of the DAE.

In such desperation
there appears to be no revision
of policy in light of the
Table of Contents changed global environment. The
shortage of uranium is one
reason why the government was
anxious to strike a deal with
the US on nuclear power. With
the old policy in operation the
DAE may be creating an ugly
situation for itself and
endangering a huge innocent
DAE's GAMBIT population.

The Economic and Political Self-Reliance Redundant

Weekly
August 6, 2005 Uranium was a strategic metal
Commentary till the early 1980s. It may be
Xavier Dias surprising to know, but the
strategic value of aluminium or
The Department of Atomic Energy alumina or bauxite has climbed
has been vigorously trying to up,2 whereas that of uranium has
extract uranium from different moved down.
ores across the country in the With the end of the cold war,
hope of feeding an expanded the opening up of the Balkan
nuclear power programme. states, the price of uranium in
However, it faces resistance the international market has
from local people wherever it fallen and it is available not
wants to set up uranium mines. only off the shelf but on the
In Jharkhand, where mining is net as well. But DAE seems to be
already taking place, there has still following the policy of
been opposition in new areas the mid-1970s when self-reliance
where the DAE hopes to mine was the mantra. With the
uranium. exception of the state of
Meghalaya, at all the sites
by Xavier Dias where the atomic mineral
division of the DAE has
By 2015, India plans to increase explored, the quality of ore is
nuclear energy productions from of extremely low grade (less
the present 2 per cent to 20 per than .02 per cent). Yet DAE is
cent; for this target to be met opening new mines in these low
the Department of Atomic Energy grade areas. Is this a sign of
(DAE) and its undertaking the desperation or is it motivated
Uranium Corporation of India by the massive budgets they have
(UCIL) has to produce the (over Rs 2,000 crore a year).3
uranium. But in the past 15 Does the DAE want uranium or is
years they have not been able to it acting similar to other
open a new1 mining site. government development
With 10 years to go and the programmes, now known as the
gestation period of establishing 'March loot' syndrome. If the
a productive uranium mine not latter is correct then they may
less than 10 years, the anxiety be doing more harm to national
seems to be bearing on top brass security and self-reliance.
 2

Besides squandering public funds when the tribal leaders came to

they could reduce the industrial know about this, they
city of Jamshedpur to a immediately put pressure on the
'sacrificed country' in the way council, which then withdrew the
the Manhattan project did in New NOC as well as any plans to give
Mexico, US. In such a scenario their lands for mining. UCIL
those resisting these new went on a publicity blitz to
uranium mines may not only have convince the people of Meghalaya
something important to say but that the mining of uranium is
could correct this absurd course safe and will lead to the
being taken by DAE. development of the state.

Stiff Public Resistance Last year, they invited a

delegation of political leaders
Nalgonda to visit Jadugora in Jharkhand
to see and experience the
In the past years wherever DAE facilities they provide to their
has set foot to open a new workers at the newly constructed
mining project it has faced one Narwarpahar colony.
setback after another. The The delegations comprising two
Indian public is now much more members from the Meghalaya
aware of the ill-effects of assembly and one each from the
radiation and does not accept Khasi Students Union (KSU) and
DAE's assurances to the Meghalaya People's Human Rights
contrary. In Nalgonda, AP, due Council (MPHRC) were flown in.
to a good coordination by the The tour was conducted in total
Movement against Uranium Project secrecy. Outside calls were
(MAUP),4 a Hyderabad-based NGO, barred. The local press from
the AP pollution board refused Jamshedpur was not allowed to
to give an no objection meet them and even refused entry
certificate (NOC) to the mine into Narwarpahar colony. On
there. UCIL had to approach the hearing this the delegates were
central government for a second not only disgusted but concluded
public hearing. that UCIL must have something to
hide.
Meghalaya Thus UCIL failed to impress upon
the delegation that its
In Meghalaya too, there has been operations are safe and mining
stiff resistance since 1992 and in Meghalaya would result in the
UCIL has not been able to development of the state. After
convince the public and win over returning to Shillong, they
the dissent. refused to give their consent.
Besides the state comes within It was a public relations fiasco
the VI Schedule of the Indian for UCIL and DAE. As this paper
Constitution which vests more is being written (June 2005)
rights including the mineral another delegation of the
rights to the tribal land- Meghalaya assembly is in
holders. Acquiring land here Jadugora. To mine in Meghalaya,
needs the approval of the DAE will have to change the
district tribal council as 95 provision of the VI Schedule of
per cent of the lands in the the Constitution.
state are owned by tribal
peoples. In 1991 DAE had managed Jadugora-Badhuranga
to hoodwink the council and get
its NOC for Atomic Mineral Facing setbacks in Nalgonda and
Division (AMD), prospect in Meghalaya they have decided to
Domiasiat west Kashi hills, but bulldoze their way in Jharkhand.
 3

On March 25, 2004 the Jharkhand district administration. The

state pollution control board villagers had resisted the entry
(JSPCB) had called for a public of the company all these months
hearing for a mining and ore but on May 16, 2005, accompanied
processing mill at Badhuranga with the police and CISF they
near Jamshedpur. started bulldozing the
UCIL decided to use strong arm 'Jaherstan' (sacred grove) of
tactics to put down dissent. the adivasis. This hit a
They brought in the paramilitary sensitive nerve and brought all
Rapid Action Force, armed with the adivasis from the
AK47s dressed in battle gear, sourrounding villages too in
besides the state police and the protest. The villagers resisted
Central Industrial Security and fought to save their
Force (CISF), and notorious Jaherstan resulting in some
mafia members from Jamshedpur. officers getting beaten up.
Thus, in a peaceful area UCIL
To get their men into an has spawned a conflict. The
aggressive mood, a free bar was sentiments and beliefs of the
set up just behind the tent adivasis in their Jaherstan are
where the JSPCB members were as sacred as any other religious
seated. Liquor was distributed community to their own sacred
to one and all. The contractor places. This disregard for the
lobby was also present with its sensitivities of the adivasis by
own musclemen. It was in this a public sector undertaking is
intimidating set-up that the deplorable and a reflection that
frightened adivasis had to voice officers from an elite
their feelings about giving up establishment such as DAE can be
their lands and livelihoods for callous. The villagers are
the project. The chairman of the filing a case against the
JSPCB failed to act impartially general manager of UCIL under
and manipulated the meeting in the SC/ST Atrocities Act for
such a way that those who dereliction of their religious
opposed the project were not place even though their
allowed to speak. Despite the confidence in the judicial
show of muscle and steel there system has worn out.
was a strong voice of opposition
at the hearing. Twenty years ago when plans were
afloat to start mining
In April this year even before operations in Turamdih and
reaching any settlement with the Badhuranga, a number of
villagers and even before outsiders, mainly non-adivasis,
getting the NOC from the purchased small plots of lands
pollution control board they in both these villages. Their
started construction activity in intention was to get a locus
Baduranga. Unlike in Jadugora standi and then claim permanent
and Turamdih where lands were jobs in the company. Today it is
taken over under the draconian these outsiders who are eager to
Land Requisition Act, this time sell their tiny plots to UCIL in
UCIL notices were served under return for jobs. And it is UCIL
the Atomic Energy Act. which is using these outsiders
Comparatively, the AEA is more to project to the state
civil. It clearly states that administration, the press and
purchase of lands has to be the public that the 'local'
negotiated. But UCIL instead of villagers want the project.
meeting villagers for a UCIL's undemocratic strategy at
negotiation, served notices for the public hearings has
requisition of lands through the backfired, it may become a
 4

victim of its own game plan. The realise that they had been
adivasis of all these areas are deceived. A majority 'failed'
now consolidating and uniting the medical test and therefore
against the company. were given daily wage jobs as
contract labour, not in UCIL but
Turamdih Controversy in another company Bharat Gold
Mines (BGM), undertaking a
Presently UCIL has mines at turnkey job. Thus, UCIL managed
Jadugora, Bhatin and to teach the villagers an
Narwarpahar. On January 26, important lesson, and this has
2004, it inaugurated Turamdih united them with the struggles
with much fanfare. The Turamdih going on in the other two areas,
project is controversial, Baduranga and Bagjanta.
abandoned 15 years ago on
grounds of economic non- Bagjanta
viability, where as it is now
when prices of uranium have After Turamdih and Baduranga,
fallen. This step in itself UCIL has set its eyes on yet
leads one to believe that DAE another mine. Bagjanta near the
has no rational policy and is closed Musabani Copper Mines of
possessed with only expending HCL. Here too they stage-managed
the budget they have. the public hearing on October
20, 2004. On May 27, 2005,
In such an absurd situation DAE before acquiring the lands or
is earning the wrath of the paying any compensation to the
adivasis. villagers, or getting the NOC
The villagers had formed the from the JPCB, UCIL directly
Turamdih Vistapit Sangh,5 and entered the village and started
this body together with the well putting up fences. Revolts are
known Jadugora movement launched now brewing wherever UCIL is
a long and militant movement setting foot. The strategy of
against the opening of this the UCIL management has been to
mine. For the Jadugora movement divide the adivasis, co-opt
this was a big challenge. Having their leadership and set up the
inspired and supported the outsider settlers against them.
resistance movements in This strategy goes against the
Meghalaya and Nalgonda it was times. A public sector
well oiled to handle Turamdih. corporation cheating the
The awareness about the hazards adivasis? Creating social
of uranium mining nationally and conflict instead of social
internationally had grown. The responsibility?
company promised jobs to 26 of
the village youth. The lure of The Jadugora movement brought to
permanent jobs and the the world stage the results of
perquisites that come with them, uranium mining on their people.
created a division within the Birth deformities, miscarriages,
movement. A majority of the rare cancers, early deaths.
villagers were against the mine. After undergoing so much of pain
All the women and village elders and suffering in Jadugora, do
were determined not to give up they not have a right to say
their agricultural lands, sacred that they do not want more and
groves and dwellings of the more of their people to be
spirits of their ancestors sacrificed? Do these adivasis
called 'Sarna'. But a handful of have any rights? The DAE has
young men of the village had brought conflict into a peace
their way. Only after handing loving adivasi population. It
over their lands did they
 5

may 'handle' or 'manage' this. South Asians Against Nukes

What will become of Jamshedpur? Mailing List:
archives are available @ two
Uranium mining is so hazardous locations
that no where in the world will May 1998 - March 2002:
you find them near human
habitation. But this state
monopoly has not only been
mining alongside habitation, but
has opted for the open pit
technology. Open pit technology
for uranium is considered
economically cheaper and less
dangerous for the worker. But
this is for the simple reason
that in an open pit mine, the
radon gas that is continuously
being emitted gets better
ventilation than an underground
mine. What this also means is
that from the mine pit, the gas
will flow into the surrounding
air. This is potentially a major
health risk for the people
living in Jamshedpur and its
environs, which are in close
proximity to Jadugora and the
uranium mines.

Notes

1 Turamdih is an abandoned mine

reopened in January 2004.
2 Mines and Mineral Review.
3 This budget is only for the
mines division. If the other
divisions 'budgets' are included
and the cost of construction of
the mines mills, etc, it will
work out to be much higher.
4 For more information visit
www.miningcommunities.org
5 Organisation of Displaced
People of Turamdih.

_________________________________

SOUTH ASIANS AGAINST NUKES

(SAAN):
An informal information platform
for
activists and scholars concerned
about
Nuclearisation in South Asia
 6

World Bank In Jharkhand1

Accountability Mechanisms & Indigenous Peoples’

Xavier Dias

Abstract
A hundred and fifty years of plunder of the mineral wealth of Jharkhand2 in India has caused untold
suffering, pain and death to the forty plus Indigenous Nations who consider this their homeland. The
Mining Industry, be it Government owned, private sector or the small scale operators have treated the
Indigenous Peoples’ as another overburden to be removed and then dumped. Rehabilitation and
compensation for livelihoods lost has been a far cry. Contrary, they land up as the largest group of under-
trials in jails and face more litigation in the Courts where the mining companies have their sway. The
thoughtless destruction by the Mining Industry to the ecosystems and biodiversity has yet to begin to be
addressed.
The case in point is Coal India Ltd, India's largest coal mining company. With the entry of the World Bank
as its lender the Adivasis3 whose lands were taken for the mine expected a turning point in the practices of
the coal company. Disappointed that this did not happen they saw a ray of hope in the Inspection Panel
mechanism of the World Bank where their grievances could at least be addressed. Through an extremely
formal process, needing skills and abilities of urban elites, this small group of Adivasis sincerely and
painstakingly walked the last mile for justice.
The article takes the Inspection Panel accountability mechanism of the World Bank and brings to focus the
trend in corporate relationships where codes of conduct and self regulatory mechanisms are being preferred
over statuary laws of democratically elected bodies.

Key words: World Bank, Coal Mines, Jharkhand, Adivasi, Indigenous, Corporate Social Responsibility,
Accountability, Sustainable Development, Environment, Ecology

‘World Bank decides if I have the right to live’

Pano Devi
a basket weaver woman evicted from Turi tola Parej4.

Backdrop to IP
Over the past two decades Indigenous Peoples’ all around the world have brought to public attention the
many violations on their homelands, of their cultural heritage and political rights by World Bank funded
projects. In numerous memorandums they have affirmed that the destruction to their homelands is a threat
to their very survival. As a remedial measure the World Bank set up its own accountability mechanism
known as the Inspection Panel. It would serve as a means to create change in the way the human and
environmental factors would be dealt with during World Bank funded projects.
Corporations too responded with the new idea of ‘Business Partners’ where, partnership, engagement and
codes of conduct would bring in a better ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’. Structural and behavioural
changes were promised in the way Corporations run our planet. The centre piece of these initiatives

1
(Published in the August 05 issue of LEAD a peer reviewed Legal & Environmental Journal published from Geneva.
2
Jharkhand a State of Adivasi peoples’ stretches across the central plateau region of India.
3
The Indigenous Peoples of peninsular India prefer to call themselves Adivasi which means first people,
4
In the video documentary ‘Do I have the right to live’ CASS
 7

expounds a Win-Win theory as workable, where Industry and affected communities can be partners in
sustainable development.
In June 2001, a small group of Adivasis 5 from the Hazaribagh Coal Belt in Jharkhand, under the banner of
Chottanagpur Adivasis Seva Samiti6 (CASS) wrote a letter to the World Bank Inspection Panel (IP)
drawing its attention to the violations at the East Parej Coal Mines, by Coal India Ltd, (CIL)7 of the World
Bank’s stated Policies and Procedures.8 The policies violated included OD 4.30 Involuntary Resettlement,
OD 4.20 Indigenous Peoples, OD 4.01 Environmental Assessment, OD 13.05 Project Supervision, BP
17.05 Disclosure of Information, and OPN 11.03 Management of Cultural Property. CASS as an affected
party sincerely, systematically and painstakingly walked the last mile to have their grievances addressed
and get justice for their people. This report documents the process, the outcome and the consequences.

The World Bank Loan

In the mid 1990’s Coal India Ltd made a request to the World Bank for a loan to execute their worker
retrenchment programme; it being part of the structural reform process and expansion of the coal sector.
Since the World Bank does not fund ‘worker retrenchment’ programmes it offered instead to provide
finance for rehabilitation work due to the expansions at twenty five coal mines of CIL. In September 1997 a
US $ 530 million loan was thus sanctioned called the Coal Sector Rehabilitation Project (CSRP). Related to
this, and specifically to assist CIL to mitigate the environmental and social impacts of the expansion funded
by the CSRP, in July 1996 another loan of US$ 63 million was given for the Coal Sector Environmental
Social Mitigation Project (CSESMP)9. It was classified as a Category A project for purposes of OD 4.01,
that is, Environmental Impact Assessment, part and parcel of which is to prevent, minimize, mitigate, or
compensate for negative environmental and social impact.10

The IP Report
In their letter to the IP, CASS had raised the question of income restoration and economic
rehabilitation of those evicted11 by CIL at the East Parej Mine. Income restoration is an
especially important factor when dealing with Indigenous communities whose skills and
livelihood resources are land and forest based and not part of the money economy. The
CASS questions were well within the World Bank’s policy statement (OD 4.30,
paragraph 3(b) (iii)) ‘displaced persons are assisted to improve, or at least restore, their
former living standards, income earning capacity, and production levels’
Visits were made from Washington to assess the allegations in the CASS complaint letter. On finding
sufficient ground for an investigation by the Inspection Panel, East Parej was taken up as a case for
investigation. The IP visited Parej on two occasions, met the relevant people, did extensive inquiries, and
released their Report in November 200212. The Report lists over 30 violations of the World Bank’s own

5
The Indigenous Peoples of peninsular India prefer to call themselves Adivasi which means first people,
6
Service Committee of Chotanagpur Adivasis.
7
India’s largest coal producer owned by the Central Government.
8
See IFC Environment and Social Policies,
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/enviro.nsf/Content/PoliciesandGuidelines, and A Citizen’s Guide to the World
Bank Inspection Panel, http://www.ciel.org/Publications/citizensguide.pdf, for a complete description of
policies and procedures
9
See International Bank for Reconstruction and Development , ‘Management Report and Recommendation
in Response to the Inspection Panel Investigation Report No. 24000’, (July 25, 2003) p 3 [14] ‘The
CSESMP became effective in July 1996, nearly two years earlier than the CSRP, in order to provide time
for CIL to establish the necessary institutional and human resources capacity for environmental and social
mitigation…’ also see p.1 [1-2]
10
see ‘OP 4.01: Operational Policies, Environmental Assessment’, October 1998, International Finance
Corporation, p.1 at: http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/enviro.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/pol_EnvAssessment/
$FILE/OP401_EnvironmentalAssessment.pdf
11
Evicted is a more appropriate term in the stead of the World Bank preferred term, displaced
 8

policies, with a further 10 issues of serious concern13. The procedure requires the IP to submit the report to
the World Bank Management (BM)14 first, being the project supervisors in this case, who in turn have to
submit their responses to the World Bank Board with suggestions for remedial action. At both stages these
two bodies may accept or reject all or any part of the Report. In this case there has been an inordinate delay
of over five months beyond the stipulated period in getting the Executive Directors approval. The
Inspection Panel’s report –241 pages including appendixes-- is damning. Below are just a few of the
violations found on the ground by the Inspection Panel and reported to the Bank Management, together
with the responses of the Bank Management.

The Violations
Income Restoration
Paragraph 3 of OD 4.30 states that the objective of the policy on Involuntary Resettlement is to insure

that: ‘[T]he population displaced by a project receives benefits from it.’ With respect to income

restoration, paragraph 3(b) (iii) states that the displaced people must be: ‘Assisted in improving their

former living standards, income earning capacity and production levels, or at least in restoring them’

and adds that: ‘Particular attention should be paid to the needs of the poorest groups to be resettled.’15

The Inspection Panel found a clear violation: ‘…these objectives have not been achieved in Parej East and,
as a result, PAPs have been harmed and continue to suffer harm.’16 And, ‘…the Panel finds that, as
Management itself recognizes, it is not in compliance with paragraphs 3(b)(iii) of OD 4.30 since, according
to the April 2002 Management Response, the income of at least 21 percent of EPAPs 17 in the Parej East
subproject had not been improved, still less restored.’18 And even:
A major continuing problem is the failure of income restoration… Because of the inadequacy of the

income restoration programs, some of them [Project-affected people] have been forced to spend

whatever remains of their compensation simply to survive. This is an extremely urgent matter. It

should not happen in a Bank-financed project. Steps should be taken to ensure compensation of

these PAPs,19 not only because they have spent their original compensation for their assets on

12
The Inspection Panel, ‘Report N0. 24000 -- Investigation Report/India: Coal Sector Environmental and
Social Mitigation Project (Credit No. 2862-IN)’ (November 25, 2002)
13
The IP Report is available at: http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2003/07/30/000160016_20030730172120/Rend
ered/PDF/240001IPR0re0India0Coal.pdf
14
‘Management’ refers to World Bank officials responsible for appraisal, reviewing, approving, negotiating
and supervising the two loans. ‘Requesters’ refers to the people and the supporting NGO, CASS, which
made the claim to the World Bank’s Inspection IP - ‘the IP’
15
The Inspection Panel, ‘Report N0. 24000 -- Investigation Report/India: Coal Sector Environmental and
Social Mitigation Project (Credit No. 2862-IN)’ (November 25, 2002) p52, [205]
16
The Inspection Panel, ‘Report N0. 24000 -- Investigation Report/India: Coal Sector Environmental and
Social Mitigation Project (Credit No. 2862-IN)’ (November 25, 2002) p 53, [210]
17
EPAP is a project-affected person entitled to economic rehabilitation assistance, a World Bank acronym
18
The Inspection Panel, ‘Report N0. 24000 -- Investigation Report/India: Coal Sector Environmental and
Social Mitigation Project (Credit No. 2862-IN)’ (November 25, 2002) p54, [212]
19
PAP’s for Project Affected People is the official World Bank term.
 9

survival, but also for the losses and harm suffered due to delays in restoring their income

potential. 20

The BM response questioned the validity of the IP reported facts by claiming that the IP
did not have access to the latest data. And now:
The latest evidence seems to suggest that the incomes of the PAPs have actually increased

significantly… The objective of CIL’s R&R Policy is to improve or at least restore the livelihoods and

incomes of PAPs. As of March-April 2002, 87.1 percent of all PAPs entitled to income restoration

assistance had met this objective …it may be too early to draw final conclusions regarding the impacts

of the income restoration measures.21

Further information is given in the BM Response to the effect that a large proportion of PAPs’ income
increased significantly, especially the income of women.22
Ironically the World Bank questions the validity of the data pertaining to the IP Report, but fails to give the
source for their progressive data! The BM Response also reflects an ignorance of the sociology of
communities, particularly there where the Bank Management rejoins that Project Affected Persons who
have migrated no longer require economic rehabilitation assistance 23: in closely knit communities in India,
the homeless get refuge in relative’s homes and/or work as coolie labour in coal haulage or scavenging on
coal waste etc. The ability to play the Good Samaritan is the strength of one’s cultural. Therefore it is
interesting to see the World Bank cashing on some thing they have not done, and thus expropriating the last
asset left with communities; -their culture.
The IP Report said:

[A] very misleading message [was] being given to the PAPS. …[T]he previous mine manager had given

PAPs promises of jobs that were not available [and] …Only during the updated census of PAPs carried

out in 1997, were the majority of Parej East PAPs presented with the fact that they would not get a mine

job, and must instead choose a self-employment income restoration scheme. In the Panel’s view, it is

understandable that PAPs who opted for jobs in June 94 should naturally expect to receive those jobs…

20
The Inspection Panel, ‘Report N0. 24000 -- Investigation Report/India: Coal Sector Environmental and
Social Mitigation Project (Credit No. 2862-IN)’ (November 25, 2002) p 121, [478]
21
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development , ‘Management Report and Recommendation in
Response to the Inspection Panel Investigation Report No. 24000’, (July 25, 2003) p7, [25]
22
The Inspection Panel, ‘Report N0. 24000 -- Investigation Report/India: Coal Sector Environmental and
Social Mitigation Project (Credit No. 2862-IN)’ (November 25, 2002) p 7 [25-28]
23
The Inspection Panel, ‘Annex 2, Management Response Request for Inspection (RQ 01/2), India: Coal
Sector Environmental and Social Mitigation Project (Credit No. 2862-IN) and Coal Sector Rehabilitation
Project (Loan No. 4226-IN/ Management Response to the Inspection Panel (July 19, 2001)’, Report and
Recommendation on Request for Inspection / India: Coal Sector Environmental and Social Mitigation
Project (Credit No. 2862-IN), Coal Sector Rehabilitation Project (Loan No. 4226; Credit-No. 2986), p 47
[76] see document at:
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/Resources/IndiaCoalEligibilityReport.pdf
 10

It must have been a shock for them to discover otherwise when finally presented with the reality of their

situation in early 1997. 24

The BM Response states that ‘despite the communications [of 6 consultative meetings

with the PAPs] PAPs continued to press for provision of additional mine jobs because of

the obvious economic security provided by such jobs.’ So, the BM Response places the blame

on the PAPs themselves rather than taking CIL to task for deceiving the PAPs.25

On Land for Land

The Investigation Report states that this alternative was not offered to the PAPs:
The ESRP26 visited some mines, including the CCL mines, in 1997. …They noted that, contrary to

Bank policy, ‘this [land for land] option has never been offered to PAPs in any of the subsidiaries

visited. Partly as a result, the question of the adequacy of compensation paid for land is an important

source of discontent with landowners’.27

To this, the BM Response was ‘forty-four PAPs had purchased replacement land,’ and
‘…54 percent of the PAPs were landless [anyway]. Action [to be taken]: Continuing
Bank supervision will follow up on the issue of reclamation of previously mined lands.’
In reality Indigenous Peoples’ when evicted not only loose their homesteads, but they are
also deprived of the land and natural resources that constituted their survival base.
Therefore it is not only the plot of land that they own, but the numerous other natural
resources, such as rivers, common lands forest etc. that sustain them and are all crucial to
their survival. Yet, though the Bank recognizes the flaw in their income restoration
policies as necessitating ‘supplementation with… measures such as land based income
generation’,28
rehabilitation policy does not include these resources when computing reimbursements.
Only once these resources are in the hands of the Company do they become assets. This,
24
The Inspection Panel, ‘Report N0. 24000 -- Investigation Report/India: Coal Sector Environmental and
Social Mitigation Project (Credit No. 2862-IN)’ (November 25, 2002) p 56, [224-227]
25
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development , ‘Management Report and Recommendation in
Response to the Inspection Panel Investigation Report No. 24000’, (July 25, 2003) Annex 1, 12, p. 21,
26
Environmental and Social Review Panel
27
The Inspection Panel, ‘Report N0. 24000 -- Investigation Report/India: Coal Sector Environmental and
Social Mitigation Project (Credit No. 2862-IN)’ (November 25, 2002) p 58 [231]
28
The Inspection Panel, ‘Annex 2, Management Response Request for Inspection (RQ 01/2), India: Coal
Sector Environmental and Social Mitigation Project (Credit No. 2862-IN) and Coal Sector Rehabilitation
Project (Loan No. 4226-IN/ Management Response to the Inspection Panel (July 19, 2001)’, Report and
Recommendation on Request for Inspection / India: Coal Sector Environmental and Social Mitigation
Project (Credit No. 2862-IN), Coal Sector Rehabilitation Project (Loan No. 4226; Credit-No. 2986), p 47
[78] see document at:
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/Resources/IndiaCoalEligibilityReport.pdf
 11

at times, results in the evicted Adivasis paying for resources that were expropriated from
them.

On the Option of Self Employment

The IP Investigation Report states that:

In 1994 only 26 of 418 PAPs expressed an interest in self-employment… Yet, it is evident that three

years later in 1997 most eligible PAPs had to choose a self-employment option to restore their former

standard of living. There is nothing in the 1994 Baseline Survey of the Rehabilitation Action Plans

(RAPs) to indicate that the eligible PAPs were counselled about the implication of the self-employment

option, and nothing to suggest that the PAPs were aware of the implication of trying to become full time

entrepreneurs.29

The World Bank is fully aware that this cannot be an option for Indigenous communities for the simple fact
that they come from an economy not dependent on surplus production and hence do not have the
entrepreneurial skills. Despite this well known fact it became the only option offered to them. The failure of
self-employment opportunities was recognized by Management30 but again places the blame for its failure
on to the PAPs, the IP reports that it: ‘is surprised that Management would accuse those, who never asked
to be relocated, of not making the necessary effort, to do something that was imposed upon them, by those
who acknowledged that such schemes had mostly failed elsewhere.’31

On Cash Compensation
The ‘basic principle of World Bank’s OD 4.30 3b is that displaced persons should be compensated for their
losses at full replacement cost32 prior to the actual move.’33 Such compensation applies to land, houses, and
other non-moveable properties such as wells. The IP Report concludes that.

Regarding Land Compensation

the IP reviews and confirms the difficulties regarding compensation, viz. ‘that many PAPs have not been
and are not being compensated at full replacement cost which would enable them to buy similar land, and

29
The Inspection Panel, ‘Report N0. 24000 -- Investigation Report/India: Coal Sector Environmental and
Social Mitigation Project (Credit No. 2862-IN)’ (November 25, 2002) p 59 [238]
30
The Inspection Panel, ‘Report N0. 24000 -- Investigation Report/India: Coal Sector Environmental and
Social Mitigation Project (Credit No. 2862-IN)’ (November 25, 2002) p 63 [257]
31
The Inspection Panel, ‘Report N0. 24000 -- Investigation Report/India: Coal Sector Environmental and
Social Mitigation Project (Credit No. 2862-IN)’ (November 25, 2002) p 62 [249]
32
According to World Bank Operational Manual OP 4.12, “replacement cost” is the method of valuation
of assets which helps determine the amount sufficient to replace lost assets and cover transaction costs. In
applying this method of valuation, depreciation of structures and assets should not be taken into account.
For example, for houses it is the market cost of the materials to build a replacement structure with an area
and quality similar to or better than those of the affected structure, plus the cost of transporting building
materials to the construction site, plus the cost of any labour and contractors’ fees, plus the cost of any
registration and transfer taxes. In determining the replacement cost, depreciation of the asset and the value
of salvage materials are not taken into account, nor is the value of benefits to be derived from the project
deducted from the valuation of an affected asset. (OP 4.12 fn 12, Annex fn 1).
33
The Inspection Panel, ‘Report N0. 24000 -- Investigation Report/India: Coal Sector Environmental and
Social Mitigation Project (Credit No. 2862-IN)’ (November 25, 2002) p 17 [58] and
 12

hence are still suffering harm’,34 the system is well-known to provide inadequate compensation35 as middle
men take a share,36 it involves under reporting of sale-prices,37 that even with the customary thirty percent
solarium it is still less than replacement cost,38 it is based on rates at the date of notification, not date of
payment (sometimes a ten year difference),39 and there is lack of transparency with regard to itemized
details of the compensation.40
On House Compensation
The IP Report notes that the process and the basis of house compensation also lack transparency and are
open to abuse, and raises serious questions.41 Bank Management Response merely repeats CIL policy, but
again fails to address the fact that the ground implementation lacks transparency and the PAPs are at the
mercy of officials and bureaucrats. Action to be taken: ‘Non’.42

Resettlement Housing Sites

‘In negotiating the loans from the World Bank, the Indian delegation
reconfirmed its commitment to the requirement (of the World Bank’s
policy)… and agreed to take necessary action.’ 43 However,
necessary action was not taken, and the IP reports that now, ‘up to
four years after the affected people have been involuntarily resettled
they are still suffering the harm that results from lack of title,
including a sense of insecurity … and inability to borrow for self
employment income restoration schemes.’44
BM Response points out that despite many efforts made to negotiate with the Law Ministry of the
Government of India (GOI), the issue is still unresolved, and ‘with regard to land titles, the World Bank
will continue to monitor this issue until titles/long-term leases are issued to all PAPs by appropriate
authorities. … and has suggested to GOI that an Independent Monitoring Panel be established for the
same.45 The irony of the situation regarding house plots is that the plots are on lands that the Company itself
has taken on a thirty year lease.

34
The Inspection Panel, ‘Report N0. 24000 -- Investigation Report/India: Coal Sector Environmental and
Social Mitigation Project (Credit No. 2862-IN)’ (November 25, 2002) pp 19, 21 [66,72]
35
The Inspection Panel, ‘Report N0. 24000 -- Investigation Report/India: Coal Sector Environmental and
Social Mitigation Project (Credit No. 2862-IN)’ (November 25, 2002) pp 19, 20 [65,68]
36
The Inspection Panel, ‘Report N0. 24000 -- Investigation Report/India: Coal Sector Environmental and
Social Mitigation Project (Credit No. 2862-IN)’ (November 25, 2002) p 20 [68]
37
The Inspection Panel, ‘Report N0. 24000 -- Investigation Report/India: Coal Sector Environmental and
Social Mitigation Project (Credit No. 2862-IN)’ (November 25, 2002) p 19 [66]
38
The Inspection Panel, ‘Report N0. 24000 -- Investigation Report/India: Coal Sector Environmental and
Social Mitigation Project (Credit No. 2862-IN)’ (November 25, 2002) p 21 [73]
39
The Inspection Panel, ‘Report N0. 24000 -- Investigation Report/India: Coal Sector Environmental and
Social Mitigation Project (Credit No. 2862-IN)’ (November 25, 2002) pp 20, 21 [71]
40
The Inspection Panel, ‘Report N0. 24000 -- Investigation Report/India: Coal Sector Environmental and
Social Mitigation Project (Credit No. 2862-IN)’ (November 25, 2002) pp 21, 22 [76].
41
The Inspection Panel, ‘Report N0. 24000 -- Investigation Report/India: Coal Sector Environmental and
Social Mitigation Project (Credit No. 2862-IN)’ (November 25, 2002) p 23 [82, 85]
42
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development , ‘Management Report and Recommendation in
Response to the Inspection Panel Investigation Report No. 24000’, (July 25, 2003) Annex 1, p 15 [3]
43
The Inspection Panel, ‘Report N0. 24000 -- Investigation Report/India: Coal Sector Environmental and
Social Mitigation Project (Credit No. 2862-IN)’ (November 25, 2002) p 34 [135]
44
The Inspection Panel, ‘Report N0. 24000 -- Investigation Report/India: Coal Sector Environmental and
Social Mitigation Project (Credit No. 2862-IN)’ (November 25, 2002) p 36 [144]
45
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development , ‘Management Report and Recommendation in
Response to the Inspection Panel Investigation Report No. 24000’, (July 25, 2003) Annex 1, pp 17, 18 [6]
 13

On Transparency
Based on its review of the documentation and interviews, the IP reports that while Management ensured
that the Sectoral Environmental Impact Assessment and Parej East Environmental Action Plan and
Resettlement Action Plan were placed in the World Bank’s Public Information Centres in Washington and
New Delhi before appraisal, it failed to ensure that the reports were available in Parej East at a public place
accessible to affected groups and local NGOs for their review and comment, not even a Summary of their
conclusions ‘in a form and language meaningful to the groups being consulted, as required by OD 4.01/BP
17.50. In the light of this the IP finds that Bank Management was not in compliance with paragraph 21 of
OD 4.01 and paragraph 12 of BP 17.50 in respect of disclosure.46
World Bank Response (Annex 1, No. 26) is ‘No action to be taken. Since the project was prepared, the
World Bank has taken measures to improve the disclosure of EIAs, RAPs and IPDPs in project affected
areas’.
ROf the thirty violations indicted in the Report the BM responds with ‘No Action to be Taken’ in twenty
four instances and for the rest with ‘follow up and supervision’ to be done.
Final Diagnosis
This is the follow-up to be taken: ‘to advise Government of India on apparent entitlements for subsistence
allowances’ as per the Parej East RAP, in the form of a lump sum payment made to the 121 eligible PAP’s
to the sum of US$ 300,000, to be disbursed by March 31, 2004’. This was rejected by the Government of
India.
The second recommendation was the setting up of an Independent Monitoring Panel (IMP) to follow up the
various issues. A similar mechanism failed in the National Thermal Power Corporation NTPC in Singrauli
project where the Government undertaking resisted the IMP.
In a letter dated May 12th 04 to CASS, the World Bank Country Director (India) calls for a meeting
between Coal India Ltd., the World Bank representatives and CASS to discuss the recommendations of a
November 03 IMP report which mentions that PAPs of Parej have suffered a ‘decrease in income’. This
November Report has not been made public, but the Country Director now calls for an External Monitoring
Panel to rectify this.
Probably for the first time in its history, the World Bank has admitted that its involvement in such mega
projects has caused poverty. It must be telling for a Western Agency perceived as missionaries of
development to face up to this fact. Parej is now known as one of the World Bank’s most-supervised
projects ever; by 2001 the World Bank made 21 supervisory visits costing $1.6 million, compared with the
$300,000 offered to the 121 PAPs’ families. Commenting on this mission the IP says ‘the supervision
team's knowledge of ground realities was limited, and for that reason, their efforts to resolve problems had
virtually no impact on the ground’.47
On 6 October 2004 World Bank representative, Ms. Samantha Forusz came down to Parej and met the
PAP’s at their resettlement colony Pindra. The people were angry and demanded jobs. She told them
categorically ‘no jobs can be given’.
Ms Forusz has been on the different World Bank teams visiting Parej and is familiar with the people there.
Pointing to one PAP wearing a Titan wrist watch she said ’I see that you have a Titan watch, the last time I
came you did not have one, how can you say that your condition has not improved?’
After Pindra she visited the CASS office, and when I asked her about the recommendations of the IP
Report, she joined her index finger to her thumb and indicated a zero. The IP Report is zero. The simple
CASS activists pleaded with her to address the plight of a particular widow whose conditions is serious. To
which she replies: ‘No jobs. We could try; remember… I am not promising; we could try to help them to
grow chickens’.

Conclusion
The World Bank has claimed that it has learnt many lessons from the Parej experience. A recent change in
policy guidelines puts the onus on the host government for ‘the human and environmental factors’ during
World Bank funded projects. What then happens to the ‘accountability mechanisms’? They were designed
as hybrids, as an answer to the litany we hear about the political system being corrupt, unable to deliver,
46
The Inspection Panel, ‘Report N0. 24000 -- Investigation Report/India: Coal Sector Environmental and
Social Mitigation Project (Credit No. 2862-IN)’ (November 25, 2002) p 99 [394]
47
The Inspection Panel, ‘Report N0. 24000 -- Investigation Report/India: Coal Sector Environmental and
Social Mitigation Project (Credit No. 2862-IN)’ (November 25, 2002) p 114 [458]
 14

non-workable, lazy third world bureaucracy. What is being sung to debt ridden African countries today.
Will the one dollar one vote principle still rule? or could we expect a more faith in democratic institutions?
This small group of Adivasis under CASS dwelling in a village with no electricity, no sanitation, have
taught the lesson to an institution struggling for credibility at least here in Jharkhand. The World Bank and
CIL, both merge into a murky field, locally known as the ‘coal-mafia’; as one covers for the other. What
then happens of the ‘accountability’, ‘Business Partners’ Win-Win promise? What conclusion should be
drawn when the anointer of the scheme fails to play the game by the rules it sets for itself? Is it just like any
other structure in the extractive industry cycle? What then happens to sustainable development?
The CASS team and the Adivasis of Jharkhand come out of the whole process wiser. The lessons they have
learned and questions they ask are educating.
Their songs, dance and art now tell this story. Images have been given to their impressions of the World
Bank in large charcoal cartoon sketches on the outer walls of their houses. An experience in a history of
injustice, has taken a political expression of mass consciousness and acts as a new feed as it merges into
their traditional art form of decorating their dwellings.
What is the next step in this travesty? The World Bank has to make an Implementation Completion Report
[ICR], for which it will undertake a census of PAP incomes. Another setup, another budget, the business of
Accountability must continue.
15