Hypatia, Inc.

The Future of Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality, Dialectic

Author(s): Catherine Malabou and Lisabeth During
Source: Hypatia, Vol. 15, No. 4, Contemporary French Women Philosophers (Autumn, 2000),
pp. 196-220
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of Hypatia, Inc.
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The Futureof Hegel:
Dialectic1
Plasticity,Temporality,
CATHERINEMALABOU

Translatedby LisabethDuring

At the centerof Catherine'sMalabou'sstudy of Hegel is a defenseof Hegel's

relationto timeand thefuture. Whilemanyreaders,followingKojeve,have taken
Hegel to be announcingthe end of history,Malaboufindsa moresuppleimpulse,
opento thenew, theunexpected.Shetakesas herguidingthreadtheconceptof "plas-
ticity,"andshowshowHegel'sdialectic-introducingthesculptor'sart intophiloso-
phy-is motivatedby thedesirefor transformation. Malabouis a cannyandfaithful
reader, and allows herclassic"maitre" to speak,if not againsthisowngrain,at least
against a too
tradition attachedto closureand system. Malabou's Hegelis a "plastic"
thinker, not a nostalgicmetaphysician.

THE PROBLEMATIC
INTRODUCTION:

A "THINGOFTHEPAST"?
A. IS HEGEL'SPHILOSOPHY

The Futureof Hegel is a title that presents itself in the affirmative,as if it

knows there is a positive answer to the question it anticipates, "DoesHegel
have a future?"Inevitably,at the end of this century,the question must still
be posed. For in this time, philosophy, while acknowledging the stature of
G. W. F Hegel and its debt to his thought, has suspectedspeculative idealism
of submitting to a totalizing or even a totalitarian structure. If speculative
philosophy has not been entirely rejected, it has been at the very least kept
at a distance. It is impossible, therefore, to consider Hegel's future today as
something alreadyguaranteed,as an establishedand recognizedfact. This fu-
tureitself needs to happen. It remainsto be demonstrated,and to be examined.
Such an examination is what the present work intends to provide.

Hypatia vol. 15, no. 4 (Fall 2000) © by Lisabeth During

 Catherine Malabou 197

By "futureof Hegel," one must understand first of all the future of his
philosophy. "Future"(avenir)has the ordinarymeaning of the time to come
(futur), the time yet ahead. Etymologyconfirmsthis connection: the future
(la-venir) means that which is to come (ad-vient).But it denotes also that
which is capable of lasting:to "havea future"is to be capable of having a pos-
terity.Now, and this is the fundamentalproblem,can the philosophy of Hegel
have a genuine posterity?Can it still hold out a promise?Can it still cause a
stir?Can it continue to make an impact on the tendencies of our times (com-
mentpourrait-elle... orienterles temps),when time has shown it to be an en-
terprisethatbringstimeto an end?
Time: it's with time that everything began; it is because of time that the
divorce between Hegel and contemporaryphilosophy was announced. To a
certain degreethe famousconclusion to the Phenomenology of Mindsigned the
death sentence of Hegelianism:
Time is the Notion itself that is thereand which presents itself
to consciousnessas empty intuition; for this reason Spirit nec-
essarilyappearsin Time, and it appearsinTime just as long as it
has not graspedits pureNotion, i.e., has not annulled Time. It
is the outer,intuited pure Self which is not graspedby the Self,
the merely intuited Notion; when this latter graspsitself it sets
aside its Time-form(hebtseineZeitformauf), comprehendsthis
intuiting, and is a comprehendedand comprehending intuit-
ing, Time, therefore, appearsas the destiny and necessity of
Spirit that is not yet complete within itself (der nicht in sich
vollendetist).(Hegel 1977,487; Hegel 1941, 2:305;Hegel 1970,
3:584-85)
Many interpretershave concluded from this discussion that time was for
Hegel nothing but a momentto be passedby. And it does appearthat time it-
self, unwilling to forgive absolute knowledge for having ordained its dialecti-
cal supersession,has demandedreparations.This demand is articulatedmost
powerfullyby Martin Heidegger,who arguesthat the time transcended(auf-
hebt)by spiritat the moment of absoluteknowledgeis simplythe vulgarnotion
of time. The "vulgarunderstandingof time" is a conception that Heidegger
believes has dominatedthe entire historyof metaphysicsand has now come to
an end with the completion of that epoch. Heidegger'sstereotypereaches its
radicalconclusion in a paraphrase:"TheHegelian notion of time represents,as
no one has properlynoted, the most radicaldevelopment at the level of the
concept of the ordinaryunderstandingof time" (Heidegger 1984, 428).2
Aristotle was the first to give conceptual elaboration to this "ordinary
understandingof time,"which he understandsas a sequenceof "nows,"passing
by without beginning or end and makingup the uniformflux within which the
sequence of events unfolds: "Time appearsto the vulgar understandingas a
198 Hypatia

successionof nows constantly "present-at-hand,"that passby and arriveat the

same moment. Time is understoodas a sequence, as a "flux"of nows, like the
"streamof time" (Heidegger 1984, 422). In Heidegger'sview, the paragraphs
devoted to time in the Encyclopediaof thePhilosophical Sciencessimplyreiterate
termby term the Aristotelian problematicof the "stigme"("point") developed
in Book IV of the Physics.Hegel fulfillsthe classical idea of the instantaneous
by determiningit conceptually as "punctuality"(Punklichkeit).It is Hegel who
maintains that:
The negativity which relates itself to space as point (diesichals
Punkt auf den Raum bezieht)and develops its determinations
within it as line and plane, exists also as somethingfor-itselfand
for its determinations in the sphere of exterality (des Aufer-
sichsein);yet at the same time as positing those determinations
in the external space, it appearsindifferent to the immobile
juxtapositions(dasruhigeNebeneinander)of space. Posited thus
for-itself,negativity is time. (Hegel 1970, 1:229)
A spatialdetermination-the point-serves to characterizea temporalde-
termination-the instant. But such a concept of time, seeming to reducetem-
porality to nothing but the form of juxtaposition, strikes us today as a tem-
porality strippedof all future.
The ordinaryunderstandingof time is what constitutes for Heidegger the
unity of the philosophical tradition summed up for him in the name "meta-
physics."This tradition conforms to an understandingof Being reduced to
"presence"(ousia, Anwesenheit),thus privileging the present tense (Gegen-
wart)with respect to the other dimensions of time. Fromthat perspective,the
past and future must necessarilyappearas either a present time which is just
past,3or a present which is to come ("a not yet now"). To conceive time as a
homogenous milieu in which things occur-a milieu in which nothing that
happens can truly come unexpectedly (survenir)-represents for Heidegger
the dominant view in philosophy from the Pre-Socraticsto Husserl. Hegel
stands out from the other philosophersbecause he takes to its logical conclu-
sion this traditionalprivileging of the present. In the speculative conception
of time, the futureis not even a timelikeothertimes:it lacksthe powerto preserve
itself, giving way to the lead-that is to say, the ontological priority-of the
past understoodas the previousmode of the present.
In his lecturesof 1930 on Hegel'sPhenomenology of Spirit,Heideggerclaims
that "[u]ndoubtedlyHegel occasionally speaksabout having been, but never
about the future.This silence fits with the fact that (for him) the past is itself
the decisive characterof time, and for a good reason:time is both the passing
itself and what passes;it has alwayspassedaway"(Heidegger 1988, 82; trans-
lation modified).4
 Catherine Malabou 199

Time in Hegel'sthought is understoodas the past tense of spirit:spiritmust

pass over (ubergehen)into time in orderto fulfill its own identity as absolute,
eternal, and in itself. That identity, in its turn, is itself a past but a past not
yet temporallypast.5It is the timeless antiquity of "presence,"the "Parousia"
of the absolute. From its standpoint, everything that occurs can be only the
indication of what has alreadycome to pass;everything still in the future is
simply a potential returnto self.
In fact, for Hegel, isn't it the case that everythingwhich occurshas done so
too late?Isn'tyouth itself, in its verynovelty, alreadybelated?In the Philosophy
of Spiritof The Encyclopediaof Philosophical Sciences,at the moment where he
analyses "the natural series of the ages of life," Hegel demonstratesprecisely
that the characteristicof youth is to believe in the future, to think that the
world is not yet all it really is: "The exalted spiritof the youth does not recog-
nize that the substantialuniverse, in its essence, has alreadyachieved in this
world its development and its actuality"(Hegel 1971, 55). The youth must
wait to growold to understandthat the world"possessesthe absolutepowerto
actualizeitself and that it has done so in ourtime; that it is not so impotent that
it needs firstto await its effective realization"(Hegel 1971, 55).
The absolute does not wait, has never been expected (ne s'estjamaisatten-
du), will never be awaited;the intense turning towardsthe unexpected (l'in-
attendu)is only one of youth'sillusions,one which Hegel himself remembersas
his own before the crisisof Frankfurt.But too late. In its twilight discourse,at
the beginning of its night, philosophymay be nothing but the announcement
of this truth: it is too late for the future.
This announcement bringswith it a feeling of constriction, as if ontology
has closed us in. The System thus seems to be a tight loop which envelops
everything-all exteriority,all alterity,all surprise.Hegel assertsthat spirithas
no absolute other than itself, for the absolutethereis no absolutealterity:"For
spirit, nothing exists which is absolutelyother than itself."That is why "[a]ll
action of spirit is nothing but a graspingof itself, and the aim of all genuine
science is only this, to know that spirit recognizesin itself everything there is
in heaven and on earth"(Hegel 1971, 1).
Spirit, whose task is to grasp itself, to anticipate the finding of itself in
everything that is now and is to come, can never encounter anything wholly
other, can never come face to face, in a sense, with the event. What place,
therefore,is there in Hegelian thought for the question of the future,if every-
thing has alreadybeen permeatedby spirit and, in this fashion, alreadycom-
pleted?
Scattered throughoutrecent philosophical writing, we find no shortageof
analysesdrawingattention to this arrested,congealed, mortifiedcharacterof
speculativethought. Alexandre Kojevehimself, althoughcommitted to stress-
ing the timeliness of Hegelian thought as a means with which to think the
200 Hypatia

future,nonetheless defines absolute knowledge in termsof "the end of time."

Now is there any temporality which can correspond to this "end of time"
except time's stasis in the congealed form of a perpetualpresent?Heidegger
agrees:"The Hegelian presentation of the true notion of being ... with what
it says about time, it is nothing other than a farewell to time as the route
towardsspirit which is eternity"(Heidegger 1988, 147).6
Has Hegel's "farewell"to time reversed into a farewell of time to Hegel?
Indeed, is not time as it exists for speculative philosophy not actually time at
all, but rather the flattening or leveling-down (Nivellierung)of time itself, of
that genuine time called by Heidegger "primordialtemporality"?Primordial
time can not be conceptualizedthrough the present, for its most fundamen-
tal "exstasis"is the future.Primordialtemporality,Heideggerwrites, "tempor-
alizes itself primarilyout of the future"(1996, 329). Thus the authentic future,
in Heidegger,is no longera simplemoment of time, but is conflatedin a certain
way with time itself.
I do not intend to stage a confrontation between the Hegelian and Hei-
deggereanconceptions of time. However, it is impossibleto be unawareof the
changes in the way the futurehas been thought about over the course of the
twentieth century.If we were to ignore,so to speak,the "futurelife"of the idea
of the future,then we would be ourselvesguilty of "leveling-down"that future
and, in a sense, lagging behind it.
Indeed the readingventured here is far from wanting to be reactionaryor
nostalgic. The success, the "future"of this approachwill depend on its capac-
ity to remain open to those argumentsthat oppose it. In particularit must re-
main open to that analysisaccordingto which the absence of a conception of
the futurein Hegel implies the absence of a futurefor the philosophyof Hegel.
To say,with Heidegger,that Hegel never speaksabout the future amounts to
saying that Hegel does not have a future.Against this, by affirmingthatindeed
thereis a "futureof Hegel," the present work contests the validity of Heideg-
ger'sassertion,all the while acknowledgingthe significanceit is owed, as well
as the philosophical concerns it continues to provoke.

B. THE PROMISEOF PLASTICITY

With this end in view, we intend to construct a concept, that of "plastici-

ty,"as foreshadowedin our title: "The Futureof Hegel: Plasticity,Temporality,
Dialectic."To "forma concept" in the sense intended here means firstof all to
take up a notion (plasticity), which has a defined and delimited role in the
philosophy of Hegel, only in orderto transformit into the sort of comprehen-
sive concept that can "grasp"(saisir)the whole. Here the double sense of grasp,
"taking"(prendre)and "understanding"(comprendre),is authorizedby the ety-
mology of the word"concept."Transformingplasticity into a concept is a mat-
 Catherine Malabou 201

ter of showing that plasticity "captures"(prend)the philosophy of Hegel and

allows the readerto "comprehend"it, appearingat one and the same time as a
structureand as a condition of intelligibility.
To forma concept meansin the second place to develop to the fullest extent
an example (une instance)capable of impartinga form to that which it grasps.
Hegel indeed assertsthis many times: if the concept is a logical form, it must
not be consideredlike an empty receptacle, ratheras a powerwhich can fash-
ion its own content. By giving plasticity a mediating position between "fu-
ture"and "temporality," my title: "TheFutureof Hegel: Plasticity,Temporality,
Dialectic," alreadyindicates that plasticitywill be envisaged as the "instance"
which givesform to the future and time in Hegel's philosophy.That is to say,
their relationshipis constructedin the mode of plasticity;time and the future
are mutuallyinvolved in a dialogicalprocessgovernedby plasticity.Fromthis
it follows that the concepts of the future and of plasticity need to be treated
concurrently:one clarifyingthe other as a title is clarifiedby its subtitle.
This relation of "synonymy"is turned around in the second place into a
relation of asymmetry.Indeed, to posit "the future"as, in effect, "plasticity"
amounts to displacingthe establisheddefinition of the futureas a moment or
period of time. And indeed in the title such a displacementwas announced:
"the future"(I'avenir),that which is "to come,"will not be restrictedin mean-
ing by the immediate,predictableconnotation, that of the "future"as "future
time." Thus it is not a matter of examining the relations between past, pres-
ent, and the conventional sense of the futurepresented in the discussionsof
time in Hegel's different versions of a Philosophyof Nature (1970).7 Rather,
these texts themselves demand that we renounce the "well-known"and fa-
miliar meaning of the future and, as a consequence, the "well-known"defi-
nition of time. The possibilitythat one temporaldetermination-the future-
can be thought differently,beyond its initial, simple status as a moment of
time-of "thatwhich is now to come"-makes it immediatelyclear that time,
for Hegel, cannot be reducedto an orderedrelationbetween moments.Rather,
we will understand"plasticity"as primarilythe excessof futureover thefuture;
while "temporality,"as it figuresin speculative philosophy,will mean instead
thesurplusof timeovertime.
These preliminaryremarksindicate at the start of the game that my work
will not follow the path set out by AlexandreKoyreand Kojeve, althoughboth
do pursuethis question of the "future"in the philosophyof Hegel. The former,
in his article on "Hegel at Jena,"the latter in his Introductionto theReadingof
Hegel, agree:in the "Systems"of the Jena period, the futurehad "prevalence"
or alternately,priority,over the past and the present. Thus both writersshow
here the proximityof the thought of the young Hegel to that of Heidegger.But
the kind of treatmentrepresentedby Koyreand Kojeve, despite its interestand
its significance, does not give us the means to respond to the question of the
202 Hypatia

future in Hegel. Besides the fact that the problem of an "orientationtowards

the future"is in no respect a Hegelian problematic,this way of readingHegel
leads,as Koyreand Kojeveboth admit,to an impasse.They end by arguingthat
there is an unresolved contradiction in the philosophy of Hegel: it can only
grantthe futurea priorityover the other momentsof time by suspending at once
all futureyet to come.
Koyre,on the one hand, arguesthat for Hegel, "time is dialectical and ...
is constructedfrom the vantage point of the future,"and on the other hand,
that "the philosophy of history-and in that respect the philosophy of Hegel
as a whole, the system,so to speak-can only be a possibilityif historyhas come
to an end, if it has no more future;if time can stop" (Koyre 1971, 189).
Hegel wasnever able to "reconcile"the two meaningsthat the notion of the
futuretakes on in his System:on the one hand, a chronological future,whose
dynamicis the foundationof all historicalbecoming/development;and, on the
other hand, a future as the logical "happening"(advent) of the Notion, that
is, the Notion in the "act-of-coming-to-itself"(Zu-sich-selbst-kommen) (Hegel
1976b, 841; 1981, 390).
Kojeve,forhis part,wants to affirmboth: he maintainson the one hand that
"the Time that Hegel has in view ... is characterizedby the primacyof the
Future"(1947, 367), but on the other hand, "man,"when he achieves the
standpoint of Absolute Knowledge,has no more future:
The Man who no longer relates himself... to an object given
externally,thus has no furtherreasonto negateit for the sake of
remaining in existence and conserving his self-identity. And
the Man who no longer negates has no real future. (Kojeve
1947,387)
The exposureof a supposedcontradiction which, by its very nature, could
not be dialecticalas it remains irresoluble:this is an impasse noted by many
interpretersof Hegel from the firsthalf of the 20th century. But the work of
a new generation of French commentators-Bernard Bourgeois,Pierre-Jean
Labarriere,GerardLebrun,Denise Souche-Dagues8-establishes on the con-
trarythat "historicalbecoming"and "logical truth"form a dynamic unity in
Hegelian philosophy.These studiesadmittedlyhave not resolvedthe problem
of the relation between "eterity" and "historicity"in Hegelianism, but they
have sufficientlyclarifiedit so that it no longer needs to be thematisedhere as
subject.If my approachdoes not return to this problematic, neither does it
organizeitself aroundan analysisof the structuralrelation connecting the Phe-
nomenologyand the Scienceof Logic.Nor, finally,does it undertakethe exami-
nation of the relation between a philosophy of history and the immanent
derivation of the Notion within the confines of the System. These problems
will be continually referredto in the courseof my inquiry,but they do not con-
stitute its themes.
 Catherine Malabou 203

The possibility of affirmingthe "futureof Hegel"-in the double meaning

of a future"of"his philosophy and a future"within"his philosophy-depends
in the firstinstance on posing the question of the futurewhere "one does not
anticipate it." Consequently it is plasticitywhich will be presented as the
"unforeseen"of Hegelian philosophy.
To this extent, the futureof the notion of plasticity must be put into play.
Its viability depends on the success of an epistemological operation which
resembles,in its method, that defined by Georges Canguilhem in terms that
would become famous:
To work on a concept is to explore the variations in its exten-
sion and its intelligibility.It is to generalizeit by including in it
the traitsof its exceptions. It is to export it outside its own do-
main, to use it as a model or conversely to look for a model for
it, in short it is to give to it, bit by bit, through orderedtrans-
formations,the function of a form. (Canguilhem 1970, 206)
Such an operation will guide us, throughoutthe entire scope of this work,
in testing theplasticityof thenotionof plasticityitself.

HEGELIANPHILOSOPHY
AND THETEST OF PLASTICITY

A. ORDINARYMEANINGSOFTHECONCEPTOF PLASTICITY

To "workon" the concept of "plasticity"will, following Canguilhem'suse,

amount to "givinga formalfunction" to a term which itself, in its firstsense,
describesor designatestheact of givingform.The English and French substan-
tives "plasticity"or plasticiteand their German equivalent, "Plaztizitat,"en-
tered the languagein the eighteenth century.9They joined two wordsalready
current which had been formed from the same root: the substantive "Plasti-
city" (diePlastik),and the adjective "plastic"(plastisch).All three wordswere
derived from the Greek plassein,which means "to model, to mould." "Plas-
tic," as an adjective, means two things: on the one hand, to be "susceptibleto
changes of form,"malleable-clay is a "plastic"material-and on the other
hand, "having the power to bestow form, the power to mould,"as in the ex-
pressions"plasticsurgeon"and "plasticarts."This twofold significationis met
again in the German adjective plastisch.Grimm'sdictionary defines it thus:
"thatwhich takes or gives shape, or figure,to bodies"(korperlich... gestaltend
oder gestaltet).10La plasticite,or "plasticity,"just like Plaztizitatin German,
describesthe natureof that which is "plastic,"that which is at once capableof
receiving and of giving form.
These definitions help to clarifythe "hermeneuticcircle"in which my ap-
proach has been caught ever since the formation of the concept "plasticity"
requiredthat the word itself be defined. The defining and the defined are the
204 Hypatia

same.Admittedly,if we areto separateone fromthe other,"theextension must

be changed."But these alterations themselves take advantage of the signifi-
cation of the term "plasticity":indeed, the word'sevolution in the language
reveals alreadyits "exportationoutside its original terrain."The homeland of
plasticity is the field of art. Plasticity is clearly intrinsic to the art of "mod-
eling" and, in the first instance, to the art of sculpture.The plastic arts are
those for which the central aim is the articulationand development of forms;
among these are counted architecture,drawing,and painting. Now, by exten-
sion, plasticity signifiesthe general aptitudefor development, the power to be
molded by one's culture, by education. We speak of the plasticity of the new-
born, of the child's plasticity of character.Plasticity is, in another context,
characterizedby "suppleness"and flexibility, as in the case of the "plasticity"
of the brain, yet it means as well the ability to evolve and adapt. It is in this
sense that one calls upon in speakingof a "plasticvirtue"possessedby animals,
plants, and living things in general.
The "extension"I have been drawingout must be understoodin a particu-
lar way. By analogy to a malleable material, children are said to be "plastic."
However, the adjective "plastic,"if it is certainly opposed to "rigid,""fixed,"
and "ossified,"is not to be confusedwith "polymorphous." Things that areplas-
tic preservetheir shape, as does the marble in a statue: once given a config-
uration,it is unable to recover its initial form."Plastic,"thus, designatesthose
things that yield themselves to being formedwhile resistingdeformation.From
this it is possible to understanda further "extension"of this term into the
terrainof histology,for which "plasticity"representsthe ability of tissue to re-
form itself after a lesion.
Plasticity'srange of meanings has not come to a halt and it continues to
evolve with and in the language.Plasticmaterialis a synthetic materialwhich
can take on different shapes and properties according to the functions in-
tended. "Plastic"on its own is an explosive materialwith a nitroglycerineand
nitrocellulose base that can set off violent detonations. The plasticity of the
word itself drawsit to extremes, both to those concrete shapes in which form
is crystallized(sculpture)and to the annihilation of all form (the bomb).

B. HEGEL'SNOTION OF PLASTICITY

To construct the concept of plasticity as it figuresin Hegel's philosophy

requiresfirstof all that we uncover the way in which Hegel himself gives shape
to this idea. Throughsuch an elaboration,we find that three areasof meaning
aremutuallyimplicated.In each case that double connotation of the adjective
"plastic"is present:capacity to receive form and capacity to produceform. It
is this double signification which enables us to treat the adjective as itself a
"speculativeword,"in Hegel's special sense.
 Catherine Malabou 205

The firstrelevantfield of significationis that of the "plasticarts."The words

"plastisch" and Plastikappearfrequently in Hegel's discussions of Greek art,
especially the Aesthetics,where sculptureis defined as "the plastic art par
in
excellence." This more familiar sense of "plasticity,"when drawn upon and
extended, permitsthe philosopherto develop his notion further:it acquiresa
greaterrange and complexity in its second signifyingfield, where it applies to
those he entitles "plasticindividuals" or plasticcharacters.In Hegel's account,
"plasticity" describes the nature of those Greek figureswho representan indi-
viduality he names "exemplary"(exemplarische)and "substantial"(substan-
tielle)."Pericles,... Phidias,Plato, and above all Sophocles, as well as Thucy-
dides, Xenophon, Socrates"are "plasticindividuals":"Theyare greatand free,
grown independentlyon the soil of their own inherently substantialpersonal-
ity, self-made,and developing into what they (essentially) were and wanted to
be" (Hegel 1975a, 719).
Hegel insists on the fact that: "This sense for the perfect plasticity of gods
and men was pre-eminently at home in Greece (dieserSinnfir die vollendete
Plastikder Gottlichenund Menschlichenwar vorehmlich in Griechenlandhei-
misch).In its poets and orators,historiansand philosophers,Greece is not to be
understoodat its heart unless we bringwith us as a key to our comprehension
an insight into the ideals of sculptureand unless we consider from the point
of view of their plasticity not only the heroic figuresin epic and dramabut
also the actual statesmen and philosophers.After all, in the beautifuldays of
Greece, men of action, like poets and thinkers, had this same plastic and
universal yet individual characterboth inwardlyand outwardly(diesenplas-
tischen,allgemeinenund dochindividuellen,nach auj3enwie nach innengleichen
Charakter)"(Hegel 1975a, 719).11
These "plasticcharacters"give formto the "thespiritualin its embodiment"
(Korperlichkeit des Geistigen).Thus the theme of plastic individuality itself
representsa middle term, mediating between plasticity in its first signifying
domain, that of sculpture,12and its third:philosophical plasticity.
The expression"philosophicalplasticity"mustbe understoodin two differ-
ent ways. On the one hand, it characterizesthe philosophical attitude, the
behavior specificto the philosopher.On the other hand, it appliesto philoso-
phy itself, to its form and manner of being, that is to say, to that rhythm in
which the speculative content is unfolded and presented.
In the Preface to The Scienceof Logicof 1831 Hegel states: "A plastic dis-
course (ein plastischerVortrag)demands, too, a plastic receptivity and under-
standing on the part of the listener (einenplastischeSinn des Aufnehmensund
Verstehens);but youths and men of such a temperwho would calmly suppress
theirown reflectionsand opinions in which originalthought is so impatient to
manifest itself, listeners such as Plato feigned, who would attend only to the
matterat hand (nurderSachefolgenderZuhorer),could have no place in a mod-
206 Hypatia

em dialogue;still less could readersof such a disposition"(Hegel 1976b, 40;

1991c, 24).
The plastic individualityof the Greeks thus acquiresthe value of a model
for the ideal philosophical attitude.13Plasticity in this connection designates
primarilythe ability of the philosophizingsubjectto attend to the content, the
"matterat hand,"by purifyingthe formof all that is arbitraryand personal,all
that is immediate and particular.However, as we have seen, "plasticity"does
not mean "polymorphous." The philosophic readeror interlocutoris of course
receptive to the form,but they in their turn are led to give form to that which
they hear or read.14In this sense they become comparable,thinks Hegel, to
those Greek exemplarsof plastic individuality.If, like those models, the ideal
philosophersareboth "universaland individual,"this comes fromthe waythey
acquire their formative principle from the universal-the Notion-while at
the same time bestowing a particularformon the universalby incarnatingit or
embodying it. Thus the individual is now understoodas becoming the "Da-
sein,"the "being-there"(l'tre-l&)of Spirit, the translationof the spiritualinto
the materialityof sense. It follows that plasticityappearsas a processwhere the
universal and the particularmutually inform one another, and their joint
outcome is that particularitycalled the "exemplaryindividual."
These remarksdraw us to think furtherabout the second connotation of
philosophicalplasticity.Forwhat is a "plasticdiscourse"(emplastischeVortrag)?
A passage from the Preface to the Phenomenologyof Spirithelps clarify this
definition:

Only a philosophical exposition that rigidly excludes (streng

ausschlosse)the usual way of relating the partsof a proposition
could achieve the goal of plasticity (diesjenige Ex-
philosophische
positionwuirdees erreichenplastischzu sein). (Hegel 1977, 39;
1941, 1:55)
As a philosophical proposition is normally understood,the subject of the
propositionis thought of as a fixed instance:it is given predicatesfromoutside,
and not able to producethem itself. "Toexclude rigorouslythe usualrelation
between the partsof a proposition"implies a reconceptualizingof this relation
as a process of substance's"self-determination"(Selbstbestimmung). One con-
ception of substance'srelation to its accidents passesinto another: this is un-
derstoodby Hegel as the passagefrom the predicativeproposition to the spec-
ulativeproposition.
Elevated into its speculative truth, the propositionalrelationbetweensub-
ject and predicatesis characterizedby "plasticity."Within the process of self-
determination, the universal (the substance) and particular(the accidents as
something independent) give form to each other througha dynamic like that
at play in the "plastic individualities."The process of self-determination is
 Catherine Malabou 207

the unfolding of the Substance/Subject. In the process, Substance withdraws

from itself in orderto enter into the particularityof its content. Through this
movement of self-negation Substance will posit itself as Subject. As Bernard
Bourgeoisremarks,"(t)he Subject is that infinite activity, or, more precisely,
negativity, whose identity is in this way made true, concrete, and mediated,
and which actualizesitself in its internal self-differentiation,in its division or
originalscission (ursprungliche Teilen),that is to say,in its 'judgment'(Ur-teil).
The identity that belongs to the subject affirmsitself in its differencewhereas
the identity at the level of substancecan only be affirmedin the negation of
differencewhich is also implicit in that identity" (Hegel 1988, 201, Note 3).
Self-determinationis the movement throughwhich substanceaffirmsitself
as at once subjectand predicateof itself. In the Scienceof Logicin the Encyclo-
pediaHegel defines the "relation between substantialityand accidentality,"
or the "Absolute Relation," as the "activity-of-form"(Formtatigkeit)(Hegel
1991a, 225). Indeed it is this "activity"that indicates precisely the very plas-
ticityof substanceitself, its capacityboth to receive formand to give formto its
own content. With this considerationof self-determination,seen as the "orig-
inaryoperation of plasticity,"we arriveat the very heart of the present study.

C. THE DIALECTICAND THE"WAIT AND SEE"

This heart has a "pulse,"whose rhythms are spelled out by the last term
of my title-"The Future of Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality,Dialectic."The
movement of self-determinationis in fact the very principle of the dialectical
process.Its energy is bor from the contradictorytension between the preser-
vation of determination as something particularand the dissolution of ev-
erything determinate in the universal. In the EncyclopediaScienceof Logic,
Hegel demonstratesthat this sametension is operativein the waya "firstterm,"
posited "in and for itself," a moment which has the appearanceof "self-sub-
sistence" (absolute self-identity), displaysitself as "the other of itself" by dis-
solving the fixity of its position (Hegel 1976b, 833-34).15
In the logical unfolding of the "substance-subject,"the possibility of this
dynamicof preservationand dissolution takes shape, as is clearlyshown in the
Preface to the Phenomenology: "On account of its simplicity or self-identity
it appearsfixed (fest) and enduring(bleibend).But this self--
(Sichselbstgleichheit)
identity is no less negativity, therefore its fixed existence passes over into its
dissolution (Auflosung)"(Hegel 1977, 34; 1941, 42).
The dialecticalprocess(my italics) is "plastic"because,as it unfolds,it makes
links between the opposing moments of total immobility (the "fixed")and
evacuation ("dissolution"),and then links both in the vitality of the whole, a
whole which, reconciling these two extremes, is itself the union (conjugaison)
of resistance(Widerstand)and fluidity (Fliissigkeit).The processof plasticity is
208 Hypatia

dialectical becausethe operationswhich constitute it-the seizureof formand

the annihilation of all form, emergence and explosion-are contradictory.16
Now we can see the connection linking the three concepts-"Plasticity,"
"temporality,"and "dialectic."Forthis is nothing less than the formationof the
future itself. Plasticity characterizesthe relation between substanceand acci-
dents. Now the Greek word "symdedakos,""accident,"derives from the verb
"symdanein,"which means at the same time to followfrom, to ensure, and to
arrive,to happen.Thereby it can designate continuationin both senses of the
word, as consequence,that is, "whatfollows"in the logical sense, and as event,
that is, "whatfollows"in a chronologicalsense. Self-determinationis thus the
relation of substance to thatwhichhappens.Following this line of thought we
understandthe "future"(a-venir)in the philosophy of Hegel as therelation,the
connection,whichsubjectivitymaintainswith theaccidental.
To understandthe future other than in the ordinaryimmediate sense of
"amoment of time"requiresby the sametoken an opening-out of the meaning
of time: an extension made possible by the very plasticityof temporalityitself.
The deployment of the Hegelian conception of time is not fixed by reference
to the places and the times-to the "moments"-of its treatment within the
System. Time is an agency (une instance)characterizedby dialectical differen-
tiation; if it finds itself divided into definite moments, these determine it only
for a moment.
Drawn into what could be called a "dialecticalcomposition,"the concepts
of "the future,""plasticity,"and "temporality"form a structureoriented to-
wards anticipation, a structureoperative in subjectivity as Hegel conceives
that. To distinguish this structurefrom the future as ordinarilyunderstood,
we will name this structurethe "Waitand See" (le "voirvenir"),obeying Heg-
el's insistence that we philosophize in the languageitself. Voirvenirin French
means to wait while observing,as is prudent,how events are developing. But
it also suggeststhat there are intentions and plans of other people which must
be probed and guessed at. In this way an expression can referat one and the
same time to the state of "beingsurewhat is coming"("etresurde ce quivient")
and "notknowingwhat will happen"("nepassavoirce quiva venir").It is on this
account that the "waitand see"can representthat interplay,within Hegelian
philosophy,of teleologicalnecessityand surpriseor novelty.
The structure of "wait and see" creates its own specific boundaries. On
the inside of the system, there is the "limit"controlling its functioning within
Hegel's thought; externally,there is a "limit"which will decide on the future
of Hegel'sthought. Our method is to "workon" all the occurrencesin Hegel of
his concept of plasticity,and then at the same time to "alterthe understand-
ing"by means of a regulated"extension"of its meaning. But this amounts to
the following: revealing the link between these two boundaries,internal and
external, and, no less, discovering the way "form"appears("lamanieredontla
formeprend")in the Hegelian system and after it.
 Catherine Malabou 209

Plasticity is, therefore, the point aroundwhich all the transformationsof

Hegelian thought revolve, the center of its metamorphoses(centredes meta-
morphoses).

HEGEL
ANDHISTWOFORMS
OFTIME

Time, as deployed in this philosophy, is neither a univocal nor a fixed

concept. In fact, Hegel works(in) on two "times"at once. Section 258 of the
Encyclopedia standsas a proofof this. "Time,"Hegel states in this paragraph,is
"thebeing which, in being, is not and in not-being, is"(Hegel 1970, 1:229-30;
1969-1979, 9:48).17 A "dialectical" understandingof this phrasebringsout of it
its necessary"doublemeaning."Normally,it can be understoodin the initial,
primaryway. Time is and is not to the degree that its moments cancel each
other out; the present is a "now"which exists, but as it is something which
passes,will soon, almost immediatelyin fact, exist no longer;this is the present
as an instant hanging between two non-existents, the past and the future.Fur-
ther to this, Hegel writes in the next paragraph,sec. 259 (Hegel 1970, 1:233):
"The dimensions of time, present, future, and past, are the becomingof exte-
riorityas such, and the resolution (Auflisung) of it into the differencesof Be-
ing as passingover into nothing, and of nothing as passingover into Being."
But to understand"becoming"(devenir)as the co-implication of presence and
nothingness, as a twofold negation of the "now,"while it is accurateas faras it
goes, is incomplete. If time is "the being which, in being, is not and in non-
being, is," then this means also, rigorouslyput: "Time itself is not what it is."
Time is not always(simultaneously,successively,and permanently) the same
as itself. The conceptof time has its own moments: it differentiatesitself and
thus temporalizes itself.

LOGICALDIFFERENTIATION

Froma carefulreadingof Encyclopediasec. 258 and sec. 259, this differen-

tiation emergesclearly.Time is in fact presentedat onceaccordingto its class-
ical Greek determination, that of Aristotle, and accordingto its modem de-
termination, that of Kant. If the analysis of the now, the definition of time
as "abeing which in being, is not" (Aristotle 1984b IV, 10, 218 b 29) is effec-
tively borrowedfrom PhysicsIV, the definition of time as "the pure form of
sensibility"-Hegel writes, in fact: "Time, like space, is a pure form of sense
or intuition; it is the non-sensuoussensuous (dasunsinnlicheSinnliche)"(Heg-
el 1970, 1:230; 1969-1979, 9:48)-is clearly taken from the Critiqueof Pure
Reason(Kant 1996).
By claiming, in the Remarkto sec. 258 (Hegel 1970, 1:230; 1969-1979,
9:49), "Time is the same principle as the 1=1of pure self-consciousness(das
selbePrinzipals das Ich=Ich),"Hegel absorbsthe conclusions of Kant'sanalysis
210 Hypatia

and recallsthe identity of the "cogito"and time itself. This identity of time and
the "cogito"cannot be reducedto a continuum of instants;ratherit appearsas
a synthetic unity (instancesynthftique),as a "waitand see."It is evident that by
defining time as a "sensiblenon-sensible"-a reference to the Kantian defi-
nition of the pureformof intuition-Hegel is not reducingthe understanding
of time to a mere series of nows. In this connection, JacquesDerridaremarks
how Heideggernever utters a word about the fact that Hegel introducesKant
"into his paraphraseof Aristotle."He fails to "relatethis Hegelian concept of
the 'sensuousnon-sensuous"'to its Kantian equivalent (44).18
The Hegelian analysisof time is not directed towardsthe single "now";nor
does time appearin it as "thatin which"becominghas its place. Hegel clarifies
this: "Itis not in time that everythingcomes to be and passesaway,rathertime
itself in the becoming." Derridacomments:"Hegeltook multiple precautionsof
this type. By opposingthem to all the metaphoricalformulationsthat state the
'fall' into time, . .. one could exhibit an entire Hegelian critique of intra-
temporality(Innerzeitigkeit)" (45).
The sameconclusions can be drawnabout the referenceto Aristotle. Hegel
clearly adopted the Aristotelian problematicof the "stigme"and, in defining
time, followed the firstphase of the aporiaas it is set out in PhysicsIV: time
is composed of "nows."But Hegel also takes on, although not explicitly, the
second part of the aporia:time is not composed of "nows."Derridaurgesour
attention on precisely this point. Aristotle's argument, in the second phase
of the aporia,maintains the impossibilitythat the parts of time can co-exist
with one another:"A now cannot coexist, as a currentand present now, with
another now as such"(Derrida1982, 54). Derridaconcludes:"The impossibil-
ity of coexistence can be posited as such only on the basis of a certain coex-
istence, of a certain simultaneityof the nonsimultaneous,in which the alterity
and identity of the now are maintainedtogether in the differentiatedelement
of a certain same (un certainm.me).... The impossible-the co-existence of
two nows-appears only in a synthesis ... in a certain complicity or compli-
cation maintaining(maintenant)together several current nows (maintenants)
which are said to be the one past and the other future"(55).
The writer drawsattention to the little word ama (hama), which appears
five times in PhysicsIV, 218a, and means "together,""all at once," "both to-
gether,"and "atthe same time."This locution "isfirstneither spatialnor tem-
poral."The simul,here, "saysthe complicity, the common origin of time (the
possibility of the synthesis of the coexistence of the nows) and space (the
potential synthesis of the coexistence of points), appearingtogether (com-
paraitre)as the condition for all appearingof Being" (1982, 56).
The exposition of PhysicsIV allowsus to see how Aristotle understandstime
at the same "time"as a sequence of nows and as an instance of synthesis.
Hegel, in his analysisof the relation between space and time, shows that he
 Catherine Malabou 211

carrieson here this same understandingof the synthesis. In referenceto space

he writes:"Itis inadmissibleto speakof spatialpoints as if they constituted the
positive element in space, (becauseon account of its lack of difference), space
is merely the possibility,not the positedness of a state of juxtaposition and
what is negative" (1970, 1:223; 1969-1979, 9:42).
Space, to the degree that it is a synthesis, is the originarypossibilityof
separation.19 Much the same is truefor time, whose synthetic unity is called by
Hegel "a negative unity."The dialectic of "Sense Certainty"in the Phenom-
enologyof Spiritexplicitly reveals the difference between the "here"and the
"now"understoodon the one hand as punctualphenomena, and on the other
as that synthesis which representsthe "now which is many nows."
In this capacityto differentiateitself fromitself time shows exactly the sign
of its plasticity.Yet this differentiation itself furtherrequiresa twofoldunder-
standing.For it is, on the one hand, synchronic-the Hegelian concept of time
does not reduce to a singularmeaning. And on the other hand, it is diachron-
ic-to say that time is not alwayswhat it is signifiesalso that it differentiates
itself from itself in time, that it has, to put it another way, a history.

B. CHRONOLOGICAL
DIFFERENTIATION

In the Encyclopedia paragraphson space and time, the implicit referencesto

Aristotle and Kant make it possible to clarifya fundamentalcharacteristicof
Hegel's thought. The "waitand see," the structureof subjective anticipation,
which is the originarypossibilityof all encounter (vis-a-vis),is not thesamein
everymomentof its history,it does not "see things coming" (voirvenir) in the
same way,it doesnot havethesamefuture(avenir).Subjectivity itself "comesto
be" (advient)in two fundamentalmoments: theGreekmomentand themodem
moment,which prove to be, both in their logical unity and in their chronolog-
ical succession, "subjectas substance"and "substanceas subject."Hegelian
philosophy synthesizes two understandings:ousia-hypokemenon-theGreek
substance-subject;subjectum-substantia-themoder substance-subject.
In the advent of Christianity,which he saw as the "axison which the his-
tory of the world turs" (Hegel 1991b, 319), Hegel saw the emergence of the
modem conception of subjectivity which dialectically sublates (relive) the
earlierGreek conception. The subject thus differsfrom itself chronologically
and logically. Firstthe "substance-subject" shows itself as a substance-subject,
then as a substance-subject;one needs to respect the accentuation here, in-
sisting on, to repeat the terms of BernardBourgeois,"The substitutionof the
primacyof Christianthought, which is subjectivist('the subjectis substance'),
for the primacy of pagan thought, which is substantialist ('substance is the
subject')"(Bourgeois 1992, 68).
We will attempt to bring to light both the logical and chronological differ-
212 Hypatia

entiations of these two "trials"(proces)of the "waitand see."They appear,in

Hegelian philosophy,as the two greatmoments of subjectivity'scoming-to-be,
the firstthe epoch that standsunderthe name of Aristotle, the second the one
which belongs to Kant.
The power of Hegel's thought comes from his transformationof the rela-
tion of these two modalities of the "waitand see"from a historical succession
to a "facea face"encounter at the level of philosophy.The firstmodalityarises
fromwhat it is possible to call the originarysyntheticunityof a teleological
move-
ment in potentialityand in action. The other modality stems from the originary
syntheticunity of apperception,the foundation of representation(Vorstellung).
Now it is the double sense of the locutions "in itself" and "foritself" which
demonstratesthis claim. The speculativecontent itself follows the movement
shapedby this contrastbetween the "in itself"and the "foritself,"a movement
conceivable in two ways.On the one hand, it opposeswhat is "potentiality"to
what is "actual"20;on the other hand, it opposes the truth known in the form
of "certainty"(truth'ssubjective moment) to the truth known in the form of
"truth"(truth'smoment of objectivity).
At the core of his philosophy, Hegel determines a speculative relation
between the teleologicalcircularityand the representational linearity,which re-
calls representationto its Greek past and announces a posteriorito Greek phi-
losophy its representativefuture.In return,Greek thought appearsas much the
future of representationas representationthe future of Greek thought. This
game of the double "waitand see"makesreadingHegel more tryingthan read-
ing almost any other philosopher.Reading Hegel amounts to finding oneself
in two times at once: the process that unfolds is both retrospectiveand pro-
spective.In the present time in which readingtakes place, the readeris drawn
to a double expectation: waiting for what is to come (accordingto a thought
which is linear), while presupposingthat the outcome has alreadyarrived(ac-
cording to the teleological ruse).
There has not yet been any study dedicated to uncovering what these two
"great moments of subjectivity"promise: nothing less than the immanent
temporalizationof the System. For these two moments don't belong to the
same rime. By configuringitself in both perspectives, Hegelian thought an-
nounces the arrival(I'advenue) of a new time. And here awaitsthe underlying
question of my work:if there is a time that is the synthesis of its own content,
thus as much a logical form as a chronological one, how can we explain its
nature?

EXPOSITIONAND TRANSCENDENTAL
C. SPECULATIVE EXPOSITION

Indeed the Philosophyof Naturehas alreadydriven time out of nature,there-

by revealingthat the concept of time exceeds its initial definition. This excess
 Catherine Malabou 213

is not, however, exhibited for itself within the System. No moment of the
speculative exposition can occupy the overarchingposition: there is no spec-
ulative "arche-moment."The "wait and see" does not enjoy a transcendental
stature.Any transcendentalinstance necessarilyfindsitself in a position of ex-
teriorityin relation to that which it organizes.By its nature, the condition of
possibility is other than that which it makes possible. Yet the Hegelian con-
ception of a systemimpliespreciselythe opposite:the absenceof any "outside"
of the System.Dialecticalphilosophyis systematically non-transcendental.
There
is no place, in Hegel, for a specific analysis of the concept of time, one that
would demonstrateits plastic character.
In this regard,our approachshall be not so much thematicas strategic.It is a
strategydriven by the two concepts-of "plasticity"and "voirvenir"-whose
construction is the keystone of this project. An economyof sensibletranslation
-to borrow the Kantian definition of "hypotyposis"21-isitself figuredsen-
suously by these concepts. This translation of the concept into the form of
the sensuousis in essence systematic,an operation which the transcendental
deduction cannot account for.
In the Phenomenology of Spirit,Hegel declares,"The singularindividual is,
on its own terms, the transition of the concept into external reality;it is the
pure schema itself (das reineSchema)"(Hegel 1977, 143; 1941, 1:201). The
living being can constructits own schemafor itself, and this, the unificationof
the concept with empirical existence, cannot be explained by anything ex-
ternalto the system.The scarcityof referencesto the notion of plasticityis thus
evidence of its distinct mode of presence, which is that of the originarysyn-
thesis, maintainedonly in the interval between presence and absence. It is for
this reason,becauseplasticity workswithin the body (au corps)of the system-
atic presentation,without ever extending above it or overdeterminingit, that
it is revealed as the concept capable of accounting for the incarnation, or
incorporation,of spirit.

IV. A READINGOF THEPHILOSOPHY

OF SPIRIT

At this point it is possible to bring together the lines of force which

determinethe strategyof this reading.The "waitand see"(voirvenir)standsfor
the operation of synthetic temporalizingin Hegel's thought, which means it
is the structureof anticipation through which subjectivity projectsitself in
advance of itself, and therebyparticipatesin the processof its own determina-
tion. Plasticity for its part guaranteesthe differentialenergy which moves at
the heart of the "waitand see,"appearingas the condition of possibilityfor this
projection.
The "waitand see"is doublydifferentiated.Logically,it gatherstogether the
different significationsof the Hegelian understandingof time: a whole and a
214 Hypatia

relation of moments (past,present,future),a synthetic structure(self-determi-

nation), a sensuous translation of the concept. Chronologically, it has itself a
history, which is unfolded in history within being reducible to it. The sub-
stance-subject is "seento come" (se voirvenir)throughtwo momentsof its own
identity, the Greek and the modem. These two majormoments each possess
their own conception of the relation between the ecstasesof time,one having
a conception of it as synthesisor self-determination, the other as hypotyposis.
Furthermore,the "infiniteelasticity of the absolute form (unendlicheElazizitat
derabsoluteForm),"fromwhich follows the temporalizationof the "process"of
the substance-subject,is that which can determine, in every moment of the
substance-subject,its "form(Form)"(Hegel 1971, 291). The form,we can say,
is the "relation (Verhaltnis)which self-consciousness takes to the body of
truth"(284).
To studyhow this device (dispositif)functions in each of its epochs, we will
enter into the "forwardmarchof spirit,"embracingits temporaldeploymentin
the places where time is supposedto be absent:in the Philosophyof Spiritof the
Encyclopedia of PhilosophicalSciences.The last edition of 1830 will be the basis
for this reading.In his Remarkto sec. 387 (Hegel 1971, 25), Hegel displaysthe
processof spiritualanticipation:
and so in spiritevery characterunderwhich it appearsis a stage
in a process of specification and development, a step forward
(Vorwartsgehen) towardsits goal (seinemZiele),in orderto make
itself into, and to realizein itself, what it implicitlyis. Eachstep,
again, is itself such a process, and its product is that what the
mind was implicitly at the beginning (and so for the observer)
it is for itself-for the special form, what spirithas in that step.
... In the philosophical vision of spirit as such, spirit is studied
as self-instructionand self-cultivation in its very essence, and
its exteriorizations(seineAuJ3erungen) are stages in the process
which brings it forwardto itself (seinesSich-zu-sich-selbst-Her-
vorbringen),links it to unity with itself (seines Zusammensch-
lieJ3ens mit sich), and so makes it actual spirit.

The readingofferedhere intends to pay particularattention to that struc-

turewithin the Philosophyof Spiritwhich leadsfromthe "sleepof spirit"(Schlaf
des Geistes)-the "passivenous of Aristotle" (Hegel 1971, 29)-to the "intel-
ligence which thinks itself": Aristotle's idea presented in the citation from
Metaphysicswhich closes the Encyclopedia(Aristotle 1984a, 7, 1072b, 18-30).
The Philosophyof Spiritforms a space extending from nous to nous. However,
between potentiality and act there develops in another place a time which
does not move forwardaccording to a teleological deployment: the time of
representation,
 Catherine Malabou 215

which gives to the instances of the content of the absolute

spirit, on the one hand, a separatebeing, making them presup-
positions towardseach other and phenomena which succeed
one afterthe other (aufeinanderfolgender (Hegel
Erscheinungen).
1969-1979, 10:3)
Central to our analysisis the way these two perspectives,Greek and modem,
are constructedand detailed.
The Hegelian exposition of Aristotle's passive nous is found in the "An-
thropology":the exposition of the temporalityof representationin "Revealed
Religion";and it is the citation from the Metaphysicswhich brings "Philoso-
phy" to its completion. The substance of the present work will consist of a
readingof these three moments of the Philosophyof Spirit:the firstmoment of
subjective spirit; the penultimate and the final moments those of absolute
spirit. These three times of the readingwill be titled, respectively:"The Hu-
manity of Hegel" ("L'Hommede Hegel");"The God of Hegel";and "The Phi-
losopher of Hegel."
The choice of this triad-"Humanity, God, Philosopher"-intends a delib-
erate allusion to Heidegger'sarticulation of "onto-theology."The challenge
here is to produce(provoquer)an interpretationof this triad that uncovers all
the surprisesit has in reserve for a reading concerned to present Humanity,
God, and the Philosopher of Hegel not as if they were fixed and substantial
entities but as perspectivesopento thecrossroadsof time.
What does that mean? Humanity,God, and Philosopherneed to be con-
sidered,to adoptHegel'sown phrase,as the "steps"(Stufe)in the development
of the substance-subject.One could think about this as if "steps"implied at
once a processof progressiveintensity and a succession of stages, as if the life
of the concept were governedby the rhythm of Humanity,God, Philosopher,
and as if it requiredan achievement of the concept by itself which, although it
is manifestedin history,has no history of its own, in the sense that it does not
have to maketimefor itself(faireson temps).
But in fact, Humanity, God, Philosopher,far from being subjects consti-
tuted in advance, turn out to be the sites where subjectivityformsitself. They
are the plasticinstances(instancesplastiques)where the three greatmoments of
self-determination-the Greek, the moder, and that of absoluteknowledge
-give themselves the "form"of moments; in other words,where they create
their specific temporality.Fromthis perspective, the notion of "step"loses its
evaluative content, and only signifiesthe breakor interruption-the operation
of breaking(coupe(s))- in the self-formationof time itself.
If one begins with the idea of such breaks, a discourse is invited that is
not content to argueeither for the unity of the logical genesis or for that of
the chronological genesis, but instead tries to locate the space of their com-
mon origin within the speculativedevelopment. Such a discourse-where the
216 Hypatia

times meet and intersect-draws from the source of that which it tries to
describe:from a speculative supplenesswhich is neither passion nor passivity,
but plasticity.
In what follows, at each moment of this triad, we need to select for ex-
amination a primordialmodalityof substancein its self-determinationand its
recurringnegativity. By doing this, we will take a contraryapproachto the
sortof discoursewhich believes it can discardthe anthropological,theological,
and philosophic materialwhose noveltyHegel bringsto light. For within this
detail will be revealed the unique perspective of a philosophy of the event.
Further,if we take this thought to the limit, we find the possibility open to
Hegel's philosophy to registeritself as an event. By means of the disciplineof
plasticityin its reading, the Encyclopedia,the ultimate expressionof Hegelian
thought, will disclose all the gentleness of its maturity.

NOTES

We very warmlythank LibrairiePhilosophiqueJ. Vrinfor grantingpermissionto

publisha translationof this work.
1. Firstpublishedas the introductionto CatherineMalabou,L'Avenir deHegel:
Plasticite, Dialectique.
Temporalite, Paris:Vrin,1996.A fulltranslationof the workinto
Englishis forthcomingwith RoutledgePress,London.Ed
2. JoanStambaugh translatesthispassageasfollows:"Because Hegel'sconceptof
timepresentsthe mostradicalwayin whichthe vulgarunderstanding of timehasbeen
given form conceptually, and one which has received too little attention"(Heidegger
1996,390). Forthe originalin SeinundZeit,see Heidegger(1984,428). Trans.
3. CompareHeidegger's formulain SeinundZeit(Heidegger1984,424):"aright-
away that is no longer."Trans.
4. I haveusedthe Frenchof Heidegger's Hegel'sPhenomenology of Spiritcitedby
CatherineMalabou.The Englishtranslationof thispassagereads:"Hegeloccasionally
speaksabouthavingbeen,butneveraboutthefuture.Thisaccordswithhisviewof the
pastas the decisivecharacterof time. It is a fadingaway,somethingtransitoryand
alwaysbygone."[Thepassageappearsin the Frenchtranslationby EmmanuelMar-
tineauin Heidegger(1984, 13). Trans.]Heideggerdeclaresin the samelectureseries
thatHegeldevelopsa fundamental viewof beingaccordingto whichwhatis a genuine
beingis "whathasreturned to itself"(Heidegger1984, 146).
5. "TheGermanlanguagehaspreserved essencein thepastparticiple(gewesen) of
the verb'to be' (sein);foressenceis past-but timelesslypast-being" (Hegel1976b,
389).
6. EmadandMalygive,"Hegel'sexplicationof the genuineconceptof being-in
thepassagejustindicated,wheretimeismentioned-is nothinglessthanleavingtime
behindon the roadto spirit,whichis eternal"(Heidegger1988,147).Malaboucites
the Frenchtranslation,Hegel(1941, 224). Trans.
7. Thatis,theversionsof Jena(1804-5 and1805-6)andthatof theEncyclopedia
of Philosophic Sciencesin its threeeditions(1817, 1827, 1830).
 Catherine Malabou 217

8. In particular,Bourgeois (1991); Labarriere(1970; 1986); Lebrun (1972),

especially chap. 8; Souche-Dagues (1986; 1990), especially chap. 3, "History,"and
(1994, Part 3), "Timeand History"and "Conclusion."
9. The word entered the French language in 1785 (DictionnaireRobert).The
BrockhausDictionary shows that Plazizititwas introducedinto German "in the age of
Goethe (dead in 1832)."
10. I reproducehere what is written in Grimm'sdictionary under the heading
and "Plastisch."
"Plastik,""Plastiker,"

PLASTIK, feminine noun, from the French, plastique,from the Greek

("techne"), the creative arts, which create organic forms out of matter
(by cutting, chiseling, casting), in the narrow sense of the word, the
"modeling arts.""The objective of all those arts, which, to honor the
Greeks, we will henceforth call 'plastic,' is to display the dignity of the
human through the mediumof the human form"(Goethe). "The plastic
artsare only effective on the highest level" (Goethe). "Paintingenjoys a
far wider domain, and greater freedom, than anything possible to the
plastic arts"(Hans Meyer).
PLASTIKER,masculinenoun, creativeartist."Dadelus,the firstcre-
ative artist"(Goethe).
"Who daresto write poetry,and is ashamedof languageand rhythm,
is like the plastic artist, who builds pictures out of air"(Platen).
"A plastic poet:our two greatestRomantics,Goethe and August von
Schlegel, are at the same time our greatest creative artists"(Heine).
PLASTISCH, adjective and adverb, "physicallyforming, shaping,
or shaped,usefulor appropriateto plasticity":"Belief,love, hope... once
they felt a plastic drive in their nature, they joined together with ener-
gy and produceda charming creation .... patience" (Goethe). "Plastic
anatomy"(Goethe). "The plastic natureof men" (Schiller). "Plasticrep-
resentations" (A.W. Schlegel). "Gervinus the plastic artist";"plastic
poet" (Heine); his "plasticpoetry,"whose formsseemed to emerge right
out of the body (Heine). "To present plastically, to paint plastically"
(with forms strongly grounded), "to delineate with plastic clarity"(Le-
nau); "plasticpeacefulness"(Auerbach);"plasticacts of violence," "steal-
ing treasuresof sculpture"(Klopstock); "the act of sculpting, of model-
ing." [Roughrendition of Grimm'snineteenth-century language.Trans.]
11. In Lectureson thePhilosophyof History(Hegel 1991b), Pericles is describedas
the paradigmof a "plastic individual":"Pericleswas a statesman of plastic antique
character"(259). It was at Pericles' instigation that there originated "the production
of those eternal monuments of sculpture":his orations were addressed"to a band of
men whose genius has become classical for all centuries"(260-61). We find here the
same examples:Thucydides, Socrates, Aristophanes. Alexander himself is character-
ized as a "plasticspirit":"(He) had been educated by the deepest and also the most
comprehensive thinker of antiquity-Aristotle; and the education was worthy of the
man who had undertakenit. Alexander was initiated into the profoundestmetaphys-
ics: thereforehis naturewasthoroughlyrefinedand liberatedfromthe customarybonds
of mere opinion, cruditiesand idle fancies (dadurchwurdeseinNaturellvollkommenge-
218 Hypatia

reinigtundvon densonstigenBandenderMeinung,derRoheit,dasleereVorsteUens befreit).

Aristotle left this grandnature as untrammeledas it was before his instructionscom-
menced;but impressedupon it a deep perception of what truth is, and formedthe spirit
which nature had endowed with genius, to a plastic being rolling freely like a sphere
through the ether" (272; translation modified).
"Plastic,"in all these instances, clearly stands for "that which has the character
of mobility."ComparingAthens to Sparta, Hegel describesthe former,cradle of the
"plastic individuals,"as the exemplaryhome of "greatindustry,susceptibility to ex-
citement, and development of individuality within the sphere of ethical spirit (eine
grosseBetriebsamkeit, Regsamkeit,AusbildungderIndividualititinnerhalbdesKreiseseines
sitdichenGeistes)."In Sparta, on the other hand, "we witness rigid abstractvirtue-a
life devoted to the State, but in which the mobility, the freedom of individuality are
put in the background(aberso, dassdieRegsamkeit,dieFreiheitderIndividualitttzurick-
gesetztist)" (261-62).
In the Lectureson theHistoryof Philosophy(Hegel 1955), Vol. 1, Hegel calls Greek
philosophy "plastic"(Introduction, 152); later we find the descriptionof Socrates as a
"plastic"individual (393).
12. Forthese individualsare in fact called "plastic"with direct referenceto sculp-
ture: "All of them are out and out artistsby nature, ideal artists shaping themselves,
individuals of a single cast, works of art standing there, like immortal and deathless
images of the gods, in which there is nothing temporal and doomed. The same plas-
ticity is characteristicof the worksof art which victors in the Olympics made of their
bodies, and indeed even of the appearanceof Phryne, the most beautiful of women,
who rose from the sea naked in the eyes of all Greece" (Hegel 1975a, 2:719-20).
13. In the Lectureson theHistoryof Philosophy,Hegel says of Socrates' interlocu-
tors:"Suchpersonagesare, as we alreadysawin connection with Socrates (Hegel 1955,
1: 402), plastic personagesas regardsthe conversations:no one is put there to state his
own views, or, as the French express it, pourplacerun mot"(Hegel 1955, 2:17; Hegel
1971-1978, 3:402). [Also in the Historyof Philosophy,Hegel sees fit to remind us that
Socrates, the son of a sculptor,was broughtup to practice this art (Hegel 1955, 1:389).
Trans.]
14. In one of its synonyms,plasticity signifies"malleability"(Bildsamkeit),mean-
ing flexibility,docility. Its second meaning-"the power to give form"-finds illustra-
tion in the Hegelian vocabularyof information,or communication;one can think in
particularof the substantives"Ein-undDurchbildung."
15. Catherine Malabou cites the French text (Hegel 1981, 379); the German
(Hegel 1969-1979, 6) is on 561. Trans.
16. In the conclusion of his essay on The ScientificWaysof TreatingNaturalLaw,
Hegel shows that spiritualdevelopment in its differentmoments(still characterizedin
this epoch with the term Potenzen)emergeat once froman appearanceand an explosion
of form: "The absolute totality restricts itself as necessity in each of its spheres, pro-
duces itself out of them as a totality, and recapitulatesthere the precedingspheresjust
as it anticipates the succeeding ones. But one of these is the greatest power ... it is
necessaryfor individualityto advance throughmetamorphoses,and for all that belongs
to the dominant stage to weaken and die, so that all stages of necessity appearas such
stages in this individualitybut the misfortuneof this period of transition (i.e. that this
strengthening of the new formation has not yet cleansed itself absolutely of the past)
 Catherine Malabou 219

is wherethe positiveresides.And althoughnature,withina specificform,advances

with a uniform(not mechanicallyuniformbut uniformlyaccelerated)movement,it
still enjoysa newformwhichit acquires.As natureentersthatform,so it remainsin
it, justas a shell startssuddenlytowardsits zenithandthen restsfora momentin it;
metalwhenheateddoesnot turnsoft like wax,but all at once becomesliquidand
remainsso-for thisphenomenonis the transitionintothe absoluteoppositeandso is
infinite,andthisemergenceof the oppositeout of infinityorout of its nothingnessis
a leap(einSprung). The shape,in its new-bornstrength,at firstexistsforitselfalone,
beforeit becomesconsciousof itsrelationto another.Justso,thegrowingindividuality
hasboththe delightof the leapin enteringa newformandalsoan enduringpleasure
in its newform,untilit gradually opensupto the negative;andin its declinetoo it is
suddenandbrittle(undauchin ihremUntergange aufeinmalundbrechend ist)"(Hegel
1975b,131-32).
17. "Sieist dasSein, das,indemes ist, nichtist, andindemes nichtist, ist."
18. Derridaaddsthat"itis wellknownthatHeideggerconsideredHegelto have
coveredoveranderasedKant'saudaciousness in manyrespects"(Derrida1982,44).
19. HegelusesAuseinandersetzen in the senseof "juxtaposition" as well as "sep-
aration."Trans.
20. See, forexample,Hegelon Aristotle:"the'dunamis' is the disposition,the 'in
itself,'the objectiveelement:alsothe abstractuniversalin general,the Idea,insofaras
merelypotentia,'Foritself'means'in act':L'energeia is the actualizingelement,nega-
tivitywhichrelatesitselfto itself"(Hegel1971-1978,3:518,519). [TheEnglishtrans-
lationgivesthis:"Itis firstin energy,or moreconcretely,in subjectivity, thathe finds
the actualizingform,the self-relating negativity"(Hegel1955,2:138).Trans.]
21. "All hypotyposis . . . consistsin makinga concept sensible,and is either
schematic or symbolic"(Kant1987,226).

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