The cybernetic paradigm

Gyula MEZEY
Zrínyi Miklós National Defence University,
Budapest, Hungary
E-mail: MEZEY@ZMNE.HU

Risk-based decision-making in reducing security risks is based on practical

approach, usually a combination of rational and cognitive theories. In risk-
management analytic, cybernetic, cognitive paradigms can be applied.
The Analytic Paradigm has the potential to clarify a decision, but cannot
guarantee an improved decision-making. Under the Analytic Paradigm it is asserted,
that someone or a group will actively select from among distinct options in a stable
decision environment so as to achieve a set of goals. Recently widely recognized, that
this assumption is farfetched from reality.
The Cybernetic Paradigm has been increasingly in use for group decision
support systems. This paradigm focuses onto uncertainty control and not
optimization. Qualitative modelling is becoming central instead of quantitative
modelling and expert knowledge based systems are in the core.

Shift from the Analytic approach

Merkhofer (1986) [1] paraphrases a comment of a leader: ”the value of
analysis [Decision analysis] lay not so much in its specific conclusions,
(which he suggested were fairly intuitive), but in its clarification of the
logic behind conclusions”. Analytic decision-making is based on abstract
models, explicit formal theories, which create an information overload on
decision-makers, and in many cases it is incompatible with both
organizational structure and processes. Some applications may be
motivated by the desire only to support a particular point of view.
According to Merkhofer (1986) [2] decisions in organizations based
on the Analytic Paradigm are typically motivated in certain situations
when either:
− Procedural rules applied in organizations evolved in stable
environment or
− Strategic decisions are to be made, or
− Responding to changes in the environment of the organization, or
− Organizational goals are implicit or fuzzy, or
− There is a group within the organization with interest in rational
choice, or
− There is an inner rivalry between interest groups within the
organization or
 − Conflict resolution is on the agenda. However, in search for
resolution of conflicts the recent Cybernetic Paradigm seems to be a
more efficient basis.

The Cybernetic Paradigm

Conflict is a problem situation, characterized by misalignment of their
objectives is perceived by social entities. Misalignment is either different
order of importance or mutual exclusivity of goals. A conflict is strategic,
if some of these objectives are related to the survival of one of the social
entities. Politics uses a combination of coerce, deterrence, and economics.
In case of a commercial conflict the resolution is explicitly held in favour
of the client company. However, in case of an IR (International Relations)
conflict the above assumption is implicit. Explicit aim is to achieve a
stable solution by sustaining the peace and international order. But even if
violent solution (armed conflict) occurs, the aim in conflict resolution is
achieving a stable solution [3]. This may be solved peacefully by finding
super-ordinate goals to get only by co-operating together.
Results of decisions are hard to evaluate in security, thus in the
absence of commonly agreed criteria, or methods, - which exist in business
management - the judgement whether a decision was correct or not,
depends on the later success (survival) of the respective organisation or
individual politician. The Cybernetic Paradigm is grounded on the
bounded rationality concept [4] and the cybernetic decision model [5] of
Steinbruner (1976). In complex situations decision makers, inherently
constrained by cognitive and information processing limitations, typically
do not optimise expected value, – they satisfice, and minimize
uncertainty.
In conflict management a natural goal is trying to predict the future,
and the behaviour of adversaries in a conflict. As part of conflict
management we deal with forecasting techniques within the context of
Crisis Analysis. The quantitative models applied by game theory, decision
theory had been proved un-predictive [6], and evaluation of the utility
function of the opponent, or probabilities had rarely ever been attained in
reality.
Decisions are made under risk in the possession of perfect
information, when the outcomes of each option and their probability
distribution is known, or made under uncertainty if not all the outcomes of
each option and their probability distribution are fully known. Due to time-
stress and cognitive computational limitations of leaders, rather than all
alternatives and outcomes are to be considered, some of the alternatives
are ignored in favour of a satisfying one. Minimization of uncertainty is
facilitated keeping key security policy variables within tolerable ranges,
through information feedback loops.
The Cybernetic Paradigm is based on the assumption of uncertainty
control since the psychological effects of uncertainty held to a minimum.
The decision-maker does not need to engage in alternative outcome
calculations or in updated probability assessments – much of that activity
is performed by a mechanism: semi-automated.
It was hoped to have better results by not trying to predict “rational”
results but to perform simulations in order to train one of the adversaries or
give advice, prepare a proposition taking into consideration the behaviour
of the opponent. The new concept of Decision Support System was
introduced.
Cybernetic (or artificial intelligence/AI/, or business intelligence)
decision-making is based on a working mechanism (for instance a type of
organisms modelled by computer), but not dissent from rationality, or
established procedures.
AI is defined as the application of knowledge, thought and learning to
computer systems to aid humans [7] with its major overlapping sub-fields:
robotics, information fusion, NLP (Natural Language Processing), CV
(Computer Vision), KB (Knowledge-Based) or ES (Expert System), and
learning systems. Systems ought to learn otherwise they run the risk of
presenting obsolete knowledge.
In crisis, decisions must be quick to cope up with fast-changing
situations typically in a context of uncertainty (lack of information and/or
overwhelming flow of non-consistent data). Raw data collected must be
analysed and structured to provide the decision-maker with usable
information. Stored knowledge of experts readily available provides a
more flexible tool for supporting quicker decision-making compared to
traditional decision aiding systems. Restructuring, modification,
prototyping of models is rapid using a tool-box and a flexible ‘qualitative
model’ (for instance a knowledge base), than in a traditional information
system.
Changes in the situation during a conflict can lead to the modifications
of the objectives. Moving from a situation to another unforeseen in the
beginning, threatening and counter-threatening, trial-and-error, feedback,
simulation are typical functions in conflict-management. Whereas an
axiomatic simulation model does not, a knowledge-based system with its
‘qualitative model’ allows dynamic modelling and ESD (Evolutionary
System Design) [8]. If properly structured it is easy to change some of the
RB (Rule Base) to observe what the new outcome would be.
 For decision support in conflict analysis knowledge based (KB) and
extended game theory-based systems are frequently used. The former class
will be tackled in the beginning, while the latter category will be dealt with
in the end of this article.
Extended game-theory based systems in practice can have an
important predicting capacity and a training effect. These models
fundamentally rely on mainly quantitative [9] data, where freedom of the
decision-maker results from choosing outcomes and trying different
preference orders on the outcomes by means of simulation.
KB systems fundamentally rely on qualitative model, where freedom
of decision maker is greater and comes from both dynamic modelling and
flexibility by rapid prototyping.
An important factor is in crisis management, that for example EFAR
can require 1-2 weeks [10] to get an output, whilst rapid prototyping in KB
systems needs only 1-2 days.

Qualitative modelling
Let us recall some notions in the beginning:
− ES (Expert System)
According to the BCS (British Computer Society), an ES “is
modelling, within a computer, of expert knowledge in a given domain,
such, that the resulting system can offer intelligent advice or take
intelligent decisions”. Rather than imitating the reasoning processes
experts use to solve specific problems an ES concentrate only to achieve
similar results. Many ES work only at an advisory level [11]. When a
system has not got such an advanced level knowledge as an expert has, -
then it is not branded as ES, just an advisory level KB system.
− KB (Knowledge Base)
In an ES it is useful to separate functional entities (inference engine,
rules in the KB, facts in the domain DB (Data Base), DMBS (Data Base
Management System), user interface, knowledge acquisition facility). The
KB is a basic part of an ES, it is a specific software, which contains the
facts about a narrow domain and relevant heuristic rules. Though KB is an
essential part of an ES, not all ESs are RB (Rule Based) systems, – the
representative form of knowledge can be for example frame-based, script-
based or hybrid one as well, but these technicalities are not going to be
discussed.
The rules (or the procedures) can be seen as a ‘qualitative model’
(RB). Though it is in combination with a normative component, this
qualitative model fundamentally does not rely on a mathematical model.
The KB contains either a person’s knowledge related to scenarios, or
results of modelling and simulation. For the purpose of crisis management
the contingency plan and basic response knowledge based on earlier
decisions made in the planning, organizing and pre-crisis stages can be
included in a KB.
Though no single expert is available to provide all the relevant rules
from his intuition, it is a fundamental assumption of ES, that holistic
expert decision-making is valid. Circularity (self-referencing), redundancy,
incompleteness, conflicting rules, random error in human judgement can
usually be found in the KB of an ES. These problems in the particular KB
of crisis management are more risky, than in a simple ES. In ensuring
completeness, the short of experts and some sort of empirical disaster data
can be balanced by higher standards of transparent logic [12]. Neither a
single KB, nor a uniform way to change knowledge, no goal-directed
search with programming languages possessing inference capabilities
using generalized search should be assumed.
− Distributed net of ESs
To have a robust redundant ES a loosely coupled network of ESs
could be appropriate to use. Cooperating ESs in a distributed system could
‘talk’ to each other like experts do, - although, as is mentioned above not
all KB systems are real ESs with deep procedural knowledge. The various
RB agents would have to exhibit organizational behaviour and human-like
thought processes. One difficulty is ‘hypothesis-conflict’ resolution:
experts often come up with conflicting hypotheses.
When knowledge representation of a variety is distributed, then the
control logic should be highly structured, procedural. When implementing
a change in a rule, usually one merely can change a parameter (a data
beforehand, or interactively, during simulation).
The evaluation of a rule base (RB) depends only on the adequacy of its
resulting outputs fired by the facts. For example, in case of a negotiation
support system, the coherence of the qualitative model is self-contained,
and completeness and lack of contradiction are relevant. A meta-level
evaluation related to the theoretical coherence of the representation is
irrelevant.
Next two particular types of ES (useful in defence systems) are
identified:
− Bootstrapping
‘Bootstrapping’ is the full replacement of the human decision-maker
by a linear statistical model. A fundamental assumption of ‘bootstrapping’
is, that decision-makers are able to identify the key predictor variables of
that model [13]. Bootstrapping models are best in routine simple decision-
making while ESs are in advisory roles.
− Linear modelling
A particular type of KB, linear modelling uses human judgements,
predictions to build a statistical model [14]. If the person is an expert, the
assumed quality of his judgmental input is high. Know-how of employing
the appropriate models, interpreting the results is also should be contained,
since beside deep procedural knowledge, meta-knowledge also should be
handled.
– A KB for contingency planning
There are six major functional elements of a framework [15] to
support scenario generation for contingency planning. KB is a central
element of this framework. The KB should consist of at least three major
functional components of a problem: a video-archive can be instructive as
to the dimensions, dilemmas, multiple goals; a model-base refers to the
decision aids available; and a group-process base can be used to handle the
group-influencing options.
The collection of historical cases and their resolutions constitutes a
KB and CBR [16] or ANN [17] (Artificial Neural Network) can be applied
to identify patterns, relationships, which subsequently lead to formulating
rules for ES and infer potential solutions for solving future problems. Even
if it is so, building an ES is highly labour intensive. Reducing labour, for
structure discovery interactive induction and knowledge acquisition can be
combined and automated (for instance: Auto-Intelligence [18]).
Nevertheless, there are difficulties using ES in dealing with
unanticipated events.

MKB (Meta Knowledge Base)

Meta-knowledge has a narrow meaning: the system’s knowledge
about ‘how’ it reasons is called Meta-knowledge [19]. In a broader
meaning all is known about the structure and content of the KB (‘rules
about rules’ provided the KB is a RB system) can be called Meta-
Knowledge as well.
In contingency planning likely the most important is to represent:
• Characterization of alternative command level models
• Strategy of decision-making:
Categorized either according to certain paradigms: Analytic, cybernetic,
cognitive (bureaucratic political), or according to Flin [20]:
RPD (Recognition-primed Decision-making), Creative, Analytical,
SOP-based,
 • Framework for organizing information:
1. Crisis states;
2. Crisis levels: the rules are modularised by the current situation,
ordered by an escalation ladder, and within the modules hierarchically
structured;
3. Hierarchical situation assessment:
− National command level: few key variables, soft data;
− Operational command level: intermediate variables, soft data;
− Tactical command level [21].

DSS (Decision Support System)

DSS can support all phases of the decision process, includes a model
base handled by a model base management subsystem, a communication
(dialog) subsystem, a DB (Data Base) handled by a DBMS (Data Base
Management Software), and optionally a KB with a knowledge
management subsystem, or/and a gaming system. In case of group
decisions, a GDSS can be used.
By definition a DSS (in case of group decision-making a GDSS, and
often an ES as well) normally in every phases of the decision process can
be useful in providing some sort of support. According to the model of
Sprague (1993) [22] the following phases of the decision process can be
supported by DSS, or ES, or EIS (EIS=Executive Information System):
− Support for the intelligence phase:
Ability to scan the environment, external and internal databases for
opportunities and problems, interpretation of what the scanning discovers.
An EIS helps in continuously monitoring by accessing databases
rapidly and efficiently. A DSS can model and analyse data fast.
An ES can diagnose problems and interpret information.
− Support for the design phase:
A DSS usually has the capability to generate alternative courses of
action, forecasting the future consequences, criteria for choice and their
relative importance.
− Support for the choice phase:
By means of a DSS different scenarios can be tested before the final
decision.
An ES can assess the desirability of the solutions and helps in
recommending one.
− Support for the decision implementation phase:
A DSS can assist in decision communication, explanation, and
justification.
 An ES can provide training.
We will deal with versions of DSS and technicalities applicable for
crisis management later in an other article. Next we are going to discuss
conflict analysis decision support only for the design phase when
forecasting future consequences.
Forecasting techniques
• A forecast can be based on some normative (Analytic Paradigm)
techniques, for instance:
1. Decision matrices
2. Relevance trees [23]
3. OR (Operation Research) techniques [24]: for instance linear
programming, dynamic programming
• Exploratory forecasting techniques could be applied, for example:
1. Trend extrapolation: extrapolation of time series, time-independent
plots, envelope curves
2. Morphological analysis: discovers the totality of options [25]
3. Intuitive techniques: for example Delphi method
4. Economic analysis: CBA, CEA [26], Discounted Cash Flow
5. Games
6. Modelling
7. Scenario writing
8. Assumption-based multi-scenarios
Shift from trend-based planning
The steps of trend-extrapolation in an outside-in perspective [27]:
1. Identifying trends in the environment (‘environment scanning’);
2. Selection of important trends likely to drive the future (expert
judgement);
3. Generating a ‘future world’ from important trends (‘extrapolation’);
4. Planning in dealing with the ‘future world’.
Uncertainty can often be handled by probability theory, Monte-Carlo
analysis.
Causal chain can be used to relate each individual decision to an
overall objective [28]. A causal chain path between cause and possible
effect (benefit/cost) can often be represented by a relevance tree [29], or an
influence diagram. In practice both normative (decision matrices,
relevance trees, etc.) and exploratory forecasting can be combined.
In identifying a single trend it is difficult to reach a common
understanding of a group
 Assumption-based planning
This is failsafe planning, since it is not necessary to reach a common
view of the group. It is easier contemplating changes to the current world,
than to predict one future world. The steps of assumption-based approach
in an inside-out perspective start from a common understanding of a
group, looking for changes, which are likely to violate assumptions:
1. Identification of assumptions underlying current operations
(reading documents and checking interviews);
2. Gathering plausible elements of change (Delphi-method by a group
of experts);
3. Identification of elements of change that could upset current
assumptions (no systemic commonly agreed method);
4. Generating a world for each violated assumption (multiple world
generation);
5. Developing ‘signposts’, ‘hedging and shaping’ actions (‘hedging
and shaping’ plans) [30].
Assumption-based planning leads to multiple scenarios and can be
seen as if collective decisions were fragmented into small segments
treatable sequentially. This fits to the “labelled sequential attention to
goals” process at the top of a hierarchy of units of a large organisation
[31]. Goal integration is “refused” by top management in practice, its
high-level decision preserves the fragmentation in the set of the lower-
level decisions [32], [33], [34] provide scenario-construction methods.
A fundamental assumption: Value integration rejected
Value integration is purposefully rejected and replaced by only
preservative values under the Cybernetic Paradigm. Also it is not yielded a
coherent preference ordering for alternative states of the world under
trade-off conditions. Co-ordination of executives does not mean analytical
integration in practice, but it does mean that established routines in the
organisation must be rendered consistent. These clusters of routine SOP’s
(standard operating procedures), once established, are not readily changed.
A decision-making mechanism produces a variety in range of
outcomes as a consequence of completing a process, without any clear
picture of the actual product, but monitors a few (critical) feedback
variables. The dominant assumption is to control the variety inherent in
the decision problem, rather then to find directly an optimal solution. It is
assumed, that subjective probability assessment of rare events is of poor
quality. In practice it is really difficult:
Calculating probability of hazard, because of lack of data (events
remain unreported), estimating dose-response relationships (most
populations are exposed to multiple hazards, and isolating effects is
difficult), predicting exposure, extrapolating the effects, estimating
consequences, measure benefits and costs, because of uncertain models –
better saying: our limited knowledge.
That is why a “learning mechanism” selects solutions not on a
theoretical, but rather on an instrumental basis. Rather than identifying an
optimal, it tries to find a robust option that satisfies across a range of
possible futures. Lack of appropriate sensitivity analysis tools for
identifying robust solutions led to the recent development of some new
software tools, for example Dynarank, @RISK (an add-in for Excel),
VISA [35].
Robust solutions to changes in inputs may provide an easier solution
of disagreement about weights, when members of the decision-making
group see, that differences in their individual weighting often do not matter
and so there is no point in debating weights, priorities [36]. This can
contribute to a much quicker decision-making process, - however, on the
expense of explicitly expressed opposite personal opinions. But as is well-
known, it is impossible to derive a truly democratic decision for resolving
differences of opinion, according to Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, so a
search for a group value or utility function is futile.
The adaptive behaviour of a cybernetic decision-mechanisms occurs
when the decision-making happens in a stable environmental subsystem
[37]. Defence planning is risk averse, normally the pessimism of the
‘maximin’ decision criterion is applied: choose the best of the worst
possible outcomes [38]. However, the aim of the decision is not to select
the option with the highest expected value or utility, but to find the ‘most
robust’, or at least a ‘robust enough’ solution. This is psychologically
likely most important for those preferring the certainty to choice between
risky options (‘maximin’ criterion). By generating scenarios of favourable
futures, windows of opportunities can be anticipated, so making possible
(at least in theory) immediate actions. Rehearsing the future of adverse
scenarios sensitises for specific triggers for these unfolding scenarios as
early warnings in order to prompt rapid deployment of intervention
towards an unfavourable not impossible future. Potential threats otherwise
may be underestimated or ignored.
Rehearsing the future by predictive and exploratory models
Predictive models
Computer modelling has been successful in those domains where the
predictions of the models can be verified by experiment and troubled when
there is no possibility of experimentally validating model correctness and
utility. Verification, validation, opaqueness of model internals and outputs,
sensitivity analysis in our case are problems, because predicted behaviour
of social models cannot be experimentally validated, so these are to be
seen as ‘exploratory models’. Where prediction, and/or experimental
validation is not possible, no single ‘true’ model can be agreed upon. It
does not matter, how detailed is the model, no amount of detail can
provide validation, only the illusion of realism.
Validation of results of simulations in scenarios with a model based on
historical experiences is still an open question as to the relevance of such
efforts. Validation of models in the social sciences is inherently difficult.
Given the absence of sufficient data, peer review of models, redundancy of
analysis and comparison of results, partial validation of the model, sub-
model validation where possible, can contribute to maintaining the
integrity of planning – but the model remains still non-predictive. Non-
predictive models must be treated differently from those experimentally
validated.
Exploratory models
Exploratory use involves the ‘guessing’ of details of a system for
which there are no data. The implications of these guesses are computed,
which might lead to exploration (for instance Chaos Theory was explored
as a result of simulating anomalous behaviour). Sensitivity analysis (by
which uncertainty in inputs is related to the uncertainty of outputs) is
critical for a model, which is believed – because of confidence in the
correctness of the conceptual model – to be predictive. For an exploratory
model assigning error ranges to the outputs is essential. So we not only can
opt for a multitude of sketchy, though easy to understand, verify, and
analyse sensitivity models, but we cannot help doing so. Even when a
model is not validated, it can serve as an ‘inference engine’ in search for
conclusions to facts or relationships that are invariant across all the set of
plausible models to reveal the desired invariance in a context by some
external analytic strategy. A complete sensitivity analysis might assess the
behaviour of all plausible models, but in practice we rely on a sampling
search for critical aspects of flexible allocation of resources even when the
exact range of outcomes is unknown.
 In the absence or short of data the model contains, ‘exploratory
modelling’ focuses the question to be answered. The exploratory model
should be revised by iteratively redesigned and implemented, during the
course of learning through its use. The complexities of the system and the
uncertainties in the environment are represented by a set of models [39].
The scope of any individual model can be designed to maximize its utility
for answering a particular question.
Forecasting, conflict and negotiation-control by use of extended
game theory
Game theory assumes conflict situations (‘a game’) controlled by
‘depsychologised’ rational behaviour of the decision-makers. Classical
game theory deals with non-cooperative behaviour and zero-sum games.
The approaches of Nash and Harsanyi [40] in modelling bargaining and
negotiation, first between two opponents, then covering their co-operative
game, later embracing more then two players, and cases where the total
payoff to all players was not constant. Co-operative game players have the
opportunity to communicate and to form binding and enforceable
agreements.
Equilibrium concepts in games are usually: Pareto optimum, non-
myopic, Stackelberg, Nash equilibriums. A myopic attitude is to put the
player and the other player at personal risk in order to maximise his own
gain. Pareto optimum exists if no player gets into a worse situation.
Stackelberg equilibrium is when the second player moves in full
knowledge of what the first has done. Nash equilibrium exists when no
player has motivation to make a move even if he is capable to do so [41].
According to Downs (1967) [42], individual actors’ game strategies
and collective bargaining manoeuvres [43] are often understood on game
theory basis.
There are empirical evidences [44], that – at least in some
circumstances – human mind works in accord with assumptions of the
rational decision theory model. Decisions were successfully modelled by
game theory, which was also applied to explain animal, and VUG
(variable universe games) [45] for explaining human behaviour [46].
Bargaining theory tries to explain how wars can occur within
rationalist framework of international relations (IR). Rather than only
defending the own position, a creative attitude based on multi-attribute
value analysis to negotiating problems led to a better deal by trading off
interests and Pareto optimum was applied [47]. However, in game theory
normally it is assumed that the players may have different pay-offs from
the other, for any particular choice of options, but they each know those
pay-offs. But in practice this is difficult to assume. A meeting, or decision
conference may be used supported by a decision analyst in case of group
decisions examining the impact of losses to be compensated by the
increased benefits of other members of the group.
It is a practical disadvantage that expressing the mutually exclusive
options of the opponents leads to a large number of course of actions even
in simple cases. Negotiation problems can be characterized by a small
number of objectives and a large number of potential courses of actions.
That is why such a software, like EQUITY [48] is used by the decision
analyst in order to perform the reallocation or trade-off calculations within
a cooperative group. This is facilitated applying a common scale to
measure benefits and a combined multi-attribute utility function [49] or in
some cases values and not utilities are applied.
Both, a consensus developed by means of trade-offs within a group
and a negotiation between two opponent groups rely on multi-attribute
value analysis, with the additive value model being appropriate in many
cases [50].
Strategic conflict decision-support requirements
Strategic conflict is a conflict of vital interests. Organisational
decision-making, and defence decision making particularly requires
analytical support in managing conflict. A strategic conflict decision-
support system would accommodate the following assumptions and
require the following characteristics [51]:
− An assumption, that some equilibrium existing in game theory is
used;
− The DSS can model the potential, power, motivation of participants
in control and direct the conflict. That game is unlikely to be zero-
sum;
− DSS can accommodate differing belief spaces of participants in the
rationality, objective, structure, and intent dimensions. The
connections between system states, the nature of transitions
themselves between the states, what constitutes success, the nature
of solution, may not commonly viewed by the players, and likely to
change as the game evolves. The transitions usually are
unrepresentable simply by cost, or probability of transition.
Multiple valid viewpoints may exist at all stages of the struggle.
Due to the difficulties over transferability of utility functions [52]
on which based a common transaction variable between players the
utility outcomes could be ordered by preference. The moves will be
ruled by authority reputation, personal influence position of senior
 players, under the urgent need for action, the cost of delay, and
sanctions;
− Adaptive to changing circumstances – the original aim can change
as well;
− The DSS accommodates limited, defective and deceitful data, but;
− New evidence or perception should lead to data improvement;
− The DSS accepts human and group irrationalities;
− Depth-changing ability between strategic and tactical level
negotiations and decision-making in practice means high and low
resolution representation (zooming). Within a local subset of the
wider network a variety of particular micro-economics and game
theory methods should be invoked to reach a local (tactical level)
optimum for local negotiations and decisions;
− System-centred and not viewing the conflict/struggle from the
viewpoint of one party;
− Both hard and soft data should be accepted;
− Auditability/backtraceability;
− Be itself acceptable to the social environment in which it is going to
operate;
− Non-conflicting with the already existing systems.
Extensions of game theory approaches to conflict
Conventional game theory fulfils only few of the criteria established
above, although at a potential lower level for specific purposes and
situations it must be taken into account.
IR (International Relations) conflict resolution and behavioural
conflict analysis approaches do not seem to be easily usable for
computation.
Non-game theoretic conflict analysis is usually underdeveloped to
provide a procedural basis, except for Knowledge Based systems.
Extensions of game theory (deterministic graphical games [VUG,
DG], hypergames, metagames, foveal games, and confrontation analysis
and drama theory, multiple futures planning (ie. FAR) have shown the
potential to be developed for DSS (Decision Support System), because
these models are brought down from the pedestal of the infallible ‘black
box’ to occupy a more modest position as a complement to the thinking
and deducing powers of crisis management.
Variable universe games (i.e. VUG, VUG1, VUG2, VUG3)
Players have different knowledge of characteristics of the game space,
and different pay-off for given terminal states. The key is the different
‘belief sets’ of the players [53], [54]. Players may disagree about the very
structure of the game.
Deterministic graphical games (i.e. DG, DGT, DGA)
Brams (1994) established a complete taxonomy of 2x2 discrete DG’s
[55].
DGT (DG terminal) games are formalised as cyclic graphs, might
be unending (with 0 payoff).
DGA (DG with time-averaged pay-offs) games extend DGT and
stationary equilibrium have been described [56] and is shown, that pure
strategy history-remembering Nash equilibriums always exist. But it is
difficult to establish a cost function associated with a player’s changing his
tactical choices.
For practice it is a problem, that both DGT and DGA assume perfect
information.
Super-games
It concerns decisions of parties with a choice between continuing co-
operation (alliance) or betrayal [57].
Hyper-games
Complex interactions among protagonists can be flexibly modelled
[58]. It has a depth-changing, data-improving, and ‘forgiving’ ability. Its
problem is the sparse literature.
Meta-games
Representing the conflict situation a meta-game offers a list of options
asking the user for identifying which options are excluded, then rank
ordering the rest on a diagram [59]. Scenarios are seen and their related
possible ‘improvement paths’ with associated benefits and costs. Human
attributes like hate, anger, can also be represented, and recommendations
are presented in a graphical way. Literature is available on case studies of
incompatible goals of players. Both the CAP (Conflict Analysis Program)
and DECISIONMAKER were designed by Fraser and Hipel (1984) [60].
But one cannot control the outcomes simply by choosing an attractive
one – this is just ‘management by hope’. You may control only your
moves, usually these are fragments of the ‘improvement paths’. In practice
an earlier analysis (‘sense-making’) and planning is required [61] before
the list of outcomes put out. Planning here means action planning – the
aim of the meta-game is to produce coherent action plans for the player.
‘Sense making’ is a specific communication using Habermas (1981)
communicative rationality concept [62]. Next, large number of tables must
be generated; in meta-game analysis each player needs a separate table for
each outcome. It is a problem when information in a table is incomplete or
misleading, and quantitative input data are difficult to absorb, the method
is difficult to computerise.
Most of the outcomes form meta-equilibrium, an outcome, which is
rational for all players. Here 3 levels of rationality are specified:
rationality, symmetric meta-rationality, general meta-rationality,
embodying traditional and new concepts on the verge of rational and
‘irrational’ decision-making [63].
Confrontation analysis and drama theory
Drama theory is an extension of the meta-game [64] to understand the
effect of changing motivations and utilities by players during the evolution
of the game. A drama evolves through scenes with tactical choices
(represented by trees) can be made by each actor. Each player in each
scene adopts a position – a scenario of the wished outcome. It is the
mathematical treatment within confrontation analysis, which provides
suggestions, how the drama is likely to develop [65]. It seems as if the
establishment of the positions of the players could only achieved with their
co-operation. It has some applications and has a DSS available [66].
A ‘crystal ball’ of the UK
A number of tools: FAR, Foveal games (EFAR), Powergraph (UK)
and KORA (US-Russia) have been in use for decision support purposes in
political, military, business long-range planning.
Multiple futures planning (i.e. FAR)
FAR (Field Anomaly Relaxation) is a future scenarios development
tool [67] used in political and military planning [68] This is a discrete state
transition based network analysis. In its first stage FAR applies the AHP
(Analytic Hierarchy Process) to be filled in by experts [69].
Getting from the situation, where we are (a present state in an N-space
of situations) it is desired to transit us to a wished situation (the object
state). The problem space can be considered as a N-space of combinations
of N field descriptors with each combination describing a conceivable
future outcome (scenario), some of them are desirable, others are adverse.
The output of FAR is that the states are finally arranged into a ‘future tree’
form, whereby no audit is possible [70]. The tree can also be considered as
a N-space of combinations of N field descriptors with each combination
describing a conceivable future outcome (scenario).
After clustering the values of the output, the discrete state transition
based FAR tree can forecast for instance the development of the possible
futures of a region.
Foveal games (i.e. EFAR)
The ‘foveal game’ structure consists of three games: the strategic
scenario game is based on heuristically derived future scenarios, local
games are using conventional game theory, and there is a transition game
in order to ensure consistency between strategic and local levels.
EFAR (Extended Field Anomaly Relaxation) extends FAR to business
strategic planning purposes as well [71]. An output of the EFAR analysis
is a network of scenarios, where the environment can recover to previous
states[72] so backtracking/audit is possible.
EFAR can represent the more dynamic nature and future movement of
organisations within the business context.
By an iterative solution process, intertwined action planning and
sense-making of a complex scene at any stage is possible. It allows the
specific analysis of the transitions between states. It has depth-changing
and focusing abilities between strategic and tactical level decision-making.
Actions, decisions, negotiations at tactical level may affect the position of
the strategic level player so maintenance of validity of the local/tactical
decision is necessary.
An output of EFAR is a set of strategic directed graphs, but these are
not detailed enough for use to play a local game.
Powergraph
‘Powergraph’ is a technique [73], which allows – in the frame of the
EFAR a ‘foveal game’ – the representation of the specific options open to
either an operational, or a tactical level player. It is appropriate for the
decision support of the management in a specific conflict, campaign,
battle, business competition struggle for a bid, etc. By means of
forecasting, helps in the formulation of a strategy taking into consideration
capability and intent, and that decisions can depend both on the beliefs and
desires of a decision maker.
‘Powergraph’ identifies the players, states of the future (as a network),
the players preferences to those states, considers who controls the
transitions between the states specified above (Boolean expressions in a
transition power matrix expressing the ability of each player to move the
system between the states), rank-orders the players preferences to the
states, algorithmically performs both activities: it determines motivated
power and examines feasible developments; then identifies responses
based on: power plays, motivational changes, contingency plans; in order
to convert them into an action plan. ‘Powergraph’ is most effective when
used in an iterative fashion [74].
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