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People of the Philippines v. Hon. Judge Palma and Romulo Intia y Morada
Case No. 219
G.R. No. L-44113 (March 31, 1977)
Chapter I, Page 2, Footnote No.3
Private Respondent Romulo, 17 years of age, was charged with vagrancy.
Respondent Judge dismissed the case on the ground that her court has no
jurisdiction to take further cognizance of this case without prejudice to the re-
thereof in the Juvenile Court, because he believed that jurisdiction over 16 yea
rs olds
up to under 21 was transferred to the Juvenile Court by the issuance of PD 603 o
r the
Child and Youth Welfare Code, which defines youthful offenders as those over 9
years of age but under 21 at the time of the commission of the offense.
W/N the issuance of PD 603 transferred the case of the accused from the
regular courts to the Juvenile Court.
The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court expressly confers upon it a special
and limited jurisdiction over criminal cases wherein the accused is under 16 year
s of
age at the time of the filing of the case . The subsequent issuance of PD 603 know
as the Child and Youth Welfare Code and defines a youth offender as one who is
over 9 years of age but under 21 at the time of the commission of the offense did
not by such definition transfer jurisdiction over criminal cases involving accus
ed who
are 16 and under 21 years of age from the regular courts to the Juvenile Court.
Primicias v. Municipality of Urdaneta
Case No. 244
G.R. No. L-26702 (October 18, 1979)
Chapter I, Page 4, Footnote No.14
Petitioner, while driving his car in the jurisdiction of Urdaneta, was charged
with violation of Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, particularly, for overtaking a
truck .
Petitioner initiated an action for annulment of said ordinance and prayed for th
issuance of preliminary injunction for restraining Respondent from enforcing the
W/N Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, by the Municipality of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan is valid.
No. Ordinance No. 3 is said to be patterned after and based on Section 53 of
Act No. 3992. However, Act No. 3992 has been explicitly repealed by RA No. 4136
(The Land and Transportation Code). By this express repeal, the general rule is
that a
later law prevails over an earlier law. Also, an essential requisite for a valid
is that it must not contravene the statute for it is fundamental principle that
municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the s
4, 6c, 49

Casco Philippine Chemical Co. Inc., v. Hon. Pedro Gimenez

Case No. 48
G.R. No. L-17931 (February 28, 1963)
Chapter I, Page 9, Footnote No.31
Petitioner was engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues. It sought
the refund of the margin fees relying on RA 2609 (Foreign Exchange Margin Fee La
stating that the Central Bank of the Philippines fixed a uniform margin fee of 2
5% on
foreign exchange transactions. However, the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass
audit and approved the said refunds upon the ground that Petitioner s separate
importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions of Se
c. 2,
par. 18 of RA 2609. The pertinent portion of this statute reads: The margin
established by the Monetary Board shall be imposed upon the sale of foreign
exchange for the importation of the following: XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the
manufacture of plywood and hardwood when imported by and for the exclusive use
of end-users.
W/N urea and formaldehyde are exempt by law from the payment of the
margin fee.
The term urea formaldehyde used in Sec. 2 of RA 2609 refers to the finished
product as expressed by the National Institute of Science and Technology, and is
distinct and separate from urea and formaldehyde which are separate chemicals
used in the manufacture of synthetic resin. The one mentioned in the law is a fi
product, while the ones imported by the Petitioner are raw materials. Hence, the
importation of urea and formaldehyde is not exempt from the imposition of the
margin fee.
2a, 6c, 25a
Astorga v. Villegas
Case No. 23
G.R. No. L-23475 (April 30, 1974)
Chapter I, Page 11, Footnote No.37
House Bill No. 9266 was passed from the House of Representatives to the
Senate. Senator Arturo Tolentino made substantial amendments which were
approved by the Senate. The House, without notice of said amendments, thereafter
signed its approval until all the presiding officers of both houses certified an
d attested
to the bill. The President also signed it and thereupon became RA 4065. Senator
Tolentino made a press statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 w
as a
wrong version of the bill because it did not embody the amendments introduced by
him and approved by the Senate. Both the Senate President and the President
withdrew their signatures and denounced RA 4065 as invalid. Petitioner argued th
the authentication of the presiding officers of the Congress is conclusive proof
of a
bill s due enactment.
W/N House Bill No. 9266 is considered enacted and valid.
Since both the Senate President and the Chief Executive withdrew their
signatures therein, the court declared that the bill was not duly enacted and
therefore did not become a law.
The Constitution requires that each House shall keep a journal. An importance
of having a journal is that in the absence of attestation or evidence of the bil
l s due
enactment, the court may resort to the journals of the Congress to verify such.
Where the journal discloses that substantial amendment were introduced and
approved and were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President for
signature, the court can declare that the bill has not been duly enacted and did
become a law.

Ichong, etc., et al. v. Hernandez, etc., and Sarmiento

Case No. 133
G.R. No. L-7995 (May 31, 1957)
Chapter I, Page 11, Footnote No.42
Petitioner is a Chinese merchant who questions the constitutionality of RA
1180 An Act to Regulate the Retail Business on the following grounds: a) It is a
violation of the Equal Protection of the Law Clause, denies them of their libert
property and due process of law 2) It is a violation of the constitutional requi
that a bill s title must reflect the subject matter of the same because regulate doe
not really mean nationalize and prohibit 3) the Act violates International treaties
and Laws
W/N RA 1180 is constitutional.
RA 1180 is constitutional. In the abovementioned case, what has been
pointed out is the constitutional requirement that A bill shall embrace only one
subject as expressed in its title. This is to prohibit duplicity in legislation b
ecause the
title must be able to apprise legislators and the public about the nature, scope
, and
consequences of that particular law. Constitution precludes the encroaching of o
department to the responsibilities of the other departments. The legislature is
the judge of necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness, and expediency of the
law, and the courts have no jurisdiction to question this.
9a, 24a, d
Municipality of Jose Panganiban v. Shell Co. of the Philippines
Case No. 181
G.R. No. L-25716 (July 28, 1966)
Chapter I, Page 11, Footnote No.42
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila
dismissing the Plaintiff s complaint for the collection of sales taxes from Defend
ant on
the ground that the law which authorizes collection of the same is unconstitutio
Defendant Company refused to pay taxes accruing from its sales because
according to them the taxable sites of the property sought to be taxed is not th
e said
Municipality. According to the Defendant, RA 1435 or Act to Provide Means for
Increasing Highway Special Fund is unconstitutional because it embraces two
subjects which are 1)amendment of the tax code, and 2) grant of taxing power to
the local government, and makes reference to Road and Bridge Fund.
W/N RA 1435 is constitutional.
RA 1435 is constitutional because it embraces only one subject reflected by its
title Road and Bridge Fund. Statutory definition prevails over ordinary usage of t
term. The constitutional requirement as to the title of the bill must be liberal
construed. It should not be technically or narrowly construed as to impede the p
of legislation. When there is doubt as to its validity, it must be resolved agai
nst the
doubt and in favor of its validity. In the abovementioned cases, what is pointed
out is
the constitutional requirement that A bill shall embrace only one subject, expres
in its title. This is to prohibit duplicity in legislation because the title must
be able to
apprise legislators and the public about the nature, scope, and consequences of
that particular law.
12a, 37, d

People of the Philippines v. Buenviaje

Case No. 203
G.R. No. L-22945 (March 3, 1925)
Chapter I, Page 12, Footnote No.46
Defendant appeals the ruling of the trial court finding her guilty for the
violation of illegal practice of medicine and illegally advertising oneself as a
doctor. Defendant practices chiropractic although she has not secured a
certificate to practice medicine. She treated and manipulated the head and body
of Regino Noble. She also contends that practice of chiropractic has nothing to
with medicine and that unauthorized use of title of doctor should be understood to
refer to doctor of medicine and not to doctors of chiropractic, and lastly, that A
3111 is unconstitutional as it does not express its subject.
W/N chiropractic is included in the term practice of medicine under
Medical laws provided in the Revised Administrative Code.
Act 3111 is constitutional as the title An Act to Amend (enumeration of
sections to be amended) is sufficient and it need not include the subject matter
each section. Chiropractic is included in the practice of medicine. Statutory
definition prevails over ordinary usage of the term. The constitutional requirem
ent as
to the title of the bill must be liberally construed. It should not be technical
ly or
narrowly construed as to impede the power of legislation. When there is doubt as
its validity, it must be resolved against the doubt and in favor of its validity
. A bill shall
embrace only one subject, expressed in its title, to prohibit duplicity in legisl
ation by
apprising legislators and the public about the nature, scope, and consequences o
the law.
2a, 7a, 25c, 37, d
Alalayan v. National Power Corporation
Case No. 8
G.R. No. L-24396 (July 29, 1968)
Chapter I, Page 12, Footnote No.46
Republic Act No. 3043 is entitled An Act to Further Amend Commonwealth
Act No. 121 . In Section 3 of the same act, Respondent is empowered, in any
franchise contract for the supply of electric power constituting 50% of the elec
power and energy of that franchisee, to realize a net profit of not more than 12
annually of its investments plus 2-month operating expenses; and NPC is allowed
renew all existing franchise contracts so that the provisions of the act could b
e given
W/N Section 3 is a subject which the bill title An Act to Further Amend
Commonwealth Act No. 121 does not embrace, thus making it a rider because it is
violative of the constitutional provision requiring that a bill, which may be ena
into law, cannot embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its
Section 3 is constitutional.
Republic Act 3043 is an amendatory act. It is sufficient that the title makes
reference to the legislation to be amended (in this case Commonwealth Act 121).
Constitutional provision is satisfied if title is comprehensive enough to includ
e the
general object which the statute seeks to effect without expressing each and eve
ends and means necessary for its accomplishment. Title doesn t need to be a
complete index of the contents of the act.
24a, 37, d
Cordero v. Hon. Cabatuando
Case No. 81
G.R. No. L-14542 (October 31, 1962)
Chapter I, Page 12, Footnote No.47
Republic Act No. 1199 is the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines.
Section 54 of this act expressed that indigent tenants should be represented by
Public Defendant of Department of Labor. Congress then amended this in Republic
Act No. 2263: An Act Amending Certain Sections of Republic Act No. 1199. Section
19 of the amendatory act says that mediation of tenancy disputes falls under
authority of Secretary of Justice. Section 20 also provides that indigent tenant
s shall
be represented by trial attorney of the Tenancy Mediation Commission.
W/N Sections 19 and 20 of Rep. Act No. 2263 is unconstitutional because of
the constitutional provision that No bill which may be enacted into law shall
embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.
Sections 19 and 20 are constitutional.
The constitutional requirement is complied with as long the law has a single
general subject, which is the Agricultural Tenancy Act, and the amendatory
provisions no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsiste
with or foreign to the general subject, will be regarded as valid. Constitutiona
provisions relating to subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so na
construed as to cripple or impede proper legislation.
24a, 37, d
Tobias v. Abalos
Case No. 291
G.R. No. L-114783 (December 8, 1994)
Chapter I, Page 12, Footnote No.47
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise
known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong because Article VIII,
Section 49 of this act provided that the congressional district of San Juan/
Mandaluyong shall be split into two separate districts.
W/N the aforestated subject is germane to the subject matter of R.A. No.
RA 7675 is constitutional.
Contrary to Petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional
district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject
of its
conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence
of its
conversion into a highly urbanized city
Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been
invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation. The
Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment,
language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the conten
ts and
the minute details therein.
20a, d

Ayson and Ignacio v. Provincial Board of Rizal

Case No. 11
G.R. No. 14019 (July 26, 1919)
The municipal council of Navotas, Rizal adopted its Ordinance No. 13, section
2 of which provided that all owners and proprietors of the industry known as fish
with nets denominated cuakit and pantukos, before engaging in fishing in the bay
of this jurisdiction within three leagues from the shore-line of this municipali
ty, are
obliged to provide themselves with a license issued by this municipal government
after payment of a fee of P50 annually, payable every three months. The authority
for the enactment of the ordinance was from section 2270 of the Administrative
W/N Section 2270 of the Administrative Code of 1916, now Section 2324 of the
Administrative Code of 1917, is invalid.
Section 2270 of the Administrative Code of 1916, now section 2323 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 is valid. It does not violate Paragraph 17, section
5 of
the Philippine Bill which provided that no private or local bill which may be ena
into law shall embrace more than one subject, and that subject shall be expresse
d in
the title of the bill because the Administrative Code is neither a private nor a
The Administrative Code of 1917 has for its title, An Act amending the
Administrative Code. It does not violate Paragraph 17, section 3 of the Jones Law
which provided that no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more
than one subject and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill, be
it was merely a revision of the provisions of the Administrative Code enacted fo
r the
purpose of adapting it to the Jones Law and the Reorganization Act.
Lidasan v. Commission on Elections
Case No. 148
G.R. No. L-28089 (October 25, 1967)
Chapter I, Page 13, Footnote No.51
Petitioner challenged Republic Act 4790, which is entitled An Act Creating
the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur as unconstitutional
the ground that it includes barrios located in another province, which is Cotaba
violating the constitutional mandate that No bill which may be enacted into law
shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the
This question was initially presented to the Respondents, which adopted a resolu
in favor of RA 4790, prompted by the upcoming elections.
W/N Republic Act 4790 is constitutional.
Republic Act 4790 is null and void. The title An Act Creating the Municipality
of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur projects the impression that solely
province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the sligh
intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are
incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase in the Province of Lanao
del Sur makes the title misleading and deceptive. The title did not inform the
members of the Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the
people in the towns of Cotabato that were affected by the law, and the province
Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their town
s and
provinces and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the publi
c in
the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill. Thes
are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of Republic

Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Reyes

Case No. 169
G.R. No. 43263 (October 31, 1935)
Chapter I, Page 13, Footnote No. 53
Respondent executed a chattel mortgage in favor of Petitioner. He failed to
pay some of the installments. Petitioner proceeded to foreclose its chattel mort
The mortgaged property was sold at a public auction by the sheriff of the City o
Manila. After applying this sum, with interest, costs, and liquidated damages to
Respondent s indebtedness, the latter owed the company a balance of P275.47 with
interest. The company instituted an action for recovery when he failed to pay th
deficiency of the debt. He pleaded as a defense that the company, having chosen
to foreclose its chattel mortgage, had no further action against him for the rec
of the unpaid balance owed by him, as provided by Act No. 4122.
W/N Act No. 4122, entitled An Act to amend the Civil Code by inserting
between Sections fourteen hundred and fifty-four and fourteen hundred and fifty-
thereof a new section, to be known as section fourteen hundred and fifty-four-A,
Act No. 4122 is valid and enforceable. The controlling purpose of Act No.
4122 is revealed to be to close the door to abuses committed in connection with
foreclosure of chattel mortgages when sales were payable in installments.
The general rule is adopted in this jurisdiction to the effect that a title whic
declares a statute to be an act to amend a specified code is sufficient and the
precise nature of the amendatory act need not be further stated. The proper
approach in cases of this character should be to resolve all presumptions in fav
or of
the validity of an act in the absence of a clear conflict between it and the
9a, 37
People of the Philippines v. Ferrer
Case No. 208
G.R. No. L-32613-14 (December 27, 1972)
Chapter I, Page 13, Footnote No.50
Private Respondents were respectively charged with a violation of Republic
Act No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Act. RA 1700 outlaws the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and other subversive associations and
punishes any person who knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliates himself
becomes or remains a member of the CPP or any other organization subversive in
nature. Tayag filed a motion challenging the validity of the statute due to its
constitutional violations. The lower court declared the statute void on the grou
that it was a bill of attainder and that it is vague and overbroad. The cases we
dismissed, to which the Government appealed.
W/N the title of the act satisfies the constitutional provision on bill titles.
Yes. The title of the bill need not be a catalogue or an index of its contents,
and need not recite the details of the Act. It is a valid title if it indicates
in clear terms
the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. A
narrow and technical construction is to be avoided, and the statute will be read
and reasonably in order not to thwart the legislative intent. The Anti-Subversio
n act
fully satisfies these requirements.
9a, 9d, 51d

Del Rosario v. Carbonell, et al.

Case No. 33
G.R. No. L-32476 (October 20, 1970)
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of RA 6132. The said Act purportedly
encompasses more than one subject for the title of the Act allegedly fails to in
The statute plainly reads: An Act Implementing Resolution to Both Houses Numbered
Two as Amended by Resolution of Both Houses Numbered Four of the Congress of the
Philippines Calling for a Constitutional Convention, Providing for Proportional
Representation Therein and Other Details Relating to the Election of Delegates t
o and
the Holding of the Constitutional Convention, Repealing for the Purpose Republic
Four Thousand Nine Hundred Fourteen, and for Other Purposes.
W/N RA 6132 is unconstitutional for embracing more than one subject.
No. The inclusion of the title is superfluous and therefore unnecessary because
the title expressly indicates that the act implements Resolutions on both Houses
Nos. 2
and 4 respectively of 1967 and 1969, and both Resolutions No. 2 and 4 likewise
categorically state in their titles that the Constitutional Convention called fo
r therein is
to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines, which phrase is
reiterated in Sec. 1 of both Resolutions.
The power to propose amendments to the Constitution is implied in the call
for the convention itself, whose raison d etre is to revise the present Constituti
on. It is
not required that the title of the bill be an index to the body of the act or be
comprehensive in matters of detail. It is enough that it fairly indicates the ge
subject and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act so as not to mislead
Congress or the people. All the details provided for in RA 6132 are germane to a
are comprehended by its title.
9a, 9d, 51d
People of the Philippines v. Valeriano Valensoy y Masa
Case No. 230
G.R. No. L-9659 (May 29, 1957)
Chapter I, Page 14, Footnote No. 55
Defendant was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila for violation of
Section 26 of Act No. 1780 by concealment of a bolo. The defendant moved to
quash the information on the ground that the title of the act, which was an Act t
regulate the importation, acquisition, possession, use, and transfer of firearms
, and to
prohibit the possession of same except in compliance with the provisions of this
did not include weapons other than firearms, and that Section 26 violated the
constitutional provision that no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace
more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.
1. W/N Act No. 1780 violated the one subject-one title rule
2. W/N it was inconsistent with the Constitution.
No. At the time of the enactment of Act No. 1780 on October 12, 1907, the
one subject-one title rule referred to private and local bills only, and to bill
s to be
enacted into a law and not to law that was already in force and existing at the
the 1935 Constitution took effect. The provision of Section 26 germane to the su
expressed in the title of the Act remained operative because it was not inconsis
with the Constitution, pursuant to Section 2 of Article XVI of the 1935 Constitu
30a, 36a, 46a, 50

People of the Philippines v. Apolonio Carlos

Case No. 204
G.R. No. L-239 (June 30, 1947)
Chapter I, Page 16, Footnote No.63
The People s Court found the Appellant, guilty of treason. Appellant attacked
the constitutionality of the People s Court Act on the ground that it contained
provisions which deal on matters entirely foreign to the subject matter expresse
d in its
title, such as: (1) a provision which retains the jurisdiction of the Court of F
irst Instance;
(2) a provision which adds to the disqualification of Justices of the Supreme Co
and provides a procedure for their substitution; (3) a provision which changed t
existing Rules of Court on the subject of bail, and (4) a provision which suspen
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
W/N the People s Court Act was unconstitutional.
No. The People s Court was intended to be a full and complete scheme with
its own machinery for the indictment, trial and judgment of treason cases. The
provisions mentioned were allied and germane to the subject matter and purposes
of the People s Court Act. The Congress is not expected to make the title of an
enactment a complete index of its contents. The constitutional rule is satisfied
if all
parts of a law relate to the subject expressed in its title.
People of the Philippines v. Leoncio Lim
Case No. 210
G.R. No. L-14432 (July 26, 1960)
Chapter I, Page 19, Footnote No.83
In March 1954, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources pursuant to
the authority granted him by Sections 3 and 4 of Act No. 4003 (Fisheries Act) is
Fisheries Administrative Order No. 37. Section 2 of said order prohibits trawl f
ishing in
certain areas in Samar. FAO No. 37 was subsequently amended with FAO No. 37 1.
Leoncio Lim, the accused in violation of said order, challenged its legality on
ground that FAO No. 37 1 was contrary to Act No. 4003, the former having no fixed
period and thus establishing a ban for all time while the latter stating that pr
was for any single period of time not exceeding five years duration.
W/N Section 2 of FAO No. 37 1 was invalid.
Section 2 of FAO No. 37 1 was valid. Although FAO No. 37 1 was defective
because it failed to specify a period for the ban, it was ruled that in case of
discrepancy between a basic law and a rule issued to implement it, the basic law
prevails because the rule cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the law.
No. 37 1 would be inoperative in so far as it exceeded the period of five years fo
r any
single period of time, but it was not necessarily rendered void by the omission.

37, 38a

KMU Labor Center v. Garcia Jr.

Case No. 68
G.R. No. 115381 (December 23, 1994)
DOTC Memorandum Order No. 90-395 was filed asking the LTFRB to allow
provincial bus operators to charge passengers rates within a range of 15% above
and below the LTFRB official rate for a period of one year. LTFRB issued Memoran
Circular No.92-009 allowing for a range of plus 20% and minus 25% of the prescri
fares. PBOAP, without a public hearing and permission from LTFRB, availed of the
deregulatory policy and announced 20% increase in existing fares. Petitioner fil
ed a
petition opposing the increase in fares. SC issued a temporary restraining order
prevent PBOAP from implementing fare increase.
1. W/N authority given by LTFRB to PBOAP to increase prices at 20% instead of 15
% is
unconstitutional on the ground that there was no filing for a petition of purpos
e in the
said increase.
2. W/N PBOAP proved that there was a public necessity for the increase thus viol
the Public Service Act and Rules of the Court.
1. LTFRB did not have authority to delegate its powers to PBOAP.
2. PBOAP was not able to prove and provide such public necessity as reason for t
fare increase.
Hijo Plantation, Inc. v. Central Bank
Case No. 57
G.R. No. L-34526 (August 9, 1988)
Congress approved RA No. 6125 entitled An act imposing STABILIZATION TAX
PHILIPPINES FOR OTHER PURPOSES Petitioners expected to pay 4% of the aggregate
value from July 1, 1972-June 30, 1973, as provided in the Act. The Central bank
released Monetary Resolution No. 1995 which states that: For exports of bananas
shipped during the period from January 1, 1972-June 30, 1972; the stabilization
shall be at the rate of 6%. For exports of bananas shipped during the period fro
m July
1, 1972 to June 30, 1973; the stabilization tax shall be at the rate of 4%. For
exports of
bananas shipped during the period from July 1, 1973-June 30, 1974; the stabiliza
tax shall be at the rate of 2%.
W/N Central bank acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when it issued Monetary Board Resolution No. 1995.
Central Bank acted with grave abuse of discretion. In case of discrepancy
between the basic law and the rule or regulation issued to implement the said la
the basic law prevails. The rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms of the
China Banking Corp. v. CA
Case No. 59
G.R. No. 121158 (December 5, 1996)
Chapter I, Page 19, Footnote No.84
Petitioner extended loans to Native West Corp. and its president, So Ching, in
return for promissory notes to pay the loans. Two extra mortgages were additiona
executed by So Ching and his wife on July and August 1989. The loans matured but
So Ching was not able to repay the said loans. This caused Petitioner to file fo
r extra
judicial foreclosures of the two mortgaged properties. The properties were to be
sold/auctioned on April 3, 1993. On April 28, 1989 the court ruled on the side o
f So
Ching. The issuance of the preliminary injunction was granted; therefore the sal
e of
the two mortgaged properties was stopped. Petitioner sought for reconsideration
and elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. They were appealing that Act No.
3135 was the governing rule in their case, instead of Administrative Order No. 3
as So
Ching was contending.
1. W/N Petitioner can extra-judicially foreclose the properties.
2. W/N Administrative Order No. 3 should govern the extra judicial foreclosure.
1. Petitioner can foreclose the properties.
2. Act No. 3135 is the governing law. Administrative Order No. 3 cannot prevail
Act 3135. It is an elementary principle that a stature is superior to an adminis
directive. Thus, the statute cannot be repealed or amended by the administrative
Santos v. Honorable Estenzo
Case No. 140
G.R. No. L-14740 (September 26, 1960)
The decedent is a driver for People s Land Transportation Company, of which
Petitioners are manager and proprietor. The Workmen s Compensation Commission
awarded the decedent s widow the amount of P3,494.40, plus burial expenses not
exceeding P200. After 5 years, Respondent, in a civil case filed by the mother o
f the
decedent, ordered Petitioners to pay the award plus P500 as attorney s fees for
failure to comply. Petitioners pray that the decision be annulled or modified ba
on Section 1 Rule 11 the Rules of the Workmen s Compensation Commission and
prays further that the P500 in atty s fees exceeded the allowed fees according to
Sec.6 Rule 26 of the said Rules.
1. W/N the Rules of the Workmen s Compensation Commission amended R.A. No.
772 and as a result deprived the court of its jurisdiction over the case.
2. W/N the court committed a grave abuse of discretion in awarding the P500 in
attorney s fees.
Petition was dismissed.
1. The Commission, or any of its rules, cannot amend an act of Congress.
Furthermore, the Rule was promulgated more than 2 years after the court had
acquired jurisdiction over the main case.
2. The court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in awarding the P500 since
said rule only applies to the Commission and not the Court.
30, 35, 46a

Grego v. Commission on Elections

Case No. 120
G.R. No. 125955 (June 19, 1997)
Chapter I, Page 23, Footnote No.98
One of the Respondents was elected for his 3rd and final term as councilor of th
2nd District of Manila. His qualifications are being questioned by herein Petiti
oner, who is
also asking for the suspension of his proclamation. Petitioner brings into consi
the fact that Respondent was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff upon fi
of serious misconduct in an administrative case held on October 31, 1981. Petiti
argues that Respondent should be disqualified under Section 40(b) of the Local
Government Code. Petitioner further argues that the Local Government Code should
be applied retroactively.
W/N or not the Section 40 of the Local Government Code should be applied
retroactively due to its wording.
Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code should not be applied
retroactively. It is understood that statutes are not to be construed as intende
d to have
a retroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings, unless such intent is
declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the language of the enactment.
fact that the provision of the Code in question does not qualify the date of a
candidate s removal and that it is couched in the past tense should not deter the
from applying the law prospectively.
The term to be looked at in the issue is REINSTATEMENT, which has a technical
meaning, referring only to an appointive position. Since Respondent was reelecte
d, this
does not fall under the scope of the term.
25a, 46c
Santos v. Municipal of Caloocan
Case No. 141
G.R. No. L-15807 (April 22, 1963)
Respondent issued Ordinance No. 24 charging slaughterhouses in the
municipality certain fees including slaughterhouse fees, meat inspection fees,
corral fees, and internal organ fees, pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 655.
Petitioners questioned the validity or said Ordinance.
W/N Respondent, in the issuance of Ordinance No. 24, exceeded the limits of its
jurisdiction provided by Commonwealth Act 655.
Respondent exceeded its jurisdiction in the issuance of the said ordinance. The
Commonwealth Act only allowed Respondent to charge slaughterhouse fees. When
Respondent ordained the payment of other said fees, it overstepped the limits of
statutory grant. The only other fees that would be acceptable were veterinary or
sanitary inspection fees since it was mentioned in the statute. Incidentally, th
e court
ordered Respondent to refund the fees with the exception of slaughterhouse fees.
One of the rules of statutory construction is that certain sections or parts of s
ections of
an ordinance may be held invalid without affecting the validity of what remains,
if the
parts are not so interblended and dependent that the vice of one necessarily vit
the others.
15a, 37

National Housing Authority v. Reyes

Case No. 85
G.R. No. 49439 (June 29, 1983)
Private Respondents owned a parcel of land of 25,000 sq/rn, subject of an
expropriation proceedings granted by the court in favor NHA. Respondents claimed
they should be paid the assessed value of P6,600.00 pursuant to PD 42. Petitione
opposed the payment claiming that it was too excessive. He cited PD 464 which
provides just compensation not to exceed the market value declared by the owner
in the amount of P1,400.00. Respondent Judge granted the payment of P6,600.00,
but Petitioner had opposed it pursuant to PD 1224 which states that the governme
shall choose between the value of real property as declared by the owner x x x o
the market value determined by the City or Provincial Assessor, whichever is low
W/N PD 464 as amended by PD 1224 determines the valuation on just
Courts accord the presumption of validity to executive acts and legislative
enactments, x x x because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constituti
on x
x x. The Respondent Judge should have followed just compensation in expropriatio
cases, that the lower value made by the landowner should be the basis for fixing
price. The petition for Certiorari is granted.
Francisco Lao Lim v. CA and Benito Villavicencio Dy
Case No. 73
G.R. No. 87047 (October 31, 1990)
Private Respondent entered into a contract of lease with Petitioner for a
period of 3 years. After it expired, Private Respondent refused to vacate the pr
and hence, the filing of an ejectment suit against the Respondent. The case was
terminated by a compromise agreement, and the lease continued from 1979 to
1982, then from 1982 to 1985. The Petitioner filed another ejectment suit. The t
rial court
dismissed the complaint on the grounds that (1) the lease contract has not expir
and (2) the compromise agreement entered into constitutes res judicata. Petition
appealed to the RTC of Manila and then to the CA which also affirmed the decisio
of the trial court.
W/N the continuance of lease is made to depend upon the will of the lessee?
W/N the action for ejectment is barred by compromise agreement on res
This is untenable because the continuance of lease is not dependent upon
the will of the lessee. On the compromise agreement, the lease is not for perpet
renewals unless the language employed indicates that it was the intention of the
On the second issue, the compromise agreement does not apply because
the present case requires a different set of evidence. The compromise agreement
does not foreclose any cause of action arising from a violation of the terms the
and hence, res judicata does not apply.
1, 11a, 26,

Hon. Alfredo S. Lim v. Felipe G. Pacquing;

Case No. 74
G.R. No. 115044 (January 27, 1995)
Executive Order No. 392 was issued transferring the authority to regulate Jai-
Alai from local governments to the Games and Amusements Board (GAB). The City of
Manila passed an Ordinance No. 7065 authorizing the mayor to allow the Associate
Development Corporation (ADC) to operate a JAI-ALAI. Then President Marcos
issued a PD 771 revoking all powers and authority of local governments to grant
franchise, license or permit, to Jai-Alai and other forms of gambling. Then Pres
Aquino issued an E.O. No. 169 expressly repealing PD. No. 810 which revokes and
cancels the franchise granted to the Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporati
In 1998, ADC tried to operate a Jai-Alai, but the Games and Amusement Board
intervened and invoked P.D. 771 which expressly revoked all existing franchises
permits to operate all forms of gambling issued by local governments.
W/N the franchise granted by the City of Manila to ADC is valid in view of E. 0.
No. 392 which transferred from local governments to the GAB the power to
regulate Jai-Alai.
W/N the ADC is correct in assailing that P.D. 771 is violative of equal
protection and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution.
R.A. 409 provides that Congress did not delegate to the City of Manila the
power to franchise the operation of Jai-Alai. And E.O. 392 removes the power of
local governments to issue license and permit.
All laws are presumed valid and constitutional. PD 771 was not repealed or
amended by any subsequent law. It did not violate the equal protection clause of
the Constitution because the said decree had revoked all franchises issued by th
local governments without exceptions.
5a, 6c, 37, 44, 50
Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union
Case No. 169
G.R. No. L-25246 (September 12, 1974)
Petitioner, an Iglesia ni Cristo , was a member of the Respondent Union
which had with their Company a collective bargaining agreement containing a
closed shop provision allowed under R.A. 875: Membership in the Union shall be
required as a condition of employment for all permanent employees workers
covered by this Agreement
RA 3350 amended RA 875: but such agreement shall not cover members of
any religious sect which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor
organization. Petitioner resigned from Respondent Union, which wrote a formal let
to the Company asking to separate the Petitioner from service.
W/N RA 3350 violates right to form or join association?
W/N RA 3350 is constitutional?
W/N the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion when ruling that
the Union should pay 500 and attorney s fee.
The right to join associations includes the right not to join or to resign from
labor organization. Section 1 960 of Art III of the 1935 Constitution, as well a
s Section 7
of Art IV of the 1973 Constitution, provide that the right to form associations
purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Article 2208 of the Civil Code provides that attorney s fees and expenses of
litigation may be awarded when the defendant s act has compelled the Plaintiff to
incur expenses to protect his interest and in any other case where the court deems
it just and equitable that attorney s fees and expenses of litigation should be
recovered .
9a, 40b

Tañada v. Tuvera
Case No. 287
G.R. No. L-63915 (December 29, 1986)
Chapter I, Page 37, Footnote No.159
Due process was invoked by the Petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a
number of Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as
required by law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a
rule, it was not so when it was otherwise provided as when the decrees themselves
declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.
W/N the clause otherwise provided in Article 2 of Civil Code pertains to the
necessity of publication.
No, the clause otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not
to the requirement of publication per se, which cannot in any event be omitted.
Publication in full should be indispensable. Without such notice or publication,
there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignorantia Legis non
excusat . The court, therefore, declares that presidential issuances of general
application which have not been published shall have no force and effect, and th
court ordered that the unpublished decrees be published in the Official Gazette
6c, 9a
Gutierrez v. Carpio
Case No. 55
G.R. No. 31025 (August 15, 1929)
The Litigants here compromised a civil case on July 13, 1928, agreeing that if
within a month from the date thereof the Plaintiffs failed to repurchase a certa
land, the ownership would vest in the Defendants. But when the Plaintiffs duly
tendered the amount, the Defendants appealed that by that time, August 13, 1928,
the time when the Plaintiffs tendered it, the stipulated or fixed period had alr
W/N the stipulated period elapsed on the time of tendering.
No. The repurchase of the land was made within the stipulated period. The
above issue depends upon the kind of month agreed upon by the parties, and on
the day from which it should be counted. Article 7 of the Civil Code had been
modified by Sec. 13 of the Administrative Code, according to which month now
means the civil month and not the regular-30-day month. In computing any fixed
period of time, with reference to the performance of an act required by law or
contract to be done within a certain limit of time, the day from which the time
reckoned is to be excluded and the date of performance included, unless otherwis
provided. There is nothing in the agreement providing otherwise.
2a, 39a

Guzman v. Lichauco
Case No. 56
G.R. No. L-17986 (October 21, 1921)
Plaintiff filed two actions of unlawful detainer to recover possession of certai
properties in Manila. The trial court decided in favor of the Plaintiff. The uns
Defendants having appealed in both cases on Dec. 9, 1920 to the Court of First
Instance of Manila, it is their duty to conform with the provisions of Sec. 88 o
f the CCP,
as amended by Act No. 2588, in case they desire to avoid the immediate execution
of the judgment pending the appeal, to pay the Plaintiff, or to deposit in court
, on or
before the TENTH day of each Calendar month , the sums of money fixed by the
Justice of the Peace as the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the
property held by them. The Defendants made such dilatory payments however they
failed to make such payments on or before the tenth day of the month. As a resul
the Plaintiff moved the court to execute the judgments. The court ordered the
immediate execution of the judgment.
W/N the payments were made on or before the Tenth day of each month.
The payment made on August 11, 1921 was one day late. The term month
must now be understood to refer to calendar month, inasmuch as Sec 13 of the
Administrative Code has modified Art. 7 of the civil code in so far as the latte
r fixes
the length of a month at thirty days.
25a, 25c
U.S. v. Paniaga
Case No. 161
G.R. No. 8223 (March 4, 1914)
This is an appeal by the government from an order of the court, setting aside
the forfeiture of a bail bond. Judgment was rendered against the principal on
February 7, and the sureties were notified on the same day to produce the thereo
their principal. On Feb 28, the court ordered that the Defendant s bond be forfeit
and the execution issued against the principal and the sureties for the amount
thereof, and that an alias warrant be issued for the arrest of the Defendant. By
various orders of the court, the sale was postponed from time to time, and final
occurred on July 8, 1912, with government as the purchaser. On July 10, 1912, th
principal was arrested. On July 13, 1912, the court, on application of the suret
ies, set
aside the order of forfeiting the bond, and ordered the sheriff to annul the sal
W/N the execution sale occurred on the date directed by the court.
Sec. 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: unless otherwise specially
provided, the time within which an act is required by law to be done shall be
computed by excluding the first day and including the last; if the last be a Sun
day or
a legal holiday, it shall be excluded. This section is only applicable if there i
s a
computation needed to be done. However, in this case, there is no necessity for
computation for the date is fixed for when the act be performed. It is also dire
that the sale should take place on a named future date. The sale here of the
property must stand.

Case No. 238
G.R. No. 98382 (May 17, 1993)
Chapter I, Page 47, Footnote No.195
To secure payments of his loans, Private Respondent mortgages two lots to
Petitioner bank. For failure to pay the obligation, Petitioner bank extrajudicia
foreclosed the mortgaged property and won the highest bidder at the auction sale
Then, a final deed of sale was registered in the Buacan Registry of Property in
favor of
the Petitioner bank and later sold the said lots to a third party.
The notices of sale of Appellant s foreclosed properties were published on
March 28, April 11 and April 12, 1969 issues of the newspaper Daily Record . The d
March 28, 1969 falls on a Friday, while the dates April 11 and 12 fall on a Frid
ay and
Saturday, respectively. Section 3 of Act No. 3135 requires that the notice of au
sale shall be published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks .
W/N the Petitioner bank complied with the requirements of weekly
publication of notice of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages.
It must be conceded that that Article 13 is completely silent as to the
definition of what is week . In Concepcion v. Andueta, the term week was
interpreted to mean as a period of time consisting of seven consecutive days. Th
Defendant-Appellee bank failed to comply with the legal requirement of publicati
1, 9a, 9b
Hidalgo v. Hidalgo
Case No. 124
G.R. No. L-25326 (May 29, 1970) and G.R. No. L-25327 (May 29, 1970)
Chapter II, Page 52, Footnote No.19
Petitioners pray to Agrarian Court to be entitled as share tenants to redeem
parcel of land they are working from the purchasers where no notice was previous
given to them by the vendor of the latter s intention to sell the property and whe
the vendor did not execute the affidavit required by Sec. 13 of the Agricultural
Reform Code before the registration of the deed of sale. Agrarian Court dismisse
petitions, stating that the right of redemption granted by Sec. 12 of the same c
ode is
only for leasehold tenants and not for share tenants, claiming that share tenanc
y and
leasehold tenancy are within the jurisdiction of the code that the code expressl
grants said right to leaseholders only and nobody else. Moreover, the court held
if the intention of Congress was to extend the right of redemption to share tena
through judicial legislation, the section would have expressly said so.
W/N not the right of redemption granted by Sec. 12 of the Agrarian Reform
Code addresses only leaseholders and not share tenants.
Agrarian Court fell into several erroneous assumptions and premises, reducing
agricultural lessee to only leasehold tenants . The purpose of the Agricultural
Land Reform Code is the abolition of agricultural share tenancy. The policy of t
State is to establish owner cultivatorship. Adherence to the letter would result
absurdity, injustice and contradictions and would defeat the plain and vital pur
of the statute.
9a, 9c, 11a, 12a, 36a, 37, 40a
Maxims invoked by lower court: 6c, 30b, 43

U.S. v. Navarro
Case No. 300
G.R. No. 6160 (March 21, 1911)
Chapter II, Page 52, Footnote No.20
They made an oath before an election officer in the municipality of Piddig (in
proceedings in connection with the general election held on Nov. 2, 1909) that t
owned real property with the value of P500. Evidence showed that the Appellants,
except for Daniel Navarro and Genaro Calixtro, did not own property of the asses
value of P500.
W/N the said statute s true test of property qualification to vote is the
actual/market value of the property owned or the assessed value thereof.
It was the intention of the legislator as proved from an examination of the
immediate context of provisions of the statute defining property qualifications of
voter, and of the statute as a whole. In the statute, property qualification is
alternative to qualification based upon an annual payment. Both qualifications a
under a single head, suggesting an intimate relation between the two in the mind
the legislator. Another section of the statute disqualifies people who are delin
quent in
the payment of public taxes assessed since Aug. 13, 1898, from voting. This prov
was directed to the case of delinquency in the payment of land taxes as well as
other taxes. The statute as a whole (as an election law) is intended to secure p
urity of
the ballot box. If the property qualification is actual/market value, it would b
e highly
improbable to enforce the statute within a reasonable time because it will be di
to determine.
10, 11a, 12a, 28, 36a, 37
Litex Employees Association v. Eduvala
Case No. 149
G.R. No. L-41106 (September 22, 1977)
Chapter II, Page 53, Footnote No.22
Respondent, Officer-in-Charge of Bureau of Labor Relations, required
referendum election among Petitioners to ascertain their wishes as to their affi
with Federation of Free Workers. Petitioners contended that there was no statuto
authorization for the Respondent to require referendum election and that
Respondent and the Bureau were beyond jurisdiction.
W/N there is a statute authorizing Respondents and giving them jurisdiction.
Article 226 of the Labor Code addresses this. Respondent and the Bureau
were within jurisdiction. Petition denied. Article 226 of Labor Code is very cle
concerning executive department s original and exclusive authority to act .
9a, 9c, 20a, 24a

Regalado v. Yulo
Case No. 255
G.R. No. L-42293 (February 13, 1935)
Chapter II, Page 55, Footnote No.25
Petitioner was Justice of Peace of Malinao, Albay. On November 16, 1931,
Act No. 3899 which provided for the age retirement among justices was approved.
few years later, Petitioner became 65 years of age (age retirement as provided b
Sec. 203 of the Administrative Code, amended further by Act. No. 3899). Shortly
thereafter, Esteban T. Villar was appointed as Justice of Peace to take the plac
e of
Petitioner. On December 17, 1934, Villar assumed office.
W/N under the provisions of Section 203 of the Administrative Code, as further
amended by Act No. 3899, the Justices of Peace and auxiliary justices appointed
prior to the approval of the Act shall cease to hold office upon reaching the ag
e of
Justices appointed prior to the approval of the Act will not be affected by
said amendment (Act No. 3899).
1, 46a
B.E. San Diego Inc. v. CA
Case No. 26
G.R. No. 80223 (February 5, 1993)
Chapter II, Page 56, Footnote No. 27
On March 3, 1986, Petitioner instituted an action in the RTC of Valenzuela
against Private Respondent De Jesus for recovery of possession of a parcel of la
nd in
said area. In her defense, De Jesus argued that the land in question was covered
PD 2016 (a complementary provision of PD 1517, which aims to protect tenants fro
unjust eviction.)
W/N PD 2016 is a valid defense of De Jesus in upholding her rights as a lessee.
PD 2016 is a valid ground for De Jesus in invoking her rights as a tenant. While
it may depart from its source, PD 1517, said provision still aims to protect the
from unscrupulous landowners from demanding a steep price for the land, as well
unjust eviction.
12a, 25a

Araneta v. Dinglasan
Case No. 84
G.R. No. L-2044 (August 26, 1949)
Chapter II, Page 56, Footnote No. 29
Executive Orders, in pursuance of Commonwealth Act No. 671 (Emergency
Powers Act), were questioned for its validity until the National Assembly Conven
of 1942
W/N the proclamations are valid.
These Executive Orders are valid because they have been enacted during
the time of the inability of the Congress to function. That when Congress conven
again on Jan. 1, 1942, said proclamations were also terminated.
2a, 9a
Endencia and Jugo v. David
Case No. 98
G.R. No. L-6355-56 (August 31, 1953)
Chapter II, Page 56, Footnote No.33
RA 590 declares that no salary received by a public officer shall be
considered exempt from income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be
a diminution of his compensation fixed by law. While Art. 8, Sec. 9 of the Const
states that judges shall receive compensation as fixed by law, which shall not b
diminished during their continuance in office. Petitioners question the legality
of RA
W/N RA 590 unconstitutional.
No. Saying that the taxing of the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease
compensation is a clear interpretation of Which shall not be diminished during th
continuance in office , by the Legislature. Through the separation of powers, such
task must be done by the Judiciary. Judicial officers are exempt from taxes on h
salary not for his own benefit but for the public, to secure and preserve his
independence of judicial thought and action.
1, 6c, 7a, 24a

Daoang v. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte

Case No. 84
G.R. No. L-34568 (March 28, 1988)
Chapter II, Page 61, Footnote No.50
Prior to this case, Petitioners contested the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and
Wilson Marcos by, Antero Agonoy and Amanda Agonoy, stating that under Art. 335
of the Civil Code, that those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged
natural children, or children by legal fiction, cannot adopt. Petitioners stated
that the
Agonoys already had a daughter of the Estrella Agonoy, who is the deceased
mother of the Petitioners, and that the Agonoys also have the Petitioners as
grandchildren. Furthermore, the Petitioners argued that the adopting would
introduce a foreign element into the family unit, and would result in the reduct
ion of
their legitimes in terms of inheritance. The Respondent Court ruled in favor for
W/N the Respondent Court erred in their decision.
No, the court was correct. In enumerating the persons who cannot adopt in
Art. 335, the children mentioned therein have a clearly defined meaning in law a
do not include grandchildren. To add grandchildren in this article where no
grandchild is included would violate the legal maxim that, what is expressly inc
would naturally exclude what is not included.
6c, 9a, 30a
CIR v. Limpan Investment Corporation
Case No. 77
G.R. No. L-28571 and L-28644 (July 31, 1970)
Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote No.55
In 1959 and 1960, Respondent Corporation filed income tax returns which
later were bases for deficiency due to disallowance by the BIR. Brought to the C
of Tax Appeals, the deficiencies on both cases were decided upon at P26,137 and
P7,240.48, resolved at September 20, 1967 (L-28571) and December 11, 1967 (L-286
W/N the CTA committed an error in its fixed date of the payment of
surcharges and interests.
The CTA s decision on the date of payment of surcharges and interests are in
error. Section 51 of the NIRC provides the following-On Tax shown on the return,
failure to pay the required amount on or before the date prescribed, interest up
such unpaid amount shall be collected as part of the tax, at the rate of one per
centum a month, from the date prescribed for the payment until paid, provided th
the maximum amount for the interest doesn t exceed the amount corresponding to
a period of 3 years. The same goes with deficiencies, except that the additional
must be paid within 30 days of the notice, else the same interests apply. With r
to surcharge, if the amount in the notice isn t paid within 30 days, a surcharge o
f 5
per centum of the amount of tax unpaid. In L-28571, the interest shall be comput
from September 7, 1962 to September 6, 1965, at 1% for 3 years, plus the surchar
ge of
5% on failure to pay the deficiency tax. In L-28644, from April 4, 1963 to April
3, 1966,
the interest shall be at 1% a month for 3 years, plus the 5% surcharge.
1, 6c, 7a, 24a, 26

Cebu Portland Cement v. Municipality of Naga, Cebu

Case No. 53
G.R. Nos. 24116-17 (August 22, 1968)
Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote No.56
Efforts of defendant Treasurer to collect from Plaintiff municipal license tax
from 1960, 1961, as well as penalties, amounting to a total sum of P204,300, hav
e all
been met with rebuff. Municipal tax imposed by Amended Ordinance No. 21. Finally
on June 26, 1961, defendant Treasurer decides to avail of Civil remedies as prov
for under Sec. 2304 of the Revised Administrative Code; he gives Plaintiff a per
iod of
ten (10) days within which to settle the account from receipt thereof. On July 6
, 1961,
defendant Treasurer notified the Plant Manager of the Plaintiff that he was dist
100,000 bags of Apo Cement in satisfaction of Plaintiff s delinquency in municipal
license tax; notice was received by Plant Officer-in-Charge Vicente T. Garagay,
acknowledged the distraint. Said articles (the cement bags) will be sold by publ
auction to the highest bidder on July 27, 1961, proceeds thereof will in part be
to settle the account. Despite notice of sale, it did not take place on July 27,
but on January 30, 1962
W/N the distraint and public auction were valid.
Both actions are valid. According to the Revised Administrative Code: The
remedy by distraint shall proceed as follows: Upon failure of the person owing a
municipal tax or revenue to pay the same, at the time required, the municipal
treasurer may seize and distraint any personal property belonging to such person
any property subject to the tax lien, in sufficient quantity to satisfy the tax
or charge in
question, together with any increment thereto incident to delinquency and the
expenses of the distraint. The clear and explicit language of the law leaves no r
for doubt. Also, this being a direct appeal to the Supreme Court, Plaintiff must
deemed to have accepted as conclusive the findings of the lower court which
upheld the validity of the auction.
6c, 7a, 43
Resins, Inc. v. Auditor General
Case No. 260
G.R. No. L-17888 (October 29, 1968)
Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote No.57
Petitioner seeks a refund from Respondent Central Bank on the claim that it
was exempt from the margin fee under RA 2609 for the importation of UREA AND
FORMALDEHYDE , as separate units used for the production of synthetic glue. The
specific language of the Act speaks of UREA FORMALDEHYDE , a finished product
which is distinct and different from UREA and FORMALDEHYDE . Petitioner argues
his view, citing the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during consider
of the bill before said House, by members thereof (referring to the Journal). Pe
would assail as devoid of support in law the action taken by the Respondent Audi
General in an endorsement to Central Bank causing it to overrule its previous
resolution and to adopt the view in such endorsement to the effect that the
importation of urea and formaldehyde, as separate units, did not come within the
purview of the statutory language that granted such exemption.
W/N Petitioner s allegations are valid.
The Act clearly states UREA FORMALDEHYDE as a finished product and not
UREA and FORMALDEHYDE as separate units. Individual statements made by
Senators do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they in
the view of the House of Representatives. If there was any mistake in the printi
ng of
the bill, it should be corrected by legislation and not by judicial decree. The
General was just doing his duty, following what was written in the statute.
6c, 7a, 43

Quijano v. Development Bank of the Philippines

Case No. 248
G.R. No. L-26419 (October 16, 1970)
Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote No.58
Petitioners filed an application for an urban estate loan with the Rehabilitatio
Finance Corporation (RFC), predecessor-in-intent of Respondent. They mortgaged
real estate properties to secure the loan; loan was approved on April 30, 1953.
Mortgage contract was executed by Petitioners in favor of DBP on March 23, 1954.
As of July 31, 1965, outstanding obligation of the Petitioners with DBP was P13,
Petitioner wrote Respondent offering to pay P14, 000 for his outstanding obligat
out of his back pay pursuant to RA 897 (Back Pay Law). Respondent advised
Petitioners of the non-acceptance of this offer on the ground that the loan was
incurred before or subsisting on June 20, 1953, when RA 897 was approved.
Respondent filed on October 14, 1965 an application for the foreclosure of real
estate mortgage executed by the Petitioners; Respondent Sheriff scheduled the
public auction after advising Petitioner of the application for foreclosure file
d by DBP.
W/N the obligation of the Petitioners was subsisting at the time of the
approval of RA 897, the Amendatory Act of June 20, 1953, to RA 304, the original
Back Pay Law.
W/N the trial court erred in declaring that the loan of the Petitioners was not
subsisting when RA 897 was enacted on June 20, 1953.
RA 897 has clear provisions that expressly require that the obligations for whic
back pay certificates may be accepted as payments must be subsisting at the time
RA 897 was approved (June 20, 1953). While Petitioner s loan was approved on April
30, 1953, they only availed of it much later on March 23, 1954. The obligation
therefore attaches only on March 23, 1954. It cannot be said that there was an
obligation subsisting at the time of the approval of RA 897.
6c, 7a, 43
KMMRC Credit Union v. Manila Railroad Company
Case No. 66
G.R. No. L-25316 (February 28, 1979)
The Petitioner filed a case for mandamus which the lower court has denied.
Petitioner seeks to overturn the ruling relying on a right that, according to th
Petitioner, RA 2023 grants to them. Paragraphs 1 & 2 of section 62 of RA 2023 co
employers to deduct from the salaries or wages of members of credit unions the
debts of the employees and pay it to said credit union. The lower court has alre
granted there is no such right granting first priority to the loan to credit uni
ons in the
payroll collection.
W/N RA 2023 converts KMMRC credit union s credit into a first priority credit.
No. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. The RA
Petitioner relies on clearly does not state the loans shall be granted first pri
ority in the
salary collections. According to Justice Recto in a subsequent opinion, it is wel
established that only specific legal rights are enforceable by mandamus, that th
right sought to be enforced must be certain and clear, and the writ not issue in
where the right is doubtful . Justice Barrera adds: the writ never issues in doubtf
cases. It neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to
exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed.

Davao Light & Power Co. v. Commissioner of Customs

Case No. 29
G.R. No. L-28739 (March 29, 1972)
Petitioner is the grantee of a legislative franchise to install, operate and
maintain an electric light, heat and power plant in the municipality of Davao. O
n two
different occasions it imported materials and equipment for installation in its
Petitioner is arguing that the taxes levied against its imports should be waived
by the
collector of customs in Cebu (the materials were delivered at the port of Cebu)
pursuant to section 17 of (pre-commonwealth) Act 3636 (Standard Electric Power
and Light Franchise Law) which states that if any competing company should be
granted franchise more favorable than the one previously granted to another
company, the latter shall enjoy the same advantages given in the other franchise
W/N section 17 of act 3636 applies to the case of Petitioner.
No. Firstly, the provision cited by Petitioner states that the franchise must be
granted to a competing party . NPC, to which the contract with tax exemptions was
given, is not a competing party to Petitioner. Secondly, Petitioner cannot rely
on RA
358 as amended by RA 987 to support its tax exemption. Exemption from taxation i
never presumed, it is always explicitly stated.
Alfredo Ramos v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 252
G.R. No. L-41295 (December 4, 1989)
Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote No.60
The municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan sued Ramos et al for the recovery of its
74 hectare fishpond. Atty. Angel Cruz, a private lawyer and head of the Cruz, Du
and Academia law firm, volunteered himself and his firm to serve as counsel for
municipality. He stipulated in the complaint that the municipality is obliged to
them not less than 20% of the amount to be recovered. Petitioners move to disqua
said private law firm as counsel on the ground that it is illegal for the munici
pality to
hire a private counsel.
W/N it is legal for the municipality to hire a private counsel in filing a case.

No. Under section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code, the provincial
fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality or municipal thereof in
court. Furthermore, under section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act, the municipal
attorney shall act as legal counsel for the municipality and perform such duties
exercise such powers as may be assigned to them by the council. The municipality s
interest would be best protected if the municipal attorney handles its litigatio
n. These
laws are implemented as well so as not to burden the municipality with the expen
of hiring a private lawyer.

Floresca v. Philex Mining Corporation

Case No. 47
G.R. No. L-30642 (April 30, 1985)
Petitioners are the surviving family of deceased employees of Respondent
Corporation who died as a result of a cave-in while working in underground minin
operations. Petitioners, with the exception of Floresca, recovered damages under
Workmen s Compensation Act. However, a later report on the accident showed
there was negligence on the part of Respondent Corporation. Thereafter, Petition
filed a civil suit to recover damages for Respondent Corporation s reckless and
wanton negligence.
W/N Petitioners have the right to choose between availing of the worker s
right under the Workmen s Compensation Act or suing in the regular courts under th
Civil Code for higher damages.
Petitioners may sue in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher
damages. However, in light of the fact that they have already recovered damages
from the Workmen s Compensation Act, if they are awarded a greater amount in the
regular courts, the amount received from this Act shall be deducted to prevent t
instance of double recovery. An injured party cannot pursue both courses of acti
simultaneously. In allowing Petitioners to sue in regular courts, the Court stat
ed that it
did not legislate in this case but rather, applied and gave effect to the consti
guarantees of social justice.
1, 17, 40a
Enrile v. Salazar
Case No. 40
G.R. No. 92163 (June 5, 1990)
Petitioner was arrested and charged with the crime of rebellion with murder
and multiple frustrated murders allegedly committed during a failed coup attempt
from November 29 to December 10, 1990.
Petitioners contend that they are being charged for a criminal offense that
does not exist in the statute books because technically, the crime of rebellion
be complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof.
W/N case of Petitioners falls under the Hernandez doctrine.
The doctrine in the case People v. Hernandez remains as the binding doctrine
operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committ
on the occasion thereof. The charges of murder and multiple frustrated murders a
absorbed in the crime of simple rebellion. Therefore, charges against Petitioner
s in the
information should be understood as that of simple rebellion under the RPC.
Furthermore, in a concurring opinion, Justice Feliciano states that if the court
that the charges of murder could be prosecuted separately from rebellion, then t
principle of non-retroactivity would be violated.
1, 46a, 48
Manikad v. Tanodbayan
Case No. 162
G.R. No. 65097 (February 20, 1984)
Chapter II, Page 63, Footnote No.65
Petitioners were members of the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA)
Police Force and were charged with crimes of smuggling, theft and violations of
Graft Law and Anti-Fencing Law before the Respondent. Petitioners argue that the
power to investigate complaints of this nature are lodged exclusively upon the E
and is not in the Respondent s jurisdiction. Section 7 of P.D. 1716-A states: The E
PZA in
the exercise of its sole police authority over the export processing zones shall
the power to receive and investigate complaints relative to violation of penal l
committed inside the zones owned and administered by the Authority
W/N Section 7 of P.D. 1716-A precludes the Respondent from investigating
complaints within the Export Processing Zone.
No, the use of sole in P.D. 1716-A refers to police authority. Although the
EPZA Police Force is the only police authority within the Zone, it is not the on
authority that may investigate complaints, especially those which fall under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
6c, 7a, 35
Senarillos v. Hermosisimo
Case No. 278
G.R. No. L-10662 (December 14, 1956)
Chapter II, Page 67, Footnote No.74
Petitioner was appointed as Chief of Police in Sibonga, Cebu. Upon the
charges filed by Petitioner, Senarillos was suspended by Municipal Mayor of Sibo
and investigated by a police committee composed of 3 councilors created by
Resolution No.2 Series 1952 of the municipal council.
The committee came up with an adverse decision subsequently signed by
the members of the council. This was appealed to and affirmed by the Commissione
of Civil Service and by the Civil Service Board of Appeals.
W/N Sibonga had jurisdiction to investigate the Chief of Police Senarillos.
No. Under RA No.557 the investigation of police officers must be conducted
by council itself and not by a mere committee thereof. Sibonga therefore had no
jurisdiction to investigate the Chief of Police Senarillos. RA No.557 has elimin
ated the
provision authorizing investigation by a committee council. Hence, the decision
against him was invalid, even if concurred in by the rest of the councilors.
The fact that the decision of the Municipal Council was issued before the
decision of the Supreme Court cannot validate the action of the police committee
The initial proceeding was illegal ab initio and the subsequent reaffirmation of
decision of the municipal council by the civil service authorities could not val
the proceeding.
1, 3a, 6b, 7a

People of the Philippines v. Moro Macarandang

Case No. 211
G.R. No. L-12088 (December 23, 1959)
Chapter II, Page 69, Footnote No.87
Defendant was accused and convicted of illegal possession of firearms in
Lanao. Defendant, admitting the ownership and possession of the firearm and
ammunitions, invokes as his legal excuse the appointment issued to him by Govern
Dimakuta as secret agent shown in the Governor s letter which he presented as and
evidence. He was granted this appointment for having shown good faith by
previously surrendering to the office of the Governor a firearm. He has then bee
appointed as SECRET AGENT to assist on the maintenance of peace and order
campaigns and is authorized to hold and carry in his possession 1 Riot shotgun.
W/N a Secret Agent tasked to assist in the maintenance of peace and order
falls among those authorized to possess firearms.
Yes. It may be true that the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm
license or permit but section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides th
peace officers are exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of
license to possess firearms. The appointment sufficiently put him in the categor
y of
peace officer equivalent even to a Municipal Police expressly covered by section
879. Wherefore the decision appealed from is reversed and the Defendant
9a, 24a
People of the Philippines v. Mapa
Case No. 213
G.R. No. L-22301 (August 30, 1967)
Chapter II, Page 69, Footnote No.89
Defendant was accused of illegal possession of firearms. He invokes in his
defense that he was an appointed Secret Agent of the provincial Governor of
Batangas. He sought to be acquitted as the case of People v. Macarandang used
the same defense providing evidences of his appointment.
W/N a Secret Agent falls among those authorized to possess firearms.
No. The court held that the law cannot be any clearer. The law does not
contain any exception for secret agent therefore holding this position would not
constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for a crime of illegal possessi
on of
firearm and ammunitions. Wherefore the conviction of the accused must stand. The
Court s ruling overturned that of People v. Macarandang.
1, 6c, 7a, 30a, 35, 46c

Co v. CA
Case No. 65
G.R. No. 100776 (October 28, 1993)
Chapter II, Page 69, Footnote No.91
Petitioner delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983 a check
drawn against the Associated Citizens Bank, postdated November 30, 1983. The
check was deposited on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days later, the
tersely-stated reason given by the bank being: CLOSED ACCOUNT. A criminal
complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was filed by the salvage
company against Petitioner. At the time of the issuance of the check, the delive
ry of
a rubber or bouncing check as a guarantee for an obligation was not
considered a punishable offense, an official promulgation made in a Circular of
Ministry of Justice.
W/N Petitioner is criminally liable.
No. According to them, Que v. People should not be applied retroactively in
accordance with the prospectivity principle of judicial rulings and the operativ
e fact
doctrine. The decision in Que should not be given retroactive effect to the prej
of Co and others similarly situated who relied on the opinion of the Secretary o
1, 2a, 46a
Sy Kiong v. Sarmiento
Case No. 150
G.R. No. L-2934 (November 29, 1951)
Petitioner is the owner of a duly licensed grocery store located in the City of
Manila and an importer of flour who sells either to bakeries or to retail dealer
s for
purposes of retail. Sometime in September 1948, the Treasurer of the City of Man
assessed against him the sum of 566.50php which represents the alleged deficienc
municipal license tax due from him on his gross sales of flour to bakeries after
deducting the sales made to retail dealers for purposes of resale.
W/N the sales of flour made by the Petitioner to bakeries to be manufactured
into bread are retail or wholesale.
The sale of flour to bakeries to be manufactured into bread and to be resold
to the public, in the absence of any express provision of law on the matter, sho
uld be
treated as a sale at retail and should subject the vendor to the retail tax law.

6c, 7a, 24a, 37, 43

Sumulong v. Commission on Elections

Case No. 149
G.R. No. 48634 (October 8, 1941)
On September 15, 1941, Respondent granted the Popular Front Party of Abad
Santos the exclusive right to propose the minority election inspector in the fir
congressional district of Pampanga, and to the Popular Front Party of Petitioner
, the
minority inspector in the second congressional district of the said province. El
days later, Respondent modified its ruling and awarded the minority inspector to
Popular Front Party of Abad Santos.
W/N Respondent committed grave abuse of discretion.
Where the minimum number of votes required by law was polled by a mere
coalition or alliance of minority parties, the right to minority representation
in the
board of election inspectors to which such coalition is entitled, cannot be clai
med by
any of the component parties which have thereafter separated. Respondent shall
have the discretion to choose the minority inspector.
36a, 37, d
Central Capiz v. Ramirez
Case No. 56
G.R. No. L-16197 (March 12, 1920)
Chapter III, Page 79, Footnote No.8
Private Respondent contracted with Petitioner Corporation for a term of 30
years, a supply of all sugar cane produced on her plantation, which was to be
converted later into a right in rem and recorded in the Registry of Property as
encumbrance upon the land, and binding to all future owners of the same. The
Respondent refuses to push through with the contract thinking it might violate A
ct No.
2874, An Act to amend and compile the laws relating to lands of public domain,
and for other purposes, since more than 61 percent of the capital stock of the
corporation is held and owned by persons who are not citizens of the Philippine
Islands or of the United States. The land involved is a private agricultural lan
W/N said Act no. 2874 is applicable to agricultural lands, in the Philippine
Islands which are privately owned.
The limit and purpose of the Legislature in adopting Act No. 2874 was and is to
limit its application to lands of public domain and that lands held in private o
are not included therein and are not affected in any manner whatsoever thereby.
Jones Law of 1916: That no bill may be enacted into law shall embrace more
than one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill.

Eugenio v. Drilon
Case No. 104
G.R. No. 109404 (January 22, 1996)
Chapter III, Page 81, Footnote No.20
Private Respondent purchased on installment basis from Petitioner, two lots.
Private respondent suspended payment of his amortizations because of nondevelopm
on the property. Petitioner then sold one of the two lots to spouses
Relevo and the title was registered under their name. Respondent prayed for
annulment of sale and reconveyance of the lot to him. Applying P.D. 957 The
Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree , the Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission ordered Petitioner to complete the development, reinstate
Private Respondent s purchase contract over one lot and immediately refund him of
the payment (including interest) he made for the lot sold to the spouses. Petiti
claims that the Exec. Sec. erred in applying P.D. 957 saying it should have not
given retroactive effect and that non-development does not justify the non-payme
of the amortizations.
W/N the Executive Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion when he
decided P.D. 957 will be given retroactive effect.
No. Respondent Executive Secretary did not act with grave abuse of
discretion and P.D. 957 is to given retroactive effect so as to cover even those
contracts executed prior to its enactment in 1976. P.D. 957 did not expressly pr
for retroactivity in its entirety, but such can be plainly inferred from the unm
intent of the law. The intent of the statute is the law.
People of the Philippines v. Purisima
Case No. 221
G.R. Nos. L-42050-66 (November 20, 1978)
Chapter III, Page 76, Footnote No.16
Twenty-six petitions for review were filed charging the respective Defendant
with illegal possession of deadly weapon in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9
An order quashed the information because it did not allege facts which constitut
the offense penalized by P.D. No. 9. It failed to state one essential element of
crime, viz.: that the carrying outside of the residence of the accused of a blad
pointed, or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with
related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or publ
disorder. Petitioners argued that a perusal of P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibi
ted acts
need not be related to subversive activities and that they are essentially malum
prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy.
W/N P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to
subversive activities.
The primary rule in the construction and interpretation of a legislative measure
is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative int
ent is the
controlling factor. Because of the problem of determining what acts fall under P
.D. 9,
it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and thi
s can
be found among others in the preamble or whereas clauses which enumerate the
facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanct
stated therein.
9a, b2

People of the Philippines v. Echaves

Case No. 207
G.R. Nos. L-47757-61 (January 28, 1980)
Chapter III, Page 77, Footnote No.22
The issue is whether or not P.D. 772, which penalizes squatting and similar acts
applies to agricultural lands. The lower court denied the motion and ruled that
agricultural land is not part of P.D. 772 on the basis of Ejusdem Generis (of th
e same
kind or species) since its preamble does not mention the Secretary of Agricultur
e. The
order of dismissal by Echaves was then appealed to the Supreme Court, thus bring
the case at hand.
Whether or not P.D. 772 applies to agricultural lands
The Supreme Court held the same ruling that the lower court did, declaring
that P.D. 772 does not apply to pasture lands because its preamble shows that it
was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to
illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals. But the
Supreme Court disagreed to the lower court s usage of the maxim Ejusdem Generis
because the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It stated that the rule of Ejus
Generis is merely a tool for statutory construction which is resorted to when th
legislative is uncertain.
9a, 36b
Aboitiz Shipping Corporation v. City of Cebu
Case No. 4
G.R. No. L-14526 (March 31, 1965)
Chapter III, Page 82, Footnote No.23
The Petitioner contends that the ordinance implemented by Respondent
should be declared null and void because the ordinance seeks to generate revenue
by collecting wharfage from vessels which dock at the public wharves of piers
located in the said City but owned by the National Government. According to
Respondent, the legislature made no distinction between those owned by the City
Cebu and the National Government and that consequently, both fall within the
scope of the power granted. Petitioners assail this construction erroneous in th
e light
of the meaning of public wharf as it may have bearing on the right to charge
W/N the City of Cebu, through its ordinance, has the right to charge
wharfages from docks which are owned by the National Government.
The term public refers to the nature of use of the pier or wharves. Hence,
the power to impose wharfage rests on a different basis and that is ownership. T
Court also referred to the previous subsection of the questioned portion of the
ordinance pointing out that it implies a distinction with regard to those docks
that are
owned by the City and those of the National Government. The Court states that on
those which are constructed by the City shall be considered as its property.
9a, 25a, 36b
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. TMX Sales, Inc.
Case No. 80
G.R. No. 83736 (January 15, 1992)
Chapter III, Page 83, Footnote No.25
Respondent Company wants a refund to an erroneously collected tax as
provided in Sec. 292 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) which includes
two-year prescription. The Petitioner claims that the prescriptive period provid
ed in
the law for refund of such tax is already expired since it is already more than
years from the date the quarterly income tax was paid. The Respondent contends,
on the other hand, that the date of filing of the final payment (Final Adjustmen
Return) is the one that should be considered with respect to the prescriptive pe
and not the quarterly payment made.
W/N the two-year prescriptive period provided in Sec. 292 of the National
Internal Revenue Code commence to run from the date the quarterly income tax
was paid or from the date of filing of the Final Adjustment Return (final paymen
The date of filing of the final payment should be considered. The Supreme
Court said that, Sec. 292 of the NIRC should be interpreted in relation to the ot
provisions of the Tax Code in order to give effect the legislative intent and to
an application of the law which may lead to inconvenience and absurdity. The
intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law a
every part of the act is to be taken into view.
11a, 36b, 36d
Feliciano v. Aquino
Case No. 105
G.R. No. 10201 (September 23, 1957)
Chapter III, Page 83, Footnote No.28
Respondent was proclaimed as elected Mayor of Concepcion, Tarlac. Four
days after the proclamation, defeated candidate Petitioner instituted quo warran
proceedings, challenging Petitioner s eligibility on the ground that Respondent wa
not yet 23 years old at the time of his election. Aquino claimed that age requir
refers only to the age at assumption of office. He appealed that the existence o
f a
semi-colon, converted into a comma in the 1951 Revised Administrative Code, does
not require him to possess the remaining qualifications at the time of the elect
ion but
rather at the time of the assumption of office, provided that he had fulfilled t
he first
two requirements.
W/N the election of Aquino is unlawful and illegal.
The primary rule of statutory construction is that punctuation marks cannot be
disregarded unless there is reason to do contrary. Punctuation marks are aids of
degree and can never control against the intelligible meaning of written words.
reason is shown why, after plainly and unequivocally requiring that the candidat
es of
other elective offices should possess the age qualification at the time of the
election , the law should suddenly change the requirement for the case of municipa
officers. No argument is needed to show that where the candidate is mentioned as
eligible or ineligible in the said section, taking part in the election is meant
, not
capacity to assume office. Decision of the lower court is affirmed and the elect
ion of
Respondent is declared unlawful and illegal.
6c, 9d, 11a, 11e, 36b

US. v. Hart
Case No. 159
G.R. No. L-8327 (March 28, 1913)
Respondent was caught in a gambling house and was penalized under Act
No. 519 which punishes every person found loitering about saloons or dram shops o
gambling houses, or tramping or straying through the country without visible mea
of support . The said portion of the law is divided into two parts, separated by t
comma, separating those caught in gambling houses and those straying through the
country without means of support. Though it was proven that Hart and the other
Defendants had visible means of support , it was under the first part of the portio
n of
law for which they were charged with. The prosecution persisted that the phrase
without visible means of support was in connection to the second part of the said
portion of Act No. 519, therefore was not a viable defense.
How should the provision be interpreted?
The construction of a statute should be based upon something more
substantial than mere punctuation. If the punctuation gives it a meaning which i
reasonable and is in apparent accord with legislative will, it may be as an addi
argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words in the statute as thus
punctuated. An argument based on punctuations alone is not conclusive and the
court will not hesitate to change the punctuation when necessary to give the act
effect intended by the legislature, disregarding superfluous and incorrect
punctuation marks, or inserting others when necessary. Inasmuch as defendant had
visible means of support and that the absence of such was necessary for the
conviction for gambling and loitering in saloons and gambling houses, defendants
are acquitted.
11e, 33
In re: Estate of Johnson
Case No. 131
G.R. No. 12767 (November 16, 1918)
Chapter III, Page 86, Footnote No.38
Petitioner was a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the United
States but died and left a will in Manila. Sec. 636 of the Code of the Civil Pro
states Will made here by an alien will made within the Philippine Islands by a citi
or subject of another state or country, which is executed in accordance with the
of the state or country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be
allowed by the law of his own state or country, may be proved, allowed and
recorded in the Philippine Islands and shall have the same effect as if executed
according to the laws of these Islands. The will of Johnson was probated and
allowed in the lower court, but Petitioner contends that Sec. 636 is applicable
only to
wills of aliens; and in this connection, attention is directed to the fact that
epigraph of this section speaks only of the will made here by an alien and to fu
fact that the word state in the body of the section is not capitalized.
W/N the will of Petitioner, a citizen of the U.S and therefore an alien, is
covered by Sec. 636.
The fact that the words state and country are not capitalized does not
mean that the United States is excluded from the phrase another state or country .
is a rule of hermeneutics that punctuation and capitalization are aids of low de
in interpreting the language of a statute and can never control against the inte
meaning of the written words. The epigraph, or heading, of a section being nothi
more than a convenient index to the contents of the provision, cannot have the
effect of limiting the operative words contained in the body of the text. Petiti
being a US citizen, thus an alien, is covered by Sec. 636. The will duly probate
24a, 25a, 26, 37, 42a, 48

People of the Philippines v. Yabut

Case No. 231
G.R. No. 85472 (September 27, 1993)
Chapter III, Page 87, Footnote No.43
Defendant was convicted for homicide. While serving sentence, he killed
another prisoner. He was consequently charged for murder. After conviction, he w
punished with the maximum period for murder, in accordance with Art. 160 of the
Revised Penal Code.
W/N the lower court erred in applying Art. 160.
No. Respondent relied on the word another appearing in the English
translation of the head note of Art. 160, and suggests that the law is applicabl
e only
when the new crime committed by a person serving sentence is different from the
crime for which he is serving sentence. According to him, his conviction for mur
der is
not different because it involved homicide. No such deduction is warranted from
text itself, or from the Spanish caption. When the text of the law is clear and
unambiguous, there is no need to resort to the preamble, heading, epigram or hea
note of a section for interpretation of the text, which are mere catchwords or
reference aids, consulted to remove, not create doubts.
6c, 7a
People of the Philippines v. Mendoza
Case No.112
G.R. No. L-38076 (November 4, 1933)
Respondents were accused for violation of Section 2654 of the Administrative
Code for allegedly depositing in the official ballot box 51 official ballots whi
ch they
prepared without the knowledge and consent of the voters. They were tried and
W/N the evidence is sufficient to convict.
No. What was presented and admitted was evidence in a previous election
case which has no probative value to establish the guilt of the defendants in th
criminal case. The English text of Section 2654 is defective as the head note cl
shows that this section is only applicable when a person fraudulently deposit s a
ballot in the ballot box. The evidence presented was insufficient to convict tha
defendants fraudulently deposited the ballots in question. Judgment was reversed
50, d

People of the Philippines v. Manaba

Case No. 110
G.R. No. L-39037 (October 30, 1933)
Defendant was charged for rape. The complaint was signed by the Chief of
Police. After trial, Defendant was convicted but the judgment was set aside and
case dismissed on his motion that the court had no jurisdiction over his person
or the
subject matter, because the complaint was not signed by the offended party.
Subsequently, the offended party signed a complaint charging Defendant of rape.
Defendant asked for dismissal on the ground of double jeopardy, but it was denie
and he was convicted.
W/N the Defendant was placed in double jeopardy.
No. Whether or not Defendant was placed in double jeopardy depends on
whether or not he was tried on a valid complaint in the first case. Art. 334 of
Revised Penal Code requires the offended party to file the complaint. As the fir
complaint was not signed by the offended party, it was not a valid complaint in
accordance with law, and the judgment of the court was void for lack of jurisdic
over subject matter, and defendant was never in jeopardy. The Spanish equivalent
the word filed is not bound in the Spanish text which is controlling, because it w
the Spanish text approved by the legislature.
6c, 36a
U.S. v. Quintanar
Case No. 162
G.R. No. 5654 (August 27, 1910)
Defendants, on the night of March 1, 1908 were caught in the act of smoking
opium, in violation of Sec. 32 of Act No. 1761, the Opium Law . On appeal,
Defendants contend that they could not be legally convicted for they rely on the
Spanish translation of the Act which provides that it will take effect despues de
primero de Marzo. (after the first of March)
W/N the Defendant should be punished under Act No 1761 which takes
effect despues del primero de Marzo.
The translation of the Defendant is not accurate. The English and original text
says: on and after March 1, 1908 . Where the Act was originally promulgated in
English, it shall prevail over its translation.
Employees Club, Inc. v. China Banking Corporation
Case No. 39
G.R. No. 40188 (July 27, 1934)
Respondent Corporation contends that the order requires it to surrender the
register of deeds of the City of Manila which is the duplicate of TCT No. 21192
so that
the contract lease might be noted and entered in the corresponding records. They
argue that the contract lease cannot be registered in the register of deeds beca
it is not a real right; and under the Civil Code and the Mortgage Law, only real
can be registered. The only exceptions, which it does not harbor, are a term
exceeding three years, rent to corresponding years paid in advance, or an expres
covenant requiring the lease to be registered.
W/N contract lease under the Mortgage law is not a real right and not be
The property in question is NOT under the Mortgage law but under Act No.
496, or the Torrens system, Sec. 51 and 52. This act expressly provides that all
must be registered in order to affect third persons, which includes the interest
from the contract of lease in favor of the Respondent. The Spanish text of the l
aw was
relied upon by the Petitioner the Mortgage Law. But the English enacted by the
Legislature, Act No. 496, should prevail.
9c, 49
McMicking v. Lichauco
Case No. 175
G.R. No. 7896 (March 30, 1914)
Chapter III, Page 88, Footnote No.49
This is an appeal on a judgment in favor of current Respondent against
Defendant Chu Chan Chac. However, there was another case pending in its
duration: an appeal in the judgment in favor of Antonio Flor Mata where judgment
execution is. And likewise, in the duration of Mata s judgment, there was yet anot
pending appeal where Defendant Lichauco owed his Aunt Clara Lichauco
With these two cases, who has preference over the funds owed by Lichauco.
Preference should be secured to Mata notwithstanding the appeal. The
preference on Mata was based on Art. 1924 of the new Code of Civil Procedure,
which secures preference to sentencias firmes only (judgments which are final in
sense that no appeal lies therefrom). Mata must have immediate recourse to the
property of Lichauco based on the first judgment. However, until the allotment o
time for perfecting of a bill is not done yet and the appeal was not taken, the
judgment, strictly, is not Sentencia Firme as used in Spanish legal terminology
it would be explained that the right to share in the distribution of the debtor
(Lichauco) could not accrue the judgment creditor (Mata) until he has the right
One must take into account that classification and the incidents of judgments, o
and decrees that were once under Spanish Terminology have been modified under
the new Code of Civil Procedure, drawn in part from American and English
precedents. One should look rather to the spirit than the letter of the law. The
lien of a
judgment is not necessarily destroyed by the perfecting of an appeal but simply
suspended. Even if there was a new judgment, it is simply reversed, not destroye
9c, 49
Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court
Case No. 11
G.R. No. L-72873 (May 28, 1987)
Chapter III, Page 89, Footnote No.54
Five siblings inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered
the name of their deceased parents. Two siblings sold their share to the same
vendee. By virtue of such agreements, the Petitioners occupied after the said sa
2/5 of the lot, representing the portions bought. They subsequently enclosed the
portion with a fence and built a semi-concrete house. One of the sisters filed a
complaint invoking the right to redeem the area sold. The trial court dismissed
complaint because the time had lapsed, not having been exercised within 30 days
from notice of the sales.
1. W/N there was a valid notice.
2. W/N Art. 1088 of the Civil Code was interpreted correctly.
Although there was no written notice, there was actual knowledge of the
sales satisfying the requirement of the law. It is unbelievable that the co-heir
s were
unaware of the sale, with the erection of a permanent semi-concrete structure. W
Art. 1088 of the Civil Code stresses the need for a written notice of sale; the
claimed that because there was no written notice, despite their obvious knowledg
of it, the 30-day period for redemption had not yet begun. The intent of the
lawmakers was to ensure that the redemptioner was properly notified of the sale
to indicate the date of such notice as the starting time of the 30-day period of
redemption. The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales alth
no notice in writing was given to them.
1, 8, 9a, 10, 11d, 11e, 12a, 17
Vda. De Macabenta v. Davao Stevedore Terminal Company
Case No. 156
G.R. No. L-27489 (April 30, 1970)
Chapter III, Page 89, Footnote No.57
At the time the decedent met the vehicular accident on September 12, 1961,
which led to his death 16 days later, the claimant-widow was not yet married to
decedent although they had already been living together as husband and wife for
the past 3 months. However, on the day following the accident, they were lawfull
wedded. The claimant widow gave birth on April 8, 1962, to the posthumous
daughter of the deceased, Racquel.
W/N the widow and posthumous child are considered dependents under the
Workmen s Compensation Act.
Yes. According to the Workmen s Compensation Act, a widow living with the
deceased or actually dependent upon him totally or partly as well as her daughte
r, if
under 18 years of age or incapable of supporting herself, and unmarried, whether
not actually dependent on the deceased are considered dependents. Although not
his wife at the time of the accident but at the time of his death, are still con
dependents under the Act.
6c, 7a, 9c, 12a, 37
Tinio, et al. v. Frances, et al.
Case No. 290
G.R. No. L-7747 (November 29, 1955)
Chapter III, Page 90, Footnote No.61
Sergio Nicolas applied for a parcel of land in Nueva Ecija and was approved
in 1917. In 1943, the final proof was approved by the Director of Lands who issu
ed a
patent in his favor, but because Sergio Nicolas died, he was substituted by his
represented by his widow. In 1947, the heirs transferred their rights to the hom
to the Defendants, with approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce,
and secured the issuance of a homestead patent in their favor. In 1953, heirs of
deceased Sergio Nicolas wanted to annul the sale of a homestead and to recover
the land, together with the fruits of the land as damages.
W/N the sale or transfer of right of the heirs of Sergio Nicolas over the parcel
land was valid.
No. Conveyances made by the heirs of the homesteader to the Defendants
do not comply with the first requirement of Sec. 20 of the Public Lands Act that
Director of lands is satisfied from proofs submitted by the homesteader that he
not continue with his homestead through no fault of his own, and that the
conveyance must be made with the prior or previous approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce. Thus the conveyance made by the heirs of Nicolas was
null and void.
9a, 9b, 37, 38b, 48
Home Insurance Company v. Eastern Shipping Lines
Case No. 125
G.R. No. 34382 (July 20, 1983)
Chapter III, Page 91, Footnote No.64
Plaintiff Company instituted two cases of recovery of damages against
Defendant Company. The Petitioner Company claimed for reimbursement with
regard to the amounts of insurance paid to the consignees due to losses suffered
the cargoes and goods shipped. In this regard, the lower court dismissed the two
cases on the ground that the Plaintiff failed to provide its legal capacity to s
W/N the lower court is correct in holding that the Plaintiff lacks legal capacit
to sue which resulted in the dismissal of the two cases.
Yes. The law on the matter is that a suing foreign company, such as Plaintiff
Company, must, in order to be capacitated to sue in the Philippine jurisdiction,
legal capacity by establishing either that its transaction upon which the compla
was based was an isolated one or that is was duly licensed or authorized by law
transact in the Philippines. Otherwise, no cause of action accrues in favor of t
Plaintiff as it has no legal right to seek relief from the court. In the case at
bar, the
insurance contracts between the Plaintiff and the Defendant were executed long
before the Plaintiff secured its license to transact business in the Philippines
. Therefore,
said insurance contracts were void from the beginning as the purpose was contrar
to public policy.
4, 8, 9c, 11a, 36a, 37

Luzon Stevedoring Company v. Trinidad

Case No. 154
G.R. No. 18316 (September 23, 1922)
Chapter III, Page 91, Footnote No.71
Plaintiff is a corporation duly organized under the laws of the Philippine
Islands, doing business in the City of Manila. Engaging in a stevedoring busines
consisting of loading and unloading of cargo from vessels in ports, at certain r
ates of
charge per unit of cargo, Plaintiff Company hopes to recover from Defendant, the
Internal Revenue Collector, the sum of P2,422.81, which had been paid under
protest. Defendant alleged that during the first quarter of 1921, the Plaintiff
engaged in business as a contractor, with its gross receipts from the said busin
amounting to P242, 281.33. Under the provisions of Sec. 1462 of Act No. 2711, th
percentage tax amount was levied and assessed toward the stevedoring business.
W/N the Plaintiff is considered a "contractor" provided by Sec. 1462 of Act No.
A contractor is defined as one who renders service in the course of an
independent occupation, representing the will of his employer only as to the res
ult of
his work, and not as to the means by which it is accomplished. Plaintiff is not
"contractor" based on Sec. 1462 of Act No. 2711. Therefore, the tax paid by the
Plaintiff was illegally collected and should be repaid.
2a, 4, 5b, 9c, 11a, 28
Go Chioco v. Martinez
Case No. 113
G.R. No. 19864 and 19685 (October 17, 1923)
Chapter III, Page 93, Footnote No.93
Petitioner made a loan of P40,000 to Respondent. They executed a promissory
note stipulating that Respondent Hermanos will pay back the loan within three
months. On the same day, Respondent Hermanos signed another promissory note
and sent a check of P1,800 to Petitioner, which was cashed. After three months,
Respondent Hermanos was unable to pay the principal. He now executed a new
promissory note, again due within the next three months, and with this note,
Respondent Hermanos sent a check for P1,800. Again, he could not pay so they
executed another promissory note and sent another check worth P1,800. This cycle
was repeated a total of 7 times, with the third cycle's promissory note bring du
e only
a month later and with a check for only P600. Then Respondent Hermanos paid
P25,000 for the principal and refused to pay for the remaining P15,000. Therefor
Petitioner filed a complaint. The trial court ruled that the interest rate of 18
% was in
violation of the Usury Law (Act 2655 as amended by Act No. 2992). Thus, he must
back P11,850 from the interest and forfeits the remaining P15,000.
W/N the charging of a usurious interest of 18% forfeits the principal loaned
together with the interest.
No, since only the interest is forfeited. Taking into consideration the history
the Usury Law, the intent of the framers is clear. In a previous law RA 2073, th
principal loan was forfeited together with the interest. However, unlike the pre
law, the current law RA 2655 provides for stricter rules and alternative punishm
ents for
violations. The current law also does not expressly mention that the principal i
s also
forfeited. As a rule of construction, when the intent of a law is ambiguous, one
consult the history of the law and its preamble to ascertain the framers intent.

9a, 9c, 36a, 37

US v. De Guzman
Case No. 297
G.R. No. L-9144 (March 27, 1915)
Chapter III, Page 94, Footnote No.95
Defendant, along with Pedro and Serapio Macarling, was convicted of
asesinato (murder) and sentenced to life imprisonment. Defendant was discharged
before he pleaded on the condition that he promised to appear and testify as a
witness for the Government against his co-accused. Upon reaching the witness
stand, Defendant denied all knowledge of the murder. He denied ever saying
anything that implicated his co-accused and swore that statements made by him
were made in fear of the police officers. The Solicitor-General asks for the dis
of the Respondent though it may result in a palpable miscarriage of justice,
nevertheless, the law provides for his dismissal and expressly bars a future pro
W/N Defendant should be discharged.
Sec. 19 and 20 are constitutional. There is no provision for perjury should the
Defendant fail to comply with the agreement with the State. However, looking at
legislative history of the statute, it can be gleaned that faithful performance
necessary to avail of the bar to criminal prosecution. Failure of the Defendant
in the
case at bar to faithfully and honestly carry out his undertaking to appear as wi
and to tell the truth at the trial of his co-accused deprived him of the right t
o plead
his formal dismissal as a bar to his prosecution. Finally, discharge cannot be a
acquittal since it was made prior to his trial.
9a, 22a, b2
Basiana v. Luna
Case no. 31
G.R. Nos. L-34135-36 (February 24, 1981)
Chapter III, Page 95, Footnote No.102
Petitioner entered into a private agreement with Cipriano Luna to prospect
with Luna getting 60% and Petitioner receiving the rest. Petitioner prospected 1
claims, 93 were recorded for him with the rest going to Luna, a clear disregard
of their
agreement. Realizing that there was something wrong with the declaration of
location records, Luna amended the declarations with the intention of clearing c
names and tie points; Petitioner however, disclaimed such consent. Consequently,
Luna cancelled the registration and created their own groups of claims overlappi
Petitioner s claims. Petitioner alleges that his claims were valid, and were merel
abandoned for failure to pay occupation fees.
W/N Petitioner s mining claims are valid.
Sec. 47 par. 2 of the Mining Law (C.A. No. 137) provides: For the purpose of
this section, a permanent and prominent object used as a tie point MAY be an
intersection of known roads; a junction of known rivers or creeks, a known publi
c or
private structure; a corner of approved public, private or mineral land survey;
kilometer post of public road; or location monument or triangulation station
established by the Bureau of Lands, Bureau of Mines, Army Corps of engineers,
Bureau of Cost and Geodetic Survey, or other government agencies. An initial post
is not enumerated as a valid tie point. Petitioner s contention that the word MAY
suggests non-exclusivity is untenable since it goes against the legislator s inten
t to
eliminate claim jumping and overlapping claims.
6c, 30a, 33, 36b
Baga v. PNB
Case No. 27
G.R. No. L-9695 (September 10, 1956)
Chapter III, Page 95, Footnote No.103
Petitioner was the recipient of benefits with Respondent as the guardian
under RA 390 or the Uniform Veterans Guardianship Act which was passed with the
intention of being modeled after the US version. RA 390 provides that a guardian
can only be terminated upon reaching the age of majority. Petitioner alleges tha
she has married and has become emancipated under Art. 399 of the New Civil Code
thus terminating the guardianship.
W/N Art. 399 of the Civil Code shall prevail over RA 390.
No. The Civil Code does not prevail. It was the clear intent of the legislator t
create a uniform law for material aid. Inserting provisions of the Civil Code wo
result in discordance with intent. RA 390 is a special law and thus must be take
n to
constitute an exception to the general law which is the Civil Code. RA 390 Sec.
applies notwithstanding any other provisions of law relating to judicial restora
tion and
discharge of guardians.
9a, 50, b2
De Villa v. CA
Case No. 88
G.R. No. 87416 (April 8, 1991)
Chapter III, Page 96, Footnote No.110
Petitioner was charged with a violation of BP 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) for
issuing a worthless check. However, he contends that the check was drawn against
dollar account with a foreign bank, and is therefore, not covered by the said la
W/N the Makati Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case in question.
The Makati Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction. The determinative factor (in
determining venue) is the place of the issuance of the check. The offense was
committed in Makati and therefore, the same is controlling and sufficient to ves
jurisdiction in the Makati Regional Trial Court. The Court acquires jurisdiction
over the
case and over the person of the accused upon the filing of a complaint or
information in court which initiates a criminal action. With regard to Petitione
r s
allegation that the check is not covered by BP 22, it will be noted that the law
not distinguish the currency involved in the case. Thus, the Court revealed that
records of Batasan, Vol. III unmistakably show that the intention of the lawmake
rs is to
apply the law to whatever currency may be the subject thereof.
9a, 17, 24b, 26, 43, b2

National Police Commission v. De Guzman, Jr.

Case No. 185
G.R. No. 106724 (February 9, 1994)
Chapter III, Page 96, Footnote No.110
RA 6975, otherwise known as An Act Establishing the PNP Under a
Reorganized Dept. of the Interior and Local Government, laid down the compulsory
retirement age of PNP officers. Respondents argue that the age of retirement (56
) of
said law cannot be applied to them since they are covered by Sec. 89 of the same
law (which temporarily extended the age of retirement). In other words, Responde
wanted to be extended the same privileges as the local police. Hence, they
contend that the term INP includes both the former members of the Philippine
Constabulary (PC) and the local police force who were earlier constituted as the
Integrated National Police (INP).
W/N the legislative intent was to classify the INP as applicable only to the
local police force.
The intent was to classify the INP in such manner that Sec. 89 of RA 6975 is
applicable only to the local police force. The use of the term INP is not synony
with the PC. Had it been otherwise, the statute could have just made a uniform
reference to the members of the whole PNP for retirement purposes and not just t
INP. Indeed, the law distinguishes INP from the PC and it cannot be construed th
INP as used in Sec. 89 includes the members of the PC. The legislature did intend
exclude the members of the PC from the coverage of Sec. 89 insofar as the
retirement age is concerned.
9c, 11a, 12a, 27, b2
China Banking Corporation v. Ortega
Case No. 21
G.R. No. L-34964 (January 31, 1973)
A complaint was filed against B&B Forest Development Corporation for the
collection of a sum of money. The trial court declared the said corporation in d
The Plaintiff sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of B&B Forest with curr
Petitioner Bank. Thus, a notice of garnishment was issued by the Deputy Sheriff
served on Petitioner Bank through its cashier, Tan Kim Liong. He refused to disc
the sought information, citing the provisions of RA 1405 which prohibits the dis
of any information relative to bank deposits to any person except upon written
permission of the depositor. Furthermore, RA 1405 also imposes criminal liabilit
y on any
official or employee of a banking institution who breaks the confidential nature
of this
W/N a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a court process
garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking RA 1405.
No. It was not the intention of the lawmakers to place bank deposits beyond
the reach of execution to satisfy a final judgment. The discussion of the confer
committee report of the two houses of Congress indicates that the prohibition
against examination of or inquiry into a bank deposit under RA 1405 does not
preclude its being garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment.
9a, 11e, 12b, 30b, 35, 38b, 43, b2

Mayon Motors v. Acting CIR

Case No. 173
G.R. No. 15000 (March 29, 1961)
Chapter III, Page 96, Footnote No.111
Petitioner Company imported 17 Pontiac automobiles in three different
shipments. Respondent assessed against Petitioner deficiency advance sales tax o
the automobiles. Petitioner requested for reconsideration and, this request havi
been denied, it recurred to the Court of Tax Appeals. After the hearing, said co
modified Respondent s decision by requiring Petitioner to pay a sum more than what
the acting Commissioner on Internal Revenue assessed and denying its claim for a
refund. Hence this appeal. Petitioner assails the procedure adopted by the tax c
and insists the court s interpretation of the Tax Code erroneous invoking a statem
made by then Congressman Ferdinand Marcos during the deliberations on the
amendments for the Tax Code.
W/N the opinion of a legislator in the deliberations of a law, controlling in th
interpretation of the law.
No. Courts are not bound by a legislator s opinion expressed in congressional
debates regarding the interpretation of a particular legislation. It is deemed t
o be a
mere personal opinion of the legislator.
Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato
Case No. 67
G.R. No. 118910 (November 16, 1995)
Petitioners seek for reconsideration of Kilosbayan, et al. v. Guingona. The
Court has determined that Petitioner has no standing to sue but did not dismiss
case. Petitioners insist that the PCSO cannot hold and conduct charity sweepstak
lotteries and other similar activities in collaboration or joint venture with an
y other
party because of the clause except for the activities mentioned in the preceding
paragraph (A) in paragraph (B) of Sec. 1 of RA 1169 as amended by BP 42.
W/N under its charter (RA 1169, as amended) the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office can enter in any form of association or collaboration with an
party in operating an on-line lottery.
No. Petitioner s interpretation fails to take into account not only the location
of the phrase in paragraph (B), when it should be in paragraph (A) had that been
the intention of the lawmaking authority, but also the phrase by itself. What the
PCSO is prohibited from doing is from investing in a business engaged in sweepst
races, lotteries and other similar activities. It is prohibited from doing so whe
ther in
collaboration, association or joint venture with others or by itself.
34, 36b
Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. v. Luzon Marine Department Union
Case No. 77
G.R. No. 9265 (April 29, 1957)
Petitioner files a case to review a resolution issued by the Court of Industrial
Relations ruling that the 20 minutes rest given to employees after mealtime shoul
not be deducted from the four hours of overtime work. Employees of the company
are seamen working in tugboats from 6:00 am 6:00 pm (12 hours of work, four hour
overtime), given three free meals a day and 20 minutes rest after mealtime.
1. W/N the definition for "hours of work" as presently applied to dry land
laborers equally applicable to seamen.
2. W/N a different criterion should be applied by virtue of the fact that the
seamen's employment is completely different in nature as well as in condition of
from that of a dry land laborer.
The definition of hours of work equally applies to seamen and no need for a
different criterion. Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 444, known as the Eight-Hour Labor Law,
that when the work is not continuous, the time during which the laborer is not
working and can leave his working place and can reset completely, shall not be
counted in the eight working hours. A laborer need not leave the premises of the
factory, shop or boat in order that his period of rest shall not be counted, it
enough that he cease to work, and may rest completely.
6c, 26
Commissioner of Customs v. Court of Tax Appeals
Case No. 71
G.R. Nos. 48886-8 (July 21, 1993)
Chapter III, Page 101, Footnote No.133
Iligan Express Corporation maintains a berthing facility at Kiwalan, Iligan City
Respondent Company availed of such facilities and as thus assessed berthing fees
the Collector of Custom which were paid by the said shipping company under
W/N a vessel berthing at a privately-owned wharf should be charged
berthing fees under Sec. 2901 of the Tariff and Custom Code, as amended by P.D.
No. Liability does not attach if the port is privately-owned. Sec. 2901 of the
Tariff and Custom Code, as amended by P.D. 34 speaks of the national ports only.
Sec. 2901 did not distinguish between national ports and private ports until it
amended by the presidential decree, and this amendment indicates a legislative
intent to change the meaning of the provision from the original. Since the said
limits the berthing taxes to national ports only, it is obvious that the private
ports are
not included. Kiwalan is not a national port in the Custom memorandum circular
33-73 or E.O. 72.
6c, 25d, 30a

Buenaseda v. Secretary Flavier

Case No. 40
G.R. No. 106719 (September 21, 1993)
Chapter III, Page 104, Footnote No.141
The Private Respondents filed an administrative complaint with the
Ombudsman against the Petitioner for the violation of the Anti-graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. In response, the Ombudsman filed an order directing the preventiv
suspension of the Petitioners, who were employees of the national center for men
health. The Respondent argue that the preventive suspension laid by the
Ombudsman under Sec. 24 of RA 6770 is contemplated in by Sec. 13(8) of Art. 9 of
the 1987 Constitution, while the Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman can only
recommend to the Heads of Departments and other agencies the preventive
suspension of officials and employees facing administrative investigation conduc
by his office.
W/N the Ombudsman has the power to preventively suspend government
officials working in other offices other than that of the Ombudsman pending the
investigation of administrative complaints.
Yes. The Ombudsman has the power to suspend the employees of the said
institution may it be in punitive or preventive suspension. Sec. 13(3) of the Co
refers to suspension in its punitive sense, as the same speaks of penalties in
administrative cases, while Sec. 24 of RA 6770 grants the Ombudsman the power to
preventively suspend public officials and employees facing administrative charge
This statute is procedural and may arise in order to facilitate a speedy and eff
investigation on cases filed against the officers. A preventive measure is not i
n itself a
punishment but a preliminary step in an administrative investigation.
27, 28
Carolina Industries Inc. v. CMS Stock Brokerage Inc.
Case No. 47
G.R. No. L-46908 (May 17, 1980)
Chapter III, Page 106, Footnote No.146
Petitioner opened a margin account with Respondent for purchasing,
carrying and selling stocks and securities listed in the Makati stock exchange.
three months, the Petitioner s amount deposited was completely wiped out without
his permission. Respondent says there was consent but the evidence did not suffi
to prove such consent. Respondent now question the appellate court s ruling on the
violation of the SEC rules and securities Act, and how these statutes are interp
the appellate court used foreign jurisprudence in coming up with this decision.
W/N there is a violation of the rules and Regulations of stock trading.
If the law renders the customers as incapable of protecting himself, it is the
duty of the broker to do so. The courts use of a ruling in foreign case is only
because the prevailing laws are patterned after those of the United States.
6d, 9

Zamora v. Collector of Internal Revenue

Case No. 176
G. R. No L-15290 (May 31, 1963)
Mariano Zamora, owner of the Bay View Hotel and Farmacia Zamora Manila,
filed his income tax returns for the years 1951 and 1952. The Collector of Inter
Revenue found that he failed to file his return of the capital gains derived fro
m the
sale of certain real properties and claimed deductions which were not allowable.

Mariano Zamora and his deceased sister Felicidad Zamora, bought a piece
of land located in Manila on May 16, 1944, for P132,000.00 and sold it for P75,0
on March 5, 1951. They also purchased a lot located in Q.C. for P68,959.00 on
January 19, 1944 which they sold for P94,000.00 on Feb. 9, 1951. The CTA ordered
estate of the late Felicidad Zamora, to pay the sum of P235.00, representing all
deficiency income tax and surcharge due from said estate. Esperanza Zamora
appealed and alleged that the CTA erred.
W/N the CTA erred in computing the taxes due for payment by Mariano
No. The appraisal is correct and the court found no plausible reason to disturb
the same.
Tamayo v. Gsell
Case No. 282
G. R. No 10765 (December 22, 1916)
Chapter III, Page 106, Footnote No.149
This is an action for damages against the Defendant for personal injuries
suffered by Braulio Tamayo, 11-year old son of the Plaintiff. The injury was att
ributed to
the boy s inexperience in the work which he had been assigned for the first time a
without prior instruction.
W/N the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages under the Employer s Liability
Yes. The Legislature intended that the measure of damages in personal injury
cases brought under the Employer s Liability Act to be the same as that in the
country from which the Act was taken, being of American origin.

Ossorio v. Posadas
Case No. 93
G.R. No. L-31088 (December 3, 1929)
Plaintiff and appellant filed for the recovery from the Defendant Collector of
Internal Revenue the sum of P56,246.72, which the Defendant, according to the
complaint, collected from the Plaintiff in excess of what he should have collect
ed by
way of income tax.
W/N the paraphernal property of the Plaintiff s wife constitutes her separate
estate within the scope and meaning of this phrase for the purposes of the
additional income tax.
Yes. It is ordered that the Defendant make two separate assessments of the
additional income tax, one against the Plaintiff, and the other against his wife
on her
paraphernal property, returning the sum of P56,203.59 to said plaintiff, without
prejudice to his levying against and collecting from said Plaintiff s wife upon he
r own
separate individual declaration, in accordance with law, the additional income t
for the income from her paraphernal property.
Campos Rueda Corp. v. Sta. Cruz Timber Co. and Felix
Case No. 17
G.R. No. L-6884 (March 21, 1956)
The Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the case of Petitioner against
Respondent to recover the value of two promissory notes for the amounts of P1,12
and P1,075, for lack of jurisdiction; holding that the two notes constitute two
causes of action involving less than P2,000. The Municipal Court likewise dismis
sed the
case of Petitioner Corporation against Respondents for collection of the same
promissory notes object of the former action, on the ground that the amount of t
notes, which Petitioner now consolidated under a single cause of action, was in
excess of its jurisdiction.
W/N the Municipal Court of Manila has jurisdiction over the subject matter of
appellant s complaint.
No. The jurisdiction of a court depends, not upon the value or demand in
each single case of action contained in the complaint, but upon the totality of
demand in all the causes of action.
6c, 7a

Ang Giok Chio vs. Springfield Fire & Marine Insurance Co.
Case No. 8
G.R. No. 33637 (December 31, 1931)
Petitioner s warehouse was destroyed by fire while the policy taken out with
Respondent for the amount of P10,000 was in force. The Respondent Company has
appealed claiming that Petitioner violated a rider on the insurance contract.
W/N a rider as forming part of the contract of insurance is null and void
because it does not comply with the Philippine Insurance Act.
Yes. A rider attached to the face of the insurance policy and referred to in
the contract of insurance, is valid and sufficient under Sec. 65 of the Philippi
Insurance Act as it was taken verbatim from Sec. 2605 of the Civil Code of Calif
which states, The section as it now reads is in harmony with the rule that a warr
may be contained in another instrument than the policy when expressly referred t
o in
the policy as forming a part thereof.
6c, 7a, b2
Pando v. Kette and Sellner
Case No. 99
G.R. No. 32124 (March 27, 1930)
This is a foreclosure of mortgage. In pursuant thereof, the sheriff on January 3
1929, posted notices of the sale of the land in said writ in 3 public places, to
wit, upon
the land itself, at the market, and on the municipal building of Pasay. Notice o
f the
sale was sent to the newspaper La Opinion for publication, and the editor certif
that he published it once a week for 3 consecutive weeks, more particularly on t
2nd, 9th, and 15th of February, 1929 and the sale took place on February 19, 192
W/N the posted notices of the sale in 3 public places and publication in La
Opinion once a week for 3 consecutive weeks satisfied the requirements of the la
regarding the notice of the sale in question.
Yes. The Provision of our Code of Civil Procedure having been adopted from
Sec. 692 of the California Code, the requirements of the law regarding the notic
e of
the sale in question have been substantially complied with.
Reyes v. Wells
Case No. 135
G.R. No. 30587 (December 4, 1929)
Defendants offered to sell to Plaintiffs an installed maguey stripping machine
and an International truck in a shed lot for P23,000. However, Plaintiff Guerrer
o said
that he could not do so for the lack of money to operate the machine. Respondent
Rader promised to furnish said Plaintiff with the amount he would need. Plaintif
would just have to make out two promissory notes in favour of the mortgage.
Defendant Rader and Plaintiff Guerrero went to J. Northcott, and on June 29, 192
the former endorsed the mortgage deed. However, neither the said amount nor any
part thereof was delivered to Plaintiff Guerrero, or to any of his co-Plaintiffs
. Due to
the failure of J. E. Rader and J. Northcott to pay said amount of P12,000, the P
sustained damages for default in the payment of the instalments due.
W/N the promissory notes in question which have not been paid, are not
supported by the evidence in relation to the competence of the testimony of
There was evidence on the part of the promissory notes in question. These are
also in line with Sec. 4604 of the Code of Iowa. The prohibition contained in sa
id law
against a witness testifying upon any transaction or communication between himsel
and a deceased person, is substantially the same as that contained in Sec. 383(7
) of
our Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2252. Therefore, we believe
that the construction placed upon it by the court in the cases cited is applicab
le to
the case at bar.
1, b2
Phil. Educ. Co. v. Soriano
Case No. 235
G.R. No. L-22405 (June 30, 1971)
Chapter III, Page 107, Footnote No.156
Montinola sought to purchase money orders from Manila Post Office. He
managed to leave the building without knowledge of the teller. Palomar received
one money order as part of their sales receipt and subsequently deposited it in
Bank of America. Respondent, Chief of the Money Order Division of the Manila Pos
Office notified the Bank of irregularity, and deducted from the bank s clearing
account the said amount, in the same way the bank of America debited Petitioner s
account with the same amount. Petitioner requested to reconsider the action but
was denied.
W/N the postal money order in question is a negotiable instrument.
Postal statutes are patterned after similar statutes enforced in the US. These
are generally constructed and construed in accordance with construction of US s
own postal statutes, in the absence of any special reason justifying departure f
the policy or practice. US held that postal money orders are not negotiable
2b, 9a, b2

Cruz v. Pahati
Case No. 28
G.R. No. L-8257 (April 13, 1956)
Defendant bought an automobile from Bulahan, for P4,900 which he paid in
check. He cancelled the sale and stopped the payment of the check upon
impoundment and as a result, he returned the automobile to Bulahan who in then
surrendered the check for cancellation. He set up a counterclaim for attorney's
Bulahan claims that he bought the automobile from Belizo without having any
knowledge of any defect in the title. It was found out that Belizo falsified a l
etter that
enabled him to sell the car of Bulahan for profit. The court rendered judgment
declaring Defendant Bulahan entitled to the automobile in question and ordered t
Plaintiff to return it to said Defendant and, upon his failure to do so, to pay
him the
sum of P4,900, with legal interest from the date of the decision. The claim for
damages and attorney's fees of Bulahan was denied. Defendant Belizo was however
ordered to indemnify the Plaintiff in the amount of P4,900 and pay the sum of P5
as moral damages. The counterclaim of Defendant was denied for lack of evidence.

Who has a better right of the two over the car.
Plaintiff has a better right to the car than Bulahan and therefore can recover
the said car. It was clear that the Plaintiff was unlawfully deprived because of
scheme of Belizo even if both the Plaintiff and Bulahan acted in good faith.
6c, 7a
Republic v. Workmen s Compensation Commission
Case No. 132
G.R. No. L-29019 (May 18, 1972)
Petitioners seek full compensation of P6,000.00 plus attorney s fee of P600.00
under the WCC, without deducting the P3,000.00 as death benefit which they had
been previously paid by virtue of the provisions of RA 610.
W/N the beneficiaries of military personnel who have received the death
gratuity under RA 610 should still be paid the death compensation under the WCC.

The resolution of the WCC is modified; the P3,000.00 received under RA 610
should be deducted from the full grant received under the WCC. It is difficult t
construe that the legislature intended to double the compensations received,
considering that at the times said laws were approved the finances of the
government could not have conceivably permitted the outlays needed for the
purpose. Furthermore, Sec. 9 of RA 610 and Sec. 5 of WCC bar payment under other
laws. It was also contended that the phrase or any other law granting similar
benefits to officers or employees, generally, of the national, provincial or mun
government in Sec. 9 is highly indicative of the legislative intent to prevent fu
recovery of compensation benefits under other laws.
17, 19b, 29, 38b, 39, 40b
Garcia et al. v. Hipolito et al.
Case NO. 53
G.R. No. L-1449 (November 30, 1903)
Judgment was rendered for the Defendants on May 1, 1903. The Plaintiffs
were notified thereof on May 21. Two days after, they excepted to the judgment
and presented a motion for a new trial, which was denied on July 23. On July 28,
Plaintiffs presented their proposed bill of exceptions, which on August 5 was al
and signed by the court. The term of the court in which the case was tried expir
ed on
May 30.
W/N Sec. 143 of the Code of Civil Procedure allows the parties to consent to
or for the judge to order an extension of the 10-day period.
The period of 10 days and the subsequent period of 5 days have to do with
the mechanical part of the appeal the preparation of the papers for transmission t
the Supreme Court. The right of the parties to the appeal was already fixed by t
notice of the intention to prepare a bill of exceptions entered of record in the
clerk s
office. If the period corresponds to the appeal or for suing out a writ of error
found in
most other laws of American origin, it cannot be extended. But that period is en
different from the 10 days for allowing the preparation of papers, after the rig
ht to
remove the case has been secured. Therefore, it cannot be said that an extension
this time is an extension of the time to appeal. Moreover, considering when the
was adopted, it seems impossible that the Commission intended to deprive the cou
and the parties of the power to extend the term, given the physical impossibilit
y to
comply with it in many cases.
11a, 19b, 27, 48
ESSO Standard Eastern Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Case No. 41
G.R. No. 70037 (July 7, 1989)
The case is an appeal on the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals denying
the Petitioner s claims for refund of the margin fees P102,246.00 for 1959 and
P434,234.92 for 1960.
W/N RA 2609, entitled An Act to Authorize the Central Bank of the Philippines
to Establish a Margin over Banks Selling Rates of Foreign Exchange , is a police
measure or a revenue measure.
RA 2609 is a police measure as it is applied in order to strengthen our country s
international reserve. Petitioner contended that margin fees are taxes and cited
background and the legislative history of the Margin Fee Law showing that RA 260
was nothing less than a revival of the 17% excise tax on foreign exchange impose
by RA 601. This was a revenue measure formally proposed by President Carlos P.
Garcia to Congress as part of, and in order to balance, the budget for 1959-1960
The CTA stated that it is a well-settled jurisprudence that only in extremely
doubtful matters of interpretation does the legislative history of an act of Con
become important. As a matter of fact, there may be no resort to the legislative
history of the enactment of a statute, the language of which is plain and
unambiguous, since such legislative history may only be resorted to for the purp
ose of
solving doubt, not for the purpose of creating it. Moreover, at least two cases
been decided in which it was held that margin fee is not a tax.
1, 7a

Commissioner of Customs v. ESSO Standard Eastern Inc.

Case No. 26
G.R. No. L-28329 (August 17, 1975)
Petitioner contends that the special import tax under RA 1394 is separate and
distinct from the customs duty prescribed by the Tariff and Customs Code, and th
the exemption enjoyed by Respondent from the payment of customs duties under
the Petroleum net of 1949 does not include exemption from the payment of the
special import tax provided in RA 1394.
W/N the exemption enjoyed by Respondent from customs duties granted by
RA 387 should include the special import tax imposed by RA 1394, or the Special
Import Tax Law.
Petitioner took exception to the finding of the CTA that "The language of RA
1394 seems to leave no room for doubt that the law intends that the phrase 'Spec
Import Tax' is taken to include customs duties". In order to determine the true
intent of
the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be
as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. In fact every statute shou
receive such construction as will make it harmonize with the pre-existing body o
f laws.
Antagonism between the Acts to be interpreted and existing or previous laws is t
o be
avoided, unless it was clearly the intention of the legislature that such antago
should arise and one amends or repeals the other, either expressly or by implica
Another rule applied by this Court is that the courts may take judicial notice o
f the
origin and history of the statutes which they are called upon to construe and
administer, and of facts which affect their derivation, validity and operation.
Court examined the six statuettes repealed by RA 1394.
9a, 36b, 38a, b2
Pascual v. Director of Lands
Case No. 100
G.R. No. L-15816 (February 29, 1964)
Petitioner filed with Respondents, pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 102 C.A.
No. 141, a petition for the cancellation of the lease contract aforesaid on the
that Ramos had failed to pay the rentals on the lands for seven years and the ta
thereon since 1947, and on the further ground that he and his successors-in-inte
had not cultivated the property nor introduced improvements thereon, in violatio
n of
the terms and conditions of the lease. The policy in the disposition and concess
ion of
public land is to give priority or preference to the actual occupant. Thus, in c
ases of
lease the law requires that no lease shall be permitted to interfere with any pr
claim by settlement or by occupation, until the consent of the occupant or settl
er is
first had, or until such claim shall be legally extinguished (Sec. 33, C.A. No.
141). If
anyone should be given prior right of entry at all, it should be the actual occu
who have presented several petitions for the subdivision or and sale of the land
W/N the ruling of the trial court upholding Petitioner s claim to a right of entry
was correct.
No. It is well settled that the contemporaneous interpretation given by
administrative officials to a law they are bound to enforce or implement deserve
great weight. In the present case, it appears that the trial court reversed not
only the
decision of Respondent and of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
but that of the Office of the President, without the record disclosing in our op
that the same are clearly erroneous and unfounded. To the contrary, they appear
be in consonance with the purpose of the law invoked by Petitioner, namely, to g
priority or preference to the actual occupant of public land which Petitioner is

Orencia v. Enrile
Case No. 92
G.R. No. L-28997 (February 22, 1974)
Petitioner is alleging that he is the deputy clerk of court of the Clerks of Cou
Division of the Land Registration Commission, and he has been performing functio
of Assistant Chief of said division and has been considered and recognized as su
until RA 4040, increasing the salaries of Assistant Chiefs of Divisions, among o
thers, was
implemented where he was left out while co-assistant chief of the nine other div
of the Land Registration Commission were so recognized and extended increased
compensation. Respondents filed their answer, and after usual admissions and
denials, interposed a defense that Petitioner is unqualified for the position of
Chief, and being a new position created under RA 4040, the same can only be file
by a qualified person; that Respondent, being a lawyer, is more qualified than
Petitioner, who is only a high school graduate with second grade civil service
eligibility, and praying that the petition be dismissed
W/N the Petitioner should be recognized as the deputy clerk of court of the
Clerks of Court Division of the Land Registration Commission.
For Respondent officials, the answer was not in doubt. Since there was a new
legal provision to be construed, one which admittedly, to follow the approach of
counsel for Petitioner, has an ambiguous aspect, they chose to follow the princi
that a public office is a public trust. Certainly, such a contemporaneous constr
one moreover dictated by the soundest constitutional postulate, is entitled to t
highest respect from the judiciary.
m i k iPeople of the Philippines v. Hernandez
Case No. 107
G.R. Nos. L-39840 and L-39841 (December 23, 1933)
Respondent ran for governor in Camarines Norte and assumed office on
October 16, 1931. At this time, he was a delinquent in the payment of P2,000 for
taxes to the government. Two or three days before Respondent assumed office, the
municipal treasurer demanded him to pay said taxes but he failed to do so. The
Insular Auditor permitted Respondent to receive his salary as governor, on the
condition that it would be used to pay off the delinquent taxes. The Chief of
Executive Bureau and Attorney General agreed with Insular Auditor. By September,
1932, taxes had been paid for. However, in April 1932, he was charged for violat
Sec. 2659 of the Administrative code and was found guilty and was deprived the
right to suffrage and public office.
W/N Sec. 2659 can be applied to refrain Respondent from taking office as
Governor in Camarines Norte.
No. Sec. 2659 refers to a person who assumes office to which he had been
elected without possessing the necessary qualifications to hold public office as
provided by law. Delinquency of payment of taxes is no longer a disqualification
assuming a public office. Hence, even though Respondent did not pay his land
taxes, this does not incapacitate him from assuming office. Under these
circumstances, we should follow the doctrine laid down in the cases of Molina vs
Rafferty: long continued administrative interpretation of a tax law, while not
conclusive, should be followed unless clearly erroneous. And in this case, it wa
s not.
2a, 32, 42b

Sagun v. People s Homesite and Housing Corporation

Case No. 266
G.R. No. 73603 (June 22, 1988)
Chapter III, Page 112, Footnote No.180
Respondent Corporation was created to provide decent, low cost housing for
those who are unable to provide themselves with this. In accordance with RA 3208
the lots located in Block 330, LCH Project 3, Quezon City were meant to be used
this purpose. However, the Petitioners first used the lots for store purposes, b
converting these store units into their dwelling homes. In 1971, Petitioners dec
that they wanted to buy these lots from Respondent Corporation but filed a petit
for mandamus alleging that Respondent Corporation was selling the lots at P50/sq
m., which was in violation of RA 3802.
W/N Respondent Corporation can be compelled by mandamus to sell these
lots for not more than P10/sq m. to its registered tenants or their successors i
n interest,
in reference to Sec. 1 of RA 3802.
No. For mandamus to lie, Petitioner s rights should be well-defined, clear and
certain. In the case at bar, there is no showing of a clear and certain right to
Respondent Corporation to sell them the units for a price lower than what is bei
offered. The Petitioners first leased these units for business purposes. Thus, t
he price of
P50 is not excessive or unreasonable considering that the market value for the l
ots is
at least P120. The action of Respondent Corporation neither conflicts with the l
aw nor
does it demonstrate any abuse of discretion to warrant its reversal. Moreover, t
here is
no obligation of Respondent Corporation, under RA 3802, aside from the fact that
the determination of the selling price requires exercise of discretion on their
2a, 9a
Philippine Global Communications, Inc. v. Relova
Case No. 236
G.R. No. L-60548 (November 10, 1986)
Chapter III, Page 112, Footnote No.181
In 1976, Petitioner filed with the Board of Communication, now NTC, an
application for authority to establish a branch station in Cebu for the purpose
rendering international telecommunication services from Cebu to any point outsid
the Philippines where it is authorized to operate. In 1977, Manila was designate
d as
the sole gateway for communications in the Philippines. In January 1979, BOC gav
Petitioners authority to establish a station in Cebu, subject to that as soon as
carriers have upgraded their facilities, applicant shall cease its operations.
Respondents filed a joint motion for reconsideration of said decision, which rul
ed in
favor of the Respondents claiming that Petitioner does not have the authority to
establish other stations aside from the station in Makati. This is a petition se
eking to set
aside the ruling rendered.
W/N Petitioner is authorized under RA 4617 to establish stations in places or
points outside Metro Manila?
Yes. RA 4617 clearly authorizes Petitioner to construct, maintain, and operate,
apart from its principal station in Makati, other stations or branches within th
Philippines for purposes of its international communications operations. This ca
n be
seen in Sec. 3 and 4 wherein other stations may be established as long as it is
approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The opinion of the
Secretary and Undersecretary of Justice which affirmed the authorization of othe
stations is material and must be considered in favor of the Petitioners.
2a, 36b

Asturias Sugar Central v. Commissioner of Customs

Case No. 24
No. L-19337 (September 30 1969)
Chapter III, Page 112, Footnote No.183
Petitioner filed a petition for review of the unfavorable decision of the CTA
which denied the recovery of the sum of P28,629.42 which the Petitioner paid und
protest in the concept of customs duties and special import tax.
Under the law in effect at that time, the Petitioner is entitled to recovery of
taxes and duties paid for importation of containers provided importer re-exports
containers within a 1year period.
Also Asturias contends that they are entitled to an alternative recovery of the
said amount minus 1% under Sec. 106(b) of the Customs and Tariff Act.
W/N Petitioner is entitled to recovery of import taxes and duties.
No. The 1-year period mentioned in the Philippine Tariff Act contains no
express mention of any extension or of any grounds for it to be extended.
The provisions invoked by the Petitioner to sustain his claim for refund, offer
two options to an importer. The first gives him the privilege of importing, free
import duties, the containers mentioned therein as long as he exports them withi
one year from the date of acceptance of the import entry, it is non-extendible.
second contemplates a case where import duties are first paid subject to refund
the extent of 99% of the amount paid, provided the articles mentioned are export
within three years from importation.
2a, 4, 38b, 43
Phil. Sugar Central Agency v. Collector of Customs
Case No. 241
No. 27761 (Dec. 6 1927)
Chapter III, Page 113, Footnote No.186
Petitioner acts as agency and attorney-in-fact of Ma-ao Sugar Central Co.
Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. shipped 5,124,416 gross kilos of centrifugal sugar to Un
States in a wharf on Pulapandan, Occidental Negros on steamship Hannover. Wharf
was built and maintained solely by the Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. Defendant
collected wharfage dues on petitioner s wharf.
W/N the Defendant can collect wharfage dues on wharves not owned by
Yes. The Government can be allowed to collect because not to do so would
overthrow and destroy the whole system of the Government, in and by which millio
of pesos have been levied and collected and expended in the construction of
Government wharves, and it would have defeated the construction of the
Government wharf at Pulapandan.
Dissenting Opinion:
Historically, wharves not owned nor operated by government cannot be
taxed or levied upon.
3a, 4, 37, 5b, 11d

Manila Jockey Club Inc. v. Games and Amusement Board

Case No. 164
No. L-12727 (February 29, 1960)
Chapter III, Page 114, Footnote No.190
The Petitioner states that they are entitled to certain Sundays unreserved for
any event and that reducing the number of said days is an infringement of their
Petitioner relies on the strength of Sec. 4 of RA 309, as amended by RA 983, tha
t the
unreserved Sundays may be used by private individuals or groups duly licensed by
the Games and Amusement Board (GAB). RA 1502 increased the sweepstakes draw
and races to 12 but without specifying the days on which they are to be run, the
reduced the number of racing days assigned to private individuals and entities b
y six.
W/N the Petitioner has a right to the unreserved days.
No. From the wording of the RA 309 and RA 983, it is clear that the text is
permissive and is not mandatory. The private individuals and entities are not en
to the use of such days. Petitioner s claim that the intent of the legislature was
allow the races and sweepstakes to be run on the same day are untenable. The
words of members of Congress are not representative of the entire House of
Representatives or Senate. Also, Petitioner s claim that to allow the PCSO to use
equipment and property is deprivation of property is also untenable because they
have a rental agreement with the PCSO.
6c, 6g, 37, 38b
Ramos v. CA
Case No. 253
G.R. No. L-22753 (December 18, 1967)
Chapter III, Page 115, Footnote No.193
The present case had its incipiency in a petition filed by the then National
Rice and Corn Corporation (NARIC) workers for an obligation created by agreement
confirmed by the Court of Industrial Relations directing NARIC to pay 25% for
additional compensation for overtime work, night work and work rendered on
Sundays and legal holidays by its laborers and employees. Rice and Corn
Administration (RCA) claims that unlike NARIC, which was possessed with a distin
and separate corporate existence, they are merely an office directly under the
President, a governmental machinery to carry out a declared government policy to
stabilize the price of palay, rice, and corn, and not for profit. To carry out t
function, by law of the Commonwealth Act otherwise known as the Budget Act, RCA
depends for its continuous operation on appropriation yearly set aside by the
General Appropriations Act. There has been consistent administrative interpretat
by the Office of the President as to what may, under law, be granted to RCA work
and employees for overtime work and work on Sundays and holidays. Not a matter
of right, such compensation was given upon authority of the Budgetary Act.
W/N RCA should be held answerable when NARIC ceased to exist and RCA
was created for the said obligation.
While executive construction is not necessarily binding upon courts, it is
entitled to great weight and consideration. The reason for this is that such
construction comes from the particular branch of government called upon to
implement the particular law involved. Thus, unless the President specifically
appropriates the 25% compensation, RCA is not liable to the abovementioned
2a, 11a, 38b

Salaria v. Buenviaje
Case No. 267
G.R. No. L-45642 (February 28, 1978)
Chapter III, Page 115, Footnote No.193
Petitioner has been staying on the land of Cailao when the latter sold the said
land to Private Respondent Mendiola. A formal letter of demand to vacate the
premises was sent by Respondent Mendiola to Petitioner. A complaint for unlawful
detainer was filed by Mendiola against Petitioner Salaria. After the trial, the
City Court
ordered Petitioner to vacate the leased premises. On appeal, the CFI through
Respondent Judge Buenviaje affirmed the decision of the inferior court. Thus, a
petition for review on Certiorari was filed with the Supreme Court.
W/N Respondent can eject Petitioner from the lot.
No. Memorandum Circular No. 970 was issued by the President stating that
except for the causes for judicial ejectment of lessees bona fide tenants of
dwelling places covered by said decree are not subject to eviction, particularly
if the
only cause of action thereon is personal use of the property by the owners or th
families. Construction by Executive Branch of Government of a particular law
although not binding upon courts must be given weight as the construction comes
from that branch called upon to implement the law. The ground relied upon by the
lessor in this case, namely, personal use of property by the owner or lessors or
families is not one of the causes for judicial ejectment of lessees.
2a, 30a, 38b
University of the Philippines v. CA
Case No. 305
G.R. No. L-28153 (January 28, 1971)
Chapter III, Page 115, Footnote No.195
With the filing of Petition for injunction in the Court of First Instance of Man
Petitioners in the original case sought to restrain herein Respondent from dismi
them and to declare as a matter of legal right that they should not be dismissed
the Philippine General Hospital by herein Respondent but by the Civil Service
W/N the dismissal of original Petitioners in the case by the Board of Regents is
final, or requires further action by the Civil Service Commission.
The management of Philippine General hospital was initially under the Office
of the President of the Philippines. Under RA 51 and E.O. 94, the President tran
them under herein Respondent. Thus, the Supreme Court ruled that the President a
Board of Regents of the U.P. possess full and final authority in disciplining, s
and removal of the civil service employees of the University, including those of
Philippine General Hospital, independently of the Commissioner of the Civil Serv
and the Civil Service Board of Appeals.
2a, 6c, 9b, 20c, 38b

Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) v. Bureau of Labor Relations

Case No. 120

G.R. No. L-43760 (August 21, 1976)
Petitioner lost to National Federation of Free Labor Unions (NAFLU) in the
certification elections for the exclusive bargaining agent of the employees in
Philippine Blooming Mills, Company, Inc.
Tallied votes are as follows:
Spoiled Ballots 17 (not counted)
Abstained 4
Total Ballots 864
(Note: NAFLU didn t obtain the majority vote, which is 432.)
Petitioner contends that the spoiled should be considered as in the ruling in a
previous case. Respondent answered that the ruling in the previous case was base
on the Industrial Peace Act, which has been superseded by the present Labor Code
and as such cannot apply to the case at bar.
W/N the Respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion by not allowing
the spoiled ballots to be considered as in the previous case of Allied Workers
Association of the Philippines vs. CIR.
There was no grave abuse of discretion made by Respondent since the basis
of the ruling in the Allied Workers case has been superseded by the present Labo
Code. Also, the Rules and Regulations implementing the present Labor Code has
been already been made known to public and as such has the enforcing power in
the case at bar.
1, 2a, 39a
Everett v. Bautista
Case No. 43
G.R. No. 46505 (November 7, 1939)
Petitioner and Respondent were partners who owned and managed
Queen s Theater during the first Quarter of 1937. The partnership charged admissio
fees of P0.40 per seat and at other times charged more than P0.40 but not more t
P0.70 per seat. During the first Quarter of 1937, their receipts were P15, 881.4
1. At that
time, imposition tax is at 5% of the gross receipts of theaters, cinematographs,
whose admission price exceeds P0.40 (Sec. 1&3 of C.A. No. 128). The law does not
say how tax should be imposed in cases where the daily receipts are not made at
the same rate. As such, the Collector of Internal Revenue issued Regulations No.
which states that the daily receipts of prices charged differently will be joint
ly taken
into account for computation purposes. Sec. 1458 of the Administrative Code stat
that penalty for late payment will be at 25% of the tax imposed. The parties fai
led to
pay the tax on time and therefore subject to Sec. 1458. They were asked to pay
P992.50, which they refused to pay.
1. W/N the collection to said tax is in accordance with law.
2. W/N Regulations No. 94 is in accordance with law.
Yes to both. The interpretation given to a law by an officer charged by reason
of his office to carry out its provisions should be respected. It has also been
held that
where there is ambiguity in the language of the law, contemporaneous constructio
is given weight.

Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees Union (IBAAEU) v. Inciong

Case No. 62
G.R. No. L-52415 (October 23, 1984)
Petitioner first filed a complaint to the lower Court against Insular Bank of As
and America (IBAA) for not paying the holiday pay. The Petition was granted and
IBAA paid for the holiday wage. Later, IBAA stopped paying the holiday wage in
compliance to the issuance of Sec. 2 of the Rules and Regulations implementing t
Labor Code and the Policy Instruction No. 9 issued by Respondent (then Secretary
DOLE). Petitioner filed for a motion for a writ of execution to enforce the arbi
ter s
decision of paying the holiday wages and the motion was granted. IBAA then
appealed to NLRC and NLRC dismissed the appeal. At this point, IBAA filed a moti
for reconsideration to Respondent. Respondent granted IBAA s motion for
reconsideration. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari charging Respon
dent of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
1. W/N the decision of the Labor Arbiter can be set aside by Respondent
considering that it has become final and had been partially executed.
2. W/N Sec. 2 of Implementing Rules and Policy Instruction No. 9 are valid.
A judgment in a labor case that has become executory cannot be revoked
after finality of judgment. In the case at bar, IBAA waived its right to appeal
paying the holiday wage and is therefore deemed to have accepted the judgment
as correct. Sec. 2 and Policy Instruction No. 9 are both null and void since the
amended the provisions of the Labor Code. It has been held that where the
language of the law is clear and unequivocal the law must be taken to mean
exactly what it says. And also, if a contemporaneous construction is so erroneou
s, the
same must be declared null and void.
6c, 17, 37, 40c
Philippine Apparel Workers Union vs. NLRC
Case No. 119
G.R. No. L-50320 (March 30, 1988)
A collective bargaining agreement was made between Petitioners and
Management of Philippine Apparel Inc. (PAI) on April 2, 1977 and was signed on
September 7, 1977. CBA stipulated a P22.00 increase in monthly wage of workers t
will retroact from April 1, 1977. However, on May of the same year, P.D. 1123 gr
a P60.00 increase in living allowance which will take effect from January 1, 197
provided that those who were granted an increase of less that P60.00 will be giv
the difference. Management argues that since on April 2, there has been an
agreement to a P22.00 increase, PAI only had to pay the difference of P38.00.
Moreover, PAI was able to get the opinion of the Undersecretary of Labor support
the PAI Management. Labor contends that increase does not fall within the
exemption since the CBA was signed on September after P.D. 1123 has been passed.

W/N the case falls under the exception of P.D. 1123.
No. There was no formal agreement on April 2, 1977 regarding the increase.
Moreover, the opinion of the Undersecretary of Labor was based on a wrong premis
and misinterpretation by PAI Management. It was unlawful and beyond the scope of

United Christian Missionary Society vs. Social Security Commission

Case No. 293
G.R. No. L-26712-16 (December 27, 1969)
Chapter III, Page 206, Footnote No.206
Petitioner is a volunteer group that did not know that they had to pay tax for
their operations. Nevertheless, upon knowledge thereof, they paid their premium
remittances but refused to pay the incredible penalty fees since they did not kn
that they had to pay the aforementioned premium remittances, claiming that the
assessed penalties were inequitable. Respondent said that their organization is
embraced in the Social Security Act; therefore the assessed penalties are impose
on them.
W/N Respondent erred in ruling that it has no authority under the Social
Security Act to condone, waive or relinquish the penalty prescribed by law for l
payment of remittances.
Respondent has no such authority. Petition is dismissed on the ground that in
the absence of an express provision in the Social Security Act vesting Responden
t the
power to condone penalties, it has no legal authority to condone, waive, or
relinquish the penalty for late premium remittances mandatorily imposed under th
SS Act. The reason of the law is to develop, establish gradually and perfect a so
security system which shall be suitable to the needs of the people to provide
employees against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age, and death. Good
faith and bad faith are irrelevant since the law makes no distinction. Where the
language of the law is clear and the intent of the legislature is equally plain,
there is
no room for interpretation.
6a, 6b, 7a, 9a, 26
Yra v. Abaño
Case No. 316
G.R. No. 30187 (November 15, 1928)
Chapter III, Page 118, Footnote No.214
Respondent was running for office in Bulacan, his hometown. However, he is a
registered voter in Manila and to be a candidate, one of the qualifications is t
he/she who is running should be a duly qualified elector therein .
W/N Respondent is an eligible to run as a local official of Bulacan.
Yes. He is qualified to run for local office. In a previous case contested in th
Philippine Assembly, Fernando Ma. Guerrero a candidate for representative to the
Phil. Assembly was alleged to be unqualified for the position on the ground that
was not registered in his electoral district. The conclusion to which was, qualif
elector meant that he has all the qualifications provided by the law to be a vote
and need not be register. The same was the case and decision of the Executive
Bureau on the qualifications of Senator Jose P. Laurel. It is sufficient that he
the qualifications stated in Sec. 431 and none of the disqualifications stated i
n Sec.
432 of the Election Law. However, it is not least to disregard the forcible argu
advanced that when the law make use of the phrases, qualified electors and
qualified voter the law means what it says. It would be an absurdity to hold one a
qualified elector who was not eligible to vote in his own municipality.
2a, 3a, 6c, 11a

Interprovincial Autobus Co., Inc. v. CIR

Case No. 134
G.R. No. L-6741 (January 31, 1956)
Chapter III, Page 120-121, Footnote No.222 & 227
Petitioner is engaged in transporting passengers and freight by means of TPU
buses in Misamis Occidental and Northern Zamboanga. The provincial revenue
agent for Misamis Occidental examined the stubs of the freight receipts that had
been issued by Petitioner. The stubs and the daily reports of the conductor did
state the value of the goods transported. Pursuant to Sec. 121 and 127 of the Re
Documentary Stamp Tax Regulations of the Department of Finance, the agent
assumed that the value of the goods was more than P5. Petitioner asked for a ref
and the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental rendered a judgment in the
favor but the Court of Appeals reversed the decision.
1. W/N the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the case.
2. W/N the Court of Appeals decision is erroneous.
The Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction because according to both the Judiciary
Act of 1948 and the Constitution the Supreme Court has the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over all cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessmen
t or tolls,
or any penalty in relation thereto. The decision of the Court of Appeals however
not erroneous:
Sec. 121 falls within the scope of administrative power of the Secretary of
Finance as authorized in Sec. 79 of the Revised Administrative Code.
The regulation (Sec. 121) is valid also because of the principle of legislative
approval be re-enactment. The regulations were approved on September 16,
1924. When the National Internal Revenue Code was approved on February
18, 1939, the same provisions of stamp tax, bills of landing and receipts were
2a, 4
In re: McCulloch Dick
Case No. 129
G.R. No. L-13862 (April 15, 1918)
Chapter III, Page 120, Footnote No.223
Petitioner, the editor and proprietor of the Philippines Free Press, filed for a
of habeas corpus so that he may be discharged from detention by the acting chief
of police of the city of Manila. He is being detained because the Governor-Gener
of the Philippines ordered his deportation. Before the Governor-General gave his
order, there was an investigation in the manner and form prescribed in Sec. 69 o
f the
Administrative Code.
W/N the Governor-General has the power under Act No. 2113 and Sec. 69 of
the Administrative Code to institute and maintain deportation proceedings.
Yes, the Governor-General has the power to institute and maintain
deportation proceedings. When the provisions of Act No. 2113 were enacted and
continued in force by the enactment of the Administrative Code and again
continued in force by the enactment of the Jones Law the construction theretofore
placed upon it by this court became an integral part of these statutes having th
force and the effect of a legislative command. In the interpretation of reenacted
statutes, the court will follow the construction which they received when previo
usly in
force. The legislature will be presumed to know the effect which such statutes
originally had, and by reenactment to intend that they should again have the sam
1, 3a, 4, 9a

Howden & Co., Ltd. v. Collector of Internal Revenue

Case No. 9
G.R. No. L-19392 (April 14, 1965)
Chapter III, Page 120, Footnote No.222 and 224
Commonwealth Insurance Co. (CIC), a domestic corporation, entered into
reinsurance contracts with 32 British companies not engaged in business in the
Philippines represented by herein Plaintiff. CIC remitted to Plaintiff reinsuran
premiums and, on behalf of Plaintiff, paid income tax on the premiums. Plaintiff
a claim for a refund of the paid tax, stating that it was exempted from withhold
tax reinsurance premiums received from domestic insurance companies by foreign
insurance companies not authorized to do business in the Philippines. Plaintiffs
that since Sec. 53 and 54 were substantially re-enacted by RA 1065, 1291 and 2343,
said rulings should be given the force of law under the principle of legislative
approval by re-enactment.
W/N the tax should be withheld.
No. The principle of legislative enactment states that where a statute is
susceptible of the meaning placed upon it by a ruling of the government agency
charged with its enforcement and the legislature thereafter re-enacts the provis
without substantial changes, such action is confirmatory to an extent that the r
carries out the legislative purpose. This principle is not applicable for the
aforementioned sections were never re-enacted. Only the tax rate was amended.
The administrative rulings invoked by the CIR were only contained in unpublished
letters. It cannot be assumed that the legislature knew of these rulings. Finall
y, the
premiums remitted were to indemnify CIC against liability. This took place withi
n the
Philippines, thus subject to income tax.
2a, 4
Laxamana v. Baltazar
Case No. 144
G.R. No. L-5955 (September 19, 1952)
Chapter III, Page 121, Footnote No.225
The Mayor of Pampanga was suspended. By virtue of Sec. 2195 of the
Revised Administrative Code, Respondent Vice Mayor assumed the office. However,
the Provincial Governor, by virtue of Sec. 21 of the Revised Election Code, appo
herein Petitioner as the mayor.
W/N Respondent is the right person to assume office.
Yes, Respondent should assume the vacated position. Sec. 21 of the Revised
Election Code, which was taken from Sec. 2180 of the Revised Admin Code, applies
to municipal officers in general while Sec. 2195 of the Revised Administrative C
applies to the office of mayor in particular. A special provision overrides a ge
one. Also, the incorporation of Sec. 2180 in Sec. 21 does not enlarge its scope
merely supplements it. It has also been consistently held in case of suspension
of the
mayor, the vice-mayor shall assume office; the legislature is presumed to be
acquainted with this contemporaneous interpretation. Hence, upon re-enacting Sec
2180, the interpretation is deemed to have been adopted.
1, 4, 38b, 50

Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice

Case No. 32
G.R. No. L-42821 (January 18, 1936)
Chapter III, Page 121, Footnote No.226
Petitioner was appointed justice of the peace for Lingayen, Pangasinan. He
relinquished his office after he had reached the age of 65 because of the provis
of Act No. 3899. Petitioner claimed that he was entitled to the benefits under t
vetoed Sec. 7 of the Retirement Gratuity Law which entitled justices of the peac
e to
gratuities. Petitioner was contesting the validity of the veto of the Governor-G
by claiming that the Act was not an appropriation bill and hence, was not subjec
t to
W/N the veto of the Governor-General of Sec. 7 was valid.
Yes. It is clear from reading Sec. 12 that the Legislature intended this Act to
an appropriation measure and that it anticipated the possibility of a future vet
o by
the Chief Executive. Hence, the Governor can constitutionally veto certain items
this bill. Furthermore, the legislature accepted the veto and made no attempt to
override it. The executive department sustained the validity of the veto as well
Contemporaneous construction is not decisive for the courts, but when two co-equ
branches of government have adopted and accepted the construction of statutes,
they must be given great respect. Also, this practice of vetoing the separate it
ems in
a bill by the Chief Executive has long been allowed and to rule against it would
require a clear showing of unconstitutionality.
2a, 2b, 3a, 6c
NPC v. Province of Lanao del Sur
Case No. 187
G.R. No. 96700 (November 19, 1996)
Chapter III, Page 122, Footnote No.232
Petitioner Corporation was assessed real property taxes by Respondent since
its tax exempt status was revoked by P.D. 1931. Because of the Petitioner s failur
e to
pay, the properties were auctioned with the Respondent as the sole bidder.
Petitioner contends that its status was never revoked but merely suspended. With
Resolutions issued by the Fiscal Incentives Review Board (FIRB), the tax exempti
privileges of the Petitioners were restored. However, Respondent contends that t
Resolutions issued by the said Board was void relying on an earlier case between
Petitioner and the Province of Albay stating that FIRB does not have power to re
tax exemptions and that the said Board can only recommend to the President or th
Minister of Finance which subsidiary of the Government can be given exemptions.
Note however, that the Albay case was already superceded by the Maceda vs.
Macaraig case stating that the FIRB Resolution is in accordance with the
requirements of the law if it was properly approved by the Minister of Finance.
In the
present case, the FIRB Resolutions reinstating the status were properly approved
the Minister of Finance.
1. W/N Respondent Province and provincial officials can validly and lawfully
assess RPT against, and thereafter sell at public auction the subject properties
of the
Petitioner to effect collection of alleged deficiencies in the payment of such t
2. W/N Petitioner has ceased to enjoy its tax and duty exemption privileges,
including its exemption from payment of RPT.
The Petitioner never lost its tax exempt status, but its privileges were only
suspended. Thus, the Respondent cannot assess deficiency RPT against the Petitio
Furthermore, since the Petitioner was never delinquent in paying RPT, the subseq
auction and sale of the Petitioner s assets is also considered void.
1, 5a, 5b, 9a, 20a, 37, 38a, 49

J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Mariano & Aquial & Cordova

Case No. 64
G.R. No. L-33140 (October 23, 1978)
Plaintiffs Aquial (herein Respondents) claimed ownership of a parcel of land
located in QC having an area of 383 hectares. They alleged that it had been
fraudulently or erroneously included in OCT No. 735 of the Registry of Deeds of
and that it was registered in the names of Defendants Tuason (herein Petitioners
pursuant to a decree issued on July 6, 1914 in Case No. 7681 of the Court of Lan
Registration. Plaintiffs Aquial prayed that OCT No. 735 and the titles derived t
be declared void due to certain irregularities in the land registration proceedi
ng. The
Tuason s prayed that the petition be dismissed on the ground that the court has no
jurisdiction over the case, improper venue, prescription, laches and prior judgm
Respondents Cordova spouses were allowed to intervene in the case since they
were able to purchase 11 hectares from the Aquials.
W/N OCT No. 735 is valid.
OCT No. 735 is valid. The validity of OCT No. 735 was already decided upon
by the Supreme Court in the cases of Benin vs. Tuason, Alcantara vs. Tuason and
vs. Tuason. The ruling in these cases was also applied in other cases involving
validity of OCT No. 735.
5a, 5b
J.M. Tuason v. Land Tenure Administration
Case No. 135
G.R. No. L-21064 (February 18, 1970)
Chapter XI, Page 434, Footnote No.7
Petitioner is the owner of a land called Tatalon Estate in Quezon City. They
seek to nullify RA 2616 which directs the expropriation of two lots inside the e
Under Art. 8, Sec. 4 of the Constitution, The Congress may authorize, upon paymen
of just compensation, the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lot
s and
conveyed at cost to individuals Petitioner contends that said law is unconstituti
because the provision in the Constitution refers to lands not landed estates.
W/N RA 2616 is unconstitutional.
No. The question is one of constitutional construction. The Constitution clearly
states that land not landed estates can be expropriated. It has a broader scope,
allowing the legislature to expropriate more types of land. The law does not
distinguish between different types regardless of how big or small it may be, as
as there is a need to address a growing social problem such as inequality.
9a, 9c, 24a, 26, 37, 40c

Tolentino v. Commission on Elections

Case No. 154
G.R. No. L-34150 (October 16, 1971)
The 1971 Constitutional Convention seeks to amend Sec. 1 of Art. 5 of the
Constitution reducing the voting age from 21 to 18 years old. This proposal was
to be
submitted to the people for ratification in a plebiscite coinciding with the Nov
1971 elections relying on Sec. 1, Art. 15 of the Constitution: The Congress in a
session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate a
the House of Representatives voting separately may propose amendments to this
Constitution or call a convention for the purpose. Such amendments shall be vali
d as
part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an el
at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification.
W/N there is a limitation or condition in Sec. 1 of Art. 15 of the Constitution
calling for a plebiscite on the sole amendment contained in Organic Resolution N
There was a violation. Because such amendments regardless of how many
are to be submitted to the people for their ratification in an election, An elect
only means one. Also, no fixed frame of reference is given to the voter. No one
knows what changes in the fundamental principles of the constitution would be
modified. The amendments being proposed by the convention in must be seen in
relation to the whole.
6c, 7a
Aglipay v. Ruiz
Case No. 4
G.R. No. 45459 (March 13, 1937)
Respondent, who is the Director of Post, announced that he would order the
issuance of postage stamps to commemorate the celebration of the 33rd
International Eucharistic Congress in accordance with Act No. 4052. Petitioner,
who is
the Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks prohibition of such
because it violates Sec. 13, Art. 6 of the Constitution.
W/N the sale of such stamps is in violation of the constitutional mandate of
religious freedom.
Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the
Respondent is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special
postage stamps would be "advantageous to the Government. In this case, the
issuance of the postage stamps was not inspired by any sectarian feeling. Act. N
4052 grants the Respondent discretion to issue postage stamps with new designs "
often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government.
9a, 36a, 37
U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho
Case No 295
G.R. No. 17122 (February 27, 1922)
Chapter XI, Page 435, Footnote No.12
Respondent was charged for violating E.O. 53 (which fixes the ceiling price at
which rice may be sold) when he sold rice at a price greater than that fixed by
E.O. 53 follows Act No. 2868 which penalizes monopoly and hoarding of products
under extraordinary circumstances. Respondent contends that the Legislature has
not defined any basis for the order but has left it to the discretion of the Gov
General. Without leaving the discretion to say which extraordinary circumstances
the Governor General are, Defendant will not be charged.
W/N Act No. 2868 is unconstitutional for undue delegation of legislative
The act is unconstitutional. The Constitution is something solid, permanent and
substantial. As known, no nation living under republican form of government can
enact a law delegating the power to fix the price at which rice should be sold.
power can never be delegated under a republican form of government. This power
is exclusive to the legislative. In fixing the price, the law is dealing with pr
property and private rights, which are sacred under the Constitution.
Ordillo v. COMELEC
Case No. 192
G.R. No. 93054 (December 4, 1990)
Chapter XI, Page 437, Footnote No.24
A plebiscite was held pursuant to R.A. No. 6766 (Organic Act creating the
Cordillera Autonomous Region) with the votes of the people in the provinces of
Benguet, Mountain Province, Kalinga-Apayao, Ifugao, Abra and the city of Baguio.
Out of the provinces, only Ifugao managed to get a majority vote. Resolutions an
memorandum from the COMELEC and the Secretary of Justice states that only
provinces voting favorably in the plebiscite shall constitute the region.
W/N Ifugao being the only one which voted for the creation of CAR can
alone, legally and validly constitute a region.
Art. X, Sec. 15 of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that there shall be
created autonomous regions consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and
geographical areas From this, it can be derived that the term region used in its
ordinary sense means two or more provinces. The provisions of R.A. No. 6766 also
show that the Congress never intended that a single province may constitute the
Autonomous Region.
6c, 7a, 11g, 25a, 28

De los Santos vs. Mallare

Case No. 89
G.R. Nos. L-3045-6 (August 31, 1950)
Chapter XI, Page 440 and 450, Footnote No.33 and 54
This case questions the legality of the Petitioner s removal from the same
office which would be the effect of Respondent s appointment. Petitioner contends
that under the Constitution, he can not be removed against his will and without
cause, citing Sec. 4, Art. 12 of the Constitution which reads: No officer or empl
of the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for a cause provided b
law. Respondent admits that the position of City Engineer belongs to the
unclassified service . According to Lacson vs. Romero, all officers or employees i
n the
unclassified service are protected by the above provision; but notes that there
is a
difference between this case and the Lacson case. Sec. 2545 of the Revised
Administration Code authorizes the President to remove at pleasure any of the
officers enumerated therein, one of who is the city engineer. The two provisions
repugnant and absolutely irreconcilable.
W/N the position of City Engineer is an unclassified service.
No. Reading Art. 12, Sec. 1 of the Constitution, it is clear that Sec. 4 protect
those appointed into the service that do not fall as any of the following: policy
primarily confidential or highly technical in nature . The position of city
engineer is neither of the above-stated. This is confirmed by the enactment of C
No. 177. As a contemporaneous construction, this Act affords an index to the
meaning of Civil Service as conceived by the framers of the Constitution.
Furthermore, the rules of construction inform us that the words used in construc
are to be given the sense they have in common use. The Court therefore held that
Petitioner De los Santos is entitled to remain in office as the City Engineer of
with all the emoluments, rights and privileges appurtenant thereto, until he res
igns or
is removed for cause, and that Respondent s appointment is ineffective in so far a
s it
may adversely affect those emoluments, rights and privileges.
Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary
Case No. 64
G.R. No. 83896 (February 22, 1991)
Chapter XI, Pages 443, 450 and 454, Footnotes No. 41, 51 and 71
Petitioners maintain that the Executive Order which, in effect, allows members
of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other
government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions. This run
s counter
to Art. 7, Sec. 13 of the Constitution which provides that the President, Vice-P
the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided by the Constitution, hold any other office or employment duri
their tenure.
W/N the prohibition in Art. 7, Sec. 13 admits of the broad exceptions made for
appointive officials in general under Art. 9-B, Sec. 7, par. 2.
No. A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention
underlying the provision. The practice of holding multiple offices or positions
in the
government would lead to abuses by unscrupulous public officials who took the
scheme for purposes of self-enrichment, particularly during the Marcos era. The
qualifying phrase unless otherwise provided in this Constitution of Sec. 13, Art.
cannot possibly refer to the broad exceptions of Sec. 7, Art. 9-B of the 1987
Constitution. The former is meant to lay down the general rule of holding multip
offices applicable to all elective public officials and employees while the latt
er is
meant for the exception of the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet
their deputies and assistants. To construe otherwise would be to render nugatory
meaningless the manifest intent and purpose of the framers of the Constitution.
284 is therefore declared null and void.
6b, 9a, b2

People of the Philippines vs. Muñoz

Case No. 217
G.R. No. L-38969 (February 9, 1989)
Chapter XI, Page 446, Footnote No.42
The Defendant was convicted of three counts of murder. The penalty for
murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code was reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death but this was modified by Art. 3, Sec. 19(1) of the 1987
Constitution providing that any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced
to reclusion temporal.
W/N this Court would adhere to the Masangkay ruling that the abolition of the
death penalty limited the penalty for murder to the remaining periods, to wit, t
minimum and the medium.
No. In the case at bar, the Court found that the applicable sentence would
be the medium period of penalty prescribed in Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code
which does not follow the Masangkay ruling, and that would be reclusion perpetua
1, 6c, 20a
Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Case No. 190
G.R. No. 78780 (July 23, 1987)
Chapter XI, Page 447, Footnote No.46
Petitioners submit that any tax withheld from their emoluments and
compensations as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their
salaries, contrary to the provision of Sec. 10, Art. 8 of the Constitution manda
ting that
during their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased , even as i
t is
anathema to the ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned by the Constitution
W/N the salary of the members of the judiciary is subject to the general
income tax applied to all taxpayers.
Yes. The salary of the members of the judiciary is subject to the general
income tax. According to Perfecto vs. Meer, income taxes are part of the diminut
of judges salaries because the independence of judges is of far greater
importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries . Endencia
vs. David confirmed Perfecto vs. Meer. However both decisions must be discarded
because the framers of the fundamental law (i.e. Fox, Concepcion, and Bernas), a
the alter ego of the people, have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the
meaning of Sec. 10 Art. 8 of the 1987 Constitution; that is, to make the salarie
s of the
members of the judiciary taxable.
3, b1

Tañada v. Cuenco, et al
Case No. 286
G.R. No. L-10016 (February 28, 1957)
Chapter XI, Page No. 451, Footnote No.55
The Senate upon nomination of the Nacionalista Party chose Senator Laurel,
Lopez, and Primicias, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). Upon
nomination of the Citizens Party, Petitioner was next chosen by the Senate as
member of SET. Then, the Senate chose Respondents as members of the same SET.
Petitioners maintain that after the nomination and election of Senator Laurel, L
and Primicias of the Nacionalista Party as members of the SET, the other Senator
must be nominated by the Citizens Party. Respondents alleged, however, that six
members of the Electoral Tribunal shall be members of the Senate or the House of
Representatives , is mandatory. The word shall is imperative in nature relative to t
number of members of the Electoral Tribunal and this is borne in the opinion of
Secretary of Justice.
W/N the election of Respondents as members of the Electoral Tribunal was
valid or lawful.
No. The application of the doctrine of contemporaneous construction is
more restricted except as to matters committed by the Constitution itself to the
discretion of some other department, contemporary or practical construction is n
necessarily binding upon the courts, even in a doubtful case. Hence, if the
judgment of the court, such construction is erroneous and its further applicatio
n is not
made imperative by any paramount considerations of public policy, it may be
2a, 6b, 9b, 11a
Aratuc v. COMELEC
Case No. 19
G.R. No. L-49705-09 (February 8, 1979)
Chapter XI, Page 452, Footnote No.62
Two petitions were filed against the Respondent claiming that it failed to
address irregularities in the Central Mindanao elections for the Interim Batasan
W/N the Supreme Court has the power to review decisions made by the
Respondent in handling the pre-proclamation controversies cited by the Petitione
No. The Supreme Court may only review actions carried out with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court cit
differences in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions with regard to the Supreme Court s
power over COMELEC decisions in 1935, the Supreme Court may review
Respondents decisions on either review or certiorari; 1973, Respondent s decisions
may only be brought up on ground of certiorari alone. This highlights the 1973
Constitution s intent to strengthen Respondent s independence. Consequently, errors
of judgment that were based on substantial evidence are not reviewable in
6a, 9a, 25a
In Re: Appointment of Valenzuela and Vallarta
Case No. 59
A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC (November 9, 1998)
Judges were appointed to the RTC by the President on May 12 1998, within 2
months before the election. There are two conflicting provisions in the 1987
Constitution, the former validating this action and the latter proscribing it. O
n the one
hand, Art. 8, Sec. 4 requires that all vacancies in the judiciary be filled with
in 90 days
of such vacancy. On the other hand, Art. 7, Sec. 15 prohibits the President from
making any appointments two months before Presidential elections, except for
temporary appointments to executive positions when public interest is at stake.
W/N the appointments were valid.
No, the appointments were void. The general rule is that the President must fill
in vacancies in the Judiciary within 90 days, but this does not apply in the spe
circumstance of Presidential elections, which occurs only once every six years.
Temporary appointments to executive positions are the only exception. The
prohibition is for public policy purposes, to prevent midnight appointments which
is more compelling than temporary vacancies in the judiciary.
6c, 9a, 35, 36b, 38a, 50, b
Magtoto v. Manguera
Case No. 159
G.R. Nos. L-37201-02 (March 3, 1975)
Chapter XI, Page 457, Footnote No.79
The present cases involve the interpretation of Sec. 20 Art. 4 of the New
Constitution which took effect on Jan. 17, 1973. The provision reads: Any person
under investigation shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to b
informed of such right . Any confession obtained in violation of this section shal
l be
inadmissible. Petitioner was accused in two criminal cases of murder in two
informations both dated Feb. 23, 1973. During the trial, his extrajudicial confe
dated Nov. 15, 1972 was admitted in evidence over the objection that it was take
while the accused was in the preventive custody of the PC without his having bee
informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel.
1. W/N the Petitioner s extra-judicial confession dated on Nov. 15, 1972 is
admissible as evidence.
2. W/N Sec. 20, Art. 4 of the New Constitution can be applied retroactively.
1. Yes. Petitioner s confession is admissible. The court ruled that a confession
obtained from a person under investigation, who has not been informed of his rig
ht to
counsel, is admissible in evidence if the same had been obtained before the
effectivity of the New Constitution, since no law gave the accused the right to
be so
informed before that date. Conversely, such confession is inadmissible if the sa
had been obtained after the effectivity of the New Constitution.
2. No. The constitutional guarantee of right to counsel only has prospective
effect. Giving such provision a retroactive effect would invite unwarranted hard
on the part of the prosecutor.
12a, 46a

Filoteo v. Sandiganbayan
Case No. 106
G.R. No. 79543 (October 16, 1996)
Chapter XI, Page 457, Footnote No.80
Petitioners were held guilty by Respondent Court for the crime of robbery of a
postal delivery van. Upon the capture of his co-accused, he was pointed out as t
mastermind. When Petitioner was captured, he admitted involvement in the crime
and pointed his other confederates. On May 30, 1982, Petitioner executed sworn
statements (confessing what had happened), without the presence of a counsel. Th
1987 Constitution provides that the right to counsel of the accused cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of a counsel. Petitioner claims tha
t such
proscription against an uncounselled waiver is applicable to him retroactively,
though his custodial investigation took place in 1983.
1. W/N the Petitioner s extra-judicial confession is admissible even without the
presence of a counsel.
2. W/N the said provisions of 1987 Constitution can be applied retroactively.
1. Yes, it is admissible under the 1973 Constitution. Accordingly, waivers of th
right to counsel during custodial investigation without the benefit of counsel d
the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution should, by such argumentation, be admis
2. No. The specific provision of the 1987 Constitution requiring that a waiver b
an accused of his right to counsel during custodial investigation must be made w
the assistance of a counsel may not be applied to him retroactively or in cases
the extrajudicial confession was made prior to the effectivity of the said const
1, 5a, 46a
Co v. Electoral Tribunal, House of Representatives
Case No. 66
G.R. Nos. 92191-92 and 92202-03 (July 30, 1991)
Chapter XI, Page 457, Footnote No.82
Respondents declared Jose Ong Jr., elected representative of Northern
Samar, as a natural born Filipino citizen. Petitioners contend that based on the
Constitution, Jose Ong, Jr. who was born on June 19, 1948 (during which the 1935
Constitution was operative), is not a natural born Filipino citizen having been
born to
a Chinese father, Jose Ong Chuan and a Filipina mother Agrifina Lao.
1. W/N people who have elected Philippine citizenship under the 1935
Constitution are to be considered natural born Filipino citizens.
2. W/N this provision should be applied retroactively.
Yes. Under of Art. 4 Sec. 1 par. 3 of the Constitution, children born of Filipin
mothers before January 17, 1973 shall be accorded natural born status if they el
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. They need not perform
act of election granted that his father was naturalized and declared a Filipino
citizen by 1957, when he was only 9 years old. The provision in question must be
applied retroactively since it seeks to remedy the inequitable situation under t
he 1935
Constitution wherein people born of Filipino fathers and alien mothers were
considered natural born while children born of Filipino mothers and alien father
s were
8a, 9a, 42a

Sarmiento v. Mison
Case No. 277
G.R. Nos. 80519-21 (December 17, 1987)
Chapter XI, Page 458, Footnote No.84
Petitioners question the validity of appointment of Respondent as
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs on the ground that it was not confirmed by
the Commission on Appointments. The Court favored the Respondent based on
express provisions of the 1987 Constitution.
W/N Sec. 16, Art. 7 provides for officers other than the first group to be
appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
No. Sec. 16 Art. 7 only provides for the appointment, by the President of
heads of executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and othe
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution with the
requirement of CA approval. Deliberations of the Constitutional Commission revea
that the framers of the 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the position head
s of
bureaus from CA confirmation with the intent of reconciling the 1935 Constitution
which turned the Commission into a venue for horse-trading , and that of the 1973
Constitution which placed absolute power of appointment in the President. The wo
also in the second sentence of Sec. 16 Art. 7 must not be construed as to suppose
that officers in the second sentence shall be appointed in a like manner as that o
the first group.
9a, 24b, 32, 39a, b
Domingo v. Commission on Audit
Case No. 37
G.R. No. 112371 (October 7, 1998)
Petitioner was endorsed with several government vehicles for the use of the
personnel of the entire Region V of DSWD. Respondent sent a communication to the
Petitioner informing her that post-audit reports on the DSWD disbursement accoun
showed that officials provided with government vehicles were still collecting
transportation allowances when they should not be. Petitioner asserted that even
she was assigned a government vehicle, she was entitled to transportation
allowance on the days she did not use a government vehicle.
W/N a commutable transportation allowance may still be claimed by a
government official provided with a government vehicle, for the days the officia
l did
not actually use the vehicle.
The General Appropriations Act of 1988, 1990 and 1991 clearly provides that
transportation allowance will not be granted to officials who are assigned a
government vehicles except as approved by the President.
6c, 7a, 24a
Globe-Mackay v. NLRC and Salazar
Case No. 112
G.R. No. 82511 (March 3, 1992)
Chapter IV, Page 124, Footnote No.3
Petitioner placed Respondent Salazar under preventive suspension because it
appeared that she had full knowledge of the loss and whereabouts of an air
conditioner that Delfin Saldivar had stolen from the company but failed to infor
m her
employer. Respondent Salazar filed a complaint for illegal suspension and for ot
damages. On appeal, the Respondent Court affirmed the decision of the Labor
Arbiter with respect to the reinstatement of Private Respondent but limited back
wages to 2 years and deleted award for moral damages.
1. W/N the Labor Tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
reinstatement of Respondent Salazar.
2. W/N there existed independent legal grounds to hold Respondent Salazar
answerable as well and, thereby, justify her dismissal.
The Labor Code clearly provides that an employee who is unjustly dismissed
from work shall be entitled to reinstatement and to his full back wages. An exce
to this is when the reinstatement may be inadmissible due to strained relations
between the employer and the employee. The position of Private Respondent as
systems analyst is not one that may be characterized as such. Moreover, Petition
merely insinuated that since Respondent Salazar had a special relationship with
Saldivar, she might have had direct knowledge of Saldivar s questionable activitie
Luzon Brokerage Co v. Public Service Commission
Case No. 76
G.R. No. L-37661 (November 16, 1932)
Petitioner has been operating a fleet of trucks utilized exclusively for the
carriage of goods or cargo of its particular customers. On May 9, 1932, Responde
required the Petitioner to file with the commission within a period of thirty da
ys an
application for a certificate of public convenience for the operation of his tru
since they were said to be devoted to the transportation of cargo with
compensation as provided in Sec. 13 of the Public Service Law.
W/N the amendments introduced into Sec. 13 of Act No. 3108 by Act No.
3316 conferred jurisdiction on the Respondents over the Petitioner s business,
although it is not a common carrier.
The omission from Sec. 13 of the phrase for public use in the definition of a
public service does not mean that the Legislature meant to extend the jurisdicti
on of
the PSC to private enterprises not devoted to public use. Public service is a se
rvice for
public use. The insertion of the phrase for hire or compensation does not show the
intent either. This is a stock phrase found in most definitions of a common carr
ier and
a public utility. Also, notwithstanding the changes in the wording of the defini
tion of
the term public service introduced by Act No. 3316, there were no alterations
made in the basic provisions of the other sections. Respondent has no jurisdicti
over Petitioner.
6c, 36b


Aparri v. Court of Appeals

Case No. 15
G.R. No. L-30057 (January 31, 1984)
Chapter IV, Page 124, Footnote No.4
R.A. 1160 created the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation
Administration (NARRA). Said law also empowered its Board of Directors to appoin
and fix the term of office of the General Manager subject to approval of the
On January 15, 1960, the Board approved Resolution No. 13 appointing
Petitioner as General Manager of NARRA.
On March 15, 1962, the Board approved Resolution No. 24 wherein the
President expressed his desire to fix the term of office of the incumbent Genera
Manager up to March 31, 1962.
W/N Resolution No. 24 constitutes removal of Petitioner without cause.
No, Petitioner s term of office is deemed expired. R.A. 1160 expressly gives the
Board the power to appoint and fix the term of office of the General Manager. Th
word term describes the period that an office may hold office and upon expiration
of such term, his rights, duties, and authority must cease. In this case, the te
rm of
office is not fixed by law, but by the Board.
6a, 6c
People v. Quijada
Case No.
G.R. Nos. 115008 (July 24, 1996)
Respondent killed Diosdado Iroy using an unlicensed firearm. He was
convicted of 2 offenses, which were separately filed:
1) Murder under Art. 248 of the RPC
2) Illegal possession of firearms in its aggravated form under PD 1866
Par 2 of Sec 1 of P.D. 1866 states that, If homicide or murder is committed with
use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed.
1) W/N the trial court s judgment should be sustained in conformity with the
doctrine laid down in People v. Tac-an, People v. Tiozon, People v. Caling,
etc. OR to modify the judgment and convict the appellant only of illegal
possession of firearm in its aggravated form pursuant to People v. Barros.
2) W/N the 2nd par of Sec 1 of PD1866 integrated illegal possession of firearm a
the resultant killing into a single integrated offense.
The trial court s judgment is affirmed.
2nd par of Sec 1 of P.D. 1866 does not support a conclusion that intended to
treat said two offenses as a single and integrated offense of illegal
possession with homicide or murder . It does not use the clause as a result or
on the occasion of to evince an intention to create a single integrated
crime, but rather it uses the clause with the use of .

Baranda v. Gustillo
Case No. 30
G.R. No. L-81163 (September 26, 1988)
Chapter IV, Page 125, Footnote No.5
Both parties claim that they own a parcel of land, Lot No. 4517. The Court,
after discovering that private respondent s TCT was fraudulently acquired, ordered
writ of possession against them and issued a resolution denying with finality a
for reconsideration filed by Private Respondents. Another group filed a separate
case against Petitioners and applied for lis pendens on the TCT of said lot, whi
ch the
court found out to be privies of the Private Respondents tasked to delay the
implementation of the final decisions of the Court.
W/N the pendency of the appeal in subsequent civil case with the Court of
Appeals prevents the court from canceling the notice of lis pendens in the
certificate of titles of petitioners which were earlier declared valid and
subsisting by this Court.
What is the nature of the duty of the Register of Deeds to annotate or annul
the notice of lis pendens in a Torrens Certificate of Title?
Respondent Judge abused his discretion in sustaining the Acting Register of
Deed s stand. He forgot the 1st par of Sec. 77 of P.D. 1529 which provides:
Cancellation of lis pendens Before the final judgment, a notice of lis
pendens may be cancelled upon order of the Court after proper showing
that it is necessary to protect the rights of those who caused it to be
Sec 10 of PD 1529 states that, It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to
immediately register an instrument presented for registration . If the
instrument cannot be registered, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof
and inform the presenter of such denial in writing, stating the ground
therefore, and advising him of his rights to appeal by consulta.
Basbacio v. Office of the Secretary, Dept. of Justice
Case No.
G.R. No. 109445 (November 7, 1994)
RA 7309, among other things, provides for compensation of persons unjustly
accused, convicted, and imprisoned. Petitioner and his son-in-law Balderrama wer
charged with murder and frustrated murder for killing Boyon and wounding his wif
and son, due to a land dispute and thus imprisoned. However, on appeal to the CA
Petitioner was acquitted on the ground that conspiracy between him and his son-i
was not proven. What was proven was that he was at the scene of the crime
with Petitioner when the shooting happened and left the place with his son-in-la
Petitioner claims he was unjustly accused and is entitled to compensation.
W/N Petitioner is entitled to compensation pursuant to RA 7309.
No, he is not. For one to be unjustly accused one must be wrongly accused
from the very beginning, unjustly convicted (when a judge knowingly and
deliberately rendered an unjust judgment, whimsical and capricious devoid of any
basis for judgment) and imprisoned. In the case at bar, Petitioner was acquitted
because the prosecution was unable to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
Petitioner was guilty. Thus, he does not fall under RA 7309.
9a, 11a, 25a

Segovia v. Sandiganbayan
Case No.
G.R. No. 124067 (March 27, 1998)
Petitioners were designated as members of the Contracts Committee for
NPC s Mindanao project. The lowest bidder, Joint Venture was disqualified after th
PCAB verified that Joint Venture as well as the 2nd lowest bidder, Urban Consoli
Constructors, were downgraded thereby ineligible as bidders. Since all other bids
exceeded the allowable government estimate on the project, the committee
declared a failure of bidding and directed a re-bidding. NPC Board approved, but
for reasons not on record. The project was eventually cancelled. Petitioners wer
charged under RA 3019 for in one way or the other, extending undue advantage to
Joint Venture through manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusab
negligence. For this, petitioners were suspended from office.
W/N it is mandatory or discretionary for Sandiganbayan to place under
preventive suspension public officers who stand accused before it.
Yes, it is mandatory. Under the act, one accused of any offense involving
fraud upon government public funds or property whether the crime is simple or
complex, regardless of stage of execution and mode of participation, shall be
suspended from office. Jurisprudence is clear that upon determination of the val
of the information, a court must issue a suspension order as held in Gonzaga v.
Sandiganbayan, Luciano, et al. v. Mariano, Socrates v. Sandiganbayan.
1, 5a, 7a
Tanada v. Yulo
Case No. 288
No. 43575 (May 31, 1935)
Chapter IV, Page 127, Footnote No.11
Petitioner is a Justice of Peace appointed by the Gov. Gen. with the consent
by the Philippine Commission, assigned to Alabat, Tayabas. Later in his service,
was transferred to Perez, Tayabas. He reached his 65th birthday on October 35, 1
subsequent to the approval of Act No. 3899 which makes mandatory the retirement
of all justices who have reached 65 years of age at the time said Act takes effe
ct on
January 1, 1933. The judge of First instance, acting upon the directive of the S
of Respondent Justice, directed Petitioner to cease holding office pursuant to A
No. 3899.
W/N Petitioner should cease to hold office.
W/N his transfer is considered a new transfer and requires confirmation by
the Philippine Commission.
No, Petitioner should not cease to hold office as Act No. 3899 clearly states
that those who will cease to hold office are those 65 yrs of age at the time the
takes effect, not thereafter. Therefore, Petitioner shall be a Justice of Peace
for life as
long as he stays in good behavior or does not become incapacitated.
No, his transfer is not a new appointment. Hence, no confirmation is required
as it is just an enlargement of the jurisdiction grounded on original appointmen
6c, 7a

Eliseo Silva v. Belen Cabrera

Case No. 146
G.R. No. L-3629 (March 19, 1951)
Respondent filed an application with the Public Service Commission for a
certificate of public convenience, to be able to operate an ice plant in the Cit
y of
Lipa. Petitioner, owner of another ice plant already in the same area, opposed
Respondent s application, claiming that public convenience did not need another
ice plant. Atty. Aspillera was delegated by the Commissioner to receive testimon
and conduct hearing of the contest; thereafter the Commission en banc rendered a
decision that Respondent was allowed to operate the ice plant. After which,
Petitioner claimed that under the law, no one except the Commissioner may hear
contested cases.
W/N delegation to Atty. Aspillera to hear the case is lawful.
No, the delegation is unlawful. Although Sec. 32 of Public Service Act allows
the Commission to delegate to any of their attorneys the right to receive eviden
ce or
take testimony, Sec. 3 of the same act provides that in (1) all contested cases
and (2)
cases involving fixing of rates, the reception of evidence may only be delegated
one of the Commissioners.
Thus, though the law makes it inconvenient or cumbersome for the
Commission to handle contested cases, where the law is clear, the Commission nor
the Court may not disregard, circumvent, or interpret the law any other way. Plu
you have to look at the entire Act, and not just specific provisions, in applyin
g the
6c, 7a, 8a, 36b
Radio Communications of the Philippines v. National Telecom. Com.
Case No. 129
G.R. No. L-68729 (May 29, 1987)
Petitioner was awarded legislative franchise in 1957 by RA 2036 to operate a
radio communications system, recognized by the Public Service Commission (PSC).
Petitioner then established services in Sorsogon, Mindoro, and Samar. In 1980, t
Respondent, which replaced the PSC, authorized Kayumanggi to set up radio
systems in Mindoro and Samar too. Respondent, after conducting a hearing upon a
complaint by Kayumanggi, ordered Petitioner to stop operating, because it didn t
have a certificate of public convenience, which is necessary under EO 546 for an
public service to operate.
W/N Petitioner still needs a certificate of candidacy before it can validly
Yes, they need such certificates to validly operate.
Petitioner was created under RA 2036, governed by the Public Service
Commission. Under it, radio companies did not need a certificate of public
convenience to operate. However, P.D. 1 abolished the Public Service Commission
and EO 546 created the Respondent Commission. Under EO 546, Respondent must
issue a certificate of public convenience for the operation of radio communicati
systems. Petitioner did not avail of it when they should have.
2a, 6c, 30, 46a, 49

National Federation of Labor v. Hon. Eisma

Case No. 84
G.R. No. L-61236 (January 31, 1984)
Zambowood Union went on strike because of the illegal termination of their
union leader and underpayment of their monthly allowance. In the process, they
blocked the roads and prevented customers and suppliers from entering the
premises. Thereafter, Respondent filed in court for damages for obstruction of p
property. Petitioners contended that jurisdiction over this case belongs to Labo
Arbiter and not for courts to decide.
W/N courts may be labor arbiters that can pass on a suit for damages filed by
an employer or is it the Labor Arbiter of the NLRC?
Yes, the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction.
In the Labor Code, Sec. 217 vested Labor Arbiters with original jurisdiction.
However, P.D. 1367 amended Sec. 217, vesting courts of first instance with origi
jurisdiction to award damages for illegal dismissal. But again P.D. 1691 amended
217 to return the jurisdiction to Labor Arbiters. Additionally, BP 130 amended t
he same
section, but without changing original jurisdiction of LA over money claims aris
from employer-employee relations. Thus the law is clear, respondent Judge has no
jurisdiction to act on the case.
1, 6c, 7a
Pascual v. Pascual-Bautista
Case No. 198
G.R. No. 84240 (March 25, 1992)
Chapter IV, Page 127, Footnote No.16
Petitioners are the acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio Pascual,
the latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual, who
intestate without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurio
W/N Art. 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which states that An
illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate chil
dren and
relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit
in the same
manner from the illegitimate child , can be interpreted to exclude recognized
natural children from the inheritance of the deceased.
In Diaz v. IAC, this Court ruled that Art. 992 of the Civil Code provides a
barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestat
e between
the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father o
r mother
of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not
recognized by law for the purposes of Art. 992.
Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate childr
Petitioners herein cannot represent their father in the succession of the latter
to the
intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood brother of their fat
6c, 7a, 7b, 36b
People v. Amigo
Case No. 201
G.R. No. 116719 (January 18, 1996)
Chapter IV, Page 127, Footnote No.16
The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision finding the Accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, and sentenced to the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
Accused-Appellant argues that error was committed by the trial court in
imposing or meting out the penalty of reclusion perpetua against him despite the
fact that Sec. 19 (1), Art. 3 of the 1987 Constitution was already in effect whe
n the
offense was committed.
Accused-Appellant contends that under the 1987 Constitution and prior to
the promulgation of RA 7659, the death penalty had been abolished and hence, the
penalty that should have been imposed for the crime of murder committed by
Accused-Appellant should be reclusion temporal in its medium period to 20 years
reclusion temporal.
W/N Sec. 19 (1), Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution means to require a
corresponding modification in the other periods as a result of the prohibition a
the death penalty.
In People vs. Muñoz, the Court held that A reading of Section 19 (1) of Article
III will readily show that there is really nothing therein which expressly decla
res the
abolition of the death penalty.
5a, 7b
People v. Santayana
Case No. 115
No. L-22291 (November 15, 1976)

Accused was found guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty from one year and one day to two years,
and to pay the costs.
W/N the appointment of the Appellant as a special agent of the CIS, which
apparently authorizes him to carry and possess firearms, exempts him from securi
ng a
license or permit corresponding thereto.
Yes. At the time of appellant s apprehension, the doctrine then prevailing was
enunciated in the case of People vs. Macarandang wherein it was held that the
appointment of a civilian as secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace a
order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within the categor
y of
a peace officer equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly
covered by Section 879 .

National Marketing Corp. (NAMARCO) v. Miguel D. Tecson

Case No. 184
G.R. No. L-29131 (August 27, 1969)
Chapter 4, Page 127, Footnote No.18
On 14 November 1955, defendants were ordered by the Court of First
Instance of Manila to pay PRATRA, the sum of P7,200 plus 7% interest until the a
was fully paid until May 25, 1960. On 21 December 1965, Plaintiff filed a compla
against the same defendants for the revival of the judgment rendered in the init
case. Defendants moved to dismiss the said complaint, on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof and prescription of action. The com
was dismissed as having prescribed.
W/N the date on which ten years from December 21, 1955 expired was
considered to be December 21, 1965.
NO. "When the laws speak of years ... it shall be understood that years are of
three hundred sixty-five days each" according to Art. 13 of our Civil Code. 1960
1964 being leap years, the month of February in both had 29 days, so that ten (1
years of 365 days each, or an aggregate of 3,650 days, from December 21, 1955,
expired on December 19, 1965.
6c, 7b
Santiago v. Commission on Elections, et al.
Case No. 90
G.R. No. 127325 (March 19, 1997)
Chapter IV, Page 129, Footnote No.26
On December 6, 1996, Private Respondents filed with Respondent
Commission a petition to amend the Constitution through a system of initiative S
ec. 2,
Art. 17 of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners filed a special civil action for p
based on the argument that the constitutional provision on people s initiative can
only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress and no such law has been
passed. RA 6735 provides for three systems of initiative: initiative on the Cons
on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitl
e on
initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which a
specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omiss
ion indicates
that the matter of people's initiative to amend the Constitution was left to som
future law.
W/N RA 6735 is an adequate statute to implement Section 2, Article 17 of the
1987 Constitution.
NO. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum
(Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitl
e is provided
for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter si
mply means
that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and loc
al laws.
If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of th
initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subti
therefore, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or
of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constit
is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws.
9a, 43

Villanueva v. COMELEC
Case No. 170
No. L 54718 (December 4, 1986)

On January 25, 1980, Petitioner filed a certificate of candidacy for Vice Mayor
of Dolores for the January 30 elections in substitution for his companion Mendoz
who withdrew candidacy without oath upon filing on January 4. Petitioner won in
election but Respondent Board disregarded all his votes and proclaimed Responden
Candidate as the winner on the presumption that Petitioner s candidacy was not
duly approved by Respondent. Petitioner filed a petition for the annulment of th
proclamation but was dismissed by Respondent Commission on the grounds that
Mendoza s unsworn withdrawal had no legal effect, and that assuming it was
effective, Petitioner s candidacy was not valid since Mendoza did not withdraw aft
January 4.
W/N Petitioner should be disqualified on the ground of formal or technical
No. The fact that Mendoza s withdrawal was not sworn is a technicality, which
should not be used to frustrate the people s will in favor of Petitioner as the su
candidate. Also, his withdrawal right on the very same day that he filed his
candidacy should be considered as having been made substantially and in truth
after the last day, even going by the literal reading of the provision by Respon
Commission. The spirit of the law rather than its literal reading should have gu
Respondent Commission in resolving the issue of last-minute withdrawal and
substitution of other persons as candidates.
1, 9a, 39c
Mario R. Melchor v. Commission on Audit
Case No. 177
G.R. No. 95398 (August 16, 1991)
Chapter IV. Page 133, Footnote No.35
On July 15, 1983, Petitioner, as school administrator of Alangalang Agro-Industr
School of Leyte, entered into a contract with Cebu Diamond Construction for the
construction of one of the school buildings. The school accountant issued a
certificate of availability of funds to cover the construction cost but failed t
o sign as a
witness to the contract, which was approved by the Minister of Education. During
construction, the contractor sought additional charges due to labor cost increas
but eventually gave up the project to save itself from losses. Consequently, the
matter was referred to Respondent Commission who disallowed the payment in post-
audit on the ground that the contract was null and void for lack of signature of
chief accountant of the school as witness to it. For this reason the petitioner
made personally liable for the amount paid to the contractor.
1. W/N the contract was null and void.
2. W/N the petitioner should be held personally liable for the amount paid to th
No. The chief accountant s issuance of a certificate of fund availability served
as substantial compliance with the requirements of LOI 968 in the execution of t
contract. The contract was also valid and enforceable because it already bore th
approval of the Minister of Education. Also, it was highly inequitable for the C
ourt to
compel the Petitioner, who had substantially complied with the mandate of LOI 96
to shoulder the construction cost of the building, which was being utilized by t
school when he was not reaping benefits from it.
8a, 9a, 12a
Mateo Casela v. Court of Appeals, and Exequiel Magsaysay
Case No. 50
G.R. No. L 26754 (October 16, 1970)
Chapter IV, Page 134, Footnote No.38
Petitioner was ordered, on Oct. 26, 1956, to vacate the premises and remove his
house. Petitioner refused to comply. Thus, the Court issued two more writs on Ma
y 6,
1958 and April 14, 1959. Instead of obeying the writs, the Petitioner filed a ca
se before
the Court of First Instance of Zambales, asking Private Respondent to pay him th
value of his house in addition to damages. He also filed a motion for suspension
the implementation of the writ of execution. The Court granted the motion for
suspension but the civil case was dismissed when it reached Respondent Court. Fo
this reason, Magsaysay filed a motion for execution of the writ dated Dec. 6, 19
and another on Feb. 11, 1964. CAR denied the motion holding that its decision da
Oct. 26, 1956 could no longer be executed on mere motion for the reason that a
period of five years has already elapsed from the said date.
W/N the motion for execution which was filed beyond the reglementary
period was time-barred.
No. From Dec. 17, 1956 when the decision in question became final and
executory, to Dec. 11, 1963, the date when Private Respondent s motion for
execution was filed, a period of 6 years, 11 months and 24 days elapsed. From th
period, the time during which the writs of execution could not be served, or a p
of 3 years, 9 months and 25 days must be subtracted. Consequently, only 3 years,
month and 29 days can be charged against the reglementary period. Hence Private
Respondent s motion for execution was not time-barred.
8a, 9c, 11a, 11d, 11e
De Jesus v. City of Manila
Case No. 86
G.R. No. L-9337 (December 24, 1914)
Chapter IV, Page 134, Footnote No.41
In 1907, Petitioner bought from an original owner a piece of land in Manila
which was under the Torrens system. Apparently, the original owner incorrectly
declared the size of the land. So, from 1901 1907, the original owner was paying
lesser taxes than he should have and same for Petitioner from 1907 1910. Upon
finding out that he was not paying the correct amount of taxes, Petitioner paid
taxes, fees, and interest of P2, 096.49 for the unpaid balance of the years 1901
Soon after, he protested and filed an action to recover the same amount.
Petitioner was awarded P1, 649.82.
Petitioner contends that the supposed taxes from before 1910 were not
actually taxes because they had not yet been assessed. Taxes may not be due and
payable until they are assessed.
W/N Petitioner should still pay the taxes which were not assessed before.
Petitioner should only pay the taxes when he was the owner of the property.
6, 9a, 38b, 43, 50

Federation of Free Workers v. Inciong

Case No. 45
G.R. No. L-48848 (May 11, 1988)
In April 1977, PD 1123 was promulgated requiring all employers in the private
sector to pay their employees an extra P60/month as emergency allowance. The
increase was set at May 1, 1977, as well as the rules issued on the same day. Se
c. 6
stated that Employers may apply for exemption with the Secretary of Labor within
days from the effectivity of these rules. On September 27, 1977, the company fil
with the Wage Commission its application for exemption from paying the increase.
Respondent approved both applications granting exemptions for the company.
Petitioners argue that Respondent committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting
to loss of jurisdiction by approving both applications.
1. W/N the first application was filed beyond the 30-day reglementary period.
2. W/N the petitioners were in a financial position to pay the additional emerge
No, the application was not a strict rule. The purpose of the PD is to protect
wages and income. The law takes into consideration that there is a possibility t
some employers are not financially capable to pay such wages and such
incapability may happen anytime within the year.
No, only the Department of Labor and Wage Commission can decide if the
petitioner was in a financial position to pay. The Department is in a better pos
ition to
assess the matter. In absence of any grave abuse of discretion, their
recommendations will be respected by the courts. Moreover, the company was able
prove their financial situation by giving financial statements.
8, 9a, 42
Morales v. Paredes
Case No. 83
G.R. No. L-34428 (December 29, 1930)
Petitioner claimed to own a parcel of land in Pangasinan wherein two other
people have already registered such land as their own.
Respondent Judge granted the registration of the land to the two claimants.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration in the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan. While the Motion was still pending, Petitioner brought the present a
to the Supreme Court praying that the decision of Respondent Judge be set aside
and a new trial should be granted in accordance with Sec. 513 if the Code of Civ
W/N a new trial should be granted in accordance with Sec. 513 of the Code
of Civil Procedure.
Supreme Court cannot open a new trial. The Supreme Court does not have
jurisdiction to reopen judgments under Sec. 513 if there are other adequate reme
available. Petitioner still has a pending Motion for Reconsideration case with t
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, therefore, that action should be finished

Prasnik v. Republic of the Philippines

Case No. 125
G.R. No. L-8639 (March 23, 1956)
Petitioner seeks to adopt four children which he claims to be his and Paz
Vasquez children without the benefit of marriage. The Solicitor General opposed t
stating that Art. 338 of the Civil Code allows a natural child to be adopted by
father refers only to a child who has not been acknowledged as natural child. It
maintains that in order that a natural child may be adopted by his natural fathe
r or
mother there should not be an acknowledgment of the status of the natural child
it will go against Art. 335.
W/N the Civil Code allows for the adoption of acknowledged natural children
of the father or mother.
The law intends to allow adoption whether the child be recognized or not. If
the intention were to allow adoption only to unrecognized children, Article 338
be of no useful purpose. The rights of an acknowledged natural child are much le
than those of a legitimated child. Contending that this is unnecessary would den
y the
illegitimate children the chance to acquire these rights. The trend when it come
s to
adoption of children tends to go toward the liberal. The law does not prohibit t
adoption of an acknowledged natural child which when compared to a natural
child is equitable. An acknowledged natural child is a natural child also and fo
the words of the law, they should be allowed adoption.
6c, 8a, 9, 12, 26, 36a, 37, 39b
De Guia v. COMELEC
Case No. 30
G.R. No. 104712 (May 6, 1992)
Petitioner contends that under Par (d) of Sec. 3 of RA 7166, members of the
Sangguniang Panlulungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large.
W/N par (d) Sec. 3 of RA 7166 should be interpreted to mean that elective
officials of the Sangguniang Panlulungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected
at large.
No. Par (d) Sec.3 of the RA refers only to elective officials of the Sangguniang
Panlulungsod of single district cities and elective officials of the Sangguniang
for municipalities outside Metro Manila. The law specifically stated that provin
ces with
only one legislative district should be divided into two and therefore should
necessarily be elected by districts. Par (d) should be interpreted in line with
the rest of
the statute and to follow the interpretation of the petitioner there would have
no reason for the RA to single out the single district provinces. The court real
ized that
the language of the law in this case seems abstruse and the key to determine wha
legislature intended is the purpose or reason which induced it to enact the stat
The explanatory note in the proposed bill provided that the reason for the divis
into two legislative districts is to reduce the number of candidates to be voted
for in
the 1992 elections.
2, 9c, 11a, 36b, 37, b2
Salenillas v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 68
G.R. No. 78687 (January 31, 1989)
Chapter IV, Page 135, Footnote No.47
On December 4, 1973, the property of Petitioners was mortgaged to
Philippine National Bank as security for a loan of P2,500. For failure to pay th
eir loan,
the property was foreclosed by PNB and was bought at a public auction by Private
Respondent. Petitioner maintains that they have a right to repurchase the proper
under Sec.119 of the Public Land Act. Respondent states that the sale of the pro
disqualified Petitioners from being legal heirs vis-à-vis the said property. Respo
also maintains that the period for repurchase has already prescribed based on
Monge et al. vs. Angeles.
1. W/N petitioners have the right to repurchase the property under the said Act.
2. W/N the prescription period had already prescribed.
The provision makes no distinction between the legal heirs. The distinction
made by Respondent contravenes the very purpose of the Act. Petitioners
contention would be more in keeping with the spirit of the law.
With regard to prescription, the Monge case involved a pacto de retro sale
and not a foreclosure sale and so the rules under the transaction would be diffe
For foreclosure sales, the prescription period starts on the day after the expir
ation of
the period of redemption when the deed of absolute sale was executed.
9b, 26, 27, 9b, 42a
Sarcos v. Castillo
Case No. 276
G.R. No. L-29755 (January 31, l969)
Chapter IV, Page 136, Footnote No. 48
Petitioner, the elected Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur, was charged with
misconduct and dishonesty in office by Respondent, the Provincial Governor of
Surigao del Sur. The act, constituting the alleged dishonesty and misconduct in
consisted in the alleged connivance of Petitioner with certain private individua
ls in
the cutting and selling of timber or logs for their own use and benefit, to the
and prejudice of the public and of the government. And on the basis of such
administrative complaint, Petitioner was placed under preventive suspension by
Respondent pursuant to Sec. 5, of RA No. 5185, otherwise known as the
Decentralization Act of l967 .
W/N Respondent is vested with power to order such preventive suspension
under the Decentralization Act of l967.
The new law explicitly stated that the power of suspension was vested on the
Provincial Board. The purpose of this was to prevent partisan considerations by
vesting the power on a board where no one person may have monopoly over the
power of suspension. The Provincial Governor may no longer have the power of
preventive suspension over a Municipal Mayor.
1, 6c, 6d, 7a, 9a, 36b, 49

Ala Mode Garments, Inc. v. NLRC

Case No. 7
G. R. No. 122165 (February 17, l997)
Chapter IV, Page 138, Footnote No. 53
Respondents were both employees of Petitioner and holding position as line
leaders, tasked to supervise 36 sewers each. On May 5 and 6, l993, all the line
did not report for work. On May 6, l993, Private Respondents were not allowed to
enter the premises of the Petitioner, and then required to submit written explan
as to their absence. On May 10, l993, Private Respondents tendered their
explanation letters.
Despite their explanation, they were not allowed to resume their work and
were advised to await the decision of the management whether or not the real
reason for their absence was intended to sabotage the operations of Petitioner.
other line leaders were allowed to resume their work despite their absence on Ma
y 5
and 6, l993.
W/N the failure of Petitioner to allow Private Respondents from resuming their
work constitutes dismissal from the service?
W/N the Labor Arbiter erred in limiting the award of backwages for only a
period not exceeding three 3 years?
Under the old doctrine, the backwages that can be awarded to illegally
dismissed employees was not to exceed a period of three years. However, a new
doctrine allowed the awarding of full backwages and also prevented the
company from deducting the earnings of the illegally dismissed employees
elsewhere during the pendency of their case. The Labor Arbiter was wrong in
awarding backwages for a period of not exceeding three years.
1, 5a, 6a, 6c, 7a, 49
Jose Comendador v. Renato S. De Villa
Case No. 69
G.R. No. 93177 (August 2, 1991)
Chapter IV, Page 142, Footnote No. 61
The petitioners are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing
prosecution for their participation in the failed coup d etat on December l to 9,
In connection with their prosecution, a Pre-Investigation Panel and a Court
Martial was formed. During their trial, petitioners invoked their right to perem
challenge. The same was denied by the Court Martial on the ground that the right
was discontinued when martial law was declared under a Presidential Decree.
W/N there was substantial compliance in the conduct of pre-trial
W/N there was a legal basis for the GCM No. 14 to deny the right of
petitioners to invoke a peremptory challenge.
W/N there was a legal basis for the Regional Trial Courts to grant bail and
order for the release of petitioners.
The right to peremptory challenge was suspended when Martial Law was
declared. But when the same was lifted, the right to peremptory challenge was
effectively revived. The reason being, the right was suspended due to the creati
on of
military tribunals to try cases of military personnel and other cases that may b
referred to them, so when martial law was lifted and the tribunals were abolishe
d, the
right to peremptory challenge was revived.
2a, 9a, 10
Matabuena v. Cervantes
Case No. 172
G.R. No. L-28771 (March 31, 1971)
Chapter IV, Page 143, Footnote No.69
Felix Matabuena cohabitated with Respondent. During this period, Felix
Matabuena donated to Respondent a parcel of land. Later the two were married.
After the death of Felix Matabuena, his sister, Petitioner, sought the nullifica
tion of the
donation citing Art.133 of the Civil Code Every donation between the spouses
during the marriage shall be void.
The trial court ruled that this case was not covered by the prohibition because
the donation was made at the time the deceased and Respondent were not yet
married and were simply cohabitating.
W/N the prohibition applies to donations between live-in partners.
Yes. It is a fundamental principle in statutory construction that what is within
the spirit of the law is as much a part of the law as what is written. Since the
reason for
the ban on donations between spouses during the marriage is to prevent the
possibility of undue influence and improper pressure being exerted by one spouse
the other, there is no reason why this prohibition shall not apply also to commo
The court, however, said that the lack of the donation made by the
deceased to Respondent does not necessarily mean that the Petitioner will have
exclusive rights to the disputed property because the relationship between Felix
Respondent were legitimated by marriage.
6c, 9a, 9c
Lopez & Sons, Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals
Case No. 151
G.R. No. L-9274 (February 1, 1957)
Chapter IV, Page 144, Footnote No.76
Petitioner imported wire nettings from Germany. The Manila Customs
Collector assessed the customs duties on the basis of the suppliers invoice. The
were paid and the shipment released. Thereafter, the Manila Customs Collector
reassessed the duties due on the basis of the dollar value of the importation an
imposed additional duties.
Petitioner appealed directly to Respondent Court but they dismissed it for lack
of jurisdiction citing Sec. 7 of RA 1125 creating said Tax Court. Provision says
that the
Court has jurisdiction to review decisions of Commissioner of Customs. However,
under Sec. 11 of same Act, the Court has jurisdiction to review rulings of the C
of Customs when brought by persons affected thereby.
W/N Respondent Court has jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Collector
of Customs.
Yes, there is indeed a disparity between Sec. 7 and 11 of same RA. The
Supreme Court concurred with the positions of the Solicitor General that a cleri
error was committed in Sec. 11 and the word Collector should read Commissioner.
support this, the Supreme Court cited that under the Customs Law as found under
Sec. 1137 to 1410 of the Revised Administrative Code, the Collectors of Customs a
mere Subordinates of the Commissioner of Customs over whom he has supervision
and control.
In this ruling, the court did not engage in judicial legislation. It merely rect
an apparent clerical error in the wordings of the statute to carry out the consp
intention of the Legislature. Under the rule of statutory construction, it is no
t the letter,
but the spirit of the law and the intent of the legislature that is important.
9c, 16a, 16c, 36a

Lamb v. Phipps
Case No. 143
G.R. No. L-7806 (July 12, 1912)
Chapter 4, Page 144, Footnote No.78
Petitioner contends that he had rendered a proper account of all the funds
of the government which came to his possession as a superintendent of the Iwahig
Penal Colony and that all of his accounts are balanced. Petitioner thus filed an
action for mandamus to compel the acting auditor of the Philippines to issue a
clearance. However, it was contended that the action for mandamus cannot
prosper since there is no showing that, as provided by law, there is no plain, sp
and adequate remedy in the ordinary courts of law.
W/N the legislature intended to limit the jurisdiction to cases where there is n
other adequate and speedy remedy in the ordinary courts of law.
There appears to be a typographical error in the wording of Sec. 222 of Act
No. 190 which reads in part: When the complaint in an action in a court of First
Instance alleges that any inferior tribunal, it may if there is no other plain,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary courts of law.
The phrase courts of law should read as course of law . Copied verbatim
from the Code of Civil Procedure of California, the said section in the Californ
ia Code
reads course of law instead of courts of law . Spanish translation of said Sec. 222
more clearly indicates what the legislature intended. In Spanish, the other reme
dy is
not limited to the ordinary courts of law . On its face, this evident typographical
error, which, if uncorrected, would render the law nonsensical. It is therefore
the duty
of the court to give the statute a sensible construction, such as will effectuat
e the
legislative intent and to avoid injustice or an absurd conclusion.
9c, 9d, 11a, 11d, 12a, 36a, 36b, 36d, 36f, 37
Com. of Internal Revenue v. ESSO
Case No. 27
G.R. No. L-28502-03 (April 18, 1989)
Respondent overpaid its 1959 income tax. It was accordingly granted a tax
credit by Petitioner on August 5, 1964. However, Respondent s payment for 1960 was
found to be short. Thus, Petitioner demanded payment of the deficiency tax toget
with interest for the period of April 18, 1961 to April 18, 1964. On August 10,
Respondent paid under protest the amount alleged to be due. It protested the
computation of interest, arguing that it was more than what was properly due,
claiming that it should only be required to pay interest for the amount of the
difference between the deficiency tax and Respondent s overpayment.
1. W/N Respondent shall pay the deficiency tax of P367, 994 with interest.
2. W/N Respondent is entitled to a refund.
The government already had in its hands the sum of P221, 033 representing
the excess payment of Respondent. Having been paid and received by mistake, the
sum belonged to Respondent and the government had the obligation to return such
amount, which arises from the moment that payment is made, and not from the time
that the payee admits the obligation to reimburse. Since the amount of P221, 033
was already in the hands of the government as of July, 1960, whatever obligation
Respondent might subsequently incur in favor of the government would have to be
reduced by that sum, in respect of which no interest could be charged.
It is well established that to interpret words of the statute in such a manner a
to subvert these truisms simply cannot and should not be countenanced. Nothing i
better settled than the rule that courts are not to give words a meaning which w
lead to absurd and unreasonable consequences. Moreover, a literal interpretation
to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results. Statutes should
receive a
sensible construction, such as will give effect to the legislative intention and
so as to
avoid an unjust or absurd conclusion.
8a, 8b, 11a, 11d, 11e, 12a, 12b
People v. Villanueva
Case No. 116
G. R. L-15014 (April 29, 1961)
Defendant was accused of crime of serious and less serious physical injuries
with damage to property in amount of P2,362 through reckless imprudence in the
Justice of the Peace Court of Batangas. The case was considered beyond the
court s jurisdiction because of the fine imposable upon the accused. The case was
forwarded to the Court of First Instance, which also declared itself without jur
because the penalty for the more serious offense of physical injuries through re
imprudence is only arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, and even
applied to its maximum degree. It should remain within the jurisdiction of the J
of Peace.
Whether or not the Court of First Instance has jurisdiction.
Yes. Angeles et al vs. Jose, a similar case, held that jurisdiction was with the
Court of First Instance and not the municipal court. Also, since the Court of Fi
Instance would have jurisdiction if the only offense were the damage of property
, it
would be absurd to say that the graver offense of serious and less serious physi
injuries combined with damage to property through reckless imprudence is in
jurisdiction of the Justice of Peace.
Moreover, there is the possibility that the prosecution will fail to prove the
physical injuries aspect of the case and establish only the damage to property.
Justice of Peace, if given jurisdiction, would find itself without jurisdiction
to impose
the P2,636 fine for the damage to property committed, since such fine cannot be
than the amount of the damage.
5, 11
People v. Duque
Case No. 106
G. R. 100285 (August 13, 1992)
Chapter IV, Page 149, Footnote No.97
Accused was charged with illegal recruitment because he was not licensed
nor authorized by the proper government agency, POEA. The Labor Code provides
that the offense shall prescribe in 3 years but does not contain any provision o
f how
to compute it. Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 provides that prescription shall begin to r
from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be n
known at the time, from the discovery thereof and institution of judicial procee
for its investigation and punishment . According to Accused, a literal reading
suggests that the prescriptive period would never begin to run.
What is the prescription of the criminal offense of the Accused?
Prescription began from the time the activities of the Accused were
ascertained by the complainants and by the POEA to have been carried out without
any license or authority from the government. There is absurdity in Sec. 2 but
Accused does not benefit from a literal reading. It must be construed in such a
as to give effect to the intention and avoid absurd results. Institution of judic
proceedings for its investigation and punishment may be either disregarded as
surplusage or should be deemed preceded by the word until .
9, 11a, 11d, 12, 15, 38

Bello v. Court of Appeals

Case No. 15
G. R. L-38161 (March 29, 1974)
Petitioners falsely appealed a case to the Court of First Instance, which should
have been taken directly to Respondent Court. The Prosecutor filed a petition to
dismiss appeal. Petitioners invoked an analogous provision (Rule 50, Sec. 3) dir
the Court of Appeals in cases erroneously brought to it to certify the case to t
proper court. The Court of First Instance still ordered the dismissal of the app
Petitioners then filed their petition for prohibition and mandamus to prohibit t
execution of judgment and elevate the appeal to Respondent Court. They dismissed
the petition. Although Respondent Court recognized that the Court of First Insta
may have exercised its inherent powers to direct appeal to Respondent Court, it
that Petitioners did not implead the Court of First Instance as principal party
respondent and thus it could not grant any relief at all even on the assumption th
Petitioners can be said to deserve some equities .
W/N the case should be elevated to Respondent Court despite finality of
judicial decision.
Yes. The Court of First Instance acted with grave abuse of discretion. The
Supreme Court cautions against narrowly interpreting a statute, defeating its pu
and stressed that it is the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes as to a
such a deplorable result of injustice or absurdity . The provision should also be
within the context and spirit of Rule 50, Sec. 3 as an analogous provision. The
Supreme Court finds no reason as to why the court cannot act in all fairness and
justice to be bound by the same rule.
9a, 9c, 9d, 9e, 11a, 11g, 11h, 12, 36, 8b
Cesario Ursua v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 306
G.R. No. 112170 (April 10, 1996)
Chapter 4, Page 152, Footnote No.112
Petitioner was charged before the Office of the Ombudsman. He was
requested by his lawyer to personally procure the complaint from the Ombudsman
because the law firm s messenger, Oscar Perez, had to attend some personal
matters. At the Office of the Ombudsman, he wrote his name at the logbook as
Oscar Perez. Petitioner s real identity was eventually discovered by the employees
of the Ombudsman. He was charged and convicted for violation of C.A. No. 142.
W/N the acts committed by the petitioner were among the evils sought to be
remedied by C.A. No. 142
Petitioner was acquitted. Statutes are to be construed in the light of the
purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. The court may
consider the spirit of the statute where the literal meaning would lead to injus
tice and
absurdity. Likewise, C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute that should be construed st
against the state, and in favor of the accused.
9a, 11a, 12a, 41a

Paat v. Court of Appeals

Case No. 95
G.R. No. 111107 (January 10, 1997)
Petitioner questioned the legality of the forfeiture of the truck used in illega
logging operations. He insists that only the Court can do so, citing Section 68
of PD
705 as amended by EO 277 which reads The court shall further the order of
confiscation in favor of the Government as well as the machinery, equipment
which are illegally used
W/N the petition should be granted in light of Sec. 68 of P.D. 705.
No. The above-quoted provision should be read together with Sec. 68a.
Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the e
vil to
be suppressed, and they should be given such construction as will advance the
object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended.
9a, 36a
Pritchard v. Republic
Case No. 245
G.R. No. L-1715 (July 17, 1948)
Chapter 4.16, Footnote No.114, page 156
The Solicitor General opposed the claim of the Petitioner for exemption from
filing a declaration of intention on the ground that under the requirement for
exemption, it is imperative that Petitioner s children should be enrolled during t
entire period of residence, and that the Petitioner having failed to enroll all
of his
children in school, he failed to comply with one of the conditions required to e
him to exemption from filing a declaration of intention.
W/N the Petitioner should be allowed to avail of the exemption by invoking
the aforementioned provision.
The provision of law invoked by appellant must be interpreted in the sense
that the enrollment required by law must be made at any time during the entire
period of the residence of the applicant. The drafters of the law could not have
intended to create an absurd or impossible situation.
11a, 19a
Salvacion v. Central Bank of the Philippines
Case No. 245
G.R. No. 94723 (August, 21, 1997)
Chapter 4.16, Footnote No.114, page 156
An American tourist raped 12 year old girl. In order to pay for moral damages,
the Deputy Sheriff of Makati sent a notice of garnishment to China Bank in order
draw from the American s bank account to pay the fees. China Bank responded by
invoking Sec. 113 of Circular 960 of Central Bank, which states that foreign curr
deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment or any other process of an
court. Respondent Bank states that though the law is harsh, such is the law and
firm on the policy.
W/N Section 13 of Central Bank Circular 960 and Section 8 of RA 6427, as
amended by PD 1246 should be made applicable to a foreigner.
Central Bank contends that the reason for the exemption is to encourage the
deposit of foreign currency. RA 6424 was enacted during a period of economic cri
where foreign investments were minimal. As, some time has already passed since t
crisis that enacted RA 6424, the economy has now somewhat recovered from the
financial drought.
Hence, the Court ruled that it is unthinkable that the guilty would be acquitted
at the
expense of the innocent, stating that if Circular 960 is to be followed, justice
would be
undermined, stating Art. 10 of the Civil Code, in case of doubt as to the interp
or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right an
justice to prevail.
2, 14, 39
Demafiles v. Comelec
Case No. 91
G.R. No. L-28396 (December 29, 1967)
Chapter 4.18, Footnote 126, page 159
Respondent Galido won over Petitioner due to the Provincial Board voting to
reject returns. Petitioner challenged the right of 2 board members to sit, consi
that they were reelectionists. Respondent Commission ruled in favor of Petitione
Galido then asked for reconsideration, stating that the 2 board members in quest
were disqualified only when the board was acting as a provincial but not as
municipal. In light of this, Respondent Commission reversed its previous decisio
1. W/N this case is moot and the board had the authority to reject the returns f
Precinct 7.
2. W/N the board members who were candidates for reelection were disqualified
from sitting in the board in its capacity as a municipal board of canvassers.
3. W/N Respondent Commission can order the board of canvassers to count a return
RA 4970 reads the first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the municipality
of Sebaste shall be elected in the next general elections for local officials an
d shall
have qualified. The Supreme Court ruled that and shall have qualified is devoid of
meaning. The term of office of municipals shall begin in the 1st day of January
following their election, despite the fact that Sebaste was a newly created
No, a canvassing board may not reject any returns due to whatever cause.
However, since there is a possibility of fraud, the canvass made and proclamatio
should be annulled. The law states any member of a provincial board or of
municipal council who is a candidate for office in any election, shall be incomp
to act on the said body. Since Respondent Commission has the power to annul and
illegal canvass and proclamation, there is no reason as to why it cannot order
canvassing bodies to count all returns which are otherwise regular.
15, 35, 43, 26

National Housing Corporation v. Juco

Case No. 86
G.R. No. L-64313 (January 17, 1985)
For being declared guilty of stealing scrap iron owned by Petitioner, Private
Respondent was terminated. He filed a complaint with Respondent Court and
Petitioner replied stating that the Respondent Court is without jurisdiction as
Petitioner Corporation is a government owned corporation and the grounds for
dismissal were for valid reasons. Respondent Court however, despite past decisio
decided in favor of the Private Respondent.
W/N employees of Petitioner are covered by the Labor Code or by the laws
and regulations governing the civil service.
Petitioner is government owned as it never had any private stockholders. The
1935 constitution s section 1 article 12 states that A civil service embracing all
branches and subdivisions of the government shall be provided by law. While the
amendments in section 1 article 12b of the 1973 constitution states that The civi
service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision and instrumentality of the
government, including every government owned or controlled corporation.
Clearly, the inclusion of government owned or controlled corporation carries
out a message that the coverage is broad and all-embracing. Furthermore, P.D. 80
Sec. 56 implements the said provision. In addition to this, the Labor Code state
s that
the mentioned corporations shall be governed by the Civil Service Law.
6, 7, 24, 26, 38b
People v. Mejia
Case No. 111
G.R. Nos. 118940-41 and G.R. No. 119407 (July 7, 1997)
Sec. 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act reads:

Sec. 14. Any person who is found guilty of carnapping shall, irrespective of
the value of the motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not
less than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years,
when the carnapping is committed by means of violence or in intimidation of
persons or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death,
when the owner, driver, or occupant is killed or raped in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.
W/N the phrase is killed covers both homicide and murder.
If the crime was frustrated murder, would the penalty be life imprisonment or
reclusion perpetua to death?
W/N frustrated homicide would be treated as a separate offense.
The words is killed make no distinction between homicide and murder.
Whether it is one or the other which is committed in the course of carnapping or
the occasion thereof makes no difference in so far as the penalty is concerned. T
killing, whether it is homicide or murder, cannot be treated as a separate offen
se and
only serves to qualify the carnapping.
The phrase is killed refers only to consummated murder, and not frustrated
Frustrated homicide (or murder) is not treated as a separate offense as it is
deemed to fall under the clause of Sec. 14 by means of violence or in intimidatio
n of
persons .
6c, 7a, 26, 38a, 43, 48

City of Manila v. Judge Gomez and Esso Philippines

Case No. 23
G. R. No. L-37251 (August 31, 1981)
The Revised Charter of Manila took effect on June 18, 1949. It fixes the annual
realty tax at one and one-half percent. The Special Education Fund Law (RA 5447)
which took effect on Jan. 1, 1969, imposed an annual additional one percent tax
and fixes the total realty tax at three percent. With the three percent maximum
set by RA 5447, the municipal board of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7125,
effective beginning the third quarter of 1972, imposing an additional one-half
percent realty tax. Respondent Corporation paid the tax, but protested the
Ordinance; the Court of First Instance of Manila ruled that the tax ordinance is
as it is not authorized by the city charter or by any law, and that the city of
should reimburse Respondent Corporation said tax.
W/N the tax ordinance is valid.
The Court holds that the doctrine of implications in Statutory Construction
sustains the City of Manila s contention that the additional one-half percent real
ty tax
is sanctioned by the provision of the Special Education Fund Law that the total r
property tax shall not exceed a maximum of three per centum . While the 1949
Revised Charter of Manila fixed the realty tax at one and one-half percent, the
Special Education Fund Law fixed three percent as the maximum real property tax.
The obvious implication is that an additional one-half percent tax could be impo
by municipal corporations. Inferentially, that law fixed at two percent the real
ty tax
that would accrue to the city or municipality. The fact that the 1974 Real Prope
Tax Code specially fixes the real property tax at two percent confirms the prior
intention of the lawmaker to impose two percent as the realty tax proper. That w
also the avowed intent of the questioned ordinance.
2a, 20a, 38b, 43, 49
Chua v. Civil Service Commission
Case No. 60
G.R. No. 88979 (February 7, 1992)
Chapter IV, Page 164, Footnote No.146
RA 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation as
well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Section 2 covers those
are qualified:

Sec. 2. Coverage. This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees
of the National Government. The benefits authorized under this Act shall
apply to all regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees, regardless
of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of
government service as of the date of separation
Petitioner Lydia Chua, believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits
the program, filed an application on January 30, 1989 with Respondent
Administration, which, however, denied the same. Recourse by the petitioner to
Respondent Commission yielded the same result.
W/N Petitioner s status as a co-terminus employee is excluded from the
benefits of RA 6683 (Early Retirement Law).
The petition is granted. The Early Retirement Law would violate the equal
protection clause of the constitution if the Supreme Court were to sustain
Respondent s submission that the benefits of said law are to be denied a class of
government employees who are similarly situated as those covered by the said law
The court applied the doctrine of necessary implication in deciding this case.
2a, 11e, 12a, 20a, 20b, 37

Solid Homes Inc. v. Teresita Payawal

Case No. 280
G.R. No. 84811 (Aug. 29, 1989)
Chapter IV, Page 169, Footnote No.164
The Court of Appeals sustained that the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
has jurisdiction over the case filed by the Respondent against Petitioner for fa
ilure to
deliver a land title after payment of the agreed amount. Petitioner contends tha
t the
case should have been heard by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board and
not the RTC.
1. W/N the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.
2. W/N the applicable law is the general law (BP 129) or the special law (PD 134
The RTC has no jurisdiction over the case since the respondent s argument
relies on the general statute where in fact it is the special statute that shoul
d prevail.
1, 20c, 50
Richard Gordon v. Regino Veridiano II
Case No. 116
G.R. No. L-55230 (Nov. 8, 1988)
Chapter IV, Page 170, Footnote No.171
Respondent Yambao owns a San Sebastian Drugstore and an Olongapo City
Drugstore. A test buy operation at San Sebastian Drugstore, wherein agents were
sold 200 tablets of Valium without a doctor s prescription, gave rise to the closu
ordered by the FDA. Before such order was promulgated, the Mayor revoked the
Mayor s Permits issued to San Sebastian Drugstore and subsequently, a signboard
was posted by the Vice-Mayor at the drugstore announcing its permanent closure.
On May 7, 1980, FDA approved Respondent s request to exchange the locations of
the two drugstores (which were 5m apart and in the same building). Upon
knowledge of this, Petitioner then revoked the Mayor s Permit issued to Olongapo
City Drugstore.
The conflict between the FDA s and the mayor s power to grant and revoke
licenses for the operation of drugstores.
The FDA had the authority to order the closure of San Sebastian Drugstore, the
Mayor however did not. In the case of Olongapo City Drugstore however, the
authority rested on the Mayor (local jurisdiction).
20c, 38b

Eufronio Llanto v. Mohamad Ali Dimaporo

Case No. 155
G.R. No. L-21905 (Mar, 31, 1966)
Chapter IV, Page 171, Footnote No.178
The Provincial Board of Lanao del Norte reverted the 60- 61 salary
appropriation for the position of Assistant Provincial Assessor to the general f
und. The
position, then held by the Petitioner, was abolished. Petitioner came to the cou
rt on
mandamus, wherein the Respondent s motion to dismiss was granted hence the
current action.
1. Was the dismissal order issued without hearing on the motion to dismiss?
2. Is it void?
There is no need for a hearing and no, it is not void. The motion to dismiss is
grounded on lack of cause of action, which can be determined by reference to the
facts in the averred pleading. The question raised is purely one of law. The leg
al issue
was fully discussed in the motion and opposition thereto. Oral arguments are the
reduced to unnecessary ceremonies. Further, petitioner contends that the stamp o
approval of the Secretary of Finance is needed in abolishing his position. Such
was, however, done away with by the Local Autonomy Act (Sec. 3a of RA2264).
6c, 20a, 32, 37, 49
People v. Concepcion
Case No. 205
G.R. No. 19190 (November 29, 1922)
Chapter IV, Page 176, Footnote No.202
Defendant authorized an extension of credit in favor of Puno Y Concepcion,
S. en C, a co-partnership. Defendant s wife was a director of this co-partnership.
Defendant was found guilty of violating Sec. 35 of Act No. 2747 which says that T
National Bank shall not, directly or indirectly, grant loans to any of the membe
rs of the
Board of Directors of the bank nor to agents of the branch banks. This Section wa
s in
effect in 1919 but was repealed in Act No. 2938 approved on January 30, 1921.
W/N Defendant can be convicted of violating Sections of Act No. 2747, which
were repealed by Act No. 2938.
In the interpretation and construction, the primary rule is to ascertain and giv
effect to the intention of the Legislature. Section 49 in relation to Sec. 25 of
Act No.
2747 provides a punishment for any person who shall violate any provisions of th
e Act.
Defendant contends that the repeal of these Sections by Act No. 2938 has served
take away basis for criminal prosecution. The Court holds that where an act of t
Legislature which penalizes an offense repeals a former act which penalized the
same offense, such repeal does not have the effect of thereafter depriving the
Courts of jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence offenders charged with viola
tions of
the old law.
6a, 6b, 9a, 37, 38b

Tantuico, Jr. v. Domingo

Case No. 285
G. R. No. 96422 (February 28, 1994)
Chapter IV, Page 176, Footnote No.205
The petition questions the withholding of one-half of Petitioner s retirement
benefits. Petitioner was Chairman of the COA from 1976 to 1986. On December 1985
he applied for and obtained clearance, which covered the period from 1976 to
1985, from all money, property, and other accountabilities in preparation for hi
retirement. After the EDSA Revolution, he submitted his resignation and sought a
second clearance for the period from January 1, 1986 to March 9, 1986. Responden
who took over as Chairman, created an inventory/audit of all equipment acquired
during the tenure of his 2 predecessors. After the committee recommended
Petitioner s clearance from accountability and after another special audit,
Respondent approved Petitioner s application for retirement but added that ½ of the
money value of benefits due would be withheld subject to the findings of the aud
W/N Respondent can authorize that half of Petitioner s retirement benefits
may be withheld.
No. Under Section 4 of RA 1568 providing for life pension to the Auditor
General and members of COMELEC, the benefits granted shall not be subject to
garnishment, levy or execution. Likewise, under Section 33 of P.D. 1146 (Revised
Government Service Insurance Act), the benefits granted shall not be subject,
among others, to attachment, garnishment, levy or other processes. Withholding
Petitioner s benefits is not allowed in this case. Well-settled is the rule that r
laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree because the intention is
to provide
for the retiree s well-being.
9a, 9b, 9d, 11f, 11g, 11h, 11i, 38b, 42a
Alpha Investigation and Security Agency, Inc. v. NLRC
Case No. 12
G.R. No. 111722 (May 27, 1997)
Chapter V, Page 177, Footnote No.2
Petitioner provides security services. One of its clients is Don Mariano Marcos
State University (DMMSU). Security guards working in DMMSU filed before the Regi
Office of the DOLE a complaint against Petitioner for noncompliance with the cur
minimum wage order. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision holding Petitioner and
DMMSU solidarily liable for the salary differential owed to the security guards.
Petitioner alleges that payment of the wage increase should be borne by DMMSU.
W/N Petitioner may be held jointly and severally liable with DMMSU for nonpaymen
of minimum wage.
Yes, Petitioner is jointly and severally liable with DMMSU for the payment of
wage increases. Section 6 of RA 6727 (Wage Rationalization Act) provides that in
case of wage increases resulting in a salary differential, the liability of the
and contractor shall be joint and several. The same liability attaches under Art
106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code. Petitioner contends that the matter involved
the case at bar hinges on wage differentials and wage increases, as prescribed i
Section 6 of RA 6727, and not wages in general as provided by the Labor Code. Th
interpretation is not acceptable. It is a cardinal rule in statutory constructio
n that in
interpreting the meaning and scope of a term used, a careful review of the whole
law, as well as the intendment of the law, must be made. Legislative intent must
ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole and not of an isolate
part or a particular provision alone.
9c, 25a, 36a, 36c, 38b

Alfon v. Republic
Case No. 6
G.R. No. L-51201 (May 29, 1980)
Petitioner files a petition to have her named changed from Maria Estrella
Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella Alfon.
The reasons she gave on why she was petitioning to have her name changed are the
She has been using the name Estrella Alfon from infancy.
She has been enrolled from Grade school to College in the same name.
All acquaintances know her as Estrella Alfon.
She exercised her right to suffrage under the same name.
W/N legitimate and legitimated children are required to use the
surname of their father.
No. The word "principally" as used in Article 364 is not equivalent to
"exclusively" so that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated
should choose to use the surname of its mother to which he or she is equally ent
Petitioner is therefore allowed to change her name from Maria Estrella Veronica
Primitiva Alfon Duterte to Estrella Alfon
1, 17, 42a
Espino v. Cleofe
Case No. 102
G.R. No. L-33410 (July 13, 1973)
Chapter V, Page 182, Footnote No.25
Petitioners appeal a decision involving a petition for declaratory relief filed
18 Respondents for a judicial declaration of their rights under RA 1862 as amend
by RA 4902 in the matter of conversion lump sum gratuity to annual retirement
W/N the provision applies to military personnel who retire even after its June
17, 1967.
No. Looking at the legislative intent through the explanatory note the persons
referred to are those who had retired and received the gratuity in lump sum afte
June 22, 1957 but prior to the approval of the act on June 17, 1967.
A contrary interpretation which would allow or authorize retired military
personnel present or future to convert lump sum gratuity to annual pension would
virtually abolish the essential distinction between the two types of retirement
and render the option under the law meaningless and nugatory.
6c, 7a, 9a, 25a
Republic Flour Mills, Inc v. Commissioner of Customs
Case No: 258
G. R. No. L-28463 (May 31, 1971)
Chapter V, Page 184, Footnote No.39
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals in whi
they found in Sec. 2802 of the Tariff and Customs Code.
Petitioner was assessed wharfage dues for the exportation of bran (ipa) and
pollard (darak) under Sec. 2802 of the Tariff and Customs Code which states:
There shall be levied collected and paid on products of the
Philippines exported from the Philippines, a charge of 2 pesos per
gross metric ton as a fee for wharfage
W/N the words products of the Philippines excludes bran and pollard on the
ground that they are from wheat grain, which is imported into the Philippines.
No. Even without undue scrutiny it does appear quite obvious that as long as
the goods are produced in the country, they fall within the terms of the above
section. The law is clear; it must be obeyed. The Term product of the Philippines
should be taken in its usual signification to mean any product produced in the
country; hence, bran(ipa) and pollard(darak) produced from wheat imported into
the country are products of the Philippines.
6c, 6d, 7a, 24a, 24b
Asiatic Petroleum Co. v. Collector of Internal Revenue
Case No. 10
G.R. No. 12687 (August 27, 1918)
Chapter V, Page 187, Footnote No.47
The Defendant, under threat of penalty, compelled the Plaintiff to pay the
Internal Revenue Tax provided for under Sec. 17 of Act No. 2432 upon all such oi
which the plaintiff had on hand on the 1st day of January, 1915. The tax was pai
under protest. The Plaintiff contends that the tax collected was illegal. Sec. 1
7 Par 72a
of Act No. 2432 provides that no tax (imposed by this law) shall be collected on
articles which, before the taking effect of this Act, shall have been disposed o
f to
consumers or persons other than manufacturers or wholesale dealers. Said Act took
effect upon the 1st day of January, 1915.
W/N a dealer is required to pay the Internal Revenue Tax, provided for under
Sec. 17 Par 72a of Act No. 2432, upon mineral oils, composed of kerosene and
gasoline which had been sold, but not delivered, prior to the 1st day of January
No. The Legislature evidently intended, by said phrase, to mean that
merchandise dispose of had been sold. The Legislature, by Act No. 2445, fully
recognized that the phrase disposed of meant nothing more or less than a
contract whereby the vendor was bound to furnish an article, because in said Act
provided that the purchaser, and not the vendor, was subject to pay such tax in
absence of stipulations to the contrary. The phrase disposed of as used in Sec. 17
Act No. 2432, should be given its commercial sense and not a technical
3, 6c, 25a, 43

Wil Wilhemsen, Inc v. Baluyut

Case No. 173
G.R. Nos. L-27350-51 (May 11, 1978)
Empty cargo vans were used by Plaintiffs to facilitate the carriage and sale
storage of merchandise loaded on their vessels for delivery from foreign ports o
Manila among others. After the merchandise had arrived at the port and the cargo
vans had been emptied of their contents, they were left along Muelle de San
Francisco Stalag. The Defendant applied to the Surveyor of Port for the transfer
these empty sea vans. The request was based on the Memorandum Order No. 19
and the Memorandum Order dated April 20, 1964. The trial court held that the
transfer of Appellants empty cargo vans to the warehouse of Appellee was done by
authority of Customs Memorandum of April 20, 1964 and Customs Administrative
Order No. 22-64, and that the said objects were lawfully detained by Appellee in
warehouse pending the payment of storage charges.
W/N the decision of the trial court is legally valid.
Yes. As plainly worded in the administrative order, it becomes necessary for all
empty sea vans to be removed from the pier premises by their owners or shipping
agents within ten days after the vans have been completely emptied of all their
contents. This is in order to make available at all times adequate space in all
ports for
the loading and unloading of cargoes. In addition, the administrative order has
requirement similar to that found in Memorandum Order No. 130-63 whereby the
owners of the impounded vans should be notified in writing. The two customs
regulations under consideration are in pari materia so far as both operate under
flexible cargo system.
9a, 25a, 32, 35, 38a, 50
Calder & Co v. The United States
Case No. 44
G.R. No. 2839 (August 15, 1907)
Chapter V, Page 187, Footnote No.46
The following were imported into the Philippines "One steam turbine,
condensing machinery, hot well and pumps, complete with parts and accessories"
the steam turbine was classified under Par 257b as other machinery and detached
parts not otherwise provided for". The trial court reversed the classification m
ade by
customs authorities and classified it under Par 250 as "Dynamos, generators, exc
and all other machinery for the generation of power."
W/N the machinery in question should be classified under Par 257b or Par 250.
A turbine engine and generator, although intended for use as a power-
generating device, does not constitute a complete power generation machine.
Component parts must still be added for that purpose to be achieved it should be
classified as "other machinery" under Par 257b.
6b, 9c, 25a, 43

Manila Herald Publishing Co v. Ramos

Case No. 163
G. R. No. L-4268 (January 18, 1951)
Chapter V, Page 188, Footnote No.51
Respondent filed a libel suit, docketed as Civil Case No. 11531, against
Aproniano G. Borres, Pedro Padilla and Loreto Pastor, editor, managing editor an
reporter, respectively, of the Daily Record, a daily newspaper, asking damages
aggregating P90,000. With the filing of this suit, the Plaintiff secured a writ
preliminary attachment upon putting up a P50,000 bond. The Sheriff of the City o
Manila levied an attachment upon certain office and printing equipment found in
the premises of the Daily Record. Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc. and Printer
s, Inc.
commenced a joint suit against the sheriff, Respondent Quirino and Respondent
Corporation, in which the former sought (1) to enjoin the defendants from
proceeding with the attachment of the properties above mentioned and (2) P45,000
damages. This suit was docketed as Civil Case No. 12263. Respondent Judge
declared that the suit, in case No. 12263, was "unnecessary, superfluous and ill
and so dismissed the same. He held that what Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc.,
Printers, Inc., should do was intervene in Case No. 11531.
W/N Respondent Judge has authority to dismiss Case No. 12263 at the stage
when it was thrown out of court.
Yes, the right to intervene, unlike the right to bring a new action, is not
absolute but left to the sound discretion of the court to allow.
9a, 25a, 30, 36a, 36b
Malanyaon v. Lising et. al
Case No. 160
GR No. L-56028 (July 30,1981)
Chapter V, Page 188, Footnote No.52
A Municipal Mayor was charged with violation of RA 3019 (Anti Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act). He was suspended from office but he died during his
incumbency, and while the case was pending. The case was dismissed due to his
death. Petitioner sought payment of his salary during his period of suspension
pursuant to Sec 13 of RA 3019 which provides, Should he be convicted by final
judgment he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if
he is
acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefit
s w/c
he failed to receive during suspension .
W/N the dismissal of the case due to death of the accused constitutes
No. It is obvious that when the statute speaks of the suspended officer being
"acquitted" it means that after due hearing and consideration of the evidence
against him the court found that his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable
doubt. Dismissal of the case is not equal to acquittal of the accused. In People
Salico (84 Phil. 722), " Acquittal is always based on the merits but dismissal d
oes not
decide the case on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty.
6c, 7a, 25a

Rura v. Lopena
Case No. 139
G. R. No. L-69810-14 (June 19, 1985)
Chapter 5, Page 189, Footnote No.53
Petitioner was accused, tried and convicted of five (5) counts of estafa
committed on different dates. The counts were consolidated and tried jointly. On
ly a
single decision was rendered. The Petitioner then applied for probation but was
denied by the fiscal on the ground that he had been previously convicted by fina
judgment of an offense. The fiscal invoked Sec. 9 of the Probation Law, which
disqualifies persons who have previously been convicted by final judgment from
applying for probation. The trial court denied his application on the belief tha
t since
the crimes were committed on different dates, he was guilty on each of those dat
Petitioner however contends that since there is only one decision, he has not ye
been previously convicted.
How should the word previously be construed?
The word previously refers to the date of the conviction and not to the
dates of the crimes involved. Although he was guilty of five counts of estafa, t
were tried jointly and only one decision was handed down. Hence, when Petitioner
applied for Probation he had not yet had a final judgment of conviction on his
record. He is eligible for probation under such circumstances.
6c, 7a, 48
Krivenko v. Register of Deeds
Case No. 139
G.R. No. L-360 (November 15, 1947)
Chapter 5, Page 190, Footnote No.60
Petitioner, an alien, bought a residential lot but its registration was interrup
by the war. In 1945, he sought to accomplish the registration but was denied by
register of deeds of Manila on the ground that he cannot acquire land in this
jurisdiction. Petitioner brought the case to the Court of First Instance of Mani
la which
ruled in favor of sustaining the refusal of the register of deeds.
W/N residential land falls under the phrase agricultural lands as stated in Article
XIII of the 1935 Constitution.
Under the Constitution, aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural
lands, which includes residential lands. It may safely be presumed that what the
members of the Constitutional Convention had in mind when they drafted the
Constitution was this well-known classification and its technical meaning then
prevailing. Soon after, the National Assembly revised the Public Land Law and pa
C.A. No. 141 which permits the sale of residential lots to Filipino citizens or
corporations controlled by such citizens. Such revision is equivalent to a decla
that residential lots are considered as agricultural lands, for under the Consti
only agricultural lands may be alienated. In addition, the interpretation given
by the
Secretary of Justice (1939) also supports the claim that residential land is part
public agricultural lands .
It is clear that the three branches of the Government have always maintained tha
residential lots are included in agricultural lands . If the term "private agricultur
lands" is to be construed as not including lands not strictly agricultural, the
would not be in line with the conservative spirit of the Constitution.
1, 2a, 5a, 9a, 25a, 30a, b

Chang Yung Fa, et al. v. Gianzon, etc. and De la Cruz, etc.

Case No. 19
G.R. No. L-7785 (November 25, 1955)
Petitioners were admitted to the Philippines on pre-arranged employment as
immigrants under C.A. No. 613 with the express condition that their stay shall b
limited to two years. An amendatory law was then passed which changes the
classification of pre-arranged employees from immigrants to non-immigrants.
Petitioners contend that having been classified as non-quota immigrants , they
should have been admitted for permanent residence in this country because the
word immigrant is defined to be a person who comes into a country for a
permanent residence.
W/N the word immigrant only refers to a person who comes into a country
for a permanent residence.
The only definition given by our law to the term "immigrant" is: "any alien
departing from any place outside the Philippines destined for the Philippines, o
than a nonimmigrant." The law gives no definition to the term "nonimmigrant" fro
which we may imply that the term "immigrant" is merely intended to include any a
coming to this country for permanent residence as now contended by appellants. A
review of the whole law would disclose no such intention which denotes that the
purpose of the law is to give broad power to the Commissioner of Immigration on
matters pertaining to the admission of immigrants into the Philippines.
6b, 9a, 36b
Garcia v. COMELEC
Case No. 109
G.R. No. 111511 (October 5, 1993)
Chapter V, Footnote No.67, Page No. 192
In its Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan ng
Morong, Bataan agreed to the inclusion of the municipality of Morong as part of
Subic Special Economic Zone in accord with Republic Act No. 7227. Respondent
Commission issued two resolutions denying the petition for initiative and refere
on the ground that its subject is merely a resolution and not an ordinance. It
contends through the Office of the Solicitor General that under the Local
Government Code of 1991, a resolution cannot be the subject of a local initiativ
The same is being asserted by the respondent Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong.
W/N a local resolution of a municipal council can be the subject of an
initiative and referendum.
The petition to review and set aside the issued COMELEC resolutions is
granted because resolutions are appropriate subjects for initiative and referend
(Sec. 32 of Art. VI of the Constitution). Also, RA 6735, the law providing for a
system on
initiative and referendum, includes resolutions as among the subjects of initiat
Although the Local Government Code does not include the word resolution in its
definition, the court holds that the definition does not limit the coverage of l
initiatives to ordinances alone. Resolutions are still proper subjects of an ini
according to the Constitution and RA 6735.
6a, 9c, 11a, 50

Motoomull v. dela Paz

Case No. 180
G.R. No. L-45302 (July 24, 1990)
Chapter V, Footnote No.73, Page No. 195
The Petitioners and the Respondents were the initial directors of the Sarkara
Trading Corporation. The Corporation issued a resolution authorizing the issuanc
e of
unissued stocks on a one is to one basis to its stockholders. The resolution was
amended authorizing the issuance of unissued shares of stock on a two is to one
to its stockholders payable on Aug. 31, 1974. Petitioner sought issuance of a
preliminary injunction by the Court of Appeals to stop the enforcement of the SE
decision pending resolution of the appeal. The Court however held that it had no
jurisdiction according to RA 5434 which reads: Appeal shall not stay the award,
ruling, decision or judgment unless the officer or body rendering the same or th
court, on motion, after hearing, and on such terms as it may deem just, should
provide otherwise. The propriety of a stay granted by the officer or body render
the award, order, ruling, decision or judgment may be raised only by motion in t
main case.
1. W/N the word court refers to a trial court and not the Court of Appeals
2. W/N the Court of Appeals can grant a stay in the execution of the decision.
Yes, the word court refers to the trial court. The law unequivocally stated its
declared objection that appeal shall not stay the appealed decision, award, orde
The exception is given where the officer or body rendering the same, or the cour
t on
motion, after hearing should provide otherwise. The law provides further that th
propriety of a stay granted by the officer or body rendering the award, order,
decision or ruling may be raised only by motion in the main case. More important
where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptib
le of
various meanings, its obscurity or doubt may be reviewed by reference to associa
words. Accordingly, an interpretation which leads to patent inconsistency must b
rejected as not in accordance with the legislative intent.
9a, 12a, 36a
People v. Nazario
Case No. 218
G.R. No. L-44143 (August 31, 1988)
Chapter V, Footnote No.81, Page No. 197
Accused was charged with violating a municipal ordinance requiring him to
pay municipal taxes worth P362.52 as a fishpond operator in spite of repeated
demands. Sec. 1 Ordinance No. 4 Series of 1995 provides: Any owner or manager of
fishponds in places within the territorial limits of Pagbilao, Quezon, shall pay
municipal tax in the amount of P3.00 per hectare of fishpond on part thereof per
annum. He admits to the non-payment of the taxes but contends that the
ordinance is unconstitutional, or assuming its constitutionality that it does no
t apply to
him as he is a lessee not an owner or manager.
1. W/N the ordinance is null and void because it is ambiguous and uncertain.
2. W/N the ordinance applies to Accused.
No, the ordinance is constitutional. In no way may the ordinance at bar be said
to be tainted with vagueness. It is unmistakable from the above provision that t
Accused falls within the coverage. As the actual operator of the fishponds, he c
within the term manager . While it appears that the National Government is the
owner of the fishpond, the Government never shared in the profits they generated
. It
is therefore, logical that Accused alone shoulders the burden of the taxes under
ordinance. And obviously, the word owner cannot be construed to include the
Government because of the ancient principle that the government is immune from
2a, 6c, 37

People v. Evangelista
Case No. 106
G.R. No. 84332-33 (May 8, 1996)
Private Respondent was charged and convicted of frustrated homicide.
Private Respondent filed a petition for probation. However, Chief Probation and
Parole Officer recommended denial of Private respondent s application for
probation on the ground that by appealing the sentence of the trial, he had alre
waived his right to make his application for probation. The RTC set aside the
Probation Officer s recommendation and granted Private Respondent s application
on April 23, 1993.
W/N the Respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion by
granting private respondent s application for probation.
Yes. Private Respondent filed his application for probation on December 28,
1992, after PD 1990 had taken effect. It is thus covered by the prohibition that
application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has
perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction and that the filing of the
application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal. Having appealed from
the judgment of the trial court and applied for probation only after the Court o
Appeals had affirmed his conviction, Private Respondent was clearly precluded fr
the benefits of probation.
6, 26, 49
Banco de Oro Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Equitable Banking Corporation
Case No. 12
G.R. No. 74917 (January 20, 1988)
Respondent Bank filed a case against Petitioner Bank for reimbursement of
P45,982.23 as a consequence of six crossed Manager s checks which turned out to
have forged and/or unauthorized endorsements appearing at the back of each
check. Philippine Clearing House Corp. (PCHC) ordered Petitioner Bank to pay the
said amount. Petitioner Bank appealed saying that PCHC had no jurisdiction
because the checks involved were non-negotiable checks.
W/N PCHC had jurisdiction over checks which are non-negotiable.
Yes. As provided in the articles of incorporation of PCHC, its operation extends
to clearing checks and other clearing items. Clearly, the term checks refer to
checks in general use in commercial and business activities, including nonnegoti
checks. No doubt non-negotiable checks are within the ambit of PCHC s
There should be no distinction in the application of a statute where none is
indicated for courts are not authorized to distinguish where the law makes no
distinction. They should instead administer the law not as they think it ought t
o be but
as they find it and without regard to consequences.
24a, 24b, 25a, 25b, 26

Robles v. Zambales Chromite Mining Co., et. al.

Case No. 261
G.R. No. L-12560 (September 30, 1958)
Chapter V, Page 199, Footnote No.90
Petitioner and Respondent Company entered into a contract by virtue of
which the latter delivered the possession of certain mining properties over whic
h it
had control to Petitioner who was to extract, mine and sell ores from said prope
upon payment of certain royalties. Upon violation of the terms of agreement, the
company filed a complaint for unlawful detainer. Petitioner filed a motion to di
the complaint on the ground that the Justice of Peace was without jurisdiction i
taking cognizance of the case for unlawful detainer involving mineral land.
W/N Sec. 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court includes any kind of land, including
mineral lands.
Yes. Any land spoken of in this provision obviously includes all kinds of land,
whether agricultural, residential or mineral. It is a well known maxim in statut
construction that where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish.

24a, 26
Velasco v. Lopez
Case No. 308
G.R. No. 905 (February 12, 1903)
Santiago Velasco died in Namacpacan, La Union on December 4, 1895,
leaving a last will and testament. The Plaintiff seeks to declare such will void
several grounds, most importantly that the hour is not stated.
W/N the will of Santiago Velasco is void because the hour of its execution is
not stated.
Yes. Book III, Title II, Chapter I, Article 695 and 687 of the civil Code explic
states that said wills without necessary formalities will be void:
The testator shall express his last will to the notary and to the witnesses. Afte
r the
testament has been drafted in accordance with the same, stating the place, year,
month, day and hour of its execution its shall be read aloud, (art 695)
Any will, in the execution of which the formalities respectively established in
this chapter have not been observed, shall be void. (art 687)
The law explicitly defines what shall consist in open wills (art 695) and what t
sanctions shall be if such formalities aren t met. (art 687)
It was stated that if the decision would be in favor of the Defendant
(overlooking the absence of the hour) the Court may disregard one formality afte
another until eventually they had to repeal the entire system established by the
6d, 7a

Colgate-Palmolive Phil, Inc v. Gimenez

Case No. 67
G.R. No. L-14787 (January 28, 1961)
Chapter V, Page 199, Footnote No.95
Petitioner Corporation engages in manufacturing toilet preparations and
household remedies. Importation of materials including stabilizers and flavors is
among those Petitioner imports. For every importation, Petitioner pays the Centr
Bank of the Philippines 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used for
payment of the cost, transportation and other charges pursuant to RA 601, the
Exchange Tax Law. Under such law, it was also provided that:
Foreign exchanged used for the payment of cost, transportation and/or other
charges incident to the importation into the Philippines of stabilizer and flavo
shall be refunded to any importer making application therefore.
The petitioner therefore seeks a refund of the 17% special excise tax
W/N the imports of dental cream stabilizers and flavors are subject to a 17%
transportation tax exemption under the Exchange Tax Law.
No. The refusal to deny refund was based on the following argument:
All the items enumerated for the tax exemption fall under one specific class, na
food products, books supplies/ materials and medical supplies. The stabilizers an
flavors the petitions refer to are items which must fall under the category of fo
products. Because such items will be used for toothpaste, it is not a food produ
ct and
therefore not subject to exemption
Petitioner s arguments effected the grant of the refund:
RA 601 does not categorize the exceptions as stated above. Though stabilizers and
flavors are preceded by items that might fall under food products, the following
which were included are hardly such: fertilizer, poultry feed, vitamin concentra
cattle, and industrial starch.
Therefore, the law must be seen in its entire context, not the parts and
categorizations posited by the respondent.
26, 29, 36
Oliva v. Lamadrid
Case No. 191
G.R. No. L-23196 (October 31, 1969)
Chapter V, Page 200, Footnote No.96
Plaintiff was the owner of a parcel of land which he mortgaged as security for
the payment of a loan. Having defaulted in the payment of the loan, the property
was foreclosed and sold to Respondent. However, under RA 720, the land could be
redeemed two (2) years after the sale, Feb. 4 1963. No redemption was made withi
that time. On May 31 1963, Plaintiff offered to repurchase, claiming that under
No. 141, he was entitled to repurchase the land, not two (2), but five (5) years
the title was sold because he was a holder of a free patent and torrens title.
W/N the period of redemption is governed by Sec. 119 of C.A. No. 141 of Sec.
5 of RA 720.
No. Petitioner, as a former owner of land with a homestead patent and a
torrens title, is not included in those enumerated in RA 601 and therefore not s
to the two (2) year allotment for redemption.
In July 30, 1951, the Court had already decided that Sec. 119 of C.A. No. 141
is applicable to foreclosure sales of lands covered by a homestead or a free pat
therefore, the plaintiff may use its provision of five (5) years.
Where the general law is the Commonwealth Act and the specific law is the
Republic Act, they should be unified, and should abide by the conditions of the
1, 30a, 38a, 39a, 50, b, b2

Escosura v. San Miguel Brewery, Inc.

Case No. 100
G.R. No. L-16696 & L-16702 (January 31, 1962)
Chapter V, Page 200, Footnote No.97
Petitioners are employees of San Respondent Corporation who at various
times during employment, fell ill. They were given sick leave pay pursuant to it
Health, Welfare and Retirement Plan. Despite receipt of the sick leave pay from
Respondent Corporation, the employees claimed for sickness benefit allowances
under the Social Security Act contending that their receipt of sick leave pay of
than the full wage does not preclude them from claiming for the allowances
provided in the law. Respondent Corporation countered that having already
received sick leave pay, they cannot claim benefits under the Social Security Ac
t as
these are exclusive to those not receiving any leave privileges at all from the
W/N Petitioners were entitled to additional sickness benefit allowance under
the Social Security Act.
To uphold the theory that as long as the employee receives any amount as
sick leave pay by a private benefit plan, the employee cannot avail of the privi
under the Social Security Act, would be to enable the employer to defeat the
purpose of the law. The Social Security Act, having been enacted for the welfare
the employees, cannot be given an interpretation that would defeat such purpose.

26, 2b, 3a, 38b
Philippine British Assurance v. Intermediate Appelate Court
Case No. 234
G.R. No. L-72005 (May 29, 1987)
Chapter 5, Page 200, Footnote No.99
Sycwin Coating& Wires Inc, filed a complaint for a collection of money
against Varian Industrial Corporation. During the pendency, Respondent attached
some of the properties of Varian Industrial Corp upon the posting of a supersede
bond. The latter in turn posted a counter bond through Petitioner so the attache
properties were released. Sycwin filed a petition for execution pending appeal
against the properties of Varian, which was granted. However, the writ of execut
was returned unsatisfied as Varian failed to deliver the previously attached per
properties upon demand. Sycwin prayed that Petitioner Corporation be ordered to
pay the value of its bond which was granted.
W/N the counter bond issued was valid.
The counter bond was issued in accordance with Sec. 5, Rule 57 of the Rules
of Court. Neither the rules nor provisions of the counter bond limited its appli
cation to
a final and executory judgment. It appllies to the payment of any judgment that
be recovered by Plaintiff. The only logical conclusion is that an execution of a
judgment including one pending appeal if returned unsatisfied may be charged
against such counter bond. The rule therefore, is that the counter bond to life
attachment shall be charged with the payment of any judgment that is returned
unsatisfied. It covers not only a final and executory judgment but also the exec
of a judgment of pending appeal.
24a, 26, 36a

Ramirez v. Court of Appeals

Case No. 251
G.R. No. L-16696 & L-16702 (January 31, 1962)
Chapter 5, Page 201 , Footnote No.100
A civil case was filed by Petitioner alleging that Private Respondent, in a
confrontation in the latter s office allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated him.
Petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event to support her claim. The
of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal. Thus, respondent and filed a c
W/N the facts charged against him constituted an offense.
The law makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties in an
private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape
recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be
penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those
involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all pers
unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "
Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
6a, 7a, 9a, 11a, 24a, B2
Pilar v. Commission on Elections
Case No. 242
G. R. No. 115245 (July 11, 1995)
Chapter 5, Page 201, Footnote No.100
On March 22, 1992, Petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the positio
of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. Three days
later, he withdrew his certificate of candidacy. As a result, Respondent Commiss
imposed a fine of P10,000 pesos for failure to file his statement of contributio
ns and
expenditures. Petitioner contends that it is clear from the law that the candida
te must
have entered the political contest, and should have either won or lost.
W/N Petitioner can be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributio
and expenditures since he was a non-candidate , having withdrawn his certificate
of candidacy three days after its filing.
Yes. Sec. 14 of RA 7166 states that every candidate has the obligation to file
his statement of contributions and expenditures. As the law makes no distinction
qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the
same, the term every candidate must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate
who pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy. Sec. 13 of
Resolution No. 2348 categorically refers to all candidates who filed their certif
of candidacy .
6c, 7a, 26, 37, b2

Sanciangco v. Roño
Case No. 273
G. R. No. 68709 (July 19, 1985)
Chapter 5, Page 203 , Footnote No.106
Petitioner was elected as Barangay Captain. Later, he was elected President
of the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) of Ozamiz City by the Board of
Directors of the said Association. Petitioner then Petitioner then filed his Cer
tificate of
Candidacy for the May 14, 1984 elections for Misamis Occidental under the banner
of the Mindanao alliance. He was not successful in the said elections.
W/N an appointive member of the Sangguniang Panglungsod, who ran for
the position of Mambabatas Pambansa in the elections of May 14, 1984, should be
considered as resigned or on forced leave of absence upon filing of his certific
ate of
The legislative intent of Sec. 13(2) of BP 697 is clear that even appointive
Barangay officials are deemed also covered by the said provision. Since he is
unquestionably an appointive member, he is deemed to have ipso facto ceased to
be such member when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 1984 Batas
6c, 7a, 9c, 28, 36b
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 38
G. R. No. 116356 (June 29, 1998)
Davao Pilots Association elevated a complaint against Petitioner for a sum of
money and attorney s fees alleging that DPA had rendered the pilotage services to
Petitioner between January 14, 1987 to July 22, 1989 with total unpaid fees of
P703,290.18. Despite repeated demands, Petitioner failed to pay and prays that t
latter be directed to pay the amount with legal rate of interest from the filing
of the
complaint; attorney s fees equivalent to 25% of the principal obligation.
W/N EO 1088 is unconstitutional.
No. In Philippine Interisland Shipping Association of the Philippines v. Court o
Appeals, the court upheld the validity of EO 1088 and it shall not depart from t
ruling. The Court s holding clearly debunks Petitioner s insistence on paying the
pilotage fees based on the memorandum circulars issued by the PPA. Administrativ
or Executive Acts, Orders and Regulations shall be valid only when they are not
contrary to the laws or the Constitution.
1, 5a, 9a, 37 49

Castillo-Co v. Barbers
Case No.
G.R. No. 129952 (June 16, 1998)
Congressman Junie Cua filed a complaint before the Office of the
Ombudsman against Governor Castillo-Co and Provincial Engineer Virgilio Ringor
alleging irregularities in the purchase of heavy equipment by the Governor and
Provincial Engineer. The items purchased were reconditioned instead of brand new
and included other irregularities. Emilio A. Gonzales III, Director, and Jesus G
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, placed the Petitioners under preventive suspension
for 6 months. Petitioners contest that the Deputy Ombudsman has no power to sign
the order of preventive suspension.
W/N the deputy Ombudsman possessed the authority to sign the order for
preventive suspension.
Yes. The deputy Ombudsman possessed the authority to preventively suspend
the Petitioners. There is nothing in RA 7975 which may suggest that the Ombudsma
and only the Ombudsman may sign an order preventively suspending officials
occupying positions classified as grade 27 or above. The word or is clearly
disjunctive in this case signifying dissociation from one thing from the other.
6c, 7a
People v. Martin
Case No. 214
G.R. No. L-33487 (May 31, 1971)
Chapter 5, Page 204, Footnote No.110
Respondents were charged with violating Sec. 46 of C.A. No. 613 or the
Philippine Immigration Act by the Court of First Instance of La Union, specifica
lly in the
act of bringing in and landing. The Court dismissed the charges on the ground of
being a continuous offense with Criminal Case 6258-M filed in Bulacan against ot
Respondents who were concealing and harboring the same Chinese Immigrants who
were brought in therefore they had no jurisdiction.
W/N the act of bringing in and landing constitute a continuous offense with
concealing and harboring.
No. They are two separate offenses.
C.A. No. 613 clearly provides that the four acts are in fact four separate acts.
Each act possesses its own distinctive, different, and disparate meaning. The wo
rd OR
in C.A. No. 613 cannot be given a non-disjunctive meaning signifying the separat
of one act from the other. The words in the information suggesting conspiracy ar
considered a mere surplusage.
6c, 7a, 37, 15b

GMCR v. Bell Telecommunications Inc.

Case No. 49
G.R. No. 126496 (April 30, 1997)
NTC Commissioner Kintanar denied the request of Bell Telecommunications
for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity for the installation of
telecommunications equipment pursuant to its congressional franchise to operate.
The denial was promulgated despite the approval of the CCAD of its feasibility a
the endorsement of Deputy Commissioners Fidelo Q. Dumlao and Consuelo Perez.
Whether the NTC is a collegial body or under the direct and sole control of
Commissioner Kintanar.
The NTC is a collegial body and its decisions should be reached by a majority
vote. Executive Order 146 creating the NTC clearly shows that the NTC shall be
composed of a head commissioner and 2 deputy commissioners suggesting its
collegial nature. Therefore the acts of Chairman Kintanar are void ab initio for
unabashedly contrary to law.
6c, 7a, 15a, 24a
Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc.
Case No. 158
G.R. No. 111097 (July 20, 1994)
Chapter V, Page 208, Footnote No. 130
PAGCOR, created by P.D. 1896, leased a building belonging to Pryce in order
to prepare to open a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Various civic organizations,
religious elements, women s and youth groups, and even the local officials angrily
denounced the project. The Sangguniang Panlungsod swiftly enacted two
ordinances disallowing the building of the planned casino. Petitioners argue tha
t by
virtue of the Local Government Code (LGC), the Sangguniang Panlungsod may
prohibit the operation of casinos by passing ordinances to protect the general
welfare of their citizens from the harmful effects of gambling.
W/N the two ordinances as enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Cagayan de Oro are valid.
The two local ordinances are not valid. In Basco v. Phil. Amusements and
Gaming Corp., this Court sustained the constitutionality of the decree. Under th
LGC, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress gambling and
other prohibited games of chance. Since the world gambling should be read as
referring to only illegal gambling which, like the other prohibited games of cha
must be prevented or suppressed. On the assumption of a conflict between P.D. 18
and the LGC, the proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other but to g
effect to both by harmonizing them if possible. Casino gambling is authorized by
1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullifie
d by
a mere ordinance.
5a, 9c, 11e, 28, 37, 38, 50
Commissioner of Customs v. Philippine Acetylene Company
Case No. 72
G.R. No. L-22443 (May 29, 1971)
Chapter V, Page 210, Footnote No. 135
Charles Butler, manager of Respondent Company, imported a custom-built
LPG tank which is used to contain LPG from the refinery in Batangas and to trans
it to the company s plant in Manila. RA 1394 provides a tax exemption for the
importation of machinery and/or raw materials to be used by new and necessary
industries as determined in accordance with RA 901. The Tax Court held that the
industry should be understood in its ordinary and general definition, which is a
enterprise employing relatively large amounts of capital and/or labor.
W/N the Philippine Acetylene Co., Inc. may be considered engaged in an
industry as contemplated in Sec. 6 of RA 1394 and therefore exempt from the
payment of the special import tax with respect to the gas tank in question.
Philippine Acetylene is not exempt from the special import tax. Tax
exemptions are held strictly against the taxpayer. The obvious legislative inten
t is to
confine the meaning of the term industries to activities that tend to produce or
create or manufacture, and not to all ventures and trades falling under the ordi
and general definition. In granting the exemption, it would have been illogical
Congress to specify importations needed by new and necessary industries as the
term is defined by law and in the same breath allowed a similar exemption to all
other industries in general.
9a, 9c, 11a, 11d, 28, 43
People v. Santiago
Case No. 224
G.R. No. L-17663 (May 30, 1962)
Chapter V, Page 136, Footnote No. 211
The information alleges that Santiago has committed the crime of "libel." The
accused delivered false, malicious, and highly defamatory statements against May
Lacson through an amplifier system before a crowd of around a hundred persons.
Defendant moved to quash this information upon the ground that the crime charged
therein is not libel but oral defamation.
Whether the crime charged in the information is oral defamation, under Art.
358 of the Revised Penal Code, or libel, under Art. 355, in relation to Art. 353
, of the
same Code.
The facts alleged in the information constitute the crime of oral defamation.
The word "radio" should be considered in relation to the terms with which it is
associated, all of which have a common characteristic, namely, their permanent
nature as a means of publication, and this explains the graver penalty for libel
that prescribed for oral defamation. Radio as a means of publication is the
transmission and reception of electromagnetic waves without conducting wires
intervening between transmitter and receiver, while transmission of words by mea
of an amplifier system is not thru "electromagnetic waves" but thru the use of
"conducting wires" intervening between the transmitter and the receiver. It has
been held in the United States that slanderous statements forming part of a
manuscript read by a speaker over the radio constitute libel.
11h, 25a, 28, b2

Caltex (Phil.), Inc. v. Palomar

Case No. 45
G.R. No. 19650 (September 29, 1966)
Chapter V, Page 137, Footnote No. 211
Petitioner conceived the Caltex Hooded Pump Contest where participants
have to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump can dispense
during a specific period of time. There was no fee or consideration required to
paid, nor any purchase of any Caltex products to be made in order to join the
contest. Foreseeing the extensive use of mail for advertising and communications
Caltex requested clearance for Respondent Postmaster General but was denied
citing said contest is a gift enterprise deemed as a non-mailable matter under the
anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law. Hence, Petitioner filed a petition fo
declaratory relief.
W/N the Caltex Hooded Pump Contest falls under the term gift enterprise
which is banned by the Postal Law.
No, said contest is not a gift enterprise. The word lottery is defined as a
game of chance where the elements of which are (1) consideration, (2) chance,
and (3) prize. The term gift enterprise and scheme in the provision of the Postal
Law making unmailable any lottery, gift, enterprise, or scheme for the distributi
on of
money or any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind
means such enterprise as will require consideration as an element. The intent of
prohibition is to suppress the tendency to inflame the gambling spirit and to co
public morals. There being no element of consideration in said contest, the spir
it of
the law is preserved.
9a, 28
San Miguel Corp. v. NLRC
Case No. 272
G.R. No. 80774 (May 31, 1988)
Chapter V, Page 211, Footnote No. 138
Petitioner Corporation sponsored an Innovation Program which rewarded
cash to SMC employees who will submit ideas and suggestions beneficial to the
corporation. Rustico Vega submitted his proposal entitled Modified Grande
Pasteurization Process and claimed entitlement to the cash award. SMC denied
utilizing such proposal but Vega alleged otherwise and filed a complaint with th
NLRC which arbitrated against the Petitioner.
W/N the money claim of Vega falls within the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter
and the NLRC.
No, said money claim falls outside the jurisdiction of said agencies. The
jurisdiction of the NLRC is outlined in Art. 217 of the Labor Code which include
s in par.
3 all money claims of workers, including those based on nonpayment or
underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation pay and other benefits
provided by law or appropriate agreement While par. 3 refers to all money
claims of workers, it is not necessary to suppose that the entire universe of mon
claims has been absorbed into the jurisdiction of the NLRC. Par. 3 should not be
in isolation with the context formed by par. 1 (unfair labor practices), par. 2
and conditions of employment), par. 4 (household services), par. 5 (prohibited
activities). The unifying element of pars. 1-5 is that they refer to cases or di
arising out of or in connection with an employer-employee relationship. The scop
e of
par. 3 is clarified by its associated paragraphs wherein money claims falling wi
thin the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRC are those which have some reason
causal connection with the employer-employee relationship.
28, 36b, 36e

Gotiaco v. Union Ins. Soc. Of Camilon

Case No. 114
G.R. No. 13983 (September 1, 1919)
Chapter V, Page 213, Footnote No. 141
The Gotiaco Brothers transported a cargo of rice from Saigon to Cebu. The
rice was damaged due to the inflow of seawater into the ship during the voyage
because of a defect in one of its drain pipes. Plaintiffs sought recovery from
Defendant under maritime insurance that purports to insure the cargo from: Perils
of the seas, men of war, fire, enemies, pirates, rovers, thieves, jettisons, barr
atry of
the master and mariners, and of all other perils, losses, and misfortunes The tria
court ruled that the ship was unseaworthy and Defendant is not liable. Plaintiff
appealed hence this action.
W/N the insurer is liable for the loss.
No, the owners of the damaged rice must look to the shipowner for redress
and not to the insurer. The words all other perils, losses, and misfortunes are to
interpreted as covering risks which are of like kind with the particular risks w
hich are
enumerated in the preceding part of the clause in the contract. A loss which, in
ordinary course of events, results from the natural and inevitable action of the
from the ordinary wear and tear of the ship, or from the negligent failure of th
e ship s
owner to provide the vessel with proper equipment to convey the cargo under the
ordinary condition is not a peril of the sea. The insurer undertakes to insure aga
perils of the sea and similar perils, not against perils of the ship. It was fou
nd that the
cargo was improperly stowed and that the owners of the ship were chargeable with
negligence for failure to protect the pipe by putting a case over it. It was
appropriately held that the ship was not seaworthy.
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Oil Industry Commission
Case No. 122
G.R. No. L-41315 (November 13, 1986)
Petitioner Corporation was contending that Respondent Commission had no
jurisdiction over the contractual disputes between them and a gasoline dealer in
name of Manuel Yap.
W/N Respondent Commission had jurisdiction over the contractual disputes.
The contention of the Petitioner is well founded. A detailed reading of the
entire OIC Act will say that there has not been an express provision providing f
disputes involving the gasoline dealer and the oil company.
Sec 6 of R.A. 6173 restricts the extent and scope the OIC prerogative of
jurisdiction in sub paragraph a to f.
What the law intend here is to be all embracing to the jurisdictional power of
Respondent Commission so anything not mentioned are not or cannot be presumed
or indicated. Thus, the jurisdictional power should be restricted to mere regula
and supervisory power and not judicial. The phrase, to set the conditions means th
right to prescribe rules and conduct. It only pertains to rule making power and
adjudication. Such limitation is included in the provision in Sec. 7(4d)
25, 30, 31, 36

Cagayan Valley Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

Case No. 43
G.R. No. 123248 (October 16, 1997)
Chapter V, Page 217, Footnote No.158
La Tondeña registered with the Philippine Patent Office, pursuant to RA 6231,
the 350 c.c. white flint bottles it has been using for its gin popularly known a
s Ginebra
San Miguel . Thereafter, a case was initiated against Petitioner for using the 350
white flint bottles with the mark La Tondeña, Inc. and Ginebra San Miguel
stamped or blown-in therein by filling the same with Petitioner s liquor product
bearing the label Sonny Boy for commercial sale and distribution, without La
Tondeña s written consent, and in violation of Sec. 2 of RA 623 as amended by RA
W/N La Tondeña was part of the protected beverages of RA 623 amended
by RA 5700.
The words other lawful beverages is used in its general sense, referring to all
beverages not prohibited by law. Beverage is defined as a liquor or liquid for d
Hard liquor, although regulated, is not prohibited by law; hence, it is within t
purview and coverage of RA 623, as amended. To limit the coverage of the law onl
to those enumerated or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned
defeat the very purpose of the law.
9a, 26, 29
Rep. of the Philippines vs. Hon. Migrinio and Tecson
Case No. 257
Acting on information received, which indicated the acquisition of wealth
beyond his lawful income, the Philippine Anti-Graft Board required Private
Respondent to submit his explanation or comment, together with his supporting
evidence. Private Respondent, a retired lt. colonel, was unable to produce his
supporting evidence, despite several postponements, because they were allegedly
in the custody of his bookkeeper who had gone abroad. The anti-graft Board was
created by the PCGG to investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices
of AFP personnel, both retired and in active service.
W/N Private Respondent may be investigated and prosecuted by the Board,
an agency of the PCGG, for violation of RA 3019 and 1379.
No. Applying the rule in statutory construction, the term subordinate as used
in EO 1 and 2 would refer to one who enjoys a close association or relation with
former President Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family member,
relative, and close associate in EO 1 and the close relative, business associate
dummy, agent, or nominee in EO 2.
28, 30, 36b, 38
Commissioner of Customs vs. Court of Tax Appeals
Case No. 71
G.R. Nos. 48886-88 (July 21, 1993)
Chapter III, Page 101, Footnote No.133
Petitioner contends that the importation of the foodstuffs in question is prohib
ited and
the articles thus imported may be subject to forfeiture under Sec. 2530 (f) and
102 (k)
of the Tariff and Customs Code. The foodstuffs in question being articles of pro
importation cannot be released under bond.
W/N the imported foodstuffs in question are not contraband, and are not as
stated by Respondent Court, among the prohibited importations enumerated in Sec.
102 of the Tariff and Customs Code therefore these foodstuffs may be released
under bond as provided in Sec. 2301 of the same code.
Yes. The imported foodstuffs are considered prohibited importation under Sec.
102 (k) of the Tariff and Customs Code.
United States vs. Sto. Nino
Case No. 302
Chapter V, Page 220, Footnote No.172
Respondent was caught possessing a deadly weapon. He was prosecuted
under Act No. 1780, which stated that it shall be unlawful for any person to carr
concealed upon his person any bowie knife, dirk dagger, kris or other deadly
weapons, provide that this prohibition shall not apply to firearms in the posses
sion of
persons who have secured a license therefore or who are entitled to carry the sa
under the provision of this Act.
The trial court ruled that, using the principle of ejusdem generis, the law will
apply to bladed weapons
W/N the trial court was correct in applying ejusdem generis.
No. The trial court erred in applying ejusdem generis because the latter is only
resorted to in determining the legislative intent, such that if the intent is cl
ear, the rule
must give way. In this case, the proviso provides that unlicensed revolvers were
covered by the law and as such the law is not limited to bladed weapons.
6c, 29

Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. Social Security Commission

Case No. 263
G.R. No. L-15045 (January 20, 1961)
Chapter V, Page 221, Footnote No.175
Petitioner filed with Respondent Commission a request that Catholic Charities,
and all religious and charitable institutions and/or organizations, which are di
rectly or
indirectly, wholly or partially, operated by the Roman Archbishop of Manila be
exempted from compulsory coverage of RA 1161, otherwise known as the Social
Security Law of 1954.
Petitioner contends that the term employer as defined in the law should
following the principle of ejusdem generis---be limited to those who carry on
undertakings or activities which have the element of profit or gain, or which are
pursued for profit or gain, because the phrase activity of any kind in the definiti
is preceded by the words any trade, business, industry, undertaking.
W/N the rule of ejusdem generis can be applied in this case.
No. The rule of ejusdem generis applies only where there is uncertainty. It is n
controlling where the plain purpose and intent of the Legislature would thereby
hindered and defeated. The definition of the term employer is sufficiently
comprehensive as to include religious and charitable institutions or entities no
organized for profit. This is made more evident by the fact that it contains an
exception in which said institutions or entities are not included.
9a, 29
Rep. v. Estenzo
Case No.
G.R. No. L 35376 (September 11, 1980)
Private Respondents filed a petition to reopen a decision by the Cadastral
Court to declare Lot No. 4273 of the Ormoc Cadastre as public land. Petitioners
an instant petition alleging that the trial court erred in assuming jurisdiction
over the
petition for reopening the cadastral proceedings.
W/N RA 6236 applies to the reopening of cadastral proceedings on certain
lands which were declared public lands.
No. RA 6236 does not apply to the reopening of cadastral proceedings on
certain lands which were declared public lands. The Respondent judge was wrong i
interpreting that RA 6236 is applicable; the job of the judiciary is to apply la
ws, not
interpret it.
6d, 7a, 30, 32

In re estate of Enriquez and Reyes

Case No. 130
G.R. No. 9351 (January 6, 1915)
Chapter V, Page 223, Footnote No. 180
Francisca Reyes died intestate and was survived by his 2 legitimate
daughters, Petra and Pascuala. Petra had 2 legitimate children, Rafael and Josef
Pascuala had 1 legitimate child, Aurea, and had begotten a natural child by a pr
Vicente. Petra, Pascuala, and Aurea have since died. The lower court held that
Vicente was the owner of all the separate property of Aurea and half of the esta
te of
W/N Vicente was an acknowledged natural child.
Yes. G. E. 68, which was promulgated on December. 18, 1899, repealed the
law that priesthood was a ground for declaring a marriage void. Since Vicente wa
born in 1905 after the said law was enacted, he is considered an acknowledged
natural child.
30a, 35, 49
Empire Insurance Co. v. Rufino
Case No. 97
G.R. No. L 38268 (May 31, 1979)
Chapter V, Page 223, Footnote No. 181
Vicente A. Rufino died intestate and was survived by his widow and 7
children. They then executed a Partition Agreement agreeing to pay for all liabi
or obligations of the decedent.
Almost 1 year later, Petitioner filed a Civil Case claiming liabilities and obli
gations from
the Rufino estate. The trial court dismissed this claim stating the Petitioner d
id not file
within the time limited in the notice to creditors in the intestate proceedings.
Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed by the Petitioner on the decision of
the trial
court claiming that what was previously filed was not a money claim against the
estate of the decedent, but a claim on the estates of the Respondents.
W/N the petition has merit.
The petition is dismissed for lack of merit. The liabilities claimed by Petition
were not listed in the obligations acknowledged by the Partition Agreement.
29, 30a, 45a
Ching Leng v. Galang
Case No.
G. R. No. L-11931 (October 27, 1958)
Petitioner obtained judgment granting his petition for naturalization. He and
his wife later petitioned to the Court of First Instance in Rizal for the adopti
on of his
five children who were all minors and Chinese nationals. The petition was later
granted. Petitioner then requested the Commissioner of Immigration to cancel the
alien certificate of registration of their children based on the following groun
ds: (1) by
virtue of their naturalization, the children are now considered as Filipino citi
zens, (2)
adoption gave the adopted children the same rights and duties as if they were th
legitimate children of the adopter, (3) since a legitimate child follows the nat
of the adopter, the children are considered Filipino Citizens.
W/N citizenship can be acquired by a child through adoption.
Citizenship is not a right but a mere privilege. Art. 254 of the Civil Code
enumerates the rights of the legitimate child and acquisition is not a part of t
he said
enumeration. Furthermore, Art. 341 of the Civil Code does not include acquisitio
n of
citizenship. Also, Art. 49 of a special law that provides the character of natur
enumerates the means of acquiring citizenship and adoption is not part of it.
Acosta v. Flor
Case No. 5
G. R. No. 2122 (September 13, 1905)
Chapter V, Page 224, Footnote No. 187
The Plaintiff and the Defendant were candidates for the Office of the
Municipal President of Laoag, Ilocos Norte. Plaintiff alleged that he was duly e
to said office and that the Defendant had usurped and unlawfully held the same.
However, not a single witness presented by Plaintiff confirmed the latter s allega
that he had obtained a majority of 100 votes at the said election. Nor can it be
inferred from the evidence introduced by the Plaintiff that he, as a result of s
election, or for any other reason, was entitled to the office of Municipal Presi
dent of
Laoag, now held by Defendant.
Can the Plaintiff maintain an action for the purpose of excluding the
Defendant from the exercise of said office?
No. Art. 199, 200, and 201 of the Code of Civil Procedure has reserved to the
Attorney-General and to the provincial fiscals, as the case may be, the right to
such action. If the legislative had intended to give all citizens alike the righ
t to
maintain an action for usurpation of public office, it would have plainly said s
o in the
law in order to avoid doubt on a subject of such far-reaching importance.

Lerum v. Cruz
Case No. 146
G. R. No. L-2783 (November 29, 1950)
Chapter V, Page 225, Footnote No. 192
This is an appeal for a petition for declaratory relief. Attys. Lerum and
Fernando filed for this petition in order to test the sufficiency and probative
value of a
testimony in a bigamy case by (former) Judge Cruz regarding the issuance of a
divorce decree.
Can the attorneys file a petition for declaratory relief regarding the sufficien
and probative value of (former) Judge Cruz s testimony?
No, the petition for declaratory relief cannot be granted. Under Sec 1, Rule 66
of the Rules of Court, declaratory relief may only be granted to a person whose
are affected by a statute or ordinance, or who is interested under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument. The sufficiency and probative value of a
testimony, which is the subject matter for declaratory relief in the instant cas
e, is not
included in the enumeration. Thus, the assailed order is affirmed.
Central Barrio v. City Treasurer of Davao
Case No. 55
G.R. No. L-25811 (April 3, 1968)
Chapter V, Page 225, Footnote No. 193
On August 29, 1962, the City of Davao passed Resolution No. 732, pursuant to
RA 2370, declaring as officially and legally existing several barrios of the cit
y. Among
these were barrios Agdao, Bucana and Poblacion. Subsequently, barrio Poblacion,
also called barrio Central, asked for its alleged 10% share in taxes collected o
n real
property located within the barrio, as provided in Sec. 3 of RA 3590. Respondent
refused to release the share on the ground that the amount pertaining to the sai
barrio, in relation to barrios Agdao and Bucana, cannot be determined because th
respective boundaries of said barrios were not yet fixed as required by law. The
Petitioner thus filed a case against Davao City s Treasurer, Council, Auditor and
Mayor with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Davao, which dismissed the case
the ground that the issue had been rendered academic by the passage of RA 4354,
amending the charter of Davao City.
W/N the dismissal order was correct.
The dismissal was affirmed. Sec. 2 of RA 4354 enumerated the barrios
comprising the City of Davao, which did not include the Petitioner. Thus, there
facie arises the conclusion that said law abolished Barrio Central as part of Da
City. A non-existent barrio or a barrio not situated in Davao City cannot presen
t a
claim against it or its officials for a share in taxes under RA 3590.

Vera v. Fernandez
Case No. 55
G.R. No.L-31364 (March 30, 1979)
Chapter V, Page 225, Footnote No. 193
This case is an appeal with regard to two orders promulgated by the CFI of
Negros Occidental, Branch V in relation to the intestate estate of Luis D. Tongo
y. The
cases were for the claim and payment of deficiency income taxes in the total sum
P3,254.80 with 5% surcharge and 1% monthly interest, as provided in the Tax Code
The Petitioners were denied the said claim and payment as they were barred under
Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
W/N the statute of non-claims under Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the New Rules of Court
bars claim of the government for unpaid taxes.
The order appealed from is reversed. A perusal of the aforequoted provision
shows that it makes no mention of claims for monetary obligations of the deceden
created by law, such as taxes which is entirely different from the claims enumer
therein. Par. 315 of the Tax Code states that payment of income tax shall be a l
ien in
favor of the government from the time the assessment was made by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue until paid with interests, penalties, etc. Thus
, before
the inheritance has been passed to the heirs, the unpaid taxes due the decedent
may be collected, even without its having been presented under Sec. 2 of Rule 36
the Rules of Court.
27, 30, 44
Villanueva v. City of Iloilo
Case No. 312
G.R. No. L-26521 (December 28, 1968)
Chapter V, Page 226, Footnote No. 197
The case is an appeal questioning the lower court s judgment declaring
Ordinance No. 11 as illegal. The Petitioners, Eusebio and Remedios Villanueva, a
owners of 5 tenement houses containing 43 apartments. By virtue of the ordinance
the city was able to collect P5,824 from the spouses for the years 1960-1964.
Is Ordinace 11 illegal because it imposes double taxation?
Is the City of Iloilo empowered by the Local Autonomy Act to impose tenement
Is it oppressive and unreasonable because it carries a penal clause?
Does it violate the uniformity of taxation?
The judgment is reversed; the ordinance is valid.
No. The same tax may be imposed by the national government as well as by the
local government.
Yes. RA 2264 confers on local governments broad taxing authority. It is clear tha
the intention of the ordinance is to impose a tenement or apartment tax, which i
not among the exceptions listed in Sec. 2 of the Local Autonomy Act.
No. The lower court had in mind the constitutional provision that no person shall
be imprisoned for a debt or non-payment of a poll tax , which should not apply;
the tax in question is neither a debt nor a poll tax.
No. Taxes are uniform and equal when imposed upon all property of the same
class or character within the taxing authority.
7a, 20c, 30, 35, 42
Santo To v. Cruz-Paño
Case No. 275
G.R. No. L-55130 (January 17, 1983)
Chapter V, Page 226, Footnote No. 199
Petitioner Santo To was convicted of estafa for a bouncing check and was
sentenced with a penalty of prision mayor. He appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which reduced his sentence to the penalty of prision correctional. He then filed
petition for probation but was denied by the Respondent judge, Hon. Cruz-Paño,
despite the favorable recommendation of the Probation Office, on the ground that
granting it would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, and that Santo To w
not a penitent offender. In a motion for reconsideration, the Solicitor General
recommended the grant because the Petitioner was not among the offenders
disqualified to avail probation, as enumerated in the probation law (P.D. 968) S
ec. 9.
Can Petitioner To avail himself of probation?
Yes. The law gives more importance to the offender than the crime. He is a
first-time offender and his offense has relative lightness. In addition, the Res
judge cannot assume that To had not shown repentance. Besides, where the
Probation Law expressly enumerates the persons disqualified to avail of its bene
the clear intent is to allow the benefits of probation to those not included in
9a, 36b
Samson v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 270
G.R. No. L-43182 (November 25, 1986)
Chapter V, Page 226, Footnote No. 200
Petitioner Samson, the mayor of Caloocan, terminated the services of
Respondent, Mr. Talens, as Assistant Secretary, through Administrative Order No.
because of lack and loss of confidence, and appointed Mr. Liwag, co-Petitioner,
said position. RA 2260 (Civil Service Act of 1959) Sec 5(f) declares that the po
sition of
secretaries to city mayors as non-competitive. Talens asserts his position was n
covered by the said act and, being permanently appointed, he can only be
removed for a cause and after due process. The Court of First Instance ruled in
of Talens, declaring the order null and void. The Court of Appeals also affirmed
Was the termination of Talens illegal?
Yes, Talens termination was illegal; his position is not among those expressly
declared by law as highly confidential. The nature of functions attached to a po
determines whether such position is highly confidential. Where the law provides
positions in the government belong to the competitive service, except those
declared by law to be in the noncompetitive service and those which are policy-
determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature, the legislatu
re is
presumed to have intended to exclude those not enumerated, for otherwise, it wou
have included them in the enumeration.
9a, 30

Finman General Assurance Corp. vs. Court of Appeals

Case No. 107
G.R. No 100970 (September 2, 1992)
Chapter V, Page 228, Footnote No. 202
Carlie Surposa was insured with the Petitioner and had several relatives as his
beneficiaries. On October 18, 1988, Carlie Surposa died of a stab wound. After a
written notice of claim by the beneficiaries to the insurance company, the latte
denied the claim, saying that murder and assault are not within the scope of the
coverage of the insurance policy. The insurance company was found liable by the
Insurance Commission to pay P15,000, and this decision was affirmed by the
appellate court. Petitioner contends that the CA was wrong in using expressio uni
exclusio alterius in a personal accident insurance policy since death resulting f
murder and/or assault are impliedly excluded therefrom.
Did the CA make a mistake in using the said principle?
No. The fact remains that the death of Surposa was pure accident on the
part of the victim. Furthermore, the personal accident insurance policy specific
enumerated only 10 circumstances where no liability attaches to the insurance
company. Failure to include death through murder or assault meant it had not bee
intended to be exempt from liabilities resulting from such.
9a, 30
Centano v. Villalon-Pornillos
Case No. 54
G.R. No. 113092 (September 1, 1994)
Chapter V, Page 228, Footnote No. 203
In 1985, the officers of Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a
fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay in Bulacan.
Centeno, chairman of the group, approached Judge Angeles, President of Tikay,
and the latter solicited P 1,500. However, this solicitation was made without a
from the DSWD and as a result, it was contended that Centeno violated P.D. 1564,
which states Any person to solicit or receive contributions for charitable or pub
welfare purposes shall secure a permit from the regional Office of the Departmen
t of
Social services and Development.
W/N the phrase charitable purposes in P.D. 1564 is meant to include
religious purposes.
No. Where a statute is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by
interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The 1987 Constitution tre
ats the
words charitable and religious separately and independently from each other.
Since P.D. 1564 merely states that charitable or public welfare purposes need a
permit from DSWD, this means that the framers of the law never intended to inclu
solicitations for religious purposes within its coverage. The term charitable shou
ld be
strictly construed to exclude solicitations for religious purposes. Moreover, sinc
e this
is a criminal case, penal law must be construed strictly against the State and l
in favor of the accused.
6c, 11g, 11i, 25, 27, 30, 48
Escribano v. Avila
Case No. 101
G.R. No. L-30375 (September 12, 1978)
Chapter V, Page 229, Footnote No. 205
Congressman Salipada Pendatun of Cotobato, filed a complaint for libel
against Mayor Jose Escribano of Tacurong before the Court of First Instance (now
RTC) to Judge David Avila. Escribano questioned Judge Avila s authority to conduct
the preliminary investigation of the offense. He contended that the city fiscal
Cotobato is the only one empowered to conduct the preliminary investigation,
pursuant of RA 4363 and Art. 360 of the RPC which does not empower the Court of
First Issuance to conduct preliminary investigations of written defamations due
to an
amendment made for Art 360.
Whether the Court of First Issuance is invested with the authority to conduct
the preliminary investigation of the crime of libel or whether that power is lod
exclusively in the city attorney of that city.
Yes. The Court of First Issuance may conduct preliminary investigations
because this power is not lodged exclusively in the city attorney. The enumerati
on in
the law of the public officers and the courts that may conduct preliminary
investigations was designed to divest the ordinary municipal court of that power
not to deprive the Court of First Instance of that same power. The power of the
CFT to
conduct a preliminary investigation is derived from the constitutional grant of
for a judge to hold a preliminary examination and to issue warrants of arrest an
search warrants. What is important to remember is that preliminary investigation
s by
the CFT is the exception to the rule and not the general rule.
9c, 11e, 12, 37
Manabat v. De Aquino
Case No. 161
G.R. No. L-5558 (April 29, 1953)
Chapter V, Page 229, Footnote No. 208
Petitioners were ordered to pay P 1,261.74 plus interest for usury, wherein the
couple failed to appear in court and present evidence in the hearing. Notified o
f the
decision on September 7, 1951, they filed for an appeal by registered mail on
September 22 of that same year. However, the papers were actually received by th
court on September 24. Thus, the Judge of First Instance declared that the appea
was late and dismissed it.
Whether the appeal was deemed filed on September 22, when they were
deposited by registered mail, or Sept 24, when they were actually received
by the court.
W/N the appeal has been perfected within 15 days.
Yes. The appeal was perfected within 15 days. Rule 27 Sec. 1 of the Rules of
Court must be applied which will result to the date of deposit in the post offic
e by
registered mail of court papers as the date of filing. Uniformity of rules is to
be desired
to simplify procedure. Thus, Petitioners filed their appeal just in time.
3a, 9c, 11d, 12a
Gomez v. Ventura and Board of Medical Examiners
Case No. 115
No. 32441. March 29, 1930
Chapter V, Page 229, Footnote No.209
Plaintiff had his license revoked on unprofessional conduct due to the
administration of opium. Petitioner claims that his administration of opium to p
was not a grounds for unprofessional conduct because it has been repealed by
subsequent Opium Laws.
W/N Plaintiff should have his license restored.
No, Plaintiff should not have his license restored. The subsequent Opium Laws
cannot be held to have impliedly repealed prior ones as these did not conflict o
remove said prior laws. The Opium Laws are in fact in force and the ill-defined
term of
unprofessional conduct can include improper administration of opium to patients.

9a, 38b
Primero v. CA
Case No. 126
G.R. Nos. 48468-69. November 22, 1989
Petitioner carried a bladed weapon outside of his residence while PD 9, the
prohibition against fan knives, balisong or clubs was in effect which thereafter
resulted in his arrest.
Petitioner answers in his defense that a bayonet, the bladed weapon he was
carrying, was neither a blunt nor bladed weapon enumerated in PD 9 and therefore
he was not guilty of violating the law against bladed or blunt weapons.
W/N a bayonet is not a bladed or blunt weapon that falls under the purview
of PD 9.
No, the bayonet is a bladed weapon that falls under PD 9. Petitioners defense
of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is weak and incomplete. It would make n
sense if possession of a fan knife, which is less lethal than a bayonet, would b
punishable while possession of a bayonet would not.
9a, 30a

SEC Legal Opinion re BIR Employees Association Inc.

Case No. 142
Oct. 23, 1987
Petitioners inquired as to whether or not past presidents can run as board
members or are merely ex-officio board members.
W/N past presidents of the association can run again as members of the
board or are automatically ex officio members.
Past Presidents may run again for positions in the board. There is nothing in th
rules and regulations of the association or the BIR that past presidents of the
association may not run again for board membership even as they are automaticall
made ex officio members of the board.
Roldan v Villaroman
Case No. 262
G.R. No. 46825 (October 18, 1939)
Chapter V, Page 234, Footnote No. 229
Respondents were charged of murder. During the trial, Respondent Cuevas
became ill and had to be confined to a hospital. Judge Roldan, the Petitioner,
denied the Respondents for postponement of the trial on the ground of illness of

Cuevas. The court also compelled the counsel of the accused to present evidence
and their witnesses and ordered to arrest the accused. Respondents then institut
ed a
certiorari proceeding in the Court of Appeals against the Petitioner, impugning
decision of the judge for proceeding with the case in the absence of Cuevas. The
CA then issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering Judge Roldan from conti
with the trial.
W/N the CA has jurisdiction over the case.
No. The CA resolutions denying the motions of the Solicitor-General rely
principally upon the decision rendered in the case of Mujer vs. CFI of Laguna, w
held that the phrase in aid of its appellate jurisdiction only refers to its proxi
antecedent and to all other auxiliary writs and process. This ruling is in conjunc
with the rule of interpretation that a qualifying phrase should be understood as
referring to the nearest antecedent. Moreover, the rule in the interpretation ap
plied is
in fact the general rule in the interpretation of qualifying or conditional phra
ses found
in a law, but this rule is subject to the exception that where the intention of
the law is
to apply the phrase to all the antecedents embraced in the provision, the same
should be made extensive to the whole.
1, 6d, 9c, 33, 36b, b2

Herras Teehankee v. Director of Prisons

Case No. 122
G.R. No. L-278 (July 18, 1946)
Chapter V, Page 234, Footnote No. 230
Petitioner was apprehended by the US Counter Intelligence Corps
Detachment under Security Commitment Order No. 286 wherein she was specifically
charged with (a) active collaboration with the Japanese, and (b) previous
association with the enemy. When she, along with her co-detainees and co-
Petitioners in that case, was delivered by the US Army to the Commonwealth
Government pursuant to the proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur of
December 29, 1944, she was detained by said Government under that charge. And
under the same charge during all the time referred to, she has remained in custo
of the Commonwealth Government.
W/N Petitioner is constitutionally entitled bail.
Yes. The constitutional mandate laid down the rule that all persons shall
before conviction be bailable, except those charged with capital offenses when
evidence of guilt is strong. Since the People s Court Act and the Constitution and
other statutes in this jurisdiction should be read as one law, and since the lan
used in this court in construing the Constitution and other statutes on the matt
er of
bail is substantially the same as the language used by the People s Court Act on t
same subject, the most natural and logical conclusion to follow in cases of capi
offenses before conviction is that discretion refers only to the determination o
whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. To hold that the People s Court ha
uncontrolled discretion in such cases and to deny bail even where the evidence o
guilt is not strong or there is absolutely no evidence at all, is to make the Ac
t offensive
not only to the letter but also to the spirit of the Constitution, which is cont
rary to the
most elementary rules of statutory construction.
6c, 6d, 11g, 12a, 26, 35, 37, 38b, 42a
Jose Antonio Mapa v. Hon. Joker Arroyo and Labrador Development Corporation
Case No. 170
G.R. No. 78585 (July 5, 1989)
Chapter V, Page 234, Footnote No. 231
Mapa bought lots from Labrador Development Corporation which are
payable in ten years. Mapa defaulted to pay the installment dues and continued t
do so despite constant reminders by Labrador. The latter informed Mapa that the
contracts to sell the lots were cancelled, but Mapa invoked Clause 20 of the fou
contracts. Said clause obligates Labrador to complete the development of the lot
except those requiring the services of a public utility company or the governmen
within 3 years from the date of the contract. Petitioner contends that P.D. 957
requires Labrador to provide the facilities, improvements, and infrastructures fo
r the
lots, and other forms of development if offered and indicated in the approved
subdivision plans.
W/N Clause 20 of the said contracts include and incorporate P.D. 957 through
the doctrine of last antecedent, making the cancellation of the contracts of sal
No. Labrador has every right to cancel the contracts of sale, pursuant to
Clause 7 of the said contract for the reason of the lapse of five years of defau
payment from Mapa. P.D. 957 does not apply because it was enacted long after the
execution of the contracts involved, and, other than those provided in Clause 20
, no
further written commitment was made by the developer. The words which are
offered and indicated in the subdivision or condominium plans refer not only to
other forms of development but also to facilities, improvements, and
infrastructures . The word and is not meant to separate words, but is a conjunction
used to denote a joinder or a union.
6d, 7a, 33

People of the Philippines v. Teodoro Tamani

Case No. 227
G.R. No. L-22160 and G.R. No. L-22161 (January 21, 1974)
Chapter V, Page 234, Footnote No. 232
Tamani was convicted of murder and attempted murder by the lower court
on February 14, 1963. Upon receipt of a copy of this order, his counsel subseque
filed a motion for reconsideration on March 1, 1963, which was denied. The lower
court sent a copy of the order of denial to the counsel by registered mail on Ju
ly 13,
1963 through the counsel s wife. Counsel filed his appeal only on September 10, 19
forty-eight days from July 24th , which is the reglementary fifteen-day period f
appeal. Appellees contend that the case should be dismissed on the ground that t
appeal was forty-eight days late. They invoked Sec. 6, Rule 122 of the Rules of
which states that an appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from the
promulgation or notice of the judgment or order appealed from.
W/N the fifteen-day period should commence from the date of promulgation
of the decision.
Yes. Using the rule of reddendo singula singulis, the word promulgation
should be construed as referring to judgment , while notice should be construed
as referring to order . Tamani s appeal is therefore 58 days late, not 47, as Appelle
contend; he only had a day left from the receipt of his wife of the notice on Ju
ly 13.
Nonetheless, the court decided to act upon the appeal at hand to obviate any
possible miscarriage of justice .
6c, 7a, 8a 11g, 34
Andres Borromeo v. Fermin Mariano
Case No. 38
G.R. No. L-16808 (January 3, 1921)
Chapter V, Page 236, Footnote No. 240
Andres Borromeo was appointed and commissioned as Judge of the Twenty-
fourth Judicial District, effective July 1, 1914. On February, 25, 1920, he was
Judge of the Twenty-first Judicial District, and Fermin Mariano was appointed Ju
of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District. Judge Borromeo has since the latter date
consistently refused to accept appointment to the Twenty-first Judicial District
. The
Attorney-General assails the validity of the later appointment by arguing on the
of Sec. 155 of the Administrative Code, which states that nothing herein shall be
construed to prevent a judge of first instance of one district from being appoin
ted to
be judge of another district.
W/N Borromeo has the right to sit as the Judge of the 24th Judicial District.
Yes. The concluding part of Sec. 155 of the Administrative Code used by the
Attorney-General should be construed as a proviso, although it did not start wit
h the
usual introductory word, provided . The word appointed in the proviso should be
given its meaning in the ordinary sense, and thus, should mean the nomination or
designation of an individual . The provisions of the Judiciary Law are plain and
unambiguous. Judges of First Instance are appointed Judges of the Courts of Firs
Instance of the respective judicial districts of the Philippine Islands. They ho
ld these
positions of Judges of First Instance of definite districts until they resign, r
etire or are
removed through impeachment proceedings. The power to appoint lies on the
appointing officer, but the power to accept lies solely on the appointee. Hence,
appointee s consent is needed and he has power to refuse an appointment. In
upholding the independence of the judiciary and the state s separation of powers,
the only way to remove Borromeo from power is by impeachment.
6c, 7a, 9a, 9c, 12a, 24a, 37

Case No. 2
G.R. No. 109328 (August 16, 1994)
Chapter V, Page 240, Footnote No. 250
Petitioners were employed by the National Steel Corporation for their five year
expansion program. The workers contend that they should be considered regular
workers as opposed to project workers, as the NSC and NLRC ruled. ALU-TUCP claim
that they have been working in NSC for more than 6 years and that their work is
necessary for the business, and that would have been more than enough to conside
them as regular employees. Petitioners contentions stemmed from Art. 280 of the
Labor Code.
W/N Petitioners should be considered regular employees.
No. The provision calls for casual employees. Since Petitioners were
considered project employees, this provision does not apply to them. Moreover, t
fact that they have been working in NSC for more than a year does not mean they
are automatically converted into regular employees. (They were hired as project
employees for the 5-year expansion program. Once that project is done, their
services will no longer be needed.) In Mercado, Sr. vs. NLRC, the proviso in par
. 2 of
Art.280 relates only to casual employees and is not applicable to those who do n
qualify under the definition of such workers in par. 1. The proviso is to be con
with reference to the immediately preceding part of the provision to which it is
attached, and not to other sections thereof.
1, 6, 33
Arenas v. City of San Carlos, Pangasinan
Case No. 20
G.R. No. L-34024 (April 5, 1978)
Chapter V, Page 240, Footnote No. 251
RA 5967 provides that second and third class judges would receive an annual
salary of P18,000. Arenas was receiving a monthly salary of P1000.00, P350 of wh
was from the national government and the remaining P650 comes from the city
government. Petitioner had repeatedly requested the city to enact the said RA bu
the Respondent City refused.
W/N Judge Arenas should be granted the increase in his salary from P12,000
to P18,000.
Looking at the Senate deliberations, the intention in enacting the RA was that
the salary of a city judge should not be higher than the salary of the city mayo
Moreover, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably const
they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should
resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. In case t
here is
repugnancy between the proviso and the main provision, the latter provision,
whether a proviso or not, is given preference because it is the latest expressio
n of the
intent of the legislation, but more so because provisos are negatively written a
gives off a more mandatory tone.
6c, 33, 43,48, b2

Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance

Case No. 292
G.R. No. 115852 (August 25, 1994)
Chapter V, Page 243, Footnote No. 266
Petitioner assail the constitutionality of RA 7716 saying that S. No. 1630 did n
pass three reading on separate days as required in the Constitution because the
second and the third readings were done on the same day. The President had
certified S. No. 1630 as urgent and the presidential certification dispensed wit
h the
requirement not only of the printing but also that of reading the bill on three
W/N RA 7716, an act that seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT
system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue
Code, has been constitutionally passed.
There is no merit in the contention that presidential certification dispenses
only with the requirement for the printing of the bill and its distribution thre
e days
before its passage but not with the requirement of three readings on separate
days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Sec 26(2) qualifies the two stated
conditions before a bill can become a law: (i) the bill has passed three reading
on separate days and (ii) it has been printed in its final form and distributed
days before it is finally approved. In other words, the "unless" clause must be
in relation to the "except" clause, because the two are really coordinate clause
of the same sentence. To construe the "except" clause as simply dispensing with
the second requirement in the "unless" clause (i.e., printing and distribution t
days before final approval) would not only violate the rules of grammar but it
would also negate the very premise of the "except" clause: the necessity of
securing the immediate enactment of a bill which is certified in order to meet a
public calamity or emergency.
ALDECOA v. Hongkong and Shanghai Bank
Case No. 126
30 Phil. 228, (March 23, 1915)
Chapter V, Page 245, Footnote No. 272
The mother of the Plaintiffs, Isabel Palet, was a general partner in the firm,
Aldecoa & Company. The said firm, however, was heavily indebted to the
Defendant corporation. Isabel s remedy for this was to furnish certain securities
obligations to the Defendant Corporation, and to mortgage certain real propertie
s of
her sons. In order to mortgage these properties, she emancipated her sons and
mortgaged their properties with her consent. The Petitioners now seek to cancel
instruments of mortgage executed by them.
W/N Isabel Palet can legally emancipate the Plaintiffs under the law in force
in this country in 1903, and in so doing, confer upon them the capacity to execu
te a
valid mortgage on their real property with her consent.
We must look at the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (American)
relating to guardianship and upon certain provisions of the Civil Code (Spanish)
relating to the control of the parents over the person and property of their min
children. The Code of Civil Procedure impliedly repealed some parts of the old
Spanish code. According to the Code of Civil Procedure, there is no longer a nee
d to
be formally emancipated by the parents after attaining the age of majority. At t
time of the furnishing of the mortgage emancipation documents, Joaqin was alread
of legal age and so his mortgage remained valid, while Zoilo s mortgage was not
valid even if he signed it with his mother because he was a minor when he execut
the mortgage.

Ocampo v. Buenaventura
Case No. 88
G.R. No. L-32293 (January 24, 1974)
On September 11, 1966 the Cebu Police Department arrested and detained
Edgardo Ocampo and other minors for an alleged violation of Ordinance No. 228
which fixed curfew hours. The minors were then convicted for violation of said
ordinance. On appeal, the minors were acquitted since the reason they violated t
ordinance was to attend a birthday, which is considered as a wholesome
assemblage, and therefore falls under the exception to the curfew rule. Roberto
Ocampo filed a complaint against the Respondents for serious misconduct, grave
abuse of authority, and commission of a felony. The Mayor issued an ordinance
exonerating the policemen. On March 17, 1969 a complaint was lodged with the
Police Commission for the same grounds.
W/N the Mayor can decide or investigate on administrative cases involving
police service and personnel.
The Respondents argument is devoid of merit. The power of local officials to
investigate and decide administrative cases involving police service and personn
has been transferred to the POLCOM under RA 4864. According to Commission v.
Hon. Bello, Sec. 26 of the Police Act is a mere saving clause and refers only to
administrative cases involving police personnel and service pending at the time
the effectivity of the Act (September 8, 1969). Sec. 26 may not be interpreted t
mean that the Board of Investigators and Police Commission could not legally
function to carry into effect the purpose of the Act until after the lapse of th
e 100
1, 6c, 6d
Aisporna v. Court of Appeals and People
Case No. 6
G.R. No. L-39419 (April 12, 1982)
Chapter VI, Page 248, Footnote No. 8
Petitioner Mrs. Aisporna was charged with violation of Sec. 189 of the
Insurance Act for allegedly acting as an insurance agent without first securing
certificate of authority to act as such from the office of the Insurance Commiss
Mrs. Aisporna, however, maintained that she was not liable because she only assi
her husband, and that she did not receive any compensation.
W/N the receipt of compensation is an essential element for violation of Sec.
Receipt of compensation is essential to be considered an insurance agent.
Every part of a statute must be considered together with the other parts, a kept
subservient to the general intent of the enactment, and not separately and
independently. The term agent used in par. 1 of Sec. 189 is defined in par. 2 of t
same section. Applying the definition of an insurance agent in par. 2 to the age
nt in
par. 1 would give harmony to the aforementioned 3 paragraphs of Sec. 189. A
statute must be construed so as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisio
wherever possible. Every part of the statute must be considered together with th
other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.
6c, 9c, 28, 36b, 36c, 36d, 37

Gaanan v. Indeterminate Appellate Court

Case No. 108
G.R. No. L-69809 (October 16, 1986)
Chapter VI, Page 249, Footnote No. 11
Atty. Pintor called Leonardo Laconico to discuss the terms of the withdrawal
of his complaint for direct assault against Laconico in the City Fiscal of Cebu.
same day, Laconico called the Appellant, Atty. Edgardo Gaanan to come to his
office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case. When
complainant Pintor called up, Laconico requested Appellant Gaanan to secretly
listen to the telephone call through the extension phone.
W/N an extension telephone is one of the prohibited devices covered by Sec.
1 of RA 4200.
Telephone party lines were intentionally deleted from the provisions of the Act.
must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate insta
of a device. An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as the
devices enumerated in Sec. 1 RA 4200. In order to determine the true intent of t
legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be tak
en as
detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. In the case of Empire Insu
Company v. Rufino, held that the phrase device or arrangement in Sec. 1 of RA
4200, although not exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be construed to
comprehend instruments of the same nature, that is, instruments the use of which
would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. Furthermore, it is
general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accu
6c, 11g, 29, 30a, 36c, 36d, 48, b2
Radiola-Toshiba Phils. Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate
Case No. 249
G.R. No. 75222 (July 18, 1991)
Chapter VI, Page 252, Footnote No. 20
The levy on attachment against the subject properties of spouses Carlos and
Teresita Gatmaytan was issued on March 4, 1980 by the Court of First Instance of
Pasig. However, the insolvency proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Ange
City was commenced more than four months after the issuance of the said
attachment. Under the circumstances, Petitioner Radiola-Toshiba Phils. contended
that its lien on the subject properties overrode the insolvency proceeding and w
not dissolved thereby.
W/N the levy on attachment dissolved the insolvency proceedings against
Respondent spouses even though it commenced four months after said attachment.
No. Sec. 32 of the Insolvency Law is clear that there is a cut off period one
month in attachment cases and thirty days in judgments entered in actions
commenced prior to the insolvency proceedings. Also, there is no conflict betwee
Sec. 32 and Sec. 79. Where a statute is susceptible to more than one interpretat
the court should adopt such reasonable and beneficial construction as will rende
the provision thereof operative and effective and harmonious with each other.
6c, 36a, 37

Lopez v. El Hogar Filipino

Case No. 152
G.R. No. L-22678 (January 12, 1925)
Chapter VI, Page 251, Footnote No. 16
Pursuant to a contract of loan and mortgage, El Hogar Filipino caused the
mortgaged properties to be sold publicly in an extra-judicial sale. Lopez and
Javelona, in whose favor the loan was made, sought to have the contract of loan
and mortgage annulled on the ground that the agreement was usurious. They
contended that the court erred in holding that the word void , as used in the Usury
Law, was intended to make the entire transaction a nullity.
W/N the meaning of the word void , as used in the Usury Law, was intended
to make the entire transaction a nullity.
No. From the very context of the law, the legislature, in using the word void ,
did not intend that the transaction should be a complete nullity. It was only wi
respect to the usurious interest. The intention of the legislature must be ascer
not from the consideration of a single word or a particular phrase of the law, b
ut from
the context of the whole law or from a portion thereof, as compared with the who
Every part of the act should be read with the purpose of discovering the mind of
9b, 25a, 37
JMM Promotions v. NLRC
Case No. 136
G.R. No. 109835 (November 22, 1993)
Chapter VI, Page 251, Footnote No. 21
JMM Promotions paid license fee amounting to P30, 000 and posted a cash
bond of P100, 000 and a surety bond of P50,000, as required by the POEA Rules.
When JMM Promotions appealed to NLRC regarding a decision rendered by POEA,
the NLRC dismissed the petition for failure to post the required appeal bond as
required by Art. 223 of the Labor Code.
Is JMM Promotions still required to post the required appeal bond, as required
by Art. 223 of the Labor Code, considering it has already posted a cash bond and
surety bond, as required by the POEA?
Yes. The POEA Rules regarding monetary appeals are clear. A reading of the
POEA Rules shows that, in addition to the cash and surety bonds and the escrow
money, an appeal bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary award is required
to perfect an appeal from a decision of the POEA.
6b, 6d, 7a, 12a, 36a, 37

Araneta v. Concepcion
Case No. 17
G.R. No. L-9667, (July 31, 1956)
Chapter VI, Page 252, Footnote No. 24
The husband filed a case for legal separation against his wife on the ground
of adultery. After the issues were joined, Defendant therein filed an omnibus pe
to secure the custody of their three minor children, a monthly support of P5,000
herself and said children, and the return of her passport; to enjoin Plaintiff f
ordering his hirelings from harassing and molesting her; and to have Plaintiff t
pay for the fees of her attorney in the action. The judge rendered his decision
regarding the omnibus petition and granted the custody of the children to
Defendant, a monthly allowance of P2,300 for support for her and the children, P
for a house, and P2,000 as attorney s fees. The judge refused to reconsider the or
W/N the parties are required to submit evidence before deciding the
omnibus petition.
No. If the parties are allowed to present evidences regarding the omnibus
petition, it would violate the intent of the law regarding the 6-month cooling p
contained in Art. 103 of the Civil Code. A recital of grievances in court may fa
n their
grievances against one another; the legislature s intent is to give them opportuni
ty for
dispassionate reflection. Note, however, that the case was filed after 6 months
of the
filing of the legal separation case. As such, the determination of the custody a
alimony must have been given force and effect, provided it did not go to the ext
of violating the policy of the cooling off period.
9a, 27, 36a, 36c, 36d, 37
Lichauco vs. Apostol
Case No. 147
G.R. No. L-19628 (December 4, 1922)
Chapter VI, Page 252, Footnote No. 23
Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the business of importing carabao and
other draft animals. It now desires to import from Pnom-Pehn a shipment of draft
cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum. However, the Director of
Agriculture refuses to admit said cattle, except upon the condition stated in
Administrative Order No. 21 of the Bureau of Agriculture that said cattle shall
been immunized from rinderpest before embarkation at Pnom-Pehn.
Legislations involved in the case:
Sec. 1762 of the Administrative Code prohibition against bringing of animals fro
infected foreign country
Sec. 1770 of the Administrative Code Bringing of diseased animal into islands
Sec. 1762 of the Administrative Code as amended by Act No. 3052 Bringing of
animals imported from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands
W/N Sec. 1762 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3052, has
been repealed by the implication in Sec. 1770.
No. Sec. 1762, as amended, is of a general nature, while Sec. 1770 deals with
a particular contingency not made the subject of legislation in Sec. 1762. Sec.
therefore is not considered as inconsistent with Sec. 1762 and it must be consid
as a special qualification of Sec. 1762. Sec. 1770 of the Administrative Code re
in full force and effect, being a special law having special contingency not dea
within Sec. 1762, which extends merely to the importation of draft animals for
purposes of manufacturing serum.
2a, 36a, 38b, 50

Cassion v. Banco Filipino

Case No. 51
G.R. No. L-3540 (July 30, 1951)
Chapter VI, Page 256, Footnote No. 31
Plaintiffs mortgaged two parcels of land to PNB for P600. Plaintiffs defaulted
and PNB extra judicially foreclosed the mortgage and sold it to Cabatigan. After
year but before the expiration of 5 years, Plaintiffs offered to repurchase the
land but
PNB turned down the offer. PNB relied on RA 2938 and RA 3135, which created the
PNB and authorizes it to have extra judicial foreclosure of mortgage respectivel
while Plaintiffs relied on RA 2874, known as the Public Land act, which provided
every conveyance of land acquired under free patent or homestead provisions shal
be subject to repurchase by the applicant for a period of 5 years from date of
Which of the conflicting statues should prevail?
When two or more conflicting statues exist, as when general and special
provisions are inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the former and a particu
intent will control a general one that is inconsistent with it regardless of to
respective dates of passage. RA 2874 specially relates to specific property, thu
s it is
an exception to the coverage of RA 2938 and 3135.
9, 38a, 38b, 40b, 50
People v. Palmon
Case No. 220
G.R. No. L-2860 (May 11, 1950)
Chapter VI, Page 257, Footnote No. 35
Palmon was charged with serious physical injuries (prision correctional in med
and max period 2 yrs, 4 mos. 1 day 6 yrs) before the CFI of Capiz. Before the
arraignment of the accused, the judge motu proprio dismissed the case on the
ground that under Sec. 87 of RA 296, the crime falls under the jurisdiction of t
justice of the peace. However, the solicitor general contended that CFI has
Which court has jurisdiction to try the case?
Sec 44(f) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 confers original jurisdiction on the CFI
over all criminal case in which the penalty provided is imprisonment for more th
an 6
months. Sec. 87 of the same act also confers original jurisdiction on the justic
e of the
peace and the judges of municipal courts over all criminal cases relating to ass
where the intent to kill is not charged upon the trial. Hence, the CFI and justi
ce of the
peace courts have concurrent original jurisdiction over the case.
36c, 36d, 37
Chartered Bank v. Imperial and National Bank
Case No. 57
G.R. No. 17222 (March 15, 1921)
Chapter VI, Page 257, Footnote No. 35
Umberto de Poli was declared to be in a state of insolvency at the instance of
Plaintiff, and the sheriff was ordered to take possession of all property of sai
Defendant. In an earlier case, the PNB had obtained a writ by virtue of which th
sheriff also seized certain goods owned by the insolvent. Plaintiff asserted tha
t since
the insolvent had been declared as such, all civil proceedings against him shoul
have been suspended according to the last portion of Sec. 60 of the insolvency l
Which provision is controlling upon the case?
To ascertain the meaning of the various provisions of the insolvency law, every
section, provision and clause of a statue must be expounded in reference to ever
other. Thus, Sec. 60 should be understood in reference with the other provisions
the same law, and as such the PNB falls under the exception to Sec. 60 as stated
the other provision of the same law.
9, 36c, 36d, 36e, 37, b2
Montenegro v. Castañeda and Balao
Case No. 179
G.R. No. L-4221 (August 30, 1952)
Chapter VI, Page 258, Footnote No. 39
Maximino Montenegro was arrested in Manila by agents of the Military
Intelligence Service of the AFP for complicity with a communistic organization i
n the
commission of acts of rebellion, insurrection or sedition. Maximino s father then
submitted an application for writ seeking the release of his son. Three days aft
er, Pres.
Quirino issued Proclamation No. 210 suspending the privilege of the writ of habe
W/N Proclamation No. 210 is erroneous since it included sedition, which is not
under the Constitution.
W/N the Bill of Rights prohibited the suspension of the privilege of the writ.
There is no doubt that it was erroneous to include sedition. Art. 7 only
provides invasion, insurrection, rebellion or imminent danger as grounds for
suspension. Sedition should be deemed as a mistake or surplusage that does not
taint the decree as a whole. Also, as posed by Prof. Aruego, the Bill of Rights
denied suspension in case of imminent danger, while Art. 7 expressly authorized
President to suspend when there is imminent danger. Moreover, during the
Constitutional Convention, the debates voted down an amendment to add another
cause, which is imminent danger of invasion, insurrection or rebellion.
6c, 15a, 20b, 36f, b2

Arabay Inc. v. CFI of Zamboanga

Case No. 16
G.R. No. L-37684 (September 10, 1975)
Chapter VI Page 259, Footnote No. 43
The Municipality of Dipolog enacted Ordinance No. 19 that charged tax for
the selling and distribution of gasoline, lubricating oils, diesel fuel oils, an
d petroleum-
based products. Arabay Inc., distributor of gas, oil and other petroleum product
contested the validity of such on the ground that the tax is beyond the power of
municipality to levy under Sec. 2 of RA No. 2264, which provides that municipali
may not impose tax on articles subject to specific tax except gasoline.
W/N Arabay Inc. is entitled to a refund.
The ordinance levied a sales tax not only because of the character of the
ordinance as a sales tax ordinance, but also because the phraseology of the
provision reveals in clear terms the intention to impose a tax on sale. It is ev
ident from
the terms that the amount of the tax that may be collected is directly dependent
upon to the volume of sales. Since Sec. 2 of the Local Autonomy Act prohibits th
municipality from imposing sales and specific tax, with the exception of gasolin
there subsists the right of Arabay Inc. to a refund. The reasonable and practica
interpretation of the terms of the proviso in question resulted in the conclusio
n that
Congress, in excluding gasoline, deliberately and intentionally meant to put it
the power of such local governments to impose whatever type or form of taxes.
6c, 11e, 12a, 14, 20a
Paras v. COMELEC
Case No. 196
G.R. No. 123169 (November 4, 1996)
Chapter VI, Page 259, Footnote No. 50
A petition for recall was filed against Paras, who is the incumbent Punong
Barangay. The recall election was deferred due to Petitioner s opposition that und
Sec. 74 of RA No. 7160, no recall shall take place within one year from the date
of the
official s assumption to office or one year immediately preceding a regular local
election. Since the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set on the first Mond
of May 2006, no recall may be instituted.
W/N the SK election is a local election.
No. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to its context,
and it must be considered together and kept subservient to its general intent. T
evident intent of Sec. 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall onc
e during his
term, as provided in par. (a) and par. (b). The spirit, rather than the letter o
f a law,
determines its construction. Thus, interpreting the phrase regular local election
include SK election will unduly circumscribe the Code for there will never be a
election rendering inutile the provision. In interpreting a statute, the Court a
that the legislature intended to enact an effective law. An interpretation shoul
d be
avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated,
meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.
9a, 11d, 25b, 27, 36b, 37, 38

Javellana v. Kintanar
Case No. 138
G.R. No. L-33169 July 30, 1982
Chapter VI, Page 262, Footnote No.55
Petitioner is the owner of a market (building and lot) in Crossing Bago, Bago
City, which consists of store spaces and of permanent and movable stalls leased
vendors. Said market has served the general population of the City of Bago for m
than twenty (20) years already when it was denied the payment of Petitioner for
municipal license for the 3rd quarter of 1968 on the ground that Ordinance No. 1
had been enacted prohibiting the establishment, maintenance or operation of a
public market in the City of Bago by any person, entity, or corporation other th
an the
local government. Appellant claims that a public market is one that is not owned
privately; whereas the appellees say that is one that serves the general public.

W/N the marketplace owned by Petitioner is a public market.
The test of a public market is its dedication to the service of the general
public and not its ownership. A scrutiny of the charter provision will readily s
how that
by public market, it is meant one that is intended to serve the general public.
Petitioner himself so declared when he testified that his market is engaged in
servicing the public, not only in Bago City, but also those coming from other
1, 2a, 6d, 40c
Niere v. CFI of Negros Occidental, Branch II
Case No. 188
G.R. No. L-30324 November 29, 1973
Chapter VI, Page 262, Footnote No.60
Petitioner is a Civil Service eligible and was appointed city engineer of La
Carlota City by the City Mayor pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 21 of RA 4858
City Charter). After the enactment of the Decentralization Act, Private Responde
was appointed by the President of the Philippines as city engineer of La Carlota
Petitioner refused to turn over office and claimed that he was the one legally
appointed as city engineer under RA 4858. House Bill No. 9711, which became RA
4585, originally expressly included city engineer as one of those whom the city
can appoint under Sec. 21 of said RA, but during the period of amendment in the
Senate, the position of said engineer was deleted in the final draft of Sec. 21.

1. W/N deletion of the position of city engineer in Sec. 21 of RA 4585 an amendm
purely of form only or not.
2. W/N appointing authority for the post of city engineer belongs to the city Ma
yor or
1. NO, it is a substantial amendment. Nothing could be more substantial than the
vesting of a power to appoint such an important city official as the city engine
er. If
Congress wanted to authorize the city mayor to appoint all heads and employees o
city department, it could have easily re-phrased Sec. 21 of the City Charter to
effect. Such section expressly limits the appointing authority of the mayor.
2. NO. Since the city mayor under Sec. 21 is without authority to appoint the ci
engineer, this prerogative can only be exercised by the President of the Philipp
who, under Sec. 10(3) of Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, shall nominate wi
th the
consent of the Commission on Appointments all other officers of the government
whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for
6c, 29, 30a, 32, 38b, b2

Uytengsu vs. Republic of the Philippines

Case No. 307
G.R. No. L-6379 (September 29, 1954)
Chapter VI, Page 263, Footnote No.61
Petitioner-appellee was born, of Chinese parents in Dumaguete, Negros
Oriental n October 6, 1927. After finishing primary and secondary education here
the Philippines, he went to the United States to further his studies from the ye
1947-1950. In April of the same year he returned to the Philippines for four (4)
vacation. On July 15, 1950, he filed for naturalization. Forthwith, he returned
to the
United States and took a post-graduate degree which he finished in July 1951l bu
t he
did not return to the Philippines until October 13, 1951. Hence, the original da
te of
hearing the case, originally scheduled to take place on July 12, 1951, had to be
1. W/N the application for naturalization may be granted, notwithstanding the fa
that petitioner left the Philippines immediately after the filing of his petitio
n and did
not return until several months after the first date set for the hearing thereof
2. W/N domicile and residence are synonymous.
1. No. Section 7 of C.A. No. 473 requires applicant for naturalization to reside
continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition up t
o the time
of his admission to Philippine citizenship.
2. No. Although the words residence and domicile are often used
interchangeably, each has, in strict legal parlance, a meaning distinct and diff
from that of the other. Actual and substantial residence within the Philippines,
legal residence or domicile, is required. Residence indicates permanency of
occupation, distinct from lodging or boarding, or temporary occupation. Domicile
residence with intention to stay.
6c, 7, 11a, 25a, 37
Manila Lodge No. 176 v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 165
G.R. No.L-41001 and G.R. No.L-41012 (September 30, 1976)
Chapter VI, Page 264, Footnote No. 63
The Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1306 which authorized the City of
Manila to reclaim a portion of Manila Bay. The reclaimed area was to form part o
f the
Luneta extension. The act provided that the reclaimed area shall be the property
the City of Manila, and the city is authorized to set aside a tract of the recla
imed land
for a hotel site and to lease or to sell the same. Later, the City of Manila con
veyed a
portion of the reclaimed area to Petitioner. Then Petitioner sold the land, toge
ther with
all the improvements, to the Tarlac Development Corporation (TDC).
W/N the subject property was patrimonial property of the City of Manila.
The petitions were denied for lack of merit. The court found it necessary to
analyze all the provisions of Act No. 1360, as amended, in order to unravel the
legislative intent. The grant made by Act No. 1360 of the reclaimed land to the
City of
Manila is a grant of a public nature. Such grants have always been strictly constr
against the grantee because it is a gratuitous donation of public money or resou
which resulted in an unfair advantage to the grantee. In the case at bar, the ar
reclaimed would be filled at the expense of the Insular Government and without c
to the City of Manila. Hence, the letter of the statute should be narrowed to ex
matters which, if included, would defeat the policy of legislation.
2a, 6c, 9a, 36b, 37, 43

Almeda v. Florentino
Case No. 10
G.R. No.L-23800 (December 21, 1965)
Chapter VI, Page 265, Footnote No. 67
RA183, the charter of Pasay City (enacted June 21, 1947), provides in its Sec. 1
that the Board shall have a secretary who shall be appointed by it to serve durin
g the
term of office of the members thereof On June 18, 1960, RA 2709 amended Sec. 12
of RA 183. On the strength of Par. 2 of Sec. 12 of the Pasay City Charter, as am
the Vice-Mayor of Pasay City appointed Petitioner Almeda as secretary of the
Municipal Board of said City. The very next day, the Board refused to recognize
Petitioner as its secretary and, in turn, appointed Respondent Florentino to the
purportedly under Sec. 14 of the City Charter.
Which law applies on the matter of the appointment of the Secretary of the
Municipal Board of Pasay City?
The petition was dismissed. There is nothing in RA 2709 that indicates any
intention on the part of the Legislature to repeal, alter, or modify in any way
provisions of Sec. 14 of R.A 183. Repeals by implication are not favored, unless
it is
manifested that the legislature so intended.
9c, 37, 49, 50
Abellana v. Marave
Case No. 3
G.R. No.L-27760 (May 29, 1974)
Chapter VI, Page 266, Footnote No. 71
Petitioner was prosecuted of the crime of physical injuries through reckless
imprudence. The criminal case was filed with the city court of Ozamis City, whic
found Petitioner guilty as charged. Petitioner appealed such decision to the CFI
. At
this stage, the Private Respondents as the offended parties filed with another b
of the CFI of Misamis Occidental presided by Respondent Judge, a separate and
independent civil action for damages. Petitioner sought for the dismissal of suc
action principally on the ground that there was no reservation for the filing th
ereof in
the City Court of Ozamis Respondent Judge was not persuaded and issued the order
to deny Petitioners motion to dismiss.
W/N the order was issued with grave abuse of discretion.
Petition for certiorari is dismissed. Petitioner s literal reading of the Sec. 1 o
f Rule
111 of the Rules of Court ignores the de novo aspect of appealed cases from city
courts as provided in Sec. 7 of Rule 123. Such interpretation, does likewise, gi
ve rise to
a constitutional question that may trench on a substantive right in accordance t
o Art.
33 of the Civil Code.2 As stated in Art. X, Sec. 5, par.5 of the 1973 Constituti
on, the
grant of power to this Court does not extend to any diminution, increase or
modification of substantive rights. Thus, it is a well-settled doctrine that a c
ourt is to
avoid construing a statute or legal norm in such a manner as would give rise to
constitutional doubt. Lastly, in the case at bar, literal construction of the la
w is not
favored. The law as an instrument of social control will fail in its function if
through an
ingenious construction sought to be fastened on a legal norm, particularly a
procedural rule, there is placed an impediment to a litigant being given an
opportunity of vindicating an alleged right.
6c, 12a, 37
Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad
Case No. 317
G.R. No. L-20479 (February 6, 1925)
Chapter VI, Page 267, Footnote No. 78
Act 2972 prohibited record books of Merchants from being written in a
language other than English, Spanish, or a local dialect. Yu Cong Eng, a Chinese
merchant, was penalized for keeping books written in Chinese. He and other Chine
merchants challenged the constitutionality of the law.
Is Act 2972 constitutional?
It is constitutional. The purpose of the Act is to prevent fraud in book keeping
and evasion of taxes for the protection of the public good. This decision is con
with the ruling in Kwong Sing v. City of Manila, where laundrymen were prohibite
from issuing receipts written in Chinese. Class legislation is thus allowed if i
t is for the
public good. Instead of interpreting the Act as a blanket prohibition against ke
books in Chinese, it may be interpreted as a directory measure that records
pertaining to taxes must be written or annotated in English, Spanish, or a local
or have a duplicate in any of these languages. This liberal interpretation is re
and it upholds constitutionality.
1a, 6d, 9c, 11e, 37
City of Naga v. Agna
Case No. 63
G.R. No. L-36049 (May 31, 1976)
Chapter VI, Page 268, Footnote No. 83
The City of Naga changed its tax system from graduated tax to percentage
tax. Respondent taxpayers insisted on paying the new taxes the following year,
pursuant to the Revised Administrative Code (Sec. 2309). It stated that tax
enactments changing the current system prior to December 15 should take effect
the following year. The Naga City government, on the other hand, claimed that
under the Local Autonomy Act (RA 2264), tax ordinances take effect 15 days after
publication; this allegedly impliedly repealed Sec. 2309 of the Admin Code.
Did RA 2264 repeal Sec. 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code?
No, it did not. There is a presumption against implied repeal; a subsequent
provision only repeals a prior provision clearly contradictory to it. If two law
s can be
harmonized, then the Courts shall do so. Sec. 2309 of the Revised Admin Code
applies in this case because the new tax changed a prior tax system. RA 2264 onl
applies for entirely new tax provisions.
37, 38a, 38b

Case No. 152
G.R. No. 112093 (October 4, 1994)
BP 885 is an act creating the new province of Negros del Norte. The plebiscite
for the approval of the act was only conducted in the municipalities prospective
composing the new province. The parent provinces, which will get also affected,
were not included in the plebiscite.
Is BP 885 unconstitutional?
It is unconstitutional. The Constitution provides that a plebiscite must be held
in all units affected, including the parent province, and not just the new areas
. The
draft bill provided that the plebiscite be conducted in all units, and not just
the areas
constituting the new province, but the final bill only limited it to the latter.

Philippine Government v. Municipality of Binangonan
Case No. 118
G.R. No. L-10202 (March 29, 1916)
Chapter VI, Page 268, Footnote No. 84
Petitioner Municipality of Cardona challenged the constitutionality of EO 66
by the Governor-General granting Binangonan municipal authority over 7 additiona
barrios. Petitioner claimed that the Governor-General has no legislative authori
ty and
that this legislation was not for the public good.
Is EO 66 constitutional?
It is constitutional. Every act of legislation is presumed to be constitutional
for the public good; facts need not be stated to prove it.
12a, 37
People v. Del Rosario
Case No. 105
G.R. No. L-7234 (May 21, 1955)
On July 27, 1953, information was filed in the Municipal Court of Pasay
charging Paz M. del Rosario with slight physical injuries committed on May 28, 1
The accused presented a motion to quash the information on the ground that the
offense charged had already prescribed in accordance with Art. 90 and Art. 91 of
the RPC. The municipal court sustained the motion and dismissed the case. Hence,
an appeal against the dismissal is made to the Supreme Court.
Whether the prescriptive period should commence from the very day on
which the crime was committed, or from the day following that in which it was
W/N the term month in the RPC should be understood to be a month of 30
days, instead of the civil/calendar month.
1. In computation of the period of time within which an act is to be done, the l
aw has
always directed that the first be excluded and the last included (Art. 13, Civil
Art. 18 of the CC directs that any deficiency in any special law must be supplie
d by
its provisions. As the RPC is deficient in that it does not explicitly define ho
w the period
is to be computed, resort must be had to Art. 13 of the CC.
2. By express provision of Article 13 on the new Civil Code, a month is to be
considered as the regular 30-day month. In accordance therewith, the term month
used in Art. 90 of the RPC should be understood to mean the regular 30-day month
and not the solar or civil month. Hence, the Court held that the offense charged
not yet prescribed because July is the 60th day from May 29.
6c, 38b, 46a
Salvatierra v. Court of Appeals
Case No.
G.R. No. 107797 (August 26, 1996)
Enrique Salvatierra died intestate and was survived by his legitimate brothers,
Tomas, Bartolome, Venancio, and Macario, and a sister, Marcela. His estate
consisted of 3 parcels of land (Lots 25, 26, & 27). Macario sold the 405 sq. mts
. out of
the 749 sq. mts. total area of Lot 26 to his son, Anselmo. Eventually, an extraju
partition with confirmation of sale was executed by and among the surviving legal
heirs of Enrique, which consisted of the aforementioned lots. Thereafter, Venanc
sold Lot No. 7 (which belonged to him by virtue of the said partition), and a 14
9-sq. m.
portion of Lot 26 to spouses Longalongs. It turned out, however, that Anselmo al
obtained an OCT covering the whole of Lot No. 26. The complaints for reconveyanc
were filed 5 years after the issuance of such OCT to Anselmo.
Which prescriptive period for actions for annulment should prevail, Art. 1391 of
the new CC or Art. 1144 of the same Code?
W/N there was a double sale.
1. Art. 1144 of the CC prevails. The prescriptive period for such actions is 10
years, as
held in previous cases. Hence, the action for reconveyance had not yet prescribe
There is no ambiguity in the terms and stipulations of the extrajudicial partiti
on. Thus,
the literal and plain meaning thereof should be observed. What Anselmo bought
from his father was only 405 sq. m of Lot 26. The registration of the whole Lot
26 in the
name of Anselmo was, therefore, done with evident bad faith.
2. There was no double sale. Both parties did not dispute the contents of the
extrajudicial partition.
5a, 6c, 7a

Pasno v. Ravina and Ravina

Case No. 199
G.R. No. 31581 (February 3, 1930)
Chapter VI, Page 273, Footnote No. 104
Labitoria, during her lifetime, mortgaged 3 parcels of land to the PNB. When
Labitoria died, a petition was presented for the probate of her last will and
testament. During the pendency of the case, a special administrator of the estat
e of
the deceased was appointed by the court. The special administrator failed to
comply with the conditions of the mortgage, and the PNB asked the sheriff to
proceed with the sale of the parcels of land. The CFI ruled in favor of the spec
administrator requiring the sheriff to abstain from selling the said lands.
W/N the will is valid
W/N the PNB had the right to foreclose in its favor the mortgage which was
executed by Labitoria now that the mortgaged property is in custodia legis.
1. The law does not require that the will shall be dated. Accordingly, an errone
date will not defeat a will.
2. Yes. The PNB had the right to foreclose the said mortgaged property. The
mortgagee should foreclose the mortgage in accordance with Sec. 708 of the Code
of Civil Procedure. Since Act 3135 fails to make provision regarding the sale of
mortgaged property which is in custodia legis, it would be logical to suppose Se
c. 708
of the Code of Civil Procedure would govern latter contingency. Act 3115 must be
presumed to have been acquainted with the provisions of the Code of Civil
38a, 38b
C & C Commercial v. NAWASA
Case No. 42
G.R. No. L-27275 (November 18, 1967)
Chapter VI, Page 274, Footnote No. 107
NAWASA conducted three separate bids for the three different waterworks
projects in Manila, Davao and Iloilo. However, C & C Commercial Corporation, one
of those who participated in the bidding but eventually lost, filed three
corresponding supplemental complaints on each of the aforesaid waterworks
projects contending that NAWASA violated Sec. 1 of RA 912, which should give
preference to local materials that are available, practicable and usable. The sa
law also provides that this nationalistic policy of preferring for locally produ
materials is in relation to the construction or repair work undertaken by the
Government. NAWASA alleged that it should not be included within the meaning of
the term Government as used in the said law.
W/N NAWASA falls under the term government under RA 912.
Yes. The NAWASA should be deemed embraced within the term
government found in RA 312, and in the construction of their works or purchase of
materials thereof, local material should be given preference whenever available,
practicable and usable. Government-owned or controlled corporations are not
exempted from RA 912. Two laws are being considered in this case: C.A. No. 138 a
RA 912. Both relate to the same subject matter and have the same nationalistic
purpose or object which is to give preference to locally produced materials in
purchases, works or projects of the Government (referring to Filipino-First poli
9a, 35, 36, 37, 38a, 38b

Butuan Sawmill, Inc. v. City of Butuan

Case No. 41
G.R. No. L-21516 (April 29, 1966)
Chapter VI, Page 277, Footnote No. 119
The Petitioner was granted a legislative franchise under RA 399 for an electric
light, heat, and power system in Butuan and Cabadbaran, Agusan, together with th
issuance of a certificate of public convenience and necessity by the Public Serv
Commission. However, the City of Butuan issued Ordinances numbered 11, 131 and
148 imposing a 2% tax on the gross sales or receipts of any business operated in
city. Butuan Sawmill, Inc. questioned the validity of the taxing ordinance which
deemed to have impaired the obligation of contract thereby depriving the Petitio
of property without due process of law. On the other hand, Respondent maintained
that it was vested with the power to provide for the levy and collection of taxes
general and special purposes as stipulated in its charter which was granted in 19
W/N the inclusion of the franchise business of Petitioners falls within the
coverage of the taxing ordinances pursuant to the city s power of taxation.
No. the inclusion of the franchise business of the Butuan Sawmill, Inc. by the
City of Butuan is beyond the broad power of taxation of the city under its chart
Neither could the latter s power therein granted be taken as an authority delegate
to the city to amend or alter the franchise, considering the absence of an expre
ss or
specific grant of power to do so. Where there are two statutes, the earlier spec
and the latter general and the terms of the general are broad enough to include
the matter provided for in the special the fact that one is special and the othe
r is
general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as a remainin
exception to the general as a general law of the land, while the other as the la
w of a
particular case.
25, 50, d
Manila Railroad Co. v. Rafferty
Case No. 168
G.R. No. 14205 (September 30, 1919)
Chapter VI, Page 279, Footnote No. 124
The Defendant assessed and collected against Manila Railroad internal
revenue taxes upon oil and coal materials imported into the Philippine by virtue
of an
act of Congress in 1913. The latter contended that the taxes had been illegally
collected pursuant to a private charter granted by the legislature in 1906. On t
other hand, Rafferty asserts that the 1913 Act of Congress repealed the 1906 pri
W/N the 1913 Act of Congress repealed the 1906 private charter.
No. A special law (including private charters) having the character of a
private contract, supposes that the legislators intended to attend to the specia
l facts
and circumstances, the consideration of such being embodied in the special law.
general law subsequently enacted by the legislature cannot be taken to have
modified or altered the charter, unless the intent to modify or alter is manifes
t. Where
the general act is later, the special statute will be construed as remaining an
exception to its terms, unless repealed expressly or by necessary implication.
37, 50

De Jesus v. People of the Philippines

Case No. 87
G. R. No. L-61998 (February 22, 1983)
Chapter VI, Page 277, Footnote No. 117
The Petitioner, COMELEC registrar of Casiguran, was charged by the
Tanodbayan before the Sandiganbayan with the violation of the 1978 Election Code
He filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the jurisdiction t
investigate, prosecute and try the offense charged against him is lodged with th
COMELEC, and, coincidentally, the Court of First Instance (now RTC).
W/N the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over election offenses with respect to
public officers.
No. Sec. 2 of Art. XII [C] of the 1973 Constitution granted COMELEC the power
to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections, while Sec
182 of the 1978 Election Code vested the Commission with authority to conduct
preliminary investigation and subsequently prosecute all election offenses punis
under the same Code. The legislative intent in granting COMELEC the said power i
s to
insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of elections. To divest the COMELEC
of its
authority would seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving the aforemention
constitutional mandate. At the same time, Sec 184 of the Election Code, which de
specifically with election offenses, must be favored over provisions of P.D. 160
6 which
speaks generally of other crimes or offenses committed by public officers in rel
to their office. The former cannot be construed as impliedly repealed by the lat
thereby continuing to be an exception granted the more specific legislative inte
nt it
6, 9, 37, 38, 50
US v. Almond
Case No. 157
G.R. No. 2517 (June 2, 1906)
The complaint alleges that R.W. Almond, master and in charge of the
steamship Rubi brought Tawas Tahan, is an alien of East India who is afflicted w
trachoma. He permitted Tawas Tahan to land in the Philippine Islands from the
steamship at a place and time other than that designated by the immigration
officers. The evidence showed that Defendant adopted due precautions to prevent
the landing of Tawas Tahan, and that if the landing was made, it was made withou
the Defendant s knowledge or consent.
W/N a conviction can be sustained when it appears that there was no
consent, either tacit or express, to the landing of the alien.
Sec. 18 imposes upon one who has brought immigrant aliens into a United
States port the duty of adopting due precautions to prevent the landing of any s
alien at any time or place other than that designated by the immigration officer
s and
fixes a penalty for permitting an alien so to land. The word permit implies that t
landing of the alien must be with the express or tacit consent of the owner, off
agent or person in charge of the vessel.
6c, 11e, 41a, 48
US v. Estapia
Case No. 298
G.R. No. 12891 (October 19, 1917)
Chapter VII, Page 289, Footnote No. 23
A case was filed against Defendants for having engaged in cockfighting, in
violation of Sec. 1 of Act. No. 480. The Defendants held a cockfight on a cleari
near a grove of buri palms. The prosecution argued that the term cockpit should
be construed to mean any place in which a cockfight takes place.
W/N the clearing where the cockfight was held by the Defendants is a
cockpit within the contemplation of the law.
The term cockpit as used in the statute has a limited meaning so it cannot
be construed to mean or include a clearing such as had been used by the
Defendants. Penal provisions of a statute are to be construed strictly and parti
words used in the law should be construed in relation to the context.
25, 37, 48
U.S. v. Abad Santos
Case No. 294
G.R. No. 12262 (February 10, 1917)
Chapter VII, Page 290, Footnote No. 28
The Appellant was accused of violating the provisions of the Internal Revenue
Law by failing to make an entry for the January 5, 1915 indicating whether any
business was done on that day or not. He had employed a bookkeeper with the
expectation that the latter would perform all the duties pertaining to his posit
including the entries required to be made by the Collector of Internal Revenue.
W/N the Appellant is guilty of violating the Internal Revenue Law.
The Appellant must be acquitted since it is undisputed that he took no part in
the keeping of the book in question and that he never personally made an entry i
n it
as he left everything to his bookkeeper. Courts will not hold one person crimina
responsible for acts of another done without his knowledge or consent, unless th
e law
clearly so provides.
41a, 48


People v. Atop
Case No. 202
G.R. Nos. 124303-05 (February 10, 1998)
Chapter VII, Page 290, Footnote No. 29
Appellant was found guilty of 3 counts of rape. The trial court sentenced him
to 2 terms of reclusion perpetua for the first two counts, and to death for the
holding that his common-law relationship with the victim s grandmother aggravated
the penalty. Private complainant Regina Guafin, 12 years old, is the granddaught
of Trinidad Mejos, the common-law wife of the Appellant.
1. W/N the trial court erred in appreciating the nighttime and relationship as
aggravating the penalty imposable for the rape allegedly committed.
2. W/N the trial court erred in finding Appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes charged.
1. The trial court erred. Nocturnity must have been deliberately sought by the
Appellant to facilitate the crime or prevent its discovery or evade his capture
facilitate his escape. Neither can we appreciate relationship as aggravating. Th
scope of the relationship under Art. 15 of the RPC encompasses only the spouse,
ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural or adopted brother or sister, and rel
by affinity in the same degrees. Outside these enumerations and consistent with t
doctrine that criminal laws must be liberally construed in favor of the accused,
other relationship between the offender and the victim may aggravate the
imposable penalty for the crime committed.
2. The Appellant was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The offended
party s straightforward and unequivocal statements show indelible badges of truth.
People v. Padilla
Case No. 113
G.R. No. 47027 (February 4, 1941)
Chapter VII, Page 291, Footnote No. 30
Appellants Padilla, a Filipino citizen, and Von Arend, a German citizen, acting
jointly and conniving with each other, voluntarily, illegally, and criminally ev
aded the
provisions of Art. 4 of C.A. No. 138, which requires Philippine or U.S. citizens
hip before
the exercise or enjoyment of the privilege established in said article. It is co
however, that notwithstanding the infringement of Sec. 4. of Act No. 138, the
Appellants cannot be punished therefore since the said Act imposes no penal
sanction whatsoever.
W/N a violation of C.A. No. 138 may be prosecuted under C.A. No. 108,
entitled An Act to punish acts of evasion of the laws on the nationalization or c
rights, franchises or privileges.
Yes. Any citizen of the Philippines or of the United States who knowingly allows
his name or citizenship to be used so that a person not so qualified may enjoy t
privilege granted to domestic entities by C.A. No. 138, as well as any alien pro
thereby, is guilty of violation of C.A. No. 108.
The very title of Act No. 108 gives unmistakable notice of the legislative inten
and purpose of punishing all acts of evasion of the laws of the nationalization
certain rights, franchise or privileges. Sec. 1 of the same Act applies punishme
provided therein to all cases in which any constitutional or legal provision requ
Philippine or United States citizenship as a requirement for the exercise or enj
of a right, franchise or privilege. Under Act No. 108, any legal provision, whene
existing at the time of the passage of said Act or promulgated thereafter, would
within its scope. One of such legal provision is Art. 4 of Act No. 138.
6a, 6c, 9a

People v. Salazar
Case No. 223
G.R. No. L-13371 (September 24, 1959)
Chapter VII, Page 292, Footnote No. 36
The Appellant was charged with the crime of malversation of public funds.
The Appellant being the then Deputy Provincial and Municipal Treasurer, and as
such, accountable for the funds collected and received by him, did willfully,
feloniously and with grave abuse of confidence, misappropriate, and convert to h
own personal use and benefit, from said funds, the sum of P13,897.77. Upon
arraignment, the Appellant pleaded not guilty, which he later withdrew and
changed to guilty. He was sentenced to be imprisoned, to suffer the penalty of
perpetual special disqualification, to pay a fine, to indemnify the Government
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The
Appellant contends that the lower court committed an error in sentencing him to
suffer the aforementioned penalty on the ground of lack of malice in the commiss
of the crime, in that, he did not apply the missing funds to his personal use an
benefit but lost the same while he was drunk.
W/N the penalties imposed by the lower court were excessive given the
contention of Appellant.
No. There is nothing in the record that supports the claim that missing funds
were lost while the Appellant was drunk. When he entered the plea of guilty, he
thereby admitted, not only his guilt, but also all the material facts alleged in
information, namely, that he willfully, feloniously and with grave abuse of
confidence, misappropriate, misapply, embezzle, and convert to his own personal
use and benefit, from said funds, the sum of P13,897.77, thus clearly indicating
malice or evil intent on his part. His plea of guilt carried with it the acknowl
or admission that the willful acts charged were done with malice.
7b, 11e, 41a, 43
People v. Garcia
Case No. 209
No. L-2873 (February 28, 1950)
Chapter VII, Page 293, Footnote No. 41
The lower court, ignoring the Appellant s minority, sentenced him to an
indeterminate penalty of 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional to
years of prision mayor for the crime of robbery. RA 47 which amended Art. 80 of
RPC by reducing from 18 to 16 the age below which the Appellant has to be
committed to the custody or care of a public or private, benevolent or charitabl
institution, instead of being convicted and sentenced to prison, has given rise t
o the
controversy. The Solicitor General believes that the amendment by implication ha
also amended par. 2 of Art. 68 of the RPC, which provides that when the offender
over 15 and under 18 years of age, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by
law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period.
W/N the Appellant, being 17 years of age at the time of the commission of
the crime, was entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of Art. 68, pa
r. 2 of
the RPC.
Yes. We find no irreconcilable conflict between Art. 68, par. 2, as it now stand
and Art. 80 as amended. There is no incompatibility between granting Appellant o
the ages of 15 to 18 a privileged mitigating circumstance and fixing at 16 the
maximum age of persons who are to be placed in a reformatory institution. All pa
of a statute are to be harmonized and reconciled so that effect may be given to
each and every part thereof, and that conflicting interest in the same statute a
never to be supposed or so regarded, unless forced upon the court by an
unambiguous language.
37, 38b

People v. Terrada, et. al.

Case No. 229
G.R. No. L-23625 (November 25, 1983)
Chapter VII, Page 293, Footnote No. 42
On November 1951 and May 1952, Appellees Obo, Gundran, and Terrado
applied for and were issued free patents for contiguous parcels of land situated
Camarines Sur. These parcels of land were forest land and as such are not
disposable. On March 1962, three separate informations for falsification of publ
document were filed against the Appellees for having conspired with one another
through false and fraudulent misrepresentations alleging that they had all the
qualifications and had complied with all legal requirements of the law to entitl
e them
to a free patent. Appellees claim that the crime has already prescribed accordin
to the RPC, but the State argues that the crime has not prescribed under Act No.
3585 where the crime of perjury prescribes in 8 years.
W/N the prescriptive period to be applied should be 10 years under the RPC
or 8 years under Act No. 3585.
The 8 year prescriptive period should be applied. Penal statutes must be
strictly applied. Where a crime is punishable by both a special law and the RPC
with different prescriptive periods, the one favorable to the accused or the sho
prescriptive period should be applied.
43, 48
US v. Toribo
Case No. 304
G.R. No. 5060 (January 26, 1910)
Chapter VII, Page 295, Footnote No. 48
Evidence suggests that Appellant slaughtered the carabao for human
consumption, which is in violation of Act No. 1147, An Act Regulating the
Registration, Branding, Slaughter of Large Cattle. It appears that in the town of
Carmen in Bohol, there aren t any slaughterhouses. Appellant suggests that under
such circumstances, the provisions of Act No. 1147 do not penalize slaughter of
cattle without permit. Appellant also alleges that it is an infringement on his
right over
his property (carabao).
W/N Act No. 1147 applies only when there is a municipal slaughterhouse, and
the slaughter of a carabao is made therein.
No. As long as the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption is done
without a permit secured first from the municipal treasurer, the penalty under t
he Act
applies. The Act primarily seeks to protect the large cattle of the Philippine I
against theft and to make recovery and return of the same easy. More importantly
, it
is to protect the very life and existence of the inhabitants of the Philippines,
by the continued destruction of large cattle by disease, making it reasonable fo
r the
legislative to prohibit and penalize a perfectly legal act utilizing personal pr
operties of
citizens (cattle) if not for the extraordinary conditions/threat present. Well s
ettled is
the doctrine of the State s legitimate exercise of the right of eminent domain lai
down in jurisprudence. Where the language of the statute is fairly susceptible o
many interpretations, that which stays true with the intent of the law must be
5a, 9a, 37

US v. Go Chico
Case No. 299
G.R. No. 4963 (September 15, 1909)
Chapter VII, Page 295, Footnote No. 49
Appellant is charged with the violation of Sec. 1 of Act No. 1696 or the Flag
Law, displaying in his store a number of medallions, in the form of a small butt
upon the faces of which were imprinted in miniature the picture of Emilio Aguina
and the flag or banner or device used during the late armed insurrection in the
Philippine Islands against the U.S. Appellant claims that he is ignorant of the
law and
consequently, had no corrupt intention to violate the law. He claims acquittal o
n the
ground that his guilt must be proven beyond reasonable doubt and that the law wa
referring to identical banners, emblem, flag, etc.
1. W/N to be in violation of the Flag Law, Appellant must have acted with
criminal intent.
2. W/N the wording of the law exempts the articles displayed by the
1. No, criminal intent isn t necessary for violation of the Flag Law.
2. The medallions, though not exactly identical, comes within the purview of
the class of articles referred to by the law.
Jurisprudence has held that in crimes made by statutory requirement, criminal
intent is not necessary. Intention of the perpetrator is entirely immaterial bec
ause to
hold otherwise would render the statute substantially worthless, and its executi
impossible. The statute did not include intent as an element of a crime, and it
is clear
so no interpretation is required. Clearly therefore, ignorance of the law is not
a valid
defense for violation thereof. The description in the law refers not to a partic
ular flag,
but to a type of flag.
5a, 7a, 9a, 9c, 11a, 43, a
Arriete v. Director of Public Works
Case no. 22
G.R. No. 37125 (September 30, 1933)
Chapter VII, Page 296, Footnote No. 52
Appellant Arriete, as legal guardian on behalf of minor Carmen Jagunap,
sought to recover the title and possession of three lots which were sold by the
in a public auction to Appellee Ledesma (and thereafter sold to Fermin Caram) to
satisfy the judgment of a lien for nonpayment of taxes, under the Irrigation Act
2152. However, it was found that the delinquent taxpayer was not the owner of sa
lots, but Carmen Jagunap was.
W/N Appellee Ledesma has any rights over the lots acquired in good faith
under the final deed of sale of the provincial sheriff.
No, she acquired no right at all. Act No. 2152 provided that regarding
expropriation of land, the list of lands filed by the Director of Public Lands m
ust be
published, and notice should be given to the owners to file answer or appear in
civil case. No such publication or notice was evident in this case.
It is not sufficient that they had actual knowledge. Statutes in the
derogation of rights are construed strictly. This is because people in a republi
state like ours enjoy inherent rights guaranteed by the Constitution or protecte
d by
law, like the right against undue deprivation of property. Thus, whenever there
statutes authorizing the expropriation of private land or property, these statut
es are
construed strictly.
6c, 7a, 43

Provincial Chapter of Laguna v. COMELEC

Case No. 246
G.R. No. L-53460 (May 27, 1983)
Chapter VII, Page 297, Footnote No. 57
Nacionalista Party (NP) filed a petition against Respondent San Luis of the
Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) for turncoatism. When Respondent San Luis ran as
Governor of Laguna under Liberal Party (LP) in 1972, he won. The normal expiry f
the term was 1975, but it was extended lawfully by the President. Now (1980) he
running for Governor again under KBL. Under the law, No elective public officer
may change his political party affiliation during his term of office or within six
immediately preceding or following an election.
W/N COMELEC was correct in dismissing petition which contended that
Respondent San Luis should be disqualified from running due to turncoatism.
No, he cannot be disqualified. He did not change affiliations during his term.
He was expelled from the LP in 1978 and this can t be construed as a willful chang
of affiliation. At that time, no one even knew when the next elections were, so
Respondent could not have changed affiliations simply to anticipate the next
The constitutional prohibition cannot be applied to the period beyond the
frame-up (1971-1975) term to which public officials were elected in 1971 because
would unduly impinge on freedom of association guaranteed to all.
Between two constructions, one of which would diminish or restrict
fundamental right of people and the other of which would not do so, the latter
construction must be adopted.
11a, 37, 48
Genaro B. Reyes Construction Inc. v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 51
G.R. No. 108718 (July 14, 1994)
Chapter VII, Page 297, Footnote No. 57
Petitioners filed petition to stop Respondent DPWH from implementing the
notice of pre-termination in their contract for construction of the flood contro
facilities and land improvement works in Butuan City. Petitioners won in a publi
bidding held for this purpose. Respondents claimed that with a 9.86% negative
slippage (delay in the infrastructure project), the government was either author
to take over the project or let another contractor finish it. Petitioners howeve
claimed that not only were the delays caused significantly by DPWH, but also
termination of contract is only appropriate if the negative slippage reaches 15%
W/N termination of contract with Petitioners is valid.
No, Respondents may not terminate contract with Petitioners and award the
contract to other bidders. The discretion of Respondent DPWH to terminate or res
the contract comes into play only in the event the contractor shall have incurre
d a
negative slippage of 15% or more, according to P.D. 1870 and DPWH Circular No.
The intent of the law in allowing the government to take over delayed
construction projects with negative slippage of 15% or more is primarily to save
money and to avoid dislocation of the financial projections and/or cash flow of
government. Terminating the contract and awarding it to Hanil, a previously
disqualified bidder, would actually result in a financial loss to the government
6c, 9a, 12a

Tenorio v. Manila Railroad Co.

Case No. 289
G.R. No. L-6690 (March 29, 1912)
Chapter VII, Page 297, Footnote No. 62
Defendant company took possession of and occupied a small parcel of land
without the express consent of Plaintiff and without having made payment therefo
alleging that the land is a part of certain lands described in condemnation
W/N Plaintiff has the right to maintain this separate action for damages for
trespass on his land on the ground that it was his duty to seek redress in the
condemnation proceedings instituted by Defendant company.
As a general rule, the steps prescribed by the statute must be followed or the
proceedings will be void. Since these statutes are in derogation of general righ
t and
of common-law modes of procedure, they must be strictly construed in favor of th
landowner, and must be at least substantially or fully and fairly complied with.
In the absence of proof of a substantial compliance with the provisions of law
touching such proceedings, the Plaintiff was clearly entitled to institute any
appropriate action to recover the damages which she may have suffered as a resul
of an unauthorized and unlawful seizure and occupation of her property.
The theory on which the trial judge correctly proceeded was that Defendant
company having unlawfully taken possession of a part of the tract of land in
question, and by its operations thereon rendered the whole tract worthless to th
Plaintiff. Thus, Plaintiff is entitled to abandon the entire tract, and recover
for its full value.
21a, 43
City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, et al.
Case No. 61
G.R. No. L-14355 (October 31, 1919)
Chapter VII, Page 297, Footnote No. 64
Appellant presented a petition in the CFI of Manila praying that certain lands,
be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement the
extension of Rizal Avenue. Appellee denied that it was either necessary or exped
that the parcels of land be expropriated for street purposes.
W/N in expropriation proceedings by the Appellant, the courts may inquire
into, and hear proof upon, the necessity of the expropriation.
In our opinion, when the legislature conferred upon the courts of the
Philippine Islands the right to ascertain upon trial whether the right exists fo
r the
exercise of eminent domain, it intended that the courts should inquire into, and
proof upon, those questions (of necessity).
It is alleged, and not denied, that the cemetery in question may be used by
the general community of Chinese, which fact, in the general acceptation of the
definition of a public cemetery, would make the cemetery in question public
property. If that is true, the petition of the Plaintiff must be denied, for the
reason that
the Plaintiff has no authority or right under the law to expropriate public prop
Even granting that a necessity exists for the opening of the street in question,
the record contains no proof of the necessity of opening the same through the
cemetery. The record shows that adjoining and adjacent lands have been offered
to the city free of charge, which will answer every purpose of the Plaintiff.
9a, 24a, 43
Velasco v. Republic of the Philippines
Case No. 165
G.R. No. L-14214 (May 25, 1960)
Chapter VII, Page 299, Footnote No. 76
Petition for naturalization of Petitioner was denied for failure to meet the
requirements of the law.
W/N the trial court erred in denying the petition for naturalization.
No. Considering that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and
strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant , we are
constrained to hold that the trial court did not err in denying the petition for
Lee Cho v. Republic of the Philippines
Case No. 72
G.R. No. L-12408 (December 28, 1959)
Chapter VII, Page 299, Footnote No. 76
Before an applicant may apply for Philippine citizenship, the law requires that
he file a declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen one year prior t
o the
filing of application unless he is exempt from complying with said requirement.
law exempts one from filing a declaration of intention in two cases: (a) if he i
s born in
the Philippines and has received primary and secondary education in any school
recognized by the government; and (b) if he has continuously resided in the
Philippines for a period of 30 years or more provided that he has given primary
secondary education to all his children either in a public school or private sch
recognized by the government. In the instant case, Petitioner has not filed any
declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen because, as he claims, he
resided continuously in the Philippines for a period of more than 30 years and h
given primary and secondary education to all his children in private schools
recognized by the government.
W/N the Petitioner has complied with the requirement of the law regarding his
duty to afford primary and secondary education to all his children.
No. The government disputes that Petitioner has failed to give such education
to his daughters Angelita and Lourdes. The reason that Angelita was not able to
complete her studies because she got married is not only unsatisfactory but betr
the sincerity of Petitioner in embracing our citizenship. It was further shown t
hat in
spite of Lourdes s alleged sickness, she continued her studies in a Chinese school
which strictly employed a Chinese curriculum. Considering that the provisions of
Naturalization Law should be strictly construed in order that its laudable and
nationalistic purpose may be fully fulfilled, the Supreme Court concluded that
Petitioner has failed to qualify to become a Filipino citizen and so his petitio
n should
be denied.
6c, 7b, 43

Co v. Republic of the Philippines

Case No. 24
G.R. No. L-12150 (May 26, 1960)
Chapter VII, Page 299, Footnote No. 76
Petitioner filed his petition for naturalization in the trial court. The court
ordered that a certificate of naturalization be issued to Petitioner after the l
apse of
two years from the date the decision became final and all the requisites provide
d for
in RA 503 were met. The government appealed the decision contending that from
the evidence itself introduced by Petitioner it would appear that he failed to c
with some of the requirements prescribed by law in order to qualify him to becom
e a
Filipino citizen. Thus, it is claimed, he has not stated that he believes in the
underlying the constitution, but rather stated that he believes in democracy upo
cross-examination. It is contended that such belief is not sufficient to comply
with the
requirement of the law that one must believe in the principles underlying our
W/N the trial court erred in finding that Petitioner had all the qualifications
naturalization and none of the disqualifications mentioned in the law.
Yes. In so stating that he believes merely in our laws, Petitioner did not
necessarily refer to those principles embodied in our constitution which are ref
to in the law. He has also failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproacha
manner in his relation with our government as evidenced by his failure to regist
er his
family with the Bureau of Immigration and to file his income tax return. Conside
that "naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in f
avor of
the government and against the applicant," the Supreme Court held that the trial
court erred in granting the petition for naturalization.
6c, 7b, 43
Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos
Case No. 157
G.R. No. L-120082 (September 11, 1996)
Chapter VII, Page 301, Footnote No. 85
Respondent Cesa, OIC, Office of the Treasurer of the City of Cebu,
demanded payment for realty taxes on several parcels of land belonging to the
Petitioner, who objected to such demand claiming in its favor Sec. 14 of RA 6958
which exempt it from payment of realty taxes.
Respondent City of Cebu alleges that as an LGU and a political subdivision, it
has the power to impose, levy, assess, and collect taxes within its jurisdiction
. Such
power is guaranteed by the Constitution and enhanced further by the LGC. While i
may be true that under its Charter the Petitioner was exempt from the payment of
realty taxes, this exemption was withdrawn by Sec. 234 of the LGC.
W/N Petitioner is a taxable person.
Yes. Petitioner cannot claim that it was never a taxable person under its
Charter. It was only exempted from the payment of real property taxes. The grant
of the privilege only in respect of this tax is conclusive proof of the legislat
ive intent to
make it a taxable person subject to all taxes, except real property tax.
Even if the Petitioner was originally not a taxable person for purposes of real
property tax, in light of the foregoing disquisitions, it had already become, a
person for such purpose in view of the withdrawal in the last paragraph of Sec.
234 of
exemptions from the payment of real property taxes.
Since taxes are what we pay for civilized society, or are the lifeblood of the
nation, the law frowns against exemptions from taxation and statutes granting ta
exemptions are thus construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayers and liber
ally in
favor of the taxing authority. Else wise stated, taxation is the rule, exemption
is the exception.

The Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in the Philippines v. A. W. Hastings, Assess

and Collector of the City of Manila, and the City of Manila
Case No. 136
G.R. No. 1974 (March 15, 1906)
Chapter VII, Page 300, Footnote No. 79
In 1901, Appellant imposed a tax upon the residence of the Roman Catholic
archbishop of Manila, overruling the claim that it was exempt from taxation as
provided by Sec. 48 of Act No. 183 of the Philippine Commission. The Appellant
contended that the said property was not a parsonage and not adjacent to the
cathedral, being 80 to 100 meters distant from the church, and that the exemptio
privilege was already exhausted by its allowance to the parsonage of the adjoini
W/N the house of the archbishop of Manila should be exempted from tax.
In enacting its exemption laws, the Commission had in view not only the conditio
peculiar to and inherent in Roman Catholic parishes in the Islands, but their in
tent was
to extend the exemption to the parsonages appurtenant to all churches. And it is
general rule that statutes exempting charitable and religious property from taxa
should be construed fairly and not unnaturally though strictly and in such manne
r as
to give effect to the main intent of the legislators. Although separated from th
cathedral by an intervening block, and although a parsonage within the area was
already exempt, the residence of the archbishop should still be exempted from
taxation as a parsonage adjacent to the cathedral.
8a, 9b, 43
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court Of Appeals, Court of Tax Appeals and
Ateneo de Manila University
Case No. 74
G.R. No. 115349 (April 18, 1997)
Chapter VII, Page 300, Footnote No. 81
Private Respondent is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution with
auxiliary units and branches all over the Philippines, one of which is the Insti
tute of
Philippine Culture (IPC), which is engaged in social sciences studies of Philipp
society and culture. In 1983, Petitioner issued a demand letter regarding the
institution s tax liabilities. Petitioner contended that private Respondent was an
independent contractor within the purview of Sec. 205 of the Tax Code, and was
conducting studies for a fee, and therefore subject to 3% contractor s tax.
W/N Private Respondent, through its auxiliary unit or branch, the IPC,
performing the work of an independent contractor and, thus subject to 3%
contractor s tax levied by Sec. 205 of the National Internal Revenue Code.
No. The research activity of the IPC was done in pursuance of maintaining privat
Respondent s university status and not in the course of an independent business of
selling such research with profit in mind. There was no evidence that the IPC ev
sold its services for a fee to anyone or was ever engaged in business apart from
academic purposes of the university. Petitioner erred in applying the principles
of tax
exemption without first applying a strict interpretation of the tax laws.

Manila Railroad Company v. Insular Collector of Customs

Case No. 167
G.R. No. 30264 (March 12, 1929)
Chapter VII, Page 301, Footnote No. 84
Appellee Manila Railroad Company used dust shields made of wool on all of
its railway wagons to cover the axle box which protects from dust the oil deposi
therein which serves as lubricant of the bearings of the wheel. Under par. 141 o
f Sec.
8 of the Tariff Law of 1909, manufactures of wool, not otherwise provided for ar
subject to 40% ad valorem. On the other hand, under par. 197 of same law, vehicl
for use on railways and tramways, and detached parts thereof are subject to 10%
valorem. Appellant Insular Collector of Customs classified dust shields as
manufactures of wool, not otherwise provided for. Upon appeal, however, the CFI
overruled the decision and classified dust shields as detached parts of vehicles f
use on railways.
Whether dust shields should be classified as manufactures of wool or as
detached parts of vehicles for use on railways.
Dust shields are classified for the purposes of tariff as detached parts of
vehicles under par. 197. It is a general rule in the interpretation of statutes
taxes not to extend their provisions beyond the clear import of the language use
d. In
case of doubt, they should be construed strictly against the government and in f
of the citizen. And when there is in the same statute a particular enactment and
general one which in its comprehensive sense would include what is embraced in
the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general one must
be taken to affect only such cases within its general language as are not within
provisions of the particular enactment.
38a, 43, 50
Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court
Case No. 256
G.R. No. L-69344 (April 26, 1991)
Chapter VII, Page 301, Footnote No. 84
Respondent spouses Antonio and Clara Pastor owed the Government P1,283,
621.63 for taxes from the years 1955-1959. A reinvestigation of their debt was m
and the amount was changed to P17,117.08. They applied for tax amnesty under
P.D. 23, 213 and 370. Due to this, their debt even decreased to about P12,000. T
paid such debt to the Government and had receipts as proofs of such.
The Government contended that the spouses could not avail of the tax
amnesty under P.D. 213 because of Revenue Regulation No. 8-72 which stated that
amnesty is not allowed for those who had pending assessments with the BIR.
Respondent spouses then contended that Revenue Regulation No. 8-72 was
null because P.D. 213 did not contain any exemption wherein one should not be
allowed to amnesty.
W/N Respondent spouses were properly given tax amnesty.
Yes, because Revenue Regulation No. 8-72 was null and void. If Revenue
Regulation No. 8-72 provided an exception to the coverage of P.D. 213, then such
provision is null and void for being contrary to the Presidential Decree. Revenu
regulations shall not prevail over provisions of a Presidential Decree.
8, 26
Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. v. Department of Finance
Case No. 82
G.R. No. 108524 (November 10, 1994)
Chapter VII, Page 301, Footnote No. 85
Petitioner is a corporation whose members are engaged in buying and selling
copra. Prior to Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) 47-91, copra was classified as
a food product under Sec. 103(b) of the National Internal Revenue Code and
therefore exempt from tax in all stages, including distribution.
Under Sec. 103(a), the sale of agricultural NON-food products in their original
state is exempt from VAT only if the seller is the primary producer and the owne
r of
the land which the same is produced. Under Sec. 103(b), the sale of agricultural
food products in their original state is exempt from VAT in all stages.
RMC 47-91 then reclassified copra as a non-food product.
W/N copra is an agricultural food product which is exempt from VAT and thus
not under the purview of RMC 47-91.
No, it is not an agricultural food product, thus it is not exempt from VAT. The
Commissioner of Internal Revenue s interpretation is entitled to great respect
because it is the government agency charged with the interpretation and
implementation of tax laws. In fact, although copra is from coconut, and 80% of
coconut plant is edible, copra per se is not intended for human consumption.
2a, 42a, b
Acting Commissioner of Customs v. Manila Electric Company
Case No. 3
G.R. No. L-23623 (June 30, 1977)
Chapter VII, Page 301, Footnote No. 85
RA 1394 exempted payment of special import tax for spare parts used for
industries and also insulators from all taxes of whatever nature. Respondent con
that their insulating oils are exempt from taxes.
W/N insulating oil is an insulator making Respondent exempt from paying its
No, insulating oil is different from insulators. The Supreme Court looked into
the definition of insulating oils under Materials Handbook by George J. Brady, 8th
The court found out that insulating oils are used for cooling as well as
insulating. And there is no question that the insulating oil that Respondent is
is used for cooling instead of insulating. The law frowns on exemption from taxa
hence an exempting provision must be construed stictissimi juris.
9a, 43, b
Collector of Internal Revenue v. Manila Jockey Club Inc.
Case No. 68
G.R. No. L-8755 (March 23, 1956)
Chapter VII, Page 304, Footnote No. 97
Respondents Manila Jockey Club Inc. and Philippine Racing Club Inc. are
corporations organized primarily for holding horse races. Petitioner is contendi
ng that
payments for renting several parts of the property that Respondents rent and lea
are subject to the 20% amusement tax in the National Internal Revenue Code.
W/N rentals received by the Respondents from private horse owners or
trainers, the PCSO, the White Cross, the Philippine Anti-Tuberculosis Society ar
subject to the 20% amusement tax.
The law refers to gross receipts and not gross income . This clause is plain
demonstration that the gross receipts refer to the collections on days when the
race track is open to the general public and admission fees are or are not charg
This necessarily excludes income of the Respondents received on days when they d
not legally and actually hold horse races. The lease by the Respondents of the l
clearly has nothing to do with horse racing. It is to be remembered that the law
makes the proprietor, lessee, or operator, of the amusement place liable for the
amusement tax, the three tax payers being connected by the disjunctive
conjunction or , thereby positively implying that the tax should be paid by either
proprietor, the lessee, or the operator, as the case may be, singly and not all
at one
and the same time.
6c, 7a, 27
People v. Castañeda Jr.
Case No. 104
G.R. No. L-46881 (September 15, 1988)
Chapter VII, Page 306, Footnote No. 102
Respondents were charged of 8 criminal cases for violating the National
Internal Revenue Code for manufacturing alcoholic products subject to specific t
without having paid the annual privilege tax therefore. Respondents argued that
they are exempt from taxes because they are entitled to the benefits available
under P.D. 370 which declares tax amnesty.
W/N Respondent is entitled to the benefits of tax amnesty under the P.D.
To be entitled to the extinction of liability provided by P.D. 370, the claimant
must have voluntarily disclosed his previously untaxed income or wealth and paid
required 15% tax on such previously untaxed income or wealth. Where the disclosu
was not voluntary, the claimant is not entitled to the benefits expressly exclud
ed from
the coverage of P.D. 370. In the instant case, the violations with which the
Respondents were charged had already been discovered by the BIR when P.D. 370
took effect. It is necessary to note that the "valid information under RA 2338"
to in Sec. 1(a)(4) of P.D. 370 refers not to a criminal information filed in cou
rt by a
fiscal or special prosecutor, but rather to the sworn information or complaint f
iled by
an informer with the BIR under RA 2338 in the hope of earning an informer's rewa
6c, 25a, 43

Zamora v. City of Manila

Case No. 175
G.R. No. 3433 (March 2, 1907)
Chapter VII, Page 306, Footnote No. 102
Act No. 975 is a remedial statute which provides for relief of persons who have
paid an excessive assessment on taxes prior to the creation of the Board of Tax
Petitioner prays that the word land in the title and body of the statute be
interpreted to mean land including buildings and improvements thereon .
W/N the word land should be interpreted liberally to mean land with the
buildings and improvements thereon.
While the distinction does not appear to have been consciously made in Act
No. 123, it is disregarded in Act Nos. 82 and 551. The rule of strict constructi
on of
statutes granting exemptions from taxation is not applicable in this case. This
rule is
not without its exceptions and limitations, and the plain principles of justice
that the act under consideration should be construed with some liberality. It is
remedial statute, providing for a refund of taxes which have been collected unju
and upon an unfair and inequitable valuation of land. While some of the Acts of
Commission have consciously sought to give to the word land and real estate a
special signification, nevertheless such use has not been uniform and the deviat
therefrom have been so frequent that it affords no safe rule from interpretation
9a, 9d, 9f, 27, b2
Republic Flour Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Case No. 259
G.R. No. L-25602 31 (February 18, 1970)
Chapter VII, Page 306, Footnote No. 103
In 1957, Petitioner was granted tax-exemption privileges pursuant to RA 901.
In 1958, Petitioner imported a quantity of wheat grains, part of which was not u
sed in
the business that year. The surplus of wheat grains were finally utilized into f
lour and
sold in 1959. Petitioner paid sales tax of P37,275.55, but the cost of wheat lef
t over
was treated as deductible item from gross sales in 1959. Respondent Commissioner
finally assessed the Petitioner of deficiency tax of P23,170.17 because material
purchased from tax-exempt industries were not acquired from one enjoying tax-
exemption privilege under our laws.
W/N Respondent Commissioner is correct in imposing the deficiency sales tax.
No. Sec. 186-A of Internal Revenue provides that whenever a tax-free product
is utilized in the manufacture or production of any article, in the determinatio
n of the
value of such finished article, the value of such tax-free product shall be dedu
While It is true that tax exemptions (and deductions) are not favored in the law
, and
are construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayer, it is equally a recognize
d principle
that where the provision of the law is clear and unambiguous, so that there is n
occasion for the court s seeking the legislative intent, the law must be taken as
it is,
devoid of judicial addition or subtraction.
6c, 7a, 43

Ajero v. Court of Appeals

Case No. 5
G.R. No. 106720 (September 15, 1994)
Chapter VII, Page 309, Footnote No. 117
Petitioners filed a petition for probate of holographic will left by the late An
Sand. They alleged that the decedent was of sound and disposing mind, and was
capacitated to dispose of her estate by will.
Private Respondent opposed the petition claiming the will or testament was
not of the decedent and the same was procured through improper pressure. It was
also opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero claiming that the decedent was not the sole owner
the property. The trial court granted and/or admitted the decedent s holographic
will to probate. On appeal, said Decision was reversed by the CA for its failure
comply with Art. 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code.
W/N the CA is correct that the will did not comply with the law.
No. Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallo
of a holographic will that is unquestionably handwritten by the testator. Art. 8
13 of
the New Civil Code affects only the validity of the dispositions in the will, bu
t not its
probate. A holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding no
with Art. 814. In case of alterations, cancellations or insertions, the lack
of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes, but not its
The CA, however, correctly held that Annie Sand could not dispose the other
property including the house and lot, which she shares with her father s other hei
1, 6c, 7a, 9a
In re: Testate Estate of Tampoy
Case No. 61
G.R. No. L-14322 (February 25, 1960)
Chapter VII, Page 309, Footnote No. 117
In the matter of Petition for Probate Proceedings before the CFI of Cebu, the
will consists of two pages and the last page had been duly signed by the testatr
and the three testimonial witnesses who also signed the first page but the testa
failed to sign the left margin of the first page.
The lower court denied the petition because the will was not executed in
accordance with law, citing Sec. 618 of Act No. 190, as amended.
W/N the probate court (CFI) is correct in denying the petition for the
allowance of the will.
Yes. Sec. 618 of Act No. 190, as amended, requires that the testator sign the
will and each and every page thereof in the presence of the witnesses, and that
latter sign the will and each and every page thereof in the presence of the test
and of each other, which requirement should be expressed in the attestation clau
This requirement is mandatory, for failure to comply with it is fatal to the val
idity of the
will. Thus, it has been held that Statutes prescribing the formalities to be obse
rved in
the execution of wills are very strictly construed. A will must be executed in
accordance with the statutory requirements; otherwise it is entirely void. All t
requirements stand as of equal importance and must be observed, and courts
cannot supply the defective execution of the will. Accordingly, we cannot escape
the conclusion that the same fails to comply with the law and therefore, cannot
admitted to probate.
6c, 7a

A.L. Ammen Transportation Company, Inc. v. Borja

Case No. 1
G.R. No. L-17750 (August 31, 1962)
Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 123
Respondent filed an action against Petitioners in the CFI of Albay to recover
compensation for overtime work rendered, and damages. Pending this, Respondent
filed the present proceedings on the Court of Industrial Relations.
1. W/N the scope of the term action falls under RA 1994.
2. W/N the Court of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction.
1. The Petitioner contends that the phrase action already commenced
employed in the statute should be construed as meaning only actions filed in a
regular court of justice. With this limited and narrow interpretation, we cannot
The statute under consideration is undoubtedly a labor statute and as such must
liberally construed in favor of the laborer concerned.
2. The allegation in the complaint filed by the Respondent employee that he
was separated automatically from the said employment with Defendants, and
notwithstanding pleas for reinstatement, Defendants refused and still refuse to
reinstate Plaintiff, and his prayer for specific reliefs and other reliefs justif
y the
conclusion that said Respondent ought reinstatement aside from overtime wages.
This was within the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations.
Lazo v. Employee s Compensation Commission
Case No. 70
G.R. No. 78617 (June 18, 1990)
Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 123
Petitioner is a security guard of the Central Bank of the Philippines assigned t
its main office. His regular tour of duty is from 2pm to 10pm. On June 18, 1986,
Petitioner rendered full duty. But, as the security guard who was to relieve him
to arrive, the Petitioner rendered overtime duty up to 5am the next day. On his
home, he met an accident and as a result, he sustained injuries. For injuries su
he claimed for disability benefits under P.D. 626 but was denied by the GSIS.
W/N the denial of compensation under P.D. 626 was valid.
No. In the case at bar, it can be seen that Petitioner left his station at the
Central Bank several hours after his regular time off, because the reliever did
come on time. There is no evidence on the record that Petitioner deviated from h
usual, regular homeward route. While presumption of compensability and theory of
aggravation under the Workmen s Compensation Act may have been abandoned
under the New Labor Code, it is significant that the liberality of the law in ge
favor of the workingman still subsists.

Villavert v. Employee s Compensation Commission

Case No. 313
G.R. No. L-48605 (December 14, 1981)
Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 124
The Petitioner is the mother of the late Marcelino Villavert, who died of acute
hemorrhagic pancreatic, employed as a code verifier in the Philippine Constabula
She filed a claim for income benefits for the death of her son under P.D. 626, a
amended, with the GSIS. The said claim was denied by the GSIS on the ground that
acute hemorrhagic pancreatic is not an occupational disease and that Petitioner
had failed to show that there was a causal connection between the fatal ailment
Marcelino and the nature of his employment. The Petitioner appealed to the ECC
which affirmed the denial.
W/N the ECC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the claim of
the Petitioner.
From the foregoing facts of record, it is clear that Marcelino died of acute
hemorrhagic pancreatic which was directly caused or at least aggravated by the
duties he performed as coder verifier, computer operator and clerk typist of the
Philippine Constabulary. There is no evidence at all that Marcelino had a bout of
alcoholic intoxication shortly before he died. Neither is there a showing that he
drugs. All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of this Code, includi
ng its
implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of the labor.
Abella v. National Labor Relations Commission
Case No. 2
G.R. No. 71813 (July 20, 1987)
Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 124
Petitioner leased a farm land, Hacienda Danao Ramona, in Negros
Occidental for a period of ten years. It is renewable at her instance, which she
to do, for another ten years. During the existence of the lease she employed the
private Respondents. Upon expiration of the leasehold rights, Petitioner dismiss
ed the
two Respondents.
W/N the Respondents are entitled to separation pays.
Yes. The applicable law on the case is Art. 284 of the Labor Code.
Notwithstanding the contention of the Petitioner that the aforementioned provisi
violates the constitutional guarantee against impairment of obligations and
contracts, because when she leased the farm land, neither she nor the lessor
contemplated the creation of the obligation to pay separation pay to the workers
upon the expiration of the lease. The court held such contention untenable as th
issue had already been adjudicated in the case of Anucension v. NLRC. It was sta
in the said case that the prohibition to impair the obligation of contracts is no
absolute and unqualified. The prohibition is general. The court further stated th
at the
purpose of Art. 284 is for the protection of the workers whose employment is
terminated because of the closure of establishment. Without such law, employees
like the Respondents will lose the benefits to which they are entitled. Moreover
, it is
well settled that in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of
Labor Code, the worker s welfare should be the primordial and paramount
consideration, and that all doubts shall be resolved in favor of labor.
5a, 9a, 9d

Del Rosario & Sons v. National Labor Relations Commission

Case No. 36
No. L-64204 (May 31, 1985)
Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 124
Petitioner, a logging company, entered into a contract of services with
Calmar Security Agency to supply the Petitioner with security guards. The securi
guards, herein Respondents, filed a complaint for underpayment of salary against
the Petitioner and the security agency. The Labor Arbiter found the security age
to be liable for the underpayment and dismissed the case against the logging
The security agency appealed the case to the NLRC. The latter allowed the
appeal even though there were formal defects in the procedure by which the
appeal was made. It was not under oath and the appeal fee was paid late.
W/N the formal defects of the appeal of the security agency should
invalidate the appeal.
No. According to Art. 221 of the Labor Code, in any proceeding before the
Commission or any of the Labor Arbiters, the rules of evidence prevailing in cou
rts of
law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of the
Code that
the Commission and the Arbiters shall use every and all reasonable means to
ascertain the facts in each case and proceed all in the interest of justice. The
of verification could have easily been corrected by making an oath and even
though the payment was late, it was still paid.
9a, 9d, 40b
Manahan v. Employee s Compensation Commission
Case No. 79
G.R. No. L-44899 (April 22, 1981)
Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 124
Nazario Manahan, Jr., died of Enteric Fever while he was employed as a
teacher in the Las Piñas Municipal High School. The claimant, the widow of the
deceased, filed a claim in the GSIS for she contends that the death of her husba
was due to his occupation. However, GSIS denied such claim. Claimant filed for a
Motion for Reconsideration alleging that the deceased was in perfect health prio
r to
his employment and that the ailment of the deceased is attributable to his
employment. Again she was denied by the GSIS. She then appealed her case to
the Employees Compensation Commission which also denied her claim.
W/N the widow of the deceased is entitled to claim benefits.
Yes. The findings of the commission indicated that the deceased was in
perfect health prior to his employment as a teacher and that in the course of hi
employment, he was treated for Epigastric pain-and ulcer-like symptoms. This was
supported by his medical records and a medical certificate issued by Dr. Bernabe
Epigastric pain is a symptom of Ulcer and Ulcer is a common complication of Ente
Pursuant to the doctrine of Corales v. ECC, the provisions of the Workmen s
Compensation Act shall be applied, thus the presumption of compensability should
be in favor of the claimant. Moreover, it is well settled that in case of doubt,
the case
should be resolved in favor of the worker and that Labor laws should be liberall
construed to give relief to the worker and his dependents.
5a, 9a, 9d, 40b

Liwanag v. Workmen s Compensation Commission

Case No. 75
G.R. No. L-12164 (May 2, 1959)
Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 124
Appellants Benito Liwanag and Maria Liwanag Reyes are co-owners of
Liwanag Auto Suppy. They hired Roque Balderama as a security guard, who was
killed in the line of duty by criminals. His widow and children filed a claim fo
compensation with the Workmen s Compensation Commission, which was granted in
an award that ordered the Appellants to pay jointly and severally the amount of
P3,494.40 to the claimant in lump sum. Appellants did not question the right of
Appellees to compensation nor the amount awarded. However, they claim that
because the Workmen s Compensation Act did not give an express provision
declaring solidary obligations of business partners, the compensation should be
W/N the Commission erred in ordering the Appellants to pay jointly and
No. Although the WCA does not contain any provision expressly declaring
that the obligation arising from compensation is solidary, other provisions of l
aw show
how their liability is solidary. Art. 1711 and 1712 of the New Civil Code and Se
c. 2 of
the WCA reasonably indicate that in compensation cases, the liability of busines
partners should be solidary. If the responsibility were to be merely jointly, an
d one of
them happens to be insolvent, the award would only be partially satisfied, which
evidently contrary to the intent of the law to give full protection to employees
. The
WCA should be construed fairly, reasonably and liberally for the employee and
9a, 9c, 9d, 36, 38, 40
Sibulo v. Altar
Case No. 279
G.R. No. L-1916 (April 30, 1949)
Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 125
Petitioner, owner of first class agricultural land, entered into a contract of
tenancy with Respondent. Petitioner was to furnish the work animals and farm
implements and Respondent was to defray all expenses of planting and cultivation
The net produce was to be divided equally. The contract was disapproved by the
Tenancy Law Enforcement Division of the Department of Justice because the divisi
contravenes with a provision of the Tenancy Law. It was taken to the Court of
Industrial Relations, which declared the contract illegal as against public poli
cy as
contemplated in Sec. 7 of the Tenancy Law, for the reason that instead of receiv
60% of his total share, the tenant shall receive 50% only. Petitioner claimed th
at the
contract is not among those expressly declared to be against public policy in Se
c. 7
of the Tenancy Law, which he argues to be an exhaustive list.
W/N the contract is against public policy as contemplated in Sec. 7 of the
Tenancy Law.
No. In declaring certain stipulations to be against public policy, the legislatu
could not have meant to sanction other stipulations which, though not specified,
similar to those expressly mentioned. The purpose of the law might easily be
defeated otherwise. The Tenancy Act is a remedial legislation intended to better
lot of the share-cropper by giving him a more equitable participation in the pro
of the land which he cultivates. Being a remedial statute, it should be construe
d to
further its purpose in accordance with its general intent.
9a, 9c, 12a, 36, 40

Guerrero v. Court of Appeals

Case No. 54
G.R. No. L-44570 (May 30,1986)
Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 126
Apolonio Benitez was hired by the Petitioners to work in their plantation. He
was allowed for that purpose to put up a hut within the plantation. He shared 1/
3 of
the proceeds with his coconut-related responsibilities. Afterwards, the Petition
ers and
Benitez executed an agreement allowing Benitez to continue working as tenant; th
Agricultural Tenancy Act would govern their relationship. Later the Petitioners
Benitez out. Benitez sued in the Court of Agrarian Relations, which ordered his
reinstatement. The Petitioners appealed to the CA, which affirmed the Court of
Agrarian Reform s decision. The Petitioners then appealed to the Supreme Court.
Pending appeal, the Code of Agrarian Reforms was passed repealing the
Agricultural Tenancy Act. The Petitioners then claimed that since the basis of t
he suit
was a share tenancy agreement, the decisions lost their validity.
W/N share tenancy ended.
No. An agreement is not abrogated by the subsequent repeal of the law.
The phasing out of share tenancy was never intended to mean a reversion of tenan
into farmhands or hired laborers with no rights. The Agricultural Tenancy Act an
Agricultural Land Reform Code have not been entirely repealed by the Code of
Agrarian Reform. But assuming that they were, the rule that the repeal of a stat
defeats all actions pending under the repealed statute has the exception when
vested rights are affected and obligations of contract are impaired.
9a, 12, 32, 38
Vicente v. Employee s Compensation Commission
Case No. 168
G.R. No. 85024 (January 23, 1991)
Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 127
Petitioner was an employed nursing attendant. At the course of his
employment, he had several physical complications which forced him to retire. So
the age of forty-five, he availed an optional retirement to entitle him to income
benefits under the GSIS retirement program. The application was supported by a
physician s certification that Petitioner was classified as under permanent total
disability. The significance of such classification was whether or not Petitioner
avail of the full income benefits. GSIS contended that Petitioner was only perman
partial disability . The ECC affirmed the GSIS decision.
Whether Petitioner was under permanent total disability or permanent partial
Petitioner was under permanent total disability. The test of whether or not an
employee suffers from permanent total disability is a showing of the capacity of
employee to continue performing his work notwithstanding the disability he incur
The Court takes this occasion to stress once more its abiding concern for the we
of government workers, especially the humble rank and file. It is for this reaso
n that
the sympathy of the law on social security is toward its beneficiaries and requi
res a
construction of utmost liberality in their favor.
9a, 11b, 12a

Tamayo, et al. v. Manila Hotel Company

Case No. 283
G.R. No. L-8975 (June 29, 1957)
Chapter VII, Page 311, Footnote No. 128
265 employees of Appellee Manila Hotel Co., who had to be dismissed and
paid the value of their accumulated leave under Sec. 266 of the Administrative
Code, as amended by RA 611, when the hotel was leased to a private concern on
June 30, 1954, brought the present action to recover from the Appellee Manila Ho
Co. an additional amount for accrued leave alleged to be due them under the
same section of the Administrative Code, as later amended by RA 1081, approved
on June 15, 1954, that is to say, 15 days before they were separated from the
W/N Petitioners could avail of the alleged accrued benefits.
No. Art. 4 of the New Civil Code provides that laws shall have no retroactive
effect unless the contrary is provided. As RA 1081 does not provide that it is t
o have a
retroactive effect, it can only be given effect from the date of its approval.
Corporal v. Employee s Compensation Commission
Case No. 83
G.R. No. 86020 (August 5, 1994)
Chapter VII, Page 311, Footnote No. 131
Norma Corporal was an employed public school teacher. During the course
of her work, she had several pregnancies. On her 4th pregnancy, she suffered
complete abortion. On her 5th pregnancy, she gave birth to a baby boy with the
help of a hilot . An hour later, she was rushed to the hospital due to profuse vagi
bleeding. She underwent hysterectomy but she died afterwards. Her husband,
herein Petitioner, filed a claim for compensation benefit with GSIS. But said ag
denied. The matter was elevated to ECC but the petition was also dismissed becau
the cause of his wife s death was non-work-related.
W/N Petitioner could avail the compensation benefit.
No. The determination of whether the prolapse of Norma s uterus developed
before or after her 5th pregnancy is immaterial since this illness is the result
of her
physiological structure and changes in the body. While as a rule that labor and
social welfare legislation should be liberally construed in favor of the applica
nt, there
is also a rule that such liberal construction cannot be applied if the pertinent
provisions of the Labor Code are clear.
6c, 43

People v. Moran
Case No. 216
G.R. No. 17905 (January 27, 1923)
Chapter VII, Page 320, Footnote No. 167
Appellant was punished for violating the Election Law. When the decision
was published, it was increased to 6 months. Defendant alleges that the crime ha
already prescribed, pursuant to Sec. 71 of Act No. 3030, which was enacted by th
Legislature on March 9, 1922.
W/N Act No. 3030 is meant to apply to the Administrative Code and whether
the said act should be retroactive with respect to Art. 22 and 7 of the RPC.
Act No. 3030 is intended to be amendatory to several sections of the
Administrative Code. Furthermore, Art. 22 of the RPC can only be invoked with
reference to some other penal law. Hence with regard to Art. 7, the SC contends
that Art. 22 should still apply to special laws.
Also, the prescription of the crime is intimately connected with that of the
penalty. A statute declaring prescription of a crime has no other purpose than t
annul prosecution of the offender. When the statute makes no distinction, it mak
no exception. Statutes are not construed to have retrospective operation as to
destroy or impair rights unless such was clearly the intention.
The new law shortening the time of prescription indicates that the sovereign
acknowledges that the previous one was unjust and enforcing the latter would be
26, 37, 46a, 48
People v. Reyes
Case No. 222
G.R. Nos. 74226-227 (July 27, 1989)
Chapter VII, Page 320, Footnote No. 168
On June 1983, the complainants allegedly discovered that the property of
their deceased parents was falsely transferred to Mizaph Reyes through falsified
signatures and untruthful statements in the deed of registration. However as the
was registered on May 26, 1961, the lower courts held that the period of prescri
has long passed.
Whether or not the lower courts erred in dismissing the case due to the
passing of the prescriptive period.
The SC ruled affirmed the decision of the lower court, as the registration of
land acts as a notice to the whole world. Under this, it is also presumed that t
purchaser has examined the instruments of the record.
The court will not hesitate to apply rules of construction in civil cases to tha
t of
criminal ones, should the circumstances warrant. Rights should not be left on a
precarious balance, always susceptible possible challenges. This should also app
ly to
criminal cases.
Furthermore, as stated in People v. Moran, in the interpretation of the law and
that of the prescription of crimes, a liberal reading that is most favorable to
accused is the one to be adopted.

Board of Administrators of the PVA v. Bautista

Case No. 37
G.R. No. L-37867 (February 22, 1982)
Chapter VII, Page 321, Footnote No. 170
Respondent Gasilao, a veteran, failed to present all the necessary papers to
receive his pension. After finally complying with all the necessities, he was aw
with the full benefits of RA 65, Sec. 9 and RA 1920, for P100 a month and an
additional P10 per minor. Later, on June 22, 1969, RA 5753 was approved. However
due to the lack of funds, Respondent Gasilao only received a 25% increase and on
after January 15, 1971.
The lower court granted Respondent Gasilao his pension, starting from
December 18, 1955 at the rate of P50, and then P100 plus P10 per minor, from Jun
22, 1957 up to August 7, 1968. To pay the difference of P100 plus P30 per month
P20 per month for each minor from June 22, 1969 up to January 15, 1971, the
difference of P75 plus P22.50 per month for his wife, and P20 per minor from Jan
16, 1971 up to December 31, 1971.
W/N the lower court erred in the retroactivity of Respondent Gasilao s
Respondent Gasilao is a veteran of good standing and has complied with the
prescriptive period for filing for his pension. The laws on veteran pension must
liberally construed as to grant our veterans the proper recognition. Granting su
pensions the earliest possible time is more in tune with the spirit of RA 65. Bu
t, as the
government has yet to provide the necessary funds, the judgment of the lower cou
is modified as, effective December 18, 1955 at P50 plus P10 per month for each
minor, increased to P100 from June 22, 1957 to August 7, 1968. The difference fr
June 22, 1969 to January 14, 1972 is subject to the release of funds by the
9a, 40b
Legaspi v. Executive Secretary and Agrarian Reforms
Case No. 145
No. L-36153 (November 28, 1975)
Chapter VII, Page 322, Footnote No. 173
Petitioner, an employee of the Department of Agrarian Reforms, sent a letter
to the Respondent Secretary of the Department, Conrado Estrella. Petitioner
expressed his desire to be laid-off under the provisions of RA 3844, as amended
by RA
6389, on the condition that he would also be paid the gratuity benefits to which
might be entitled under C.A. No. 186, as amended by RA 1616. GSIS approved his
retirement gratuity under C.A. No. 186, as amended by RA 1616 but denied his cla
for gratuity under RA 3844, as amended by RA 6389.
W/N Petitioner is entitled to both gratuity benefits under C.A. No. 186, as
amended by RA 1616, and RA 3844, as amended by RA 6389.
No. There is nothing in RA 3844, as amended by RA 6389, that would suggest
that an employee who is laid-off or prefers to be laid-off can receive two pensi
benefits, one under its provisions and another pursuant to C.A. No. 186.
This interpretation is more in line with the policy of the law embodied in C.A.
No. 186 prohibiting an employer from paying double retirement benefits to an
employee. Being the law governing the retirement of government employees, all
other laws extending retirement benefits to government employees should, in case
ambiguity, be construed in relation to C.A. No. 186 and in the light of its prov
isions. It
is a rule of statutory construction that when the legislature enacts a provision
, it is
understood that it is aware of previous statutes relating to the same subject ma
and that in the absence of an express repeal or amendment therein, the new
provision should be deemed enacted pursuant to the legislative policy embodied i
prior statutes, which should all be construed together.
6c, 38b

Re: Monthly Pension of Judges and Justices

Case No. 60
A.M. No. 09-9-019-SC (October 4, 1990)
Chapter VII, Page 322, Footnote No. 174
This matter was brought about due to two separate publications in the Official
Gazette of the same amendment to RA 910 (Special Retirement Law of Judges and
Justices). P.D. 1438 was published in Vol. 74 of the Official Gazette, No. 30, w
hich did
not provide how to compute the monthly pension starting from the sixth year of
retirement. However, in Vol. 74 of the Official Gazette, No. 41 provided that th
monthly pension starting from the sixth year of retirement is equivalent to the
salary he was receiving on the date of his retirement. Since 1978 however, GSIS
computed the monthly pension as follows: 1) highest salary, plus 2) highest
representation and transportation allowances (RATA), plus 3) longevity pay (whic
was considered part of the salary starting in 1983 pursuant to Sec. 42, BP 129).
basis was the copy of P.D. 1438 which was published in Vol. 74 of the Official G
No. 30.
Which version of P.D. 1438 must be followed.
The Court directed GSIS to continue implementing RA 910, as amended by
P.D. 1438, in the same manner as it has done since 1978. This is definitely more
keeping with and gives substance to the elementary rule of statutory constructio
that, being remedial in character, retirement laws should be liberally construed
administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited and all doubts as
the intent of the law should be resolved in favor of the retiree to achieve its
humanitarian purposes. Retirement laws are intended to entice competent men and
women to enter the government service and to permit them to retire therefrom wit
relative security, not only for those who have retained their vigor but, more so
, for
those who have been incapacitated by illness or accident.
9a, 40b
Re: Application For Retirement Under R.A. No. 910 of Associate Justice Ramon B.
Britanico of the IAC
Case No. 128
A.M. No. 6484-Ret. (May 15, 1989)
Chapter VII, Page 323, Footnote No. 177
Justice Britanico requested that he be granted retirement benefits under RA
910 in addition to or in lieu of benefits he received under RA 1616 upon termina
tion of
his service in the Judiciary by the acceptance of his courtesy resignation by Pr
Aquino, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1 dated February 25, 1986, requiring all
appointive public officials to submit their courtesy resignations beginning with
members of the Supreme Court. Justice Britanico served the government for 36.23
years, of which 10 years, 2 months, and 27 days were served in the Judiciary. As
provided in Sec. 1 of RA 910, the judges or justices who may enjoy retirement be
with their lifetime annuity, should have rendered at least 20 years service in th
judiciary or in any other branch of the government or both. They fall into three
those who resign by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of their
office and had rendered at least 20 years service in the judiciary or in any
other branch of the government or both
Which category Justice Britanico belongs to.
He belongs to the second category of Sec. 1. The acceptance of his
courtesy resignation, not being a voluntary resignation (as held in Ortiz v. COM
resulted in his incapacity to discharge the duties of his office, which he could
very well held until he reaches the mandatory retirement age of 70 years.
Retirement laws should be liberally construed to and applied in favor of the
persons intended to be benefited thereby.
6c, 40b, 43c

Re: Gregorio G. Pineda

Case No. 132
A.M. No. 6789-RET (Jul 13, 1990)
Chapter VII, Page 323, Footnote No. 178
These are petitions or motions for reconsideration filed by six retired judges,
namely Pineda, Montesclaros, de Lara, Montecillo, Paredes and Gerochi, asking th
they be granted gratuity and/or retirement benefits under RA 910, as amended, in
addition to or in lieu of the benefits under RA 1616 or P.D. 1146. They want to
advantage of the Plana and Britanico ruling.
W/N they should be granted benefits under RA 910 pursuant to the Plana or
Britanico ruling.
No. A close scrutiny into the service records as well as the conduct of the
judges is necessary to determine their qualification to receive benefits under R
A 910.
The rule is that retirement laws are construed liberally in favor of the retirin
employee. When the court allows exemptions to fix rules for certain judges, ther
e are
ample reasons behind each grant. The crediting of leaves is not done
indiscriminately. The court only allows the use of the Plana or Britanico ruling
if the
career of the judge was marked by competence, integrity and dedication to the
public service. Most of the judges however retired bowing to policy consideratio
ns, id
est courtesy resignations. The De La Llana ruling is an essential factor in dete
whether or not the judges should be granted the benefits they ask for. It stated
that if
a judge was not recommended for reappointment following their courtesy
resignations then the relevant factors were considered and they were found
9c, 9e, 37, 42a
Ramirez v. Arrieta
Case No. 130
G.R. No. L-19183 (Nov. 29, 1962)
Chapter VII, Page 325, Footnote No. 181
Petitioner filed an action against Apolinar Serina seeking the annulment of a
transfer certificate of title over a parcel of land alleging misrepresentation.
dismissed the complaint. The Plaintiff filed a notice of intent to appeal. The e
nd of
the 30 day period fell on a Sunday hence it was moved to the following Monday bu
one of the two bondsmen was unable to sign the appeal bond. The clerk of court
suggested that the document first be completed by the Plaintiff before filing it
Petitioner followed the suggestion and filed the complete document the next day.
Defendant filed an opposition to the approval of the appeal bond since it was fi
one day after the end of the reglementary period. The judge disapproved the bond
and rendered the judgment final and executory. Plaintiff interposed a petition f
mandamus to the SC saying that the CFI committed a grave abuse of discretion.
W/N the CFI committed grave abuse of discretion in disallowing the appeal
Yes, it did. The action of the CFI is harsh and improvident according to the
SC. The bond would have been filed on time if it had not been for the defect.
According to the Rules of Court, a personal appeal bond need not necessarily be
subscribed by 2 sureties, it would suffice that the court approves such. Further
the Rules of Court also state that the appeal needs only one surety. So long as
surety is solvent and acceptable to the court, it should suffice. Moreover, the
in the appeal bond, even if indeed 2 sureties were needed, the court would not
have been deprived of jurisdiction since it was filed within the reglementary pe
Rules of procedure should be liberally construed in order to promote their objec
t and
assist the parties in obtaining a just determination of their cases.
9a, 9d, 9e, 11b
International Corporate Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court
Case No. 63
G.R. No. L-6970 (Jan. 30, 1988)
Chapter VII, Page 326, Footnote No. 181
Private Respondent secured a loan from Petitioner s predecessor in interest by
mortgaging her properties. The amount approved for release was used to pay for h
other obligations to Petitioner. Thus, private Respondent claimed that she never
received anything from the approved loan. Private Respondent made a money
market placement. Meanwhile, she allegedly failed to pay her mortgage so the ban
refused to pay the interest earned by the placement, applying the amount instead
to the deficiency in the mortgage. The mortgaged properties were auctioned.
Private Respondent filed a petition to release in her favor the amount earned in
money market investment which was subsequently granted by the court. The court
issued a writ of execution against Petitioner s property. Private Respondent filed
an ex
parte motion praying that five branches of the bank pay her the total amount of
money market interest, which was granted. Petitioner failed to comply with all t
said orders. The supplemental petition of the Private Respondent was marred by
erasures, alterations, and/or additions. Such bond was therefore rendered withou
force and effect. Private Respondent contends that the alterations were all made
the insurance company itself since there were no ready-made forms available.
W/N there can be legal compensation in the case at bar.
Compensation is not proper where the claim of the person asserting the setoff
against the other is neither clear nor liquidated. Compensation cannot extend to
unliquidated disputed claim arising from breach of contract. Petitioner is indeb
ted to
private Respondent in the amount of the money market interest. The debt of P6.81
of private Respondent to Petitioner is however in doubt. This prevents legal
compensation from taking place under Art. 1290 of the Civil Code. The filing of
insufficient or defective bond does not dissolve absolutely and unconditionally
injunction issued. The decision of the CA is affirmed.
9c, 9d, 11b
Del Rosario v. Hamoy
Case No. 35
No. L-77154 (June 30, 1987)
Chapter VII, Page 326, Footnote No. 181
For want of a one-peso documentary stamp in a special power of attorney
for pre-trial purposes, in lieu of the personal appearance of Plaintiff, the Res
Judge declared him non-suited and dismissed the complaint for failure of the
Plaintiff to appear for pre-trial conference.
W/N Respondent Judge erred in dismissing the case because the document
did not have the required one-peso documentary stamp.
Yes. Had Respondent Judge been less technical and more sensible, the
present proceedings and the consequent waste of time of this Court would have
been avoided. By such rigidity, Respondent denied the Petitioner substantial jus
He could have easily required counsel for Plaintiff to buy the documentary stamp
and affix it to the special power of attorney and it would not have taken ten mi
The Respondent Judge lost sight of the fact that even the Rules of Court themsel
fortified by jurisprudence, mandate a liberal construction of the rules and plea
in order to effect substantial justice.
8c, 9d, 18a, 18b
Lacsamana v. Intermediate Appellate Court
Case No. 69
No. L-73146-53 (August 26, 1986)
Chapter VII, Page 326, Footnote No. 181
A decision was rendered against Petitioner by the RTC, thus counsel for
Petitioner filed a motion with Respondent court for 15 days extension to file a
for review. However, a decision was promulgated by the Respondent court ruling
that the period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot
extended and declared the case terminated. The Respondent court cited a
Supreme Court decision where the issue was regarding an extension to file a moti
for reconsideration of a final order or ruling and not the question of granting
a motion
for extension of time to file a petition for review.
W/N Respondent court erred in terminating the case.
Yes. The Court rules, for the guidance of Bench and Bar, that a motion for
extension of time to file a petition for review under Sec. 22 of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act and Sec. 22(b) of the Interim Rules, may properly be filed wi
and granted by the IAC (now the Court of Appeals). The Court further restates an
clarifies the modes and periods as follows: (6) Period of extension of time to f
petition for review: Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Decision
, an
extension of only 15 days for filing a petition for review may be granted by the
save in exceptionally meritorious cases. The motion for extension of time must b
filed and the corresponding docket fee paid within the reglementary period of
2a, 5b, 27
Gimenez v. Securities and Exchange Commission
Case No. 52
No. L-68568 (December 26, 1984)
Chapter VII, Page 326, Footnote No. 181
Gimenez Stockbrokerage filed a motion for reconsideration before the
Commissioners of the SEC 27 days after receiving their decision. The SEC denied
motion for reconsideration for being filed out of time. The SEC ruled that the 3
period provided for in Sec. 6 of P.D. 902-A was modified by Sec. 39 of the Judic
Revamp Law (BP 129) which provides for a period of 15 days for appealing from fi
order, resolutions, awards of decisions of any court.
W/N Sec. 39 of BP 129 applies to the SEC.
No. Sec. 39 of BP 129 expressly refers to courts . The SEC is not a court. It is
an administrative agency. Repeals by implication are not favored. The 30-day
period fixed by P.D. 902-A, the organic law of the SEC, is still in force.
6c, 7a, 24a, 37, 38b
Blanco v. Bernabe and Lawyers Cooperatuve Publishing Co.
Case No. 36
G.R. No. L-44970 (March 31, 1936)
Chapter VII, Page 326, Footnote No. 183
To comply with the requirements to file an appeal the Petitioners filed the
notice along with a money order for the sum of P16 to the Collector of Internal
Revenue. However the Collector returned the said money order to sender for the
reason that he had no authority to be its depositary. With such, the appeal was
deemed filed for failure to comply with the requirements.
W/N the requisites were complied with and W/N the court should grant the
remedy prayed for by the Petitioners.
Under Sec. 76 of Act No. 190 on how appeals are perfected, The bond to
be given shall be filed with the justice of peace . In lieu of such bond the Appe
may file with the justice a certificate of the proper official that the Appellan
t has
deposited P25 with the municipal treasurer (In Manila with the Collector of Inte
Revenue). The Petitioners therefore have complied with said requirements.
The non-presentation of this certificate was not due to the Petitioner s failure
or omission but to the refusal of the Collector of Internal Revenue to receive t
deposit tendered by the Petitioner. The fact that the corresponding receipt ther
has not been issued or the failure to present the same in due time should not af
the remedy.
6c, 6d, 7a
Case and Nantz v. Jugo
Case No. 49
G.R. No. L-832 (October 14, 1946)
Chapter VII, Page 327, Footnote No. 187
Herein Defendants were to pay a counterbond to which they had complied
with. They furnished the Sheriff with a copy of the said counterbond to comply w
the requirement. The Sheriff is then tasked to furnish the Plaintiff with a copy
. On the
occasion when the Sheriff received the copy of such, the counsel of the Plaintif
f was
present in his office. He asked the latter if there were objections to the said
counterbond and the counsel replied none. Due to unfortunate circumstances the
Sheriff failed to deliver a copy of such counterbond to the counsel to formalize
act of furnishing a copy.
W/N the Defendants complied with the requirement of filing a counterbond
and W/N the Plaintiff was furnished a copy of such.
Yes to both issues. Negligence or unavoidable circumstances should not
adversely affect the Defendant under the circumstance of this case. The sole
purpose of the counterbond is to enable the Plaintiff to see that the bond is in
prescribed form and for the right amount. There was substantial compliance with
when their attorney was shown in the Sheriff s office the Defendant s counterbond.
6d, 9a, 9d

C. Viuda de Ordoveza v. Raymundo

Case No. 91
G.R. No. L-45155 (July 31, 1936)
Chapter VII, Page 327, Footnote No. 189
Petitioner is the Respondent in another case and she contends that the
opposing party failed to file her brief within the 15-day period which makes her
appeal ipso facto dismissed and the CA had no authority to grant additional 5 da
to file her brief.
W/N the CA had authority to reinstate the appeal and to grant the Appellant
an additional 3 days with which to file her brief.
Yes. Under the Rules of Court the court may, on motion to the Appellee and
notice the Appellant or on its own motion dismiss the bill of exceptions or the
appeal. The word may implies that the matter of dismissing the appeal or not rests
within the sound discretion of the court.
Javellana v. Mirasol and Nuñez
Case No. 65
G.R. No. 14881 (February 5, 1920)
Chapter VII, Page 328, Footnote No. 192
A redemption of property from an execution sale, which had been effected
in behalf of a brother of the execution debtor (Julio Javellana), was attacked i
n this
case as void because of a supposed collusive agreement between the
redemptioner (Luis Mirasol) and sheriff (Geronimo Nuñez) whereby the latter agreed
to withhold the redemption money from the creditor and to return it to the
redemptioner if the latter should finally succeed in establishing his title to t
he same
property in other litigation.
W/N the redemption has been effected in good faith and in accordance
with the requirements of law.
A liberal construction will be given to statutes governing the redemption of
property, to the end that the property of the debtor may be made to satisfy as m
liabilities as possible. Redemption of property sold under execution is not rend
invalid by reason of the fact that the payment to the sheriff for the purpose of
redemption is effected by means of a check for the amount due. Any ordinary
creditor, or assignee as such, having a judgment subsequent to that under which
property was sold may exercise the right of redemption. The act of the redemptio
in redeeming the property pending the decision of those appeals was not an
officious act in any sense. It was on the contrary necessary to the reasonable
protection of his right as a subsequent judgment-creditor of Maximino Mirasol.
38b, 41

Del Rosario v. Equitable Ins. and Casualty Co., Inc.

Case No. 34
G.R. No. L-16215 (June 29, 1963)
Chapter VII, Page 328, Footnote No. 192
Defendant company issued Personal Accident Policy No. 7136 on the life of
Francisco del Rosario, binding itself to pay the sum of P1,000 to P3,000, as ind
for the death of the insured. Petitioner, father of the insured, filed a claim f
payment with Defendant company when his son died of drowning after being
forced to jump off the motor launch ISLAMA on account of fire. Defendant
company refused to pay more than P1,000 since they alleged that their liability
only said amount pursuant to Sec. 1, Part I of the provisions of the policy.
How much the Defendant company should pay in indemnity for the death of
Francisco del Rosario.
The policy does not positively state any definite amount that may be
recovered in case of death by drowning. There is an ambiguity in this respect in
policy, which ambiguity must be interpreted in favor of the insured and strictly
the insurer so as to allow a greater indemnity. Petitioner is entitled to recove
r P3,000.
The insurance company has already paid the amount of P1,000 to Petitioner so tha
there still remains a balance of P2,000 of the amount to which he is entitled to
11a, 38
De la Cruz v. Capital Ins. & Surety Co.
Case No. 156
G.R. No. L-16138 (April 29, 1961)
Chapter VII, Page 328, Footnote No. 192
Eduardo de la Cruz was the holder of an accident insurance policy
underwritten by the Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. In a boxing contest
participated into by the insured, Eduardo slipped and was hit by his opponent on
left part of the back of the head, causing Eduardo to fall, with his head hittin
g the
rope of the ring. The cause of death was reported as hemorrhage, intracranial, l
Simon de la Cruz, the father of the insured, filed a claim with the insurance co
for payment of the indemnity under the insurance policy. Defendant company set
up the defense that the death of the insured, caused by his participation in a b
contest, was not accidental and, therefore, not covered by insurance.
W/N Eduardo s death falls under the definition of the policy against death or
disability caused by accidental means.
The terms accident and accidental , as used in insurance contracts, have
not acquired any technical meaning, and are construed by the courts in their
ordinary and common acceptation. There is no accident when a deliberate act is
performed unless some additional, unexpected, independent and unforeseen
happening occurs which produces or brings about the result of injury or death. T
failure of the Defendant company to include death resulting from a boxing match
other sports among the prohibitive risks leads to the conclusion that it did not
to limit or exempt itself from the liability for such death.
3, 25a, 30a

Ty Vs. First National Surety & Assurance Co., Inc.

Case No. 156
G.R. No. L-16138 (April 29, 1961)
Chapter VII, Page 328, Footnote No. 192
Plaintiff Diosdado C. Ty insured himself in 18 local insurance companies,
among which being the eight above named Defendants, which issued to him
personal accident policies. On December 24, 1953, a fire broke out which totally
destroyed the Broadway Cotton Factory. Fighting his way out of the factory, Plai
was injured on the left hand by a heavy object which caused temporary total
disability of his left hand. Plaintiff filed the corresponding notice of acciden
t and
notice of claim with all of the Defendants to recover indemnity under Part II of
policy but the Defendants rejected plaintiff's claim for indemnity for the reaso
n that
there being no severance of amputation of the left hand, the disability suffered
him was not covered by his policy.
W/N it is necessary that there should be an amputation of the left hand of the
Plaintiff before he can recover on the insurance policies.
The clear and express conditions of the insurance policies define partial
disability as loss of either hand by amputation through the bones of the wrist.
was no such amputation in the case at bar. All that was found by the trial court
which is not disputed on appeal, was that the physical injuries "caused temporar
total disability of plaintiff's left hand." In addition, the agreement contained
in the
insurance policies is the law between the parties. As the terms of the policies
clear, express and specific that only amputation of the left hand should be
considered as a loss thereof, an interpretation that would include the mere frac
or other temporary disability not covered by the policies would certainly be
6b, 7a, 9c
Capati v. Ocampo
Case No. 46
G.R. No. L-28742 (April 30, 1982)
Chapter VIII, Page 330, Footnote No. 8
Plaintiff, a resident of Pampanga, entered into a sub-contract with the
Defendant, a resident of Naga City. The Defendant completed a construction job
for the Plaintiff. However, the construction was completed on a date later than
was agreed in their contract. Hence, Plaintiff filed in the CFI of Pampanga an a
for recovery of consequential damages due to the delay. Defendant filed a motion
to dismiss the complaint on the ground that venue of action was improperly laid.
CFI of Pampanga dismissed the Plaintiff's complaint on ground of improper venue.

W/N the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of improper venue was
No. The rule on venue of personal actions cognizable by the CFI is found in
Sec. 2(b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, which provides that such "actions may b
commenced and tried where the Defendant or any of the Defendants resides or
may be found, or where the Plaintiff or any of the Plaintiffs resides, at the el
ection of
the Plaintiff." The word "may" is merely permissive and operates to confer discr
upon a party. Under ordinary circumstances, the term "may be" connotes possibili
it does not connote certainty. "May" is an auxillary verb indicating liberty,
opportunity, permission or possibility.
6c, 25a, b

Chartered Bank v. National Government Auditing Office

Case No. 58
G.R. No. L-38513 (March 31, 1987)
Chapter VIII, Page 331, Footnote No. 10
Iloilo city branch of Petitioner bank was accepting postal money order from
the general public since 1946. These orders were presented to the Iloilo city of
fice for
payment and if said office could not pay in full, they would issue receipts for
remaining balance. On 1968, the Bureau of Posts issued an unnumbered circular:
"Memorandum of Understanding Covering Cashing and Clearing of Money Orders,"
effective October 1, 1968, involving the installation of a new postal money orde
system which requires that all commercial banks, regardless of location, must cl
ear all
postal money orders they have received and paid with the Central Bank at Manila.
Petitioner bank continued its transactions with the post office under the old pr
through the latter's Acting Cashier beyond October 1, 1968. The post office said
the arrangements made by the acting cashier and the Petitioner bank were private
unauthorized arrangements and any claim for settlement of any unpaid money
orders should be directed against the said cashier.
W/N the unnumbered circular and the undated memorandum of
understanding are directory and permissive in nature.
Respondents are correct by saying that the purposes of the new postal
money order system negate the contention that said circular and memorandum are
not mandatory in nature and that they are for the convenience of commercial bank
operating in the Manila area only.
7a, 9a, 36a, 36b
Guiao v. Figueroa
Case No. 121
G.R. No. L-6481 (May 17, 1954)
Chapter VIII, Page 333, Footnote No. 17
In the trial of People v. Gopez, the provincial fiscal introduced Porfirio Dizon
and Emiliano Manalo as witnesses for the State. After the reinvestigation, an
amended information was filed, and two new accused were included, namely, Jesus
Guiao and Eulogio Serrano. But Dizon and Manalo were not included. In view of th
failure of the provincial fiscal to include these two persons, the action for ma
was filed by Jesus Guiao to compel the fiscal to include Dizon and Manalo as
accused in his information.
W/N a fiscal may be compelled by mandamus to include in an information
persons who appear to be responsible for the crime charged therein.
Yes. Sec. 1 of Rule 106 of the Rules of Court taken from Act No. 2709 states
that, Every prosecution for a crime shall be in the name of the United States aga
all persons who appear to be responsible therefor, except in the cases determine
d in
Sec. 2 of this Act. A perusal of Act No. 2709 discloses the legislative intent to
that all persons who appear to be responsible for an offense should be included
the information. The use of the word "shall" and of the phrase "except in cases
determined" shows Sec. 1 is mandatory, not merely directory.
6c, 9a, 25a

Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (South) Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

Case No. 153
G.R. No. 117188 (August 7, 1997)
Chapter VIII, Page 334, Footnote No. 22
The Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association Inc. (LGVHAI) was registered
with Respondent Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC) as the sole
homeowners organization in the said subdivision but it did not file its corporate
Later, it was discovered that there were two other organizations within the
subdivision: the North and South Associations. Respondent HIGC then informed the
president of LGVHAI that the latter has been automatically dissolved because of
non-submission of its by-laws as required by the Corporation Code. This resulted
the registration of Petitioner association. LGVHAI complained and got a favorabl
result from Respondent HIGC declaring the registration of Petitioner association
cancelled and Respondent CA subsequently affirmed the said decision. Hence,
Petitioner association filed a petition for certiorari.
W/N the failure of a corporation to file its by-laws within one month from the
date of its incorporation results in its automatic dissolution.
No. The legislature s intent is not to automatically dissolve a corporation for it
failure to pass its by-laws. The word must in a statute is not always imperative b
ut it
may be consistent with an exercise of discretion. The language of the statute sh
be considered as a whole while ascertaining the intent of the legislature in usi
ng the
word must or shall .
9c, 25a, 36a, 38b, b
Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 95
G.R. No. 102858 (July 28, 1997)
Chapter VIII, Page 334, Footnote No. 23
Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration
of a land title. During the pendency of the said petition, he died and his heirs
represented by Josefa Abistado as a guardian ad litem in order to continue the
petition. The trial court dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction . However
, it
was found that the applicant had been in open, continuous and exclusive possessi
of the subject land since 1938. The reason for the dismissal is that the applica
nt failed
to publish the notice of Initial Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation p
to a law. The CA set aside the decision of the trial court. Thus, Petitioner bro
ught the
case to the Supreme Court.
Whether the newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an
original land registration case is mandatory or directory.
It is mandatory. The law used the term "shall" in prescribing the work to be
done by the Commissioner of Land Registration upon the latter's receipt of the c
order setting the time for initial hearing. The said word denotes an imperative
thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute. While such literal mandate
not an absolute rule in statutory construction, as its import ultimately depends
upon its
context in the entire provision, it is held that in the present case the term mu
st be
understood in its normal mandatory meaning in order to uphold the norms of due
6c, 9a

Bersabal v. Salvador
Case No. 34
G.R. No. L-35910 (July 21, 1978)
Chapter VIII, Page 335, Footnote No. 25
Private Respondents filed an ejectment suit against the Petitioner. The
subsequent decision was appealed by the Petitioner and during its pendency, the
court issued an order stating that counsels for both parties are given 30 days fro
receipt of this order within which to file their memoranda in order for this cas
e to be
submitted for decision by the court. After receipt, Petitioner filed a motion ex
to submit memorandum within 30 days from receipt of notice of submission of the
transcript of stenographic notes taken during the hearing of the case which was
granted by the court. But the Respondent judge issued an order dismissing the ca
for failure to prosecute Petitioner s appeal. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration citing the submitted ex parte motion but the court denied it.
W/N the mere failure of an Appellant to submit the mentioned memorandum
would empower the CFI to dismiss the appeal on the ground of failure to prosecut
The court is not empowered by law to dismiss the appeal on the mere failure
of an Appellant to submit his memorandum. The law provides that Courts shall
decide cases on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted from the city
courts: Provided parties may submit memoranda if so requested It cannot be
interpreted otherwise than that the submission of memoranda is optional.
Republic Planers Bank v. Agana Sr.
Case No. 133
G. R. No. 51765 (March 3, 1997)
Private Respondents filed in court a quo, an action for specific performance
to compel petitioner to redeem 800 preferred shares of stock with a face value o
P8,000.00 and to pay 1% quarterly interest thereon as quarterly dividend owing t
under the terms and conditions of the certificates of stock. The court a quo ren
judgment in favor of Private Respondents.
W/N Respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction in compelling Petitioner bank to redeem Private
Respondents preferred shares
Yes. Respondent Judge, in ruling that Petitioner must redeem the shares in
question, stated that, On the question of the redemption by the Defendant of said
preferred shares of stock, the very wordings of the terms and conditions in said
certificates clearly allows the same. What Respondent Judge failed to recognize
was that while the stock certificate does allow redemption, the option to do so
clearly vested in the Petitioner Bank. The redemption therefore is clearly the t
known as "optional". Furthermore, the terms and conditions set forth therein use
word "may". It is a settled doctrine in statutory construction that the word "ma
denotes discretion, and cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect.
6c, 6b, 7a, 30b, 36a

Phil. Consumers Foundation , Inc. v. Nat l Telecommunications Commission

Case No. 121
G.R. No. L-63318 (November 25, 1983)
Respondent Commission approved a revised schedule for Subscriber
Investment Plan (SIP) filed by Private Respondent. Petitioner states that SIP sc
presented by the Private Respondent is pre-mature and, therefore, illegal and
baseless, because the Respondent Commission has not yet promulgated the
required rules and regulations implementing Sec. 2 of P.D. 217 which provides, Th
Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communications through its Board
of Communications and/or appropriate agency shall see to it that the herein
declared policies for the telephone industry are immediately implemented and for
this purpose pertinent rules and regulations may be promulgated ...
W/N Respondent Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion.
Yes. P.D. 217 deals with matters so alien, innovative and untested such that
existing substantive and procedural laws would not be applicable. Thus, the SIP
so set up precisely to ensure the financial viability of public telecommunicatio
companies which in turn assures the enjoyment of the population at minimum cost
the benefits of a telephone facility. Without promulgation of rules and regulati
there would be confusion among the rights of Private Respondent, the consumers
and the government itself. The plan to expand the company program and/or
improve its service is laudable, but the expenses should not be shouldered by th
telephone subscribers. Considering the multi-million profits of the company, the
of expansion and/or improvement should come from part of its huge profits.
8b, 9d, 11b, 12a
Phil. Consumers Foundation, Inc. v. NTC and PLDT (Resolution)
Case No. 94
G.R. No. L-63318 (August 18, 1984)
Respondent Commission filed a manifestation that it is joining Private
Respondent in its second motion for reconsideration and adopting it as its own.
decision promulgated interprets the rule-making authority delegated in Section 2
P.D. 217 to the then Department of Public Works, Transportation and
Communications as mandatory, which construction is not supported by the actual
phraseology of said Section 2.
W/N the previous decision rendered making it mandatory to set rules and
regulations implementing P.D. 217 should be reconsidered.
Yes. The basic canon of statutory interpretation is that the word used in the la
must be given its ordinary meaning, unless a contrary intent is manifest from th
e law
itself. Hence, the phrase "may be promulgated" should not be construed to mean
"shall" or "must".
6c, 6d, 9f, 30b, 24, 36, 39c

Diokno v. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation

Case No. 93
G.R. No. L-4712 (July 11, 1952)
Chapter VIII, Page 336, Footnote No. 32
Petitioner, the holder of a back pay certificate of indebtedness issued under
RA 304, sought to compel Respondent company to accept his back pay certificate
as payment of his loan from the latter. His basis was Sec. 2 of RA 304, which pr
that investment funds or banks or other financial institutions owned or controlle
d by
the government shall subject to availability of loanable funds accept or discoun
at not more than two per centum per annum for ten years such certificate for
certain specified purposes. Respondent company contended however that the
word shall used in this particular section of the law is merely directory. The low
court sustained Respondent company.
W/N Petitioner can use his back pay certificate to pay for his loan to
Respondent company.
No. It is true that in its ordinary signification, the word shall is imperative.
However, the rule is not absolute; it may be construed as may when required by
the context or by the intention of the statute. The modifier, at not more than tw
per centum per annum for ten years. , the interest to be charged, that the verb-
phrase is mandatory because not only the law uses at not more but the legislative
purpose and intent, to conserve the value of the back pay certificate for the be
of the holders, for whose benefit the same have been issued, can be carried out
fixing a maximum limit for discounts. But as to when the discounting or acceptan
shall be made, the context and the sense demand a contrary interpretation. If th
acceptance or discount of the certificate is to be subject to the condition of the
availability of loanable funds, it is evident the legislature intended that the
acceptance shall be allowed on the condition that there are available loanable
funds. In other words, acceptance or discount is to be permitted only if there ar
loanable funds.
6c, 25a, 26
Berces v. Guingona, et. al.
Case No. 33
G.R. No. 112099 (February 21, 1995)
Chapter VIII, Page 337, Footnote No. 34
Petitioner filed two administrative cases against Respondent mayor of Tiwi,
Albay for 1) abuse of authority; and 2) dishonesty, with the Sangguiniang
Panlalawigan. Respondent mayor was convicted, and accordingly, suspended in
both cases. Respondent mayor appealed to the Office of the President and prayed
for stay of execution under Sec. 67(b) of the LGC. The Office of the President s
execution, citing Sec. 68 of RA 7160 and Sec. 6 of A.O. No. 18. According to
Petitioner, the governing law is RA 7160, which contains a mandatory provision t
an appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final and executory.
Petitioner further contends that A.O. No. 18 was repealed by RA 7160.
W/N R.A. 7160 repealed A.O. No. 18.
No. Sec. 530(f), RA 7160 did not expressly repeal Sec. 6, A.O. No. 18 because
it failed to identify or designate the laws on executive orders that are intende
d to be
repealed. If there was any repeal, it was by implication which is not favored. I
n the
absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing
prior law unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists between t
two. There is none in this case. The first sentence of Sec. 68 provides that an a
shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or executory. It gives discretio
n to
reviewing appeals to stay execution. The term shall may be read mandatory or
directory, depending upon consideration of the entire provision where it is foun
25a, 26, 50
Mers Shoes Manufacturing, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.
Case No. 81
G.R. No. 123669 (February 27, 1998)
Chapter VIII, Page 337, Footnote No. 35
Petitioner hired Respondent workers as piece rate workers. Alleging serious
business decline, Petitioner barred its workers from entering the company to wor
k. The
workers challenged the legality of Petitioner s stoppage of operations. The Labor
Arbiter found the shutdown with cause but without the required notice, and order
Petitioner to pay indemnity and separation pay. Petitioner appealed to Responden
NLRC but sought a reduction of the cash or surety bond. Despite the reduction
granted, Petitioner still failed to post bond within 10 days, resulting to the d
ismissal of
appeal for failure to perfect it.
W/N Respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion.
No. Under Art. 223 of the Labor Code, an appeal by the employer may be
perfected only upon posting of cash or surety bond in an amount equivalent to th
monetary award. Perfection of appeal is jurisdictional and non-compliance with
such legal requirements is fatal. The word only makes it perfectly clear that the
posting of bond is to be the exclusive means by which an employer s appeal may be
25a, 26
Fule v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 48
G.R. No. L-79094 (June 22, 1988)
Chapter VIII, Page 337, Footnote No. 37
Petitioner, an agent of the Towers Assurance Corporation, issued and made
out check No. 26741 in favor of Roy Nadera. Said check was dishonored for the
reason that the said checking account was already closed, thus in violation of B
P 22,
the Bouncing Checks Law. Upon the hearing, prosecution presented its evidence
and the Petitioner waived his right. Instead, he submitted a memorandum confirmi
the Stipulation of Facts. He was convicted by the trial court, and on appeal, th
Appellate Court.
W/N the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC based on the Stipulation
of Facts that was not signed by the Petitioner nor his counsel.
The CA erred. Case is re-opened to receive evidence of Petitioner. Sec. 4 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides, No agreement or admission made or
entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the
accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him and his counsel .
Because of the word shall , in its language, the rule is mandatory. Negative
words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative
are merely directory. Therefore, the signature of the Petitioner and the counsel
mandatory. Also, penal statues are to be liberally construed in favor of the acc

McGee v. Republic
Case No. 174
G.R. No. L-5387 (April 29, 1954)
Chapter VIII, Page 337, Footnote No. 37
Petitioner, an American citizen married to Leonarda Crisostomo, wants to
adopt her children by her first husband. However, he is barred from doing so und
Art. 335 of the old Civil Code which states that those who have legitimate,
legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fiction
cannot adopt. Petitioner and Leonarda have one legitimate child. Despite Art. 33
the trial court ruled in favor of the adoption, invoking Art. 338 which states t
hat a
step-child, by the step-father or step-mother can be adopted.
W/N a husband having a legitimate child may adopt a step-child.
No. One strong argument presented by the trial court in upholding the
adoption is that to hold otherwise would render Art. 338 meaningless and a
surplusage. However, it must be noted that Art. 335 and Art. 338 should be
considered in relation to each other. That a parent can adopt a step-child is li
by Art. 335 that said parent cannot have a legitimate child in order to qualify
as an
adopter. One principle behind this is to protect the successional rights of the
legitimate child. In addition, under the laws of statutory construction, negativ
e words
and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are
merely directory. Art. 335 is phrased in a negative manner: cannot adopt. While
338 is positive: the following may be adopted.
Penid v. Virata
Case No. 101
G.R. No. L-44004 (March 25, 1983)
Chapter VIII, Page 338, Footnote No. 40
Confidential Information No. 28 of the BIR was filed by the Petitioners. It is a
sworn statement that listed the shipping companies and agents who had been
falsely declaring their gross earnings on the basis of a parity rate of P2.00 to
US $1.00
defrauding the Philippine Government of millions of pesos in taxes. Further,
Petitioners divulged other cases of erroneous conversion not listed in the Confi
Information. One of these was Pan Fil Co. Inc. Now the Petitioners seek their 25
reward taken from the total revenue collected from shipping companies in payment
for their deficiencies as provided by RA 2338.
W/N the Petitioners could claim reward from Pan Fil Co. Inc, a company
which is not included in the Confidential Information.
Yes. According to Sec. 4 of RA 2338, In order to entitle an informer to a
reward, the information given by him must lead to or be instrumental in the disc
of the fraud or violation and results in the recovery of collection of revenues .
Not only did the BIR rely on the Confidential Information submitted by the
Petitioners for their investigation, but also on the categorical statement that
shipping companies falsely declared their gross earnings, which led to further
investigations and, consequently, recovery of collection. Therefore, this inform
was instrumental in the discovery of the fraud or violation.
In jurisprudence, statues offering rewards must be liberally construed in favor
of informers and with regard to the purpose for which they are intended.
6c, 9d

Pahilan v. Tabalba, et al.

Case No. 96
G.R. No. 110170 (February 21, 1994)
Chapter VIII, Page 342, Footnote No. 63
Petitioner and Respondent were candidates for Mayor of Guinsiliban,
Camiguin. Respondent Tabalba was proclaimed Mayor. Petitioner Pahilan filed an
election protest although the docket fees he paid were insufficient. The trial c
dismissed the election protest for non-payment on time of the required fees for
an initiatory pleading. Within the 5-day period to appeal, Petitioner filed a ver
appeal brief. But the Clerk of Court said that his office did not receive any noti
of appeal from Petitioner. Petitioner s appeal was then dismissed for failure to
appeal within the prescribed period.
1. W/N the verified appeal was validly dismissed.
2. W/N the trial judge validly dismissed the petition of protest of Petitioner f
non-payment on time of the required fees.
1. No. The notice of appeal can be validly substituted by an appeal brief. The
filing and approval of the record on appeal necessarily involves the filing of t
notice of appeal. The RTC was sent copies by registered mail within the prescrib
period, and is assumed to be received in the regular course of the mail, filed a
s of the
date of mailing.
2. No. The docket fee was paid although insufficient. Statutes providing for
election contests are to be liberally construed that the will of the people in t
choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere technical objections.
9a, 9c, 9d, 40b
Pimentel v. Festejo
Case No. 124
G.R. No. L-2327 (January 11, 1949)
Chapter VIII, Page 342, Footnote No. 64
Festejo was proclaimed Mayor of Santa Lucia with Appellant protesting.
Appellant contends that the lower court erred in not crediting to him the 59 bal
which would have made him win. Appellant s name in the 59 ballots were written on
different lines such as those corresponding to vice-mayor, member of the provinc
board or councilor. Appellant claimed that his name was only misplaced but the
intention to elect him as mayor was apparent.
W/N Appellant can claim as votes in his favor ballots with his name which
does not appear written in the space reserved for mayor.
No. For any ballot to be counted for a candidate for mayor, it is indispensable
that his name be written by the voter in the ballot and cannot be mistaken by a
person who, as provided by the Constitution, is able to read. A name can be
counted for any office only when it is written within the space indicated upon t
ballot for the vote for such office. It is impossible to count a ballot as vote
for a
candidate for mayor, when his name is clearly written in the space reserved for
another office.
Considering that in 59 ballots claimed by Appellant in this appeal his name
does not appear written in the space reserved for mayor, he cannot claim them as
votes in his favor as candidate for mayor.
6d, 7b, 43
Roxas v. Rafferty
Case No. 264
G.R. No. L-12182 (March 27, 1918)
Chapter VIII, Page 345, Footnote No. 75
Plaintiffs owned a parcel of land. In the latter part of 1913, the construction
a reinforced concrete building was begun. It was finished in all respects on Feb
15, 1915.
The city assessor and collector of Manila, under the date of December 1,
1914, sent Plaintiffs notice, received by them on December 25, 1914, requiring t
to declare the new improvements for assessments for the year 1915. Plaintiffs pa
the amount of the taxes, which amounted to P3,000, under protest. Suit was begun
in the CFI of Manila to recover this sum with interest at the legal rate from th
e date of
W/N the assessment was legal.
No. The assessor cannot make a valid assessment unless he has given proper
notice. The law requires that the assessor should have notified the Plaintiffs d
November. His attempted notification on December 25, 1914, was not given during
the time fixed by statute, thus there was no legal assessment of the Roxas Build
ing for
the year 1915.
Furthermore, the city assessor and collector were under the obligation to add
any completed improvements to the assessment list. The city assessor and collect
could not prematurely perform this duty on improvements not yet completed.
6c, 19
Serfino v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 145
G.R. No. 40858 (September 15, 1987)
Chapter VIII, Page 345, Footnote No. 75
A parcel of land, consisting of 21.1676 hectares situated in Sagay, Negros
Occidental, was patented in the name of Pacifico Casamayor, under Homestead
Patent No. 44139. Upon registration of said patent, OCT No. 1839 was issued by s
office in the name of Pacifico Casamayor. In 1945, Casamayor sold the land in fa
of Nemesia Baltazar. Apparently, OCT No. 1839 was lost during the war and upon t
petition of Baltazar, the CFI of Negros ordered its reconstitution in the name o
Casamayor. On the same day, TCT No. 57-N was issued in the name of Nemesia
Baltazar but after the cancellation of OCT No. 14-R. In 1951, Baltazar sold the
property to Respondent Lopez Sugar Central, which did not present the documents
for registration until December 1964 to the Office of Registry of Deeds. Said of
refused registration upon its discovery that the same property was covered by
another certificate of title, TCT No. 28985, in the name of Petitioner.
W/N the purchase by Respondent Lopez Sugar Central of the lot in question
was null and void from the beginning.
No, applying Sec. 118 of C.A. No. 141, which prohibits the alienation of
homestead lots to private individuals within 5 years from the date of the issuan
ce of
the patent, and not Sec. 121 which governs sale to corporations. Since the grant
more than 5 years before, the transfer to Nemesia Baltazar was valid and legal.
37b, 43

Quijano v. Development Bank of the Philippines

Case No.
G. R. No. 26419 (October 16, 1970)
Petitioner filed an urban estate loan with respondent which was approved.
The loan was to be released in installments. The outstanding obligation of the
petitioners with respondent, including interests, amounted to P13,983.59. Petiti
wrote the respondent offering to pay in the amount of P14,000 for his outstandin
obligation, out of the proceeds of his back pay pursuant to RA No. 897 (RA 897).
Respondent advised petitioners of the non-acceptance of the offer on the ground
that the loan was not incurred before or subsisting on June 20, 1953 when RA 897
W/N petitioner s obligation is subsisting at the time of the approval of RA 897.
No. The provision expressly provides that the obligations must be subsisting at
the time of the approval of RA 897. Hence, when such backpay certificates are
offered in payment to a government-owned corporation of obligation thereto which
was not subsisting at the time of the enactment of said Act on June 20, 1953, su
corporation may not legally be compelled to accept the certificates. The Court
cannot see any room for interpretation or construction in the clear and unambigu
language of the provision of law.
28, 7a, 6c, 1
Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections
Case No. 137
G.R. No. 119976 (September 18, 1995)
Chapter VIII, Page 347, Footnote No.84
Petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative
of the First District of Leyte. Private respondent Montejo, the incumbent
Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same posit
filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification with respondent COMELEC
alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residen
W/N petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of
Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the 1995 elections.
Yes. Residency qualification pertains to domicile. As a minor, petitioner
followed the domicile of her parents in Tacloban, Leyte. As domicile, once acqui
it is retained until a new one is gained. In spite of the being born in Manila,
was her domicile of origin by operation of law. Parenthetically, when she marrie
then Congressman Marcos, petitioner was obliged, by virtue of Art. 110 of the Ci
Code, to follow her husband s actual place of residence fixed by him. Although Mr.
Marcos has different places of residence, and even if he had designated one, wha
petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. Therefore, she did not los
her domicile of origin.
25a, 37, 39a

Portillo v. Salvani
Case No. 243
G.R. No. L-32181 (March 10, 1930)
Chapter III, Page 101, Footnote No. 130
Appellant Salvani won the elections in 1928 for the office of provincial
governor of Antique. Appellee Portillo, his nearest opponent, filed an election
on July 9, 1928. Decision was rendered on August 15, 1929 declaring appellee Por
the winner.
W/N the decision by the trial judge declaring appellee Portillo is valid.
The decision is void for want of jurisdiction. The Election Law provides that al
proceedings in an electoral contest shall be terminated within one year. Legisla
history of the said legislation reveals that the shift of the tenor of the statu
te from
silence to mild admonition to stronger suggestion and finally to an emphatic and
explicit provision suggests the legislative intent to make the provision mandato
One year having already elapsed, the proceeding is deemed terminated and the
court loses jurisdiction rendering any subsequent decision void for want of juri
6c, 7a, 7b, 9a, 43, 45, b2
Querubin v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 247
G.R. No. L-2581 (December 2, 1948)
Chapter VIII, Page 332, Footnote No. 14
Petitioner defeated Felipe Mamuri in the election for the mayoralty of Ilagan.
Mamuri filed an election protest in the court, lost and filed an appeal thereaft
er. The
appeal was not acted upon for three months hence the petition to dismiss the cas
for the court had lost jurisdiction.
W/N the CA had lost their jurisdiction to decide the appeal.
No. Sec. 178 of the Election Code provides that appeals from decisions in
election contests should be decided within three months after filing. However, t
provision is directory in nature since to apply a mandatory character would defe
the purpose of due process of the law. The dismissal in such a case will constit
ute a
miscarriage of justice. The doctrine in Portillo v. Salvani should be abandoned.

1, 2, 5b, 18b, 39b

Nilo v. Court of Appeals

Case No. 189
G.R. No. L-34586 (April 2, 1984)
Chapter III, Page 89, Footnote No. 59
Private respondent Gatchalian is the owner of a parcel of Riceland at
Bulacan with an area of 2 hectares. Petitioner elected to use the leasehold syst
Private respondent then filed for ejection citing personal cultivation on March 7,
1968. Private respondent won the case and petitioner filed an appeal citing that
3844 was amended on September 10, 1971 removing personal cultivation from the
grounds for ejectment.
W/N the amendment of RA 6389 has retroactive effect.
No. Art. 4 of the New Civil Code provides that laws shall have no retroactive
effect unless it is explicitly provided. The legislation involves social justice
, however
the landowners being holders of only small parcels of land should also be entitl
ed to
social justice. Furthermore, to rule against the small landowners would be thwar
legislative intent of creating independent and self-reliant farmers.
9a, 46a, 46b
Salcedo and Ignacio v. Carpio and Carreon
Case No. 138
G.R. No. L-4495 (June 6, 1951)
Petitioners were appointed members of the Board of Dental Examiners. RA
546 was approved and Sec. 1 thereof amended Sec. 10 of the Reorganization Act
No. 4007. By virtue of this law, a Board of Dental Examiners was appointed by th
President, whose terms directly overlapped and conflicted with that of the
W/N it was the intention of Congress, in enacting RA 546, to abolish all the
pre-existing Boards of Examiners existing after the time of the enactment thereo
Appointment of the respondents is valid. It is obvious that it is the intention
Congress to do so, because the provisions of said Act are inconsistent with thos
e of
the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Act No. 4007.
In the case of Camacho vs. Court of Industrial Relations it was held that it is
well established rule recognized by all authorities without exception, that a
retrospective or retroactive law is that which creates a new obligation, imposes
new duty or attaches a new disability in respect to a transaction already past;
that status is not made retrospective because it draws on antecedent facts for i
operation, or in other words part of the requirements for its action and applica
tion is
drawn from a time antedating its passage.
5a, 9c, 46, 49

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Lingayen Gulf Electric Power Co., Inc.

Case No. 78
G.R. No. L-23771 (August 4, 1988)
Chapter IX, Page 355, Footnote No. 14
The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) assessed and demanded from
respondent deficiency franchise taxes and surcharges applying the franchise tax
of 5% as prescribed in Sec. 259 of the National Internal Revenue Code, instead o
f the
lower rates as provided in the municipal franchises. Pending the case, RA 3843 w
passed, granting to the respondent a legislative franchise for the operation of
heat, and power. This law lowered the franchise tax rate to 2%.
W/N RA 3843 is unconstitutional for being violative of the uniformity and
equality of taxation clause of the Constitution.
It is valid. Sec. 259 of the Tax Code was never intended to have a universal
application. RA 3843 did not only fix and specify a franchise tax of 2% on its g
receipts, but made it in lieu of any and all taxes, all laws to the contrary
notwithstanding, thus leaving no room for doubt regarding the legislative intent.

Charters or special laws granted and enacted by the Legislature are in the
nature of private contracts. They do not constitute a part of the machinery of t
general government. The Legislature considers and makes provision for all the
circumstances of a particular case.
RA 3843 specifically provided for the retroactive effect of the law.
6c, 9c, 46, 49
Gallardo v. Borromeo
Case No. 50
G.R. No. L-36007 (May 25, 1988)
Petitioner filed to terminate the leasehold of the respondent tenant so he
(plaintiff) may cultivate it himself as he had retired from his government job a
s a letter
carrier. Upon appeal, the CA applying Sec. 7 of RA 6389, held that the landowner s
desire to cultivate the land himself is not a valid ground for dispossessing the
W/N the CA correctly gave retroactive application to Sec. 7 of RA 6389.
No. The applicable law when petitioner filed his complaint was RA 3844 which
provided a ground for the ejectment of the tenant should the landowner have a
desire to personally cultivate the landholding. The newer law, R.A. 6389 elimina
this ground.
In applying Art. 4 of the New Civil Code, RA 6389 cannot be given retroactive
effect in the absence of a statutory provision for retroactivity or a clear impl
ication of
the law to that effect. Since Congress failed to express an intention to make sa
id RA
retroactive, it may not apply to ejectment cases then already pending adjudicati
by the courts.
6c, 46e

Cebu Portland Cement v. CIR

Case No. 52
G.R. No. 20563 (October 29, 1968)
Chapter IX, Page 355, Footnote No. 15
The case involves petitioner s claim for refund of sales tax paid from
November 1954 to March 1955, and ad valorem tax paid from April 1955 to
September 1956 from the sale of APO Portland cement produced by petitioner.
Since 1952, however, petitioner had been protesting the imposition of the sales
tax on
its APO Portland cement, and on January 1953, it also protested the payment of t
ad valorem taxes. Petitioner claimed for refund and brought its case to the Cour
t of
Tax Appeals. Petitioner contends that the percentage taxes collected by responde
are refundable since under RA 1229 (effective June 1955), producers of cement ar
exempt from the payment of said tax. The Court of Tax Appeals ruled otherwise.
Whether RA 1229 applies prospectively or retroactively.
A statute operates prospectively only and never retroactively, unless the
legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either by the express terms
of the
statute or by necessary implication. In every case of doubt, the doubt must be
resolved against the retrospective effect. While the purpose of the amendment, a
mentioned in the explanatory note to the bill, was not only to accelerate the
collection of mining royalties and ad valorem taxes but also clarify the doubt o
f the
tax-paying public on the interpretative scope of the two terms, it certainly coul
d not
have been the intention of the lawmakers to unsettle previously consummated
transactions between the taxpayer and the Government.
46a, 46c, 46e
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Filipinas Compania de Seguros
Case No. 76
G.R. No. 14880 (April 29, 1960)
Chapter IV, Page 134, Footnote No. 41
Respondent, an insurance company, was engaged in business as a real
estate dealer. RA 1612 amended the National Internal Revenue Code and provided
for a scale of graduated rates; this took effect on August of 1956. Petitioner a
against the respondent taxes (to which the insurance company has already paid in
full on January 1956) for the year 1956 based on RA 1612. Respondent appealed to
the Court of Tax Appeals the erroneous assessment of the petitioner and was gran
a decision in favor of it.
W/N RA 1612 should be applied retroactively.
No. As a rule, laws have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.
The rule applies with greater force to the case at bar, considering that RA 1612
which imposes the new and higher taxes, expressly provides that said Act shall t
effect upon its approval.
46a, 46c, 46e

Laceste v. Santos
Case No. 140
G.R. No. 36886 (February 1, 1932)
Chapter IX, Page 351, Footnote No. 1
Petitioner committed rape along with Nicolas Lachica. The crime took effect
before the effectivity of the RPC. However, Lachica married the victim, Magdalen
de Ocampo, and was accordingly relieved from criminal prosecution. The petitione
continued to serve his sentence but now prays for the Court to set him at libert
through the writ of habeas corpus, pleading that there is no sufficient legal gr
ound for
continuing his imprisonment any longer based on the last sentence of Art. 344 of
W/N the last paragraph of Art. 344 of the RPC has retroactive effect.
Yes. The petition for habeas corpus was granted. The principle granting to
the accused in certain cases an exception to the general rule that laws shall no
t be
retroactive when the law in question favors the accused applies. Conscience and
good law justify this exception.
Balatbat v. Court of Appeals and Passion
Case No. 29
G.R. No. L-36378 (January 27, 1992)
Chapter IX, Page 363, Footnote No. 73
Petitioner has an agricultural land in Sta. Ana, Pampanga containing 18,490
square meters of land owned by Garcia. Garcia sold the land to private responden
Pasion and had declared it for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 126.
Private respondent Pasion claims that he will cultivate the land pursuant to Sec
. 36(1)
of RA 3844. However, petitioner maintains that the case should have been decided
in light of Sec. 7 of RA 6389 since, in view of the appeal the respondent still
does not
have the vested right to acquire the land.
W/N Sec. 7 of RA 6389 should be given retroactive effect.
No. Art. 4 of the Civil Code provides that there should be no retroactive
effect unless otherwise provided by law. In order for a law to have a retroactiv
effect it should have a provision stating its retroactivity, otherwise nothing s
hould be
understood which is not embodied in the law. Furthermore the law is a rule
established to guide our action with no binding effect until it is enacted, thus
have no effect in past times but laws look forward in the future.
20, 46b, 46e
People v. Zeta
Case No. 232
G.R. No. L-7140 (December 22, 1955)
Chapter VI, Page 266, Footnote No. 72
Appellant was found guilty of violating RA 145 for having collected fees in
excess of 5% of the amount received by the claimant as compensation for services
rendered. At the time the agreement was made the law in force was C.A. No. 675
which allowed a person to charge not more than 5% of any amount that the
claimant would collect. The trial court in convicting appellant held that the
agreement for the payment of a 5% fee on the amount collected was void and
W/N RA 145 has a retroactive effect.
No. It does not appear in the language of RA 145 that it should be given
retroactive effect. There is a need of a law to tell the retroactivity of RA 145
for it to
act on cases under the old law. Laws cannot be given retroactive effect unless i
t is
specifically stated in the provision. Furthermore, strict construction on the la
w was
made so as not to prejudice the constitutional right of the constructor and for
the law
not to have any retroactive effect.
11b, 20, 46e
San Jose v. Rehabilitation Finance Corp.
Case No. 271
G.R. No. L-7766 (November 29, 1955)
Chapter IX, Page 369, Footnote No. 104
Plaintiff presented this petition to recover the interest she supposedly has in
her pre-war loan with defendant. The basis of the suit was RA 671 amending RA 40
the former law condoning the pre-war loans and the interest corresponding from
January 1, 1946 to March 14, 1951. The lower court decided for defendant to retu
the interest to the plaintiff.
W/N the lower court was correct in imposing the return of interest to plaintiff
by the defendant.
Yes. RA 671 is made to condone only the unpaid interest. It did not include
within its term completed payment and paid interest. Where a statute was amended
and reenacted, the amendment should be construed as if it had been included in
the original act; but it could afford no retroactive effect unless plainly made
so by the
terms of the amendment.
20, 46e

People v. Sumilang
Case No. 226
G.R. No. L-49187 (December 18, 1946)
Chapter IX, Page 371, Footnote No. 111
The petitioner was convicted of the crime of arson and sentenced to the
indeterminate penalty from 5 years and 4 months and 21 days of prision correctio
to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor. On appeal, both the CA and the SC affirm
the sentence of the lower court.
Based on the records, a copy of the resolution of the Court denying the
motion for reconsideration was mailed to the petitioner s attorney. However, the
attorney alleges in his petition that he did not receive the notice because then
was already hiding in the mountains of Laguna as a guerilla officer of the Marki
guerilla. The attorney prays that the reading of the sentence be suspended and t
petitioner be allowed to file whatever pleading that may be allowed by this
Honorable Tribunal necessary for the protection of the rights of the petitioner.

W/N the petition to suspend reading of sentence and to file pleading or
motion should be granted.
No. It is a well established rule of statutory construction that statutes regula
the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending a
undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in
sense and to that extent.
Palomo Building Tenants Association v. Intermediate Appellate Court
Case No. 97
G.R. No. L-68043 (October 31, 1984)
Petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Sale and Damages with
Preliminary Injunction before the then Court of First Instance of Manila against
respondents Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and Capitol Hills, as
principal defendants, and the five (5) judges of the then City Court of Manila i
n the
injunction aspect of the case. Respondent GSIS and Capitol Hills filed separate
motions to dismiss on the grounds that the complaint states no cause of action a
that there are other actions pending between the same parties for the same cause
Respondent judge granted private respondents' motion to dismiss.
W/N the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) erred in sustaining the order of
respondent, denying petitioner's motion for approval of the record on appeal due
failure to amend the record on appeal within the period granted them.
Yes. Petitioners invoke Section 39 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980
(BP 129) which dispensed with the record on appeal and claim that herein
respondent IAC erred in not applying retrospectively the said law. Ruled in Alda
y vs.
Camilon, "[t]he reorganization having been declared to have been completed, BP
Big. 129 is now in full force and effect. A Record on Appeal is no longer necess
ary for
taking an appeal. The same proviso appears in Section 18 of the Interim Rules an
Guidelines issued by this Court on January 11, 1983. Being procedural in nature,
provision s may be applied retroactively for the benefit of petitioners, as appe
'Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable
actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws a
retrospective in that sense and to that extent' (People vs. Sumilang, 77 Phil. 7
[19461.] "
5a, 46e

MRCA, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

Case No. 78
G.R. No. 86675 (December 19, 1989)
The petitioner prays to set aside the decision of the CA affirming the order of
the RTC dismissing the complaint for non-payment of the proper filing fees as th
prayer of the complaint failed to specify the amounts of moral damages, exemplar
damages, attorney s fees and litigation expenses sought to be recovered by it from
the defendants but left them to the discretion of the Honorable Court.
W/N the petition has merit.
Yes. It is a well established rule of statutory construction that statutes
regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to action
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are
retrospective in that sense and to that extent.
Ocampo v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 89
G.R. No. 7960 (December 8, 1989)
Petitioner began construction of his house without permit from the owner,
while being informed of P.D. 772. Petitioner never showed title to the land he
claimed to have purchased. Sec. 1 of P.D. 772, otherwise known as the Anti
Squatting Law has three elements:
(a) accused is not the owner of the land;
(b) he
succeeded in occupying or possessing the property through force,
intimidation, or threat or by taking such advantage of the absence or
tolerance of the owner;
(c) such occupation of the property is without the consent or against the will o
the owner.
Sec. 15, Rule 119 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states that after
prosecution has rested its case, the court may dismiss the case on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence.
1. W/N petitioner is guilty of the crime of squatting.
2. W/N a motion to dismiss bars a petitioner from presenting his evidence.
Yes on both counts. By moving to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence, petitioner waives his right to present evidence to substantiate his de
and in effect submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the
45a, 46b
Yakult Philippines v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 315
G.R. No. 91856 (October 5, 1990)
Chapter IX, Page 372, Footnote No. 117
Petitioner argues that the civil action for damages for injuries arising from
alleged criminal negligence, being without malice, cannot be filed independently
the criminal action under Art. 33 of the Civil Code.
W/N a civil action instituted after the criminal action was filed may prosper
even if there was no reservation to file a separate civil action.
Yes. Under the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action unl
ess the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separ
ately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
38b, 46e
Aris (Phil.) Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission
Case No. 21
G.R. No. 90501 (August 5, 1991)
Chapter IX, Page 372, Footnote No. 119
Petitioner assails the constitutionality of Sec. 12 of RA 6716 to Art. 223 of th
Labor Code, and Transitory Provisions of the said Interim Rules on the basis of
being in
violation of due process and non retroactivity of laws, respectively.
W/N amendments introduced by Sec. 12 of RA 6715 to Art. 223 of the Labor
Code, and Transitory Provisions of the said Interim Rules are constitutional.
Yes on both counts. The provision concerning the mandatory and automatic
reinstatement of an employee whose dismissal is found unjustified by the labor a
is a valid exercise of the police power of the state, and the contested provisio
n is
then a police legislation . The questioned Interim Rules can be given retroactive
effect for they are procedural or remedial in character.
8a, 46e

Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Co. v. Court of Appeals

Case No. 25
G.R. No. L-54305 (February 14, 1990)
Chapter IX, Page 373, Footnote No. 124
Petitioner entered into an operating agreement with CUENCO-VELEZ whereby
the said petitioner was granted the right to operate 12 mining claims belonging
the latter located at Toledo City, Cebu. Petitioner also entered into a similar
agreement with BIGA COPPER; subject of this Operating Agreement are 31 mining
claims of BIGA-COPPER likewise located at Toledo City, Cebu. However, of the tot
mining claims "leased" by petitioner from both CUENCO-VELEZ and BIGA COPPER, 9
mining claims overlap. These 9 overlapping mining claims became the subject of
administrative cases where CUENCO-VELEZ won. During the pendency of this appeal,
CUENCO-VELEZ and BIGA COPPER, entered into a compromise agreement. This
compromise agreement enabled BIGA-COPPER to eventually lay claim over the 9
overlapping mining claims. Due to the promulgation of P.D. 1281, a number of the
defendants filed a supplemental motion to dismiss. They alleged that the operati
agreement which BIGA COPPER signed with petitioner had already been revoked by
a letter and that by reason of this rescission, the trial court is deemed to hav
e lost
jurisdiction pursuant to Sec. 7(a)(c) and Sec. 12 of P.D. 1281.
W/N P.D. 1281 prevails.
P.D. 1281 prevails for special laws prevail over statutes or laws of general
Government of the Philippine Islands v. Municipality of Binalonan
Case No. 117
G.R. No. L-8243 (December 24, 1915)
Chapter I, Page 12, Footnote No. 44
This is a registration proceedings instituted by the Director of Lands under Sec
61 of Act No. 926, seeking to compel the registration of all private property wi
thin a
prescribed area in the municipality of Binalonan, Pangasinan on two parcels of l
Act No. 926 is not applicable to any other than public lands, or, at most, lands
claimed by the Government. The Act does not touch upon the compulsory
registration of private titles. Cadastral Act (No. 2259) authorizes the Director
of Lands
to institute compulsory registration proceedings against all owners and claimant
s of
property within any area which has been regularly surveyed and platted under the
procedure prescribed in the Act. Sec. 61 of Act No. 926 does not permit of simil
proceedings. The title of the Public Land Act contains no mention of compulsory
registration proceedings. No reference is made in Act No. 2259 to the repeal or
amendment of Sec. 61 of Act No. 926.
Whether Sec. 61 of Act No. 926 authorizes the institution of compulsory
registration proceedings against private owners or whether it is not confined
exclusively to public lands.
Act No. 2259 was enacted to remedy the shortcomings of existing legislation
on the same subject. The fact that the new Act does not expressly state that it
amends or repeals Sec. 61 of Act No. 926 does not necessarily rebut this conclus

Development Bank of the Phil. v. Court of Appeals

Case No. 92
G.R. No. L-28774 (February 28, 1980)
Chapter IV, Page 175, Footnote No. 199
The Board of Governors appropriated money to purchase land for a housing
project for its employees who shall pay for them in monthly installments for 20
However, the area sold was then part of a bigger parcel of land and because the
subdivision plan for the area was still pending approval by the Bureau of Lands,
sales agreement between the DBP and the PHHC was not presented immediately for
registration by the DBP. DBP expressed its doubts as to whether it could acquire
property in question for the intended purpose of a housing project in the light
of the
then Sec. 13 of RA 85. However, without the knowledge of the DBP, a portion of t
property including the 159 lots sold to the DBP, were segregated and a separate
certificate of title was issued for the segregated portion in the name of PHHC w
there was no annotation whatsoever to the title. Then, RA 3147 was enacted,
amending certain provisions of the DBP Charter (RA 85), among which was Sec. 13.

W/N there is retroactivity of the amendment of Sec. 13 of RA 85, by RA 3147.
Yes. One of the purposes of Congress when it enacted RA 3147, by amending
Sec. 13 of RA 85, was to erase any doubts regarding the legality of the acquisit
ion by
the DBP of the 159 lots from the PHHC for the housing project which it intended
establish for its employees who did not yet have houses of their own. It is, the
refore, a
curative statute to render valid the acquisition by the DBP of the 159 lots from
Briad Agro Development Corp. v. Hon. dela Serna, and dela Cruz, et al.
Case No. 39
G.R. No. 83225 (June 29, 1989)
Chapter IX, Page 376, Footnote No. 136
The case arose out of a complaint filed by Trade Union of the Philippines and
Allied Services WFTU Local Chapter No. ROI-005 against respondent agricultural f
for alleged underpayment/non-payment of minimum wage, ECOLA, overtime pay,
legal holiday pay, night shift differential pay, 13th month pay and service ince
leave pay. Respondent failed to submit controverting evidence despite due notice
Director Balbin thus ruled in favor of the employees and ordered respondent to p
In its appeal to the NLRC, Briad Agro questioned the Regional Director s
authority to entertain the pecuniary claim of workers, which NLRC dismissed on t
strength of E.O. 111 amending Art. 128(b) of the Labor Code, which granted to
Regional Directors jurisdiction over monetary claims.
W/N the jurisdiction over money claims is exclusive to the Labor Arbiters, by
force of Art. 217 of the Labor Code.
The Court held that E.O. 111 has the character of a curative law to remedy a
defect that attached to the provision subject of the amendment. This was clear f
the proviso: The provisions of Art. 217 of this Code notwithstanding The intended
effect was clearly to make the Secretary of Labor and the various Regional Direc
have concurrent jurisdiction. E.O. 111 therefore has retroactive effect.
6a, 9, 30b, 38b, 46e
Erectors, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, Hon. Andres, Jr. and Burg
Case No. 99
G.R. No. 104215 (May 8, 1996)
Chapter IX, Page 377, Footnote No. 140
Private respondent was recruited to work in Saudi Arabia as a service
contract driver. Months after, another contract was executed which changed his
position into that of a helper/laborer. When private respondent returned to the
Philippines, he invoked his first contract and demanded that petitioner pay the
difference between his salary and allowance as indicated in the said contract an
the amount actually paid to him, plus his contractual bonus.
Private respondent filed the complaint with the Labor Arbiter but E.O. No. 797
was passed, creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA),
vested with the original and exclusive jurisdiction over money claims between
employers and employees abroad. The Labor Arbiter still proceeded with the case
and rendered a Decision in favor of private respondent.
W/N E.O. 797 should be given retroactive effect and thus divest the Labor
Arbiter of jurisdiction.
No. E.O. 797 is not a curative statute and is therefore not included in the
exception to the rule on prospectivity. Laws should only be applied prospectivel
unless the legislative intent to give them retroactive effect is expressly decla
red or is
necessitated. Furthermore, the jurisdiction over the subject matter is determine
d by
the law in force at the time of the commencement of the action; in this case, th
were P.D. 1691 and 1391.
35, 46a, 46c, 46e
Santos v. Duata and the Court of Appeals
Case No. 274
G.R. No. L-20901 (August 31, 1965)
Chapter IX, Page 376, Footnote No. 134
Duata and Aguilar bought a parcel of land which subsequently became a
quarter part of Lot No. 37. The lot was purchased by Santos, Gaanan and Aguilar.
convenience, the title was issued in Santos s name.
On August 3, 1955, private respondent Duata, the daughter of the Duata
spouses, instituted an action for reconveyance of ¼ of Lot No. 37. Santos denied t
spouses ownership, claiming that the land had been sold to her by Aguilar in a
private document. The trial court pronounced the document as a pacto de retro
sale and ruled in favor of Santos. Upon appeal, the CA ruled that the transactio
n was
actually an equitable mortgage under Art. 1602 of the New Civil Code and set asi
the decision of the trial court.
Whether Santos and Aguilar, in executing the said private document,
intended a mortgage or sale with pacto de retro.
It is a mortgage. Art. 1602 was designed primarily to curtail the evils brought
about by contracts of sale with right of repurchase; it envisioned contracts of
with right to repurchase where the real intention of the parties is that the pre
purchase price is money loaned, and in order to secure the payment of the loan,
contract purporting to be a pacto de retro sale is drawn up.
Said article is remedial in nature and can thus be applied retroactively to
cases arising prior to the effectivity of the New Civil Code.
8c, 17, 21, 46e

Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr.

Case No. 182
G.R. No. 103702 (December 6, 1994)
Chapter IX, Page 381, Footnote No. 150
President C. Garcia, issued E.O. 353 creating the municipal district of San
Andres, Quezon. Then by virtue of E.O. 174, issued by President D. Macapagal, th
municipal district of San Andres was later officially recognized to have gained
status of a fifth class municipality by operation of Sec. 2 of RA 1515. It was t
attacked of its validity.
While petitioners would grant that the enactment of RA 7160 may have
converted the Municipality of San Andres into a de facto municipality, they cont
that since the petition for quo warranto had been filed prior to the passage of
law, petitioner municipality had acquired a vested right to seek the nullificati
on of
E.O. 353, and any attempt to apply Sec. 442 of RA 7160 to the petition would
perforce be violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
W/N the E.O. creating the municipality of San Andres was cured by Sec.
442(d) of RA 7160.
Yes. The de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in the province of
Quezon must be conceded. Sec. 442(d) of the LGC of 1991, which provides that
municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executives o
and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding off
ice at
the time of the effectivity of the code shall henceforth be considered as regula
municipalities, is also curative statute, as it validates the creation of munici
palities by
executive orders which had been held to be an invalid usurpation of legislative
46e, 6c
Ortigas & Co. v. Feati Bank & Trust
Case No. 193
G.R. No. L-24670 (December 14, 1979)
Chapter VIII, Page 312, Footnote No. 133
Appellee began laying the foundation and commenced the construction of
a building on Lots Nos. 5 and 6, to be devoted to banking purposes. Appellant
demanded that appellee stop the construction of the commercial building on the
said lots. The latter refused to comply, contending that the building was being
constructed in accordance with the zoning regulations, defendant having filed
building and planning permit applications with the Municipality of Mandaluyong.
W/N the resolution of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong declaring Lots
Nos. 5 and 6, among others, as part of the commercial and industrial zone of the
municipality, prevailed over the building restrictions imposed by plaintiff-appe
llant on
the lots in question and if Resolution No. 27 s-1960 is a valid exercise of poli
ce power.
The trial court held that the subject restrictions were subordinate to Municipal
Resolution No. 27. It upheld the classification by the Municipal Council of the
along EDSA Avenue as a commercial and industrial zone, and held that the same
rendered "ineffective and unenforceable" the restrictions in question as against
Resolution No. 27 was passed in the valid exercise of police power to
safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare o
the people in the locality.
Even if the subject building restrictions were assumed by the defendant as
vendee of Lots Nos. 5 and 6, in the deeds of sale and in the TCTs the contractua
obligations so assumed cannot prevail over Municipal Resolution No. 27.
6c, 46e

Billones v. Court of Industrial Relations

Case No. 35
G.R. No. L-17566 (July 30, 1965)
Chapter IX, Page 372, Footnote No. 119
Petitioners were allegedly employees of Luzon Stevedoring Corporation,
which required them to work 18 hours a day without giving them additional
compensation. There was an amicable settlement but petitioners disclaimed having
knowledge stating they did not authorize the filing.
Respondent contends that petitioners are barred due to prescription under
Sec. 7-A of C.A. No. 144, as amended by RA 1993.
W/N Sec. 7-A of C.A. No. 144, as amended by RA 1993 to the effect that any
action to enforce any cause under this Act shall be commenced within three years
after such cause of action accrued; otherwise it shall be barred forever.
It would have applied, provided that actions already commenced before the
effective date of this act shall not be affected by the period prescribed. As th
statute shortened the period of action accrued, it was contended that to give it
retroactive effect would impair vested rights since it would operate to preclude
six years from their accrual. The court ruled that a statute of limitations is p
rocedural in
nature and no vested right can attach thereto nor arise therefrom. Because the
statute shortened the period within which to bring an action and in order not to
violate the constitutional mandate concerning due process, claimants whose claim
were injuriously affected thereby should have a reasonable period of one year fr
the time the new statute took effect within which to sue on such claims.
6c, 46e
Philippine National Bank v. Asuncion
Case No. 237
G.R. No. L-46095 (November 23, 1977)
Chapter X, Page 387, Footnote No. 3
On January 1963, Philippine National Bank (PNB) granted Fabar Incorporated
a loan secured by joint signatures of Jose Barredo, Carmen and Tomas Borromeo
and Manuel Barredo. By May, 1977 the outstanding balance was over P8 million. PN
filed a case against all 4 signatories. However, before the case was decided, Ma
Barredo passed away. The case was dismissed pursuant to Sec. 6, Rule 86 of the R
of Court that the claim of PNB should be filed with the estate proceedings of M.
Barredo and cannot be brought against other surviving debtors.
W/N the Courts interpretation of Sec. 6, Rule 86 prevents a creditor from
proceeding against the surviving solidary debtors is accurate.
No. Art. 1216 of the New Civil Code gives the creditor the right to proceed
against anyone of the solidary debtors, or some, or all . Thus, the choice is left
up to
PNB to decide. Sec. 6 of Rule 86 simply provides the procedure if in case the cr
desires to go against the deceased debtor. To require PNB to go against the esta
would deprive PNB of his substantive rights provided by Art. 1216. In this case,
Rules of Court may not prevail over Art. 1216 because substantive law cannot be
amended by a procedural rule. Moreover, the 1987 Constitution states that rules
promulgated by the Supreme Court should not diminish, increase of modify
substantive rights.
9a, 9c

Ongsiako v. Gamboa
Case No. 90
G.R. No. L-1867 (April 8, 1950)
In 1946, Ongsiako (landowner) and Gamboa (tenant) entered into a contract
pursuant of Sec. 8 of Act 4054. This act provided that the palay would be divide
equally by the 2 parties. However, later that same year, Act 4054 was amended by
RA 34. During liquidation, Gamboa sought application of the amendatory law which
provided for crop division on a 55-45 basis in favor of the tenants. Ongsiako in
sists that
RA 34 is not remedial in nature and therefore cannot be given retroactive effect
Because of this, the original contract starting an equal sharing of profits shou
ld be
W/N RA 34 is remedial in nature and should be given retroactive effect.
Yes. In the past, laws concerning this issue have been amended with the
intent of being remedial and therefore, producing retroactive effect. Moreover,
it is
clearly shown in the recommendation of the President concerning RA 34 that this b
seeks to amend the Rice Share Tenancy Act in such a way to make the division of
crops more equitable to the tenants The principal feature of this bill is to incr
the participation of the tenants in the production of the land he is cultivating
2a, 6b, 9a, 49
Amandy v. People
Case No. 7
G.R. No. 79010 (May 23, 1988)
Petitioner was arrested and tried for possession of 1.6 grams of marijuana.
Because he pleaded guilty in his trial, he was given a sentence of six years and
1 day
(the minimum time for his offense). Petitioner then filed for probation alleging
968. However, the petition was denied because P.D. 1990 had repealed P.D. 968, n
longer permitting petitioner to fall under those eligible for probation.
W/N the lower court erred in disapproving Amandy s petition for probation.
No. The law clearly declares who are entitled to probation and who aren t.
Petitioner does not fall under those entitled because those who have been
sentenced to serve a maximum term of more than six years are excluded from the
benefits of the Probation Law. Because P.D. 1990 was promulgated after P.D. 968,
former prevails. Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken as it
devoid of judicial addition or subtraction.
6c, 7a, 7b, 22a, 25a, 36a, 43, 49

Parras v. Land Registration Commission

Case No. 197
G.R. No. L-16011 (July 26, 1960)
Chapter X, Page 390, Footnote No. 16
Petitioner was required by the Land Registration Commissioner (LRC) to remit
to the Commissioner's office, pursuant to Special Provisions of RA 2300, otherwi
known as the Appropriations Act for the current fiscal year, the sum of P57.00 a
estimated cost of publication in the Official Gazette of the initial notice of t
hearing of the case.
Petitioner refused to pay the said amount stating that such insertion is
unconstitutional being as it is revenue-raising. He prays that he be exempt from
a deposit and that the LRC and the Director of Printing be ordered to publish th
notice in the Official Gazette.
1. W/N petitioner can be exempted.
2. W/N the law states that persons will be made to pay for the publication.
Petitioner was made to pay. The law that petitioner relies on was Sec. 114 of
Act 496. The reenactment of the same law as RA 117 did not include the said
provision of Act 496.
11, 32, 38b
Diu v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 96
G.R. No. 115213 (December 19, 1995)
Chapter X, Page 391, Footnote No. 28
On several occasions, private respondent Pagba purchased on credit various
articles of merchandise from petitioners' store all valued at P7,862.55. Private
respondents failed to pay despite repeated demands.
Petitioners brought the matter before the Barangay Chairman and the latter
set the case for hearing, but private respondents failed to appear. When the par
met, they failed to reach an amicable settlement.
Private respondents in their Answer, while admitting indebtedness, interposed
two counterclaims: (1) for P6,227.00 as alleged expenses for maintenance and rep
of the boat belonging to petitioners, and (2) another for P12,0000.00 representi
ng the
cost of the two tires which petitioners allegedly misappropriated.
W/N parties did not meet in presence of a Pangkat as required by law.
Petition was granted without prejudice to the re-filing of the case by
petitioners after due compliance with the provisions of P.D. 1508, otherwise kno
wn as
the "Katarungang Pambarangay Law".
It must be noted that P.D. 1508 has been repealed by codification in the LGC
of 1991. The basic complaint was filed by petitioners before the trial court bef
ore the
effectivity of the LGC. Nevertheless, Sec. 4 and 6 of the former law have been
substantially reproduced in Sec. 410(b) and 412 respectively, of the latter law.

4, 5b, 9a, 36b
Government v. Springer
Case No. 119
G.R. No. L-26979 (April 1, 1927)
Chapter I, Page 38, Footnote No. 166
The National Coal Company elected its board of directors via vote in
accordance with its by-laws. However, the respondents are stated as usurping and
illegally occupying said positions since they were not elected by the proper
The National Coal Company was formed by the Philippine Government. The
Government intended to retain a majority stake in the said company; however, it
ended up occupying almost 90% of the stock. During the election of directors, th
members of the government appeared, two from the legislative and one from the
W/N the executive is the sole administrator of the Philippine Government.
Yes. Sec. 4 of Act No. 2705, as amended by Sec. 2 of Act No. 2822, as
purports to vest the voting power of the government-owned stock in the National
Coal Company in the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, is unconstitutional and void.
6c, 9a, 30a, 38b
Mecano v. Commission on Audit
Case No. 176
G.R. No. 103982 (December 11, 1992)
Chapter X, Page 395, Footnote No. 45
Petitioner seeks to nullify the decision of the Commission on Audit (COA)
embodied in its Endorsement denying his claim for reimbursement under Sec. 699 o
the Revised Administrative Code (RAC), as amended.
Petitioner is a Director II of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). He wa
hospitalized for cholecystitis from March 26 to April 7, 1990, on account of whi
ch he
incurred medical and hospitalization expenses, the total amount of which he is
claiming from the COA. However, the reimbursement process was stalled because of
the issue that the RAC Sec. 699 was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987.
1. W/N petitioner can claim from the COA.
2. W/N Sec. 699 of RAC was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987.
Petition was granted. The question of whether or not petitioner can claim from
COA is rooted on whether or not Sec. 699 of the RAC has been repealed. The Court
finds that that section although not included in the reenactment of the
Administrative Code of 1987 is merely under implied repeal, and the Court consid
such implied repeal as not favorable. Also the Court finds that laws must be in
with each other. The second sentence of Art. 173 of the Labor Code, as amended b
P.D. 1921, expressly provides that "the payment of compensation under this Title
not bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Sec. 699 of the RAC whose
benefits are administered by the system (SSS or GSIS) or by other agencies of th
30a, 32, 37, 38b, 49

Chin Ah Foo and Yee Shee v. Concepcion and Lee Voo

Case No. 20
G.R. No. 33281 (March 31, 1930)
The accused, one Chan Sam, was acquitted of murder but was ordered to
be committed to an asylum. The court permitted accused to leave the hospital two
years later on the strength of doctor s reports. In issuing the order of release t
respondent judge relied upon Art. 8, par. 4, of the Penal Code. On the other han
Sec. 1048 of the Administrative Code confers on the Director of Health the autho
to say when a patient may be discharged from an insane asylum.
W/N the court which ordered the confinement of an insane person in an
asylum possesses the power to permit said insane person subsequently to leave th
asylum without the approval of the Director of Health.
It is a well-known rule of statutory construction that when there is no express
repeal, none is presumed to be intended. Likewise, when two portions of the law
be construed so that both can stand together, this should be done. Art. 8 of the

Penal Code has not been impliedly repealed by Sec. 1048 of the Administrative
Code. The powers of the courts and the Director of Health are complementary with
each other. Thus, any person confined in any asylum by order of the court in
accordance with Art. 8 of the Penal Code cannot be discharged from custody
without the acquiescence of the Director of Health. The converse proposition equ
holds true.
38b, 49
Ynchausti & Co v. Stanley
Case No. 174
G.R. No 12330 (January 25, 1917)
The petitioner, a company engaged in the coastwise shipping business,
sought to prohibit the Insular Collector of Customs from enforcing the requireme
which states that coastwise vessels shall carry third mate as one of the officer
s on
each vessel. The petitioner relied upon the ground that Act No. 2614 was not and
could not have been repealed by the Administrative Code; Act No. 2614 being
specific with regard to the management of Philippine vessels.
W/N there is a conflict between Act No. 2614 and paragraph (e) of Sec. 1312
of the Administrative Code.
There is no express repeal of Act No. 2614. It is apparent that there was no
specific intention to repeal the statute. The Philippine Legislature could not h
intended to repeal said Act within less than three weeks after its passage and
substitute in its place absolutely nothing except the uncontrolled judgment of t
Insular Collector of Customs.
9a, 9c, 49, 50

U.S. v. Tantoco
Case No. 164
G.R. No. 11338 (August 15, 1916)
The defendant was charged with having illegally in his possession and under
his control a certain amount of opium. The trial court dismissed the complaint o
n the
theory that Act No. 2381 and all other laws had been repealed by the Act of the
United States Congress. The Government appealed.
What the effect of said Act was upon local legislation dealing with the subject
of opium.
That the United States Congress did not intend to repeal any of the local laws
dealing with the subject of opium appears from the law itself. Whether or not an
is impliedly repealed is a question of legislative intent to be ascertained by a
examination of both statutes, and in the light of the reason, purpose, and objec
t of
both. The United States Congress never intended to relax the stringent provision
relating to the smoking of opium or to its use in any of its forms whatever.
9a, 49
Fabros, et al. v. Laya
Case No. 44
G. R. No. 70832 (December 18, 1987)
This is a consolidated case involving the allocation of the incremental
proceeds of authorized tuition fee increases of private schools provided for in
3(a) of P.D. 451, and thereafter, under the Education Act of 1982 (BP 232). Then
Minister of Education Jaime C. Laya promulgated the disputed MECS Order No. 25,
entitled Rules and Regulations to Implement the Provisions of BP 232, The Educat
Act of 1982, relative to Student Fees for School Year 1985-1986. Petitioners pra
yed for
temporary restraining order on the Rules and Regulations, which was granted to
them. However, four schools prayed for the lifting of the TRO on the ground that
tuition fee increase has already been approved pursuant to P.D. 451, which the
Court thereby lifted.
W/N BP 232 has repealed P.D. 451 which thereby makes MECS Order No. 25
Yes. Under P.D. 451, the authority to regulate the imposition of tuition and
other school fees or charges by private schools is lodged with the Secretary of
Education and Culture, where Sec. 42 of BP 232 liberalized the procedure by
empowering each private school to determine its rate of tuition and other school
fees or charges. P.D. 451 provides that 60% of the incremental proceeds of tuiti
fee increases shall be applied or used to augment the salaries and wages of
members of the faculty and other employees of the school; while BP 232 provides
that the increment shall be applied or used in accordance with the regulations
promulgated by the MECS. Hence, there was a repeal.
4, 39b

Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc. v. Feliciano

Case No. 127
G.R. No. L-24022 (March 3, 1965)
Chapter X, Page 399, Footnote No. 61
Private respondent Feliciano, the Chairman and General Manager of the
Rice and Corn Administration, wrote the President of the Philippines urging the
immediate importation of rice, thru a government agency which the President may
designate, pursuant to the recommendation of the National Economic Council as
embodied in its Resolution No. 70, series of 1964. It was approved. The Presiden
designated the Rice and Corn Administration as the government agency authorized
to undertake the importation pursuant to which Chairman Feliciano announced an
invitation to bid for said importation and set the bidding date. Petitioners con
that the importation is contrary to RA 3452 which prohibits the government from
importing rice and that there is no law appropriating funds to finance the same.

W/N RA 2207 was repealed by RA 3452.
The importation may be illegal on the ground that such importation belong
exclusively to private parties, thereby prohibiting any government agency from d
so. RA 2207 provides that should there be an existing or imminent shortage in th
local supply of rice of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency, and
this is
certified by the National Economic Council, the President may authorize such
importation thru any government agency that he may designate. The two laws,
although with a common objective, refer to different methods applicable to diffe
circumstances. The two laws can therefore be construed as harmonious parts of th
legislative expression of its policy to promote a rice and corn program. In orde
r to
effect a repeal by implication, the latter statute must be irreconcilably incons
and repugnant to the prior existing law, hence there was no repeal.
38b, 39a
Brias de Coya v. Tan Lua, et al.
Case No. 16
G.R. No. 30756 (September 22, 1931)
Defendant-appellant Tan Lua was declared an insolvent in the Philippines
while she was in China. At this, she appointed her son to manage, sell and encum
her properties situated in the Philippines. A certain Vicente Nepomuceno was
appointed assignee of the involuntary insolvency. Defendant-appellant executed a
mortgage deed of a parcel of land to petitioner so as to secure a loan. The assi
filed his appointment for the purpose of transferring the property to him.
W/N the mortgage given by respondent to petitioner was valid and legal
considering the fact that the assignee recorded his appointment after the transf
has been made.
The Insolvency Law and the Land Registration Act compliment each other
and are both intended to protect the rights and interests of creditors, accordin
g the
latter a means for securing their insolvent debtor's property, against which the
y may
enforce their credits. Construing the Insolvency Law together with the Land
Registration Act, we reach the conclusion that in order that the assignment of t
insolvent debtor's real property made by the clerk of the proper court to the as
may operate to vest in said assignee all of said estate from the commencement of
the insolvency proceedings, both such proceedings and the assignment must have
been recorded in the registry of deeds, the former from their commencement.
Petitioner is a mortgagee in good faith and therefore the mortgage upon the land
given to him by the latter, which was registered with a Torrens title, is legal
and valid.
38b, 39a

Villegas vs. Subido

Case No. 314
G.R. No. L-31711, (September 30, 1971)
Chapter X, Page 411, Footnote No.96
The Secretary of Finance authorized Jose R. Gloria of the Office of the City
Treasurer of Manila to assume the duties of Assistant City Treasurer. In an
Administrative Order, series of 1968, Petitioner, Mayor of the City of Manila, d
Gloria to desist and refrain from exercising the duties and functions of the Ass
City Treasurer, saying that Romualdez is not empowered to make such designation.
Petitioner, appointed Manuel D. Lapid as Assistant City Treasurer. Respondent,
disapproved the appointment, basing his action, on an opinion of the Secretary o
Justice, to the effect that the appointment of Assistant Provincial Treasurers i
s still
governed by Sec. 2088a of the Revised Administrative Code, and not by Sec. 4 of
Decentralization Law, RA 5185.
W/N the Decentralization Law should govern.
No. It has been the constant holding of this court that repeals by implication
are not favored and will not be so declared unless it be manifest that the legis
so intended. Such a doctrine goes as far back as United States v. Reyes, a 1908
decision. It is necessary then before such a repeal is deemed to exist that it b
e shown
that the statutes or statutory provisions deal with the same subject matter and
the latter be inconsistent with the former.
A subsequent statute, general in character as to its terms and application, is
not to be construed as repealing a special or specific enactment, unless the
legislative purpose to do so is manifest.
1, 9, 50
Jalandoni vs. Endaya
Case No. 137
G.R. No. L-23894, (January 24, 1974)
Chapter X, Footnote No. 62
Petitioner instituted a criminal complaint for libel against a Serafin Cruz in t
Municipal Court of Batangas presided over by the Respondent Judge. During the
hearing of the libel case Cruz, through counsel manifested in open court that un
Art. 360 of the Revised Penal Code, (the court of first instance of the province
or city
where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the of
parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense), Responde
Judge was devoid of jurisdiction to do so. There was, as noted, a negative respo
Respondent still tried the case.
W/N Municipal Court of Batangas has jurisdiction over case at hand.
No. As is clear from his well-written memorandum, he did base his action on
what for him was the consequence of the Judiciary Act as amended by RA 3828,
Sec. 87 of which would confer concurrent jurisdiction on municipal judges in the
capital of provinces with court of first instance where the penalty provided for
by law
does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six years
fine not exceeding six thousand pesos or both. Libel is one of those offenses in
in such category. He would thus conclude that as the amendatory act came into
effect on June 22, 1963, the provisions of Art. 360 as last amended by RA 1289
conferring exclusive jurisdiction on courts of first instance, was thus repealed
1, 9, 49

CIR vs. Rio Tuba Nickel Mining Corporation.

Case No. 79
G.R. Nos. 83583-84 September 30, 1991
Chapter X, Page 400, Footnote No.64
Respondent Corporation filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue two
separate written claims for refund in the amounts of P974,978.50 and P424,303.33
respectively, representing 25% of the specific taxes collected on the refined an
manufactured mineral oils, motor fuel and diesel fuel oils that it had utilized
in its
operations as a mining concessionaire, using RA 1435 as basis. The Court of Tax
Appeals decided that Respondent Corporation can no longer claim this due to P.D.
231, 436 and 711.
W/N Republic Act No. 1435 (An Act To Provide Means of Increasing the
Highway Special Fund) or certain provisions thereof have been repealed by
subsequent statutes.
Yes. We find that the disputed proviso found in Sec. 5 of RA 1435 was drafted
to favor a particular group of taxpayers-the miners and the lumbermen-because it
was "unfair" to subject them to the increased rates and in effect make them subs
the construction of highways from which they did not directly benefit. Given the
present concept of the general fund and its wide application, then the proviso i
Sec. 5 of RA 1435 has truly become an anachronism. It is inevitable that, sooner
later, the miners will stand to benefit from any of the government endeavors and
will no longer be correct to asseverate that the imposition of the increased rat
es in
specific taxes to augment the general fund for government undertakings is "unfai
r" to
the miners because they are not directly convenienced.
While we generally do not favor repeal by implication, it cannot be denied
that situations can and do arise wherein we are left with no other alternative b
ut to
concede the point that an earlier law has been impliedly repealed or revoked by
later law because of an obvious inconsistency.
Valdez v. Tuazon
Case No. 111
G.R. No. L-14957 (March 16, 1920)
Chapter X, Page 388, Footnote No. 9
This is a petition for divorce filed by petitioner against his respondent wife.
No. 2710 states that a petition of divorce due to adultery or concubinage cannot
granted except upon conviction. The respondent has never been convicted of the
offense of adultery. Petitioner contends that he is entitled to divorce based on
prevailing laws before the enactment of Act No. 2710.
W/N Act No. 2710 should be applied in the case.
Act No. 2710 should be applied. Even if the said Act has no repealing clause,
when there is a plain and unavoidable repugnancy between two laws, the later mus
be given effect. Negative statutes are mandatory, and must be presumed to have
been intended as a repeal of all conflicting provisions.
The situation in this case does not require the application of any of the
artificial canons of interpretation, for the language of the statute is so plain
that its
meaning is unmistakable.
7a, 49
Estate of Mota v. Concepcion
Case No. 42
G.R. No. L-34581 (March 31, 1932)
In 1919, Lazaro Mota and Salvador Serra entered into a partnership to
construct several kilometers of railroad in Occidental Negros. In 1920, Serra
transferred his half interest to Concepcion and Whitaker. In December of the sam
year, Mota also sold his half to the same purchaser. On the last sale, only part
of the
price was paid, so Concepcion and Whitaker mortgaged to Mota the railroad. Mota
registered the contract as an unregistered real property.
1. W/N a mortgage over an unregistered property is valid.
2. W/N enforcement of mortgage is fatal to right of rescission.
1. According to Standard Oil Co. vs. Castro, Sec. 194 of the Administrative
Code clearly recognizes the validity of such a contract between the contracting
2. The election to enforce the contract of mortgage is fatal to the right of
rescission. Serra foreclosed the mortgage given to him to secure the unpaid port
of the selling price of the railway.
Torrente v. Grove
Case No. 155
G.R. No. L-2340 (December 21, 1905)
This case is an appeal from a habeas corpus proceeding, discharging the
petitioner from detention. It is alleged that the order of arrest is illegal on
its face in
that the Justice of the Peace had no jurisdiction to issue the order directing t
making of an arrest outside the Province of Cebu. It is contended that the arres
t and
detention of petitioner, were illegal and void.
W/N the Justice of the Peace can issue an order of arrest wherever he may
be in the Philippines.
Under the provision of Sec. 13 of G.O. No. 58, a justice of the peace is vested
with authority to issue a lawful order of arrest, wherever he may be in the Phil
Due to contrary provisions, the general order has impliedly repealed the Spanish
The contention of the petitioner that Act No. 59 is a proof that the Civil Commi
deemed it necessary to make an express grant of such authority and that they wer
of opinion that prior to the publication of the said law the processes of the ju
stices of
the peace did not run throughout the province, much less the archipelago. The co
however said that the opinion of the law making authority as to the meaning and
effect of the law does not determine what the law actually is, it is entitled to
respectful consideration, but it is not conclusive on the courts.
4, 49

Pamil v. Teleron
Case No. 195
G.R. No. L-34854 (November 20, 1978)
Chapter I, Page 33, Footnote No. 148
Respondent Fr. Gonzaga was elected and proclaimed municipal mayor of
Albuquerque, Bohol. The petitioner, himself an aspirant for the office, filed fo
Gonzaga s disqualification based on Sec. 2175 of the Administrative Code which
stated that in no case can ecclesiastics be elected to a municipal office.
W/N an ecclesiastic is eligible to be elected.
The vote was indecisive. Seven believed Sec. 2175 was no longer operative.
Five believed that the prohibition was not tainted with any constitutional infir
Though the five were a minority, the votes of the seven were insufficient to ren
der the
provision ineffective, hence it was presumed valid. Gonzaga was ordered to vacat
the mayoralty.
Dissenting Seven: The challenged provision was superseded by the 1935
Constitution, the supreme law, which mandated that no religious test shall be
required for the exercise of political rights. Sec. 2175 was also repealed by th
Election Code for ecclesiastics are no longer included in the enumeration of
ineligible persons. Also, legislation that intends to repeal all former laws upo
n the
subject shows the legislative intent to repeal the former statutory law.
Minor Five: For a later provision to repeal a prior one there must be such
absolute repugnance between the two. No such repugnance is discernible. Sec.
2175 has neither been repealed nor superseded. The section also admitted no
exception, therefore there can be none. The Court cannot rewrite the law under t
guise of interpretation.
Dissenting Seven: 9a, 30a, 32, 49 Minor Five: 6c, 7a, 7c, 37, 43

People v. Almuete
Case No. 200
G.R. No. L-26551 (February 27, 1976)
Chapter IV, Page 142, Footnote No. 61
Almuete, et. al. were charged with the violation of Sec. 39 of the Agricultural
Tenancy Law (ATL). The accused, tenants of Fernando, allegedly pre-threshed a
portion of their respective harvests without notifying her or obtaining her cons
ent. The
accused filed a motion to quash alleging that at the time of the supposed offens
there was no longer any law punishing the act.
W/N pre-threshing was still a crime at the time the act was committed.
Sec. 39 was impliedly repealed by the Agricultural Land Reform Code which
was already in force at the time of the act. The ALRC suspended the ATL. It inst
the leasehold system and abolished the rice share tenancy system. The prohibitio
against pre-threshing is premised on the existence of the rice share tenancy sys
and is the basis for penalizing clandestine pre-threshing. The evident purpose i
s to
prevent the tenant and the landholder from defrauding each other in the division
the harvests. The legislative intent not to punish anymore the tenant s act of pre
threshing is evident by not re-enacting Sec. 39 of the ATL. A subsequent statute
revising the whole subject matter of a former statute operates to repeal the for
statute. The repeal of a penal law deprives the courts of jurisdiction to punish
charged with a violation of the old penal law prior to its repeal.
9a, 10, 47, 49

Smith Bell & Co. v. Municipality of Zamboanga

Case No. 148
G.R. No. L-33318 (December 20, 1930)
Municipality of Zamboanga imposed upon the plaintiff a license fee for its
machine for the baling of hemp in accordance with Ordinance No. 226. Plaintiff p
the license fee under protest and contended that defendant had no authority to
impose such tax and that the ordinance in question is null and void. The defenda
argues that the latter has no power to levy the tax in question under Sec. 2625(
d) of
the Administrative Code but it does have such power under a subsequent
enactment of Act No. 3422.
W/N Act No. 3422 repealed Sec. 2625(d) the Administrative Code.
Repeals by implication are not favored. If the legislature intended its repeal,
would have made specific reference in the repealing clause as it did in expressl
repealing Sec. 2407 of the Administrative Code. A general affirmative act will n
ot be
construed to repeal a special or local statute unless the intention is manifest.

37, 50
Lechoco v. Civil Aeronautics Board
Case No. 71
G.R. No. L-32979-81 (February 29, 1972)
Petitioner contends that by the enactment of RA 2677 amending Sec. 13(a)
and 14 of C.A. No. 146, jurisdiction to control rates of airships was taken away
the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) and re-vested in the Public Service Commission
(PSC) since RA 2677 impliedly repealed RA 776 which conferred to the CAB the
power of control over air rates and fares.
On the other hand, respondents argue that jurisdiction over air fares and rates
were, under both statutes, exercisable concurrently by the CAB and the PSC.
Whether the authority to fix air carrier s rates is vested in the CAB or in the PS
Authority to fix air carrier s rates is vested in both the CAB and the PSC. Under
RA 776, the CAB can fix and determine reasonable individual, joint or special ra
charges or fares for air carriers but is subject to the maximum rates on freight
s and
passengers that may be set by the PSC under RA 2677. Furthermore, implied repeal
statutes is not favored.
37, 38b
Villegas v. Enrile
Case No. 171
G.R. No. L-29827 (March 31, 1973)
It is the contention of the petitioner that if Sec. 4 of the Decentralization Ac
be given effect, then the authority to appoint a City Fiscal is not lodged in
respondent Secretary of Justice but in him as Mayor of the City of Manila.
The defense of the respondents on the other hand is the continuing effectivity
of the provision of the Charter of the City of Manila, which negates the assumpt
ion of
authority on the part of the petitioner.
W/N the Decentralization Act impliedly repealed the provision of the Charter
of the City of Manila.
No. The issue in this case was already decided in previous jurisprudence in the
case of Villegas v. Subido. Furthermore, petitioner ignored the provision that t
he City
Fiscal is not included in the enumeration made in the Decentralization Act.
2a, 5a, 37
Villegas v. Subido
Case No. 172
G.R. No. L-24012 & L-24040 (August 9, 1965)
The Commissioner of Civil Service claims that RA 2260 impliedly repealed RA
557and 409 providing for the removal and suspension of policemen. The City Mayor
was ordered to cease from deciding administrative cases of officers and employee
in Manila and submit to the Commissioner of Civil Service all pending disciplina
W/N RA 2260 impliedly repeal RA 557 and Sec. 22 of RA 409 so as to vest in the
Commissioner of Civil Service the exclusive and original jurisdiction to remove,
suspend and separate policemen and employees of the City of Manila in the
competitive service.
No. RA 2260 states that the removal and suspension by the City Mayor can be
passed upon or reviewed by the Commissioner of Civil Service. It does not state
the power of removal is conferred to the other body. RA 557 and 409 are special
laws covering specific situations of policemen and employees of the City of Mani
RA 557 and 409 subsists side-by-side with RA 2260 and are not impliedly repealed
the latter which is a general law. RA 2260 contemplates appeal from the decision
the City Mayor to the Commissioner of Civil Service, instead of to the President
Repeal by implication is not favored and if two laws can be reconciled, the
construction will be against such repeal.
9a, 38b, 50

U.S. v. Palacio
Case No. 301
G.R. No. 11002 (January 17, 1916)
Chapter X, Page 406, Footnote No. 77
Respondent was accused of violating Sec. 87 of Act No. 82 when he willfully
omitted from the tax lists real property which he knows to be lawfully taxable.
posits that Act No. 2238 repeals by implication Act No. 82 because of the clause
Sec. 18 that states all acts or parts of Acts in conflict therewith are repealed.
W/N Act No. 2238 had repealed the penal effect of Act No. 82.
No. Act No. 2238 had done nothing but to change the method and
procedure provided in Act No. 82. Repeals by implication are not favored, unless
it is
manifest that such is the intention of the legislature. Act No. 2238 provides no
thus, Sec. 87 of Act No. 82 continues in force.
9a, 38b
Marin v. Nacianceno
Case No. 171
G.R. No. 5939 (March 29, 1911)
Chapter X, Page 411, Footnote No. 100
Felisa Hernandez died before the testatrix, but the testatrix did not alter her
will in respect to this legacy after the death of the legatee. The petitioners a
re the
surviving heirs of the devisee who relies upon Sec. 758 of the Code of Civil Pro
which provides that When a devise or a legacy is made to a child and the
devisee or legatee dies before the testator, leaving issues such issue shall take
estate so given as the devisee or legatee would have done unless a different
disposition is required by law. The executor of the will opposes the payment upon
the ground that such legatee had no interest therein, having died before the tes
so as to pass to the heirs.
W/N the heirs of Felisa Hernandez become the heir to her legacy after her
death even if the testator did not alter her will.
Yes. The construction by the respondent would repeal or annul the section
absolutely. It is tantamount to saying that the legislature enacted a law and
repealed it at the same time. If petitioners are not entitled to the payment of
legacy, then Sec. 758 would have no value and might as well have never been
written which is an absurd interpretation.
9a, 11
Velunta v. Chief, Philippine Constabulary
Case No. 309
G.R. No. L-71855 (January 20, 1988)
Chapter X, Page 412, Footnote No. 102
Petitioner as patrolman and member of the Integrated National police (INP)
apprehended a motorcycle driver for violation of traffic rules. An altercation
occurred which resulted in the shooting and death of the driver Lozano. Anacorit
the widow of Lozano then filed for a criminal case where it was found that there
a prima facie evidence that petitioner, with deliberate intent and with intent to
shot Lozano during the performance of duty. Petitioner contends that General Cou
Martial has no jurisdiction since P.D. 1850 was repealed by E.O. 1040 & 1012.
W/N the Court Martial has jurisdiction.
Yes. It is specifically stated under E.O. 1012 that it is only the operational
supervision and direction over all units of the INP that was transferred from the
Constabulary to the city/municipal government. Under E.O. 1040, it is the exerci
se of
administrative control and supervision over units of the INP that was transferred
the President. The allegation that P.D. 1850 has been expressly repealed by clea
r and
precise provision of E.O. 1040 is inaccurate. Repeals by implication are not fav
and will not be so declared unless the intent of the legislators in manifested.
9a, 20c, 27, 37
Pacis v. Averia
Case No. 194
G.R. No. L-22526 (November 29, 1966)
Chapter X, Page 413, Footnote No. 105
Petitioner, the Acting Collector of Customs, commenced a seizure and
forfeiture proceedings pursuant to the Tariff and Customs Code referring to the
incident wherein sailors were wounded in a chase for boat loaded with untaxed
cigarettes. On the same day, Marges, the alleged boat owner, filed a Civil Case
replevin alleging that the boat was stolen. The fishing boat therein was transfe
rred to
the Provincial Sheriff, and later on to Marges as commanded by respondent Hon.
W/N Marges could recover the fishing boat.
W/N Provincial Sheriff may be held in contempt for failure to comply with
the writ.
1. No. The jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs is provided for in RA
1937 which took effect much later than the Judiciary Act. It is axiomatic that t
he later
law prevails over the prior statute.
2. Yes. The writ was received by respondent Sheriff. It has also caught
the Supreme Court s notice that respondent sheriff has practically taken the cudge
for the boat owner. He went beyond his official acts and proceeded to espouse th
cause of the boat owner giving impression that his interest in the subject is mo
re than
just the interest of a public official.
9a, 20c, 49
Herman v. Radio Corporation of the Philippines
Case No. 123
G.R. No. 26802 (July 15, 1927)
Chapter X, Page 414, Footnote No. 107
Two Philippine corporation attempting to develop the commercial radio
business (Far Eastern Radio Inc. and Radio Corp.) agreed to merge. The petitione
herein has been largely interested in the respondent corporation, and in
consideration of the cancelled contract for his services to the respondent, it w
agreed in the contract of merger that he should be offered the post of manager o
the traffic department.
W/N Herman s claim for salary has been expressly waived in the final
Yes. In Sec. 333 of the Code of Civil Procedures, it mentions that whenever a
party has, by his own declaration, act or omission, intentionally or deliberatel
y led
another to believe a particular thing is true and to act upon such belief, he ca
be permitted to falsify it. Sec. 1815 of the Civil Code also does not apply sinc
e the
transaction was more than a compromise. The Code of Civil Procedures must prevai
because it is a later expression of legislative will than Art. 1815 of the Civil
9a, 49
Philippine National Bank v. Cruz, et al.
Case No. 239
G.R. No. 80593 (December 18, 1989)
Chapter X, Page 414, Footnote No. 108
Aggregate Mining Exponents (AMEX) suffered huge financial losses and was
unable to pay its remaining employees. Two years after, AMEX entered into an
operation contract agreement with T.M. San Andres Development Corporation, thus
enabling the latter to acquire on lease the equipment of AMEX.
The unpaid workers filed for monetary compensation before the Labor Arbiter.
The said Arbiter awarded backwages and separation pay. AMEX did not appeal but
PNB, as mortgage-creditor, appealed and alleged that the workers should be given
their unpaid wages only and not the termination pay. The NLRC denied the appeal
of PNB. Hence, this instant petition by the PNB on the grounds that Article 110
of the
Labor Code does not create lien in favor of the workers for unpaid wages upon th
properties of the employer.
W/N Art. 110 of the Labor Code is to be construed as not favoring the unpaid
workers because of the order of preference provided in Art. 2241 to 2245 of the
No. Art. 110 of the Labor Code provides for worker preference in case of
bankruptcy . It specifically states that In the event of bankruptcy of an employer s
business, his workers shall enjoy FIRST preference as regards to their unpaid wa
any provision of law to the contrary not withstanding such unpaid wages shall be
paid in FULL before claims of the government and other creditors may be paid.
6a, 49

David v. Commission on Elections

Case No. 85
G.R. No. 127116 (April 8, 1997)
Chapter X, Page 413, Footnote No. 105
Barangay Chairman Alex David raised the question of when the barangay
elections should be held and questions the COMELEC s schedule of holding such
elections on the 2nd Monday of May 1997. The COMELEC s basis is R.A. 7160 or the
Local Government Code which mandates barangay elections every 3 years.
Petitioner David contends that an earlier law, R.A. 6679, should be the one foll
R.A. 6679 provides that barangay elections should be held every 5 years. He also
contends that there is a violation of Art. 10, Sec. 8 of the Constitution.
1. What the term of office of barangay officials is.
2. W/N there was a violation of Art. 10, Sec. 8 of the Constitution.
1. It is basic in cases of irreconcilable conflict between two laws that the lat
legislative enactment prevails. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Paras v. COMEL
had the opportunity to mention when the next barangay election should be when it
stated that the next regular election involving the barangay office is barely 7
months away, the same having been scheduled in May 1997 .
2. No. Art. 10, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides that, The term of office of
elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined b
y law,
shall be three years It is not to be construed as prohibiting a 3-year term of off
for barangay officials.
1, 9a, 20a, 49
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 73
G.R. No. 95022 (March 23, 1992)
Chapter VII, Page 300, Footnote No. 81
This is a petition to reverse the Decision ordering the refund of the GCL
Retirement Plan representing the withholding tax on income.
RA 4917 exempted the GCL Retirement Plan, including all the retirement
benefits given to officials and employees of private firms, from income tax. Soo
after, P.D. 1959 was promulgated abolishing the exemption from withholding tax o
interest on bank deposits previously given by P.D. 1739 if the recipient of the
interest is
exempt from income taxation. The GCL Plan is one of those exempted from income
tax under RA 4917.
Petitioner contends that P.D. 1959 impliedly repealed the provisions of RA 4917
and RA 1983, and that GCL Plan is subject to the final withholding tax.
W/N GCL Retirement Plan retains its tax exemption after the promulgation of
P.D. 1959.
Yes. The deletion in P.D. 1959 of the provisions regarding tax exemption under
the old law can t be deemed to be applicable to the employees trusts. P.D. 1959 is
a general law, hence, it can t repeal a specific provision impliedly.
It is known in statutory construction that a subsequent statute that is general
character can t be construed as repealing a special or specific enactment unless
there is a legislative manifestation of such effect. Also in Villegas v. Subido,
such rule is
upheld even if the provisions of the latter legislation are sufficiently compreh
ensive to
include what was set forth in the special act.
1, 5a, 43, 50

People v. Leachon, Jr.

Case No. 108
G.R. No. 108725-26 (September 25, 1998)
The Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro filed two separate
information for violation of P.D. 772, also known as Anti-Squatting Law before t
he RTC
presided over by respondent judge. After presenting the evidence, the prosecutio
rested the cases.
Almost a year after the prosecution has rested, respondent judge issued an
order dismissing the case motu proporio on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Thereafter, the CA ordered the continuation of trial of the subject case. A mont
after, the respondent judge dismissed the case again, opining that P.D. 772 is
obsolete and deemed repealed by Sec. 9 and 10 of Art. 13 of the 1987 Constitutio
which provide that, urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their
dwellings demolished except in accordance with law and in a just and humane
W/N responded judge acted in grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
subject criminal case.
Yes. The Anti-Squatting law enjoys the presumption of constitutionality. Unless
otherwise repealed by a subsequent law or adjudged unconstitutional by this cour
a law will always be presumed valid. At the time the order was issued by respond
judge, P.D. 772 was still effective. Neither has this court declared its
unconstitutionality, notwithstanding the social justice provision of the Constit
37, 50
Philippine Airlines Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission
Case No. 118
G.R. No. 114307 (July 8, 1998)
Private respondent Edilberto Castro was hired as manifesting clerk by petitioner
PAL. Respondent was apprehended by government authorities while about to board a
flight en route to Hongkong in violation of Central Bank (CB) Circular 265, as a
mended by
CB Circular 383, in relation to Sec. 34 of RA 265, as amended.
PAL placed Castro on preventive suspension for grave misconduct. Three years
and six months after his suspension, PAL issued a resolution finding respondent
guilty of the
offense charged but nonetheless reinstated the latter. The said resolution likew
ise required
respondent to affix his signature therein to signify his full conformity to the
action taken by
PAL. Upon his reinstatement, respondent filed a claim against PAL for backwages
salary increases granted under the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) coverin
g the
period of his suspension.
W/N Castro is entitled to backwages and salary increases granted under the CBA
during his period of suspension.
Yes. The rules clearly provide that a preventive suspension shall not exceed a
maximum period of 30 days, after which period, the employee must be reinstated t
o his
former position. If the suspension is otherwise extended, the employee shall be
entitled to
his salaries and other benefits that may accrue to him during the period of such
7a, 13b
Province of Misamis Oriental v. Cagayan Electric Power and Light Company, Inc.
Case No. 127
G.R. No. 45355 (January 12, 1990)
Respondent CEPALCO was granted a franchise under RA 3247, 3570, and
6020 to install, operate and maintain an electric light, heat and power system i
Cagayan de Oro City and its suburbs including the municipalities of Tagoloan, Op
Villanueva, and Jasaan. The franchise of CEPALCO expressly exempts it from
payment of all taxes of whatever authority except 3% tax on its gross earnings.
The Provincial treasurer of Misamis Oriental, however, demanded payment of
the provincial franchise tax from CEPALCO in accordance with the Local Tax Code
(P.D. 231) and pursuant thereto, the Provincial Revenue Ordinance No. 19.
W/N CEPALCO is exempt from paying the provincial franchise tax.
No. No provision in P.D. 231 expressly or impliedly amends or repeals RA 3247,
3570 and 6020. A special and local statute applicable to a particular case is no
repealed by a later statute which is general in its terms, provisions and applic
even if the terms of the general act are broad enough to include cases in the sp
law unless there is manifest intent to repeal or alter the special law. Also, th
Secretary of Finance made it clear that the franchise tax provided in the Local
Code may only be imposed on companies with franchise that do not contain
exempting clause.
2a, 50
De Joya v. Lantin
Case No. 31
G.R. No. L-24037 (April 27, 1967)
Respondent Francindy Commercial purchased bales of textile from Cebu
Company Ernerose Commercial. However, the Bureau of Customs discovered that
the goods to be delivered by Ernerose were different from those declared. Custom
took custody of the shipment.
Francindy Commercial filed a petition in the Court of First Instance for
Customs to release the goods. Francindy insisted that the CFI had jurisdiction o
the basis of the Judiciary Act and not the Bureau of Customs. RA 1937 and 1125,
the other hand, vest exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedi
ngs to
the Bureau of Customs.
Who has jurisdiction over the shipment.
The Bureau of Customs does. RA 1937 and 1125 are special laws, whereas the
Judiciary Act is a general law. In case of conflict, special laws prevail over g

Arayata v. Joya
Case No. 9
G.R. No. L-28067 (March 10, 1928)
Cecilio Joya was leasing six friar lots, and he started paying the Government
for such. Because the number of lands he can hold is limited, he conveyed some o
the lots to respondent F. Joya as administrator.
Cecilio died before fully paying the Government for the lands. His widow,
herein petitioner, was ruled to own only one-half of the lot based on the Civil
provision on conjugal property. The court then sought to deliver the property to
Florentino for liquidation and distribution.
Petitioner claimed that under Act 1120, Sec. 16, the widow receives all deeds
of her deceased spouse upon compliance with requirements of the law.
Whether the Civil Code provision on conjugal property prevails or Act 1120 s
full conveyance of the property to the widow.
Act 1120 prevails. It lays down provisions regarding acquisition, disposition,
and transmission of friar lands, which are contrary to the Civil Code. The Civil
Code is
a general law, while Act 1120 is a special law. The special law must prevail.
Sitchon, et al. v. Aquino
Case No. 147
G.R. No. L-8500 (February 27, 1956)
Respondent Aquino, the City Engineer of Manila, demolished the houses of
the six petitioners in this class suit, because their houses were public nuisance
s built
on public streets and river beds.
Petitioners contend that under the Civil Code, Art. 701 and 702, it is the distr
health officer who should remove public nuisances. Respondent, on the other hand
argues that RA 409, the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, grants the power
remove public nuisances to the City Engineer.
Whose job it is to determine and demolish public nuisances, the health officer
under the Civil Code or the city engineer under RA 409.
The City Engineer, under RA 409, has jurisdiction. The Civil Code is a general
law applicable throughout the Philippines, whereas RA 409 is a special law that
pertains solely to the City of Manila. When a general and a special law are in c
the latter prevails.

Bellis v. Bellis
Case No. 14
G.R. No. L-23678 (June 6, 1967)
Amos Bellis, a citizen of Texas USA, died. He had 7 legitimate and 3 illegimate
children, all surnamed Bellis. After the execution of the decedent s will, which w
executed in the Philippines where the properties involved were situated, the exe
divided the residuary estate into 7 equal portions for the benefit of the testat
or s 7
legitimate children. Herein appellants filed their respective oppositions on the
that the partition deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children. Relying
on Art. 16
of the New Civil Code which provides that the national law of the decedent shoul
apply (Texas Law), which did not provide for legitimes, the CFI of Manila denied
Whether Texas Law or the Philippine Law must apply in intestate and
testamentary succession.
Texas Law should apply. Art. 16, par 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code render
applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary
successions. It must have been the purpose of the Congress to make Art. 16, par.
2 a
specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succ
As further indication of this intent, Art. 1039 provides that the capacity to su
cceed is
governed by the national of the decedent. It is thus evident that Congress has n
intended to extend our system of legitimes to the succession of foreign national
6b, 9c
Philippine Trust Co. v. Macuan
Case No. 123
G.R. No. 32280 (March 24, 1930)
Defendant Macuan married F. Tormo, who became mentally incapacitated.
Defendant filed a petition to the Court asking that he be appointed guardian of
person and estate of his wife, the latter consisting in undivided half in a cert
ain land
with improvements, which is claimed to be conjugal property. Subsequently, M.
Tormo, et. al., filed a motion, which was later granted by the Court, praying th
at the
guardian be instructed to file a complete inventory of all the property belongin
g to
his ward. A special guardian, Philippine Trust Co., was appointed for the recove
ry of
the ownership and possession of the property herein involved.
1. W/N a married woman judicially declared mentally incapacitated is
entitled to include in the inventory of her property that which is conjugal.
2. W/N the defendant may be compelled to include in the inventory of his
mentally incapacitated wife s property, her undivided half of the conjugal propert
1. No. She is not entitled to include half of the legal conjugal partnership,
which still subsists, in the inventory of her property.
2. The defendant, being the guardian, cannot be compelled to include in the
inventory of the same, said half of the conjugal property. The Court relied on 1
) the
Code of Civil Procedure, which is general in character; and 2) the Civil Code, w
is more specific, referring to the management of the property of a demented ward
who is married. Thus, Civil Code takes precedence over the Code of Civil Procedu
Tan Liao v. American President Lines, Ltd.
Case No. 153
G.R. No. L-7280 (January 20, 1956)
This is an action filed by plaintiff-appellant Tan Liao for the recovery of
P92,755.00, with interest from the damages allegedly suffered by plaintiff due t
o the
wrongful and unauthorized delay and careless handling in the transportation of a
cargo of eggs undertaken by defendant for plaintiff from the port of New York, U
to the port of Manila. The suit was brought more than a year from the receipt of
goods, and thereby, claimed by the defendant to have already prescribed in
accordance with the prescription given by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.
W/N the action for damages had already prescribed, and thus, barred the
appellant to receive compensation for damages.
Yes, it has already prescribed. The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act provides
that loss or damage suit must be brought within one year after the delivery of t
goods. Relying on the ruling in previous cases, the Court held that the prescrip
period of 1 year established by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act modified pro ta
the provisions of Act No. 190 as to goods transported in foreign trade, the form
being a special act while the latter is a law of general application.
5a, 50
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Tax Appeal
Case No. 75
G.R. No. 44007 (March 20, 1991)
Chapter X, Page 415, Footnote No. 115
Private respondent, a British-owned foreign corporation was granted a
legislative franchise, pursuant to RA 808, which included a tax exemption from t
payment of all taxes except a franchise tax of 5% on the gross earnings and tax
on its
real property. The CIR assessed the corporation in the amount of 7M pesos
representing deficiency income tax maintaining that the franchise was inoperativ
for failure to comply with Sec. 8, Art. 14 of the 1935 Constitution which limits
the grant
of franchise to Filipino-owned corporations. The Court of Tax Appeals rendered t
franchise unconstitutional while declaring petitioner s assessment without effect
having been made beyond the prescribed period stipulated in the Tax Code.
W/N the provision in the franchise requiring the payment of only 5% of the
gross receipts in lieu of any and all taxes is unenforceable and without legal e
for failure of the respondent corporation to comply with the 1935 Constitution,
Corporation Law and the Public Service Act.
No. The legislative franchise was valid. As a charter is in the nature of a priv
contract, the imposition of another franchise tax on the corporation by the loca
authority would constitute an impairment of the contract between the government
and the corporation. RA 808 as a special statute must be deemed an exemption to
the general laws as it was meant to meet particular sets of conditions and
9a, 50

NPVC v. Presiding Judge RTC Br. XXV

Case No. 87
G.R. No. 72477 (October 16, 1990)
The Province of Misamis Oriental filed a complaint with the Regional Trial
Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch XXV against NAPOCOR for the collection of
real property tax covering the period 1978 to 1984. Petitioner contends that the
has no jurisdiction over the suit and that it is not the proper forum for the ad
of the case pursuant to P.D. 242 which provides that disputes between agencies o
the government including GOCC s shall be administratively settled or adjudicated b
the Secretary of Justice. On the other hand respondent invokes P.D. 464 which
governs the appraisal and assessment of real property for purposes of taxation b
provinces, cities and municipalities thereby justifying its position in favor of
concerned municipal corporations.
W/N the respondent court has jurisdiction over the civil action.
Yes. P.D. 242 must yield to P.D. 464 on the matter of which tribunal or agency
has jurisdiction over the enforcement and collection of real property taxes. gra
that the latter is a special law dealing specifically with real property taxes w
P.D. 242 is a general law that deals with a broad coverage concerning administra
settlement of disputes, claims and controversies between or among government
agencies and instrumentalities. Special laws ought to be upheld and construed as
exceptions to the general law in the absence of special circumstances calling fo
r a
contrary conclusion
Lopez, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission
Case No. 150
G.R. No. 87119 (April 16, 1991)
Chapter X, Page 415, Footnote No. 116
The Vice-mayor of Manila submitted to the Civil Service Commission the
appointment of 19 officers in the Executive Staff of the Office of the Presiding
pursuant to the provisions of RA 409. However, the City Budget of Manila questio
whether the payroll of the newly appointed employees may be paid out of city fun
on the basis of the appointments signed by the Vice Mayor. The City Legal Office
then rendered an opinion that the proper appointing officer is the City Mayor an
not the City Council.
W/N the Charter of the City of Manila has been repealed by RA 5185 giving
mayors the power to appoint all officials entirely paid out by city funds and BP
empowering local executives to appoint all officers and employees of the city.
No. Regardless of their date of passage, a special law (RA 409) providing
specifically for the organization of the Government of the City of Manila prevai
ls over
a general law. RA 5185 and BP 337 as general laws were not meant to deprive the
City Council of Manila of its appointing power. Also, since repeals by implicati
on are
not favored, conflict between the statutes should be very clear to favor the
assumption that the latter in time repeals the other.
37, 38b, 50

Manzano v. Valera
Case No. 80
G.R. No. 122068 (July 8, 1998)
A criminal complaint for libel was filed in the sala of herein petitioner, who
initially recognized that the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the cas
thereafter forwarding the records to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Ho
the latter opined that the MTC should take cognizance of the case based on
Republic Act 7691 which expanded the jurisdiction of Metropolitan, Municipal Tri
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts to hear and decide criminal cases where the
penalty does not exceed 6 years. Petitioner thus filed a motion to dismiss upon
respondent s acceptance of the case for the MTC s lack of jurisdiction over the
offense charged.
W/N the MTC has exclusive jurisdiction over complaints for libel.
No. The applicable law is still Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code which
categorically provides that jurisdiction over libel cases are lodged with the Co
urts of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts). Although RA 7691 was enacted to
decongest the clogged dockets of the Regional Trial Courts by expanding the
jurisdiction of first level courts, the said law is of general character and doe
s not alter
the provisions of Article 360 of the RPC, which is a law of special nature. Gran
ted that
there seems to be no manifest intent to repeal or alter the jurisdiction in libe
l cases
from the provisions of R.A. 7691it must be maintained that a special law cannot
repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication.
37, 38, 50
Garcia v. Pascual, et al.
Case No. 110
G.R. No. L-16950 (December 22, 1961)
Chapter VI, Page 277, Footnote No. 118
Petitioner, a junior typist civil service eligible, was appointed by the Justice
Peace as clerk of the municipality of San Jose, Nueva Ecija. When vouchers were
submitted to the mayor, he did not want to approve them. His reason was RA 1551
has repealed Sec. 75 of RA 926, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act.
Sec. 75 of the Judiciary Act provides that justices of peace may have clerks of
court at the expense of the municipalities and shall be appointed by respective
justices. RA 1551 however, which is claimed to have repealed Sec. 75 of RA 296
provides that all employees whose salaries are paid out of the general funds of
municipalities shall be appointed by the mayor.
W/N Sec. 75 of RA 926 has been repealed by RA 1551.
The judge ruled that said RA 1551 did not expressly repeal Sec. 75 of the
Judiciary Act and that the two laws may be reconciled following the principle of
that a prior specific statute is not repealed by a subsequent general law. Also,
being no specific grant of authority in favor of the mayor to appoint the clerk
court, the power to appoint should not be considered lodged in the said mayor.
Lastly, the intent of the law in placing the appointment of the clerks in the ju
stice of
the peace is to prevent the importunities and pressure of prejudicial politics.
6b, 9a, 32, 36d, 50, b2

Lagman v. City of Manila, et al.

Case No. 141
G.R. No. L-23305 (June 30, 1966)
Chapter X, Page 420, Footnote No. 126
Petitioner operates 15 auto trucks with fixed routes and regular terminal for
the transportation of passengers and freight.
The Municipal of Manila repealed RA 409 and enacted Ordinance No. 4986,
entitled An Ordinance Rerouting Traffic on Roads and Streets within the City of
Manila, and For Other Purposes.
W/N the enactment and enforcement of Ordinance No. 4986 is
unconstitutional, illegal, ultra vires, and null and void.
No. RA 409 is a special law and of later enactment than C.A. No. 548 and the
Public Service Law, so that even if conflict exists between the provisions of th
e former
act and the latter acts, RA 409 should prevail over both Commonwealth Acts.
Moreover, the powers conferred by law upon the Public Service Commission
were not designed to deny or supersede the regulatory power of local governments
over motor traffic.
6c, 11a, 49, 50
Bagatsing v. Ramirez
Case No. 28
G.R. No. L-41631 (December 17, 1976)
Chapter VI, Page 268, Footnote No. 83
The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7522, An Ordinance
Regulating the Operation of Public Markets and Prescribing Fees for the Rentals
Stalls and Providing Penalties for Violation thereof and for other Purposes.
Respondent were seeking the declaration of nullity of the Ordinance for the
reason that a) the publication requirement under the Revised Charter of the City
Manila has not been complied with, b) the Market Committee was not given any
participation in the enactment, c) Sec. 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Pract
Act has been violated, and d) the ordinance would violate P.D. 7 prescribing the
collection of fees and charges on livestock and animal products.
What law shall govern the publication of tax ordinance enacted by the
Municipal Board of Manila, the Revised City Charter or the Local Tax Code.
The fact that one is a special law and the other a general law creates the
presumption that the special law is to be considered an exception to the general
The Revised Charter of Manila speaks of ordinance in general whereas the Local
Tax Code relates to ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges in
particular. In regard therefore, the Local Tax Code controls.
6c, 7a, 11a, 17, 40b, 49, 50

Latin Maxims
Index animi sermo est.
Legis interpretation legis vim obtinet.
Speech is the index of intention.
Judicial construction and interpretation of a statute acquires the force of law.

Animus hominis est anima scripti.

The intention of the party is the soul.
Verba legis non est recedendum.
From the words of the statute there should be no departure.

Maledicta et exposition quae corrumpit textum.
It is bad construction which corrupts the text.
Contemporanea exposition est optima et fortissimo in lege.
Littera scripta manet.
Contemporary construction is strongest in law.
The written word endures.
Optima est legum interpres consuetudo.
Clausula rebus sic stantibus.
Custom is the best interpreter of a statute.
Things thus standing.
Regula pro lege, si deficit lex.
In default of the law, the maxim rules.
Absoluta sentential expositore non indigent.
When the language of the law is clear, no explanation is required.
Optimus interpres rerum usus.
Dura lex sed lex.
The best interpreter of the law is usage.
The law may be harsh but it is the law.
Communis error facit jus.
Hoc quidem perquam durum est, sed ita lex scripta est.
Common error sometimes passes as current law.
It is exceedingly hard, but so the law is written.
Quod ab initio non valet in tractu temporis non convalescit.
That which was originally void, does not by lapse of time become valid.
Ratihabitio mandato aequiparatur.
Aequitas nunquam contravenit legis.
Legislative ratification is equivalent to a mandate.
Equity never acts in contravention of the law.
Aequum et bonum est lex legume.
Stare decisis et non quieta movere.
What is good and equal is the law of laws.
Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled.
Jus ars boni et aequi.
Interest republicae ut sit finis litium.
Law is the art of equity.
The interest of the state demands that there be an end to litigation.
Ratio legis est anima legis.
The reason of the law is the soul of the law.

Littera necat spiritus vivificate.

The letter kills but the spirit gives life.
Verba intentioni, non e contra, debent inservice.
Words ought to be more subservient to the intent, and not the intent to the

Benignus leges interpretandae sunt, quod voluntas eraum conservetur.

Laws are to be construed liberally, so that their spirit and reason be preserved
Qui haret in littera haret in cortice.
He who considers merely the letter of an instrument goes but skin deep into its
Quando verba statute sunt speciali, ratio autem generalia, statum generaliter
est intelligendum.
When the words used in a statute are special, but the purpose of the law is
general, it should be read as the general expression.
10. Cessante rationi legis, cessat et ipsa lex.
When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases.
11. Interpretatio talis in ambiguis simper fienda est ut evitetur inconveniens e
Where there is ambiguity, the interpretation of such that will avoid
inconveniences and absurdity is to be adopted.
Legis construction non facit injuriam.
The construction of the law will not be such as to work injury or injustice.
Argumentum ab inconvenient plurimum valet in lege.
An argument drawn from inconvenience is forcible in law.
Verba nihil operari melius est quam absurde.
It is better that words should have no operation at all than that they should
operate absurdly.
Lex simper intendit quod convenit rationi.
The law always intends that which is in accordance with reason.
Ubi eadem ratio ibi idem jus.
Like reason doth make like law.
Argumentum a simili valet in lege.
An argument drawn from a similar case, or analogy, prevails in law.
De similibus idem est judicium.
Concerning similars, the judgment is the same.
Ubi eadem est ratio, ibi est eadem legis disposition.
Where there is the same reason, there is the same law

12. Ea est accipienda interpretation quae vitio caret.

That interpretation is to be adopted which is free from evil or injustice.
Lex injusta non est lex.
An unjust law is not a law.
13. Fiat justitia, ruat coelum .
Let right be done, though the heavens fall.
Nemo est supra legis.
Nobody is above the law.
Nulla potential supra legis esse debet.
No power must be above the law.
14. Jurae naturae aequum est neminem cum alterius detrimento et injuria fieri
It is certainly not agreeable to natural justice that a stranger should reap the
pecuniary produce of another man s work.
15. Surplusagium non nocet.
Surplusage does not vitiate a statute.
Utile per inutile non vitiatur.
The useful is not vitiated by the non-useful.
16. Falsa demostratio non nocet, cum de corpore constat.
False description does not preclude construction nor vitiate the meaning of
the statute.
Nil facit error nominis cum de corpora vel persona constat.
Error in name does not make an instrument inoperative when the description
is sufficiently clear.
Certum est quod certum reddi potest.
That is sufficiently certain which can be made certain.
17. Ibi quid generaliter conceditur, inest haec exception, si non aliquid sit co
jus basque.
Where anything is granted generally, exemption from rigid application of law
is implied; that nothing shall be contrary to law and right.

18. Summum jus, summa injuria.

The rigor of the law would be the highest injustice.
Jus summum saepe, summa est militia.
Extreme law is often extreme wrong.
19. Nemo tenetur ad impossibilia.
The law obliges no one to perform an impossibility.
Impossibilum nulla obigatio est.
There is no obligation to do an impossible thing.
Lex non cogit ad impossibilia.
The law does not require an impossibility.
Lex non intendit aliquid impossible.
The law does not intend the impossible.
20. Ex necessitate legis.
By the necessary implication of law.
In eo quod plus sit, simper inest et minus.
The greater includes the lesser.
Cui jurisdiction data est, ea quoque concessa esse videntur sine quibus
jurisdiction explicari non potuit.
When jurisdiction is given, all powers and means essential to its exercise are
also given.
21. Ubi jus, ibi remedium.
Where there is a right, there is a remedy for violation thereof.
Ubi jus incertum, ibi jus nullum.
Where the law is uncertain, there is no right.
22. Ex dolo malo non oritur action.
An action does not arise from fraud.
Nullius commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria.
No one may derive advantage from his own unlawful act.
In pari delicto potior est condition defendentis.
Where the parties are equally at fault, the position of the defending party is
the better one.
23. Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum.
What cannot, by law, be done directly cannot be done indirectly.
24. Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda.
General words should be understood in their general sense.
Generis dictum generaliter est interpretandum.
A general statement is understood in its general sense.
25. Verba accipienda sunt secundum subjectam materiam.
A word is to be understood in the context in which it is used.
Verba mere aequivoca, si per communem usum loquendi in intellectu certo
sumuntur, talis intellectus preferendus est.
Equivocal words or those with double meaning are to be understood
according to their common and ordinary sense.
Verba artis ex arte.
Words of art should be explained from their usage in the art to which they
Verba generalia restringuntur ad habilitatem rei vel personam.
General words should be confined according to the subject-matter or
persons to which they relate.
26. Ubi lex non distinguit necnon distinguere debemus.
Where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish.
27. Dissimilum dissimilis est ratio.
Of things dissimilar, the rule is dissimilar.
28. Noscitur a sociis.
A thing is known by its associates.
29. Ejesdem generis.
Of the same kind or specie.

30. Expressio unius est exclusion alterius.

The express mention of one person, thing or consequence implies the
exclusion of all others.
Expressum facit cessare tacitum.
What is expressed puts an end to that which is implied.
31. Argumentum a contrario.
Negative-Opposite Doctrine: what is expressed puts an end to that which is
32. Cassus omissus pro omisso habendus est.
A person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have
been omitted intentionally.
33. Ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatur sentential.
A qualifying word or phrase should be understood as referring to the nearest
34. Reddendo singular singulis.
Referring each to each, or referring each phrase or expression to its
appropriate object, or let each be put in its proper place.
35. Exceptio firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis.
A thing not being expected must be regarded as coming within the purview
of the general rule.
36. Optima statute interpretatrix est ipsum statutum.
The best interpreter of the statute is the statute itself.
Ex tota materia emergat resolution.
The exposition of a statute should be made from all its parts put together.
Injustum est, nisi tota lege inspecta, de una aliqua ejus particula proposita
indicare vel respondere.
It is unjust to decide or to respond as to any particular part of a law without
examining the whole of the law.
Nemo enim aliquam partem recte intelligere possit antequam totum interum
atque interim perlegit.
The sense and meaning of the law is collected by viewing all the parts
together as one whole and not of one part only by itself.
Ex antecendentibus et consequentibus fit optima interpretation.
A passage will be best interpreted by reference to that which precedes and
follows it.
Verba posterima propter certitudinem addita ad priora quae certitudine
indigent sunt referenda.
Reference should be made to a subsequent section in order to explain a
previous clause of which the meaning is doubtful.
37. Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat.
A law should be interpreted with a view of upholding rather than destroying it.
38. Pari materia.
Of the same matter.
Interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus.
Every statute myst be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to
form a uniform system of law.
39. Distingue tempora et concordabis jura.
Distinguish times and you will harmonize law.
-Tempora mutantur et leges mutantur in illis.
-Times have changed and laws have changed with them.

Mutatis mutandis.
With the necessary changes.

40. Salus populi est suprema lex. 45. Vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subv
The voice of the people is the supreme law. The law aids the vigilant, not those
who slumber on their rights.
Statuta pro publico commodo late interpretantur. Potior est in tempore, potior e
st in jure.
Statutes enacted for the publc good are to be construed liberally. He who is fir
st in time is preferred in right.
Privatum incommodum publico bono pensatur.
The private interests of the individual must give way to the accommodation of Ch
the public.

46. Lex prospicit, non respicit.
41. Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea. The law looks forward, not backward.
The act does not make a person guilty unless the mind is also guilty. Lex de fut
uro, judex de praeterito.
Actus me invito facturs non est meus actus. The law provides for the future, the
judge for the past.
An act done by me against my will is not my act. -Nova constitutio futuris forma
m imponere debet non praeteritis.
-A new statute should affect the future, not the past.
42. Privilegia recipiunt largam interpretationem voluntate consonem concedentis.
Leges quae retrospciunt, et magna cum cautione sunt adhibendae neque
Privileges are to be interpreted in accordance with the will of him who grants e
nim janus locatur in legibus.
them. Laws which are retrospective are rarely and cautiously received, for Janus
Renunciatio non praesumitur. really no place in the laws.
Renunciation cannot be presumed. Leges et constitutiones futuris certum est dare
formam negotiis, non ad facta
praeterita revocari, nisi nominatim et de praeterito tempore et adhuc
43. Strictissimi juris. pendentibus negotiis cautum sit.
Follow the law strictly. Laws should be construed as prospective, not retrospect
ive, unless they are
expressly made applicable to past transactions and to such as are still
44. Nullum tempus occurit regi. pending.
There can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on
47. Nullum crimen sine poena, nulla poena sine lege.
There is no crime without a penalty, there is no penalty without a law.
48. Favorabilia sunt amplianda, odiosa restringenda.
Penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect.


49. Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant.
Later statutes repeal prior ones which are repugnant thereto.
50. Generalia specialibus non derogant.
A general law does not nullify a specific or special law.
A. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
Ignorance of the law excuses no one.
B. In obscuris inspici solere quod versimilius est, aut quod plerumque
fieri solet.
When matters are obscure, it is customary to take what appears to be more
likely or what usually often happens.
Ambiguitas verborum patens nulla verificatione excluditur.
A patent ambiguity cannot be cleared up by extrinsic evidence.
C. Ad ea quae frequentibus accidunt jura adaptatur.
Laws are understood to be adapted to those cases which most frequently
Jus constitui oportet in his quae ut plurimum accidunt non quae ex inordinato.
Laws ought to be made with a view to those cases which happen most
frequently, and not to those which are of rare or accidental occurrence.
Quod semel aut bis existit praetereunt legislatores.
Legislators pass over what happens only once or twice.
De minimis non curat lex.
The law does not concern itself with trifling matters.
D. Nigrum Nunquam Excedere Debet Rubrum.
The black (body of the act printed in black) should never go beyond the red
(title or rubric of the statute printed in red).