Академический Документы
Профессиональный Документы
Культура Документы
The rule of strict construction was applied by the Supreme Court in interpreting
certain provisions of the Monopoly and Restrictive Trade Practices Act (Goyal vs. Reliance
Industries Ltd., (2003) 113 Comp. cases 1). In State of Maharashtra vs. Billimoria (2003) 7
SCC 336) the Supreme Court while considering certain provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling
and Regulation) Act, held that an expropriatory legislation should be strictly construed.
However, in invoking certain exclusionary clauses, the Court adopted a liberal construction;
thus, accepting the position that different portions of the same statute can be interpreted
differently based on the texture, content and object thereof.
A rule of strict construction is not of universal application. While statutes like the
taxing statutes have generally to be interpreted strictly, wherever provisions are remedial or
beneficent in nature they should receive a liberal construction. Remedial legislations are
generally beneficient or social justice oriented. A remedial statute may contain penal
provisions to prevent infringement. While remedial statute has to be liberally construed, the
penal provisions should receive strict construction. The House of Lords in London and North
Eastern Railway Company vs. Berriman (1946) 1 All E.R 255) while interpreting such a
statute, observed “Wherever Legislature prescribes a duty and penalty for breach of it, it
must be assumed that the duty is prescribed in the interest of the community or some part
of it and the penalty is prescribed as a sanction for its performance”. The Supreme Court in
Tolaram vs. State of Bombay (AIR 1954 SC 496) quoted with approval the observation of
Lord Macmillan, “Where penalties for infringement are imposed it is not legitimate to stretch
the language of a Rule, however beneficient its intention, beyond the fair and ordinary
meaning of its language”. In the Berriman case (ibid.,) different notes were struck by the
House of Lords. After two decades, the House of Lords while considering a case under
Factories Act, held that there is no need to construe the Act restrictively, “though equally
there is no need to expand it beyond its natural meaning”. The Supreme Court in Appabalu’s
case (AIR 1993 SC 1126) while considering the Civil Rights Act, held that the Statute has to
be construed in the light of the objective and with a view to implement the mandate of the
Constitution. A perusal of the various decisions of the Supreme Court would show that the
interpretation is guided by the objective of the Act rather than the mere consequences. The
Court aims at promoting the beneficient objective of the Act while being aware that the
breach thereof leads to penal consequences and consequently strict interpretation in
relation to such penal provisions. In the Indian Medical Association case (AIR 1996 SC 550)
the Supreme Court took the view that any repugnancy has to be resolved in favour of the
consumer to achieve the objective of the Act.
SUBSIDIARY RULES
In dealing with rules of interpretation it must be remembered that there are various
subsidiary rules of interpretation, some of which are dealt with below:
(i) CASUS OMISSUS
Normally the Court cannot supply any assumed omission in the statute except in case
of necessity, within the four corners of the statute. ( Union of India –vs. Rajiv Kumar (AIR
2003 SC 2917)
(ii) CONJUNCTION DISJUNCTION
The word “or” is generally used disjunctively while “and” is used conjunctively. In
certain situations however, these words may be interchanged. In the words of Lord Halsbury
these words cannot be interchanged unless the clear intent of the statute requires that to be
done. The Supreme Court considered this issue in the leading case of Chamarbaugwala (AIR
1957 S.C. 699) with a view to give effect to the clear intention of the Legislature as
evidenced from the statute as a whole.
(iii) RULE OF EJUSDEM GENERIS
The Supreme Court in the case of Kavalappara vs. State (AIR 1960 SC 1080)
explained the principle of Ejusdem Generis to mean that general words following a particular
class, category or genes should be construed as limited to the same kind as those specified.
In the words of the Supreme Court the Rule is intended to reconcile incompatibility between
specific and general terms and applies only when specific words falling within a class or
genes is followed by a general term. It is also relevant that the legislative intent should not
point to a different interpretation.
This rule can be invoked only if there is a distinct genus which comprises more than
one species. Where the items specified belong to different classes or categories, the
principle of Ejusdem Generis cannot be invoked.
WORDS OF RANK
Allied to the rule of Ejusdem Generis is the rule relating to Words of Rank. Where a
statute refers to persons or things of a particular specified rank and is followed by general
words, such general words cannot cover persons and things of higher rank.
REDDENDO SINGULA SINGULIS
This is also a rule allied to the rule of Ejusdem Generis. The rule applies where
general words of description follow a list of particular things. In such a case, the general
words are to be construed distributively to things to which such general words can be
applied. An illustration of the above rule is the expression “if one shall draw or load a sword
or gun”. Applying the above rule to interpret the above statement, the word “draw” should
refer to “sword”, while “load” would refer to “gun”. The Supreme Court applied the above
rule while interpreting the proviso to Article 304 of the Constitution in Koteswar Vittal
Kamath vs. K. Rangappa Baliga & Co. (AIR 1969 SC 504).
DEEMING PROVISION
Deeming provisions or legal fictions abound in many statutes. While giving effect to
legal fictions, all facts and circumstances incidental thereto and inevitable corollaries thereof
have to be assumed.
READING DOWN
The rule of Reading Down is adopted by Courts to iron out creases and smoothen the
crudities in a statute to make it workable. The Court exercises a limited power under this
Rule, if the statute as such cannot be enforced and would lead to unworkable results. In
such a situation the Court reads down the provision for making it workable, keeping in view
the scheme and object of the Act [Goutham’s case (supra); Calcutta Gujarathi Education
Society vs. Calcutta Municipal Corporation (2003) 10 SCC 533].
EXPRESSION UNIUS
Under this Rule, where a particular thing is specifically expressed, it does not
necessarily mean that all other circumstances are excluded. The normal rule of
interpretation is that the mere expression of one term does not necessarily mean that all
other situations cannot co-exist. The above Rule was applied by the Supreme Court in Union
of India vs. Shiv Dayal & Sons (AIR 2003 SC 1877).
GENERALIA SPECIALIBUS
This Rule is invoked where there are two conflicting provisions of law in operation in
the same field. Where a statute or rule specifically operates in a field, general rule would not
apply to the circumstances and situations covered by the special statute. (D.R. Yadav vs.
R.K. Singh) [(2003) 7 SCC 110].
Some of the important Rules as well as Subsidiary Rules of Interpretation have been
referred to herein before. To conclude, the object of Interpretation of Statutes is to arrive at
the true intent of the law maker and the best interpretation is that which focuses the spirit
of law.