JURISDICTION

Regional Director
Recovery of wages, simple money claims and other benefits. — Upon complaint of
any interested party, the Regional Director of the Department of Labor and Employment
or any of the duly authorized hearing officers of the Department is empowered, through
summary proceeding and after due notice, to hear and decide any matter involving the
recovery of wages and other monetary claims and benefits, including legal interest,
owing to an employee or person employed in domestic or household service or
househelper under this Code, arising from employer-employee relations: Provided, That
such complaint does not include a claim for reinstatement: Provided, further, That the
aggregate money claims of each employee or househelper do not exceed five thousand
pesos (P5,000). The Regional Director or hearing officer shall decide or resolve the
complaint within thirty (30) calendar days from the date of the filing of the same. Any
sum thus recovered on behalf of any employee or househelper pursuant to this Article
shall be held in a special deposit account by, and shall be paid, on order of the Secretary
of Labor and Employment or the Regional Director directly to the employee or
househelper concerned. Any such sum not paid to the employee or househelper,
because he cannot be located after diligent and reasonable effort to locate him within a
period of three (3) years, shall be held as a special fund of the Department of Labor and
Employment to be used exclusively for the amelioration and benefit of workers.
Any decision or resolution of the Regional Director or hearing officer pursuant to this
provision may be appealed on the same grounds provided in Article 223 of this Code,
within five (5) calendar days from receipt of a copy of said decision or resolution, to the
National Labor Relations Commission which shall resolve the appeal within ten (10)
calendar days from the submission of the last pleading required or allowed under its
rules.
The Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representative may
supervise the payment of unpaid wages and other monetary claims and benefits,
including legal interest, found owing to any employee or househelper under this Code.
(Article 129 of the Labor Code)

Labor Arbiter
Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. — (a) Except as otherwise
provided under this Code, the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of
the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of
stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or
non-agricultural:
(1) Unfair labor practice cases;
(2) Termination disputes; (Subject to Art 261 - VA's jurisdiction over unbresolved
grievance from CBA/company personel policies)
(3) If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may
file involving wages, rate of pay, hours of work and other terms and
conditions of employment;
(4) Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from
the employer-employee relations;
(5) Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including
questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts; and
(6) Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and
maternity benefits, all other claims arising from employer-employee relations,
 including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an
amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00), whether or not
accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.
(b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases
decided by Labor Arbiters.
(c) Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining
agreements and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company
personnel policies shall be disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the
grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration as may be provided in said agreements.
(Article 217 of the Labor Code)
Money Claims. - Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor
Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing
of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue
of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including
claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.
The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any
and all claims under this section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be
incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent
for its approval. The performance bond to be filed by the recruitment/placement agency,
as provided by law, shall be answerable for all money claims or damages that may be
awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the
corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be
jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims
and damages.
xxx xxx xxx
In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized
cause as defined by law or contract, the worker shall be entitled to the full
reimbursement of his placement fee with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum,
plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3)
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
xxx xxx xxx
(Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 [Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995])

Bureau of Labor Relations

The Bureau of Labor Relations and the Labor Relations Divisions in the regional
offices of the Department of Labor and Employment shall have original and exclusive
authority to act, at their own initiative or upon request of either or both parties, on all
inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and all disputes, grievances or problems arising
from or affecting labor-management relations in all workplaces whether agricultural or
non-agricultural, except those arising from the implementation or interpretation of
collective bargaining agreements which shall be the subject of grievance procedure
and/or voluntary arbitration.
The Bureau shall have fifteen (15) calendar days to act on labor cases before it,
subject to extension by agreement of the parties. (Article 226 of the Labor Code)
Clearly, the Secretary of Labor and Employment has no jurisdiction to entertain the
appeal of ABBOTT. The appellate jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor and Employment is
limited only to a review of cancellation proceedings decided by the BLR in the exercise of its
exclusive and original jurisdiction. The Secretary of Labor and Employment has no
jurisdiction over decisions of the BLR rendered in the exercise of its appellate power to
 review the decision of the Regional Director in a petition to cancel the union's certificate of
registration, said decisions being final and inappealable.
xxx xxx xxx
It is clear then that the Secretary of Labor and Employment did not commit grave abuse
of discretion in not acting an ABBOTT's appeal. The decisions of the BLR on cases brought
before it on appeal from the Regional Director are final and executory. Hence, the remedy of
the aggrieved party is to seasonably avail of the special civil action of certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court.
(Abbott Laboratories vs. Abbott Laboratories Employees Union [G.R. No. 131374, 26
January 2000.)

Voluntary arbitrator
The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the
interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those
arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies referred to
in the immediately preceding Article. Accordingly, violations of a Collective Bargaining
Agreement, except those which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as
unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the Collective Bargaining
Agreement. For purposes of this Article, gross violations of a Collective Bargaining
Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic
provisions of such agreement.
The Commission, its Regional Offices and the Regional Directors of the Department
of Labor and Employment shall not entertain disputes, grievances or matters under the
exclusive and original jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary
arbitrators and shall immediately dispose and refer the same to the grievance machinery
or voluntary arbitration provided in the collective bargaining agreement.
(Article 261 of the Labor Code)

Appeal

From Labor Arbiter to NLRC

Article 221 of the Labor Code mandates that technical rules of evidence in courts of
law shall not be controlling in any of the proceedings before the Commission or the
Labor Arbiters. Further, the Commission is required to use every reasonable means to
ascertain the facts without regard to technicalities or procedure. Technical rules may be
relaxed to prevent miscarriage of justice. They must not be allowed to stand in the way
of equitably and completely resolving the rights and obligations of the parties.
In the case at bar, petitioner had the opportunity to rebut the truth of these additional
documents. Respondent NLRC, on appeal, correctly accorded weight to these
documents considering their nature and character. These were daily time records,
certifications from the postmaster, etc., whose trustworthiness can be relied upon.
(Cañete vs. NLRC [G.R. No. 114161, 23 November 1995])

Grounds for Appeal

(a) If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor
Arbiter;
(b) If the decision, order or award was secured through fraud or coercion,
including graft and corruption;
(c) If made purely on questions of law; and
 (d) If serious errors in the findings of facts are raised which would cause grave or
irreparable damage or injury to the appellant.

Grave Abuse of Discretion

The phrase "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction"

has settled meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It means such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment by the tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial power
as to amount to lack of power. (Arroyo vs. De Venecia [277 SCRA 268, (1997])

Private respondent, after receiving a copy of the labor arbiter's decision, wrote the
labor arbiter who rendered the decision and expressed dismay over the judgment.
Neither notice of appeal was filed nor cash or surety bond was posted by private
respondent. Nevertheless, the labor tribunal took cognizance of the letter from private
respondent and treated said letter as private respondent's appeal. In a certiorari action
before this Court, we ruled that the labor tribunal acted with grave abuse of discretion in
treating a mere letter from private respondent as private respondent's appeal in clear
violation of the rules on appeal prescribed under Section 3(a), Rule VI of the Rules of
Procedure of NLRC. (Garcia vs. NLRC [264 SCRA 261, 1996])
The labor arbiter committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to resolve
immediately by written order a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and
the supplemental motion to dismiss as mandated by Section 15 of Rule V of the New
Rules of Procedure of the NLRC. Philippine Airlines Inc. vs. NLRC [263 SCRA 638,
1996])
The NLRC gravely abused its discretion by allowing and deciding an appeal without
an appeal bond having been filed as required under Article 223 of the Labor Code.
(Unicane Workers Union-CLUP vs. NLRC [261 SCRA 573, 1996])
The labor arbiter gravely abused its discretion in disregarding the rule governing
position papers. In this case, the parties have already filed their position papers and
even agreed to consider the case submitted for decision, yet the labor arbiter still
admitted a supplemental position paper and memorandum, and by taking into
consideration, as basis for his decision, the alleged facts adduced therein and the
documents attached thereto. (Mañebo vs. NLRC [229 SCRA 240, 1994])
The NLRC gravely abused its discretion in treating the motion to set aside judgment
and writ of execution as a petition for relief of judgment. In doing so, public respondent
had, without sufficient basis, extended the reglementary period for filing petition for relief
from judgment contrary to prevailing rule and case law. (Gesulgon vs. NLRC [219 SCRA
561, 1993])

Appeal Bond
 Appeal. Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Artiber are final and executory
unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days
from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. Such appeal may be entertained only
on any of the following grounds:
xxx xxx xxx
In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may
be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable
bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the
monetary award in the judgment appealed from. (Article 223 of the Labor Code)
The requirement that the employer post a cash or surety bond to perfect its/his
appeal is apparently intended to assure the workers that if they prevail in the case, they
will receive the money judgment in their favor upon the dismissal of the employer's
appeal. It was intended to discourage employers from using an appeal to delay, or even
evade, their obligation to satisfy their employee's just and lawful claims. (Viron Garments
Mfg., Co. vs. NLRC [G.R. No. 97357, 18 March 1992])

There is a clear distinction between the filing of an appeal within the reglementary
period and its perfection. The latter may transpire after the end of the reglementary
period for filing the appeal.
Under Article 223 of the Labor Code, an appeal to the NLRC from the decisions,
awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter must be made "within ten (10) calendar days from
receipt of such decisions, awards or orders." Under Section 3(a) of Rule VI of the New
Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, the appeal fees must be paid and the memorandum of
appeal must be filed within the ten-day reglementary period.
Neither the Labor Code nor its implementing rules specifically provide for a situation
where the appellant moves for a reduction of the appeal bond.
Inasmuch as in practice the NLRC allows the reduction of the appeal bond upon
motion of appellant and on meritorious grounds, it follows that a motion to that effect
may be filed within the reglementary period for appealing. Such motion may be filed in
lieu of a bond which amount is being contested. In the meantime, the appeal is not
deemed perfected and the Labor Arbiter retains jurisdiction over the case until the NLRC
has acted on the motion and appellant has filed the bond as fixed by the NLRC. (Star
Angel Handicraft vs. NLRC [G.R. No. 108914, 20 September 1994])

The precipitate filing of this special civil action for certiorari without first moving for
reconsideration of the assailed judgment of NLRC warrants the outright dismissal of this
case. As we consistently held in numerous cases, a motion for reconsideration is
indispensable for it affords the NLRC an opportunity to rectify errors or mistakes it might
have committed before resort to the courts can be had.
It is settled that certiorari will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against acts of public respondent. 5
In the case at bar, the plain and adequate remedy expressly provided by law was a
motion for reconsideration of the impugned decision, based on palpable or patent errors,
to be made under oath and filed within ten (10) days from receipt of the questioned
judgment of the NLRC, a procedure which is jurisdictional. Hence, original action of
certiorari, as in this case will not prosper.
Further, not having filed a motion for reconsideration within the ten-day reglementary
period, the questioned order, resolution or decision of NLRC, becomes final and
executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof. Thus, as regards petitioner,
the decision of NLRC became final and executory on December 7, 1995. Consequently,
the merits of the case can no longer be reviewed to determine if the respondent NLRC
 could be faulted of grave abuse of discretion. (Lagera vs. NLRC [G.R. No. 123636, 31
March 2000])

Generally, certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for
reconsideration is filed before the respondent tribunal to allow it an opportunity to correct
its imputed errors. However, the following have been recognized as exceptions to the
rule: Where -
1. The order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
2. The questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and
passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed
upon in the lower court;
3. There is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further
delay would prejudice the Government or of the petitioner or the subject
matter of the action is perishable;
4. Under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;
5. Petitioner is deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency of relief;
6. In a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of
such relief by the trial court is improbable;
7. The proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
8. The proceedings was ex parte or on which the petitioner had no opportunity
to object; and
9. The issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.
(Abraham vs. NLRC [G.R. No. 143823, 06 March 2001])

From NLRC to Court of Appeals

A review of the legislative records on the antecedents of R.A. No. 7902 persuades us
that there may have been an oversight in the course of the deliberations on the said Act
or an imprecision in the terminology used therein. In fine, Congress did intend to provide
for judicial review of the adjudications of the NLRC in labor cases by the Supreme Court,
but there was an inaccuracy in the term used for the intended mode of review. This
conclusion which we have reluctantly but prudently arrived at has been drawn from the
considerations extant in the records of Congress, more particularly on Senate Bill No.
1495 and the Reference Committee Report on S. No. 1495/H. No. 10452.
The Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the
NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the
special civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of
decisions of the NLRC. The use of the word "appeal" in relation thereto and in the
instances we have noted could have been a lapsus plumae because appeals by
certiorari and the original action for certiorari are both modes of judicial review
addressed to the appellate courts. The important distinction between them, however,
and with which the Court is particularly concerned here is that the special civil action of
certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of this Court and the Court of
Appeals; whereas to indulge in the assumption that appeals by certiorari to the Supreme
Court are allowed would not subserve, but would subvert, the intention of Congress as
expressed in the sponsorship speech on Senate Bill No. 1495.
Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed
appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to
mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions
should hence forth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the
doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired.
(St. Martin Funeral Home vs. NLRC [G.R. No. 130866, 16 September 1998])