amount. Petitioner Bank appealed saying that PCHC had no jurisdiction
Probation Officer’s recommendation and granted Private Respondent’s application because the checks involved were non-negotiable checks.
on April 23, 1993.
ISSUE: W/N PCHC had jurisdiction over checks which are non-negotiable.
W/N the Respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion by
granting private respondent’s application for probation. HELD:
Yes. As provided in the articles of incorporation of PCHC, its operation extends
HELD: to “clearing checks and other clearing items.” Clearly, the term “checks” refer to
Yes. Private Respondent filed his application for probation on December 28, checks in general use in commercial and business activities, including non-
1992, after PD 1990 had taken effect. It is thus covered by the prohibition that “no negotiable checks. No doubt non-negotiable checks are within the ambit of PCHC’s
application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has jurisdiction.
perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction” and that “the filing of the There should be no distinction in the application of a statute where none is
application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.” Having appealed from indicated for courts are not authorized to distinguish where the law makes no
the judgment of the trial court and applied for probation only after the Court of distinction. They should instead administer the law not as they think it ought to be but
Appeals had affirmed his conviction, Private Respondent was clearly precluded from as they find it and without regard to consequences.
the benefits of probation.
LATIN MAXIM: 24a, 24b, 25a, 25b, 26
6, 26, 49

Robles v. Zambales Chromite Mining Co., et. al. Velasco v. Lopez

Case No. 261 Case No. 308
G.R. No. L-12560 (September 30, 1958) G.R. No. 905 (February 12, 1903)
Chapter V, Page 199, Footnote No.90

Petitioner and Respondent Company entered into a contract by virtue of Santiago Velasco died in Namacpacan, La Union on December 4, 1895,
which the latter delivered the possession of certain mining properties over which it leaving a last will and testament. The Plaintiff seeks to declare such will void on
had control to Petitioner who was to extract, mine and sell ores from said properties several grounds, most importantly that the hour is not stated.
upon payment of certain royalties. Upon violation of the terms of agreement, the
company filed a complaint for unlawful detainer. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss ISSUE:
the complaint on the ground that the Justice of Peace was without jurisdiction in W/N the will of Santiago Velasco is void because the hour of its execution is
taking cognizance of the case for unlawful detainer involving mineral land. not stated.

W/N Sec. 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court includes any kind of land, including Yes. Book III, Title II, Chapter I, Article 695 and 687 of the civil Code explicitly
mineral lands. states that said wills without necessary formalities will be void:
“The testator shall express his last will to the notary and to the witnesses. After the
HELD: testament has been drafted in accordance with the same, stating the place, year,
Yes. Any land spoken of in this provision obviously includes all kinds of land, month, day and hour of its execution its shall be read aloud,” (art 695)
whether agricultural, residential or mineral. It is a well known maxim in statutory “Any will, in the execution of which the formalities respectively established in
construction that where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. this chapter have not been observed, shall be void.” (art 687)
The law explicitly defines what shall consist in open wills (art 695) and what the
LATIN MAXIM: sanctions shall be if such formalities aren’t met. (art 687)
24a, 26 It was stated that if the decision would be in favor of the Defendant
(overlooking the absence of the hour) the Court may disregard one formality after
another until eventually they had to repeal the entire system established by the

6d, 7a

Colgate-Palmolive Phil, Inc v. Gimenez Oliva v. Lamadrid

Case No. 67 Case No. 191
G.R. No. L-14787 (January 28, 1961) G.R. No. L-23196 (October 31, 1969)
Chapter V, Page 199, Footnote No.95 Chapter V, Page 200, Footnote No.96

Petitioner Corporation engages in manufacturing toilet preparations and Plaintiff was the owner of a parcel of land which he mortgaged as security for
household remedies. Importation of materials including “stabilizers and flavors” is the payment of a loan. Having defaulted in the payment of the loan, the property
among those Petitioner imports. For every importation, Petitioner pays the Central was foreclosed and sold to Respondent. However, under RA 720, the land could be
Bank of the Philippines 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used for the redeemed two (2) years after the sale, Feb. 4 1963. No redemption was made within
payment of the cost, transportation and other charges pursuant to RA 601, the that time. On May 31 1963, Plaintiff offered to repurchase, claiming that under C.A.
Exchange Tax Law. Under such law, it was also provided that: No. 141, he was entitled to repurchase the land, not two (2), but five (5) years after
“Foreign exchanged used for the payment of cost, transportation and/or other the title was sold because he was a holder of a free patent and torrens title.
charges incident to the importation into the Philippines of … stabilizer and flavors …
shall be refunded to any importer making application therefore.” ISSUE:
The petitioner therefore seeks a refund of the 17% special excise tax W/N the period of redemption is governed by Sec. 119 of C.A. No. 141 of Sec.
5 of RA 720.
W/N the imports of “dental cream stabilizers and flavors” are subject to a 17% HELD:
transportation tax exemption under the Exchange Tax Law. No. Petitioner, as a former owner of land with a homestead patent and a
torrens title, is not included in those enumerated in RA 601 and therefore not subject
HELD: to the two (2) year allotment for redemption.
No. The refusal to deny refund was based on the following argument: In July 30, 1951, the Court had already decided that Sec. 119 of C.A. No. 141
All the items enumerated for the tax exemption fall under one specific class, namely: is applicable to foreclosure sales of lands covered by a homestead or a free patent;
food products, books supplies/ materials and medical supplies. The “stabilizers and therefore, the plaintiff may use its provision of five (5) years.
flavors” the petitions refer to are items which must fall under the category of food Where the general law is the Commonwealth Act and the specific law is the
products. Because such items will be used for toothpaste, it is not a food product and Republic Act, they should be unified, and should abide by the conditions of the
therefore not subject to exemption times.
Petitioner’s arguments effected the grant of the refund:
RA 601 does not categorize the exceptions as stated above. Though “stabilizers and LATIN MAXIM:
flavors” are preceded by items that might fall under food products, the following 1, 30a, 38a, 39a, 50, b, b2
which were included are hardly such: fertilizer, poultry feed, vitamin concentrate,
cattle, and industrial starch.
Therefore, the law must be seen in its entire context, not the parts and
categorizations posited by the respondent.

26, 29, 36

Escosura v. San Miguel Brewery, Inc. Philippine British Assurance v. Intermediate Appelate Court
Case No. 100 Case No. 234
G.R. No. L-16696 & L-16702 (January 31, 1962) G.R. No. L-72005 (May 29, 1987)
Chapter V, Page 200, Footnote No.97 Chapter 5, Page 200, Footnote No.99

Petitioners are employees of San Respondent Corporation who at various Sycwin Coating& Wires Inc, filed a complaint for a collection of money
times during employment, fell ill. They were given sick leave pay pursuant to its against Varian Industrial Corporation. During the pendency, Respondent attached
Health, Welfare and Retirement Plan. Despite receipt of the sick leave pay from some of the properties of Varian Industrial Corp upon the posting of a supersedes
Respondent Corporation, the employees claimed for sickness benefit allowances bond. The latter in turn posted a counter bond through Petitioner so the attached
under the Social Security Act contending that their receipt of sick leave pay of less properties were released. Sycwin filed a petition for execution pending appeal
than the full wage does not preclude them from claiming for the allowances against the properties of Varian, which was granted. However, the writ of execution
provided in the law. Respondent Corporation countered that having already was returned unsatisfied as Varian failed to deliver the previously attached personal
received sick leave pay, they cannot claim benefits under the Social Security Act as properties upon demand. Sycwin prayed that Petitioner Corporation be ordered to
these are exclusive to those not receiving any leave privileges at all from the pay the value of its bond which was granted.
ISSUE: W/N the counter bond issued was valid.
W/N Petitioners were entitled to additional sickness benefit allowance under
the Social Security Act. HELD:
The counter bond was issued in accordance with Sec. 5, Rule 57 of the Rules
HELD: of Court. Neither the rules nor provisions of the counter bond limited its application to
To uphold the theory that as long as the employee receives any amount as a final and executory judgment. It appllies to the payment of any judgment that may
sick leave pay by a private benefit plan, the employee cannot avail of the privileges be recovered by Plaintiff. The only logical conclusion is that an execution of any
under the Social Security Act, would be to enable the employer to defeat the judgment including one pending appeal if returned unsatisfied may be charged
purpose of the law. The Social Security Act, having been enacted for the welfare of against such counter bond. The rule therefore, is that the counter bond to life
the employees, cannot be given an interpretation that would defeat such purpose. attachment shall be charged with the payment of any judgment that is returned
unsatisfied. It covers not only a final and executory judgment but also the execution
LATIN MAXIM: of a judgment of pending appeal.
26, 2b, 3a, 38b
24a, 26, 36a

Ramirez v. Court of Appeals Pilar v. Commission on Elections

Case No. 251 Case No. 242
G.R. No. L-16696 & L-16702 (January 31, 1962) G. R. No. 115245 (July 11, 1995)
Chapter 5, Page 201 , Footnote No.100 Chapter 5, Page 201, Footnote No.100

A civil case was filed by Petitioner alleging that Private Respondent, in a On March 22, 1992, Petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the position
confrontation in the latter’s office allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated him. of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. Three days
Petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event to support her claim. The act later, he withdrew his certificate of candidacy. As a result, Respondent Commission
of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal. Thus, respondent and filed a criminal imposed a fine of P10,000 pesos for failure to file his statement of contributions and
case. expenditures. Petitioner contends that it is clear from the law that the candidate must
have entered the political contest, and should have either won or lost.
W/N the facts charged against him constituted an offense. ISSUE:
W/N Petitioner can be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions
HELD: and expenditures since he was a “non-candidate”, having withdrawn his certificate
The law makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties in any of candidacy three days after its filing.
private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape
recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be HELD:
penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those Yes. Sec. 14 of RA 7166 states that “every candidate” has the obligation to file
involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons his statement of contributions and expenditures. As the law makes no distinction or
unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the
Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish. same, the term “every candidate” must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate
who pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy. Sec. 13 of
LATIN MAXIM: Resolution No. 2348 categorically refers to “all candidates who filed their certificate
6a, 7a, 9a, 11a, 24a, B2 of candidacy”.

6c, 7a, 26, 37, b2

Sanciangco v. Roño Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

Case No. 273 Case No. 38
G. R. No. 68709 (July 19, 1985) G. R. No. 116356 (June 29, 1998)
Chapter 5, Page 203 , Footnote No.106

Petitioner was elected as Barangay Captain. Later, he was elected President Davao Pilots Association elevated a complaint against Petitioner for a sum of
of the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) of Ozamiz City by the Board of money and attorney’s fees alleging that DPA had rendered the pilotage services to
Directors of the said Association. Petitioner then Petitioner then filed his Certificate of Petitioner between January 14, 1987 to July 22, 1989 with total unpaid fees of
Candidacy for the May 14, 1984 elections for Misamis Occidental under the banner P703,290.18. Despite repeated demands, Petitioner failed to pay and prays that the
of the Mindanao alliance. He was not successful in the said elections. latter be directed to pay the amount with legal rate of interest from the filing of the
complaint; attorney’s fees equivalent to 25% of the principal obligation.
W/N an appointive member of the Sangguniang Panglungsod, who ran for ISSUE:
the position of Mambabatas Pambansa in the elections of May 14, 1984, should be W/N EO 1088 is unconstitutional.
considered as resigned or on forced leave of absence upon filing of his certificate of
candidacy. HELD:
No. In Philippine Interisland Shipping Association of the Philippines v. Court of
HELD: Appeals, the court upheld the validity of EO 1088 and it shall not depart from this
The legislative intent of Sec. 13(2) of BP 697 is clear that even appointive ruling. The Court’s holding clearly debunks Petitioner’s insistence on paying the
Barangay officials are deemed also covered by the said provision. Since he is pilotage fees based on the memorandum circulars issued by the PPA. Administrative
unquestionably an appointive member, he is deemed to have ipso facto ceased to or Executive Acts, Orders and Regulations shall be valid only when they are not
be such member when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 1984 Batasan contrary to the laws or the Constitution.
LATIN MAXIM: 1, 5a, 9a, 37 49
6c, 7a, 9c, 28, 36b

Castillo-Co v. Barbers People v. Martin

Case No. Case No. 214
G.R. No. 129952 (June 16, 1998) G.R. No. L-33487 (May 31, 1971)
Chapter 5, Page 204, Footnote No.110
Congressman Junie Cua filed a complaint before the Office of the FACTS:
Ombudsman against Governor Castillo-Co and Provincial Engineer Virgilio Ringor Respondents were charged with violating Sec. 46 of C.A. No. 613 or the
alleging irregularities in the purchase of heavy equipment by the Governor and Philippine Immigration Act by the Court of First Instance of La Union, specifically in the
Provincial Engineer. The items purchased were “reconditioned” instead of brand new act of bringing in and landing. The Court dismissed the charges on the ground of it
and included other irregularities. Emilio A. Gonzales III, Director, and Jesus Guerrero, being a continuous offense with Criminal Case 6258-M filed in Bulacan against other
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, placed the Petitioners under preventive suspension Respondents who were concealing and harboring the same Chinese Immigrants who
for 6 months. Petitioners contest that the Deputy Ombudsman has no power to sign were brought in therefore they had no jurisdiction.
the order of preventive suspension.
ISSUE: W/N the act of bringing in and landing constitute a continuous offense with
W/N the deputy Ombudsman possessed the authority to sign the order for concealing and harboring.
preventive suspension.
HELD: No. They are two separate offenses.
Yes. The deputy Ombudsman possessed the authority to preventively suspend C.A. No. 613 clearly provides that the four acts are in fact four separate acts.
the Petitioners. There is nothing in RA 7975 which may suggest that the Ombudsman Each act possesses its own distinctive, different, and disparate meaning. The word OR
and only the Ombudsman may sign an order preventively suspending officials in C.A. No. 613 cannot be given a non-disjunctive meaning signifying the separation
occupying positions classified as grade 27 or above. The word “or” is clearly of one act from the other. The words in the information suggesting conspiracy are
disjunctive in this case signifying dissociation from one thing from the other. considered a mere surplusage.


6c, 7a 6c, 7a, 37, 15b

GMCR v. Bell Telecommunications Inc. Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc.

Case No. 49 Case No. 158
G.R. No. 126496 (April 30, 1997) G.R. No. 111097 (July 20, 1994)
Chapter V, Page 208, Footnote No. 130

NTC Commissioner Kintanar denied the request of Bell Telecommunications PAGCOR, created by P.D. 1896, leased a building belonging to Pryce in order
for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity for the installation of to prepare to open a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Various civic organizations,
telecommunications equipment pursuant to its congressional franchise to operate. religious elements, women’s and youth groups, and even the local officials angrily
The denial was promulgated despite the approval of the CCAD of its feasibility and denounced the project. The Sangguniang Panlungsod swiftly enacted two
the endorsement of Deputy Commissioners Fidelo Q. Dumlao and Consuelo Perez. ordinances disallowing the building of the planned casino. Petitioners argue that by
virtue of the Local Government Code (LGC), the Sangguniang Panlungsod may
ISSUE: prohibit the operation of casinos by passing ordinances to protect the general
Whether the NTC is a collegial body or under the direct and sole control of welfare of their citizens from the harmful effects of gambling.
Commissioner Kintanar.
HELD: W/N the two ordinances as enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
The NTC is a collegial body and its decisions should be reached by a majority Cagayan de Oro are valid.
vote. Executive Order 146 creating the NTC clearly shows that the NTC shall be
composed of a head commissioner and 2 deputy commissioners suggesting its HELD:
collegial nature. Therefore the acts of Chairman Kintanar are void ab initio for being The two local ordinances are not valid. In Basco v. Phil. Amusements and
unabashedly contrary to law. Gaming Corp., this Court sustained the constitutionality of the decree. Under the
LGC, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress “gambling and
LATIN MAXIM: other prohibited games of chance.” Since the world “gambling” should be read as
6c, 7a, 15a, 24a referring to only illegal gambling which, like the other prohibited games of chance,
must be prevented or suppressed. On the assumption of a conflict between P.D. 1869
and the LGC, the proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other but to give
effect to both by harmonizing them if possible. Casino gambling is authorized by P.D.
1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by
a mere ordinance.

5a, 9c, 11e, 28, 37, 38, 50

Commissioner of Customs v. Philippine Acetylene Company People v. Santiago

Case No. 72 Case No. 224
G.R. No. L-22443 (May 29, 1971) G.R. No. L-17663 (May 30, 1962)
Chapter V, Page 210, Footnote No. 135 Chapter V, Page 136, Footnote No. 211

Charles Butler, manager of Respondent Company, imported a custom-built The information alleges that Santiago has committed the crime of "libel." The
LPG tank which is used to contain LPG from the refinery in Batangas and to transport accused delivered false, malicious, and highly defamatory statements against Mayor
it to the company’s plant in Manila. RA 1394 provides a tax exemption for the Lacson through an amplifier system before a crowd of around a hundred persons.
importation of machinery and/or raw materials to be used by new and necessary Defendant moved to quash this information upon the ground that the crime charged
industries as determined in accordance with RA 901. The Tax Court held that the term therein is not libel but oral defamation.
industry should be understood in its ordinary and general definition, which is any
enterprise employing relatively large amounts of capital and/or labor. ISSUE:
Whether the crime charged in the information is oral defamation, under Art.
ISSUE: 358 of the Revised Penal Code, or libel, under Art. 355, in relation to Art. 353, of the
W/N the Philippine Acetylene Co., Inc. may be considered engaged in an same Code.
industry as contemplated in Sec. 6 of RA 1394 and therefore exempt from the
payment of the special import tax with respect to the gas tank in question. HELD:
The facts alleged in the information constitute the crime of oral defamation.
HELD: The word "radio" should be considered in relation to the terms with which it is
Philippine Acetylene is not exempt from the special import tax. Tax associated, all of which have a common characteristic, namely, their permanent
exemptions are held strictly against the taxpayer. The obvious legislative intent is to nature as a means of publication, and this explains the graver penalty for libel than
confine the meaning of the term “industries” to activities that tend to produce or that prescribed for oral defamation. Radio as a means of publication is the
create or manufacture, and not to all ventures and trades falling under the ordinary transmission and reception of electromagnetic waves without conducting wires
and general definition. In granting the exemption, it would have been illogical for intervening between transmitter and receiver, while transmission of words by means
Congress to specify importations needed by new and necessary industries as the of an amplifier system is not thru "electromagnetic waves" but thru the use of
term is defined by law and in the same breath allowed a similar exemption to all "conducting wires" intervening between the transmitter and the receiver. It has also
other industries in general. been held in the United States that slanderous statements forming part of a
manuscript read by a speaker over the radio constitute libel.
9a, 9c, 11a, 11d, 28, 43 LATIN MAXIM:
11h, 25a, 28, b2

Caltex (Phil.), Inc. v. Palomar San Miguel Corp. v. NLRC

Case No. 45 Case No. 272
G.R. No. 19650 (September 29, 1966) G.R. No. 80774 (May 31, 1988)
Chapter V, Page 137, Footnote No. 211 Chapter V, Page 211, Footnote No. 138

Petitioner conceived the “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” where participants Petitioner Corporation sponsored an Innovation Program which rewarded
have to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump can dispense cash to SMC employees who will submit ideas and suggestions beneficial to the
during a specific period of time. There was no fee or consideration required to be corporation. Rustico Vega submitted his proposal entitled “Modified Grande
paid, nor any purchase of any Caltex products to be made in order to join the Pasteurization Process” and claimed entitlement to the cash award. SMC denied
contest. Foreseeing the extensive use of mail for advertising and communications, utilizing such proposal but Vega alleged otherwise and filed a complaint with the
Caltex requested clearance for Respondent Postmaster General but was denied NLRC which arbitrated against the Petitioner.
citing said contest is a “gift enterprise” deemed as a non-mailable matter under the
anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law. Hence, Petitioner filed a petition for ISSUE:
declaratory relief. W/N the money claim of Vega falls within the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter
and the NLRC.
W/N the “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” falls under the term “gift enterprise” HELD:
which is banned by the Postal Law. No, said money claim falls outside the jurisdiction of said agencies. The
jurisdiction of the NLRC is outlined in Art. 217 of the Labor Code which includes in par.
HELD: 3 “all money claims of workers, including those based on nonpayment or
No, said contest is not a gift enterprise. The word “lottery” is defined as a underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation pay and other benefits
game of chance where the elements of which are (1) consideration, (2) chance, provided by law or appropriate agreement…” While par. 3 refers to “all money
and (3) prize. The term “gift enterprise” and “scheme” in the provision of the Postal claims of workers,” it is not necessary to suppose that the entire universe of money
Law making unmailable “any lottery, gift, enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of claims has been absorbed into the jurisdiction of the NLRC. Par. 3 should not be read
money or any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind” in isolation with the context formed by par. 1 (unfair labor practices), par. 2 (terms
means such enterprise as will require consideration as an element. The intent of the and conditions of employment), par. 4 (household services), par. 5 (prohibited
prohibition is to suppress the tendency to inflame the gambling spirit and to corrupt activities). The unifying element of pars. 1-5 is that they refer to cases or disputes
public morals. There being no element of consideration in said contest, the spirit of arising out of or in connection with an employer-employee relationship. The scope of
the law is preserved. par. 3 is clarified by its associated paragraphs wherein money claims falling within the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRC are those which have some reasonable
LATIN MAXIM: causal connection with the employer-employee relationship.
9a, 28
28, 36b, 36e

Gotiaco v. Union Ins. Soc. Of Camilon Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Oil Industry Commission
Case No. 114 Case No. 122
G.R. No. 13983 (September 1, 1919) G.R. No. L-41315 (November 13, 1986)
Chapter V, Page 213, Footnote No. 141

The Gotiaco Brothers transported a cargo of rice from Saigon to Cebu. The Petitioner Corporation was contending that Respondent Commission had no
rice was damaged due to the inflow of seawater into the ship during the voyage jurisdiction over the contractual disputes between them and a gasoline dealer in the
because of a defect in one of its drain pipes. Plaintiffs sought recovery from name of Manuel Yap.
Defendant under maritime insurance that purports to insure the cargo from: “Perils…
of the seas, men of war, fire, enemies, pirates, rovers, thieves, jettisons,… barratry of ISSUE:
the master and mariners, and of all other perils, losses, and misfortunes…” The trial W/N Respondent Commission had jurisdiction over the contractual disputes.
court ruled that the ship was unseaworthy and Defendant is not liable. Plaintiffs
appealed hence this action. HELD:
The contention of the Petitioner is well founded. A detailed reading of the
ISSUE: entire OIC Act will say that there has not been an express provision providing for
W/N the insurer is liable for the loss. disputes involving the gasoline dealer and the oil company.
Sec 6 of R.A. 6173 restricts the extent and scope the OIC prerogative of
HELD: jurisdiction in sub paragraph a to f.
No, the owners of the damaged rice must look to the shipowner for redress What the law intend here is to be all embracing to the jurisdictional power of
and not to the insurer. The words “all other perils, losses, and misfortunes” are to be Respondent Commission so anything not mentioned are not or cannot be presumed
interpreted as covering risks which are of like kind with the particular risks which are or indicated. Thus, the jurisdictional power should be restricted to mere regulatory
enumerated in the preceding part of the clause in the contract. A loss which, in the and supervisory power and not judicial. The phrase, ”to set the conditions” means the
ordinary course of events, results from the natural and inevitable action of the sea, right to prescribe rules and conduct. It only pertains to rule making power and not
from the ordinary wear and tear of the ship, or from the negligent failure of the ship’s adjudication. Such limitation is included in the provision in Sec. 7(4d)
owner to provide the vessel with proper equipment to convey the cargo under the
ordinary condition is not a “peril of the sea.” The insurer undertakes to insure against LATIN MAXIM:
perils of the sea and similar perils, not against perils of the ship. It was found that the 25, 30, 31, 36
cargo was improperly stowed and that the owners of the ship were chargeable with
negligence for failure to protect the pipe by putting a case over it. It was
appropriately held that the ship was not seaworthy.


Cagayan Valley Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals Rep. of the Philippines vs. Hon. Migrinio and Tecson
Case No. 43 Case No. 257
G.R. No. 123248 (October 16, 1997)
Chapter V, Page 217, Footnote No.158

La Tondeña registered with the Philippine Patent Office, pursuant to RA 6231, Acting on information received, which indicated the acquisition of wealth
the 350 c.c. white flint bottles it has been using for its gin popularly known as “Ginebra beyond his lawful income, the Philippine Anti-Graft Board required Private
San Miguel”. Thereafter, a case was initiated against Petitioner for using the 350 c.c., Respondent to submit his explanation or comment, together with his supporting
white flint bottles with the mark “La Tondeña, Inc.” and “Ginebra San Miguel” evidence. Private Respondent, a retired lt. colonel, was unable to produce his
stamped or blown-in therein by filling the same with Petitioner’s liquor product supporting evidence, despite several postponements, because they were allegedly
bearing the label “Sonny Boy” for commercial sale and distribution, without La in the custody of his bookkeeper who had gone abroad. The anti-graft Board was
Tondeña’s written consent, and in violation of Sec. 2 of RA 623 as amended by RA created by the PCGG to “investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices
5700. of AFP personnel, both retired and in active service.”

W/N La Tondeña was part of the protected beverages of RA 623 amended W/N Private Respondent may be investigated and prosecuted by the Board,
by RA 5700. an agency of the PCGG, for violation of RA 3019 and 1379.

The words “other lawful beverages” is used in its general sense, referring to all No. Applying the rule in statutory construction, the term “subordinate” as used
beverages not prohibited by law. Beverage is defined as a liquor or liquid for drinking. in EO 1 and 2 would refer to one who enjoys a close association or relation with
Hard liquor, although regulated, is not prohibited by law; hence, it is within the former President Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family member,
purview and coverage of RA 623, as amended. To limit the coverage of the law only relative, and close associate in EO 1 and the close relative, business associate,
to those enumerated or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned will dummy, agent, or nominee in EO 2.
defeat the very purpose of the law.
LATIN MAXIM: 28, 30, 36b, 38
9a, 26, 29

Commissioner of Customs vs. Court of Tax Appeals United States vs. Sto. Nino
Case No. 71 Case No. 302
G.R. Nos. 48886-88 (July 21, 1993)
Chapter III, Page 101, Footnote No.133 Chapter V, Page 220, Footnote No.172

Petitioner contends that the importation of the foodstuffs in question is prohibited and Respondent was caught possessing a deadly weapon. He was prosecuted
the articles thus imported may be subject to forfeiture under Sec. 2530 (f) and 102 (k) under Act No. 1780, which stated that “it shall be unlawful for any person to carry
of the Tariff and Customs Code. The foodstuffs in question being articles of prohibited concealed upon his person any bowie knife, dirk dagger, kris or other deadly
importation cannot be released under bond. weapons, provide that this prohibition shall not apply to firearms in the possession of
persons who have secured a license therefore or who are entitled to carry the same
ISSUE: under the provision of this Act.
W/N the imported foodstuffs in question are not contraband, and are not as The trial court ruled that, using the principle of ejusdem generis, the law will only
stated by Respondent Court, among the prohibited importations enumerated in Sec. apply to bladed weapons
102 of the Tariff and Customs Code therefore these foodstuffs may be released
under bond as provided in Sec. 2301 of the same code. ISSUE:
W/N the trial court was correct in applying ejusdem generis.
Yes. The imported foodstuffs are considered prohibited importation under Sec. HELD:
102 (k) of the Tariff and Customs Code. No. The trial court erred in applying ejusdem generis because the latter is only
resorted to in determining the legislative intent, such that if the intent is clear, the rule
LATIN MAXIM: must give way. In this case, the proviso provides that unlicensed revolvers were
29 covered by the law and as such the law is not limited to bladed weapons.

6c, 29

Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. Social Security Commission Rep. v. Estenzo
Case No. 263 Case No.
G.R. No. L-15045 (January 20, 1961) G.R. No. L – 35376 (September 11, 1980)
Chapter V, Page 221, Footnote No.175

Petitioner filed with Respondent Commission a request that “Catholic Charities, Private Respondents filed a petition to reopen a decision by the Cadastral
and all religious and charitable institutions and/or organizations, which are directly or Court to declare Lot No. 4273 of the Ormoc Cadastre as public land. Petitioners filed
indirectly, wholly or partially, operated by the Roman Archbishop of Manila” be an instant petition alleging that the trial court erred in assuming jurisdiction over the
exempted from compulsory coverage of RA 1161, otherwise known as the Social petition for reopening the cadastral proceedings.
Security Law of 1954.
Petitioner contends that the term “employer” as defined in the law should— ISSUE:
following the principle of ejusdem generis--- be limited to those who carry on W/N RA 6236 applies to the reopening of cadastral proceedings on certain
“undertakings or activities which have the element of profit or gain, or which are lands which were declared public lands.
pursued for profit or gain,” because the phrase “activity of any kind” in the definition
is preceded by the words “any trade, business, industry, undertaking. HELD:
No. RA 6236 does not apply to the reopening of cadastral proceedings on
ISSUE: certain lands which were declared public lands. The Respondent judge was wrong in
W/N the rule of ejusdem generis can be applied in this case. interpreting that RA 6236 is applicable; the job of the judiciary is to apply laws, not
interpret it.
No. The rule of ejusdem generis applies only where there is uncertainty. It is not LATIN MAXIM:
controlling where the plain purpose and intent of the Legislature would thereby be 6d, 7a, 30, 32
hindered and defeated. The definition of the term “employer” is sufficiently
comprehensive as to include religious and charitable institutions or entities not
organized for profit. This is made more evident by the fact that it contains an
exception in which said institutions or entities are not included.

9a, 29

In re estate of Enriquez and Reyes Empire Insurance Co. v. Rufino

Case No. 130 Case No. 97
G.R. No. 9351 (January 6, 1915) G.R. No. L – 38268 (May 31, 1979)
Chapter V, Page 223, Footnote No. 180 Chapter V, Page 223, Footnote No. 181

Francisca Reyes died intestate and was survived by his 2 legitimate Vicente A. Rufino died intestate and was survived by his widow and 7
daughters, Petra and Pascuala. Petra had 2 legitimate children, Rafael and Josefa. children. They then executed a Partition Agreement agreeing to pay for all liabilities
Pascuala had 1 legitimate child, Aurea, and had begotten a natural child by a priest, or obligations of the decedent.
Vicente. Petra, Pascuala, and Aurea have since died. The lower court held that Almost 1 year later, Petitioner filed a Civil Case claiming liabilities and obligations from
Vicente was the owner of all the separate property of Aurea and half of the estate of the Rufino estate. The trial court dismissed this claim stating the Petitioner did not file
Francisca. within the time limited in the notice to creditors in the intestate proceedings. A
Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed by the Petitioner on the decision of the trial
ISSUE: court claiming that what was previously filed was not a money claim against the
W/N Vicente was an acknowledged natural child. estate of the decedent, but a claim on the estates of the Respondents.

Yes. G. E. 68, which was promulgated on December. 18, 1899, repealed the W/N the petition has merit.
law that priesthood was a ground for declaring a marriage void. Since Vicente was
born in 1905 after the said law was enacted, he is considered an acknowledged HELD:
natural child. The petition is dismissed for lack of merit. The liabilities claimed by Petitioner
were not listed in the obligations acknowledged by the Partition Agreement.
30a, 35, 49 LATIN MAXIM:
29, 30a, 45a

Ching Leng v. Galang Acosta v. Flor

Case No. Case No. 5
G. R. No. L-11931 (October 27, 1958) G. R. No. 2122 (September 13, 1905)
Chapter V, Page 224, Footnote No. 187

Petitioner obtained judgment granting his petition for naturalization. He and The Plaintiff and the Defendant were candidates for the Office of the
his wife later petitioned to the Court of First Instance in Rizal for the adoption of his Municipal President of Laoag, Ilocos Norte. Plaintiff alleged that he was duly elected
five children who were all minors and Chinese nationals. The petition was later to said office and that the Defendant had usurped and unlawfully held the same.
granted. Petitioner then requested the Commissioner of Immigration to cancel the However, not a single witness presented by Plaintiff confirmed the latter’s allegations
alien certificate of registration of their children based on the following grounds: (1) by that he had obtained a majority of 100 votes at the said election. Nor can it be
virtue of their naturalization, the children are now considered as Filipino citizens, (2) inferred from the evidence introduced by the Plaintiff that he, as a result of said
adoption gave the adopted children the same rights and duties as if they were the election, or for any other reason, was entitled to the office of Municipal President of
legitimate children of the adopter, (3) since a legitimate child follows the nationality Laoag, now held by Defendant.
of the adopter, the children are considered Filipino Citizens.
ISSUE: Can the Plaintiff maintain an action for the purpose of excluding the
W/N citizenship can be acquired by a child through adoption. Defendant from the exercise of said office?

Citizenship is not a right but a mere privilege. Art. 254 of the Civil Code No. Art. 199, 200, and 201 of the Code of Civil Procedure has reserved to the
enumerates the rights of the legitimate child and acquisition is not a part of the said Attorney-General and to the provincial fiscals, as the case may be, the right to bring
enumeration. Furthermore, Art. 341 of the Civil Code does not include acquisition of such action. If the legislative had intended to give all citizens alike the right to
citizenship. Also, Art. 49 of a special law that provides the character of naturalization maintain an action for usurpation of public office, it would have plainly said so in the
enumerates the means of acquiring citizenship and adoption is not part of it. law in order to avoid doubt on a subject of such far-reaching importance.


30a 30a

Lerum v. Cruz Central Barrio v. City Treasurer of Davao

Case No. 146 Case No. 55
G. R. No. L-2783 (November 29, 1950) G.R. No. L-25811 (April 3, 1968)
Chapter V, Page 225, Footnote No. 192 Chapter V, Page 225, Footnote No. 193

This is an appeal for a petition for declaratory relief. Attys. Lerum and On August 29, 1962, the City of Davao passed Resolution No. 732, pursuant to
Fernando filed for this petition in order to test the sufficiency and probative value of a RA 2370, declaring as officially and legally existing several barrios of the city. Among
testimony in a bigamy case by (former) Judge Cruz regarding the issuance of a these were barrios Agdao, Bucana and Poblacion. Subsequently, barrio Poblacion,
divorce decree. also called barrio Central, asked for its alleged 10% share in taxes collected on real
property located within the barrio, as provided in Sec. 3 of RA 3590. Respondent
ISSUE: refused to release the share on the ground that the amount pertaining to the said
Can the attorneys file a petition for declaratory relief regarding the sufficiency barrio, in relation to barrios Agdao and Bucana, cannot be determined because the
and probative value of (former) Judge Cruz’s testimony? respective boundaries of said barrios were not yet fixed as required by law. The
Petitioner thus filed a case against Davao City’s Treasurer, Council, Auditor and
HELD: Mayor with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Davao, which dismissed the case on
No, the petition for declaratory relief cannot be granted. Under Sec 1, Rule 66 the ground that the issue had been rendered academic by the passage of RA 4354,
of the Rules of Court, declaratory relief may only be granted to a person whose rights amending the charter of Davao City.
are affected by a statute or ordinance, or who is interested “under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument.” The sufficiency and probative value of a ISSUE:
testimony, which is the subject matter for declaratory relief in the instant case, is not W/N the dismissal order was correct.
included in the enumeration. Thus, the assailed order is affirmed.
LATIN MAXIM: The dismissal was affirmed. Sec. 2 of RA 4354 enumerated the barrios
30a comprising the City of Davao, which did not include the Petitioner. Thus, there prima
facie arises the conclusion that said law abolished Barrio Central as part of Davao
City. A non-existent barrio or a barrio not situated in Davao City cannot present a
claim against it or its officials for a share in taxes under RA 3590.


Vera v. Fernandez Villanueva v. City of Iloilo

Case No. 55 Case No. 312
G.R. No.L-31364 (March 30, 1979) G.R. No. L-26521 (December 28, 1968)
Chapter V, Page 225, Footnote No. 193 Chapter V, Page 226, Footnote No. 197

This case is an appeal with regard to two orders promulgated by the CFI of The case is an appeal questioning the lower court’s judgment declaring
Negros Occidental, Branch V in relation to the intestate estate of Luis D. Tongoy. The Ordinance No. 11 as illegal. The Petitioners, Eusebio and Remedios Villanueva, are
cases were for the claim and payment of deficiency income taxes in the total sum of owners of 5 tenement houses containing 43 apartments. By virtue of the ordinance,
P3,254.80 with 5% surcharge and 1% monthly interest, as provided in the Tax Code. the city was able to collect P5,824 from the spouses for the years 1960-1964.
The Petitioners were denied the said claim and payment as they were barred under
Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. ISSUE:
1. Is Ordinace 11 illegal because it imposes double taxation?
ISSUE: 2. Is the City of Iloilo empowered by the Local Autonomy Act to impose tenement
W/N the statute of non-claims under Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the New Rules of Court taxes?
bars claim of the government for unpaid taxes. 3. Is it oppressive and unreasonable because it carries a penal clause?
4. Does it violate the uniformity of taxation?
The order appealed from is reversed. A perusal of the aforequoted provision HELD:
shows that it makes no mention of claims for monetary obligations of the decedent The judgment is reversed; the ordinance is valid.
created by law, such as taxes which is entirely different from the claims enumerated 1. No. The same tax may be imposed by the national government as well as by the
therein. Par. 315 of the Tax Code states that payment of income tax shall be a lien in local government.
favor of the government from the time the assessment was made by the 2. Yes. RA 2264 confers on local governments’ broad taxing authority. It is clear that
Commissioner of Internal Revenue until paid with interests, penalties, etc. Thus, before the intention of the ordinance is to impose a tenement or apartment tax, which is
the inheritance has been passed to the heirs, the unpaid taxes due the decedent not among the exceptions listed in Sec. 2 of the Local Autonomy Act.
may be collected, even without its having been presented under Sec. 2 of Rule 36 of 3. No. The lower court had in mind the constitutional provision that “no person shall
the Rules of Court. be imprisoned for a debt or non-payment of a poll tax”, which should not apply;
the tax in question is neither a debt nor a poll tax.
LATIN MAXIM: 4. No. Taxes are uniform and equal when imposed upon all property of the same
27, 30, 44 class or character within the taxing authority.

7a, 20c, 30, 35, 42

Santo To v. Cruz-Paño Samson v. Court of Appeals

Case No. 275 Case No. 270
G.R. No. L-55130 (January 17, 1983) G.R. No. L-43182 (November 25, 1986)
Chapter V, Page 226, Footnote No. 199 Chapter V, Page 226, Footnote No. 200

Petitioner Santo To was convicted of estafa for a bouncing check and was Petitioner Samson, the mayor of Caloocan, terminated the services of
sentenced with a penalty of prision mayor. He appealed to the Court of Appeals, Respondent, Mr. Talens, as Assistant Secretary, through Administrative Order No. 3,
which reduced his sentence to the penalty of prision correctional. He then filed a because of lack and loss of confidence, and appointed Mr. Liwag, co-Petitioner, to
petition for probation but was denied by the Respondent judge, Hon. Cruz-Paño, said position. RA 2260 (Civil Service Act of 1959) Sec 5(f) declares that the position of
despite the favorable recommendation of the Probation Office, on the ground that secretaries to city mayors as non-competitive. Talens asserts his position was not
granting it would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, and that Santo To was covered by the said act and, being permanently appointed, he can only be
not a penitent offender. In a motion for reconsideration, the Solicitor General removed for a cause and after due process. The Court of First Instance ruled in favor
recommended the grant because the Petitioner was not among the offenders of Talens, declaring the order null and void. The Court of Appeals also affirmed said
disqualified to avail probation, as enumerated in the probation law (P.D. 968) Sec. 9. decision.

Can Petitioner To avail himself of probation? Was the termination of Talens illegal?

Yes. The law gives more importance to the offender than the crime. He is a Yes, Talens’ termination was illegal; his position is not among those expressly
first-time offender and his offense has relative lightness. In addition, the Respondent declared by law as highly confidential. The nature of functions attached to a position
judge cannot assume that To had not shown repentance. Besides, where the determines whether such position is highly confidential. Where the law provides that
Probation Law expressly enumerates the persons disqualified to avail of its benefits, positions in the government belong to the competitive service, except those
the clear intent is to allow the benefits of probation to those not included in the declared by law to be in the noncompetitive service and those which are policy-
enumeration. determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature, the legislature is
presumed to have intended to exclude those not enumerated, for otherwise, it would
LATIN MAXIM: have included them in the enumeration.
9a, 36b
9a, 30

Finman General Assurance Corp. vs. Court of Appeals Centano v. Villalon-Pornillos

Case No. 107 Case No. 54
G.R. No 100970 (September 2, 1992) G.R. No. 113092 (September 1, 1994)
Chapter V, Page 228, Footnote No. 202 Chapter V, Page 228, Footnote No. 203

Carlie Surposa was insured with the Petitioner and had several relatives as his In 1985, the officers of Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a
beneficiaries. On October 18, 1988, Carlie Surposa died of a stab wound. After a fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay in Bulacan. Martin
written notice of claim by the beneficiaries to the insurance company, the latter Centeno, chairman of the group, approached Judge Angeles, President of Tikay,
denied the claim, saying that murder and assault are not within the scope of the and the latter solicited P 1,500. However, this solicitation was made without a permit
coverage of the insurance policy. The insurance company was found liable by the from the DSWD and as a result, it was contended that Centeno violated P.D. 1564,
Insurance Commission to pay P15,000, and this decision was affirmed by the which states “Any person to solicit or receive contributions for charitable or public
appellate court. Petitioner contends that the CA was wrong in using “expressio unius welfare purposes shall secure a permit from the regional Office of the Department of
exclusio alterius” in a personal accident insurance policy since death resulting from Social services and Development.”
murder and/or assault are impliedly excluded therefrom.
ISSUE: W/N the phrase “charitable purposes” in P.D. 1564 is meant to include
Did the CA make a mistake in using the said principle? religious purposes.

No. The fact remains that the death of Surposa was pure accident on the No. Where a statute is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by
part of the victim. Furthermore, the personal accident insurance policy specifically interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The 1987 Constitution treats the
enumerated only 10 circumstances where no liability attaches to the insurance words “charitable” and “religious” separately and independently from each other.
company. Failure to include death through murder or assault meant it had not been Since P.D. 1564 merely states that charitable or public welfare purposes need a
intended to be exempt from liabilities resulting from such. permit from DSWD, this means that the framers of the law never intended to include
solicitations for religious purposes within its coverage. The term “charitable” should be
LATIN MAXIM: strictly construed to exclude solicitations for “religious” purposes. Moreover, since this
9a, 30 is a criminal case, penal law must be construed strictly against the State and liberally
in favor of the accused.

6c, 11g, 11i, 25, 27, 30, 48

Escribano v. Avila Manabat v. De Aquino

Case No. 101 Case No. 161
G.R. No. L-30375 (September 12, 1978) G.R. No. L-5558 (April 29, 1953)
Chapter V, Page 229, Footnote No. 205 Chapter V, Page 229, Footnote No. 208

Congressman Salipada Pendatun of Cotobato, filed a complaint for libel Petitioners were ordered to pay P 1,261.74 plus interest for usury, wherein the
against Mayor Jose Escribano of Tacurong before the Court of First Instance (now the couple failed to appear in court and present evidence in the hearing. Notified of the
RTC) to Judge David Avila. Escribano questioned Judge Avila’s authority to conduct decision on September 7, 1951, they filed for an appeal by registered mail on
the preliminary investigation of the offense. He contended that the city fiscal of September 22 of that same year. However, the papers were actually received by the
Cotobato is the only one empowered to conduct the preliminary investigation, court on September 24. Thus, the Judge of First Instance declared that the appeal
pursuant of RA 4363 and Art. 360 of the RPC which does not empower the Court of was late and dismissed it.
First Issuance to conduct preliminary investigations of written defamations due to an
amendment made for Art 360. ISSUE:
1. Whether the appeal was deemed filed on September 22, when they were
ISSUE: deposited by registered mail, or Sept 24, when they were actually received
Whether the Court of First Issuance is invested with the authority to conduct by the court.
the preliminary investigation of the crime of libel or whether that power is lodged 2. W/N the appeal has been perfected within 15 days.
exclusively in the city attorney of that city.
HELD: Yes. The appeal was perfected within 15 days. Rule 27 Sec. 1 of the Rules of
Yes. The Court of First Issuance may conduct preliminary investigations Court must be applied which will result to the date of deposit in the post office by
because this power is not lodged exclusively in the city attorney. The enumeration in registered mail of court papers as the date of filing. Uniformity of rules is to be desired
the law of the public officers and the courts that may conduct preliminary to simplify procedure. Thus, Petitioners filed their appeal just in time.
investigations was designed to divest the ordinary municipal court of that power but
not to deprive the Court of First Instance of that same power. The power of the CFT to LATIN MAXIM:
conduct a preliminary investigation is derived from the constitutional grant of power 3a, 9c, 11d, 12a
for a judge to hold a preliminary examination and to issue warrants of arrest and
search warrants. What is important to remember is that preliminary investigations by
the CFT is the exception to the rule and not the general rule.

9c, 11e, 12, 37

Gomez v. Ventura and Board of Medical Examiners Primero v. CA

Case No. 115 Case No. 126
No. 32441. March 29, 1930 G.R. Nos. 48468-69. November 22, 1989
Chapter V, Page 229, Footnote No.209
Petitioner carried a bladed weapon outside of his residence while PD 9, the
FACTS: prohibition against fan knives, “balisong” or clubs was in effect which thereafter
Plaintiff had his license revoked on unprofessional conduct due to the resulted in his arrest.
administration of opium. Petitioner claims that his administration of opium to patients Petitioner answers in his defense that a bayonet, the bladed weapon he was
was not a grounds for unprofessional conduct because it has been repealed by carrying, was neither a blunt nor bladed weapon enumerated in PD 9 and therefore
subsequent Opium Laws. he was not guilty of violating the law against bladed or blunt weapons.

W/N Plaintiff should have his license restored. W/N a bayonet is not a bladed or blunt weapon that falls under the purview
of PD 9.
No, Plaintiff should not have his license restored. The subsequent Opium Laws HELD:
cannot be held to have impliedly repealed prior ones as these did not conflict or No, the bayonet is a bladed weapon that falls under PD 9. Petitioners defense
remove said prior laws. The Opium Laws are in fact in force and the ill-defined term of of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is weak and incomplete. It would make no
unprofessional conduct can include improper administration of opium to patients. sense if possession of a fan knife, which is less lethal than a bayonet, would be
punishable while possession of a bayonet would not.
9a, 38b LATIN MAXIM:
9a, 30a

SEC Legal Opinion re BIR Employees Association Inc. Roldan v Villaroman

Case No. 142 Case No. 262
Oct. 23, 1987 G.R. No. 46825 (October 18, 1939)
Chapter V, Page 234, Footnote No. 229
Petitioners inquired as to whether or not past presidents can run as board FACTS:
members or are merely ex-officio board members. Respondents were charged of murder. During the trial, Respondent Cuevas
became ill and had to be confined to a hospital. Judge Roldan, the Petitioner,
ISSUE: denied the Respondents for postponement of the trial on the ground of illness of
W/N past presidents of the association can run again as members of the Cuevas. The court also compelled the counsel of the accused to present evidence
board or are automatically ex officio members. and their witnesses and ordered to arrest the accused. Respondents then instituted a
certiorari proceeding in the Court of Appeals against the Petitioner, impugning the
HELD: decision of the judge for proceeding with the case in the absence of Cuevas. The
Past Presidents may run again for positions in the board. There is nothing in the CA then issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering Judge Roldan from continuing
rules and regulations of the association or the BIR that past presidents of the with the trial.
association may not run again for board membership even as they are automatically
made ex officio members of the board. ISSUE:
W/N the CA has jurisdiction over the case.
9a HELD:
No. The CA resolutions denying the motions of the Solicitor-General rely
principally upon the decision rendered in the case of Mujer vs. CFI of Laguna, which
held that the phrase “in aid of its appellate jurisdiction” only refers to its proximate
antecedent and to “all other auxiliary writs and process.” This ruling is in conjunction
with the rule of interpretation that a qualifying phrase should be understood as
referring to the nearest antecedent. Moreover, the rule in the interpretation applied is
in fact the general rule in the interpretation of qualifying or conditional phrases found
in a law, but this rule is subject to the exception that where the intention of the law is
to apply the phrase to all the antecedents embraced in the provision, the same
should be made extensive to the whole.

1, 6d, 9c, 33, 36b, b2

Herras Teehankee v. Director of Prisons Jose Antonio Mapa v. Hon. Joker Arroyo and Labrador Development Corporation
Case No. 122 Case No. 170
G.R. No. L-278 (July 18, 1946) G.R. No. 78585 (July 5, 1989)
Chapter V, Page 234, Footnote No. 230 Chapter V, Page 234, Footnote No. 231

Petitioner was apprehended by the US Counter Intelligence Corps Mapa bought lots from Labrador Development Corporation which are
Detachment under Security Commitment Order No. 286 wherein she was specifically payable in ten years. Mapa defaulted to pay the installment dues and continued to
charged with (a) “active collaboration with the Japanese,” and (b) “previous do so despite constant reminders by Labrador. The latter informed Mapa that the
association with the enemy.” When she, along with her co-detainees and co- contracts to sell the lots were cancelled, but Mapa invoked Clause 20 of the four
Petitioners in that case, was delivered by the US Army to the Commonwealth contracts. Said clause obligates Labrador to complete the development of the lots,
Government pursuant to the proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur of except those requiring the services of a public utility company or the government,
December 29, 1944, she was detained by said Government under that charge. And within 3 years from the date of the contract. Petitioner contends that P.D. 957
under the same charge during all the time referred to, she has remained in custody requires Labrador to provide the “facilities, improvements, and infrastructures for the
of the Commonwealth Government. lots, and other forms of development” if offered and indicated in the approved
subdivision plans.
W/N Petitioner is constitutionally entitled bail. ISSUE:
W/N Clause 20 of the said contracts include and incorporate P.D. 957 through
HELD: the doctrine of last antecedent, making the cancellation of the contracts of sale
Yes. The constitutional mandate laid down the rule that all persons shall incorrect.
before conviction be bailable, except those charged with capital offenses when
evidence of guilt is strong. Since the People’s Court Act and the Constitution and HELD:
other statutes in this jurisdiction should be read as one law, and since the language No. Labrador has every right to cancel the contracts of sale, pursuant to
used in this court in construing the Constitution and other statutes on the matter of Clause 7 of the said contract for the reason of the lapse of five years of default
bail is substantially the same as the language used by the People’s Court Act on the payment from Mapa. P.D. 957 does not apply because it was enacted long after the
same subject, the most natural and logical conclusion to follow in cases of capital execution of the contracts involved, and, other than those provided in Clause 20, no
offenses before conviction is that discretion refers only to the determination of further written commitment was made by the developer. The words “which are
whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. To hold that the People’s Court has offered and indicated in the subdivision or condominium plans” refer not only to
uncontrolled discretion in such cases and to deny bail even where the evidence of “other forms of development” but also to “facilities, improvements, and
guilt is not strong or there is absolutely no evidence at all, is to make the Act offensive infrastructures”. The word “and” is not meant to separate words, but is a conjunction
not only to the letter but also to the spirit of the Constitution, which is contrary to the used to denote a joinder or a union.
most elementary rules of statutory construction.
LATIN MAXIM: 6d, 7a, 33
6c, 6d, 11g, 12a, 26, 35, 37, 38b, 42a

People of the Philippines v. Teodoro Tamani Andres Borromeo v. Fermin Mariano

Case No. 227 Case No. 38
G.R. No. L-22160 and G.R. No. L-22161 (January 21, 1974) G.R. No. L-16808 (January 3, 1921)
Chapter V, Page 234, Footnote No. 232 Chapter V, Page 236, Footnote No. 240

Tamani was convicted of murder and attempted murder by the lower court Andres Borromeo was appointed and commissioned as Judge of the Twenty-
on February 14, 1963. Upon receipt of a copy of this order, his counsel subsequently fourth Judicial District, effective July 1, 1914. On February, 25, 1920, he was appointed
filed a motion for reconsideration on March 1, 1963, which was denied. The lower Judge of the Twenty-first Judicial District, and Fermin Mariano was appointed Judge
court sent a copy of the order of denial to the counsel by registered mail on July 13, of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District. Judge Borromeo has since the latter date
1963 through the counsel’s wife. Counsel filed his appeal only on September 10, 1963, consistently refused to accept appointment to the Twenty-first Judicial District. The
forty-eight days from July 24th, which is the reglementary fifteen-day period for Attorney-General assails the validity of the later appointment by arguing on the basis
appeal. Appellees contend that the case should be dismissed on the ground that the of Sec. 155 of the Administrative Code, which states that “nothing herein shall be
appeal was forty-eight days late. They invoked Sec. 6, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court construed to prevent a judge of first instance of one district from being appointed to
which states that an appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from the be judge of another district.”
promulgation or notice of the judgment or order appealed from.
ISSUE: W/N Borromeo has the right to sit as the Judge of the 24th Judicial District.
W/N the fifteen-day period should commence from the date of promulgation
of the decision. HELD:
Yes. The concluding part of Sec. 155 of the Administrative Code used by the
HELD: Attorney-General should be construed as a proviso, although it did not start with the
Yes. Using the rule of reddendo singula singulis, the word “promulgation” usual introductory word, “provided”. The word “appointed” in the proviso should be
should be construed as referring to “judgment”, while “notice” should be construed given its meaning in the ordinary sense, and thus, should mean “the nomination or
as referring to “order”. Tamani’s appeal is therefore 58 days late, not 47, as Appellees designation of an individual”. The provisions of the Judiciary Law are plain and
contend; he only had a day left from the receipt of his wife of the notice on July 13. unambiguous. Judges of First Instance are appointed Judges of the Courts of First
Nonetheless, the court decided to act upon the appeal at hand “to obviate any Instance of the respective judicial districts of the Philippine Islands. They hold these
possible miscarriage of justice”. positions of Judges of First Instance of definite districts until they resign, retire or are
removed through impeachment proceedings. The power to appoint lies on the
LATIN MAXIM: appointing officer, but the power to accept lies solely on the appointee. Hence,
6c, 7a, 8a 11g, 34 appointee’s consent is needed and he has power to refuse an appointment. In
upholding the independence of the judiciary and the state’s separation of powers,
the only way to remove Borromeo from power is by impeachment.

6c, 7a, 9a, 9c, 12a, 24a, 37

ALU-TUCP v. NLRC Arenas v. City of San Carlos, Pangasinan

Case No. 2 Case No. 20
G.R. No. 109328 (August 16, 1994) G.R. No. L-34024 (April 5, 1978)
Chapter V, Page 240, Footnote No. 250 Chapter V, Page 240, Footnote No. 251

Petitioners were employed by the National Steel Corporation for their five year RA 5967 provides that second and third class judges would receive an annual
expansion program. The workers contend that they should be considered regular salary of P18,000. Arenas was receiving a monthly salary of P1000.00, P350 of which
workers as opposed to project workers, as the NSC and NLRC ruled. ALU-TUCP claims was from the national government and the remaining P650 comes from the city
that they have been working in NSC for more than 6 years and that their work is government. Petitioner had repeatedly requested the city to enact the said RA but
necessary for the business, and that would have been more than enough to consider the Respondent City refused.
them as regular employees. Petitioners’ contentions stemmed from Art. 280 of the
Labor Code. ISSUE:
W/N Judge Arenas should be granted the increase in his salary from P12,000
ISSUE: to P18,000.
W/N Petitioners should be considered regular employees.
HELD: Looking at the Senate deliberations, the intention in enacting the RA was that
No. The provision calls for casual employees. Since Petitioners were the salary of a city judge should not be higher than the salary of the city mayor.
considered project employees, this provision does not apply to them. Moreover, the Moreover, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed;
fact that they have been working in NSC for more than a year does not mean they they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be
are automatically converted into regular employees. (They were hired as project resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. In case there is
employees for the 5-year expansion program. Once that “project” is done, their repugnancy between the proviso and the main provision, the latter provision,
services will no longer be needed.) In Mercado, Sr. vs. NLRC, the proviso in par. 2 of whether a proviso or not, is given preference because it is the latest expression of the
Art.280 relates only to casual employees and is not applicable to those who do not intent of the legislation, but more so because provisos are negatively written and
qualify under the definition of such workers in par. 1. The proviso is to be construed gives off a more mandatory tone.
with reference to the immediately preceding part of the provision to which it is
attached, and not to other sections thereof. LATIN MAXIM:
6c, 33, 43,48, b2
1, 6, 33

Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance ALDECOA v. Hongkong and Shanghai Bank

Case No. 292 Case No. 126
G.R. No. 115852 (August 25, 1994) 30 Phil. 228, (March 23, 1915)
Chapter V, Page 243, Footnote No. 266 Chapter V, Page 245, Footnote No. 272

Petitioner assail the constitutionality of RA 7716 saying that S. No. 1630 did not The mother of the Plaintiffs, Isabel Palet, was a general partner in the firm,
pass three reading on separate days as required in the Constitution because the Aldecoa & Company. The said firm, however, was heavily indebted to the
second and the third readings were done on the same day. The President had Defendant corporation. Isabel’s remedy for this was to furnish certain securities and
certified S. No. 1630 as urgent and the presidential certification dispensed with the obligations to the Defendant Corporation, and to mortgage certain real properties of
requirement not only of the printing but also that of reading the bill on three separate her sons. In order to mortgage these properties, she emancipated her sons and
days. mortgaged their properties with her consent. The Petitioners now seek to cancel the
instruments of mortgage executed by them.
W/N RA 7716, an act that seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT ISSUE:
system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue W/N Isabel Palet can legally emancipate the Plaintiffs under the law in force
Code, has been constitutionally passed. in this country in 1903, and in so doing, confer upon them the capacity to execute a
valid mortgage on their real property with her consent.
There is no merit in the contention that presidential certification dispenses HELD:
only with the requirement for the printing of the bill and its distribution three days We must look at the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (American)
before its passage but not with the requirement of three readings on separate relating to guardianship and upon certain provisions of the Civil Code (Spanish)
days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its relating to the control of the parents over the person and property of their minor
immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Sec 26(2) qualifies the two stated children. The Code of Civil Procedure impliedly repealed some parts of the old
conditions before a bill can become a law: (i) the bill has passed three readings Spanish code. According to the Code of Civil Procedure, there is no longer a need to
on separate days and (ii) it has been printed in its final form and distributed three be formally emancipated by the parents after attaining the age of majority. At the
days before it is finally approved. In other words, the "unless" clause must be read time of the furnishing of the mortgage emancipation documents, Joaqin was already
in relation to the "except" clause, because the two are really coordinate clauses of legal age and so his mortgage remained valid, while Zoilo’s mortgage was not
of the same sentence. To construe the "except" clause as simply dispensing with valid even if he signed it with his mother because he was a minor when he executed
the second requirement in the "unless" clause (i.e., printing and distribution three the mortgage.
days before final approval) would not only violate the rules of grammar but it
would also negate the very premise of the "except" clause: the necessity of LATIN MAXIM:
securing the immediate enactment of a bill which is certified in order to meet a 49
public calamity or emergency.


Ocampo v. Buenaventura Aisporna v. Court of Appeals and People

Case No. 88 Case No. 6
G.R. No. L-32293 (January 24, 1974) G.R. No. L-39419 (April 12, 1982)
Chapter VI, Page 248, Footnote No. 8

On September 11, 1966 the Cebu Police Department arrested and detained Petitioner Mrs. Aisporna was charged with violation of Sec. 189 of the
Edgardo Ocampo and other minors for an alleged violation of Ordinance No. 228 Insurance Act for allegedly acting as an insurance agent without first securing a
which fixed curfew hours. The minors were then convicted for violation of said certificate of authority to act as such from the office of the Insurance Commissioner.
ordinance. On appeal, the minors were acquitted since the reason they violated the Mrs. Aisporna, however, maintained that she was not liable because she only assisted
ordinance was to attend a birthday, which is considered as a wholesome her husband, and that she did not receive any compensation.
assemblage, and therefore falls under the exception to the curfew rule. Roberto
Ocampo filed a complaint against the Respondents for serious misconduct, grave ISSUE:
abuse of authority, and commission of a felony. The Mayor issued an ordinance W/N the receipt of compensation is an essential element for violation of Sec.
exonerating the policemen. On March 17, 1969 a complaint was lodged with the 189.
Police Commission for the same grounds.
ISSUE: Receipt of compensation is essential to be considered an insurance agent.
W/N the Mayor can decide or investigate on administrative cases involving Every part of a statute must be considered together with the other parts, a kept
police service and personnel. subservient to the general intent of the enactment, and not separately and
independently. The term “agent” used in par. 1 of Sec. 189 is defined in par. 2 of the
HELD: same section. Applying the definition of an insurance agent in par. 2 to the agent in
The Respondents’ argument is devoid of merit. The power of local officials to par. 1 would give harmony to the aforementioned 3 paragraphs of Sec. 189. A
investigate and decide administrative cases involving police service and personnel statute must be construed so as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions
has been transferred to the POLCOM under RA 4864. According to Commission v. wherever possible. Every part of the statute must be considered together with the
Hon. Bello, Sec. 26 of the Police Act is a mere saving clause and refers only to other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.
administrative cases involving police personnel and service pending at the time of
the effectivity of the Act (September 8, 1969). Sec. 26 may not be interpreted to LATIN MAXIM:
mean that the Board of Investigators and Police Commission could not legally 6c, 9c, 28, 36b, 36c, 36d, 37
function to carry into effect the purpose of the Act until after the lapse of the 100

1, 6c, 6d

Gaanan v. Indeterminate Appellate Court Radiola-Toshiba Phils. Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate

Case No. 108 Case No. 249
G.R. No. L-69809 (October 16, 1986) G.R. No. 75222 (July 18, 1991)
Chapter VI, Page 249, Footnote No. 11 Chapter VI, Page 252, Footnote No. 20

Atty. Pintor called Leonardo Laconico to discuss the terms of the withdrawal The levy on attachment against the subject properties of spouses Carlos and
of his complaint for direct assault against Laconico in the City Fiscal of Cebu. That Teresita Gatmaytan was issued on March 4, 1980 by the Court of First Instance of
same day, Laconico called the Appellant, Atty. Edgardo Gaanan to come to his Pasig. However, the insolvency proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Angeles
office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case. When City was commenced more than four months after the issuance of the said
complainant Pintor called up, Laconico requested Appellant Gaanan to secretly attachment. Under the circumstances, Petitioner Radiola-Toshiba Phils. contended
listen to the telephone call through the extension phone. that its lien on the subject properties overrode the insolvency proceeding and was
not dissolved thereby.
W/N an extension telephone is one of the prohibited devices covered by Sec. ISSUE:
1 of RA 4200. W/N the levy on attachment dissolved the insolvency proceedings against
Respondent spouses even though it commenced four months after said attachment.
Telephone party lines were intentionally deleted from the provisions of the Act. There HELD:
must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation No. Sec. 32 of the Insolvency Law is clear that there is a cut off period – one
of a device. An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as the month in attachment cases and thirty days in judgments entered in actions
devices enumerated in Sec. 1 RA 4200. In order to determine the true intent of the commenced prior to the insolvency proceedings. Also, there is no conflict between
legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as Sec. 32 and Sec. 79. Where a statute is susceptible to more than one interpretation,
detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be the court should adopt such reasonable and beneficial construction as will render
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. In the case of Empire Insurance the provision thereof operative and effective and harmonious with each other.
Company v. Rufino, held that the phrase “device or arrangement” in Sec. 1 of RA
4200, although not exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be construed to LATIN MAXIM:
comprehend instruments of the same nature, that is, instruments the use of which 6c, 36a, 37
would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. Furthermore, it is a
general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused.

6c, 11g, 29, 30a, 36c, 36d, 48, b2

Lopez v. El Hogar Filipino JMM Promotions v. NLRC

Case No. 152 Case No. 136
G.R. No. L-22678 (January 12, 1925) G.R. No. 109835 (November 22, 1993)
Chapter VI, Page 251, Footnote No. 16 Chapter VI, Page 251, Footnote No. 21

Pursuant to a contract of loan and mortgage, El Hogar Filipino caused the JMM Promotions paid license fee amounting to P30, 000 and posted a cash
mortgaged properties to be sold publicly in an extra-judicial sale. Lopez and bond of P100, 000 and a surety bond of P50,000, as required by the POEA Rules.
Javelona, in whose favor the loan was made, sought to have the contract of loan When JMM Promotions appealed to NLRC regarding a decision rendered by POEA,
and mortgage annulled on the ground that the agreement was usurious. They the NLRC dismissed the petition for failure to post the required appeal bond as
contended that the court erred in holding that the word “void”, as used in the Usury required by Art. 223 of the Labor Code.
Law, was intended to make the entire transaction a nullity.
ISSUE: Is JMM Promotions still required to post the required appeal bond, as required
W/N the meaning of the word “void”, as used in the Usury Law, was intended by Art. 223 of the Labor Code, considering it has already posted a cash bond and
to make the entire transaction a nullity. surety bond, as required by the POEA?

No. From the very context of the law, the legislature, in using the word “void”, Yes. The POEA Rules regarding monetary appeals are clear. A reading of the
did not intend that the transaction should be a complete nullity. It was only with POEA Rules shows that, in addition to the cash and surety bonds and the escrow
respect to the usurious interest. The intention of the legislature must be ascertained, money, an appeal bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary award is required
not from the consideration of a single word or a particular phrase of the law, but from to perfect an appeal from a decision of the POEA.
the context of the whole law or from a portion thereof, as compared with the whole.
Every part of the act should be read with the purpose of discovering the mind of the LATIN MAXIM:
legislature. 6b, 6d, 7a, 12a, 36a, 37

9b, 25a, 37

Araneta v. Concepcion Lichauco vs. Apostol

Case No. 17 Case No. 147
G.R. No. L-9667, (July 31, 1956) G.R. No. L-19628 (December 4, 1922)
Chapter VI, Page 252, Footnote No. 24 Chapter VI, Page 252, Footnote No. 23

The husband filed a case for legal separation against his wife on the ground Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the business of importing carabao and
of adultery. After the issues were joined, Defendant therein filed an omnibus petition other draft animals. It now desires to import from Pnom-Pehn a shipment of draft
to secure the custody of their three minor children, a monthly support of P5,000 for cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum. However, the Director of
herself and said children, and the return of her passport; to enjoin Plaintiff from Agriculture refuses to admit said cattle, except upon the condition stated in
ordering his hirelings from harassing and molesting her; and to have Plaintiff therein Administrative Order No. 21 of the Bureau of Agriculture that said cattle shall have
pay for the fees of her attorney in the action. The judge rendered his decision been immunized from rinderpest before embarkation at Pnom-Pehn.
regarding the omnibus petition and granted the custody of the children to
Defendant, a monthly allowance of P2,300 for support for her and the children, P300 Legislations involved in the case:
for a house, and P2,000 as attorney’s fees. The judge refused to reconsider the order. Sec. 1762 of the Administrative Code – prohibition against bringing of animals from
infected foreign country
ISSUE: Sec. 1770 of the Administrative Code – Bringing of diseased animal into islands
W/N the parties are required to submit evidence before deciding the forbidden
omnibus petition. Sec. 1762 of the Administrative Code as amended by Act No. 3052 – Bringing of
animals imported from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands
No. If the parties are allowed to present evidences regarding the omnibus ISSUE:
petition, it would violate the intent of the law regarding the 6-month cooling period W/N Sec. 1762 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3052, has
contained in Art. 103 of the Civil Code. A recital of grievances in court may fan their been repealed by the implication in Sec. 1770.
grievances against one another; the legislature’s intent is to give them opportunity for
dispassionate reflection. Note, however, that the case was filed after 6 months of the HELD:
filing of the legal separation case. As such, the determination of the custody and No. Sec. 1762, as amended, is of a general nature, while Sec. 1770 deals with
alimony must have been given force and effect, provided it did not go to the extent a particular contingency not made the subject of legislation in Sec. 1762. Sec. 1770
of violating the policy of the cooling off period. therefore is not considered as inconsistent with Sec. 1762 and it must be considered
as a special qualification of Sec. 1762. Sec. 1770 of the Administrative Code remains
LATIN MAXIM: in full force and effect, being a special law having special contingency not dealt
9a, 27, 36a, 36c, 36d, 37 within Sec. 1762, which extends merely to the importation of draft animals for
purposes of manufacturing serum.

2a, 36a, 38b, 50

Cassion v. Banco Filipino People v. Palmon

Case No. 51 Case No. 220
G.R. No. L- 3540 (July 30, 1951) G.R. No. L-2860 (May 11, 1950)
Chapter VI, Page 256, Footnote No. 31 Chapter VI, Page 257, Footnote No. 35

Plaintiffs mortgaged two parcels of land to PNB for P600. Plaintiffs defaulted Palmon was charged with serious physical injuries (prision correctional in med
and PNB extra judicially foreclosed the mortgage and sold it to Cabatigan. After 1 and max period – 2 yrs, 4 mos. 1 day – 6 yrs) before the CFI of Capiz. Before the
year but before the expiration of 5 years, Plaintiffs offered to repurchase the land but arraignment of the accused, the judge motu proprio dismissed the case on the
PNB turned down the offer. PNB relied on RA 2938 and RA 3135, which created the ground that under Sec. 87 of RA 296, the crime falls under the jurisdiction of the
PNB and authorizes it to have extra judicial foreclosure of mortgage respectively, justice of the peace. However, the solicitor general contended that CFI has
while Plaintiffs relied on RA 2874, known as the Public Land act, which provided that jurisdiction.
every conveyance of land acquired under free patent or homestead provisions shall
be subject to repurchase by the applicant for a period of 5 years from date of ISSUE:
conveyance Which court has jurisdiction to try the case?

Which of the conflicting statues should prevail? Sec 44(f) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 confers original jurisdiction on the CFI
over all criminal case in which the penalty provided is imprisonment for more than 6
HELD: months. Sec. 87 of the same act also confers original jurisdiction on the justice of the
When two or more conflicting statues exist, as when general and special peace and the judges of municipal courts over all criminal cases relating to assaults
provisions are inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the former and a particular where the intent to kill is not charged upon the trial. Hence, the CFI and justice of the
intent will control a general one that is inconsistent with it regardless of to the peace courts have concurrent original jurisdiction over the case.
respective dates of passage. RA 2874 specially relates to specific property, thus it is
an exception to the coverage of RA 2938 and 3135. LATIN MAXIM:
36c, 36d, 37

9, 38a, 38b, 40b, 50

Chartered Bank v. Imperial and National Bank Montenegro v. Castañeda and Balao
Case No. 57 Case No. 179
G.R. No. 17222 (March 15, 1921) G.R. No. L-4221 (August 30, 1952)
Chapter VI, Page 257, Footnote No. 35 Chapter VI, Page 258, Footnote No. 39

Umberto de Poli was declared to be in a state of insolvency at the instance of Maximino Montenegro was arrested in Manila by agents of the Military
Plaintiff, and the sheriff was ordered to take possession of all property of said Intelligence Service of the AFP for complicity with a communistic organization in the
Defendant. In an earlier case, the PNB had obtained a writ by virtue of which the commission of acts of rebellion, insurrection or sedition. Maximino’s father then
sheriff also seized certain goods owned by the insolvent. Plaintiff asserted that since submitted an application for writ seeking the release of his son. Three days after, Pres.
the insolvent had been declared as such, all civil proceedings against him should Quirino issued Proclamation No. 210 suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
have been suspended according to the last portion of Sec. 60 of the insolvency law. corpus.

Which provision is controlling upon the case? 1. W/N Proclamation No. 210 is erroneous since it included sedition, which is not
under the Constitution.
HELD: 2. W/N the Bill of Rights prohibited the suspension of the privilege of the writ.
To ascertain the meaning of the various provisions of the insolvency law, every
section, provision and clause of a statue must be expounded in reference to every HELD:
other. Thus, Sec. 60 should be understood in reference with the other provisions of There is no doubt that it was erroneous to include “sedition.” Art. 7 only
the same law, and as such the PNB falls under the exception to Sec. 60 as stated in provides invasion, insurrection, rebellion or imminent danger as grounds for
the other provision of the same law. suspension. “Sedition” should be deemed as a mistake or surplusage that does not
taint the decree as a whole. Also, as posed by Prof. Aruego, the Bill of Rights impliedly
LATIN MAXIM: denied suspension in case of imminent danger, while Art. 7 expressly authorized the
9, 36c, 36d, 36e, 37, b2 President to suspend when there is imminent danger. Moreover, during the
Constitutional Convention, the debates voted down an amendment to add another
cause, which is “imminent danger of invasion, insurrection or rebellion.”

6c, 15a, 20b, 36f, b2

Arabay Inc. v. CFI of Zamboanga Paras v. COMELEC

Case No. 16 Case No. 196
G.R. No. L-37684 (September 10, 1975) G.R. No. 123169 (November 4, 1996)
Chapter VI Page 259, Footnote No. 43 Chapter VI, Page 259, Footnote No. 50

The Municipality of Dipolog enacted Ordinance No. 19 that charged tax for A petition for recall was filed against Paras, who is the incumbent Punong
the selling and distribution of gasoline, lubricating oils, diesel fuel oils, and petroleum- Barangay. The recall election was deferred due to Petitioner’s opposition that under
based products. Arabay Inc., distributor of gas, oil and other petroleum products, Sec. 74 of RA No. 7160, no recall shall take place within one year from the date of the
contested the validity of such on the ground that the tax is beyond the power of a official’s assumption to office or one year immediately preceding a regular local
municipality to levy under Sec. 2 of RA No. 2264, which provides that municipalities election. Since the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set on the first Monday
may not impose tax on articles subject to specific tax except gasoline. of May 2006, no recall may be instituted.

W/N Arabay Inc. is entitled to a refund. W/N the SK election is a local election.

The ordinance levied a sales tax not only because of the character of the No. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to its context,
ordinance as a sales tax ordinance, but also because the phraseology of the and it must be considered together and kept subservient to its general intent. The
provision reveals in clear terms the intention to impose a tax on sale. It is evident from evident intent of Sec. 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall once during his
the terms that the amount of the tax that may be collected is directly dependent term, as provided in par. (a) and par. (b). The spirit, rather than the letter of a law,
upon to the volume of sales. Since Sec. 2 of the Local Autonomy Act prohibits the determines its construction. Thus, interpreting the phrase “regular local election” to
municipality from imposing sales and specific tax, with the exception of gasoline, include SK election will unduly circumscribe the Code for there will never be a recall
there subsists the right of Arabay Inc. to a refund. The reasonable and practical election rendering inutile the provision. In interpreting a statute, the Court assumed
interpretation of the terms of the proviso in question resulted in the conclusion that that the legislature intended to enact an effective law. An interpretation should be
Congress, in excluding gasoline, deliberately and intentionally meant to put it within avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated,
the power of such local governments to impose whatever type or form of taxes. meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.


6c, 11e, 12a, 14, 20a 9a, 11d, 25b, 27, 36b, 37, 38

Javellana v. Kintanar Niere v. CFI of Negros Occidental, Branch II

Case No. 138 Case No. 188
G.R. No. L-33169 July 30, 1982 G.R. No. L-30324 November 29, 1973
Chapter VI, Page 262, Footnote No.55 Chapter VI, Page 262, Footnote No.60

Petitioner is the owner of a market (building and lot) in Crossing Bago, Bago Petitioner is a Civil Service eligible and was appointed city engineer of La
City, which consists of store spaces and of permanent and movable stalls leased to Carlota City by the City Mayor pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 21 of RA 4858 (the
vendors. Said market has served the general population of the City of Bago for more City Charter). After the enactment of the Decentralization Act, Private Respondent
than twenty (20) years already when it was denied the payment of Petitioner for a was appointed by the President of the Philippines as city engineer of La Carlota City.
municipal license for the 3rd quarter of 1968 on the ground that Ordinance No. 150 Petitioner refused to turn over office and claimed that he was the one legally
had been enacted prohibiting the establishment, maintenance or operation of a appointed as city engineer under RA 4858. House Bill No. 9711, which became RA
public market in the City of Bago by any person, entity, or corporation other than the 4585, originally expressly included city engineer as one of those whom the city mayor
local government. Appellant claims that a public market is one that is not owned can appoint under Sec. 21 of said RA, but during the period of amendment in the
privately; whereas the appellees say that is one that serves the general public. Senate, the position of said engineer was deleted in the final draft of Sec. 21.

W/N the marketplace owned by Petitioner is a public market. 1. W/N deletion of the position of city engineer in Sec. 21 of RA 4585 an amendment
purely of form only or not.
HELD: 2. W/N appointing authority for the post of city engineer belongs to the city Mayor or
The test of a public market is its dedication to the service of the general not.
public and not its ownership. A scrutiny of the charter provision will readily show that
by public market, it is meant one that is intended to serve the general public. The HELD:
Petitioner himself so declared when he testified that his market is engaged in 1. NO, it is a substantial amendment. Nothing could be more substantial than the
servicing the public, not only in Bago City, but also those coming from other vesting of a power to appoint such an important city official as the city engineer. If
municipalities. Congress wanted to authorize the city mayor to appoint all heads and employees of
city department, it could have easily re-phrased Sec. 21 of the City Charter to that
LATIN MAXIM: effect. Such section expressly limits the appointing authority of the mayor.
1, 2a, 6d, 40c 2. NO. Since the city mayor under Sec. 21 is without authority to appoint the city
engineer, this prerogative can only be exercised by the President of the Philippines,
who, under Sec. 10(3) of Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, shall nominate with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments “all other officers of the government
whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for…”

6c, 29, 30a, 32, 38b, b2

Uytengsu vs. Republic of the Philippines Manila Lodge No. 176 v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 307 Case No. 165
G.R. No. L-6379 (September 29, 1954) G.R. No.L-41001 and G.R. No.L-41012 (September 30, 1976)
Chapter VI, Page 263, Footnote No.61 Chapter VI, Page 264, Footnote No. 63

Petitioner-appellee was born, of Chinese parents in Dumaguete, Negros The Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1306 which authorized the City of
Oriental n October 6, 1927. After finishing primary and secondary education here in Manila to reclaim a portion of Manila Bay. The reclaimed area was to form part of the
the Philippines, he went to the United States to further his studies from the year Luneta extension. The act provided that the reclaimed area shall be the property of
1947-1950. In April of the same year he returned to the Philippines for four (4) months the City of Manila, and the city is authorized to set aside a tract of the reclaimed land
vacation. On July 15, 1950, he filed for naturalization. Forthwith, he returned to the for a hotel site and to lease or to sell the same. Later, the City of Manila conveyed a
United States and took a post-graduate degree which he finished in July 1951l but he portion of the reclaimed area to Petitioner. Then Petitioner sold the land, together with
did not return to the Philippines until October 13, 1951. Hence, the original date of all the improvements, to the Tarlac Development Corporation (TDC).
hearing the case, originally scheduled to take place on July 12, 1951, had to be ISSUE:
postponed. W/N the subject property was patrimonial property of the City of Manila.

1. W/N the application for naturalization may be granted, notwithstanding the fact The petitions were denied for lack of merit. The court found it necessary to
that petitioner left the Philippines immediately after the filing of his petition and did analyze all the provisions of Act No. 1360, as amended, in order to unravel the
not return until several months after the first date set for the hearing thereof. legislative intent. The grant made by Act No. 1360 of the reclaimed land to the City of
2. W/N domicile and residence are synonymous. Manila is a grant of a “public” nature. Such grants have always been strictly construed
against the grantee because it is a gratuitous donation of public money or resources,
HELD: which resulted in an unfair advantage to the grantee. In the case at bar, the area
1. No. Section 7 of C.A. No. 473 requires applicant for naturalization to “reside reclaimed would be filled at the expense of the Insular Government and without cost
continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition up to the time to the City of Manila. Hence, the letter of the statute should be narrowed to exclude
of his admission to Philippine citizenship. matters which, if included, would defeat the policy of legislation.
2. No. Although the words “residence” and “domicile” are often used
interchangeably, each has, in strict legal parlance, a meaning distinct and different LATIN MAXIM:
from that of the other. Actual and substantial residence within the Philippines, not 2a, 6c, 9a, 36b, 37, 43
legal residence or domicile, is required. Residence indicates permanency of
occupation, distinct from lodging or boarding, or temporary occupation. Domicile is
residence with intention to stay.

6c, 7, 11a, 25a, 37

Almeda v. Florentino Abellana v. Marave

Case No. 10 Case No. 3
G.R. No.L-23800 (December 21, 1965) G.R. No.L-27760 (May 29, 1974)
Chapter VI, Page 265, Footnote No. 67 Chapter VI, Page 266, Footnote No. 71

RA183, the charter of Pasay City (enacted June 21, 1947), provides in its Sec. 14 Petitioner was prosecuted of the crime of physical injuries through reckless
that “the Board shall have a secretary who shall be appointed by it to serve during the imprudence. The criminal case was filed with the city court of Ozamis City, which
term of office of the members thereof…” On June 18, 1960, RA 2709 amended Sec. 12 found Petitioner guilty as charged. Petitioner appealed such decision to the CFI. At
of RA 183. On the strength of Par. 2 of Sec. 12 of the Pasay City Charter, as amended, this stage, the Private Respondents as the offended parties filed with another branch
the Vice-Mayor of Pasay City appointed Petitioner Almeda as secretary of the of the CFI of Misamis Occidental presided by Respondent Judge, a separate and
Municipal Board of said City. The very next day, the Board refused to recognize independent civil action for damages. Petitioner sought for the dismissal of such
Petitioner as its secretary and, in turn, appointed Respondent Florentino to the position, action principally on the ground that there was no reservation for the filing thereof in
purportedly under Sec. 14 of the City Charter. the City Court of Ozamis Respondent Judge was not persuaded and issued the order
to deny Petitioners’ motion to dismiss.
Which law applies on the matter of the appointment of the Secretary of the ISSUE:
Municipal Board of Pasay City? W/N the order was issued with grave abuse of discretion.

The petition was dismissed. There is nothing in RA 2709 that indicates any Petition for certiorari is dismissed. Petitioner’s literal reading of the Sec. 1 of Rule
intention on the part of the Legislature to repeal, alter, or modify in any way the 111 of the Rules of Court ignores the de novo aspect of appealed cases from city
provisions of Sec. 14 of R.A 183. Repeals by implication are not favored, unless it is courts as provided in Sec. 7 of Rule 123. Such interpretation, does likewise, give rise to
manifested that the legislature so intended. a constitutional question that may trench on a substantive right in accordance to Art.
33 of the Civil Code.2 As stated in Art. X, Sec. 5, par.5 of the 1973 Constitution, the
LATIN MAXIM: grant of power to this Court does not extend to any diminution, increase or
9c, 37, 49, 50 modification of substantive rights. Thus, it is a well-settled doctrine that a court is to
avoid construing a statute or legal norm in such a manner as would give rise to a
constitutional doubt. Lastly, in the case at bar, literal construction of the law is not
favored. The law as an instrument of social control will fail in its function if through an
ingenious construction sought to be fastened on a legal norm, particularly a
procedural rule, there is placed an impediment to a litigant being given an
opportunity of vindicating an alleged right.

6c, 12a, 37

Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad City of Naga v. Agna

Case No. 317 Case No. 63
G.R. No. L-20479 (February 6, 1925) G.R. No. L-36049 (May 31, 1976)
Chapter VI, Page 267, Footnote No. 78 Chapter VI, Page 268, Footnote No. 83

Act 2972 prohibited record books of Merchants from being written in a The City of Naga changed its tax system from graduated tax to percentage
language other than English, Spanish, or a local dialect. Yu Cong Eng, a Chinese tax. Respondent taxpayers insisted on paying the new taxes the following year,
merchant, was penalized for keeping books written in Chinese. He and other Chinese pursuant to the Revised Administrative Code (Sec. 2309). It stated that tax
merchants challenged the constitutionality of the law. enactments changing the current system prior to December 15 should take effect
the following year. The Naga City government, on the other hand, claimed that
under the Local Autonomy Act (RA 2264), tax ordinances take effect 15 days after
publication; this allegedly impliedly repealed Sec. 2309 of the Admin Code.
Is Act 2972 constitutional? Did RA 2264 repeal Sec. 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code?
It is constitutional. The purpose of the Act is to prevent fraud in book keeping
No, it did not. There is a presumption against implied repeal; a subsequent
and evasion of taxes for the protection of the public good. This decision is consistent
provision only repeals a prior provision clearly contradictory to it. If two laws can be
with the ruling in Kwong Sing v. City of Manila, where laundrymen were prohibited
harmonized, then the Courts shall do so. Sec. 2309 of the Revised Admin Code
from issuing receipts written in Chinese. Class legislation is thus allowed if it is for the
applies in this case because the new tax changed a prior tax system. RA 2264 only
public good. Instead of interpreting the Act as a blanket prohibition against keeping
applies for entirely new tax provisions.
books in Chinese, it may be interpreted as a directory measure that records
pertaining to taxes must be written or annotated in English, Spanish, or a local dialect,
or have a duplicate in any of these languages. This liberal interpretation is reasonable
37, 38a, 38b
and it upholds constitutionality.

1a, 6d, 9c, 11e, 37

Tan v. COMELEC Philippine Government v. Municipality of Binangonan

Case No. 152 Case No. 118
G.R. No. 112093 (October 4, 1994) G.R. No. L-10202 (March 29, 1916)
Chapter VI, Page 268, Footnote No. 84

BP 885 is an act creating the new province of Negros del Norte. The plebiscite Petitioner Municipality of Cardona challenged the constitutionality of EO 66
for the approval of the act was only conducted in the municipalities prospectively by the Governor-General granting Binangonan municipal authority over 7 additional
composing the new province. The parent provinces, which will get also affected, barrios. Petitioner claimed that the Governor-General has no legislative authority and
were not included in the plebiscite. that this legislation was not for the public good.

Is BP 885 unconstitutional? Is EO 66 constitutional?

It is unconstitutional. The Constitution provides that a plebiscite must be held It is constitutional. Every act of legislation is presumed to be constitutional and
in all units affected, including the parent province, and not just the new areas. The for the public good; facts need not be stated to prove it.
draft bill provided that the plebiscite be conducted in all units, and not just the areas
constituting the new province, but the final bill only limited it to the latter. LATIN MAXIM:
12a, 37



People v. Del Rosario Salvatierra v. Court of Appeals

Case No. 105 Case No.
G.R. No. L-7234 (May 21, 1955) G.R. No. 107797 (August 26, 1996)

On July 27, 1953, information was filed in the Municipal Court of Pasay Enrique Salvatierra died intestate and was survived by his legitimate brothers,
charging Paz M. del Rosario with slight physical injuries committed on May 28, 1953. Tomas, Bartolome, Venancio, and Macario, and a sister, Marcela. His estate
The accused presented a motion to quash the information on the ground that the consisted of 3 parcels of land (Lots 25, 26, & 27). Macario sold the 405 sq. mts. out of
offense charged had already prescribed in accordance with Art. 90 and Art. 91 of the 749 sq. mts. total area of Lot 26 to his son, Anselmo. Eventually, an “extrajudicial
the RPC. The municipal court sustained the motion and dismissed the case. Hence, partition with confirmation of sale” was executed by and among the surviving legal
an appeal against the dismissal is made to the Supreme Court. heirs of Enrique, which consisted of the aforementioned lots. Thereafter, Venancio
sold Lot No. 7 (which belonged to him by virtue of the said partition), and a 149-sq. m.
ISSUE: portion of Lot 26 to spouses Longalongs. It turned out, however, that Anselmo already
1. Whether the prescriptive period should commence from the very day on obtained an OCT covering the whole of Lot No. 26. The complaints for reconveyance
which the crime was committed, or from the day following that in which it was were filed 5 years after the issuance of such OCT to Anselmo.
2. W/N the term “month” in the RPC should be understood to be a month of 30 ISSUE:
days, instead of the civil/calendar month. 1. Which prescriptive period for actions for annulment should prevail, Art. 1391 of
the new CC or Art. 1144 of the same Code?
HELD: 2. W/N there was a double sale.
1. In computation of the period of time within which an act is to be done, the law has
always directed that the first be excluded and the last included (Art. 13, Civil Code). HELD:
Art. 18 of the CC directs that any deficiency in any special law must be supplied by 1. Art. 1144 of the CC prevails. The prescriptive period for such actions is 10 years, as
its provisions. As the RPC is deficient in that it does not explicitly define how the period held in previous cases. Hence, the action for reconveyance had not yet prescribed.
is to be computed, resort must be had to Art. 13 of the CC. There is no ambiguity in the terms and stipulations of the extrajudicial partition. Thus,
2. By express provision of Article 13 on the new Civil Code, a month is to be the literal and plain meaning thereof should be observed. What Anselmo bought
considered as the regular 30-day month. In accordance therewith, the term month from his father was only 405 sq. m of Lot 26. The registration of the whole Lot 26 in the
used in Art. 90 of the RPC should be understood to mean the regular 30-day month name of Anselmo was, therefore, done with evident bad faith.
and not the solar or civil month. Hence, the Court held that the offense charged had 2. There was no double sale. Both parties did not dispute the contents of the
not yet prescribed because July is the 60th day from May 29. extrajudicial partition.


6c, 38b, 46a 5a, 6c, 7a

Pasno v. Ravina and Ravina C & C Commercial v. NAWASA

Case No. 199 Case No. 42
G.R. No. 31581 (February 3, 1930) G.R. No. L-27275 (November 18, 1967)
Chapter VI, Page 273, Footnote No. 104 Chapter VI, Page 274, Footnote No. 107

Labitoria, during her lifetime, mortgaged 3 parcels of land to the PNB. When NAWASA conducted three separate bids for the three different waterworks
Labitoria died, a petition was presented for the probate of her last will and projects in Manila, Davao and Iloilo. However, C & C Commercial Corporation, one
testament. During the pendency of the case, a special administrator of the estate of of those who participated in the bidding but eventually lost, filed three
the deceased was appointed by the court. The special administrator failed to corresponding supplemental complaints on each of the aforesaid waterworks
comply with the conditions of the mortgage, and the PNB asked the sheriff to projects contending that NAWASA violated Sec. 1 of RA 912, which should give
proceed with the sale of the parcels of land. The CFI ruled in favor of the special preference to local materials that are available, practicable and usable. The said
administrator requiring the sheriff to abstain from selling the said lands. law also provides that this nationalistic policy of preferring for locally produced
materials is in relation to the “construction or repair work undertaken by the
ISSUE: Government.” NAWASA alleged that it should not be included within the meaning of
1. W/N the will is valid the term “Government” as used in the said law.
2. W/N the PNB had the right to foreclose in its favor the mortgage which was
executed by Labitoria now that the mortgaged property is in custodia legis. ISSUE:
W/N NAWASA falls under the term “government” under RA 912.
1. The law does not require that the will shall be dated. Accordingly, an erroneous HELD:
date will not defeat a will. Yes. The NAWASA should be deemed embraced within the term
2. Yes. The PNB had the right to foreclose the said mortgaged property. The “government” found in RA 312, and in the construction of their works or purchase of
mortgagee should foreclose the mortgage in accordance with Sec. 708 of the Code materials thereof, local material should be given preference whenever available,
of Civil Procedure. Since Act 3135 fails to make provision regarding the sale of the practicable and usable. Government-owned or controlled corporations are not
mortgaged property which is in custodia legis, it would be logical to suppose Sec. 708 exempted from RA 912. Two laws are being considered in this case: C.A. No. 138 and
of the Code of Civil Procedure would govern latter contingency. Act 3115 must be RA 912. Both relate to the same subject matter and have the same nationalistic
presumed to have been acquainted with the provisions of the Code of Civil purpose or object which is to give preference to locally produced materials in
Procedure. purchases, works or projects of the Government (referring to Filipino-First policy).


38a, 38b 9a, 35, 36, 37, 38a, 38b

Butuan Sawmill, Inc. v. City of Butuan Manila Railroad Co. v. Rafferty

Case No. 41 Case No. 168
G.R. No. L-21516 (April 29, 1966) G.R. No. 14205 (September 30, 1919)
Chapter VI, Page 277, Footnote No. 119 Chapter VI, Page 279, Footnote No. 124

The Petitioner was granted a legislative franchise under RA 399 for an electric The Defendant assessed and collected against Manila Railroad internal
light, heat, and power system in Butuan and Cabadbaran, Agusan, together with the revenue taxes upon oil and coal materials imported into the Philippine by virtue of an
issuance of a certificate of public convenience and necessity by the Public Service act of Congress in 1913. The latter contended that the taxes had been illegally
Commission. However, the City of Butuan issued Ordinances numbered 11, 131 and collected pursuant to a private charter granted by the legislature in 1906. On the
148 imposing a 2% tax on the gross sales or receipts of any business operated in the other hand, Rafferty asserts that the 1913 Act of Congress repealed the 1906 private
city. Butuan Sawmill, Inc. questioned the validity of the taxing ordinance which is charter.
deemed to have impaired the obligation of contract thereby depriving the Petitioner
of property without due process of law. On the other hand, Respondent maintained ISSUE:
that it was vested with the “power to provide for the levy and collection of taxes for W/N the 1913 Act of Congress repealed the 1906 private charter.
general and special purposes” as stipulated in its charter which was granted in 1950.
ISSUE: No. A special law (including private charters) having the character of a
W/N the inclusion of the franchise business of Petitioners falls within the private contract, supposes that the legislators intended to attend to the special facts
coverage of the taxing ordinances pursuant to the city’s power of taxation. and circumstances, the consideration of such being embodied in the special law. A
general law subsequently enacted by the legislature cannot be taken to have
HELD: modified or altered the charter, unless the intent to modify or alter is manifest. Where
No. the inclusion of the franchise business of the Butuan Sawmill, Inc. by the the general act is later, the special statute will be construed as remaining an
City of Butuan is beyond the broad power of taxation of the city under its charter. exception to its terms, unless repealed expressly or by necessary implication.
Neither could the latter’s power therein granted be taken as an authority delegated
to the city to amend or alter the franchise, considering the absence of an express or LATIN MAXIM:
specific grant of power to do so. Where there are two statutes, the earlier special 37, 50
and the latter general – and the terms of the general are broad enough to include
the matter provided for in the special – the fact that one is special and the other is
general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as a remaining
exception to the general as a general law of the land, while the other as the law of a
particular case.

25, 50, d

De Jesus v. People of the Philippines US v. Almond

Case No. 87 Case No. 157
G. R. No. L-61998 (February 22, 1983) G.R. No. 2517 (June 2, 1906)
Chapter VI, Page 277, Footnote No. 117

The Petitioner, COMELEC registrar of Casiguran, was charged by the The complaint alleges that R.W. Almond, master and in charge of the
Tanodbayan before the Sandiganbayan with the violation of the 1978 Election Code. steamship Rubi brought Tawas Tahan, is an alien of East India who is afflicted with
He filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the jurisdiction to trachoma. He permitted Tawas Tahan to land in the Philippine Islands from the
investigate, prosecute and try the offense charged against him is lodged with the steamship at a place and time other than that designated by the immigration
COMELEC, and, coincidentally, the Court of First Instance (now RTC). officers. The evidence showed that Defendant adopted due precautions to prevent
the landing of Tawas Tahan, and that if the landing was made, it was made without
ISSUE: the Defendant’s knowledge or consent.
W/N the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over election offenses with respect to
public officers. ISSUE:
W/N a conviction can be sustained when it appears that there was no
HELD: consent, either tacit or express, to the landing of the alien.
No. Sec. 2 of Art. XII [C] of the 1973 Constitution granted COMELEC the power
“to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections,” while Sec HELD:
182 of the 1978 Election Code vested the Commission with authority to conduct Sec. 18 imposes upon one who has brought immigrant aliens into a United
preliminary investigation and subsequently prosecute all election offenses punishable States port the duty of adopting due precautions to prevent the landing of any such
under the same Code. The legislative intent in granting COMELEC the said power is to alien at any time or place other than that designated by the immigration officers and
insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of elections. To divest the COMELEC of its fixes a penalty for permitting an alien so to land. The word “permit” implies that the
authority would seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving the aforementioned landing of the alien must be with the express or tacit consent of the owner, officer,
constitutional mandate. At the same time, Sec 184 of the Election Code, which deals agent or person in charge of the vessel.
specifically with election offenses, must be favored over provisions of P.D. 1606 which
speaks generally of other crimes or offenses committed by public officers in relation LATIN MAXIM:
to their office. The former cannot be construed as impliedly repealed by the latter 6c, 11e, 41a, 48
thereby continuing to be an exception granted the more specific legislative intent it

6, 9, 37, 38, 50

US v. Estapia U.S. v. Abad Santos

Case No. 298 Case No. 294
G.R. No. 12891 (October 19, 1917) G.R. No. 12262 (February 10, 1917)
Chapter VII, Page 289, Footnote No. 23 Chapter VII, Page 290, Footnote No. 28

A case was filed against Defendants for having engaged in cockfighting, in The Appellant was accused of violating the provisions of the Internal Revenue
violation of Sec. 1 of Act. No. 480. The Defendants held a cockfight on a clearing Law by failing to make an entry for the January 5, 1915 indicating whether any
near a grove of buri palms. The prosecution argued that the term “cockpit” should business was done on that day or not. He had employed a bookkeeper with the
be construed to mean any place in which a cockfight takes place. expectation that the latter would perform all the duties pertaining to his position,
including the entries required to be made by the Collector of Internal Revenue.
W/N the clearing where the cockfight was held by the Defendants is a ISSUE:
cockpit within the contemplation of the law. W/N the Appellant is guilty of violating the Internal Revenue Law.

The term “cockpit” as used in the statute has a limited meaning so it cannot The Appellant must be acquitted since it is undisputed that he took no part in
be construed to mean or include a clearing such as had been used by the the keeping of the book in question and that he never personally made an entry in it
Defendants. Penal provisions of a statute are to be construed strictly and particular as he left everything to his bookkeeper. Courts will not hold one person criminally
words used in the law should be construed in relation to the context. responsible for acts of another done without his knowledge or consent, unless the law
clearly so provides.
25, 37, 48 LATIN MAXIM:
41a, 48

People v. Atop People v. Padilla
Case No. 202 Case No. 113
G.R. Nos. 124303-05 (February 10, 1998) G.R. No. 47027 (February 4, 1941)
Chapter VII, Page 290, Footnote No. 29 Chapter VII, Page 291, Footnote No. 30

Appellant was found guilty of 3 counts of rape. The trial court sentenced him Appellants Padilla, a Filipino citizen, and Von Arend, a German citizen, acting
to 2 terms of reclusion perpetua for the first two counts, and to death for the third, jointly and conniving with each other, voluntarily, illegally, and criminally evaded the
holding that his common-law relationship with the victim’s grandmother aggravated provisions of Art. 4 of C.A. No. 138, which requires Philippine or U.S. citizenship before
the penalty. Private complainant Regina Guafin, 12 years old, is the granddaughter the exercise or enjoyment of the privilege established in said article. It is contended,
of Trinidad Mejos, the common-law wife of the Appellant. however, that notwithstanding the infringement of Sec. 4. of Act No. 138, the
Appellants cannot be punished therefore since the said Act imposes no penal
ISSUE: sanction whatsoever.
1. W/N the trial court erred in appreciating the nighttime and relationship as
aggravating the penalty imposable for the rape allegedly committed. ISSUE:
W/N a violation of C.A. No. 138 may be prosecuted under C.A. No. 108,
2. W/N the trial court erred in finding Appellant guilty beyond reasonable entitled “An Act to punish acts of evasion of the laws on the nationalization or certain
doubt of the crimes charged. rights, franchises or privileges.”

1. The trial court erred. Nocturnity must have been deliberately sought by the Yes. Any citizen of the Philippines or of the United States who knowingly allows
Appellant to facilitate the crime or prevent its discovery or evade his capture or his name or citizenship to be used so that a person not so qualified may enjoy the
facilitate his escape. Neither can we appreciate relationship as aggravating. The privilege granted to domestic entities by C.A. No. 138, as well as any alien profiting
scope of the relationship under Art. 15 of the RPC encompasses only “the spouse, thereby, is guilty of violation of C.A. No. 108.
ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural or adopted brother or sister, and relative The very title of Act No. 108 gives unmistakable notice of the legislative intent
by affinity in the same degrees.” Outside these enumerations and consistent with the and purpose of punishing all acts of evasion of the laws of the nationalization of
doctrine that criminal laws must be liberally construed in favor of the accused, no certain rights, franchise or privileges. Sec. 1 of the same Act applies punishment
other relationship between the offender and the victim may aggravate the provided therein to “all cases in which any constitutional or legal provision requires
imposable penalty for the crime committed. Philippine or United States citizenship as a requirement for the exercise or enjoyment
of a right, franchise or privilege.” Under Act No. 108, any legal provision, whenever
2. The Appellant was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The offended existing at the time of the passage of said Act or promulgated thereafter, would fall
party’s straightforward and unequivocal statements show indelible badges of truth. within its scope. One of such legal provision is Art. 4 of Act No. 138.


30a 6a, 6c, 9a

People v. Salazar People v. Garcia

Case No. 223 Case No. 209
G.R. No. L-13371 (September 24, 1959) No. L-2873 (February 28, 1950)
Chapter VII, Page 292, Footnote No. 36 Chapter VII, Page 293, Footnote No. 41

The Appellant was charged with the crime of malversation of public funds. The lower court, ignoring the Appellant’s minority, sentenced him to an
The Appellant being the then Deputy Provincial and Municipal Treasurer, and as indeterminate penalty of 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional to 8
such, accountable for the funds collected and received by him, did willfully, years of prision mayor for the crime of robbery. RA 47 which amended Art. 80 of the
feloniously and with grave abuse of confidence, misappropriate, and convert to his RPC by reducing from 18 to 16 the age below which the Appellant has to “be
own personal use and benefit, from said funds, the sum of P13,897.77. Upon committed to the custody or care of a public or private, benevolent or charitable
arraignment, the Appellant pleaded not guilty, which he later withdrew and institution,” instead of being convicted and sentenced to prison, has given rise to the
changed to guilty. He was sentenced to be imprisoned, to suffer the penalty of controversy. The Solicitor General believes that the amendment by implication has
perpetual special disqualification, to pay a fine, to indemnify the Government also amended par. 2 of Art. 68 of the RPC, which provides that when the offender is
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The over 15 and under 18 years of age, “the penalty next lower than that prescribed by
Appellant contends that the lower court committed an error in sentencing him to law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period.”
suffer the aforementioned penalty on the ground of lack of malice in the commission
of the crime, in that, he did not apply the missing funds to his personal use and ISSUE:
benefit but lost the same while he was drunk. W/N the Appellant, being 17 years of age at the time of the commission of
the crime, was entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of Art. 68, par. 2 of
W/N the penalties imposed by the lower court were excessive given the
contention of Appellant. HELD:
Yes. We find no irreconcilable conflict between Art. 68, par. 2, as it now stands
HELD: and Art. 80 as amended. There is no incompatibility between granting Appellant of
No. There is nothing in the record that supports the claim that missing funds the ages of 15 to 18 a privileged mitigating circumstance and fixing at 16 the
were lost while the Appellant was drunk. When he entered the plea of guilty, he maximum age of persons who are to be placed in a reformatory institution. All parts
thereby admitted, not only his guilt, but also all the material facts alleged in the of a statute are to be harmonized and reconciled so that effect may be given to
information, namely, that he “willfully, feloniously and with grave abuse of each and every part thereof, and that conflicting interest in the same statute are
confidence, misappropriate, misapply, embezzle, and convert to his own personal never to be supposed or so regarded, unless forced upon the court by an
use and benefit, from said funds, the sum of P13,897.77,” thus clearly indicating unambiguous language.
malice or evil intent on his part. His plea of guilt carried with it the acknowledgement
or admission that the willful acts charged were done with malice. LATIN MAXIM:
37, 38b
7b, 11e, 41a, 43

People v. Terrada, et. al. US v. Toribo

Case No. 229 Case No. 304
G.R. No. L-23625 (November 25, 1983) G.R. No. 5060 (January 26, 1910)
Chapter VII, Page 293, Footnote No. 42 Chapter VII, Page 295, Footnote No. 48

On November 1951 and May 1952, Appellees Obo, Gundran, and Terrado Evidence suggests that Appellant slaughtered the carabao for human
applied for and were issued free patents for contiguous parcels of land situated in consumption, which is in violation of Act No. 1147, “An Act Regulating the
Camarines Sur. These parcels of land were forest land and as such are not Registration, Branding, Slaughter of Large Cattle.” It appears that in the town of
disposable. On March 1962, three separate informations for falsification of public Carmen in Bohol, there aren’t any slaughterhouses. Appellant suggests that under
document were filed against the Appellees for having conspired with one another such circumstances, the provisions of Act No. 1147 do not penalize slaughter of large
through false and fraudulent misrepresentations alleging that they had all the cattle without permit. Appellant also alleges that it is an infringement on his right over
qualifications and had complied with all legal requirements of the law to entitle them his property (carabao).
to a free patent. Appellees claim that the crime has already prescribed according
to the RPC, but the State argues that the crime has not prescribed under Act No. ISSUE:
3585 where the crime of perjury prescribes in 8 years. W/N Act No. 1147 applies only when there is a municipal slaughterhouse, and
the slaughter of a carabao is made therein.
W/N the prescriptive period to be applied should be 10 years under the RPC HELD:
or 8 years under Act No. 3585. No. As long as the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption is done
without a permit secured first from the municipal treasurer, the penalty under the Act
HELD: applies. The Act primarily seeks to protect the large cattle of the Philippine Islands,
The 8 year prescriptive period should be applied. Penal statutes must be against theft and to make recovery and return of the same easy. More importantly, it
strictly applied. Where a crime is punishable by both a special law and the RPC but is to protect the very life and existence of the inhabitants of the Philippines, imperiled
with different prescriptive periods, the one favorable to the accused or the shorter by the continued destruction of large cattle by disease, making it reasonable for the
prescriptive period should be applied. legislative to prohibit and penalize a perfectly legal act utilizing personal properties of
citizens (cattle) if not for the extraordinary conditions/threat present. Well settled is
LATIN MAXIM: the doctrine of the State’s legitimate exercise of the right of eminent domain laid
43, 48 down in jurisprudence. Where the language of the statute is fairly susceptible of
many interpretations, that which stays true with the intent of the law must be

5a, 9a, 37

US v. Go Chico Arriete v. Director of Public Works

Case No. 299 Case no. 22
G.R. No. 4963 (September 15, 1909) G.R. No. 37125 (September 30, 1933)
Chapter VII, Page 295, Footnote No. 49 Chapter VII, Page 296, Footnote No. 52

Appellant is charged with the violation of Sec. 1 of Act No. 1696 or the Flag Appellant Arriete, as legal guardian on behalf of minor Carmen Jagunap,
Law, displaying in his store a number of medallions, in the form of a small button, sought to recover the title and possession of three lots which were sold by the sheriff
upon the faces of which were imprinted in miniature the picture of Emilio Aguinaldo, in a public auction to Appellee Ledesma (and thereafter sold to Fermin Caram) to
and the flag or banner or device used during the late armed insurrection in the satisfy the judgment of a lien for nonpayment of taxes, under the Irrigation Act No.
Philippine Islands against the U.S. Appellant claims that he is ignorant of the law and 2152. However, it was found that the delinquent taxpayer was not the owner of said
consequently, had no corrupt intention to violate the law. He claims acquittal on the lots, but Carmen Jagunap was.
ground that his guilt must be proven beyond reasonable doubt and that the law was
referring to “identical” banners, emblem, flag, etc. ISSUE:
W/N Appellee Ledesma has any rights over the lots acquired in good faith
ISSUE: under the final deed of sale of the provincial sheriff.
1. W/N to be in violation of the Flag Law, Appellant must have acted with
criminal intent. HELD:
2. W/N the wording of the law exempts the articles displayed by the No, she acquired no right at all. Act No. 2152 provided that regarding
Defendant. expropriation of land, the list of lands filed by the Director of Public Lands must be
published, and notice should be given to the owners to file answer or appear in the
HELD: civil case. No such publication or notice was evident in this case.
1. No, criminal intent isn’t necessary for violation of the Flag Law. It is not sufficient that they had “actual” knowledge. Statutes in the
2. The medallions, though not exactly identical, comes within the purview of derogation of rights are construed strictly. This is because people in a republican
the class of articles referred to by the law. state like ours enjoy inherent rights guaranteed by the Constitution or protected by
Jurisprudence has held that in crimes made by statutory requirement, criminal law, like the right against undue deprivation of property. Thus, whenever there are
intent is not necessary. Intention of the perpetrator is entirely immaterial because to statutes authorizing the expropriation of private land or property, these statutes are
hold otherwise would render the statute substantially worthless, and its execution construed strictly.
impossible. The statute did not include intent as an element of a crime, and it is clear
so no interpretation is required. Clearly therefore, ignorance of the law is not a valid LATIN MAXIM:
defense for violation thereof. The description in the law refers not to a particular flag, 6c, 7a, 43
but to a type of flag.

5a, 7a, 9a, 9c, 11a, 43, a

Provincial Chapter of Laguna v. COMELEC Genaro B. Reyes Construction Inc. v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 246 Case No. 51
G.R. No. L-53460 (May 27, 1983) G.R. No. 108718 (July 14, 1994)
Chapter VII, Page 297, Footnote No. 57 Chapter VII, Page 297, Footnote No. 57

Nacionalista Party (NP) filed a petition against Respondent San Luis of the Petitioners filed petition to stop Respondent DPWH from implementing the
Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) for turncoatism. When Respondent San Luis ran as notice of pre-termination in their contract for construction of the flood control
Governor of Laguna under Liberal Party (LP) in 1972, he won. The normal expiry for facilities and land improvement works in Butuan City. Petitioners won in a public
the term was 1975, but it was extended lawfully by the President. Now (1980) he is bidding held for this purpose. Respondents claimed that with a 9.86% negative
running for Governor again under KBL. Under the law, “No elective public officer slippage (delay in the infrastructure project), the government was either authorized
may change his political party affiliation during his term of office…or within six months to take over the project or let another contractor finish it. Petitioners however
immediately preceding or following an election.” claimed that not only were the delays caused significantly by DPWH, but also
termination of contract is only appropriate if the negative slippage reaches 15%.
W/N COMELEC was correct in dismissing petition which contended that ISSUE:
Respondent San Luis should be disqualified from running due to turncoatism. W/N termination of contract with Petitioners is valid.

No, he cannot be disqualified. He did not change affiliations during his term. No, Respondents may not terminate contract with Petitioners and award the
He was expelled from the LP in 1978 and this can’t be construed as a willful change contract to other bidders. The discretion of Respondent DPWH to terminate or rescind
of affiliation. At that time, no one even knew when the next elections were, so the contract comes into play only in the event the contractor shall have incurred a
Respondent could not have changed affiliations simply to anticipate the next negative slippage of 15% or more, according to P.D. 1870 and DPWH Circular No.
election. 102.
The constitutional prohibition cannot be applied to the period beyond the The intent of the law in allowing the government to take over delayed
frame-up (1971-1975) term to which public officials were elected in 1971 because this construction projects with negative slippage of 15% or more is primarily “to save
would unduly impinge on freedom of association guaranteed to all. money and to avoid dislocation of the financial projections and/or cash flow of the
Between two constructions, one of which would diminish or restrict government.” Terminating the contract and awarding it to Hanil, a previously
fundamental right of people and the other of which would not do so, the latter disqualified bidder, would actually result in a financial loss to the government.
construction must be adopted.
LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9a, 12a
11a, 37, 48

Tenorio v. Manila Railroad Co. City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, et al.
Case No. 289 Case No. 61
G.R. No. L-6690 (March 29, 1912) G.R. No. L-14355 (October 31, 1919)
Chapter VII, Page 297, Footnote No. 62 Chapter VII, Page 297, Footnote No. 64

Defendant company took possession of and occupied a small parcel of land Appellant presented a petition in the CFI of Manila praying that certain lands,
without the express consent of Plaintiff and without having made payment therefore, be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement – the
alleging that the land is a part of certain lands described in condemnation extension of Rizal Avenue. Appellee denied that it was either necessary or expedient
proceedings. that the parcels of land be expropriated for street purposes.

W/N Plaintiff has the right to maintain this separate action for damages for W/N in expropriation proceedings by the Appellant, the courts may inquire
trespass on his land on the ground that it was his duty to seek redress in the into, and hear proof upon, the necessity of the expropriation.
condemnation proceedings instituted by Defendant company.
HELD: In our opinion, when the legislature conferred upon the courts of the
As a general rule, the steps prescribed by the statute must be followed or the Philippine Islands the right to ascertain upon trial whether the right exists for the
proceedings will be void. Since these statutes are in derogation of general right and exercise of eminent domain, it intended that the courts should inquire into, and hear
of common-law modes of procedure, they must be strictly construed in favor of the proof upon, those questions (of necessity).
landowner, and must be at least substantially or ‘fully and fairly’ complied with. It is alleged, and not denied, that the cemetery in question may be used by
In the absence of proof of a substantial compliance with the provisions of law the general community of Chinese, which fact, in the general acceptation of the
touching such proceedings, the Plaintiff was clearly entitled to institute any definition of a public cemetery, would make the cemetery in question public
appropriate action to recover the damages which she may have suffered as a result property. If that is true, the petition of the Plaintiff must be denied, for the reason that
of an unauthorized and unlawful seizure and occupation of her property. the Plaintiff has no authority or right under the law to expropriate public property.
The theory on which the trial judge correctly proceeded was that Defendant Even granting that a necessity exists for the opening of the street in question,
company having unlawfully taken possession of a part of the tract of land in the record contains no proof of the necessity of opening the same through the
question, and by its operations thereon rendered the whole tract worthless to the cemetery. The record shows that adjoining and adjacent lands have been offered
Plaintiff. Thus, Plaintiff is entitled to abandon the entire tract, and recover damages to the city free of charge, which will answer every purpose of the Plaintiff.
for its full value.
LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 24a, 43
21a, 43

Velasco v. Republic of the Philippines Lee Cho v. Republic of the Philippines

Case No. 165 Case No. 72
G.R. No. L-14214 (May 25, 1960) G.R. No. L-12408 (December 28, 1959)
Chapter VII, Page 299, Footnote No. 76 Chapter VII, Page 299, Footnote No. 76

Petition for naturalization of Petitioner was denied for failure to meet the Before an applicant may apply for Philippine citizenship, the law requires that
requirements of the law. he file a declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen one year prior to the
filing of application unless he is exempt from complying with said requirement. The
ISSUE: law exempts one from filing a declaration of intention in two cases: (a) if he is born in
W/N the trial court erred in denying the petition for naturalization. the Philippines and has received primary and secondary education in any school
recognized by the government; and (b) if he has continuously resided in the
HELD: Philippines for a period of 30 years or more provided that he has given primary and
No. Considering that “naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and secondary education to all his children either in a public school or private schools
strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant”, we are recognized by the government. In the instant case, Petitioner has not filed any
constrained to hold that the trial court did not err in denying the petition for declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen because, as he claims, he has
naturalization. resided continuously in the Philippines for a period of more than 30 years and has
given primary and secondary education to all his children in private schools
LATIN MAXIM: recognized by the government.
W/N the Petitioner has complied with the requirement of the law regarding his
duty to afford primary and secondary education to all his children.

No. The government disputes that Petitioner has failed to give such education
to his daughters Angelita and Lourdes. The reason that Angelita was not able to
complete her studies because she got married is not only unsatisfactory but betrays
the sincerity of Petitioner in embracing our citizenship. It was further shown that in
spite of Lourdes’s alleged sickness, she continued her studies in a Chinese school
which strictly employed a Chinese curriculum. Considering that the provisions of the
Naturalization Law should be strictly construed in order that its laudable and
nationalistic purpose may be fully fulfilled, the Supreme Court concluded that
Petitioner has failed to qualify to become a Filipino citizen and so his petition should
be denied.

6c, 7b, 43

Co v. Republic of the Philippines Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos

Case No. 24 Case No. 157
G.R. No. L-12150 (May 26, 1960) G.R. No. L-120082 (September 11, 1996)
Chapter VII, Page 299, Footnote No. 76 Chapter VII, Page 301, Footnote No. 85

Petitioner filed his petition for naturalization in the trial court. The court Respondent Cesa, OIC, Office of the Treasurer of the City of Cebu,
ordered that a certificate of naturalization be issued to Petitioner after the lapse of demanded payment for realty taxes on several parcels of land belonging to the
two years from the date the decision became final and all the requisites provided for Petitioner, who objected to such demand claiming in its favor Sec. 14 of RA 6958
in RA 503 were met. The government appealed the decision contending that from which exempt it from payment of realty taxes.
the evidence itself introduced by Petitioner it would appear that he failed to comply Respondent City of Cebu alleges that as an LGU and a political subdivision, it
with some of the requirements prescribed by law in order to qualify him to become a has the power to impose, levy, assess, and collect taxes within its jurisdiction. Such
Filipino citizen. Thus, it is claimed, he has not stated that he believes in the principles power is guaranteed by the Constitution and enhanced further by the LGC. While it
underlying the constitution, but rather stated that he believes in democracy upon may be true that under its Charter the Petitioner was exempt from the payment of
cross-examination. It is contended that such belief is not sufficient to comply with the realty taxes, this exemption was withdrawn by Sec. 234 of the LGC.
requirement of the law that one must believe in the principles underlying our
constitution. ISSUE:
W/N Petitioner is a “taxable” person.
W/N the trial court erred in finding that Petitioner had all the qualifications for HELD:
naturalization and none of the disqualifications mentioned in the law. Yes. Petitioner cannot claim that it was never a “taxable person” under its
Charter. It was only exempted from the payment of real property taxes. The grant
HELD: of the privilege only in respect of this tax is conclusive proof of the legislative intent to
Yes. In so stating that he believes merely in our laws, Petitioner did not make it a taxable person subject to all taxes, except real property tax.
necessarily refer to those principles embodied in our constitution which are referred Even if the Petitioner was originally not a taxable person for purposes of real
to in the law. He has also failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable property tax, in light of the foregoing disquisitions, it had already become, a taxable
manner in his relation with our government as evidenced by his failure to register his person for such purpose in view of the withdrawal in the last paragraph of Sec. 234 of
family with the Bureau of Immigration and to file his income tax return. Considering exemptions from the payment of real property taxes.
that "naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of Since taxes are what we pay for civilized society, or are the lifeblood of the
the government and against the applicant," the Supreme Court held that the trial nation, the law frowns against exemptions from taxation and statutes granting tax
court erred in granting the petition for naturalization. exemptions are thus construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayers and liberally in
favor of the taxing authority. Else wise stated, taxation is the rule, exemption therefore
LATIN MAXIM: is the exception.
6c, 7b, 43

The Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in the Philippines v. A. W. Hastings, Assessor Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court Of Appeals, Court of Tax Appeals and
and Collector of the City of Manila, and the City of Manila Ateneo de Manila University
Case No. 136 Case No. 74
G.R. No. 1974 (March 15, 1906) G.R. No. 115349 (April 18, 1997)
Chapter VII, Page 300, Footnote No. 79 Chapter VII, Page 300, Footnote No. 81

In 1901, Appellant imposed a tax upon the residence of the Roman Catholic Private Respondent is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution with
archbishop of Manila, overruling the claim that it was exempt from taxation as auxiliary units and branches all over the Philippines, one of which is the Institute of
provided by Sec. 48 of Act No. 183 of the Philippine Commission. The Appellant Philippine Culture (IPC), which is engaged in social sciences studies of Philippine
contended that the said property was not a parsonage and not adjacent to the society and culture. In 1983, Petitioner issued a demand letter regarding the
cathedral, being 80 to 100 meters distant from the church, and that the exemption institution’s tax liabilities. Petitioner contended that private Respondent was an
privilege was already exhausted by its allowance to the parsonage of the adjoining “independent contractor” within the purview of Sec. 205 of the Tax Code, and was
chapel. conducting studies for a fee, and therefore subject to 3% contractor’s tax.

W/N the house of the archbishop of Manila should be exempted from tax. W/N Private Respondent, through its auxiliary unit or branch, the IPC,
performing the work of an independent contractor and, thus subject to 3%
HELD: contractor’s tax levied by Sec. 205 of the National Internal Revenue Code.
In enacting its exemption laws, the Commission had in view not only the conditions
peculiar to and inherent in Roman Catholic parishes in the Islands, but their intent was HELD:
to extend the exemption to the parsonages appurtenant to all churches. And it is a No. The research activity of the IPC was done in pursuance of maintaining private
general rule that statutes exempting charitable and religious property from taxation Respondent’s university status and not in the course of an independent business of
should be construed fairly and not unnaturally though strictly and in such manner as selling such research with profit in mind. There was no evidence that the IPC ever
to give effect to the main intent of the legislators. Although separated from the sold its services for a fee to anyone or was ever engaged in business apart from the
cathedral by an intervening block, and although a parsonage within the area was academic purposes of the university. Petitioner erred in applying the principles of tax
already exempt, the residence of the archbishop should still be exempted from exemption without first applying a strict interpretation of the tax laws.
taxation as a parsonage adjacent to the cathedral.
8a, 9b, 43

Manila Railroad Company v. Insular Collector of Customs Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court
Case No. 167 Case No. 256
G.R. No. 30264 (March 12, 1929) G.R. No. L-69344 (April 26, 1991)
Chapter VII, Page 301, Footnote No. 84 Chapter VII, Page 301, Footnote No. 84

Appellee Manila Railroad Company used dust shields made of wool on all of Respondent spouses Antonio and Clara Pastor owed the Government P1,283,
its railway wagons to cover the axle box which protects from dust the oil deposited 621.63 for taxes from the years 1955-1959. A reinvestigation of their debt was made
therein which serves as lubricant of the bearings of the wheel. Under par. 141 of Sec. and the amount was changed to P17,117.08. They applied for tax amnesty under
8 of the Tariff Law of 1909, manufactures of wool, not otherwise provided for are P.D. 23, 213 and 370. Due to this, their debt even decreased to about P12,000. They
subject to 40% ad valorem. On the other hand, under par. 197 of same law, vehicles paid such debt to the Government and had receipts as proofs of such.
for use on railways and tramways, and detached parts thereof are subject to 10% ad The Government contended that the spouses could not avail of the tax
valorem. Appellant Insular Collector of Customs classified dust shields as amnesty under P.D. 213 because of Revenue Regulation No. 8-72 which stated that
“manufactures of wool, not otherwise provided for.” Upon appeal, however, the CFI amnesty is not allowed for those who had pending assessments with the BIR.
overruled the decision and classified dust shields as “detached parts” of vehicles for Respondent spouses then contended that Revenue Regulation No. 8-72 was
use on railways. null because P.D. 213 did not contain any exemption wherein one should not be
allowed to amnesty.
Whether dust shields should be classified as manufactures of wool or as ISSUE:
detached parts of vehicles for use on railways. W/N Respondent spouses were properly given tax amnesty.

Dust shields are classified for the purposes of tariff as detached parts of Yes, because Revenue Regulation No. 8-72 was null and void. If Revenue
vehicles under par. 197. It is a general rule in the interpretation of statutes levying Regulation No. 8-72 provided an exception to the coverage of P.D. 213, then such
taxes not to extend their provisions beyond the clear import of the language used. In provision is null and void for being contrary to the Presidential Decree. Revenue
case of doubt, they should be construed strictly against the government and in favor regulations shall not prevail over provisions of a Presidential Decree.
of the citizen. And when there is in the same statute a particular enactment and a
general one which in its comprehensive sense would include what is embraced in LATIN MAXIM:
the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general one must 8, 26
be taken to affect only such cases within its general language as are not within the
provisions of the particular enactment.

38a, 43, 50

Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. v. Department of Finance Acting Commissioner of Customs v. Manila Electric Company
Secretary Case No. 3
Case No. 82 G.R. No. L-23623 (June 30, 1977)
G.R. No. 108524 (November 10, 1994) Chapter VII, Page 301, Footnote No. 85
Chapter VII, Page 301, Footnote No. 85
FACTS: RA 1394 exempted payment of special import tax for spare parts used for
Petitioner is a corporation whose members are engaged in buying and selling industries and also insulators from all taxes of whatever nature. Respondent contends
copra. Prior to Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) 47-91, copra was classified as that their insulating oils are exempt from taxes.
a food product under Sec. 103(b) of the National Internal Revenue Code and
therefore exempt from tax in all stages, including distribution. ISSUE:
Under Sec. 103(a), the sale of agricultural NON-food products in their original W/N insulating oil is an insulator making Respondent exempt from paying its
state is exempt from VAT only if the seller is the primary producer and the owner of taxes.
the land which the same is produced. Under Sec. 103(b), the sale of agricultural
food products in their original state is exempt from VAT in all stages. HELD:
RMC 47-91 then reclassified copra as a non-food product. No, insulating oil is different from insulators. The Supreme Court looked into
the definition of “insulating oils” under Materials Handbook by George J. Brady, 8th
ISSUE: Edition.
W/N copra is an agricultural food product which is exempt from VAT and thus The court found out that insulating oils are used for cooling as well as
not under the purview of RMC 47-91. insulating. And there is no question that the insulating oil that Respondent is importing
is used for cooling instead of insulating. The law frowns on exemption from taxation;
HELD: hence an exempting provision must be construed stictissimi juris.
No, it is not an agricultural food product, thus it is not exempt from VAT. The
Commissioner of Internal Revenue’s interpretation is entitled to great respect LATIN MAXIM:
because it is the government agency charged with the interpretation and 9a, 43, b
implementation of tax laws. In fact, although copra is from coconut, and 80% of the
coconut plant is edible, copra per se is not intended for human consumption.

2a, 42a, b

Collector of Internal Revenue v. Manila Jockey Club Inc. People v. Castañeda Jr.
Case No. 68 Case No. 104
G.R. No. L-8755 (March 23, 1956) G.R. No. L-46881 (September 15, 1988)
Chapter VII, Page 304, Footnote No. 97 Chapter VII, Page 306, Footnote No. 102

Respondents Manila Jockey Club Inc. and Philippine Racing Club Inc. are Respondents were charged of 8 criminal cases for violating the National
corporations organized primarily for holding horse races. Petitioner is contending that Internal Revenue Code for manufacturing alcoholic products subject to specific tax
payments for renting several parts of the property that Respondents rent and lease without having paid the annual privilege tax therefore. Respondents argued that
are subject to the 20% amusement tax in the National Internal Revenue Code. they are exempt from taxes because they are entitled to the benefits available
under P.D. 370 which declares tax amnesty.
W/N rentals received by the Respondents from private horse owners or ISSUE:
trainers, the PCSO, the White Cross, the Philippine Anti-Tuberculosis Society are W/N Respondent is entitled to the benefits of tax amnesty under the P.D.
subject to the 20% amusement tax.
HELD: To be entitled to the extinction of liability provided by P.D. 370, the claimant
The law refers to “gross receipts” and not “gross income”. This clause is plain must have voluntarily disclosed his previously untaxed income or wealth and paid the
demonstration that the “gross receipts” refer to the collections on days when the required 15% tax on such previously untaxed income or wealth. Where the disclosure
race track is open to the general public and admission fees are or are not charged. was not voluntary, the claimant is not entitled to the benefits expressly excluded from
This necessarily excludes income of the Respondents received on days when they do the coverage of P.D. 370. In the instant case, the violations with which the
not legally and actually hold horse races. The lease by the Respondents of the land Respondents were charged had already been discovered by the BIR when P.D. 370
clearly has nothing to do with horse racing. It is to be remembered that the law took effect. It is necessary to note that the "valid information under RA 2338" referred
makes the proprietor, lessee, or operator, of the amusement place liable for the to in Sec. 1(a)(4) of P.D. 370 refers not to a criminal information filed in court by a
amusement tax, the three tax payers being connected by the disjunctive fiscal or special prosecutor, but rather to the sworn information or complaint filed by
conjunction “or”, thereby positively implying that the tax should be paid by either the an informer with the BIR under RA 2338 in the hope of earning an informer's reward.
proprietor, the lessee, or the operator, as the case may be, singly and not all at one
and the same time. LATIN MAXIM:
6c, 25a, 43
6c, 7a, 27

Zamora v. City of Manila Republic Flour Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Case No. 175 Case No. 259
G.R. No. 3433 (March 2, 1907) G.R. No. L- 25602 31 (February 18, 1970)
Chapter VII, Page 306, Footnote No. 102 Chapter VII, Page 306, Footnote No. 103

Act No. 975 is a remedial statute which provides for relief of persons who have In 1957, Petitioner was granted tax-exemption privileges pursuant to RA 901.
paid an excessive assessment on taxes prior to the creation of the Board of Tax In 1958, Petitioner imported a quantity of wheat grains, part of which was not used in
revision. the business that year. The surplus of wheat grains were finally utilized into flour and
Petitioner prays that the word “land” in the title and body of the statute be sold in 1959. Petitioner paid sales tax of P37,275.55, but the cost of wheat left over
interpreted to mean “land including buildings and improvements thereon”. was treated as deductible item from gross sales in 1959. Respondent Commissioner
finally assessed the Petitioner of deficiency tax of P23,170.17 because materials
ISSUE: purchased from tax-exempt industries were not acquired from one enjoying tax-
W/N the word “land” should be interpreted liberally to mean land with the exemption privilege under our laws.
buildings and improvements thereon.
HELD: W/N Respondent Commissioner is correct in imposing the deficiency sales tax.
While the distinction does not appear to have been consciously made in Act
No. 123, it is disregarded in Act Nos. 82 and 551. The rule of strict construction of HELD:
statutes granting exemptions from taxation is not applicable in this case. This rule is No. Sec. 186-A of Internal Revenue provides that whenever a tax-free product
not without its exceptions and limitations, and the plain principles of justice suggest is utilized in the manufacture or production of any article, in the determination of the
that the act under consideration should be construed with some liberality. It is a value of such finished article, the value of such tax-free product shall be deducted.
remedial statute, providing for a refund of taxes which have been collected unjustly While It is true that tax exemptions (and deductions) are not favored in the law, and
and upon an unfair and inequitable valuation of land. While some of the Acts of the are construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayer, it is equally a recognized principle
Commission have consciously sought to give to the word land and real estate a that where the provision of the law is clear and unambiguous, so that there is no
special signification, nevertheless such use has not been uniform and the deviations occasion for the court’s seeking the legislative intent, the law must be taken as it is,
therefrom have been so frequent that it affords no safe rule from interpretation. devoid of judicial addition or subtraction.


9a, 9d, 9f, 27, b2 6c, 7a, 43

Ajero v. Court of Appeals In re: Testate Estate of Tampoy

Case No. 5 Case No. 61
G.R. No. 106720 (September 15, 1994) G.R. No. L-14322 (February 25, 1960)
Chapter VII, Page 309, Footnote No. 117 Chapter VII, Page 309, Footnote No. 117

Petitioners filed a petition for probate of holographic will left by the late Annie In the matter of Petition for Probate Proceedings before the CFI of Cebu, the
Sand. They alleged that the decedent was of sound and disposing mind, and was will consists of two pages and the last page had been duly signed by the testatrix
capacitated to dispose of her estate by will. and the three testimonial witnesses who also signed the first page but the testatrix
Private Respondent opposed the petition claiming the will or testament was failed to sign the left margin of the first page.
not of the decedent and the same was procured through improper pressure. It was The lower court denied the petition because the will was not executed in
also opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero claiming that the decedent was not the sole owner of accordance with law, citing Sec. 618 of Act No. 190, as amended.
the property. The trial court granted and/or admitted the decedent’s holographic
will to probate. On appeal, said Decision was reversed by the CA for its failure to ISSUE:
comply with Art. 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code. W/N the probate court (CFI) is correct in denying the petition for the
allowance of the will.
W/N the CA is correct that the will did not comply with the law. HELD:
Yes. Sec. 618 of Act No. 190, as amended, requires that the testator sign the
HELD: will and each and every page thereof in the presence of the witnesses, and that the
No. Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance latter sign the will and each and every page thereof in the presence of the testator
of a holographic will that is unquestionably handwritten by the testator. Art. 813 of and of each other, which requirement should be expressed in the attestation clause.
the New Civil Code affects only the validity of the dispositions in the will, but not its This requirement is mandatory, for failure to comply with it is fatal to the validity of the
probate. A holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding non- will. Thus, it has been held that “Statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in
compliance with Art. 814. In case of alterations, cancellations or insertions, the lack the execution of wills are very strictly construed. A will must be executed in
of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes, but not its entirety. accordance with the statutory requirements; otherwise it is entirely void. All these
The CA, however, correctly held that Annie Sand could not dispose the other requirements stand as of equal importance and must be observed, and courts
property including the house and lot, which she shares with her father’s other heirs. cannot supply the defective execution of the will.” Accordingly, we cannot escape
the conclusion that the same fails to comply with the law and therefore, cannot be
LATIN MAXIM: admitted to probate.
1, 6c, 7a, 9a
6c, 7a

A.L. Ammen Transportation Company, Inc. v. Borja Lazo v. Employee’s Compensation Commission
Case No. 1 Case No. 70
G.R. No. L-17750 (August 31, 1962) G.R. No. 78617 (June 18, 1990)
Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 123 Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 123

Respondent filed an action against Petitioners in the CFI of Albay to recover Petitioner is a security guard of the Central Bank of the Philippines assigned to
compensation for overtime work rendered, and damages. Pending this, Respondent its main office. His regular tour of duty is from 2pm to 10pm. On June 18, 1986, the
filed the present proceedings on the Court of Industrial Relations. Petitioner rendered full duty. But, as the security guard who was to relieve him failed
to arrive, the Petitioner rendered overtime duty up to 5am the next day. On his way
ISSUE: home, he met an accident and as a result, he sustained injuries. For injuries sustained,
1. W/N the scope of the term “action” falls under RA 1994. he claimed for disability benefits under P.D. 626 but was denied by the GSIS.
2. W/N the Court of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction.
HELD: W/N the denial of compensation under P.D. 626 was valid.
1. The Petitioner contends that the phrase “action already commenced”
employed in the statute should be construed as meaning only actions filed in a HELD:
regular court of justice. With this limited and narrow interpretation, we cannot agree. No. In the case at bar, it can be seen that Petitioner left his station at the
The statute under consideration is undoubtedly a labor statute and as such must be Central Bank several hours after his regular time off, because the reliever did not
liberally construed in favor of the laborer concerned. come on time. There is no evidence on the record that Petitioner deviated from his
2. The allegation in the complaint filed by the Respondent employee that he usual, regular homeward route. While presumption of compensability and theory of
was “separated automatically from the said employment with Defendants, and aggravation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act may have been abandoned
notwithstanding pleas for reinstatement, Defendants refused and still refuse to under the New Labor Code, it is significant that the liberality of the law in general
reinstate Plaintiff,” and his prayer for specific reliefs and other reliefs justify the favor of the workingman still subsists.
conclusion that said Respondent ought reinstatement aside from overtime wages.
This was within the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations. LATIN MAXIM:

Villavert v. Employee’s Compensation Commission Abella v. National Labor Relations Commission

Case No. 313 Case No. 2
G.R. No. L-48605 (December 14, 1981) G.R. No. 71813 (July 20, 1987)
Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 124 Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 124

The Petitioner is the mother of the late Marcelino Villavert, who died of acute Petitioner leased a farm land, Hacienda Danao–Ramona, in Negros
hemorrhagic pancreatic, employed as a code verifier in the Philippine Constabulary. Occidental for a period of ten years. It is renewable at her instance, which she opted
She filed a claim for income benefits for the death of her son under P.D. 626, as to do, for another ten years. During the existence of the lease she employed the
amended, with the GSIS. The said claim was denied by the GSIS on the ground that private Respondents. Upon expiration of the leasehold rights, Petitioner dismissed the
acute hemorrhagic pancreatic is not an occupational disease and that Petitioner two Respondents.
had failed to show that there was a causal connection between the fatal ailment of
Marcelino and the nature of his employment. The Petitioner appealed to the ECC ISSUE:
which affirmed the denial. W/N the Respondents are entitled to separation pays.

W/N the ECC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the claim of Yes. The applicable law on the case is Art. 284 of the Labor Code.
the Petitioner. Notwithstanding the contention of the Petitioner that the aforementioned provision
violates the constitutional guarantee against impairment of obligations and
HELD: contracts, because when she leased the farm land, neither she nor the lessor
From the foregoing facts of record, it is clear that Marcelino died of acute contemplated the creation of the obligation to pay separation pay to the workers
hemorrhagic pancreatic which was directly caused or at least aggravated by the upon the expiration of the lease. The court held such contention untenable as the
duties he performed as coder verifier, computer operator and clerk typist of the issue had already been adjudicated in the case of Anucension v. NLRC. It was stated
Philippine Constabulary. There is no evidence at all that Marcelino had a “bout of in the said case that “the prohibition to impair the obligation of contracts is not
alcoholic intoxication” shortly before he died. Neither is there a showing that he used absolute and unqualified. The prohibition is general.” The court further stated that the
drugs. All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of this Code, including its purpose of Art. 284 is for the protection of the workers whose employment is
implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of the labor. terminated because of the closure of establishment. Without such law, employees
like the Respondents will lose the benefits to which they are entitled. Moreover, it is
LATIN MAXIM: well settled that in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the
9a Labor Code, the worker’s welfare should be the primordial and paramount
consideration, and that all doubts shall be resolved in favor of labor.

5a, 9a, 9d

Del Rosario & Sons v. National Labor Relations Commission Manahan v. Employee’s Compensation Commission
Case No. 36 Case No. 79
No. L-64204 (May 31, 1985) G.R. No. L-44899 (April 22, 1981)
Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 124 Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 124

Petitioner, a logging company, entered into a contract of services with Nazario Manahan, Jr., died of Enteric Fever while he was employed as a
Calmar Security Agency to supply the Petitioner with security guards. The security teacher in the Las Piñas Municipal High School. The claimant, the widow of the
guards, herein Respondents, filed a complaint for underpayment of salary against deceased, filed a claim in the GSIS for she contends that the death of her husband
the Petitioner and the security agency. The Labor Arbiter found the security agency was due to his occupation. However, GSIS denied such claim. Claimant filed for a
to be liable for the underpayment and dismissed the case against the logging Motion for Reconsideration alleging that the deceased was in perfect health prior to
company. his employment and that the ailment of the deceased is attributable to his
The security agency appealed the case to the NLRC. The latter allowed the employment. Again she was denied by the GSIS. She then appealed her case to
appeal even though there were formal defects in the procedure by which the the Employees Compensation Commission which also denied her claim.
appeal was made. It was not under oath and the appeal fee was paid late.
ISSUE: W/N the widow of the deceased is entitled to claim benefits.
W/N the formal defects of the appeal of the security agency should
invalidate the appeal. HELD:
Yes. The findings of the commission indicated that the deceased was in
HELD: perfect health prior to his employment as a teacher and that in the course of his
No. According to Art. 221 of the Labor Code, “in any proceeding before the employment, he was treated for Epigastric pain- and ulcer-like symptoms. This was
Commission or any of the Labor Arbiters, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of supported by his medical records and a medical certificate issued by Dr. Bernabe.
law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of the Code that Epigastric pain is a symptom of Ulcer and Ulcer is a common complication of Enteric
the Commission and the Arbiters shall use every and all reasonable means to Fever.
ascertain the facts in each case and proceed all in the interest of justice.” The lack Pursuant to the doctrine of Corales v. ECC, the provisions of the Workmen’s
of verification could have easily been corrected by making an oath and even Compensation Act shall be applied, thus the presumption of compensability should
though the payment was late, it was still paid. be in favor of the claimant. Moreover, it is well settled that in case of doubt, the case
should be resolved in favor of the worker and that Labor laws should be liberally
LATIN MAXIM: construed to give relief to the worker and his dependents.
9a, 9d, 40b
5a, 9a, 9d, 40b

Liwanag v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission Sibulo v. Altar

Case No. 75 Case No. 279
G.R. No. L-12164 (May 2, 1959) G.R. No. L-1916 (April 30, 1949)
Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 124 Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 125

Appellants Benito Liwanag and Maria Liwanag Reyes are co-owners of Petitioner, owner of first class agricultural land, entered into a contract of
Liwanag Auto Suppy. They hired Roque Balderama as a security guard, who was tenancy with Respondent. Petitioner was to furnish the work animals and farm
killed in the line of duty by criminals. His widow and children filed a claim for implements and Respondent was to defray all expenses of planting and cultivation.
compensation with the Workmen’s Compensation Commission, which was granted in The net produce was to be divided equally. The contract was disapproved by the
an award that ordered the Appellants to pay jointly and severally the amount of Tenancy Law Enforcement Division of the Department of Justice because the division
P3,494.40 to the claimant in lump sum. Appellants did not question the right of contravenes with a provision of the Tenancy Law. It was taken to the Court of
Appellees to compensation nor the amount awarded. However, they claim that Industrial Relations, which declared the contract illegal as against public policy as
because the Workmen’s Compensation Act did not give an express provision contemplated in Sec. 7 of the Tenancy Law, for the reason that instead of receiving
declaring solidary obligations of business partners, the compensation should be 60% of his total share, the tenant shall receive 50% only. Petitioner claimed that the
divisible. contract is not among those expressly declared to be against public policy in Sec. 7
of the Tenancy Law, which he argues to be an exhaustive list.
W/N the Commission erred in ordering the Appellants to pay jointly and ISSUE:
severally. W/N the contract is against public policy as contemplated in Sec. 7 of the
Tenancy Law.
No. Although the WCA does not contain any provision expressly declaring HELD:
that the obligation arising from compensation is solidary, other provisions of law show No. In declaring certain stipulations to be against public policy, the legislature
how their liability is solidary. Art. 1711 and 1712 of the New Civil Code and Sec. 2 of could not have meant to sanction other stipulations which, though not specified, are
the WCA reasonably indicate that in compensation cases, the liability of business similar to those expressly mentioned. The purpose of the law might easily be
partners should be solidary. If the responsibility were to be merely jointly, and one of defeated otherwise. The Tenancy Act is a remedial legislation intended to better the
them happens to be insolvent, the award would only be partially satisfied, which is lot of the share-cropper by giving him a more equitable participation in the produce
evidently contrary to the intent of the law to give full protection to employees. The of the land which he cultivates. Being a remedial statute, it should be construed to
WCA should be construed fairly, reasonably and liberally for the employee and further its purpose in accordance with its general intent.
LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9c, 12a, 36, 40
9a, 9c, 9d, 36, 38, 40

Guerrero v. Court of Appeals Vicente v. Employee’s Compensation Commission

Case No. 54 Case No. 168
G.R. No. L-44570 (May 30,1986) G.R. No. 85024 (January 23, 1991)
Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 126 Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 127

Apolonio Benitez was hired by the Petitioners to work in their plantation. He Petitioner was an employed nursing attendant. At the course of his
was allowed for that purpose to put up a hut within the plantation. He shared 1/3 of employment, he had several physical complications which forced him to retire. So at
the proceeds with his coconut-related responsibilities. Afterwards, the Petitioners and the age of forty-five, he availed an optional retirement to entitle him to “income
Benitez executed an agreement allowing Benitez to continue working as tenant; the benefits” under the GSIS retirement program. The application was supported by a
Agricultural Tenancy Act would govern their relationship. Later the Petitioners ordered physician’s certification that Petitioner was classified as under “permanent total
Benitez out. Benitez sued in the Court of Agrarian Relations, which ordered his disability.” The significance of such classification was whether or not Petitioner could
reinstatement. The Petitioners appealed to the CA, which affirmed the Court of avail of the full income benefits. GSIS contended that Petitioner was only “permanent
Agrarian Reform’s decision. The Petitioners then appealed to the Supreme Court. partial disability”. The ECC affirmed the GSIS decision.
Pending appeal, the Code of Agrarian Reforms was passed repealing the
Agricultural Tenancy Act. The Petitioners then claimed that since the basis of the suit ISSUE:
was a share tenancy agreement, the decisions lost their validity. Whether Petitioner was under permanent total disability or permanent partial
W/N share tenancy ended. HELD:
Petitioner was under permanent total disability. The test of whether or not an
HELD: employee suffers from permanent total disability is a showing of the capacity of the
No. An agreement is not abrogated by the subsequent repeal of the law. employee to continue performing his work notwithstanding the disability he incurred.
The phasing out of share tenancy was never intended to mean a reversion of tenants The Court takes this occasion to stress once more its abiding concern for the welfare
into farmhands or hired laborers with no rights. The Agricultural Tenancy Act and of government workers, especially the humble rank and file. It is for this reason that
Agricultural Land Reform Code have not been entirely repealed by the Code of the sympathy of the law on social security is toward its beneficiaries and requires a
Agrarian Reform. But assuming that they were, the rule that the repeal of a statute construction of utmost liberality in their favor.
defeats all actions pending under the repealed statute has the exception when
vested rights are affected and obligations of contract are impaired. LATIN MAXIM:
9a, 11b, 12a
9a, 12, 32, 38

Tamayo, et al. v. Manila Hotel Company Corporal v. Employee’s Compensation Commission

Case No. 283 Case No. 83
G.R. No. L-8975 (June 29, 1957) G.R. No. 86020 (August 5, 1994)
Chapter VII, Page 311, Footnote No. 128 Chapter VII, Page 311, Footnote No. 131

265 employees of Appellee Manila Hotel Co., who had to be dismissed and Norma Corporal was an employed public school teacher. During the course
paid the value of their accumulated leave under Sec. 266 of the Administrative of her work, she had several pregnancies. On her 4th pregnancy, she suffered
Code, as amended by RA 611, when the hotel was leased to a private concern on complete abortion. On her 5th pregnancy, she gave birth to a baby boy with the
June 30, 1954, brought the present action to recover from the Appellee Manila Hotel help of a “hilot”. An hour later, she was rushed to the hospital due to profuse vaginal
Co. an additional amount for accrued leave alleged to be due them under the bleeding. She underwent hysterectomy but she died afterwards. Her husband,
same section of the Administrative Code, as later amended by RA 1081, approved herein Petitioner, filed a claim for compensation benefit with GSIS. But said agency
on June 15, 1954, that is to say, 15 days before they were separated from the denied. The matter was elevated to ECC but the petition was also dismissed because
company. the cause of his wife’s death was non-work-related.

W/N Petitioners could avail of the alleged accrued benefits. W/N Petitioner could avail the compensation benefit.

No. Art. 4 of the New Civil Code provides that laws shall have no retroactive No. The determination of whether the prolapse of Norma’s uterus developed
effect unless the contrary is provided. As RA 1081 does not provide that it is to have a before or after her 5th pregnancy is immaterial since this illness is the result of her
retroactive effect, it can only be given effect from the date of its approval. physiological structure and changes in the body. While as a rule that labor and
social welfare legislation should be liberally construed in favor of the applicant, there
LATIN MAXIM: is also a rule that such liberal construction cannot be applied if the pertinent
46a provisions of the Labor Code are clear.

6c, 43

People v. Moran People v. Reyes

Case No. 216 Case No. 222
G.R. No. 17905 (January 27, 1923) G.R. Nos. 74226-227 (July 27, 1989)
Chapter VII, Page 320, Footnote No. 167 Chapter VII, Page 320, Footnote No. 168

Appellant was punished for violating the Election Law. When the decision On June 1983, the complainants allegedly discovered that the property of
was published, it was increased to 6 months. Defendant alleges that the crime has their deceased parents was falsely transferred to Mizaph Reyes through falsified
already prescribed, pursuant to Sec. 71 of Act No. 3030, which was enacted by the signatures and untruthful statements in the deed of registration. However as the deed
Legislature on March 9, 1922. was registered on May 26, 1961, the lower courts held that the period of prescription
has long passed.
W/N Act No. 3030 is meant to apply to the Administrative Code and whether ISSUE:
the said act should be retroactive with respect to Art. 22 and 7 of the RPC. Whether or not the lower courts erred in dismissing the case due to the
passing of the prescriptive period.
Act No. 3030 is intended to be amendatory to several sections of the HELD:
Administrative Code. Furthermore, Art. 22 of the RPC can only be invoked with The SC ruled affirmed the decision of the lower court, as the registration of
reference to some other penal law. Hence with regard to Art. 7, the SC contends land acts as a notice to the whole world. Under this, it is also presumed that the
that Art. 22 should still apply to special laws. purchaser has examined the instruments of the record.
Also, the prescription of the crime is intimately connected with that of the The court will not hesitate to apply rules of construction in civil cases to that of
penalty. A statute declaring prescription of a crime has no other purpose than to criminal ones, should the circumstances warrant. Rights should not be left on a
annul prosecution of the offender. When the statute makes no distinction, it makes precarious balance, always susceptible possible challenges. This should also apply to
no exception. Statutes are not construed to have retrospective operation as to criminal cases.
destroy or impair rights unless such was clearly the intention. Furthermore, as stated in People v. Moran, in the interpretation of the law and
The new law shortening the time of prescription indicates that the sovereign that of the prescription of crimes, a liberal reading that is most favorable to the
acknowledges that the previous one was unjust and enforcing the latter would be accused is the one to be adopted.
26, 37, 46a, 48

Board of Administrators of the PVA v. Bautista Legaspi v. Executive Secretary and Agrarian Reforms
Case No. 37 Case No. 145
G.R. No. L-37867 (February 22, 1982) No. L-36153 (November 28, 1975)
Chapter VII, Page 321, Footnote No. 170 Chapter VII, Page 322, Footnote No. 173

Respondent Gasilao, a veteran, failed to present all the necessary papers to Petitioner, an employee of the Department of Agrarian Reforms, sent a letter
receive his pension. After finally complying with all the necessities, he was awarded to the Respondent Secretary of the Department, Conrado Estrella. Petitioner
with the full benefits of RA 65, Sec. 9 and RA 1920, for P100 a month and an expressed his desire to be laid-off under the provisions of RA 3844, as amended by RA
additional P10 per minor. Later, on June 22, 1969, RA 5753 was approved. However, 6389, on the condition that he would also be paid the gratuity benefits to which he
due to the lack of funds, Respondent Gasilao only received a 25% increase and only might be entitled under C.A. No. 186, as amended by RA 1616. GSIS approved his
after January 15, 1971. retirement gratuity under C.A. No. 186, as amended by RA 1616 but denied his claim
The lower court granted Respondent Gasilao his pension, starting from for gratuity under RA 3844, as amended by RA 6389.
December 18, 1955 at the rate of P50, and then P100 plus P10 per minor, from June
22, 1957 up to August 7, 1968. To pay the difference of P100 plus P30 per month and ISSUE:
P20 per month for each minor from June 22, 1969 up to January 15, 1971, the W/N Petitioner is entitled to both gratuity benefits under C.A. No. 186, as
difference of P75 plus P22.50 per month for his wife, and P20 per minor from January amended by RA 1616, and RA 3844, as amended by RA 6389.
16, 1971 up to December 31, 1971.
ISSUE: No. There is nothing in RA 3844, as amended by RA 6389, that would suggest
W/N the lower court erred in the retroactivity of Respondent Gasilao’s that an employee who is laid-off or prefers to be laid-off can receive two pension
pension. benefits, one under its provisions and another pursuant to C.A. No. 186.
This interpretation is more in line with the policy of the law embodied in C.A.
HELD: No. 186 prohibiting an employer from paying double retirement benefits to an
Respondent Gasilao is a veteran of good standing and has complied with the employee. Being the law governing the retirement of government employees, all
prescriptive period for filing for his pension. The laws on veteran pension must be other laws extending retirement benefits to government employees should, in case of
liberally construed as to grant our veterans the proper recognition. Granting such ambiguity, be construed in relation to C.A. No. 186 and in the light of its provisions. It
pensions the earliest possible time is more in tune with the spirit of RA 65. But, as the is a rule of statutory construction that when the legislature enacts a provision, it is
government has yet to provide the necessary funds, the judgment of the lower courts understood that it is aware of previous statutes relating to the same subject matter,
is modified as, effective December 18, 1955 at P50 plus P10 per month for each and that in the absence of an express repeal or amendment therein, the new
minor, increased to P100 from June 22, 1957 to August 7, 1968. The difference from provision should be deemed enacted pursuant to the legislative policy embodied in
June 22, 1969 to January 14, 1972 is subject to the release of funds by the prior statutes, which should all be construed together.
LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 38b
9a, 40b

Re: Monthly Pension of Judges and Justices Re: Application For Retirement Under R.A. No. 910 of Associate Justice Ramon B.
Case No. 60 Britanico of the IAC
A.M. No. 09-9-019-SC (October 4, 1990) Case No. 128
Chapter VII, Page 322, Footnote No. 174 A.M. No. 6484-Ret. (May 15, 1989)
Chapter VII, Page 323, Footnote No. 177
This matter was brought about due to two separate publications in the Official FACTS:
Gazette of the same amendment to RA 910 (Special Retirement Law of Judges and Justice Britanico requested that he be granted retirement benefits under RA
Justices). P.D. 1438 was published in Vol. 74 of the Official Gazette, No. 30, which did 910 in addition to or in lieu of benefits he received under RA 1616 upon termination of
not provide how to compute the monthly pension starting from the sixth year of his service in the Judiciary by the acceptance of his courtesy resignation by President
retirement. However, in Vol. 74 of the Official Gazette, No. 41 provided that the Aquino, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1 dated February 25, 1986, requiring all
monthly pension starting from the sixth year of retirement is equivalent to the monthly appointive public officials to submit their courtesy resignations beginning with the
salary he was receiving on the date of his retirement. Since 1978 however, GSIS members of the Supreme Court. Justice Britanico served the government for 36.23
computed the monthly pension as follows: 1) highest salary, plus 2) highest years, of which 10 years, 2 months, and 27 days were served in the Judiciary. As
representation and transportation allowances (RATA), plus 3) longevity pay (which provided in Sec. 1 of RA 910, the judges or justices who may enjoy retirement benefits
was considered part of the salary starting in 1983 pursuant to Sec. 42, BP 129). The with their lifetime annuity, should have rendered “at least 20 years service in the
basis was the copy of P.D. 1438 which was published in Vol. 74 of the Official Gazette, judiciary or in any other branch of the government or both.” They fall into three
No. 30. categories:
ISSUE: 2. those who resign by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of their
Which version of P.D. 1438 must be followed. office and had rendered at least 20 years service in the judiciary or in any
other branch of the government or both
The Court directed GSIS to continue implementing RA 910, as amended by
P.D. 1438, in the same manner as it has done since 1978. This is definitely more in ISSUE:
keeping with and gives substance to the elementary rule of statutory construction Which category Justice Britanico belongs to.
that, being remedial in character, retirement laws should be liberally construed and
administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited and all doubts as to HELD:
the intent of the law should be resolved in favor of the retiree to achieve its He belongs to the second category of Sec. 1. The acceptance of his
humanitarian purposes. Retirement laws are intended to entice competent men and courtesy resignation, not being a voluntary resignation (as held in Ortiz v. COMELEC),
women to enter the government service and to permit them to retire therefrom with resulted in his incapacity to discharge the duties of his office, which he could have
relative security, not only for those who have retained their vigor but, more so, for very well held until he reaches the mandatory retirement age of 70 years.
those who have been incapacitated by illness or accident. Retirement laws should be liberally construed to and applied in favor of the
persons intended to be benefited thereby.
9a, 40b LATIN MAXIM:
6c, 40b, 43c

Re: Gregorio G. Pineda Ramirez v. Arrieta

Case No. 132 Case No. 130
A.M. No. 6789-RET (Jul 13, 1990) G.R. No. L-19183 (Nov. 29, 1962)
Chapter VII, Page 323, Footnote No. 178 Chapter VII, Page 325, Footnote No. 181

These are petitions or motions for reconsideration filed by six retired judges, Petitioner filed an action against Apolinar Serina seeking the annulment of a
namely Pineda, Montesclaros, de Lara, Montecillo, Paredes and Gerochi, asking that transfer certificate of title over a parcel of land alleging misrepresentation. The CFI
they be granted gratuity and/or retirement benefits under RA 910, as amended, in dismissed the complaint. The Plaintiff filed a notice of intent to appeal. The end of
addition to or in lieu of the benefits under RA 1616 or P.D. 1146. They want to take the 30 day period fell on a Sunday hence it was moved to the following Monday but
advantage of the Plana and Britanico ruling. one of the two bondsmen was unable to sign the appeal bond. The clerk of court
suggested that the document first be completed by the Plaintiff before filing it.
ISSUE: Petitioner followed the suggestion and filed the complete document the next day.
W/N they should be granted benefits under RA 910 pursuant to the Plana or Defendant filed an opposition to the approval of the appeal bond since it was filed
Britanico ruling. one day after the end of the reglementary period. The judge disapproved the bond
and rendered the judgment final and executory. Plaintiff interposed a petition for
HELD: mandamus to the SC saying that the CFI committed a grave abuse of discretion.
No. A close scrutiny into the service records as well as the conduct of the
judges is necessary to determine their qualification to receive benefits under RA 910. ISSUE:
The rule is that retirement laws are construed liberally in favor of the retiring W/N the CFI committed grave abuse of discretion in disallowing the appeal
employee. When the court allows exemptions to fix rules for certain judges, there are bond.
ample reasons behind each grant. The crediting of leaves is not done
indiscriminately. The court only allows the use of the Plana or Britanico ruling if the HELD:
career of the judge was marked by competence, integrity and dedication to the Yes, it did. The action of the CFI is harsh and improvident according to the
public service. Most of the judges however retired bowing to policy considerations, id SC. The bond would have been filed on time if it had not been for the defect.
est courtesy resignations. The De La Llana ruling is an essential factor in determining According to the Rules of Court, a personal appeal bond need not necessarily be
whether or not the judges should be granted the benefits they ask for. It stated that if subscribed by 2 sureties, it would suffice that the court approves such. Furthermore,
a judge was not recommended for reappointment following their courtesy the Rules of Court also state that the appeal needs only one surety. So long as the
resignations then the relevant factors were considered and they were found surety is solvent and acceptable to the court, it should suffice. Moreover, the defect
wanting. in the appeal bond, even if indeed 2 sureties were needed, the court would not
have been deprived of jurisdiction since it was filed within the reglementary period.
LATIN MAXIM: Rules of procedure should be liberally construed in order to promote their object and
9c, 9e, 37, 42a assist the parties in obtaining a just determination of their cases.

9a, 9d, 9e, 11b

International Corporate Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court Del Rosario v. Hamoy

Case No. 63 Case No. 35
G.R. No. L-6970 (Jan. 30, 1988) No. L-77154 (June 30, 1987)
Chapter VII, Page 326, Footnote No. 181 Chapter VII, Page 326, Footnote No. 181

Private Respondent secured a loan from Petitioner’s predecessor in interest by For want of a one-peso documentary stamp in a special power of attorney
mortgaging her properties. The amount approved for release was used to pay for her for pre-trial purposes, in lieu of the personal appearance of Plaintiff, the Respondent
other obligations to Petitioner. Thus, private Respondent claimed that she never Judge declared him non-suited and dismissed the complaint “for failure of the
received anything from the approved loan. Private Respondent made a money Plaintiff to appear for pre-trial conference.”
market placement. Meanwhile, she allegedly failed to pay her mortgage so the bank
refused to pay the interest earned by the placement, applying the amount instead ISSUE:
to the deficiency in the mortgage. The mortgaged properties were auctioned. W/N Respondent Judge erred in dismissing the case because the document
Private Respondent filed a petition to release in her favor the amount earned in the did not have the required one-peso documentary stamp.
money market investment which was subsequently granted by the court. The court
issued a writ of execution against Petitioner’s property. Private Respondent filed an ex HELD:
parte motion praying that five branches of the bank pay her the total amount of the Yes. Had Respondent Judge been less technical and more sensible, the
money market interest, which was granted. Petitioner failed to comply with all the present proceedings and the consequent waste of time of this Court would have
said orders. The supplemental petition of the Private Respondent was marred by been avoided. By such rigidity, Respondent denied the Petitioner substantial justice.
erasures, alterations, and/or additions. Such bond was therefore rendered without He could have easily required counsel for Plaintiff to buy the documentary stamp
force and effect. Private Respondent contends that the alterations were all made by and affix it to the special power of attorney and it would not have taken ten minutes.
the insurance company itself since there were no ready-made forms available. The Respondent Judge lost sight of the fact that even the Rules of Court themselves,
fortified by jurisprudence, mandate a liberal construction of the rules and pleadings
ISSUE: in order to effect substantial justice.
W/N there can be legal compensation in the case at bar.
HELD: 8c, 9d, 18a, 18b
Compensation is not proper where the claim of the person asserting the set-
off against the other is neither clear nor liquidated. Compensation cannot extend to
unliquidated disputed claim arising from breach of contract. Petitioner is indebted to
private Respondent in the amount of the money market interest. The debt of P6.81M
of private Respondent to Petitioner is however in doubt. This prevents legal
compensation from taking place under Art. 1290 of the Civil Code. The filing of
insufficient or defective bond does not dissolve absolutely and unconditionally the
injunction issued. The decision of the CA is affirmed.

9c, 9d, 11b

Lacsamana v. Intermediate Appellate Court Gimenez v. Securities and Exchange Commission

Case No. 69 Case No. 52
No. L-73146-53 (August 26, 1986) No. L-68568 (December 26, 1984)
Chapter VII, Page 326, Footnote No. 181 Chapter VII, Page 326, Footnote No. 181

A decision was rendered against Petitioner by the RTC, thus counsel for Gimenez Stockbrokerage filed a motion for reconsideration before the
Petitioner filed a motion with Respondent court for 15 days extension to file a petition Commissioners of the SEC 27 days after receiving their decision. The SEC denied their
for review. However, a decision was promulgated by the Respondent court ruling motion for reconsideration for being filed out of time. The SEC ruled that the 30-day
that the period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be period provided for in Sec. 6 of P.D. 902-A was modified by Sec. 39 of the Judiciary
extended and declared the case terminated. The Respondent court cited a Revamp Law (BP 129) which provides for a period of 15 days for appealing from final
Supreme Court decision where the issue was regarding an extension to file a motion order, resolutions, awards of decisions of any court.
for reconsideration of a final order or ruling and not the question of granting a motion
for extension of time to file a petition for review. ISSUE:
W/N Sec. 39 of BP 129 applies to the SEC.
W/N Respondent court erred in terminating the case. HELD:
No. Sec. 39 of BP 129 expressly refers to “courts”. The SEC is not a court. It is
HELD: an administrative agency. Repeals by implication are not favored. The 30-day
Yes. The Court rules, for the guidance of Bench and Bar, that a motion for period fixed by P.D. 902-A, the organic law of the SEC, is still in force.
extension of time to file a petition for review under Sec. 22 of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act and Sec. 22(b) of the Interim Rules, may properly be filed with LATIN MAXIM:
and granted by the IAC (now the Court of Appeals). The Court further restates and 6c, 7a, 24a, 37, 38b
clarifies the modes and periods as follows: … (6) Period of extension of time to file
petition for review: Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Decision, an
extension of only 15 days for filing a petition for review may be granted by the CA,
save in exceptionally meritorious cases. The motion for extension of time must be
filed and the corresponding docket fee paid within the reglementary period of

2a, 5b, 27

Blanco v. Bernabe and Lawyers Cooperatuve Publishing Co. Case and Nantz v. Jugo
Case No. 36 Case No. 49
G.R. No. L-44970 (March 31, 1936) G.R. No. L-832 (October 14, 1946)
Chapter VII, Page 326, Footnote No. 183 Chapter VII, Page 327, Footnote No. 187

To comply with the requirements to file an appeal the Petitioners filed the Herein Defendants were to pay a counterbond to which they had complied
notice along with a money order for the sum of P16 to the Collector of Internal with. They furnished the Sheriff with a copy of the said counterbond to comply with
Revenue. However the Collector returned the said money order to sender for the the requirement. The Sheriff is then tasked to furnish the Plaintiff with a copy. On the
reason that he had no authority to be its depositary. With such, the appeal was not occasion when the Sheriff received the copy of such, the counsel of the Plaintiff was
deemed filed for failure to comply with the requirements. present in his office. He asked the latter if there were objections to the said
counterbond and the counsel replied none. Due to unfortunate circumstances the
ISSUE: Sheriff failed to deliver a copy of such counterbond to the counsel to formalize the
W/N the requisites were complied with and W/N the court should grant the act of furnishing a copy.
remedy prayed for by the Petitioners.
HELD: W/N the Defendants complied with the requirement of filing a counterbond
Under Sec. 76 of Act No. 190 on how appeals are perfected, “… The bond to and W/N the Plaintiff was furnished a copy of such.
be given shall be filed with the justice of peace …. In lieu of such bond the Appellant
may file with the justice a certificate of the proper official that the Appellant has HELD:
deposited P25 with the municipal treasurer (In Manila with the Collector of Internal Yes to both issues. Negligence or unavoidable circumstances should not
Revenue). The Petitioners therefore have complied with said requirements. adversely affect the Defendant under the circumstance of this case. The sole
The non-presentation of this certificate was not due to the Petitioner’s failure purpose of the counterbond is to enable the Plaintiff to see that the bond is in the
or omission but to the refusal of the Collector of Internal Revenue to receive the prescribed form and for the right amount. There was substantial compliance with this
deposit tendered by the Petitioner. The fact that the corresponding receipt therefore when their attorney was shown in the Sheriff’s office the Defendant’s counterbond.
has not been issued or the failure to present the same in due time should not affect
the remedy. LATIN MAXIM
6d, 9a, 9d
6c, 6d, 7a

C. Viuda de Ordoveza v. Raymundo Javellana v. Mirasol and Nuñez

Case No. 91 Case No. 65
G.R. No. L-45155 (July 31, 1936) G.R. No. 14881 (February 5, 1920)
Chapter VII, Page 327, Footnote No. 189 Chapter VII, Page 328, Footnote No. 192

Petitioner is the Respondent in another case and she contends that the A redemption of property from an execution sale, which had been effected
opposing party failed to file her brief within the 15-day period which makes her in behalf of a brother of the execution debtor (Julio Javellana), was attacked in this
appeal ipso facto dismissed and the CA had no authority to grant additional 5 days case as void because of a supposed collusive agreement between the
to file her brief. redemptioner (Luis Mirasol) and sheriff (Geronimo Nuñez) whereby the latter agreed
to withhold the redemption money from the creditor and to return it to the
ISSUE: redemptioner if the latter should finally succeed in establishing his title to the same
W/N the CA had authority to reinstate the appeal and to grant the Appellant property in other litigation.
an additional 3 days with which to file her brief.
HELD: W/N the redemption has been effected in good faith and in accordance
Yes. Under the Rules of Court “the court may, on motion to the Appellee and with the requirements of law.
notice the Appellant or on its own motion dismiss the bill of exceptions or the
appeal.” The word “may” implies that the matter of dismissing the appeal or not rests HELD:
within the sound discretion of the court. A liberal construction will be given to statutes governing the redemption of
property, to the end that the property of the debtor may be made to satisfy as many
LATIN MAXIM: liabilities as possible. Redemption of property sold under execution is not rendered
9d invalid by reason of the fact that the payment to the sheriff for the purpose of
redemption is effected by means of a check for the amount due. Any ordinary
creditor, or assignee as such, having a judgment subsequent to that under which the
property was sold may exercise the right of redemption. The act of the redemptioner
in redeeming the property pending the decision of those appeals was not an
officious act in any sense. It was on the contrary necessary to the reasonable
protection of his right as a subsequent judgment-creditor of Maximino Mirasol.

38b, 41

Del Rosario v. Equitable Ins. and Casualty Co., Inc. De la Cruz v. Capital Ins. & Surety Co.
Case No. 34 Case No. 156
G.R. No. L-16215 (June 29, 1963) G.R. No. L-16138 (April 29, 1961)
Chapter VII, Page 328, Footnote No. 192 Chapter VII, Page 328, Footnote No. 192

Defendant company issued Personal Accident Policy No. 7136 on the life of Eduardo de la Cruz was the holder of an accident insurance policy
Francisco del Rosario, binding itself to pay the sum of P1,000 to P3,000, as indemnity underwritten by the Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. In a boxing contest
for the death of the insured. Petitioner, father of the insured, filed a claim for participated into by the insured, Eduardo slipped and was hit by his opponent on the
payment with Defendant company when his son died of drowning after being left part of the back of the head, causing Eduardo to fall, with his head hitting the
forced to jump off the motor launch “ISLAMA” on account of fire. Defendant rope of the ring. The cause of death was reported as hemorrhage, intracranial, left.
company refused to pay more than P1,000 since they alleged that their liability was Simon de la Cruz, the father of the insured, filed a claim with the insurance company
only said amount pursuant to Sec. 1, Part I of the provisions of the policy. for payment of the indemnity under the insurance policy. Defendant company set
up the defense that the death of the insured, caused by his participation in a boxing
ISSUE: contest, was not accidental and, therefore, not covered by insurance.
How much the Defendant company should pay in indemnity for the death of
Francisco del Rosario. ISSUE:
W/N Eduardo’s death falls under the definition of the policy “against death or
HELD: disability caused by accidental means.”
The policy does not positively state any definite amount that may be
recovered in case of death by drowning. There is an ambiguity in this respect in the HELD:
policy, which ambiguity must be interpreted in favor of the insured and strictly against The terms “accident” and “accidental”, as used in insurance contracts, have
the insurer so as to allow a greater indemnity. Petitioner is entitled to recover P3,000. not acquired any technical meaning, and are construed by the courts in their
The insurance company has already paid the amount of P1,000 to Petitioner so that ordinary and common acceptation. There is no accident when a deliberate act is
there still remains a balance of P2,000 of the amount to which he is entitled to performed unless some additional, unexpected, independent and unforeseen
recover. happening occurs which produces or brings about the result of injury or death. The
failure of the Defendant company to include death resulting from a boxing match or
LATIN MAXIM: other sports among the prohibitive risks leads to the conclusion that it did not intend
11a, 38 to limit or exempt itself from the liability for such death.

3, 25a, 30a

Ty Vs. First National Surety & Assurance Co., Inc. Capati v. Ocampo
Case No. 156 Case No. 46
G.R. No. L-16138 (April 29, 1961) G.R. No. L-28742 (April 30, 1982)
Chapter VII, Page 328, Footnote No. 192 Chapter VIII, Page 330, Footnote No. 8

Plaintiff Diosdado C. Ty insured himself in 18 local insurance companies, Plaintiff, a resident of Pampanga, entered into a sub-contract with the
among which being the eight above named Defendants, which issued to him Defendant, a resident of Naga City. The Defendant completed a construction job
personal accident policies. On December 24, 1953, a fire broke out which totally for the Plaintiff. However, the construction was completed on a date later than what
destroyed the Broadway Cotton Factory. Fighting his way out of the factory, Plaintiff was agreed in their contract. Hence, Plaintiff filed in the CFI of Pampanga an action
was injured on the left hand by a heavy object which caused temporary total for recovery of consequential damages due to the delay. Defendant filed a motion
disability of his left hand. Plaintiff filed the corresponding notice of accident and to dismiss the complaint on the ground that venue of action was improperly laid. The
notice of claim with all of the Defendants to recover indemnity under Part II of the CFI of Pampanga dismissed the Plaintiff's complaint on ground of improper venue.
policy but the Defendants rejected plaintiff's claim for indemnity for the reason that
there being no severance of amputation of the left hand, the disability suffered by ISSUE:
him was not covered by his policy. W/N the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of improper venue was
W/N it is necessary that there should be an amputation of the left hand of the HELD:
Plaintiff before he can recover on the insurance policies. No. The rule on venue of personal actions cognizable by the CFI is found in
Sec. 2(b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, which provides that such "actions may be
HELD: commenced and tried where the Defendant or any of the Defendants resides or
The clear and express conditions of the insurance policies define partial may be found, or where the Plaintiff or any of the Plaintiffs resides, at the election of
disability as loss of either hand by amputation through the bones of the wrist. There the Plaintiff." The word "may" is merely permissive and operates to confer discretion
was no such amputation in the case at bar. All that was found by the trial court, upon a party. Under ordinary circumstances, the term "may be" connotes possibility;
which is not disputed on appeal, was that the physical injuries "caused temporary it does not connote certainty. "May" is an auxillary verb indicating liberty,
total disability of plaintiff's left hand." In addition, the agreement contained in the opportunity, permission or possibility.
insurance policies is the law between the parties. As the terms of the policies are
clear, express and specific that only amputation of the left hand should be LATIN MAXIM:
considered as a loss thereof, an interpretation that would include the mere fracture 6c, 25a, b
or other temporary disability not covered by the policies would certainly be

6b, 7a, 9c

Chartered Bank v. National Government Auditing Office Guiao v. Figueroa

Case No. 58 Case No. 121
G.R. No. L-38513 (March 31, 1987) G.R. No. L-6481 (May 17, 1954)
Chapter VIII, Page 331, Footnote No. 10 Chapter VIII, Page 333, Footnote No. 17

Iloilo city branch of Petitioner bank was accepting postal money order from In the trial of People v. Gopez, the provincial fiscal introduced Porfirio Dizon
the general public since 1946. These orders were presented to the Iloilo city office for and Emiliano Manalo as witnesses for the State. After the reinvestigation, an
payment and if said office could not pay in full, they would issue receipts for their amended information was filed, and two new accused were included, namely, Jesus
remaining balance. On 1968, the Bureau of Posts issued an unnumbered circular: Guiao and Eulogio Serrano. But Dizon and Manalo were not included. In view of the
"Memorandum of Understanding Covering Cashing and Clearing of Money Orders," failure of the provincial fiscal to include these two persons, the action for mandamus
effective October 1, 1968, involving the installation of a new postal money order was filed by Jesus Guiao to compel the fiscal to include Dizon and Manalo as
system which requires that all commercial banks, regardless of location, must clear all accused in his information.
postal money orders they have received and paid with the Central Bank at Manila.
Petitioner bank continued its transactions with the post office under the old practice ISSUE:
through the latter's Acting Cashier beyond October 1, 1968. The post office said that W/N a fiscal may be compelled by mandamus to include in an information
the arrangements made by the acting cashier and the Petitioner bank were private, persons who appear to be responsible for the crime charged therein.
unauthorized arrangements and any claim for settlement of any unpaid money
orders should be directed against the said cashier. HELD:
Yes. Sec. 1 of Rule 106 of the Rules of Court taken from Act No. 2709 states
ISSUE: that, “Every prosecution for a crime shall be in the name of the United States against
W/N the unnumbered circular and the undated memorandum of all persons who appear to be responsible therefor, except in the cases determined in
understanding are directory and permissive in nature. Sec. 2 of this Act.” A perusal of Act No. 2709 discloses the legislative intent to require
that all persons who appear to be responsible for an offense should be included in
HELD: the information. The use of the word "shall" and of the phrase "except in cases
Respondents are correct by saying that the purposes of the new postal determined" shows Sec. 1 is mandatory, not merely directory.
money order system negate the contention that said circular and memorandum are
not mandatory in nature and that they are for the convenience of commercial banks LATIN MAXIM:
operating in the Manila area only. 6c, 9a, 25a

7a, 9a, 36a, 36b

Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (South) Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 153 Case No. 95
G.R. No. 117188 (August 7, 1997) G.R. No. 102858 (July 28, 1997)
Chapter VIII, Page 334, Footnote No. 22 Chapter VIII, Page 334, Footnote No. 23

The Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association Inc. (LGVHAI) was registered Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration
with Respondent Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC) as the sole of a land title. During the pendency of the said petition, he died and his heirs were
homeowners’ organization in the said subdivision but it did not file its corporate by- represented by Josefa Abistado as a guardian ad litem in order to continue the
laws. Later, it was discovered that there were two other organizations within the petition. The trial court dismissed the petition “for want of jurisdiction”. However, it
subdivision: the North and South Associations. Respondent HIGC then informed the was found that the applicant had been in open, continuous and exclusive possession
president of LGVHAI that the latter has been automatically dissolved because of of the subject land since 1938. The reason for the dismissal is that the applicant failed
non-submission of its by-laws as required by the Corporation Code. This resulted in to publish the notice of Initial Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation pursuant
the registration of Petitioner association. LGVHAI complained and got a favorable to a law. The CA set aside the decision of the trial court. Thus, Petitioner brought the
result from Respondent HIGC declaring the registration of Petitioner association case to the Supreme Court.
cancelled and Respondent CA subsequently affirmed the said decision. Hence,
Petitioner association filed a petition for certiorari. ISSUE:
Whether the newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an
ISSUE: original land registration case is mandatory or directory.
W/N the failure of a corporation to file its by-laws within one month from the
date of its incorporation results in its automatic dissolution. HELD:
It is mandatory. The law used the term "shall" in prescribing the work to be
HELD: done by the Commissioner of Land Registration upon the latter's receipt of the court
No. The legislature’s intent is not to automatically dissolve a corporation for its order setting the time for initial hearing. The said word denotes an imperative and
failure to pass its by-laws. The word “must” in a statute is not always imperative but it thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute. While such literal mandate is
may be consistent with an exercise of discretion. The language of the statute should not an absolute rule in statutory construction, as its import ultimately depends upon its
be considered as a whole while ascertaining the intent of the legislature in using the context in the entire provision, it is held that in the present case the term must be
word “must” or “shall”. understood in its normal mandatory meaning in order to uphold the norms of due
9c, 25a, 36a, 38b, b LATIN MAXIM:
6c, 9a

Bersabal v. Salvador Republic Planers Bank v. Agana Sr.

Case No. 34 Case No. 133
G.R. No. L-35910 (July 21, 1978) G. R. No. 51765 (March 3, 1997)
Chapter VIII, Page 335, Footnote No. 25

Private Respondents filed an ejectment suit against the Petitioner. The Private Respondents filed in court a quo, an action for specific performance
subsequent decision was appealed by the Petitioner and during its pendency, the to compel petitioner to redeem 800 preferred shares of stock with a face value of
court issued an order stating that “…counsels for both parties are given 30 days from P8,000.00 and to pay 1% quarterly interest thereon as quarterly dividend owing them
receipt of this order within which to file their memoranda in order for this case to be under the terms and conditions of the certificates of stock. The court a quo rendered
submitted for decision by the court.” After receipt, Petitioner filed a motion ex parte judgment in favor of Private Respondents.
to submit memorandum within 30 days from receipt of notice of submission of the
transcript of stenographic notes taken during the hearing of the case which was ISSUE:
granted by the court. But the Respondent judge issued an order dismissing the case W/N Respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
for failure to prosecute Petitioner’s appeal. Petitioner filed a motion for excess or lack of jurisdiction in compelling Petitioner bank to redeem Private
reconsideration citing the submitted ex parte motion but the court denied it. Respondents’ preferred shares
ISSUE: Yes. Respondent Judge, in ruling that Petitioner must redeem the shares in
W/N the mere failure of an Appellant to submit the mentioned memorandum question, stated that, “On the question of the redemption by the Defendant of said
would empower the CFI to dismiss the appeal on the ground of failure to prosecute. preferred shares of stock, the very wordings of the terms and conditions in said stock
certificates clearly allows the same.” What Respondent Judge failed to recognize
HELD: was that while the stock certificate does allow redemption, the option to do so was
The court is not empowered by law to dismiss the appeal on the mere failure clearly vested in the Petitioner Bank. The redemption therefore is clearly the type
of an Appellant to submit his memorandum. The law provides that “Courts… shall known as "optional". Furthermore, the terms and conditions set forth therein use the
decide… cases on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted from the city… word "may". It is a settled doctrine in statutory construction that the word "may"
courts: Provided… parties may submit memoranda… if so requested…” It cannot be denotes discretion, and cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect.
interpreted otherwise than that the submission of memoranda is optional.
LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 6b, 7a, 30b, 36a

Phil. Consumers Foundation , Inc. v. Nat’l Telecommunications Commission Phil. Consumers Foundation, Inc. v. NTC and PLDT (Resolution)
Case No. 121 Case No. 94
G.R. No. L-63318 (November 25, 1983) G.R. No. L-63318 (August 18, 1984)

Respondent Commission approved a revised schedule for Subscriber Respondent Commission filed a manifestation that it is joining Private
Investment Plan (SIP) filed by Private Respondent. Petitioner states that SIP schedule Respondent in its second motion for reconsideration and adopting it as its own. The
presented by the Private Respondent is pre-mature and, therefore, illegal and decision promulgated interprets the rule-making authority delegated in Section 2 of
baseless, because the Respondent Commission has not yet promulgated the P.D. 217 to the then Department of Public Works, Transportation and
required rules and regulations implementing Sec. 2 of P.D. 217 which provides, “The Communications as mandatory, which construction is not supported by the actual
Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communications through its Board phraseology of said Section 2.
of Communications and/or appropriate agency shall see to it that the herein
declared policies for the telephone industry are immediately implemented and for ISSUE:
this purpose pertinent rules and regulations may be promulgated ...” W/N the previous decision rendered making it mandatory to set rules and
ISSUE: regulations implementing P.D. 217 should be reconsidered.
W/N Respondent Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion.
HELD: Yes. The basic canon of statutory interpretation is that the word used in the law
Yes. P.D. 217 deals with matters so alien, innovative and untested such that must be given its ordinary meaning, unless a contrary intent is manifest from the law
existing substantive and procedural laws would not be applicable. Thus, the SIP was itself. Hence, the phrase "may be promulgated" should not be construed to mean
so set up precisely to ensure the financial viability of public telecommunications "shall" or "must".
companies which in turn assures the enjoyment of the population at minimum cost
the benefits of a telephone facility. Without promulgation of rules and regulation LATIN MAXIM:
there would be confusion among the rights of Private Respondent, the consumers 6c, 6d, 9f, 30b, 24, 36, 39c
and the government itself. The plan to expand the company program and/or
improve its service is laudable, but the expenses should not be shouldered by the
telephone subscribers. Considering the multi-million profits of the company, the cost
of expansion and/or improvement should come from part of its huge profits.


8b, 9d, 11b, 12a


Diokno v. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation Berces v. Guingona, et. al.

Case No. 93 Case No. 33
G.R. No. L-4712 (July 11, 1952) G.R. No. 112099 (February 21, 1995)
Chapter VIII, Page 336, Footnote No. 32 Chapter VIII, Page 337, Footnote No. 34

Petitioner, the holder of a back pay certificate of indebtedness issued under Petitioner filed two administrative cases against Respondent mayor of Tiwi,
RA 304, sought to compel Respondent company to accept his back pay certificate Albay for 1) abuse of authority; and 2) dishonesty, with the Sangguiniang
as payment of his loan from the latter. His basis was Sec. 2 of RA 304, which provides Panlalawigan. Respondent mayor was convicted, and accordingly, suspended in
that “investment funds or banks or other financial institutions owned or controlled by both cases. Respondent mayor appealed to the Office of the President and prayed
the government shall subject to availability of loanable funds … accept or discount for stay of execution under Sec. 67(b) of the LGC. The Office of the President stayed
at not more than two per centum per annum for ten years such certificate” for execution, citing Sec. 68 of RA 7160 and Sec. 6 of A.O. No. 18. According to
certain specified purposes. Respondent company contended however that the Petitioner, the governing law is RA 7160, which contains a mandatory provision that
word “shall” used in this particular section of the law is merely directory. The lower an appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final and executory.
court sustained Respondent company. Petitioner further contends that A.O. No. 18 was repealed by RA 7160.

W/N Petitioner can use his back pay certificate to pay for his loan to W/N R.A. 7160 repealed A.O. No. 18.
Respondent company.
HELD: No. Sec. 530(f), RA 7160 did not expressly repeal Sec. 6, A.O. No. 18 because
No. It is true that in its ordinary signification, the word “shall” is imperative. it failed to identify or designate the laws on executive orders that are intended to be
However, the rule is not absolute; it may be construed as “may” when required by repealed. If there was any repeal, it was by implication which is not favored. In the
the context or by the intention of the statute. The modifier, “at not more than two absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a
per centum per annum for ten years.”, the interest to be charged, that the verb- prior law unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists between the
phrase is mandatory because not only the law uses “at not more” but the legislative two. There is none in this case. The first sentence of Sec. 68 provides that “an appeal
purpose and intent, to conserve the value of the back pay certificate for the benefit shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or executory.” It gives discretion to
of the holders, for whose benefit the same have been issued, can be carried out by reviewing appeals to stay execution. The term “shall” may be read mandatory or
fixing a maximum limit for discounts. But as to when the discounting or acceptance directory, depending upon consideration of the entire provision where it is found.
shall be made, the context and the sense demand a contrary interpretation. If the
acceptance or discount of the certificate is to be “subject” to the condition of the LATIN MAXIM:
availability of loanable funds, it is evident the legislature intended that the 25a, 26, 50
acceptance shall be allowed on the condition that there are “available loanable
funds.” In other words, acceptance or discount is to be permitted only if there are
loanable funds.

6c, 25a, 26

Mers Shoes Manufacturing, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al. Fule v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 81 Case No. 48
G.R. No. 123669 (February 27, 1998) G.R. No. L-79094 (June 22, 1988)
Chapter VIII, Page 337, Footnote No. 35 Chapter VIII, Page 337, Footnote No. 37

Petitioner hired Respondent workers as piece rate workers. Alleging serious Petitioner, an agent of the Towers Assurance Corporation, issued and made
business decline, Petitioner barred its workers from entering the company to work. The out check No. 26741 in favor of Roy Nadera. Said check was dishonored for the
workers challenged the legality of Petitioner’s stoppage of operations. The Labor reason that the said checking account was already closed, thus in violation of BP 22,
Arbiter found the shutdown with cause but without the required notice, and ordered the Bouncing Checks Law. Upon the hearing, prosecution presented its evidence
Petitioner to pay indemnity and separation pay. Petitioner appealed to Respondent and the Petitioner waived his right. Instead, he submitted a memorandum confirming
NLRC but sought a reduction of the cash or surety bond. Despite the reduction the Stipulation of Facts. He was convicted by the trial court, and on appeal, the
granted, Petitioner still failed to post bond within 10 days, resulting to the dismissal of Appellate Court.
appeal for failure to perfect it.
ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC based on the Stipulation
W/N Respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion. of Facts that was not signed by the Petitioner nor his counsel.

No. Under Art. 223 of the Labor Code, an appeal by the employer may be The CA erred. Case is re-opened to receive evidence of Petitioner. Sec. 4 of
perfected only upon posting of cash or surety bond in an amount equivalent to the the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides, “No agreement or admission made or
monetary award. Perfection of appeal is jurisdictional and non-compliance with entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the
such legal requirements is fatal. The word “only” makes it perfectly clear that the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him and his counsel”.
posting of bond is to be the exclusive means by which an employer’s appeal may be Because of the word “shall”, in its language, the rule is mandatory. Negative
perfected. words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative
are merely directory. Therefore, the signature of the Petitioner and the counsel is
LATIN MAXIM: mandatory. Also, penal statues are to be liberally construed in favor of the accused.
25a, 26

McGee v. Republic Penid v. Virata

Case No. 174 Case No. 101
G.R. No. L-5387 (April 29, 1954) G.R. No. L-44004 (March 25, 1983)
Chapter VIII, Page 337, Footnote No. 37 Chapter VIII, Page 338, Footnote No. 40

Petitioner, an American citizen married to Leonarda Crisostomo, wants to Confidential Information No. 28 of the BIR was filed by the Petitioners. It is a
adopt her children by her first husband. However, he is barred from doing so under sworn statement that listed the shipping companies and agents who had been
Art. 335 of the old Civil Code which states that “those who have legitimate, falsely declaring their gross earnings – on the basis of a parity rate of P2.00 to US $1.00
legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fiction” – defrauding the Philippine Government of millions of pesos in taxes. Further,
cannot adopt. Petitioner and Leonarda have one legitimate child. Despite Art. 335, Petitioners divulged other cases of erroneous conversion not listed in the Confidential
the trial court ruled in favor of the adoption, invoking Art. 338 which states that “a Information. One of these was Pan Fil Co. Inc. Now the Petitioners seek their 25%
step-child, by the step-father or step-mother” can be adopted. reward taken from the total revenue collected from shipping companies in payment
for their deficiencies – as provided by RA 2338.
W/N a husband having a legitimate child may adopt a step-child. ISSUE:
W/N the Petitioners could claim reward from Pan Fil Co. Inc, a company
HELD: which is not included in the Confidential Information.
No. One strong argument presented by the trial court in upholding the
adoption is that to hold otherwise would render Art. 338 meaningless and a HELD:
surplusage. However, it must be noted that Art. 335 and Art. 338 should be Yes. According to Sec. 4 of RA 2338, “In order to entitle an informer to a
considered in relation to each other. That a parent can adopt a step-child is limited reward, the information given by him must lead to or be instrumental in the discovery
by Art. 335 that said parent cannot have a legitimate child in order to qualify as an of the fraud or violation … and results in the recovery of collection of revenues ….”
adopter. One principle behind this is to protect the successional rights of the Not only did the BIR rely on the Confidential Information submitted by the
legitimate child. In addition, under the laws of statutory construction, negative words Petitioners for their investigation, but also on the categorical statement that other
and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are shipping companies falsely declared their gross earnings, which led to further
merely directory. Art. 335 is phrased in a negative manner: cannot adopt. While Art. investigations and, consequently, recovery of collection. Therefore, this information
338 is positive: the following may be adopted.” was instrumental in the discovery of the fraud or violation.
In jurisprudence, statues offering rewards must be liberally construed in favor
LATIN MAXIM: of informers and with regard to the purpose for which they are intended.
6c, 9d

Pahilan v. Tabalba, et al. Pimentel v. Festejo

Case No. 96 Case No. 124
G.R. No. 110170 (February 21, 1994) G.R. No. L-2327 (January 11, 1949)
Chapter VIII, Page 342, Footnote No. 63 Chapter VIII, Page 342, Footnote No. 64

Petitioner and Respondent were candidates for Mayor of Guinsiliban, Festejo was proclaimed Mayor of Santa Lucia with Appellant protesting.
Camiguin. Respondent Tabalba was proclaimed Mayor. Petitioner Pahilan filed an Appellant contends that the lower court erred in not crediting to him the 59 ballots
election protest although the docket fees he paid were insufficient. The trial court which would have made him win. Appellant’s name in the 59 ballots were written on
dismissed the election protest for non-payment on time of the required fees for filing different lines such as those corresponding to vice-mayor, member of the provincial
an initiatory pleading. Within the 5-day period to appeal, Petitioner filed a “verified board or councilor. Appellant claimed that his name was only misplaced but the
appeal” brief. But the Clerk of Court said that his office did not receive any “notice intention to elect him as mayor was apparent.
of appeal” from Petitioner. Petitioner’s appeal was then dismissed for failure to
appeal within the prescribed period. ISSUE:
W/N Appellant can claim as votes in his favor ballots with his name which
ISSUE: does not appear written in the space reserved for mayor.
1. W/N the “verified appeal” was validly dismissed.
2. W/N the trial judge validly dismissed the petition of protest of Petitioner for HELD:
non-payment on time of the required fees. No. For any ballot to be counted for a candidate for mayor, it is indispensable
that his name be written by the voter in the ballot and cannot be mistaken by a
HELD: person who, as provided by the Constitution, is able to read. A name can be
1. No. The notice of appeal can be validly substituted by an appeal brief. The counted for any office only when it is written within the space indicated upon the
filing and approval of the record on appeal necessarily involves the filing of the ballot for the vote for such office. It is impossible to count a ballot as vote for a
notice of appeal. The RTC was sent copies by registered mail within the prescribed candidate for mayor, when his name is clearly written in the space reserved for
period, and is assumed to be received in the regular course of the mail, filed as of the another office.
date of mailing. Considering that in 59 ballots claimed by Appellant in this appeal his name
2. No. The docket fee was paid although insufficient. Statutes providing for does not appear written in the space reserved for mayor, he cannot claim them as
election contests are to be liberally construed that the will of the people in the votes in his favor as candidate for mayor.
choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere technical objections.
LATIN MAXIM: 6d, 7b, 43
9a, 9c, 9d, 40b

Roxas v. Rafferty Serfino v. Court of Appeals

Case No. 264 Case No. 145
G.R. No. L-12182 (March 27, 1918) G.R. No. 40858 (September 15, 1987)
Chapter VIII, Page 345, Footnote No. 75 Chapter VIII, Page 345, Footnote No. 75

Plaintiffs owned a parcel of land. In the latter part of 1913, the construction of A parcel of land, consisting of 21.1676 hectares situated in Sagay, Negros
a reinforced concrete building was begun. It was finished in all respects on February Occidental, was patented in the name of Pacifico Casamayor, under Homestead
15, 1915. Patent No. 44139. Upon registration of said patent, OCT No. 1839 was issued by said
The city assessor and collector of Manila, under the date of December 1, office in the name of Pacifico Casamayor. In 1945, Casamayor sold the land in favor
1914, sent Plaintiffs notice, received by them on December 25, 1914, requiring them of Nemesia Baltazar. Apparently, OCT No. 1839 was lost during the war and upon the
to declare the new improvements for assessments for the year 1915. Plaintiffs paid petition of Baltazar, the CFI of Negros ordered its reconstitution in the name of
the amount of the taxes, which amounted to P3,000, under protest. Suit was begun Casamayor. On the same day, TCT No. 57-N was issued in the name of Nemesia
in the CFI of Manila to recover this sum with interest at the legal rate from the date of Baltazar but after the cancellation of OCT No. 14-R. In 1951, Baltazar sold the
payment. property to Respondent Lopez Sugar Central, which did not present the documents
for registration until December 1964 to the Office of Registry of Deeds. Said office
ISSUE: refused registration upon its discovery that the same property was covered by
W/N the assessment was legal. another certificate of title, TCT No. 28985, in the name of Petitioner.

No. The assessor cannot make a valid assessment unless he has given proper W/N the purchase by Respondent Lopez Sugar Central of the lot in question
notice. The law requires that the assessor should have notified the Plaintiffs during was null and void from the beginning.
November. His attempted notification on December 25, 1914, was not given during
the time fixed by statute, thus there was no legal assessment of the Roxas Building for HELD:
the year 1915. No, applying Sec. 118 of C.A. No. 141, which prohibits the alienation of
Furthermore, the city assessor and collector were under the obligation to add homestead lots to private individuals within 5 years from the date of the issuance of
any completed improvements to the assessment list. The city assessor and collector the patent, and not Sec. 121 which governs sale to corporations. Since the grant was
could not prematurely perform this duty on improvements not yet completed. more than 5 years before, the transfer to Nemesia Baltazar was valid and legal.


6c, 19 37b, 43

Quijano v. Development Bank of the Philippines Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections

Case No. Case No. 137
G. R. No. 26419 (October 16, 1970) G.R. No. 119976 (September 18, 1995)
Chapter VIII, Page 347, Footnote No.84
Petitioner filed an urban estate loan with respondent which was approved. FACTS:
The loan was to be released in installments. The outstanding obligation of the Petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative
petitioners with respondent, including interests, amounted to P13,983.59. Petitioner of the First District of Leyte. Private respondent Montejo, the incumbent
wrote the respondent offering to pay in the amount of P14,000 for his outstanding Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position,
obligation, out of the proceeds of his back pay pursuant to RA No. 897 (RA 897). filed a “Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification” with respondent COMELEC
Respondent advised petitioners of the non-acceptance of the offer on the ground alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency.
that the loan was not incurred before or subsisting on June 20, 1953 when RA 897 was
approved. ISSUE:
W/N petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of
ISSUE: Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the 1995 elections.
W/N petitioner’s obligation is subsisting at the time of the approval of RA 897.
HELD: Yes. Residency qualification pertains to domicile. As a minor, petitioner
No. The provision expressly provides that the obligations must be subsisting at followed the domicile of her parents in Tacloban, Leyte. As domicile, once acquired,
the time of the approval of RA 897. Hence, when such backpay certificates are it is retained until a new one is gained. In spite of the being born in Manila, Tacloban
offered in payment to a government-owned corporation of obligation thereto which was her domicile of origin by operation of law. Parenthetically, when she married
was not subsisting at the time of the enactment of said Act on June 20, 1953, such then Congressman Marcos, petitioner was obliged, by virtue of Art. 110 of the Civil
corporation may not legally be compelled to accept the certificates. The Court Code, to follow her husband’s actual place of residence fixed by him. Although Mr.
cannot see any room for interpretation or construction in the clear and unambiguous Marcos has different places of residence, and even if he had designated one, what
language of the provision of law. petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. Therefore, she did not lose
her domicile of origin.
28, 7a, 6c, 1 LATIN MAXIM:
25a, 37, 39a

Portillo v. Salvani Querubin v. Court of Appeals

Case No. 243 Case No. 247
G.R. No. L-32181 (March 10, 1930) G.R. No. L-2581 (December 2, 1948)
Chapter III, Page 101, Footnote No. 130 Chapter VIII, Page 332, Footnote No. 14

Appellant Salvani won the elections in 1928 for the office of provincial Petitioner defeated Felipe Mamuri in the election for the mayoralty of Ilagan.
governor of Antique. Appellee Portillo, his nearest opponent, filed an election protest Mamuri filed an election protest in the court, lost and filed an appeal thereafter. The
on July 9, 1928. Decision was rendered on August 15, 1929 declaring appellee Portillo appeal was not acted upon for three months hence the petition to dismiss the case
the winner. for the court had lost jurisdiction.

W/N the decision by the trial judge declaring appellee Portillo is valid. W/N the CA had lost their jurisdiction to decide the appeal.

The decision is void for want of jurisdiction. The Election Law provides that all No. Sec. 178 of the Election Code provides that appeals from decisions in
proceedings in an electoral contest shall be terminated within one year. Legislative election contests should be decided within three months after filing. However, this
history of the said legislation reveals that the shift of the tenor of the statute from provision is directory in nature since to apply a mandatory character would defeat
silence to mild admonition to stronger suggestion and finally to an emphatic and the purpose of due process of the law. The dismissal in such a case will constitute a
explicit provision suggests the legislative intent to make the provision mandatory. miscarriage of justice. The doctrine in Portillo v. Salvani should be abandoned.
One year having already elapsed, the proceeding is deemed terminated and the
court loses jurisdiction rendering any subsequent decision void for want of jurisdiction. LATIN MAXIM:
1, 2, 5b, 18b, 39b
6c, 7a, 7b, 9a, 43, 45, b2

Nilo v. Court of Appeals Salcedo and Ignacio v. Carpio and Carreon

Case No. 189 Case No. 138
G.R. No. L-34586 (April 2, 1984) G.R. No. L-4495 (June 6, 1951)
Chapter III, Page 89, Footnote No. 59

Private respondent Gatchalian is the owner of a parcel of Riceland at Petitioners were appointed members of the Board of Dental Examiners. RA
Bulacan with an area of 2 hectares. Petitioner elected to use the leasehold system. 546 was approved and Sec. 1 thereof amended Sec. 10 of the Reorganization Act
Private respondent then filed for ejection citing “personal cultivation” on March 7, No. 4007. By virtue of this law, a Board of Dental Examiners was appointed by the
1968. Private respondent won the case and petitioner filed an appeal citing that RA President, whose terms directly overlapped and conflicted with that of the
3844 was amended on September 10, 1971 removing “personal cultivation” from the petitioners.
grounds for ejectment.
ISSUE: W/N it was the intention of Congress, in enacting RA 546, to abolish all the
W/N the amendment of RA 6389 has retroactive effect. pre-existing Boards of Examiners existing after the time of the enactment thereof.

No. Art. 4 of the New Civil Code provides that laws shall have no retroactive Appointment of the respondents is valid. It is obvious that it is the intention of
effect unless it is explicitly provided. The legislation involves social justice, however Congress to do so, because the provisions of said Act are inconsistent with those of
the landowners being holders of only small parcels of land should also be entitled to the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Act No. 4007.
social justice. Furthermore, to rule against the small landowners would be thwarting In the case of Camacho vs. Court of Industrial Relations it was held that it is a
legislative intent of creating independent and self-reliant farmers. well established rule recognized by all authorities without exception, that a
retrospective or retroactive law is that which creates a new obligation, imposes a
LATIN MAXIM: new duty or attaches a new disability in respect to a transaction already past; but
9a, 46a, 46b that status is not made retrospective because it draws on antecedent facts for its
operation, or in other words part of the requirements for its action and application is
drawn from a time antedating its passage.

5a, 9c, 46, 49

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Lingayen Gulf Electric Power Co., Inc. Gallardo v. Borromeo
Case No. 78 Case No. 50
G.R. No. L-23771 (August 4, 1988) G.R. No. L-36007 (May 25, 1988)
Chapter IX, Page 355, Footnote No. 14

The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) assessed and demanded from Petitioner filed to terminate the leasehold of the respondent tenant so he
respondent deficiency franchise taxes and surcharges applying the franchise tax rate (plaintiff) may cultivate it himself as he had retired from his government job as a letter
of 5% as prescribed in Sec. 259 of the National Internal Revenue Code, instead of the carrier. Upon appeal, the CA applying Sec. 7 of RA 6389, held that the landowner’s
lower rates as provided in the municipal franchises. Pending the case, RA 3843 was desire to cultivate the land himself is not a valid ground for dispossessing the tenant.
passed, granting to the respondent a legislative franchise for the operation of light,
heat, and power. This law lowered the franchise tax rate to 2%. ISSUE:
W/N the CA correctly gave retroactive application to Sec. 7 of RA 6389.
W/N RA 3843 is unconstitutional for being violative of the “uniformity and HELD:
equality of taxation” clause of the Constitution. No. The applicable law when petitioner filed his complaint was RA 3844 which
provided a ground for the ejectment of the tenant should the landowner have a
HELD: desire to personally cultivate the landholding. The newer law, R.A. 6389 eliminated
It is valid. Sec. 259 of the Tax Code was never intended to have a universal this ground.
application. RA 3843 did not only fix and specify a franchise tax of 2% on its gross In applying Art. 4 of the New Civil Code, RA 6389 cannot be given retroactive
receipts, but made it “in lieu of any and all taxes, all laws to the contrary effect in the absence of a statutory provision for retroactivity or a clear implication of
notwithstanding,” thus leaving no room for doubt regarding the legislative intent. the law to that effect. Since Congress failed to express an intention to make said RA
Charters or special laws granted and enacted by the Legislature are in the retroactive, it may not apply to ejectment cases then already pending adjudication
nature of private contracts. They do not constitute a part of the machinery of the by the courts.
general government. The Legislature considers and makes provision for all the
circumstances of a particular case. LATIN MAXIM:
RA 3843 specifically provided for the retroactive effect of the law. 6c, 46e

6c, 9c, 46, 49

Cebu Portland Cement v. CIR Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Filipinas Compaňia de Seguros
Case No. 52 Case No. 76
G.R. No. 20563 (October 29, 1968) G.R. No. 14880 (April 29, 1960)
Chapter IX, Page 355, Footnote No. 15 Chapter IV, Page 134, Footnote No. 41

The case involves petitioner’s claim for refund of sales tax paid from Respondent, an insurance company, was engaged in business as a real
November 1954 to March 1955, and ad valorem tax paid from April 1955 to estate dealer. RA 1612 amended the National Internal Revenue Code and provided
September 1956 from the sale of APO Portland cement produced by petitioner. for a scale of graduated rates; this took effect on August of 1956. Petitioner assessed
Since 1952, however, petitioner had been protesting the imposition of the sales tax on against the respondent taxes (to which the insurance company has already paid in
its APO Portland cement, and on January 1953, it also protested the payment of the full on January 1956) for the year 1956 based on RA 1612. Respondent appealed to
ad valorem taxes. Petitioner claimed for refund and brought its case to the Court of the Court of Tax Appeals the erroneous assessment of the petitioner and was granted
Tax Appeals. Petitioner contends that the percentage taxes collected by respondent a decision in favor of it.
are refundable since under RA 1229 (effective June 1955), producers of cement are
exempt from the payment of said tax. The Court of Tax Appeals ruled otherwise. ISSUE:
W/N RA 1612 should be applied retroactively.
Whether RA 1229 applies prospectively or retroactively. HELD:
No. As a rule, laws have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.
HELD: The rule applies with greater force to the case at bar, considering that RA 1612,
A statute operates prospectively only and never retroactively, unless the which imposes the new and higher taxes, expressly provides that said Act shall take
legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either by the express terms of the effect upon its approval.
statute or by necessary implication. In every case of doubt, the doubt must be
resolved against the retrospective effect. While the purpose of the amendment, as LATIN MAXIM:
mentioned in the explanatory note to the bill, was not only to “accelerate the 46a, 46c, 46e
collection of mining royalties and ad valorem taxes but also clarify the doubt of the
tax-paying public on the interpretative scope of the two terms,” it certainly could not
have been the intention of the lawmakers to unsettle previously consummated
transactions between the taxpayer and the Government.

46a, 46c, 46e

Laceste v. Santos Balatbat v. Court of Appeals and Passion

Case No. 140 Case No. 29
G.R. No. 36886 (February 1, 1932) G.R. No. L-36378 (January 27, 1992)
Chapter IX, Page 351, Footnote No. 1 Chapter IX, Page 363, Footnote No. 73

Petitioner committed rape along with Nicolas Lachica. The crime took effect Petitioner has an agricultural land in Sta. Ana, Pampanga containing 18,490
before the effectivity of the RPC. However, Lachica married the victim, Magdalena square meters of land owned by Garcia. Garcia sold the land to private respondent
de Ocampo, and was accordingly relieved from criminal prosecution. The petitioner Pasion and had declared it for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 126.
continued to serve his sentence but now prays for the Court to set him at liberty Private respondent Pasion claims that he will cultivate the land pursuant to Sec. 36(1)
through the writ of habeas corpus, pleading that there is no sufficient legal ground for of RA 3844. However, petitioner maintains that the case should have been decided
continuing his imprisonment any longer based on the last sentence of Art. 344 of the in light of Sec. 7 of RA 6389 since, in view of the appeal the respondent still does not
RPC. have the vested right to acquire the land.

W/N the last paragraph of Art. 344 of the RPC has retroactive effect. W/N Sec. 7 of RA 6389 should be given retroactive effect.

Yes. The petition for habeas corpus was granted. The principle granting to No. Art. 4 of the Civil Code provides that there should be no retroactive
the accused in certain cases an exception to the general rule that laws shall not be effect unless otherwise provided by law. In order for a law to have a retroactive
retroactive when the law in question favors the accused applies. Conscience and effect it should have a provision stating its retroactivity, otherwise nothing should be
good law justify this exception. understood which is not embodied in the law. Furthermore the law is a rule
established to guide our action with no binding effect until it is enacted, thus laws
LATIN MAXIM: have no effect in past times but laws look forward in the future.
20, 46b, 46e

People v. Zeta San Jose v. Rehabilitation Finance Corp.

Case No. 232 Case No. 271
G.R. No. L-7140 (December 22, 1955) G.R. No. L-7766 (November 29, 1955)
Chapter VI, Page 266, Footnote No. 72 Chapter IX, Page 369, Footnote No. 104

Appellant was found guilty of violating RA 145 for having collected fees in Plaintiff presented this petition to recover the interest she supposedly has in
excess of 5% of the amount received by the claimant as compensation for services her pre-war loan with defendant. The basis of the suit was RA 671 amending RA 401,
rendered. At the time the agreement was made the law in force was C.A. No. 675 the former law condoning the pre-war loans and the interest corresponding from
which allowed a person to charge not more than 5% of any amount that the January 1, 1946 to March 14, 1951. The lower court decided for defendant to return
claimant would collect. The trial court in convicting appellant held that the the interest to the plaintiff.
agreement for the payment of a 5% fee on the amount collected was void and
illegal. ISSUE:
W/N the lower court was correct in imposing the return of interest to plaintiff
ISSUE: by the defendant.
W/N RA 145 has a retroactive effect.
HELD: Yes. RA 671 is made to condone only the unpaid interest. It did not include
No. It does not appear in the language of RA 145 that it should be given within its term completed payment and paid interest. Where a statute was amended
retroactive effect. There is a need of a law to tell the retroactivity of RA 145 for it to and reenacted, the amendment should be construed as if it had been included in
act on cases under the old law. Laws cannot be given retroactive effect unless it is the original act; but it could afford no retroactive effect unless plainly made so by the
specifically stated in the provision. Furthermore, strict construction on the law was terms of the amendment.
made so as not to prejudice the constitutional right of the constructor and for the law
not to have any retroactive effect. LATIN MAXIM:
20, 46e
11b, 20, 46e

People v. Sumilang Palomo Building Tenants Association v. Intermediate Appellate Court

Case No. 226 Case No. 97
G.R. No. L-49187 (December 18, 1946) G.R. No. L-68043 (October 31, 1984)
Chapter IX, Page 371, Footnote No. 111

The petitioner was convicted of the crime of arson and sentenced to the Petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Sale and Damages with
indeterminate penalty from 5 years and 4 months and 21 days of prision correctional Preliminary Injunction before the then Court of First Instance of Manila against
to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor. On appeal, both the CA and the SC affirmed respondents Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and Capitol Hills, as
the sentence of the lower court. principal defendants, and the five (5) judges of the then City Court of Manila in the
Based on the records, a copy of the resolution of the Court denying the injunction aspect of the case. Respondent GSIS and Capitol Hills filed separate
motion for reconsideration was mailed to the petitioner’s attorney. However, the motions to dismiss on the grounds that the complaint states no cause of action and
attorney alleges in his petition that he did not receive the notice because then he that there are other actions pending between the same parties for the same cause.
was already hiding in the mountains of Laguna as a guerilla officer of the Markings Respondent judge granted private respondents' motion to dismiss.
guerilla. The attorney prays that the reading of the sentence be suspended and that
petitioner be allowed to file whatever pleading that may be allowed