Cardona On Vakyapadiya

1
AUTHOR: GEORGE CARDONA

TITLE: The Sa|Almbandha—samuddeśa (chapter on relation) and Bhart|Alrhari’s
philosophy of language
SOURCE: Journal of the American Oriental Society v119 no1 p88-125 Ja/Mr ’99
The magazine publisher is the copyright holder of this article and it is reproduced with
permission. Further reproduction of this article in violation of the copyright is prohibited.
ABSTRACT
In connection with a recent work on the Sambandhasamuddeśa of the Va-kyapadi-ya,
I consider some major issues concerning BhartrÞhari, the tradition he represents, and
how a modern scholar might approach the Va-kyapadi-ya. I discuss theoretical principles
which have been set forth as a basis for dealing with BhartrÞhari and evidence from the
Va-kyapadi- ya in connection with these principles, chiefly what is referred to as
BhartrÞhari’s perspectivism. I take up in some detail one large issue: the status of the
received high language, associated with a group of model speakers called śisÞ Þt a, who
use speech forms characterized as “correct” (sa-dhu) linguistic units (śabda) opposed
to incorrect linguistic units (asa-dhuśabda, apaśabda), that are viewed as corruptions
(apabhraṁśa), with respect to how meanings are understood by users. The principal
issue here is: do apaśabdas directly signify meanings for ś isÞ tÞ as when they
communicate with someone using a vernacular, or do these speakers resort to a
translation technique such that the apaśabda used calls to mind a sa-dhuśabda, which
then directly signifies a meaning? This topic also involves another important question:
how one should consider the VrÞtti and other commentaries in relation to what is said
in the ka-rika- text.
ABBREVIATIONS
Amba-kartri-: see Raghuna-tha Śarma-.
Bh: Maha-bha-sÞ ya: see Abhyankar.
DarpanÞ a: see Joshi, Sada-śiva Śa-stri-.
Di-pika- I: see Bronkhorst.
Hel(a-ra-ja): see Subramania Iyer 1963, 1973.
Jaimini-yasu-tra-rthasaṅgraha: see Narayana Pillai.
JS: Mi-ma-ṁsa-su-tra of Jaimini: see Abhyankar and Joshi.
Kala-: see Tripa-Þt hi-.
Ka-vya-laṅka-ra: see Durgâprasâd and PanÞ śîkar.
Kuñjika-: see Tripa-Þthi-.
LM: Laghumañju-sÞ a-: see Tripa-Þt hi-.
Mbh: Maha-bha-sÞ ya: see Abhyankar.
Nirukta: see Bhadkamkar.
Nya-yasudha-: see Mukund Shâstri.
Nya-yasu-tra: see Ta-ra-na-tha Nya-ya-Tarkati-rtha et al.
Paddhati: see Subramania Iyer 1966.
Pari-ksÞ a-: see Joshi.
PLM: Paramalaghumañju-sÞ a-: see Kapil Dev Shastri.
RaPr: Ratnapraka-śa on Maha-bha-sÞ ya: see Narasimhacharya.
RjuP: R Þ juvimala- Pañcika-: see Subrahmanya Sastri.
ŚBh: Śabara’s Bha-sÞ ya on Jaiminisu-tras: see Abhyankar and Joshi.
ŚlV: Ślokava-rttika on Śa-barabha-sÞ ya: see Dva-rika-da-s Śa-stri-.
TC IV.2: Tattvacinta-manÞi volume IV.2: see Ka-ma-khya-na-tha Tarkava-gi-R
c a.
TV: Tantrava-rttika: see Dva-rika-da-s Śa-stri-.
Uddyotana: AnnambhatÞÞta’s Uddyotana on KaiyatÞa’s Pradi-pa: see Narasimhacharya.
Ud: Na-geśa’s Uddyota on KaiyatÞa’s Pradi-pa: see Vedavrata.
GEORGE CARDONA: The Sa|Almbandha—samudde·l%sa (chapter on relation) and 2
VBh: Vaiya-karanÞ abhu-sÞ anÞ a: see BhatÞÞta-cha-rya.

VBhS: Vaiya-karanÞ abhu-sÞ anÞasa-ra: see Joshi.
VBhS-Ka-śika-: see Nandkishore Shastri.
VP: Va-kyapadi-ya: see Aklujkar, Rau, Subramania Iyer. [Ka-rika- numbers are first
given according to Rau’s edition, then according to Subramania Iyer’s edition, with
page and line numbers from the latter.]
VPTÞ -i ka-: PunÞ yara-ja’s commentary on Va-kyapadi-ya, ka-nÞdÞ a 2: see Subramania Iyer
1983.
VPVrÞ: Va-kyapadi-ya VrÞtti: see Subramania Iyer 1966, 1983.
1. BhartrÞhari’s Va-kyapadi-ya is, without any doubt the single most important work in
the long history of Pa-nÞ inian grammar, after the works of the three munis: Pa-nÞ ini,
Ka-tya-yana, and Patañjali. It certainly is the most widely cited early treatise concerning
what scholars generally refer to as Indian “philosophy of grammar,” not only among
subsequent scholars in India in various schools of thought but also among modern
scholars.(FN1) Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in the Va-kyapadi-ya and
BhartrÞhari’s Maha- bha-sÞyadi-pika-. The work under review here, a revised version of
Houben’s doctoral dissertation, treats principally one section of the third ka-nÞ dÞa of the
Va-kyapadi-ya, the Sambandhasamuddeśa,(FN2) where in eighty-eight verses BhartrÞhari
treats questions concerning relations between linguistic items and meanings.
The subtitle of his work reflects Houben’s main concern, to which the central part
of the book is devoted: “The Saṁbandha-samuddeśa, Translation and Discussion of
the Ka-rika-s” (pp. 137-324), an annotated translation of the Sambandhasamuddeśa,
followed by an appendix, “Hela- ra- ja’s Commentary ‘Praki- rnÞ apraka- ś a’ on the
Saṁbandha-samuddeśa” (pp. 325-424). The other two major sections of Houben’s
book are “Saṁbandha in some early Indian traditions and in BhartrÞhari’s Philosophy of
Language” (pp. 29-79) and “The Third Ka- nÞ dÞ a and the immediate context of the
Saṁbandha-samuddeśa” (pp. 81-135). These are preceded by an introduction (pp.
1-27); the book ends with a bibliography (pp. 425-48) and three indices: a general
index (pp. 449-53), an index locorum (pp. 453-57), and an index referring to textcritical
observations on the Sambandhasamuddeśa and Hela-ra-ja’s commentary (pp. 457-60).
Houben exhibits an impressively wide-ranging erudition together with considerable
attention to philological detail and to what other scholars have said. This can be
brought home more vividly by noting the contents of this work in greater detail.
In his introduction, Houben takes up BhartrÞhari’s life and time (pp. 3-10) and the
Va-kyapadi-ya and its interpretation (pp. 11-22), then considers research that has been
done on the Sambandhasamuddeśa and the notion of sambandha, “relation” (pp.
23-26). The introduction ends with a brief note on the present work (p. 27).
The first major part of this book is divided into four sections. Most of the second
section concerning early grammarians is devoted to the Maha-bha-sÞ ya discussion on the
first part of the va-rttika siddhe śabda-rthasambandhe lokato ’rthaprayukte śabdaprayoge
śa-strenÞa dharmaniyamhÞ . In the third section, Houben considers views of Mi-ma-ṁsa- (pp.
46-47), VaiśesÞ ika (pp. 48-53), Buddhism (pp. 53-58), and “other schools: Sa-ṁkhya,
Veda-nta” (pp. 58-63) on the notion of “relation.” As Houben notes (p. 46), these
discussions “... are mainly based on presently available secondary literature.”(FN3) The
last section on sambandha in the Va-kyapadi-ya consists of four subsections in which
the following topics are treated: the assumption that there is a beginningless relation
between words and meanings (pp. 64-66), the relation between sounds and signifiers
(pp. 66-75), “the intimate relation between śabda ‘language’, artha ‘reality’ and jña-na
‘knowledge’” (pp. 75-77), and “saṁbandha and the primary unit in language” (pp.
77-79). Part two of Houben’s work is devoted to a description and discussion of the
organization of the Va-kyapadi-ya’s third ka-nÞ dÞa.
The third and largest part of Houben’s book consists of three sections: “General
Remarks” (pp. 139-40), “Analysis of the Saṁbandha-samuddeśa” (pp. 141-44), and
“Translation and Discussion of the ka-rika-s” (pp. 145-324). The translation in turn is
divided into two parts, each further subdivided into two parts, covering respectively
ka-rika-s 1-38, 39-51, 52-59, and 60-88. Houben first gives his translations, then deals
with grammatical and semantic issues concerning terms and syntax, and finally
discusses the import of ka-rika-s—individually and in groups—in the light of what is said
elsewhere in the ka-rika- text, in the available VrÞtti(FN4) on the first and second ka-nÞ dÞ as,
and, even more extensively, in light of what Hela- ra- ja has to say. This leads to
redundancy. In the appendix containing the translation and comments on Hela-ra-ja’s
Praki-rnÞ apraka- śa the transliterated text of the eighty-eight ka- rika- s appears again,
Houben’s translations of these ka-rika-s is repeated with occasional slight variations to
take Hela-ra-ja’s interpretation into account, and there is additional discussion of what
Hela-ra-ja says.
Houben’s book affords an opportunity to consider some major issues concerning
BhartrÞhari, the tradition he represents, and how a modern scholar—from whatever
background that scholar be—might approach BhartrÞhari’s major work. My discussion is
organized as follows. First (section 2), I outline the theoretical principles Houben sets
forth as the basis for his dealing with BhartrÞhari, then (section 3) I consider evidence
from the Va-kyapadi-ya in connection with Houben’s principles, chiefly what he refers to
as BhartrÞhari’s perspectivism. I subsequently take up (section 4) one large issue: the
status of the received high language, associated with a group of model speakers called
śisÞ Þt a,(FN5) who use speech forms characterized as “correct” (sa-dhu) linguistic units
(śabda) opposed to incorrect linguistic units (asa-dhuśabda, apaśabda), that are viewed
as corruptions (apabhraṁá), with respect to how meanings are understood by users.
The principal issue here is: do apaśabdas directly signify meanings for śisÞ Þt as when
they communicate with someone using a vernacular, or do these speakers resort to a
translation technique such that the apaśabda used calls to mind a sa-dhuśabda, which
then directly signifies a meaning? This topic also involves another important question:
how one should consider the VrÞtti and other commentaries in relation to what is said
in the ka-rika- text.(FN6) Following this discussion, I take up (section 5) some points
concerning Houben’s translation.(FN7)
2. As I said at the outset, I think Houben’s book demonstrates considerable
learning. It is to be expected, then, that Houben will have his own particular views to
propound and devote more attention to the views of some scholars than to those of
others. The very breadth of the work and the attention paid to details both in the
translations and in the annotations make it difficult to write a general review or to make
critical remarks without seeming to be a nitpicker. What is more, in connection with a
work such as this, there is the danger of being viewed as a “traditionalist” as opposed
to a more open-minded “modern” scholar. Despite these risks, however, Houben’s book
exhibits qualities—both good and bad—which invite such comments.
2.1 The most important chapter in the introduction is the second, concerning the
Va-kyapadi-ya and its interpretation. Here, Houben expresses his doubts with respect to
generally held opinions concerning how one should understand what BhartrÞ hari
intended to set forth and postulates three principles which, he says (p. 16), “... clarify,
in my view, a great deal of BhartrÞhari’s thought, and particularly of his treatment of the
notion of saṁbandha ‘relation’.”
Houben accepts (p. 18) that “... BharthÞ ari did have some theoretical preferences....”
At the same time, he expends considerable energy arguing against some scholars who
see certain basic ideas maintained and defended in the Va-kyapadi-ya. Thus, he
remarks (p. 15): “According to Peri Sarveswara, the whole of the VP is to be
understood on the basis of the first four ka-rika-s ... But what would happen if we were
to take first other parts of the VP into account and return next to these introductory
ka-rika-s?”(FN8) On the same page, Houben later remarks that in the course of his
study of the Sambandhasamuddeśa he became convinced that “... attempting to
understand BhartrÞhari in the framework of “linguistic monism” would always leave some
important characteristics of the VP unexplained.”
2.2. In the same section of his introduction, Houben postulates the three principles
I alluded to earlier. He states them as follows (p. 16): “(a) different perspectives have
their own validity; (b) there is a truth or reality behind the overwhelming diversity of
words and discourse; (c) there is a permanent relation between linguistic unit and
thing-meant.”
Principle (a) is adopted as guiding the interpretation of BhartrÞhari’s work. Houben
takes a strong stance in saying that BhartrÞhari’s approach to issues of language,
meaning, and reality may be qualified as “perspectivistic,” not simply in that he takes
into consideration views proposed by Mi-ma-ṁsaka, VaiśesÞ ika, and various Buddhistic
thinkers but also (p. 16) that “... the validity of different perspectives is accepted” and
that “... the validity of a single perspective is limited.” In Houben’s opinion, earlier
scholars have failed to appreciate properly BhartrÞhari’s attitude. Thus, in connection
with his first principle, he says (p. 17):
The principle manifests itself first of all in the complex argumentative structure
of BhartrÞhari’s exposition. His awareness of the limits of each single approach
to reality explains why the VP has become to a very great extent a saṁgraha,
an encyclopedia of different existing views on linguistic and philosophical issues.
The importance of this encyclopedic approach has not been fully realized by
many interpreters and critics of BhartrÞ hari. In the case of the
Saṁbandhasamuddeśa we will see that some views which have been widely
considered as the view of BhartrÞhari on the subject, occupy, in fact, a certain
well-defined place in a whole range of different, and within their limits
acceptable, angles of approach. Too often, BhartrÞhari’s statements have been
interpreted in a polemic instead of an encyclopedic framework (this point I hope
to elaborate at other places, e.g., in Houben, forthcoming, e).(FN9)
Houben goes on to modify this by noting (p. 18) that BhartrÞhari did have some
theoretical preferences, although he had a “basically constructive” attitude towards
ideas of other thinkers.(FN10)
Principle (b) is later (p. 19) put in a different manner: “The second principle says
that it may be the case that there is a truth or reality behind the overwhelming diversity
of words and theoretical discourse.”(FN11) Houben notes that this principle prevents
the first one from leading to total skepticism or nihilism. He also remarks, touching
more closely on the central topic of his book, that this principle explains “BhartrÞhari’s
arguing for the acceptance of a relation which by definition cannot be expressed
as-it-is” in that “both the limits of language and a possible underlying reality are taken
into account.”
The third principle is one which Pa-nÞ inian grammarians maintained from the very
beginning. Houben goes on (p. 20) to say that this has as a theoretical implication “...
that thought and knowledge of a thing are always intimately, perhaps even inseparably,
connected with language.”
2.3. In connection with the thesis for which he argues strongly, that BhartrÞhari
presents other positions in a spirit of equality, Houben also considers, in the last
subsection of part 1, an important issue that is the centerpiece of the Va-kyapadi-ya’s
second ka- nÞ dÞ a: whether words (pada) and their meanings (pada- rtha) are to be
considered real (sat) constituents of utterances/sentences (va- kya) and utterance
meanings (va-kya-rtha) or merely assumed units abstracted formally from indivisible

utterances and utterance meanings for the purpose of grammatical description and
discussion. The second ka-nÞ dÞa of the Va-kyapadi-ya is concerned with the various ways
in which a sentence is defined. Concerning this ka-nÞ dÞ a, Houben (pp. 78-79) makes
three observations that are relevant to his study of the Sambandhasamuddeśa. The
second of these is as follows (p. 78):
... in the second Ka-nÞ dÞ a BhartrÞhari discusses numerous views in a positive way,
in accordance with his ‘perspectivism’ and his encyclopedic approach to
theoretical problems. Much positive attention is therefore also paid to views
which accept words as primary units....(FN12) One gets the impression that
BhartrÞhari does not try to establish one view to the exclusion of others, but
wants to show different views in contrast with each other. Throughout the
second Ka-nÞdÞ a he is extremely conscious of the value of different viewpoints.
That BhartrÞhari has still a preference for the sentence as the primary unit is not
always very clear in the second Ka-nÞdÞ a, but it is emphasized in a few strategical
places in the third Ka-nÞ dÞ a. There, BhartrÞhari refers to the process of apoddha-ra
‘abstracting from, analysis’ and to the idea of abstracting linguistic or semantic
units from more comprehensive ones (3.1.1-2, 3.4.1-2, 3.7.164, 3.13.6, 3.14.144,
3.14.169). Among these places, only 3.1.1 refers to the sentence and the word
and smaller linguistic units, in the other [sic] the emphasis is on the sentence
meaning and the word meaning and/or word meaning and smaller semantic
units.
Houben goes on (pp. 78-79) to make his third point: if the sentence is ultimately
considered the primary unit of language, then the Sambandhasamuddeśa asks the
wrong kind of question. The question asked in this samuddeśa is: what sort of relation
holds between words and their meanings? “The entire discussion in the
Saṁbandha-samuddeśa,” Houben argues, “becomes very tentative or hypothetical in
this light,” and he concludes his third point as follows:
The validity of the discussion is limited by the acceptance of theoretical choices
which are not without problems. It may be pointed out, moreover, that in the
second Ka-nÞ dÞ a BhartrÞhari does not discuss just a single view in which the
sentence is primary, but several views. What all views which accept the
sentence as primary have in common is that the status of individual words (and
corresponding word meanings) is strongly relativized.
Houben ends this section (p. 79) emphasizing that, after all, those who upheld the
primacy of constituent words included grammarians, the younger BhartrÞhari among
them:
If it was so important to BhartrÞhari to relativize the status of individual word
meanings, one may wonder: who were the thinkers who did attribute a high
status to these? Interpreters of the VP have identified these with Mi-ma-ṁsakas.
In “Who are BhartrÞhari’s padadarśins?” (Houben 1993) it has been argued that
the ‘upholders of the word’ include also grammarians and to some extent the
author of the MbhD who may have been the young BhartrÞhari.
The tenor of Houben’s inquiry which shows through in these passages appears
elsewhere, also, as when, in the final chapter of his summary of the third ka-nÞdÞ a, he
includes the following among nine observations (p. 132):
(2) In the third Ka-nÞdÞ a, as in the previous ones, there is a tendency to pay
positive attention to quite divergent views, and usually there is no absolute
commitment to one view to the exclusion of others. The approach to the
different problems may be characterized as perspectivistic.
(3) Against the background of this perspectivistic approach, there are still
theoretical preferences. It seems possible to locate the preferences evinced in
the third Ka-nÞ dÞa in the context of the discussions in the second Ka-nÞ dÞa. There,
the main problems were: is the primary unit in language the word or the
sentence? is the individual word meaning primary or the sentence meaning? The
preference evinced there for the primacy of the sentence and sentence meaning
implied that individual word meanings, if at all they are accepted, have no
independent status. The primacy of the sentence is usually no explicit argument
in the discussions in the third Ka- nÞ dÞ a. Only at a few places the reader is
reminded of the idea that, in fact, the sentence and the sentence meaning are
the primary units. Apart from these places, it may be said that in the third Ka-nÞdÞ a
views in which word meanings are not well-defined individual basic units are
generally preferred; there is no strong or absolute commitment to views which
would imply word meanings as well-defined individual basic units.
3. The three principles which Houben sets forth are basic to his treatment of the
materials in the Va-kyapadi-ya, and they are put in a manner that would appear to make
disagreement difficult. It is nevertheless difficult to see how Houben can maintain some
of his claims, at least in the strong versions he formulates, and some of what he says
puzzles me.
3.1. Consider Houben’s reaction to Peri Sarveswara’s appreciation of the
introductory ka-rika-s (above, 2.1). One may choose to ask what would happen if,
instead of starting from the beginning, we studied other parts and came back to the
beginning. It is nevertheless reasonable that an author begin his work by presenting
his general thesis, and it is also reasonable to let this be a background for one’s
understanding of what follows.
3.2. The Va- kyapadi- ya begins with a description of brahman in ka- rika- s 1-4.
BhartrÞhari immediately introduces the theme of multiplicity and unity: though brahman
is memorialized in the Veda as one, so that there is no separation between it and
powers, it appears as though distinct from these powers; and it appears as distinct
things by virtue of its several powers.(FN13) Moreover, the theme of imposition is also
brought in at the beginning, where BhartrÞ hari says(FN14) that the six
modifications—being born and so on(FN15)—which are the sources of differences in
being have their basis in the time-power of brahman, a power on which parts are
imposed.(FN16) BhartrÞhari goes on to speak of the means of reaching this brahman,
namely the Veda. Once more, he immediately strikes the note of unity versus diversity:
although one, the Veda has been memorialized in a form appearing as though it had
many “paths.”(FN17)
Subsequently, BhartrÞhari outlines in three ka-rika-s(FN18) the topics which are to be
covered in his work. Two types of meanings are distinguished: those which have a
fixed nature and those which are obtained through extraction of partial meanings from
putative complexes. Parallel to these are two kinds of linguistic units: those which are
to be explained and those which serve to convey the former. Two kinds of relations
are said to link linguistic units with meanings: a relation such that one is the cause and
the other an effect and a relation such that a linguistic unit has the property of being
naturally apt to make known a meaning. Moreover, such relations can connect
linguistic elements and meanings in ways that can have two results: a relation serves
as means with respect to merit or merely to the comprehension of meaning; the former
holds for correct speech forms, whose use leads to merit, and the latter for incorrect
forms in addition to correct ones. There can be no doubt at all that the VrÞtti is correct
when it says that the total content of the work which has been undertaken is
summarized in these three verses.(FN19) There can also be no doubt whatever that
the Va-kyapadi-ya itself distinguishes between linguistic units that are to be explained
and those which serve as means to explain them in a grammar—Pa- nÞ ini’s
AsÞ Þt a-dhya-yi-—and between meanings that are fixed and those which are abstracted
through analysis. Again, there is the distinction between unity and division, now
resulting from abstraction.
No one has denied that BhartrÞhari brings in many of points of view throughout the
Vakyapadi-ya, but one cannot be faulted for considering it appropriate to appreciate the
-
entire work in the light of the introductory ka-rika-s. In addition, BhartrÞhari makes it clear
that he bases himself on a long tradition of usage and grammar. Thus, in VP 1.26, he
says not only that the eight topics noted earlier are described in grammar both through
indirect indications and direct statements but also that they are now followed according
to tradition, to memorialize them. The Paddhati appropriately stresses that BhartrÞhari
here says he is not doing anything without precedent, only following a tradition in
presenting the eight topics at issue, and that he does all this in accordance with
tradition, so that there is no invention (utpreksÞa- ‘fancy’) for the sake of novelty.(FN20)
BhartrÞhari goes on to say, in accordance with the Maha-bha-sÞ ya,(FN21) that the correct
linguistic units that are a means to merit are established from the tradition that stems
from the śisÞ Þt as. Moreover, no one can render purposeless this settled situation, so that
śisÞ Þt as like Pa-nÞini composed a smrÞti whose object is the correctness of speech.(FN22)
After stressing again that pure reasoning by inference cannot replace what is
established through tradition, BhartrÞhari completes the section in question by saying
that śisÞ Þt as have undertaken grammatical teaching basing themselves on the teaching
that has no author—that is, the Veda—and smrÞti based on it.(FN23)
3.3. Houben’s third principle as formulated is a restatement of what Ka-tya-yana and
later Pa-nÞ ini-yas have maintained. The theoretical implication Houben draws from this,
on the other hand, is not obvious. It is one thing to say that a linguistic item like ghatÞa
bears a permanent relation with a referent, a pot;(FN24) it is another thing to claim that
one cannot have knowledge of such an entity without language, that all or most
“cognitive episodes” are verbal thoughts at some implicit level.(FN25) It is well known
that for BhartrÞhari any cognition of anything in the world is permeated by language.
This stance is compatible with accepting a permanent relation between linguistic items
and what they signify, but it does not necessarily follow as a consequence of this
acceptance.
3.4. I also think some caution is called for in connection with Houben’s first
principle. As he recognizes, scholars before him have stressed BhartrÞhari’s dealing with
views of different schools of thought in a nonpolemical manner. BhartrÞhari does not
organize his work as a series of pu-rvapaksÞ a to be refuted, thus establishing his
siddha-nta. There is no repeated iti cen na, iti siddha-ntahÞ , or iti siddha-ntitam. In this
respect, BhartrÞ hari differs from such scholars as the Pa- nÞ inian grammarians
KaunÞ dÞ abhatÞ tÞ a, and Na- geśa;(FN26) the Mi- ma- ṁ sakas Jaimini and
- -
Vacaspatimiśra;(FN27) Naiyayikas such as JayantabhatÞÞt a and Gaṅgeśa;(FN28) and
many other defenders of tenets maintained in particular schools. This does not mean,
however, that BhartrÞhari should be considered not to have held definite views of his
own and to have argued—even in the Va-kyapadi-ya—against other positions. The
closest parallel to his way of proceeding is, I think, to be found in the work which
serves as BhartrÞhari’s major source of ideas to be developed, the Maha- bha- sÞya.
Patañjali also presents arguments for various points of view—for example, that a verbal
base (dha-tu) can be defined as signifying activity (kriya- ) and being (bha-va)—and
interpretations of given su-tras, without overtly and emphatically presenting a definitive
siddha-nta. Yet his very argumentation leads one to see—though not always—his
accepted view, since certain alternatives involve such a complex of principles and
metarules to be applied that they clearly suffer from what commentators call
pratipattigaurava ‘prolixity in understanding’ and certain others clearly do not harmonize
with what is said elsewhere in the AsÞ Þt a-dhya-yi-, in va-rttikas and in the Bha-sÞ ya.
3.5. Although I agree that the Va-kyapadi-ya text calls for a great deal of study and
that for any single student much may indeed remain unexplained, I also think that
Houben has applied his first principle in a way that fails to pay appropriate attention
to BhartrÞhari’s defense of certain theoretically important positions. Consider in this
context what Houben says about the second ka-nÞ dÞ a (see 2.3).
In this ka-nÞ dÞ a, BhartrÞhari devotes a large section (VP 2.64-87) to arguments in
defense of the word and its meanings as valid. This section ends with a verse saying
that all the principles of interpretation dealt with in what has preceded, principles that
depend on word-meanings, would not serve to interpret sentences correctly if the
individual word did not signify.(FN29) Thereafter begins a section the first verse of
which asserts that there is no contradiction between what has been adduced requiring
that one accept as real the individual words of utterances and the position stated
earlier, that an utterance is an indivisible unit whose meaning also is indivisible. Even
if the utterance meaning is indivisible, it is subject to having partial meanings extracted
due to differences in expressive capacity one sees in different utterances.(FN30) One
example will serve to illustrate. If A says to B (1) vana-t pika a-ni-yata-m ‘a cuckoo should
be brought from the forest’ and B does not know what pika means, the latter inquires
about the meaning of this term alone, not about what the utterance means.(FN31)
Therefore, one may claim, the word pikahÞ is a separate independent constituent in (1),
with its own distinct meaning. The answer to this is given as follows: a sentence such
as (1) is totally distinct from a sentence such as (2) vana-d ÞrksÞ a a-ni-yata-m ‘a bear
should be brought from the forest.’ Nevertheless, people assume a similarity between
the two: they know what the extracted words vana-t, rkÞ sÞ ahÞ and a-ni-yata-m mean and
they assume that (1) and (2) share some parts, so that they inquire about the putative
part they do not know. But this is merely an analytic procedure applied to a unit that
is used as a single indivisible entity in communication. A parallel is drawn between this
and the way in which people perceive entities like a gayal (gavaya) and
Narasiṁha—VisÞ nÞu as “man-lion.” Each of these is an entity sui generis. Accordingly,
each is the object of a single cognition. Nevertheless, one understands in each a part
that is similar to some entity of a different generic class: a cow and a man,
respectively. Hence, one also understands (anupaśyati ‘sees subsequently’) that in
each of these there is a part which, though not there, is supposed to be there, a part
which is not well known as coöccuring with the other and which one has not seen with
the other—namely, a horse and a lion. But a person who reasons this way is said to
be confused, since what he is perceiving is a single indivisible entity in each
case.(FN32)
BhartrÞhari does not just show that the arguments for assuming that words are the
true units of communication can be refuted. He also emphatically argues against this
position elsewhere, saying that, if a sentence meaning is considered not to arise
directly from speech units, then a word meaning too will have to be dissociated from
words, with the consequence that the direct relation between words and
meanings—which a Mi-ma-ṁsaka too assumes to be permanent and not instituted by an
individual—also will be given up.(FN33)
It is generally accepted that BhartrÞhari is arguing here against Mi-ma-ṁsakas. This
is justified not only by the arguments advanced but also by the fact that BhartrÞhari
directly alludes to the Mi-ma-ṁsa- principle of interpretation according to which the direct
expression by an affix that something plays a contributing role in an act takes
precedence over what is understood indirectly through inference based on what must
obtain in order for a stated provision to be effective or through the coöccurrence of
terms in an utterance.(FN34)
It is also noteworthy that Kuma-rila reacts to arguments which appear in the
Vakyapadi-ya. Thus, in connection with sequences like dadhy a- naya ‘bring some
-
curds’(FN35) BhartrÞhari remarks as follows. Padas often lose through sam Þ dhi their
presumed primitive forms. This being so, how can one determine the boundaries
between padas? And how can one then discriminate a meaning for a word whose
boundary has not been grasped?(FN36) In his Ślokava-rttika, Kuma-rila sets forth the
same argument in more detail while presenting the claims of those who maintain that
a sentence alone signifies, as an indivisible unit. One should determine that a meaning
M is associated with a word W through reasoning by anvaya and vyatireka: if W is
present, M is understood and if W is absent, the meaning M is not understood. Thus,
if one has ra-ja- (nom. s.) meaning ‘king’, then in the absence of this word, one should
not understand this meaning. Yet it is understood when one says ra-jña- (inst. s.), ra-ja-
being absent. Similarly, if one associates the meanings ‘curds’ and ‘cow’ with dadhi
and gauhÞ , respectively, then these meanings should not be understood when one says
dadhy atra and ga-m.(FN37) Kuma-rila goes on to answer such objections and to uphold
the view that padas are the true units. Similarly, Kuma-rila reacts to the argument
presented in VP 2.16 (see above, with note 33): even though a sentence meaning
does not directly derive from words, this does not have as a consequence that the
word meanings are not directly related to such speech units. The word meanings can
have no other source and are not conveyed merely for their own sake but with the
intention of conveying a relational sentence meaning, so that, through these word
meanings a sentence meaning is indirectly related to words.(FN38)
On the basis of the evidence, I think it is difficult to maintain that in the second
ka-nÞ dÞ a of the Va-kyapadi-ya BhartrÞhari is granting equality to the view of those who
maintain the principles of interpretation which are based on accepting words as the
true units, namely Mi- ma- ṁsakas, or to deny that he is indeed arguing against
Mi-ma-ṁsakas.
3.6. As noted earlier (§2.3), Houben says that the “upholders of the word”
(padadarśinahÞ ) are not just Mi-ma-ṁsakas but also grammarians. In this context, it is
worth emphasizing something which Houben is aware of but downplays.(FN39) That
grammarians could and did operate with words as constituents of sentences is beyond
doubt. This does not mean, however, that BhartrÞhari’s arguments against padadarśinahÞ
are also aimed at grammarians. The issue actually comes down to something that is
brought out clearly in commentaries.
Let us begin with the ka-rika- in which BhartrÞhari contrasts the adherents of the two
views in question, VP 2.57: abhedapu- rvaka- bheda- hÞ kalpita- va- kyava- dibhihÞ |
bhedapu- rva- n abheda- ṁs tu manyante padadarśinahÞ “Differences preceded by
nondifference are posited by those who maintain that the utterance is the unit of
communication; those who maintain that the word is the unit of communication, on the
other hand, consider nondifference to be preceded by differences.” The previous ka-rika-
sums up two alternatives under the position that there is an indivisible utterance:(FN40)
whether one assumes that there is a permanence of putative composites or of a single
generic unit, those who uphold this position say that a single entity has a single
meaning,(FN41) which never deviates from it.(FN42) The first half of VP 2.57 thus links
with this preceding verse, stating that those who maintain the primacy of a sentence
as a single meaningful unit that is indivisible and has a single indivisible meaning
nevertheless countenance division of such units into constituents, only these different
constituents are fictitiously posited (kalpita-hÞ ) and necessarily based on the true, whole,
units. Those who maintain the opposed view say that the “wholes” are composite and
are based on their constituent units. Under this view, it is appropriate that only words
are based on the status of being real and sentences that are said to be single units
are “fictitiously” posited. PunÞyara-ja emphasizes this contrast.(FN43)
BhartrÞhari goes on in subsequent verses to treat the related issue of whether one
should consider the continuously recited Vedic texts (saṁhita-pa-Þt ha) as the source of
the analyzed texts (padapa-Þt ha) or vice-versa.(FN44) The VrÞtti on VP 2.58 notes some
views which merit mention here. First, an absolute opposition is made such that either
the saṁhita- or the pada is permanent. According to some, the padas are products of
padaka-ras (lit., ‘makers of words’) or identical with words known from the oral tradition
handed down; for others, it is the saṁhita- which is a product of a human tradition and
the padas are eternal. Still others hold that both are equally eternal, but in different
ways: the pada text is handed down as an eternal entity which serves to convey
something else and the saṁhita- text is handed down as an eternal entity that is
thereby conveyed. Finally, some maintain that there is only one eternal tradition
handed down, and that these are simply two aspects (śakti- ‘powers’), of being divided
and undivided, which play the roles of being what conveys and what is to be
conveyed.(FN45)
3.7. With this, it is appropriate to come back to what is said in the VrÞtti on VP
1.2-26 (see §3.2), since, as Hela-ra-ja rightly points out, the second ka-nÞdÞ a is where
BhartrÞhari reaches conclusions concerning the sentence as an object of explanation
and its meaning as a fixed meaning.(FN46)
The VrÞtti explains in detail what is meant by apoddha-rapada-rtha (‘meaning gotten
through extraction’), sthitalaksÞ anÞ o ‘rthahÞ (‘meaning whose character is fixed’), and
anva- khyeyahÞ ś abdahÞ (‘linguistic unit that is to be explained’). An
apoddha-rapada-rtha—the meaning, e.g., of a case marker in a noun or a tense marker
in a verb—has the following properties. It is absolutely fused in a single whole
meaning, so that it is extracted from a putative complex in a guise that is gotten by
inference and assumed, and only in this guise does its distinction from other abstracted
part meanings become relevant. Such a partial meaning discriminated from other partial
meanings has a form that is beyond normal communication.(FN47) Not merely is such
a form outside the realm of actual communication, it is established generally in a way
that the VrÞtti speaks of as a fancy, thus emphasizing that it is an invented entity. In
accordance with what they have understood, grammarians establish such partial
meanings, which they reach through repeated exposure to them from their
traditions.(FN48) Thus, under the assumption that different utterances contain the same
component because of similarity in form, grammarians abstract component elements
assumed to occur in what is actually an impartite linguistic unit and they do this for the
purpose of carrying out grammatical operations which account for such whole units.
The partial meaning that goes beyond normal communication is then adopted as what
is signified by these component linguistic items abstracted through reasoning by
anvaya and vyatireka.(FN49) Clearly, this abstracted meaning (so ’yam
apoddha-rapada-rthahÞ ) enters into grammatical talk, as when a grammarian like Pa-nÞini
derives complex units from posited components. The VrÞtti remarks that it also takes
part in everyday talk involving parts, which is similar to that of a grammar.(FN50) That
is, in everyday speech also speakers act as though sentences like those cited in §3.5
spoke of a distinct object, agent, and so on, separable from actions.
VrÞsÞ abha notes appropriately that the VrÞttika-ra says atyantasaṁsrÞsÞ Þt ahÞ , with ayanta-
‘absolutely’, in order to exclude a whole preceded by parts which are combined.(FN51)
In addition, since the whole meaning from which parts are extracted is a single whole
without actual parts, the form in which such a part meaning is abstracted is said to be
assumed, something to be inferred. That is, to begin with there are no real parts
associated with distinct meanings, so that reasoning through anvaya and vyatireka that
such and such a partial meaning is associated with a particular part of a larger unit
is an assumption, not a given fact.(FN52) Further, in normal interaction, as when some
one acts upon being told to do something or refrains from doing something, such
communication takes place through whole utterance meanings, not discrete part
meanings.(FN53)
The VrÞtti also says, with respect to the linguistic units characterized as those to be
explained, that for some the explanation has the word as its boundary, for others the
sentence.(FN54) That is, some grammarians derive words like purusÞ a-s (‘the man’) and
pac-a-ti (‘cooks’) individually, as though they could stand alone, and others consider
the derivational procedure immediately to involve words as related to each other in
sentences.(FN55) Now, saying a unit is to be explained amounts to saying its meaning
has a fixed character. In fact, the VrÞtti later says that in grammar the meaning of either
a pada or a sentence is considered to be fixed.(FN56) On the other hand, the VrÞtti
also emphasizes that a meaning is fixed only relative to a sentence. Meaning divisions
within padas vary. They are not necessarily linked to units with fixed boundaries, since
they are abstracted in various ways by different grammarians, who divide padas
differently.(FN57)
That is, so far as actual communication is concerned, the utterance or sentence
-
(vakya) is viewed as the unit of communication and the unit of meaning is a single,
indivisible utterance meaning. Utterances are broken up into words and words into
smaller units for the sake of grammatical description, and such sub-sentential units are
associated with meanings abstracted from utterances, but only in a grammar (śa-stre)
can one legitimately consider a word an upper boundary of description or a word
meaning a fixed meaning, just as only grammarians deal with items like bases and
affixes.
3.8. The Va-kyapadi-ya ka-rika-s make the very same points. Thus, after listing eight
different views concerning what constitutes a sentence and a sentence meaning, as
well as considering definitions of sentences proposed by Ka-tya-yana and in Mi-ma-m Þ sa-,
-
the second kanÞdÞ a starts by emphasizing the unity of the sentence and its meaning.
BhartrÞhari invokes as parallels the cognition of a variegated picture and the picture
itself. As there is a single cognition which takes the entire picture into its purview, and
this is then divided in imitation of the different things seen, there is the understanding
of a sentence meaning in the same manner: there is one understanding, which is then
artificially divided. There is a picture, which has a single overall form, but one
describes it by means of colors blue and so on, which are distinct in character and
represented as such. In the very same manner, a single sentence, which semantically
is totally independent, is accompanied by an explanation by means of other words,
which are semantically dependent.(FN58) Further, the extraction of words in a sentence
is possible in the same manner that bases, affixes, and so on are divided from each
other in a word.(FN59) Similarly, at the beginning of the third ka-nÞ dÞa BhartrÞhari says
that words are divided into two, four, or five classes by different thinkers and that such
a division is made only on the basis of abstracting from sentences, just as one extracts
bases, affixes, and so on from words. He also notes different positions concerning
individual and generic property when one abstracts word meanings.(FN60)
Of course, verses 24-26 are not the absolute beginning of the first ka-nÞ dÞa. However,
they constitute a summary of the general topics to be covered. Consequently, it is
appropriate to say that BhartrÞhari introduces the first ka-nÞdÞ a with a statement of topics
he will take up and each of the next ka-nÞdÞ as with a statement of his general thesis:
that the unit of actual communication is the sentence, associated with a sentence
meaning, that words and word meanings are abstracted from such sentences through
the same reasoning grammarians use to abstract bases, affixes, and so on from
words.
3.9. In sum, I consider that the evidence from the Va-kyapadi-ya(FN61) supports the
position that BhartrÞhari does indeed have a well-conceived theoretical stance, which he
upholds, and that he does indeed argue against scholars, such as Mi-ma-ṁsakas, who
do not accept the primacy of the sentence and of sentence meaning. That BhartrÞhari
also discusses many different views and variations on them should not obscure this
point. Nor should one expect him constantly to remind his audience of this central
thesis. It is sufficient that this is established firmly and that a diametrically opposed
view is refuted in the second ka-nÞ dÞ a, the subject of which is the sentence and its
meaning. It is also sufficient to begin the third ka-nÞ dÞa with a statement which again
emphasizes that classes of meanings and the particular sets of words with which they
are associated are abstracted from sentences and their meanings. The remainder of
the third ka-nÞ dÞ a is devoted to discussing such individual categories as well as the ways
in which complex terms—compounds and derivates with taddhita affixes—are viewed.
Finally on this topic, we have to confront the third point Houben makes in his
discussion of sambandha and the primary unit of language (see §2.3), namely that if
the sentence is ultimately considered the primary unit of language, then the
Sambandhasamuddeśa asks the wrong kind of question. I consider that the material
considered above is sufficient to show that it is Houben who has missed the point.
BhartrÞhari can maintain that the sentence is the real unit of actual communication and
still accept that through analysis one can and should abstract words and word
meanings. This is necessary in order to carry out a grammatical description. Further,
in everyday life people also accept words and word meanings, though here too these
are to be considered abstracted from sentences and sentence meanings. In addition,
there are scholars who accept the word and its meanings as the true units of
communication. Accordingly, it is appropriate that, once he has established the primacy
of the indivisible sentence, BhartrÞhari proceeds to discuss classes of words and their
meanings. Moreover, it is appropriate to begin with a discussion of generic property
and individual as word meanings, since, as Hela-ra-ja points out, different scholars
maintain that one or the other is the meaning of all abstracted words.(FN62) This
includes finite verb forms, since, under the points of view BhartrÞhari takes up, these
too can signify a generic property that characterizes all instances of a given action and
an individual instance of action (kriya-) can also be viewed as a being (satta-).(FN63)
Given all this, it is proper to take up in the third samuddeśa the possible views
concerning a relation between words and word meanings.
4. In VP 1.25 (see §3.2, with note 18), BhartrÞhari speaks of correct and incorrect
linguistic units in connection with merit and the comprehension of meaning. This point
is linked with a series of issues, which were objects of discussion starting at least with
Patañjali, concerning terms like (3) go (nom. sg. gauhÞ) considered correct linguistic
units (sa-dhuśabda) and related terms like (4) ga-vi-, gonÞ -i , gota-, gopotalika-, considered
incorrect linguistic units (asa-dhuśabda, apaśabda), both used in the same meaning
(‘cow’). The following issues are treated:
A. Are the types (3) and (4) equally old or is one to be considered derived from
the other?
B. If one is derived from the other, does type (3) derive from type (4) or (4) from
(3)?
C. At the time that both types (3) and (4) are in use, does everyone understand the
meaning in question when either (3) or (4) is used?
D. Is there a direct word-meaning relation between (3) and the meaning and also
between (4) and the same meaning or is only one directly related, the other indirectly
related, and for what reasons?
It is agreed that both types of terms convey given meanings. On other points, there
are disagreements. The discussions concerning terms of types (3) and (4) can be
summarized as follows.(FN64)
1. If both (3) and (4) are inheritances from time immemorial, they both simply signify
the meanings in question.
2. On the assumption that terms of type (4) are corruptions (apabhraṁśa) of (3), a
conclusion compatible with this is that for those persons who know both types and are
members of an élite stratum, the śisÞ Þt as:
2a. Terms of type (3) directly signify meanings.
2b. Terms of type (4) indirectly signify meanings, through the intermediary of type
(3).(FN65)
3. The fact remains that there are persons who normally communicate with terms
of type (4). Accordingly, under 2, one has to assume further that the corruption which
gave rise to (4) led to institutionalized terms that directly signify meanings at least for
such speakers. Nevertheless, there are still two possibilities open:
3a. Type (4) now simply is part of usage and directly signifies, even for śisÞ Þt as.
3b. Though institutionalized, type (4) is, by virtue of its origin, still considered to
signify only erroneously.
4. These options are of import for considering whether or not both types of items
bear śakti, which in turn has to do with what one defines as sa-dhu.
4a. If both types (3) and (4) bear śakti, and being sa-dhu consists by definition in
bearing śakti, then the distinction between sa-dhuśabda and apaśabda is eliminated.
This is something neither grammarians nor others find desirable.
4b. Under 3b, it is possible not only to maintain that being sa-dhu consists by
definition in bearing śakti but also still to maintain the distinction in question, since
items of type (4) do not truly bear śakti because they still are considered to signify
through error.
5. While maintaining 3a, the distinction between types (3) and (4) can still be
maintained, if being sa-dhu (sa-dhutva) is defined in a different manner:
5a. Sa-dhutva is a property of that which can be explained according to the
procedures of an authoritative grammar like Pa-nÞini’s.
5b. Sa-dhutva is a property of that which is appropriate to the production of merit;
that is, the use of a sa-dhu term entails merit which the use of an equivalent apaśabda
does not.
4.1. Patañjali brings in (3) and (4) several times during discussions in the Paspaśa-.
Thus, he notes that teaching correct linguistic units is briefer than teaching incorrect
ones, since for each correct linguistic unit there are many incorrect ones. (3) and (4)
are cited as examples of this situation.(FN66) Now, in Paspaśa- vt. 6, Ka-tya-yana
remarks that if there is merit in the knowledge of correct linguistic units there is also
demerit (jña-ne dharma iti cet tatha-dharmahÞ ). Commenting on this, Patañjali makes two
points. First, demerit obtains for one who knows correct linguistic units because such
a person also knows incorrect ones. That is, even śisÞ Þt as, who use sa-dhu terms, are
presumed at least to know apaśabda terms for everyday interaction. Further, because
there are many incorrect terms for each correct one, greater demerit obtains.(FN67)
Patañjali also makes the well-known and important observation concerning such terms:
given that there is the same comprehension of a meaning through a correct linguistic
unit and an incorrect one, the grammar serves to establish a restriction intended for
merit: the meaning in question should be expressed by means of a correct term, not
an incorrect one.(FN68)
It is noteworthy that Patañjali not only contrasts correct and incorrect linguistic units
using the respective terms śabda and apaśabda but that when speaking of one single
item like go as opposed to the group of items (4), he characterizes the latter as
apabhraṁśa with respect to the former. That is, these are not merely treated as
incorrect speech elements contrasted with correct ones, they are also considered
somehow to be corruptions with respect to the correct speech items. Patañjali thus
takes a stand on the questions A and B. Since items of the type ga-vi-(FN69) are
considered to be corruptions, it follows that only the correct linguistic units are to be
considered eternal, so that only these bear an eternal relation with meanings.(FN70)
In addition, both Patañjali and Ka-tya-yana indicate—though not directly in connection
with the issue of śabda versus apaśabda—how one might consider at least some
apaśabdas to have arisen. In Śivasu-tra vt. 1, Ka-tya-yana gives several reasons why Þl
must be taught in Pa-nÞini’s aksÞ arasama-mna-ya despite its restricted occurrence. One of
these is to account for the citation of terms that result from incapacity. To illustrate,
Patañjali gives the example Þl taka. Someone is named Þrtaka, so that this term is to be
used when referring to him. Say some bra-hÞmanÞa woman has used Þl taka instead and
has done this out of incapacity, because she is unable to pronounce rÞ. This is an
error, so that Þl taka as pronounced by the woman is a corruption of rÞtaka. On the other
hand, if someone else says, “the bra-hmanÞa woman says Þl taka,” that person is quoting,
so that he is not himself using an incorrect form.(FN71)
Further, since Patañjali states explicitly and Ka-tya-yana implicitly assumes that one
who knows correct speech terms also knows their incorrect counterparts, question C
is answered at least in part: at the time that both types of terms were in use, the
śisÞ Þt as who used sa-dhuśabdas also could use and understand apaśabdas.
The last question noted (D) is not dealt with in the Maha-bha-sÞ ya, but all the issues
are considered elsewhere.
4.2. Let us begin with Mi-ma-ṁsakas and Naiya-yikas.
4.2.1. As a pu-rvapaksÞ a, Jaimini states that there cannot be any settled division with
respect to linguistic items such that only items of the type (3) go or of the type (4)
ga-vi-, gonÞ -i , gota- , gopotalika- , etc., should be used, because there is no teaching
concerning the situation where such usage would arise.(FN72) That is, there is no
teaching—such as Pa-nÞ ini’s grammar—whose authority is accepted in this sphere,
whereby one could decide the issue. Śabara’s arguments are as follows. The question
at issue is: are (3) and (4) equally means of knowledge with respect to the object
possessed of a dewlap and so on? In other words, should one consider go to signify
the object in question as the single term with unbroken tradition of usage and then
consider the other terms (4) corruptions, or are all the terms to be considered equally
without beginning?(FN73)
The immediate answer is that all should be considered to signify the object in
question without beginning. The reason given is that the meaning in question is
understood from (4) and that there was similarly a relation between them and this
meaning a hundred years ago, earlier than that, and earlier still, so that (4) and their
relation with this meaning has no beginning. Moreover, it has already been established
that there is no creator of a relation between words and their meanings, this being a
fixed eternal relation.(FN74) Consequently, both (3) and (4) are to be considered sa-dhu
in the sense that they bring about (sa- dhayanti) the comprehension of the same
meaning and both may be used in speaking. (3) and (4) thus have the status of
synonyms, much like hasta, kara, pa-nÞ i ‘hand’.(FN75) Such terms are uttered for a
direct purpose—to convey a particular meaning—not for some as yet unseen result
that is to be brought about, and there is no teaching that instructs one to pronounce
them for such a purpose. Therefore, it cannot be established that one term is sa-dhu
and the others are asa-dhu.(FN76)
4.2.2. Jaimini and Śabara refute the pu-rvapaksÞ a and establish a siddha-nta on the
basis of several arguments. A liguistic item can be such that an error has a part in it,
since it is produced through articulatory effort.(FN77) It is thus possible to discriminate
between (3) and (4) by considering the latter to result from errors in attempting to
produce (3). A person may intend to jump on to dry land yet fall in the mud, to touch
water once or once to spit out water with which he has rinsed his mouth, yet
accidentally do this twice. In the same way, (4) can have come into use due to error
and need not be part of an unbroken tradition of usage.(FN78)
It is also contrary to principle that, unless otherwise definitively established, one
assume more than one term for a single meaning.(FN79) Moreover, the choice is not
arbitrary, since there is an authority concerning such usage that allows one to make
a decision: the special authority of the learned.(FN80) A particular term that such
authoritative persons teach alone as correct should be understood to be correct.(FN81)
Further, people understand the meaning in question from (4) due to the similarity of
these terms to (3), so that (4) do not have the capacity that (3) has to signify the
same object in question.(FN82) Apabhraṁśa terms like (4) play a role in the
understanding of a meaning by bringing to light the capacity which properly belongs to
their origins alone.(FN83) Śabara describes what is at play as follows. Due to
incapacity, someone pronounces ga-vi- when he wishes to pronounce a form of the term
go, such as gauhÞ . Someone else understands that this person means to refer to an
animal with a dewlap and so on, and that to this end he wants to pronounce gauhÞ but
instead pronounces ga-vi-. Thus learning from this situation, others also say ga-vi- when
what they wish to refer to is the same animal. Thereby, this animal is understood from
ga-vi-, etc. For ga-vi- and so on are similar to go.(FN84) Finally, Jaimini likens this to the
situation where someone uses a form with a certain ending that is not appropriate, yet
one understands what that person intends to say, thus recalling the form with the
appropriate ending.(FN85) For example, someone might say aśmakair a-gaccha-mi “I am
coming from Aśmaka,” using an instrumental instead of an ablative form. The
instrumental form aśmakaihÞ is heard. However, in accordance with what is intended,
the appropriate form aśmakebhyahÞ is recalled, and from this the meaning “from
Aśmaka” is understood. Similarly, when one hears ga- vi- and so on, one has a
recollection of go, and from this one understands the animal with a dewlap, and so
on.(FN86)
4.2.3. The situation where a hearer interprets an incorrect form in the way noted
can thus be treated as the first step in establishing for later generations that items of
type (4) directly signify, without an intermediate step of recalling an equivalent of type
(3). Such usage is then traced back to accidents in conversations where one speaker
makes a mistake, another knows what that person intends to say, concludes that he
meant to use a particular term and himself understands the intended meaning from
that term. Still other persons assume that the form which was accidentally used
actually directly signifies the meaning in question. This scenario is envisaged by others
also.
Commenting on Prabha-kara’s BrÞhati- to JS 1.3.8.29,(FN87) Śa-lika-na-tha says that
what Prabha-kara intends to convey is the following. A person A, wishing to utter the
word go, utters ga-vi- instead, due to a fault in his articulating speech organs or to not
being mindful or a similar reason. Through context, the adult B with whom A is talking
understands what A intends to say, so that he understands the object signified by go
and continues his conversation with A. The conversation is witnessed by two other
people, who have not acquired the understanding that go is related as signifier to the
object in question. These two mistakenly determine that B had directly understood this
meaning from ga-vi- and not through the intermediary of go. They therefore mistakenly
conclude that ga-vi- is itself a signifier, and in this conviction they continue to use this
term in their conversations with others. Following their usage, other children then
converse using ga-vi-, since they had not acquired the knowledge associating any other
word with the object in question. In this way, the use of ga-vi- is established as having
a particular beginning.(FN88)
4.2.4. Similar considerations are found later also, as in the Tattvacinta-manÞ i, where
Gaṅgeśa argues against assuming that apabhraṁśa terms as much as saṁskrÞta terms
directly signify. Having concluded that only a saṁskrÞta term bears the signifying
relation (śakti), which is secondarily transferred to apabhraṁśa terms, Gaṅgeśa has an
opponent object: how can mlecchas and others of their kind, who do not know
saṁskrÞta terms, impose the śakti of such terms on other terms? This is answered by
recounting how one considers the erroneous attribution of śakti to apabhraṁśa terms
in times long past.(FN89) Due to neglect, some person A, instead of using go as he
should, uses ga-vi-. A does this while conversing with B, who already has learned
(vyutpannahÞ ) the signifying relation between go and a cow. B understands what A
intends, so that he concludes that the latter meant to use go, and he understands the
meaning ‘cow’ from this correct term, thus carrying out his conversation with A. There
is also a bystander, a child who wants to learn (vyutpitsuhÞ ) the relation between the
word and the meaning in question. He considers that B has understood ‘cow’ from ga-vi-
alone, so that he acquires the understanding of ga-vi- as bearing the signifying relation
with a cow (gośaktatvena). Moreover, this individual then serves as a model for others
to learn that ga-vi- is so related to a cow. In this way, it is established erroneously that
apabhraṁśas have direct signifying relations with meanings.(FN90)
4.3. It is thus admitted that at some stage apabhraṁśa terms also directly signify
meanings. Now, even if one insists that the signifying relation that holds between terms
of type (4) ga-vi-, etc., is ultimately due to an error, the fact remains that this relation
does hold. At the stage where ga-vi- and such do signify, persons who use such terms
and do not know their saṁskrÞ ta equivalents—indeed do not know Sanskrit at
all—cannot be said to understand a meaning through recollecting a saṁskrÞta term.
Moreover, at this stage there can no longer be any question of error. Later Pa-nÞini-yas
set out such arguments in opposition to Naiya-yikas and Mi-ma-ṁsakas.
4.3.1. KaunÞdÞ abhatÞÞta presents the following arguments.(FN91) Under the assumption
that śakti consists in a term’s bringing a meaning to mind (bodhakatvam),(FN92) it is
possible to say that vernacular terms like ga-vi- also have śakti, because these too
convey meanings. Since there is thus no difference between items of types (3) and (4)
in that both have this property, the latter also can be considered to be sa-dhu, contrary
to the accepted view.(FN93)
The answer Naiya-yika-s and others have to this objection is given in the ka-rika-
asadhur anuma-nena va-cakahÞ kaiścid isÞ yate.... “Some consider it appropriate that an
-
asa-dhu term convey(FN94) a meaning by calling to mind(FN95) a sa-dhu term.”(FN96)
In addition, four ka-rika-s from the Va-kyapadi-ya are cited in support of this position.
According to these verses, an apabhraṁśa item that is used where a sa-dhu term is
to be used serves as a means whereby a given meaning is expressed, but not directly:
it is separated from the apabhraṁśa term by the sa-dhu term. Apabhraṁśa terms thus
are causes for the understanding of meanings to arise through the intermediary of
recalling sa-dhu terms; they bring the meaning of a correct term to one’s understanding
by apparently identifying with it.(FN97) An analogy is drawn with how adults
understand a baby. A child learning to say amba amba ‘mommy, mommy’(FN98)
makes a mistake in speaking and might say something indistinct, like
bambamba.(FN99) Those who know the proper linguistic units, however, determine the
meaning meant once the distinct form has been recalled. Apabhraṁśa terms,
moreover, are not accepted, in teaching that continues tradition,(FN100) by
authoritative persons who serve as models, in the way that synonyms are
accepted.(FN101)
Of course, actual usage is the main source for concluding that a given term has the
capacity to signify a certain meaning and this is the same for both types of terms.
KaunÞ dÞ abhatÞ tÞ a therefore goes on to summarize reasons for considering that
apabhraṁśa terms do not directly signify meanings, as follows. First, if terms of both
types (3) and (4) were considered directly to signify, one would have to conclude that
all of them possess the capacity to signify, which involves prolixity. Moreover, they
cannot be considered synonyms in the same way that sa-dhu terms with the same
meaning are said to be synonymous. The latter occur as synonyms in all speech
areas, but terms like ga-vi-, gonÞ -i , and so on are restricted in their distribution, each used
in a different area. Accordingly, Naiya-yikas and Mi-ma-ṁsakas conclude that being a
sa-dhu item consists in having the capacity directly to signify.(FN102)
KaunÞ dÞ abhatÞÞta then notes that in the second half of the verse cited above—that is,
va-cakatva- viśesÞ e va- niyamahÞ punÞ yapa- payohÞ —BhatÞ tÞ oji states his own view. The
following is said to be the intention of this passage. If apabhraṁśa terms did not have
the capacity to signify, there would not be any verbal cognition from them at all. Nor
does such a cognition arise from recollecting the associated sa- dhu term, since
speakers of a lower stratum, pa-maras, who do not know sa-dhu terms, also understand
meanings from apabhraṁśa terms and not from sa- dhu terms. Moreover, such
understanding does not arise due to erroneous assignment of signifying capacity, since
no factor enters into play that would cancel what could be the false assumption that
apabhraṁśa terms convey meaning, so that the knowledge that such terms directly
convey meanings is not falsely acquired and the knowledge that arises from hearing
the terms also is not an error.(FN103) To buttress this position with what is said by
earlier authority, two more ka-rika-s from the Va-kyapadi-ya are invoked. As interpreted
by KaunÞdÞ abhatÞÞta and his commentators, the first verse says the following. Apabhraṁśa
terms acquired the status of being established as everyday usage due to a continuous
tradition of speaking among faulty speakers.(FN104) Among such speakers, a sa-dhu
term does not signify.(FN105)
Of course, this means that being sa-dhu cannot be considered equivalent to being
a meaning signifier. Hence, being sa-dhu is said to consist in lending itself to the
production of merit, and being asa-dhu is said to consist in lending itself to the
production of demerit. The last part of ka-rika- 38 of the Vaiya-karanÞ asiddha-ntaka-rika-
thus states that a restriction is provided by the grammar with respect to merit and
demerit.(FN106)
4.3.2. Na-geśa too argues strongly that śakti resides not only in sa-dhu terms but
also in apabhraṁśa terms, because verbal exchange, which is the main source for
learning the relation between speech units and meanings, is the same for both.(FN107)
That is, whether a form like gauhÞ or ga-vi- is used, one learns from usage that each
is related as signifier to a cow.
In addition, Na-geśa also argues against those who maintain that a meaning is
understood from an apabhraṁś a term through recollecting a related sa- dhu
term,(FN108) and he too has his opponents cite VP 1.177ab and 179 (see note 101)
in support of this position.(FN109) Anuma-nena in VP 1.177ab signifies a type of
knowledge, namely remembering, so that the verse speaks of a recollection whose
objects are sa-dhu terms. Those who know sa-dhu terms have such a knowledge of
these from an apabhraṁśa because the latter can recall the former due to its similarity
with it, since it has such a sa-dhu term as its source.
The first arguments advanced against this view concern people who know both
sa-dhu and apabhraṁśa usage. To begin with, such people are known to understand
what apabhraṁśa terms signify even without recalling corresponding sa-dhu terms.
There are also some who may not know particular sa-dhu terms for certain meanings.
Yet they still understand what is meant by the apabhraṁśa terms. The position being
maintained would entail the unjustifiable consequence that those who do not know
sa-dhu terms signifying given meanings could have no understanding of those meanings
from the apabhraṁśa terms.(FN110) One could, to be sure, say that upon hearing an
apabhraṁśa term for which they do not know a sa-dhu equivalent, such persons would
assume that there must be some such term, so that they too understand a meaning
only indirectly through such recollection.(FN111) This is not acceptable. The
recollection of a sa-dhu term from an apabhraṁśa cannot be considered truly to bring
a meaning to mind. For a verbal cognition to take place appropriately, one must
perceive directly a signifying element characterized by a particular sequence of sounds
that defines the item in question as signifier of a given meaning. This is not true of
anything remembered, which is not perceived as actually uttered at the
moment.(FN112) Nor does one have a recollection so vague that the entity signified
by the apabhraṁśa item in question could be considered as referred to by a
pronoun.(FN113) For example, if someone says gagari-m a-naya “bring a pot,” one does
not understand the meaning of gagari-m(FN114) by recollecting ta-m (‘it’ [fem. acc.]).
Finally, and most generally, it is known that only an actually uttered term has the
property of producing a verbal knowledge, so that it is not possible for such a
knowledge to arise from a recalled sa-dhu term that is not actually uttered.(FN115)
Na-geśa next takes up arguments which invoke error in connection with persons who
know only apabhraṁśa usage. The claim is advanced that pa-maras use a word like
gagari- instead of the sa-dhu word ghatÞa ‘pot’ and understand this meaning from it.
However, this results from a continuous error. Thus, one accounts for an erroneous
attribution of śakti to gagari-, although one does not learn a true śakti for this term. At
some time, someone mistakenly used gagari- instead of ghatÞa, and this error continued
up to the present. This is unacceptable. Mistaking one term for another requires some
similarity. The śakti that is said to reside in a term like ghatÞa is learned not only with
respect to an object qualified by the generic property of being a pot but also
associated with a distinct sequence of sounds. One can see no property common to
gagari- and ghatÞa, so that claiming an error that continues to the present cannot be
justified.(FN116)
This problem is circumvented in the manner outlined earlier (§§4.2.1-4). As before,
moreover, here too the Va-kyapadi-ya (1.177ab) is invoked.(FN117) This too is refuted
on the grounds that it is not possible to decide on the basis of given terms that certain
ones are apabhraṁśas relative to particular saṁskrÞta terms simply on the basis of
what each signifies. Nor is it appropriate to say that those are saṁskrÞta terms which
śisÞ Þt as acknowledge to occur universally, as opposed to apabhraṁśas, which have
restricted dialect distribution, since it is accepted that śisÞ Þt a usage also has dialect
distribution: śavati is used as a verb meaning ‘go’ in the Kamboja country but in the
-
Arya country only the derivate śava- ‘corpse’ is used. Accordingly, apabhraṁśas have
śakti.(FN118)
What is more, Na-geśa finally notes, it is because of this that one sees that when
women, śu-dras, and children have a doubt concerning the meaning of a sa-dhu term
used, they determine what is meant through the apabhraṁśa.(FN119)
Further, Na-geśa conceives of the property of being sa-dhu (sa-dhutva) in the same
way as KaunÞ dÞ abhatÞÞt a (§4.3.1): this is a particular generic property, revealed by
grammar, that resides in a speech unit qualified by a particular meaning and defines
such a unit’s having the capacity to produce merit.(FN120) The Paramalaghumañju-sÞ a-
also considers that sa-dhutva can consist simply in being what is to be explained by
Pa-nÞ ini’s grammar.(FN121)
4.4. As has been shown, the Va-kyapadi-ya is invoked in the course of arguments
supporting two positions: that apaśabdas/apabhraṁśas signify only indirectly, through
the intermediary of recollected sa-dhuśabdas, and that both equally signify. Let us now
consider more closely VP 1.175-83 and 27 together with the VrÞtti.
4.4.1. The first two of these ka-rika-s state what authorities consider appropriate
(icchanti ‘desire, wish’) to call an apabhraṁśa: a linguistic unit, such as gonÞ -i , that is
devoid of the purification endowed by proper grammatical formation, uttered when one
wishes to use, for example, gauhÞ . Authorities consider such an item an apabhraṁśa
under particular circumstances: when it is linked to a particular meaning. Terms like
asva and gonÞ -i are treated as apabhraṁśas if they are used in particular meaning: asva
‘horse’ instead of aśva, and gonÞi- ‘cow’ instead of go. Such items are sa-dhu terms,
however, when used in another sphere, that is, in other meanings. In all such cases,
being sa- dhu is determined by a difference in the meaning that conditions
usage.(FN122) For example, gonÞ -i used with reference to a receptacle that holds a
certain amount of grain, etc., and asva referring to someone who does not have
money (a-sva) are sa-dhu.(FN123) In addition, gonÞ -i and asva can be sa-dhu terms used
also with reference to a cow and a horse, for a reason other than what usually
determines the use of these terms for such animals: a cow is likened to a gonÞ -i
because it has a lot of milk, so that it shares a property—holding a large amount—with
the receptacle called gonÞ -i , and a horse is spoken of as lacking money.(FN124)
VP 1.175 speaks of terms considered to be apabhraṁśa. Moreover, a term like ga-vi-
is an apabhraṁśa in that it is used when a speaker intends to say gauhÞ . That is, this
is viewed as a corruption, and the VrÞtti remarks that apabhraṁśas like ga-vi- are used
due to a speaker’s incapacity, inattention, or similar cause. Further, these corruptions
have sources, namely the sa-dhuśabdas which a speaker intends to use in the first
place. The VrÞtti on VP 1.175 not only notes this but also cites the author of the
Saṅgraha, who says that any apabhraṁśa has a correct linguistic unit as a source.
Moreover, ultimately, there is no independent apabhraṁśa lacking such a source
(aprakrÞtihÞ ): every apabhraṁśa has a sa- dhu term for its source. It is, of course,
undeniable that not every use of apabhraṁśa terms is due to error, since some
speakers simply use ga-vi- and so on as normal everyday terms. This is explained as
a generalization. Due to their becoming well known, some apabhraṁśas achieve the
status of being normal everyday terms and thereby gain independence.(FN125)
4.4.2. Once apaśabdas like ga-vi- are considered ultimately to be corruptions of
sa-dhu terms, with which they coexist in a setting where speakers of the accepted norm
must interact with others who use apaśabdas normally, two views immediately are
possible. First, one may refuse to grant status to apabhraṁśas, so that for śisÞ Þt as a
translation situation obtains: they interact with those who use apabhraṁśas normally
but they understand in terms of their own usage—something akin to a “pidgin.”
Alternatively, they may accept a true diglossic status, using the accepted norm among
themselves and interacting with others in their own vernacular. Of course, this is a
question of degree, and if the speakers of the vernacular do not also control the model
speech at least to some extent the śisÞ Þt as themselves actually must interact in the
vernacular.
VP 1.177 operates with the model in which apabhraṁśas signify indirectly. They
serve to make meanings understood, but only by bringing to mind sa-dhu terms, with
which they are seemingly identified; only in this manner do they serve to bring to light
the meanings of such terms.(FN126) The VrÞtti brings out how this indirect signification
takes place by invoking the parallel of gestures like constricting one’s eyes.(FN127)
Apabhraṁśas used in the sphere of sa-dhu terms make a meaning understood through
the intermediary channel of sa-dhu terms, just as gestures such as constricting the eyes
convey meanings through people’s being acquainted with conventions, so that the
gestures themselves seem to take on the form of these conventions and are well
established as such.(FN128) Although these gestures appear to convey meanings
directly, this is only because conventions have been set such that they are understood
to convey what certain utterances signify; the utterances which describe what these
gestures will convey by convention are directly connected with the meaning, and it is
only because one identifies the gestures and the conventional utterances that they
seem to convey meaning directly.(FN129) Similarly, apabhraṁśas do not directly
convey meanings. They only appear to do so because they are identified with the true
direct signifiers. The VrÞtti notes explicitly that VP 1.177 is stated in order to say that
apabhraṁśas do not have direct signification.(FN130)
4.4.3. Although apaśabdas might be considered corruptions of sa-dhuśabdas, they
nevertheless do indeed signify meanings, even should one insist that they do so
indirectly. Therefore, the question comes up: why are apabhraṁśas like ga-vi- and so
on not recognized as synonyms of sa-dhuśabdas like go? In this context, the behavior
is invoked of authoritative persons referred to as śisÞ Þt a, who serve as models for
speech and other modes of behavior. In connection with such issues, which depend
on lore traditionally handed down, no governing cause is stated other than the
established custom of how these śisÞ Þt as behave. If ga-vi- and so on were indeed merely
alternative expressions to go and so on, śisÞ Þt as like Pa-nÞ ini would allow them also to
be made known by rules of their grammars—that is, would allow for their explanation
by such rules—and they would use them.(FN131) They do neither. Further, a sa-dhu
term is one which is used for a meaning, which is what prompts the use of words, on
the assumption that it directly signifies such a meaning (pratyaksÞ apaksÞ enÞ a), and a
meaning which directly prompts the use of words is conveyed by sa-dhu terms.(FN132)
Hence, BhartrÞhari says what he does in VP 1.178.(FN133)
4.4.4. The next three ka- rika- s concern how apabhraṁśas originate and are
propagated to the point where they attain full status among certain speakers. The first
situation is the familiar one. A child learning to talk makes mistakes because it does
not yet have the full capacity of all its articulatory organs; even though it exerts itself
to speak clearly in the desire to produce the correct word it has been told, it produces
an indistinct sound. Adults listening to what the child is saying, on the other hand,
determine the distinct word that is at the source of the indistinct sound made by the
child and consider only that to be connected with a meaning, not its corruption
produced by the child. Similarly, some meaning is expressed by an apabhraṁśa which
is used when a sa-dhu term should be used, but this is not directly expressed. It is
separated from the apabhraṁśa by the sa-dhu term.(FN134)
The VrÞtti here speaks of speech or language which has become mixed. In this
language, apaśabdas are used in the sphere of sa-dhu terms, but śisÞ Þt as, who know
grammar, understand sa-dhu terms through them, and it is only through these sa-dhu
terms that they consider the meaning as being expressed. An asa-dhu term is thus
nothing more than a means of knowing other terms, just as smoke is a means of
knowing fire.(FN135)
There are others, however, for whom the reverse holds, as is stated in VP 1.181,
the VrÞtti on which says the following. Apabhraṁśas, being used repeatedly by women,
śu- dras, ca- nÞ dÞ a- las and such, reached the status of being fixed among negligent
speakers, so that conversation using them became more commonly established among
such speakers. Moreover, now when a doubt comes up consequent on someone’s use
of a sa-dhu term, one determines what is meant by means of the apabhraṁśa of that
term. Further, people thus consider only the asa-dhu term to be the direct signifier and
they set the sa-dhu term on the side of what serves to recall another term.(FN136)
4.4.5. The final ka-rika-s of the first ka-nÞ dÞa deal with three positions. The first of these
verses begins with a transition from what was said in the previous ka-rika-. It speaks of
this divine speech which has been defiled(FN137) by incapable speakers and goes on
to note the contrary thinking on this issue of those who view speech as not being
eternal (anityadarśina-m).(FN138) There are thus far two positions. A third position is
brought up in the second ka-rika-. Under this view, there is a continuous unbroken
stream of both sorts of speech units—sa-dhuśabda and apaśabda—so that there is no

question of one deriving from the other. Nevertheless, these come down distinguished
from each other, so that if a certain term is used when one means to express a
meaning through another that term does not signify that meaning.(FN139)
The VrÞtti on VP 1.182 begins by recounting what is known from accepted tradition.
In the beginning, the speech of self-luminous men was as free from any apabhraṁśas
as it was from falsehood and such. Over time, however, due to its being associated
with the memory of continuous repetition of earlier faults, speech went on getting
mixed with apabhraṁśas to the point where this reached the state of being the norm,
so that for speakers of this time such speech was treated as original, not a deviation
from a norm.(FN140) This is one extreme view. Others go to another extreme. They
maintain that there is no continuum of eternal sa- dhu speech forms
(anityava-dinahÞ )(FN141) and accordingly do not accept that sa-dhu terms are sources of
merit. These people say that sa-dhu speech is established purely by convention, just
as rules are established in contests between wrestlers, and that the set of sa-dhu terms
is derived from the vernacular original in that it has its source in that.(FN142)
Moreover, this set of sa-dhu forms is considered a modification that is established
later,(FN143) and is determined by confused men(FN144) according to accent,
grammatical formation, and such.(FN145)
Finally, the VrÞtti considers another position, that both types of speech forms equally
come down in an unbroken tradition. Even those for whom there is no primal age or
a divine speech which was unmixed with apaśabdas accept an unbroken tradition,
handed down by the śisÞ Þt as, establishing a difference between sa-dhu and asa-dhu
terms, just as they accept such a tradition, similarly handed down, establishing that
some women may be approached and others not. Since this distinction is thus set,
whether a well-established asa-dhu item like ga-vi- or one which, like asva, is a mistake
and not well established, is used when one wishes to signify something using another
particular term—namely go or aśva—both fail to signify in and of themselves. Whether
a meaning is understood through the intermediary of a sa-dhu term or, as with
conventional gestures such as constricting one’s eyes, there is an immediate
understanding of a meaning for people who have become confused by repeated use
of asa-dhu terms, what comes about is an understanding but nothing more.(FN146)
This is understandable from the point of view of a Pa-nÞ ini-ya, for whom the grammar
serves to establish a restriction such that in particular circumstances one who can
should express himself using sa-dhu terms only. To be sure, there are and may well
always have been asa-dhu terms also, but for this person they do not signify if a
speaker with whom he is engaged in conversation intends to communicate in the high
speech. Note, moreover, that, in consonance with the entire tradition that the
Va-kyapadi-ya represents, the VrÞtti does not countenance still another view, which
possibly could also be entertained under the thesis that both sa-dhu and asa-dhu terms
come down in an unbroken continuum. This is that someone wishing to speak in the
vernacular and accordingly to use a term like ga-vi- or gonÞ -i , might instead mistakenly
use a term like gauhÞ .(FN147) For, even if apaśabdas are not considered to be
deviants of sa-dhuśabdas and are granted equal antiquity, they are not granted equal
status. There is always an assumption that, if a mistake in usage takes place, it
consists in using an apaśabda instead of an intended śabda. This is maintained not
just by grammarians but also by Mi-ma-ṁsakas; see §4.2.2. This is also understandable
in terms of how these usages coexisted. At least from the eras of Ka-tya-yana and
Patañjali, correct Sanskrit usage coexisted with vernacular usage, viewed as relatively
incorrect, and BhartrÞhari considers this distinction to be carried on by śisÞ Þt as. When
speaking vernaculars to contemporaries, then, such speakers would hardly be viewed
as using Sanskritic forms by mistake. Nor was a śisÞ Þt a’s use of apaśabdas in informal
contexts viewed as damning. On the contrary, it is in the context where chaste usage
is absolutely required—especially in ritual—that lapses into vernacular are censured.
By ending the first ka-nÞ dÞ a in the way he does, BhartrÞhari nicely rounds things out.
For he thus harkens back to a ka-rika- (VP 1.27) which immediately follows his summary
of what will be dealt with (see §3.2, with notes 18, 19). The VrÞtti on VP 1.27 draws
a parallel between the established distinction of sa-dhu and asa-dhu usage, which
comes down in an unbroken tradition, and other such established traditions. These
concern: other means of achieving merit, which are positively enjoined; practices like
killing living beings, telling lies, and stealing, which are forbidden; and acts like
hiccuping, laughing, and scratching, which are neither enjoined nor forbidden. These all
come down in unbroken traditions and are not subject to doubt.(FN148) In a
comparable manner, VP 1.158 reiterates that Pa-nÞ ini’s grammar is a smrÞti, a work
which hands down a memorialized tradition, that is determined by the uninterrupted
tradition of usage by śisÞ Þt as.(FN149) The VrÞtti on this ka-rika- again draws a parallel with
the distinctions carried on in other smrÞtis—between what may be eaten or not eaten
and so forth—and grammatical tradition. ŚisÞ Þt as do not transgress the way of proper
behavior that is set forth in these other traditions, and the grammar is a similar smrÞti,
whose domain is what speech should and should not be used.(FN150)
4.4.6. As was noted earlier (see §4.3.1, with note 96), VP 3.30 also plays an
important role in discussions concerning sa-dhu and asa-dhu items. What the first half
of this verse says accords with what was said in VP 1.180cd (§4.4.4, with note 134).
The second half, on the other hand, assumes that sa-dhuśabdas and apaśabdas do not
differ in that both signify, so that a restriction is stated with respect to merit and
demerit: only the use of sa-dhuśabdas gains one merit. This is reconcilable with the
position that apabhraṁśa terms have come to gain established status over time, as
portrayed in VP 1.181, except that here the understanding of meaning directly from an
apaśabda is not restricted to those speakers that are considered incapable. This is
also reconcilable with the third view treated at the end of the first ka-nÞ dÞ a, such that
śabdas and apaśabdas are both considered to have come down in a continuous
stream.
4.4.7. To summarize what can be said on the basis of the Va-kyapadi-ya passages
considered here: BhartrÞ hari recognizes, as did his predecessors, that both
sa-dhuśabdas and apaśabdas are used and that the latter predominate. He also takes
three possibilities into consideration concerning their relative status:
Apaśabdas are accounted for as corruptions (apabhraṁśa) of sa-dhuśabdas, and
at one primeval time there was a divine speech unsullied by such impurities.
Both apaśabdas and sa-dhuśabdas have existed as far back as one can go, and
there is no use insisting that the former derive from the latter through some sort
of error.
What people call apaśabdas are actually part of the natural speech of people,
without the adornment of grammar, and sa-dhuśabdas have arisen from them via
grammatical analysis.
BhartrÞhari also has to admit, as did Patañjali, that even śisÞ Þt as can understand
meanings from apaśabdas as well as sa-dhuśabdas. That is, although there was among
śisÞ tÞ as an accepted high speech, they also used vernaculars in their everyday
encounters. Here too, however, there are different approaches:
There is, to begin with, what we may call the translation thesis. A śisÞ tÞ a
considers the apaśabda a corruption and understands a meaning only indirectly,
by recalling a sa-dhuśabda that is linked directly as signifier with the intended
meaning. For those who are not part of the śisÞ Þt a tradition, it is not only true that
meaning is understood directly from what śisÞ Þt as call apaśabdas, it is also true
that even if they can communicate with śisÞ Þt as, in case of doubt they understand
through their apaśabda, just as the ś isÞ tÞ a may understand through the
intermediary of sa-dhuśabda.
A śisÞ Þt a might have to admit that he can indeed understand a meaning directly
from an apaśabda, even if this is a corruption and all the more so if it has as
unending a tradition of usage as does any sa-dhuśabda, but that is all he will
admit. He will not go so far as to grant that the apaśabda actually signifies in
the same manner as does a sa-dhuśabda.(FN151)
4.5. Hela-ra-ja’s comments on VP 3.30 reflect closely what is said in the ka-rika-s and
VrÞ tti discussed in §4.4. He begins with what is, in effect, a paraphrase of VP
1.182(FN152) and notes that for learned persons(FN153) speech that has become
defiled signifies not directly, as a corrupt speech, but only once it has had its original
undefiled form made known. He specifies that the learned do not determine a meaning
directly from an apaśabda, so that for them there is no relation between apaśabdas
and meaning.(FN154) Hela-ra-ja then alludes to the tradition mentioned in the VrÞtti on
VP 1.182 concerning the primeval time when speech was devoid of apabhraṁśas and
to the Saṅgraha’s statement that any apabhraṁśa has a correct linguistic unit as its
source, while emphasizing that apabhraṁśas do not signify, that they only bring to
mind a sa-dhu term due to similarity, and that it is from sa-dhu terms that meaning
comprehension results.(FN155) He immediately goes on, however, to speak of what
prevails nowadays: impurities of speech have gained general currency in the same
manner as falsehood and such, due to the prevailing lack of merit, so that meaning
is indeed directly understood from apaśabda without the intervention of sa-dhu terms.
Although this is so, one concludes that only sa-dhu terms are means of attaining merit,
on the authority of teachings that say one should not use mleccha
speech—apaśabdas—that one should speak only using sa-dhu terms. Accordingly, the
grammar follows suit and teaches these alone.(FN156) Further, since it is accepted
that a diversity of entities is preceded by a unity and it is also true that there is a
multiplicity of human views because they are not restricted, one concludes that a group
of apaśabdas like ga-vi-, gonÞ -i , and so on, has a single sa-dhuśabda (go) for a source
and not vice versa.(FN157) Thus, an apaśabda has as its source a sa-dhuśabda, which
is the object of knowledge.(FN158) In addition, as the ultimate stage of knowledge is
identical with the undifferentiated Brahman,(FN159) so the stage of the sa-dhuśabda is
the stage of knowledge, and as differentiation in the ultimate knowledge is false
(vitathahÞ ‘contrary to fact’), so is the apabhraṁśa stage of speech that consists in
impurities false in contrast to the true form of speech that lacks these impurities.
Accordingly, there is a difference in conception (vikalpahÞ ) that depends on whether one
is considering the ultimate or something else.(FN160)
Hela-ra- ja then goes on to consider the Maha- bha- sÞya’s evam iha-pi sama- na- ya- m
arthagatau śabdena ca- paśabdena ca (see 4.1), concerning which he says the
following. This is stated only with respect to the stage of speech characterized as
ignorance. Since Patañjali states arthagatau (“there being a comprehension of a
meaning”),(FN161) the possibility that he might be saying that apaśabdas signify is not
granted respect.(FN162) What is meant, says Hela-ra-ja, is the following. Granted, to be
sure, in the stage of speech characterized as ignorance, people communicate for the
most part with apaśabda, so that there may well be just a comprehension of meaning
through both śabda and apaśabda. According to Hela-ra-ja, then, it is considered that
Patañjali’s statement, of course, shows he concedes that one understands a meaning
through both, but not that an apaśabda is thereby on a par with a sa-dhuśabda as a
signifier. However, Hela-ra- ja continues, because such usage is generally current,
BhartrÞhari says it does not make a difference between śabda and apaśabda so far as
concerns comprehension of meaning, and the grammar establishes a restriction
concerning merit and sin.(FN163)
4.6. Houben emphasizes VP 3.3.30 and the associated ka-rika-s from the first ka-nÞ dÞa
in arguing that Hela-ra-ja has not understood BhartrÞhari’s position, that the author of the
VrÞtti need not represent what BhartrÞhari thought, and that those who have followed
these commentators are mistaken. Thus, arguing against Virendra Sharma, Houben
says (p. 25):
Sharma notes that KaunÞdÞ a BhatÞÞta and Na-geśa hold corrupt forms to be directly
expressive, and say that it is the view of the grammarians. Sharma argues that
this would be an alteration of the traditional view of the grammarians
(1977:239-249). In my view, however, KaunÞ dÞ a BhatÞÞta and Na-geśa agree on this
point with both BhartrÞhari and Patañjali (cf. discussion of ka-rika- 30), while it is
Hela- ra- ja who (following the ancient VrÞ tti) deviates from the traditional
grammarian’s view.
The discussion of VP 3.3.30 to which Houben refers actually is fairly short,
approximately five pages (pp. 237-42).
4.6.1. Concerning VP 3.3.30cd, in particular, Houben says (p. 238): “The second
line of ka-rika- 30 of our chapter, devoted to the other view, tells us two things: (1) there
is no difference between correct and incorrect words in being significative or expressive
of a meaning; (2) there is a restriction with regard to merit and demerit.” He goes on
to note that the same points are made in VP 1.27, then remarks (p. 239): “The point
that there is no difference between correct and incorrect word in being significative, is
moreover elaborated in ka-rika-s 181-183.” Houben’s position is that one should not
accept the interpretation of the ka-rika-s found in the VrÞtti (p. 239):
Usually, these ka-rika-s are interpreted on the basis of the ancient VrÞtti. However,
on the basis of the ka-rika-s in their own context one has to arrive at different
conclusions, conclusions which are moreover in perfect accord with some
relevant remarks by the author of the MBhD. This passage is therefore one of
the reasons to keep what is said in the VrÞtti strictly separate from what is said
in the ka- rika- s, in whichever way one decides the authorship of these two
works.(FN164)
Houben nevertheless admits that to him parts of VP 1.182-83 (see notes 138-39)
are not absolutely clear and remarks (p. 239): “What is not directly clear from the
Sanskrit, is which opposite opinion is being referred to in 182cd. Nor is the exact
meaning of ubhayesÞ a-m and aviccheda-d clear.”(FN165)
There is much in Houben’s discussion that I find less than acceptable. Let me begin
with a general point. I consider it objectionable that in a book of 460 pages, with
verses cited twice and translations repeated, the author could not take a few pages to
present in full his arguments concerning VP 1.181-83; that instead he merely tells us
he intends to discuss problems on another occasion, although he wishes readers to
accept his conclusion that the VrÞtti does not represent what BhartrÞhari intended. The
arguments Houben does set down, moreover, are not cogently formulated. Thus, he
says (p. 240):
In the light of the preceding ka-rika-s 181-182, however, it is very likely that 183
was intended to refer also to the tradition of ‘incorrect’ Prakrit words (which were
the original and correct words according to the other group). In view of the fact
that in some circles in BhartrÞhari’s time (fourth or fifth century CE) the ‘incorrect’
Prakrit forms were cultivated, and in the light of 181, which seems to refer to
this situation, ka-rika- 183 would then also refer to someone who wanted to
pronounce an ‘incorrect’ Prakrit word, but knew only the corresponding ‘correct’
Sanskrit word.
The first of these verses clearly says that apabhraṁśas gained established status
over time, with the result that for some speakers sa-dhu terms are not signifiers.
Houben does not demonstrate, however, how the two ka-rika-s make it “very likely” that
the final verse intended to convey what he claims. Moreover, although it is beyond
dispute that vernaculars were indeed generally used, it does not follow that VP 1.183
thereby concerns speakers who wished to use a vernacular form but mistakenly used
a Sanskritic one instead. Houben should have taken into consideration the repeated
statement in the first-ka-nÞ dÞ a ka-rika-s and VrÞtti that the distinction between sa-dhu and
asa-dhu terms is an accepted tradition and the view among Pa-nÞini-yas and others that
misuse involves the use of apaśabdas where sa-dhuśabdas should be used.
4.6.2. Houben’s arguments concerning the particular issue whether asa-dhu terms
signify or not could also do with more precision. He says (pp. 240-41):
What is important is that ka-rika- 183 contains no indication whatsoever that
BhartrÞhari would not [emphasis in original] accept that in some circumstances
“incorrect” words express their meaning directly. It was precisely the point of 181
that ‘incorrect’ words may be expressive among some speakers. And at two
other places, 27 in the first Ka-nÞ dÞ a and 30 in the Saṁbandhasamuddeśa,
BhartrÞhari allows that “incorrect” words express their meaning directly.
The VrÞtti, however, suggesting that in 182 a different view is being discussed
(different from the two views referred to in 181),(FN166) denies that “incorrect”
words can be expressive. On this view, according to the VrÞtti, the “incorrect”
word, whether it has become well-established (as in the situation described in
181) or not (as in 175-180, where the speaker does intend to pronounce the
correct word), is by no means expressive of the meaning (na va- cakau
bhavatahÞ).
What VP 1.27 says is that asa-dhu terms are those which are contrary to sa-dhu
ones—either in that they are not established from a tradition handed down by śisÞ Þt as
or in that they are not means of achieving merit—although there is not a distinction
between both types in that they both convey meaning.(FN167) This does not say
explicitly that both signify meaning directly. Even under the thesis that asa-dhu terms
signify indirectly, it is still true that they signify, so that they do not differ in this respect
from sa-dhu terms.(FN168) Similarly, VP 3.3.30 also says that there is no distinction
between the two types of terms in that they both have the property of being signifiers,
but again this does not necessarily mean that both directly signify. Nor can one say
that va-caka refers only to a direct signifier. This would be incompatible with VP 1.178,
which says of asa-dhu terms that they are not directly signifiers and uses sa-ksÞ a-d
ava-caka-hÞ. If va-caka meant only ‘which signifies directly’, then ava-caka would refer to
an item that does not signify directly, so that sa-ksÞ a-t ‘directly’ would be otiose. Similarly,
abhi dha- can mean ‘signify, express’, without specifying whether this is done directly
or indirectly, so that VP 1.180 can say that a certain meaning is signified by an
asa- dhu term indirectly, as separated from its signifier by the correct term
(sa-dhuvyavahitahÞ ), which directly signifies it. Of course, va-caka and abhidha-yaka can
also refer specifically to direct signifiers. Thus, VP 1.183, in which abhidha-yakahÞ
occurs, says with respect to a term used when one wishes to use another one that
it does not signify the meaning. The verse specifies the particular condition under
which this holds. The VrÞtti (see note 146) uses va-caka, but also goes on to stress that
in both cases there is a mere understanding (sampratyayama-tram) of the meaning in
question. That is, an apaśabda like gonÞ -i , which has become established, seemingly
signifies, but this is in the way that conventional gestures convey meanings, and an
apaśabda like asva for aśva signifies only through the intermediary.
In connection with the same issue, Houben (pp. 241-42) appeals to the
Maha-bha-sÞ yadi-pika-:
As for the MBhD, its author evinces an awareness of both the view that
incorrect words are not expressive (MBhD 1:10.14-15) and the view that they
are (MBhD 1:26.13-14, 27.34-35). The author of the MBhD, as the ka-rika--author
and unlike the author of the VrÞtti and Hela-ra-ja, does not advocate an absolute
denial of the possibility of incorrect words being in some circumstances
expressive.
In footnote 380 (p. 241), appended to this passage, Houben criticizes Virendra
Sharma, saying: “Sharma (1977: 147-148) mentions only MBhD 1: 10.14-15 as ‘proof’
of BhartrÞhari’s denial of direct expressive powers to incorrect words, and neglects the
other two places which would have compelled him to modify his position.” In footnote
377 (p. 241), appended to the text where Houben says “BhartrÞ hari allows that
‘incorrect’ words express their meaning directly,” he remarks: “Exactly the same attitude
is evinced in the MBhD 1: 26.13-14 and 27.4-5.” The Di-pika- passages are as follows:
I.10.14-15: apabhraṁśa- ye [te] tv apy apratya-yaka-hÞ | esÞ a eva paksÞ o naite
pratya-yayanti-ti “But terms that are apabhraṁśas ... are not meaning conveyors.
The position is just this: these do not convey meaning.”
I.26.13-14: evam artha-vabodhaṁ prati sarvo ’rthahÞ śabdam apaśabdaṁ ca
prayuṅkte | tatra śabdena-sau pratya-yyo neterenÞ eti niyamahÞ kriyate “In the same
way, any meaning provokes both a śabda and an apaśabda for the
understanding of a meaning. This being so, a restriction is formulated: that is to
be made understood with a śabda, not with the other.”
I.27.4-5: yady apy esÞ ahÞ paksÞ ahÞ sya-t sa-dhuvad apaśabda- api va-caka-hÞ ity evam
api drÞsÞ Þt aṁ phalam tulyam artha-vabodhahÞ | iha tv adrÞsÞ Þt aṁ phalam abhyudaya iti
“Though this view too is possible, that apaśabdas signify as sa-dhu terms do,
nevertheless, they have the same direct result: the comprehension of a meaning.
In this case, however, there is an unseen result: prosperity.”
Clearly, the second passage speaks of a restriction that a meaning is to be
conveyed (pratya-yyahÞ) by one term and not by another, but it does not expressly say
anything about an apaśabda signifying directly. The last passage does indeed use
va-cakahÞ . However, as noted earlier, this too does not mean that the term in question
necessarily signifies directly. Accordingly, I think Houben’s use of “directly” is
exaggerated. It is also an exaggeration to insist that the VrÞtti does not allow that
apaśabdas do signify directly under particular circumstances. The VrÞtti on VP 1.181
(note 136) certainly does admit, as does the ka-rika-, that for speakers among whom
apabhraṁśas have become established, they signify and sa-dhu terms do not.
In sum, I find that Houben’s discussion of this issue lacks cogency. In addition, I
consider less than straightforward the strategy of argumentation adopted in
approaching the texts in question. Towards the beginning of his book, Houben makes
it clear (p. 7) that he considers the author of the VrÞtti to be someone different form
the author of the ka- rika- s, whom he considers identical with the author of the
Maha-bha-sÞ yadi-pika-. Subsequently (p. 13), he recommends caution and remarks: “Even
for someone who would like to establish continuity and unitary authorship of the two
works, it is necessary to make a sharp distinction between the two in order to prove
this point.” In his commentary on VP 3.3.30, he maintains the sharp distinction
between the works but, as can be seen from what I have said, he also abandons a
great deal of his caution. Here Houben argues on the basis of his own interpretations,
which are supported by saying “it is very likely that” VP 1.183 meant to say what he
thinks it did and, negatively, that this ka-rika- does not contain any indication that
BhartrÞhari would not accept that apaśabdas can signify directly. Houben does not
demonstrate that what he considers likely is supported by evidence and is not merely
a feeling on his part. Yet, starting from his own interpretation, he goes on to argue that
Hela-ra-ja has somehow misrepresented what the ka-rika- text says.
4.6.3. The materials thus presented constitute for Houben (p. 241) “... the
background against which Hela-ra-ja’s commentary on 30 should be evaluated.” As
noted in §4.6.2, Houben characterizes Hela-ra-ja as advocating “an absolute denial of
the possibility of incorrect words being in some circumstances significative.” Here
again, he has exaggerated and his presentation lacks subtlety. Hela-ra-ja’s comments on
VP 3.3.30 (see §4.5) immediately set the tone by speaking of the learned (vidva-ṁsahÞ ).
For him, it is they who do not determine a meaning directly from an apaśabda, so that
there is no relation between such a term and a meaning. Now, when Hela-ra-ja says
that apabhraṁśas are not signifiers (ava-caka-hÞ ), he clearly means they are not direct
signifiers, since he immediately goes on to note that such terms bring sa-dhu terms to
mind, from which one has a comprehension of meaning. He then speaks of the stage
at which apabhram Þ śas have become established, and relates this to what Patañjali
says. In addition, Hela-ra-ja makes explicit the circumstances under which apaśabdas
signify meanings directly, just as do sa-dhuśabdas: at the stage alluded to in VP 1.181
and the VrÞtti thereto. It is also with this very stage in mind that Hela-raja first brings
in Patañjali’s comments (see §4.1) that a restriction is established such that one should
use only sa-dhuśabdas to signify meanings, which are equally understood from the use
of such terms and apaśabdas.
Houben remarks in particular on what Hela-ra-ja says concerning the Maha-bha-sÞ ya’s
sama-na-ya-m arthagatau śabdena ca- paśabena ca. In his comments on VP 3.3.30,
Houben notes (p. 241): “From the use of arthagatau ‘in the understanding of meaning’
Hela-ra-ja wants to infer Patañjali’s reluctance to accept that incorrect words have a
capacity to express the meaning.” Later (p. 366), Houben translates the pertinent
phrase from Hela-ra- ja’s commentary as follows: “From the expression arthagati,
“understanding of meaning” [it is clear that] [Patañjali] is unwilling to accept that
incorrect words have expressive power towards their meaning.” He also remarks (p.
366, note 697): “Note the plural in reference to Patañjali, whereas BhartrÞhari is referred
to by Hela-ra-ja in singular.” Of course, having Hela-ra-ja say that Patañjali does not wish
to accept that apaśabdas signify directly suits Houben’s thesis, under which Hela-ra-ja
in effect denies what Patañjali actually intended and interprets the issue in accordance
with the Va-kyapadi-yavrÞtti, as opposed to the Va-kyapadi-ya itself. On the other hand,
Houben simply asserts that Hela-ra-ja’s avakarnÞayanti refers to something Patañjanli did.
He does not show that Hela-ra-ja elsewhere comparably refers to the Bha-sÞ yaka-ra in the
plural. In fact, Hela-ra-ja frequently refers to Patañjali, using bha-sÞ yaka-ra and bha-sÞ yakrÞt
and, as far as I can ascertain, always in the singular.(FN169) In view of the evidence,
it is obviously not appropriate to consider that avakarnÞ ayanti in the Praki-rnÞ apraka-śa on
VP 3.3.30 has reference to Patañjali. Instead, it is proper to consider this an instance
of an impersonal third plural form (see note 162). That is, Hela-ra-ja here is reporting
an opinion he knows of, one which agrees with what is said in the VrÞtti on VP 1.183
(see note 146). Hela-ra-ja also notes immediately thereafter that the author of the text
speaks of a non-difference in usage due to the fact that apabhraṁśas have become
established and that under these circumstances the grammar provides a restriction
such that one should use only sa-dhu terms to signify meanings in order to gain merit.
4.6.4. All this is in accord with what is said throughout the Pa-nÞ inian tradition.
Katya-yana begins by saying that the grammar serves to establish a restriction intended
-
for merit. Patañjali explains this and says that the restriction is stated showing that,
although there is the same understanding of meaning through an apaśabda as well as
a śabda, only the use of the latter results in merit. It is possible that in saying this
Patañjali considered that both types of terms signified meanings directly. On the other
hand, it is also important to see that Patañjali does not discuss this issue, so that a
definitive conclusion is not possible. One can only surmise that this point may not even
have been a source of contention for Patañjali.
As I have noted (§4.4), BhartrÞhari elaborates on the issue of sa-dhu and asa-dhu
usage in a manner which can be understood as reflecting thinking that occurred over
the years not only among grammarians but also among Mi-ma-ṁsakas and others (see
§4.2), including differences of opinion on whether apaśabdas signify directly or
indirectly and for whom, as well as on whether apaśabdas are to be considered truly
corruptions (apabhraṁśa) of sa-dhuśabda and how they came about if they are so
treated. On the other hand, BhartrÞhari does not enter into discussions concerning
relative brevity and prolixity in assuming that several apaśabdas signify a meaning
signified by a single śabda, although we know this dispute goes back much earlier,
since one finds it in Jaimini’s Mi-ma-ṁsa-su-tras (see §4.2.2). Further, by the time of
Hela-ra-ja, the question of relative brevity and prolixity, centering around whether a śakti
should be assumed for an apaśabda distinct from a sa-dhuśabda had probably already
come to have considerable importance in arguments, although this does not play an
important role in the Va-kyapadi-ya or in Hela-ra-ja’s commentary.(FN170) As shown
above (§§4.2.4-4.3), this issue came to play a large role in discussions concerning
sa-dhu and asa-dhu terms. In this context, let us consider Na-geśa’s comments on the
Pradi-pa to Bha-sÞ ya I.8.21-22. As I have pointed out (note 168), KaiyatÞa contrasts two
positions: that apabhraṁśas have come to be established through usage, so that they
signify directly without calling to mind their sa-dhu counterparts, and that they simply
signify in the same way as sa-dhu terms. Na-geśa associates the first position with the
view already set forth in VP 1.181, but he puts this in terms familiar from Nya-ya
discussions: apabhraṁśas convey meaning through erroneous attribution of śakti
(śaktibhramenÞa). He also describes, in a manner that is familiar, how this comes about
(see §§4.2.3-4.2.4): A mistakenly says ga- vi- where gauhÞ should be used and B
understands the intended meaning by remembering the sa-dhu term gauhÞ , but a
bystander C takes it that B has understood the meaning directly from ga-vi-, thus
mistakenly attributing to this the capacity to signify a cow. The error that has this
source is subsequently continued.(FN171) Na-geśa then notes that KaiyatÞa brings in the
second position because there is no decisive factor to show that apabhraṁśas gained
their ability to signify in this manner, so that śakti resides also in vernacular
terms.(FN172)
It is patent, I think, that although Na-geśa does indeed subscribe to the position that
apabhraṁśa terms signify as directly as do sa-dhu terms, he does not say exactly what
BhartrÞhari says. He is concerned with the situation, noted by Hela-ra-ja (see §4.5, with
note 156), such that apaśabdas have already achieved currency and some speakers
communicate with these only. The arguments in the Mañju-sÞa- are also specifically
aimed at Mi-ma-ṁsaka and Naiya-yika opponents, and the issue of prolixity in assuming
separate śakti relations between individual apaśabdas and a single meaning occupies
an important position. In addition, recall that, although KaunÞ dÞabhatÞÞta cites VP 3.3.30
from BhatÞÞt oji’s Siddha-ntaka-rika-s (see §4.3.1), he does not attribute the ka-rika- to
BhartrÞhari, despite the fact that he subsequently cites verses which he does explicitly
attribute to the Va-kyapadi-ya. Moreover, the first half of VP 3.3.30 now is said to
represent the position of Naiya-yikas and others, the second half BhatÞÞtoji’s siddha-nta.
Given that BhartrÞhari quite unpolemically entertains the view that apaśabdas signify
through calling to mind their sa-dhu equivalents, KaunÞdÞ abhatÞÞta’s presentation too cannot
be said to agree in full with what BhartrÞhari says. I therefore consider Houben’s bald
assertion (p. 25) that “... KaunÞdÞ a BhatÞÞta and Na-geśa agree on this point with both
BhartrÞhari and Patañjali ...” inappropriate and lacking in perspective.
4.6.5. In sum, Houben’s discussion of VP 3.3.30 and related ka-rika-s which concern
different views on the status of sa-dhu and asa-dhu terms is so intent on demonstrating
that BhartrÞhari definitely allowed for asa-dhu terms directly to signify that he overlooks
something he himself makes the very basis of his own study, BhartrÞ hari’s
“perspectivism.” With respect to this issue, as with regard to other major disputes,
BhartrÞhari does indeed present various points of view. He does not polemically attack
other positions, but he shows a clear preference for one: whether asa-dhu terms are
considered truly corruptions of sa-dhu terms, even if both come down in uninterrupted
transmission, the latter are definitely given higher status. This is the tradition of śisÞ Þt as,
to which he adheres.
5. To my knowledge, Houben’s is the first English translation of the Praki-rnÞapraka-śa
on the Sambandhasamuddeśa. As he notes (p. 23), the ka-rika-s were translated into
English earlier by K. A. Subramania Iyer (1971), who also summarizes Hela-ra-ja’s
comments. Concerning this work, Houben says (p. 23): “His translations suffice to give
a general impression of the subject matter, but are not always precise and are
sometimes more based on Hela-ra-ja’s commentary than on the ka-rika-s of the VP.”
In some cases, Houben’s claim is justified, and he has based his translation on a
rigorously established text, so that scholars must be grateful for his effort in producing
a disciplined translation of two difficult texts. Houben deserves thanks also for the
detailed discussions which follow the translations of ka-rika-s. Nevertheless, as I think I
have demonstrated, these discussions show that Houben is at times unjustifiably intent
on attributing misrepresentations to the Va-kyapadi-yavrÞtti and Hela-ra-ja’s commentary.
Despite their rigor and usefulness, some of the translations also do not do full justice
to the original and in fact do not compare all that well with those of K. A. Subramania
Iyer. I am aware that translations are happy hunting grounds for nitpickers and what
many would consider among the most excellent could be subject to criticism at the
hands of a determined critic. With all due deference, however, I think it appropriate to
consider three examples in Houben’s translation to make my point.
5.1. Houben’s translation of the VP 3.3.1 (pp. 145, 331) is:
The cognition of the speaker, the external thing meant and the own form [of the
word] are understood through words which are uttered. The relation of these
(namely, the cognition, external thing meant and own form) [with the words
which are uttered] is well-established [p. 331: “thing-meant”].
K. A. Subramania Iyer’s translation of the same verse is (1971: 76)
From words which are uttered, the intention of the speaker, an external object
and the form of the word itself are understood. Their relation is fixed.
Aside from the use of parentheses and brackets in one, both translations convey
just about the same information, although I think one would have to accept that the
second is clearer and more felicitous. One phrase which immediately strikes a reader
in Houben’s translation is cognition of the speaker, as opposed to K. A. Subramania
Iyer’s intention of the speaker. Here Subramania Iyer follows Hela- ra- ja, who
paraphrases jña-naṁ prayoktuhÞ with prayoktur abhipra-yahÞ . This is appropriate. For the
translation conveys more precisely what the ka-rika- speaks of. BhartrÞhari is not talking
about any cognitive process or result of such a process. He is talking about a
knowledge which a speaker has in his mind and wishes to convey to someone in
words. Admittedly, this is a relatively minor point. Yet a translation should certainly aim
to convey to readers the content of the original text in a way that is both precise and
understandable, and currently fashionable jargon that fails to accomplish this aim
should be avoided.
5.2. Consider now the same authors’ translations of VP 3.3.6ab (Houben, pp. 176,
341; K. A. Subramania Iyer, p. 81):
Houben: As regards sam Þ yoga (connection) and samava-ya (inherence), they (are
-
tacchabdahÞ :) are called by that word (sc. ‘relation’) because they have (as it
were) that property (sc. dependence).
Subramania Iyer: Conjunction and inherence are called relations because they
have the attribute thereof.
Here again, I think it is fair to say that Subramania Iyer’s translation not only is
more felicitous but also more immediately conveys precisely what the text intends. The
point made is that conjunction (saṁyoga) and inherence (samava-ya) are spoken of as
relations because they have a property which defines what a relation is, namely the
property of being dependent. Subramania Iyer translates the Sanskrit taddharmanÞ ohÞ
“because they have the attribute thereof,” but Houben translates “because they have
(as it were) that property (sc. dependence).” He also devotes much of his commentary
on the ka-rika- to explaining this term, as follows (p. 177):
In this interpretation, the first word taddharmanÞ os is a Bahuvri-hi going with
saṁyogasamava-yayohÞ. Hela-ra-ja takes it as an upama--bahuvri-hi, and tad in the
compound as a reference to saṁbhandha, the topic of the preceding three
ka- rika- s. This gives the following: sam Þ yoga (connection) and samava- ya
(inherence) have as it were the property (sc. dependence) of this (relation). That
the compound is interpreted as an upama--bahuvri-hi is not without reason, for if
it was a simple Bahuvri-hi, there would be the suggestion that relation still does
have an own property. And since upama--bahuvri-his are not uncommon in
Sanskrit, it is not far-fetched to interpret the compound this way, in a context in
which identities and near-identities are of crucial significance. A translation
without ‘as it were’ or equivalent would use less words, yet say more than
warranted on the basis of the Sanskrit compound. In my translation, tad- in the
compound is taken as a direct reference to the property of dependence. In that
case, if ‘as it were’ is omitted there is still no suggestion that relation (pure and
simple) is an entity having its own property. Because sam Þ yoga (connection) and
-
samavaya (inherence) are dependent in some respects, but independent in other
respects, the words ‘as it were’ have been added between parentheses.
Houben reiterates his difference with Hela-ra-ja in a note appended to his translation
of the Praki-rnÞ apraka- śa.(FN173) I confess that I find the discussion cited above
confusing. VP 3.3.5 says that there is no term which signifies a relation qua relation
(svadharmenÞ a ‘in its own quality’)(FN174) and that, since a relation is absolutely
dependent,(FN175) its characteristic form is not referred to by any particular nominal
term. Accordingly, a relation does indeed have a property, dependence (pa-ratantrya).
Moreover, Houben does not justify choosing his interpretation of taddharmanÞ ohÞ . He
does not demonstrate why one should choose to say that tad in this compound “refers
to dharma in 5 and to atyantaparatantratva in 4.” Hela-ra-ja’s interpretation is at least
well grounded in BhartrÞhari’s own diction. TaddharmanÞ os tu ta-cchabdyam in VP 3.3.6
reflects a reasoning which is formulated in several places, both in grammar and in
Nya-ya. For example, in the Maha-bha-sÞ ya on 4.1.48, Patañjali says that a term x is
used with reference to some Y that is not X, a proper referent of x, for four reasons:
because Y is located in or on X, because Y has a property or properties that X has,
because Y is located near X, and because Y is accompanied by X.(FN176) In
consonance with such usage, VP 3.3.6 says that conjunction and inherence are termed
(ta-cchabdyam ‘the property of having that for word’, i.e., being so designated)
sambandha because they have a property that characterizes a relation. The property
in question is being dependent on something else (pa-ratantryam), as Hela-ra-ja rightly
notes: one considers that the defining feature of a relation is being dependent;
conjunction and inherence have this feature with respect to substances and qualities,
so that the term sambandha is used for them.(FN177) On the other hand, these are
not absolutely dependent in that they can be independent entities served by other,
dependent, ones. Hence, Hela-ra-ja takes taddharmanÞohÞ in the ka-rika- as equivalent to
tasyeva dharmo yayohÞ .(FN178) Taddharman used here is then equivalent to

taddharmadharma ‘which has a property that is (like) the property of X’, just as
usÞ Þt ramukha (‘camel-face’) used of someone who has a face like that of a camel is
tantamount to usÞ Þt ramukhamukha and tatka-la used with reference to vowels that have
the time duration of a given vowel is equivalent to tatka-laka-la.(FN179) Of course, this
means that tad of taddharmanÞ ohÞ refers to a relation (sambandha): taddharmahÞ = tasya
dharmahÞ ‘property of that’ = sambandhasya dharmahÞ ‘property of a relation’;
taddharmadharma = taddharma iva dharmo yasya ‘something which has the property
which is the property of that’. This makes good sense, since in VP 3.3.4-6 BhartrÞhari
is speaking of a relation and what its basic characteristic is, then speaks of what
conjunction and inherence have in common with this.
5.3. Finally, consider Houben’s translation of a passage from the beginning of the
Praki- rnÞ apraka- śa on 3.3.2 (123.11-2): svaru- pa- vivekenaiva hy arthapara- marśo
’bhidha-nam ucyate vrÞddhavyavaha-ra-t tathaiva sambandhavyutpattehÞ . Hela-ra-ja here
says that only referring to a meaning as not distinguished from the term that signifies
it is spoken of as signifying, and he gives a reason for this: because from the usage
of elders the relation between signifier and meaning is learned (... -vyutpattehÞ) in this
way alone. Houben translates (p. 333): “For we speak of ‘expression’ only if the
thing-meant is grasped as being not different from the own form, because the relation
arises in exactly that way [with the thing-meant being not different from the own form
of the word] from the usage of the elders.” He thus interprets vyutpatti here to mean
‘arising’. This is confusing. If Houben understands that in Hela- ra- ja’s view a
word-meaning ‘relation’ arises in the sense of being produced, then Hela-ra-ja is made
to contradic what he says in his commentary on VP 3.3.1, where he emphasizes that
the relation is not a matter of agreed convention established by men. How, then,
should one understand that “the relation arises ... from the usage of the elders”? One
does not have to make the effort. For Hela-ra-ja is clearly using vyutpatti here in a
well-known sense, with reference to learning a relation. Similarly, vyutpanna refers to
one who knows the relation between a sa-dhu term and a given meaning, and vyutpitsu
refers to someone who wishes to learn such a relation; see §3.7, with note 49;
§§4.2.3-4, and note 110.
6. In his work, Houben has undertaken both to translate rigorously the ka-rika-s of
the Sambandhasamuddeśa and to explain these in a historical and theoretical
perspective. He has in addition not only translated Hela-ra-ja’s commentary on these
verses but also attempted to demonstrate that in important ways Hela- ra- ja has
misrepresented what BhartrÞhari meant to say and that he has done this by accepting
interpretations found in the VrÞtti. While attempting to maintain a neutral stance towards
the question whether the author of the VrÞtti is BhartrÞhari himself, moreover, Houben
nevertheless makes it clear that he considers the VrÞtti to have misrepresented what is
said in important ka-rika-s of the Va-kyapadi-ya’s first ka-nÞdÞ a.
Houben is to be admired for his ambitious undertaking and for his learning. For
reasons given above, I nevertheless consider that his undertaking has not succeeded
in some important respects. I think he exaggerates what he calls BhartrÞ hari’s
“perspectivism.” He also depends too often on vague argumentation and assumption
when he attempts to demonstrate that the VrÞtti and Hela-ra-ja have misrepresented
BhartrÞhari’s views. And, for all its rigor, Houben’s translation at times either fails to
convey the intent of the Va-kyapadi-ya clearly or actually misunderstands what BhartrÞhari
and Hela-ra-ja say.
I suggest that, instead of seeking to find “our” interpretations of what BhartrÞhari says
as opposed to what we consider misrepresentations on the part of commentators like
Hela-ra-ja, we would do well patiently to consider with more receptive minds what all
these authors say as well as full evidence from scholars representing other schools of
thought on common topics of discussion.
ADDED MATERIAL
GEORGE CARDONA
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
This is a review-article of: The SamÞ bandha-Samuddeśa (Chapter on Relation) and
BhartrÞhari’s Philosophy of Language: A Study of BhartrÞhari’s Sam
Þ bandha-samuddeśa in
the Context of the Va kyapadi ya with a Translation of Hela- ra- ja’s Commentary,
- -
Praki- rnÞ a-praka- śa. By JAN E. M. HOUBEN. Gonda Indological Studies, vol. II.
Groningen: EGBERT FORSTEN, 1995. Pp. 460 + xv. I wish to express here my
gratitude to scholars who helped me by reading a draft of this review. I have adopted
numerous suggestions Ashok N. Aklujkar made regarding both style and content.
Edwin Gerow suggested important stylistic revisions, which I have also adopted. Claus
Oetke helped me sharpen thoughts on “perspectivism” and translation. Had it been
possible, I would have taken his cue and gone much more deeply into both these
issues in general and in connection with BhartrÞhari specifically. Jon Yamashita made
several suggestions and corrected many typographic errors.
FOOTNOTES
1 For bibliographic information see Cardona 1976: 295-305; forthcoming, §4.2; and
Ramseier 1993.
2 On the cover and the title page sam Þ bandha appears—with m Þ for the bindu
representing anusva-ra—but elsewhere saṁbandha. I shall uniformly write sambandha.
3 I consider this section the weakest part of Houben’s book. Thus, in subsection 3.1
(pp. 46-47), concerning Mi-ma-ṁsa-, he does not even mention Jaiminisu-tra 1.3.8.24ff.,
where the issue is taken up whether terms like ga-vi-, gonÞ -i are to be granted authority
in the same way that go is; see below, §4.2.
4 In what follows, I shall refer to the VrÞtti on the Va-kyapadi-ya and to the VrÞttika-ra,
although I accept that BhartrÞhari is the author of both works, as well as of the
Maha-bha-sÞ yadi-pika-. Recent arguments that have been proposed to show that BhartrÞhari
and the VrÞttika-ra are distinct are not acceptable, in my opinion. For literature and
arguments against some recent claims, see Cardona forthcoming, §4.2.3.
5 These śisÞ Þt as are bra-hmanÞ as characterized not only by their speech but also by their
moral behavior, and they inhabit a particular area in the subcontinent. See Cardona
1997: 550-54 (§834). In a more general perspective, śisÞ Þt as are the carriers of Vedic
traditions governing behavior.
6 Another topic that brings up this question is that of how word and meaning are
identified with each other. Due to limitation of space, I do not take this up.
7 A comment is in order concerning the physical aspects of this book. In general, the
production is good. There are typographical errors, as is to be expected in any book
of this size, but misprints are relatively few and mostly self correcting. One error that
is not appears on page 241, note 380, where a reference is given to “Sharma (1977:
147-148).” The correct reference is to pages 247-48. More surprising is the fact that
in both copies which I received—one a review copy, the other a complimentary copy
from the publisher—pages 145-60 are missing and pages 161-76 are duplicated.
Fortunately, M. M. Deshpande did me the favor of copying and sending the missing
pages, for which I thank him.
8 I have omitted only a reference to Peri Sarveswara Sharma’s article.
9 The article alluded to has been published: Houben 1992-93.
10 Similarly, Houben 1992-93: 2.
11 Italics in the original.
12 I have omitted references Houben gives here to two articles by him.
13 VP 1.2: ekam eva yad a-mna-taṁ bhinnaśaktivyapa-śraya-t | aprÞthaktve ’pi śaktibhyahÞ

prÞthaktveneva vartate.
14 VP 1.3: adhya- hitakala- ṁ yasya ka- laśaktim upa- śrita- hÞ | janma- dayo vika- ra- hÞ sÞ adÞ
bha-vabhedasya yonayahÞ .
15 ja-yate ‘is born’, asti ‘is, exists’, viparinÞamate ‘changes’, vardhate ‘grows’, apaksÞ-i yate
‘diminishes’, vinaśyati ‘perishes, ceases to be’. E.g., Nirukta 1.2.
16 adhya- hita- is equivalent to adhya- ropita-, as the Paddhati notes (18.9-10):
adhya-hita-hÞ adhya-ropita-hÞ kala-hÞ yasya-hÞ .
17 VP 1.5: pra-ptyupa-yo ’nuka-raś ca tasya vedo maharsÞ ibhihÞ | eko ’py anekavartmeva
sama-mna-tahÞ prÞthak prÞthak.
18 VP 1.24-26: apoddha-rapada-rtha- ye ye ca-rtha-hÞ sthitalaksÞ anÞ a-hÞ | anva-khyeya-ś ca ye
śabda- ye ca-pi pratipa-daka-hÞ || ka-ryaka-ranÞabha-vena yogyabha-vena ca sthita-hÞ | dharme
ye pratyaye ca-ṅgaṁ sambandha-hÞ sa-dhvasa-dhusÞ u || te liṅgaiś ca svaśabdaiś ca śa-stre
’sminn upavarnÞ ita-hÞ | smrÞtyartham anugamyante kecid eva yatha-gamam.
19 VPVrÞ 1.24-26 (65.1): trisÞ v apy esÞ u ślokesÞ u prastutasya parisama-ptihÞ.
20 Paddhati 64.21-23: smrÞ tyartham iti: na maya- kiñcid apu- rvaṁ kriyate kintu
smaranÞ a-rtham asÞ Þt apada-rthi-samanugama iti prakaranÞaprayojanam a-ha | yatha-gamam iti:
notpreksÞ aya- api tv a-gama-nusa-renÞ eti.
21 VP 1.27: śisÞ tÞ ebhya a- gama- t siddha- hÞ sa- dhavo dharmasa- dhanam |
arthapratya-yana-bhede vipari-ta-s tv asa-dhavahÞ. See below, $4.4.5.
22 VP 1.29: na-narthika-m ima-m Þ kaścid vyavastha-m kartum arhati | tasma-n nibadhyate
- -
śisÞ Þt aihÞ sadhutvavisÞ aya smrÞtihÞ.
23 VP 1.43: tasma-d akrÞtakaṁ śa-straṁ smrÞtiṁ ca sanibandhana-m | a-śritya-rabhyate
śisÞ Þt aihÞ sa-dhutvavisÞ aya- smrÞtihÞ.
24 For the present discussion, it does not matter whether this referent is an individual
or an individual qua member of a class delimited by a defining generic property, an
external existent, or a mental entity.
25 See Houben, p. 20.
26 In the Vaiya- karanÞ asiddha- ntaka- rika- , Vaiya- karanÞ abhu- sÞ anÞ a, and
- - - -
VaiyakaranÞ asiddhantamañjusÞ a, as well as abbreviated versions of the last two, the
Vaiya-karanÞ abhu-sÞ anÞ asa-ra and Vaiya-karanÞ asiddha-ntalaghumañju-sÞ a-.
27 In their Mi-ma-ṁsa-su-tra and Bha-vana-viveka or Vidhiviveka.
28 In their Nya-yamañjari- and Tattvacinta-manÞ i.
29 VP 2.87: iti va-kyesÞ u ye dharma-hÞ pada-rthopanibandhana-hÞ | te sarve na prakalperan
padaṁ cet sya-d ava-cakam.
30 VP 2.88: avibhakte ’pi va-kya-rthe śaktibheda-d apoddhrÞte | va-kya-ntaravibha-gena
yathoktaṁ na virudhyate.
31 VP 2.72: nirjñta-rthaṁ padaṁ yac ca tadarthe pratipa-dite | pika-di yad avijña-taṁ tat
kim ity ȧnuyujyate “There are words whose meanings are understood, and when their
meanings have been understood, one asks ‘what is ...’ concerning words whose
meanings have not been understood.” I have translated with plural forms under the
assumption that padam and so on are generic singulars. The issue of how to interpret
words like pika—which are used among mlecchas but not among śisÞ Þt as—is taken up
-
in the A ryamleccha- dhikaranÞ a of Mi- ma- ṁ sa- su- tras (JS 1.3.5.10: coditaṁ tu
prati-yeta- virodha- t prama- nÞ ena), where the siddha- nta is that such terms are to be
understood in the meanings authorized by mleccha usage and not on the basis of
etymological or grammatical analysis.
32 VP 2.90-92: gavaye narasiṁhe ca-py ekajña-na-vṙte yatha- | bha-gaṁ ja-tyantarasyaiva
sadrÞśaṁ pratipadyate , aprasiddhaṁ tu yaṁ bha-gam adrÞsÞ Þt am anupaśyati | ta-vaty
asaṁvidaṁ mu-dÞ hahÞ sarvatra pratipadyate , tatha- pika-diyogena va-kye ’tyantavilaksÞ anÞ e
| sadÞ rśasyaiva saṁjña-nam asato ’rthasya manyate. For 2.90b, I have accepted the
reading ekajña- na- vrÞ te in accordance with PunÞ yara- ja’s commentary, where he
paraphrases this with ekajña-nena abhinnena a-vrÞte visÞ ayi-krÞte paricchinne sati “by one
knowledge: one that is not split up, when ... is covered: when ... has been made the
object of ..., has been determined.” That is, a gayal or Narasiṁha is the object of a
single undifferentiated knowledge. The reading shown appears also in K. A.
Subramania Iyer’s and Raghuna-tha Śarma-’s editions, as well as in A. N. Aklujkar’s
unpublished edition. Rau’s edition, based on the ka-rika- manuscripts alone, reads
ekajña-na-d Þrte “without....” Under this reading, the verse speaks of one’s understanding
a part that is similar to what pertains to a totally different generic class without actually
having a cognition of such a part in a gayal or Narasiṁha. In Aklujkar’s edition, 2.90
has va-py instead of ca-py and 2.91 is: aprasiddhaṁ tu yad bha-gam adrÞsÞ Þt am anupaśyati
| ta-vat tv asaṁvidan mu-dÞ hahÞ sarvaṁ na pratipadyate.
33 VP 2.16: aśabdo yadi va- kya- rthahÞ pada- rtho ’pi tatha- bhavet | evaṁ ca sati
sambandhhÞ śabdasya-rthena hi-yate. I have adopted the reading aśabdo instead of
Rau’s aśa-bdo on the basis of the VrÞtti. The argument advanced in this verse is
obviously against Bha-ÞtÞta Mi-ma-ṁsakas, who let individual words signify their meanings
and then have these word meanings come into relation to yield a meaning that is not
signified by any speech unit. See Cardona 1983: 148-51.
34 VP 2.73: sa-marthyapra-itaṁ yac ca vyaktyartham anusÞ ajyate | śrutir eva-nusÞ aṅgenÞ a
ba- dhika- liṅ gava- kyayohÞ . This alludes to what is said in JS 3.3.7.14:
śrutiliṅgava- kyaprakaranÞ astha- nasama- khya- na- na- ṁ samava- ye pa- radaurbalyam
arthaviprakarsÞ a-t, which is actually cited in the VrÞtti on VP 2.75. Direct expression,
indirect inference due to the capacity of something said to serve as as indication that
something else must obtain, use of a term with another in a single utterance, the
mutual expectation between the meanings of terms, collocation, and the use of a
derived term are placed on a scale such that each later factor has less weight than
an earlier one in case of both coming into play for interpreting a given statement. The
VrÞtti on VP 2.73 (itaś ca-vibha-gapaksÞ o na yuktahÞ | śrutiva-kyasamava-ye śrutitva-viśesÞ enÞa
paradaurbalya-sambhava-t) begins by noting that this gives another reason (itaś ca) why
it is not proper to consider an utterance as a single indivisible whole (avibha-gapaksÞ o
na yuktahÞ ). If both śruti and va-kya come into play (śrutiva-kyasamava-ye), under this
view it is impossible to make a decision, because it is not possible that one be less
strong than the other, since there is no distinction in that there is simply śruti.
BhartrÞ hari takes up the same issues in the Ja- tisamuddeśa (VP 3.1.75-76) and
considers also the possibility that the referents of both terms are directly linked to the
action. These issues cannot be discussed here.
35 This example is given in PunÞ yara-ja’s commentary on VP 2.95. PunÞyara-ja here also
emphasizes that the argument is made against those who assume that only padas are
real: yadi pada-ny eva satya-ni tada- dadhy a-nayetya-disaṁhita-ya-ṁ ru-pavina-śa-t padasya
niyatasya-bha-ve kam avadhiṁ grÞhi-tva- tadartho vivicyata-m ...
36 VP 2.95: ru-pana-śe pada-na-ṁ sya-t kathaṁ ca-vadhikalpana- | agrÞhi-ta-vadhau śabde
kathaṁ ca-rtho vivicyate.
37 ŚlV, Va-kya-dhikaranÞa 178: tatha- ra-ja-rthava-n drÞsÞ Þt o ra-jñety atra ca na-sty asau | dadhi
gaur iti na-pi-mau vidmo dadhy atra ga-m iti.
38 ŚlV, Va- kya- dhikaranÞ a 230: aśa- bde ca- pi va- kya- rthe na pada- rthesÞ v aśa- bdata- |
va-kya-rthasyeva naitesÞ a-ṁ nimitta-ntarasambhavahÞ .
39 Houben (1993: 160) remarks, “It should be pointed out that even according to the
view that the sentence is the primary unit, it is acceptable to divide the sentence
secondarily into words and these into smaller parts.” I cannot enter here into details
concerning passages from the Di-pika-.
40 PunÞyara-ja introduces this, saying sphotÞapaksÞ am apy upasaṁhartum a-ha “He says
... to summarize the position that an utterance is sphotÞa.”
41 K. A. Subramania Iyer’s edition reads ekasyaiva-rthata-m “only one has meaning,”

which is found in the VrÞtti on VP 2.75.
42 VP 2.56: nityatve samuda-ya-na-ṁ ja-ter va- parikalpane | ekasyaika-rthata-m a-hur
va-kyasya-vyabhica-rinÞ -i m. This follows ka-rika-s (VP 2.54-55) summarizing the position that
a sentence is a composite of words whose meanings enter into relations with each
other and the view that the sequence of words itself constitutes the utterance.
43 VPTÞ -i ka- 2.57.
44 The contrasting views are set forth in VP 2.58: padaprakrÞtibha-vaś ca vrÞttibhedena
varnÞ yate | pada- na-ṁ saṁhita- yonihÞ saṁhita- va- pada-śraya-. BhartrÞhari goes on to
discuss places in the Maha-bha-sÞ ya where Patañjali speaks of padas as products which
authors of padapa-Þt has (padaka-ra-hÞ ) produce.
45 VPVrÞ 2.58: tatra kesÞ a-ñcit paurusÞ eya-nÞ y a-mna-yapada-ni śabdesÞ u smrÞtipaksÞ asya va- |
kesÞ a-ñcit tu padaru-pa eva-mna-yahÞ saṁhita- paurusÞ eyi- smrÞtipaksÞ asya va- | kesÞ a-ñcit tu
nitya-v ubha- v apy etau sama- mna-yau padasama-mna-yas tu pratipa-dakatvena nityahÞ
itaras tu pratipa-dyatvena nityahÞ | kesÞ a-ñcin nityasyaikasya-mna-yasya dve ete nitye
vibha-ga-vibha-gaśakti- pratipa-dakapratipattavyaru-penÞa vartete.
46 Hela-ra- ja, introduction to VP 3.1.1: iha pada- rtha- sÞ tÞakaparatva- d va- kyapadi-yasya
prathamaka- nÞ dÞ ena prayojana- dipada- rthe nirnÞ -i te ’nantaraka- nÞ dÞ opapa- ditopapattibhir
va- kyatadarthayor anva- khyeyasthitalaksÞ anÞ ayohÞ pada- rthayor nirnÞ -i tatva- t
- - -
tadaupayikapoddharapadavicarahÞ prakramyate.
47 VPVrÞ 1.24-26 (65.1-3): tatra-poddha-rapada-rtho na-ma-tyantasaṁsrÞsÞ Þt ahÞ saṁsarga-d
anumeyena parikalpitena ru-penÞ a prakrÞtavivekahÞ sannapoddhriyate | praviviktasya hi
tasya vastuno vyavaha-ra-ti-taṁ ru-pam.
48 VPVrÞ 1.24-26 (65: 3-4): tat tu svapratyaya- nuka- renÞ a yatha- gamaṁ
bha-vana-bhya-savaśa-d utpreksÞ aya- pra-yenÞ a vyavastha-pyate.
49 VPVrÞ 1.24-26 (65: 4-6): tathaiva ca- pravibha- ge śabda- tmani ka- rya- rtham
anvayavyatireka- bhya- ṁ ru- pasamanugamakalpanaya- samuda- ya- d apoddhrÞ ta- na- ṁ
śabda-na-m abhidheyatvena-śri-yate. This point is also emphasized elsewhere. VP 2.12
states that vrÞsÞ abha ‘bull’ (cf. rÞsÞ abha ‘bull’), udaka ‘water’ (cf. udan ‘water’), ya-vaka
‘food made from barley’ (cf. ya-va ‘food made from barley’) contain meaningless parts;
they are analyzed, to be sure, and this is done by reasoning through anvaya and
vyatireka, but anvaya and vyatireka are merely a means allowing one to speak of such
items in terms of grammatical operations describing them through derivation (bha-gair
anarthakair yukta- vrÞsÞ abhodakaya-vaka-hÞ | anvayavyatirekau tu vyavaha-ranibandhanam).
Commenting on this ka-rika-, PunÞyara-ja remarks as follows: There is no understanding
of the meaning of an element rÞsÞ abha separately in vrÞsÞ abha or that of udan, ya-va in
udaka, ya-vaka. However, how would one who does not know be instructed in the
grammar except through reasoning by anvaya and vyatireka with respect to bases and
affixes? Thus also, the only view that is appropriate is that an impartite sentence alone
is a signifier (nahi vrÞsÞ abhe ÞrsÞ abhasyodakaya-vakayor vodaya-vaśabdayor artha-nugamahÞ
kaścid asti api tu śa-stre padasya prakrÞtipratyayayor anvayavyatireka-bhya-ṁ vina- katham
ajño vyutpa-dyeta | evañca niraṁśam eva va-kyaṁ va-cakam ity eva yuktam).
50 VPVrÞ 1.24-26 (65: 6-7): so ’yam apoddha-rapada-rthahÞ śa-stravyavaha-ram anupatati
śa-stravyavaha-rasadÞ rśaṁ ca laukikabhedavyavaha-ram.
51 Paddhati 64.26-65.1: apoddha-ranÞ aṁ saṁsargapu- rvakam iti pu- rva- vastha- m a- ha
atyantasaṁsrÞsÞ Þt a iti | vibha-gapu-rvakasaṁsarganisÞ edha-ya-tyantagrahanÞ am.
52 Paddhati 65.10-12: kathaṁ niravayavatva- t prÞ thakkriyety a- ha anumeyeneti |
anvayavyatireka-bhya-ṁ bha-ga-numa-na-t | ta-v eva niravayave katham ity a-ha kalpiteneti
| asatyata-m anvayavyatirekayor a-ha. Much later, Na-geśa again makes the same point
when he says (LM 14): ... prativa-kye saṅketagraha- sambhava- t tadanva- khya- nasya
laghu- pa- yena- sambhava- c ca kalpanaya- pada- ni pravibhajya pade
prakrÞ tipratyayabha- gakalpanena kalpita- bhya- m anvayavyatireka- bhya- ṁ

tattadarthavibhagaṁ śastramatravisÞ ayaṁ parikalpayanti smaca-rya-hÞ “Since it is not
- - - -
possible to grasp a conventional relation with respect to each sentence and also
because it is not possible to describe each sentence in a brief manner, teachers
fictitiously divided up words and, by assuming bases and affixes as separate parts in
a word, posited such and such meaning parts—whose domain is solely the
grammar—through assumed anvaya and vyatireka.” The assumption that one can thus
carry out reasoning from anvaya and vyatireka with respect to putative parts in turn
rests on the assumption that certain things that look similar are in fact the same.
BhartrÞhari makes this point frequently, as in VP 2.92 (see §3.5, with note 32); see also
above with note 49.
53 Paddhati 65.15-16: yatahÞ pravibhaktaihÞ padr-thair na pravrÞttinivrÞttilaksÞ anÞo vyavaha-rahÞ
... saṁsrÞsÞ Þt air eveti.
54 VPVrÞ 1.24-26 (68: 5-6): anva- khyeya- ś ca ye śabda- hÞ : kesÞ a- ñcit pada- vadhikam
anva-khya-naṁ va-kya-vadhikam ekesÞ a-m. My earlier wording (Cardona 1976: 301: “... in
addition to the sentence, some take syntactic units (pada) as the units to be analysed”)
was poor, since one could misunderstand the intent. I should not have used ‘analysed’.
55 The VrÞtti goes on to give examples such that Pa-nÞini could be understood to work
under the padasaṁska- rapaksÞ a in addition to the va- kyasaṁska- rapaksÞ a. I cannot
discuss this point here.
56 VPVrÞ 1.24-26 (77.1): sthitalaksÞ anÞ as tu śs-tre pada-rtho va-kya-rtho va-. The VrÞtti goes
on to explain just what this meaning is. I do not think it is necessary to consider this
here.
57 VPVrÞ 1.24-26 (66.4-67.1): tatha- pu- rvapada- rtha uttarapada- rtho ‘nyapada- rthahÞ
pra-tipadikr-tho dha-tvarthahÞ pratyaya-rtha ity ekapadava-cyo ‘py aniyata-vadhir bahudha-
pravibhajya kaiścit kathañcid apoddhriyate.
58 VP 2.7-9: yathaika eva sarva-rthapraka-śahÞ pravibhajyate | drÞśyabheda-nuka-renÞ a
va-kya-rtha-nugamas tatha- || citrasyaikasya ru-pasya yatha- bhedanidarśanaihÞ | ni-la-dibhihÞ
sama-khya- naṁ kriyate bhinnalaksÞ anÞ aihÞ || tathaivaikasya va- kyasya nira- ka- ṅksÞ asya
sarvatahÞ | śabda-ntaraihÞ sama-khya-naṁ sa-ka-ṅksÞ air anugamyate. In 2.7d, I have adopted
the reading va-kya-rtha-nugamas tatha-, found in the editions of Raghuna-tha Śarma-, K.
A. Subramania Iyer, and Aklujkar, instead of Rau’s va-kya-rtha-vagamas tatha-, for two
reasons: this accords with 2.9d anugamyate and it is the reading reflected in
PunÞ yara-ja’s commentary.
59 VP 2.10: yatha- pade vibhajyante prakrÞtipratyaya-dayahÞ | apoddha-ras tatha- va-kye
pada-na-m upapadyate. K. A. Subramania Iyer’s and Raghuna-tha Śarma-’s editions have
upavarnÞ yate ‘is described’, which occurs also in PunÞyara-ja’s TÞ -i ka-.
60 VP 3.1.1.-2: dvidha- kaiścit padaṁ bhinnaṁ caturdha- pañcadha-pi va- | apoddhrÞtyaiva
va-kyebhyahÞ prakrÞtipratyaya-divat || pada-rtha-na-m apoddha-re ja-tir va- dravyam eva va- |
padr-thau sarvaśabda-na-ṁ nitya-v evopavarnÞ itau.
61 Due to space limitations, I have omitted discussing evidence from the
Maha-bha-sÞ yadi-pika-, which, though understandably scantier than the evidence from the
Va-kyapadi-ya and its VrÞtti, nevertheless is in harmony with it.
62 Helara- ja 3.1.2 (8.4-5): tatha- hi sarvesÞ a- m api śabda- na- ṁ padaru- pa- nÞ a- m Þ
na-ma-khya-ta-disvabha-va-na-ṁ ja-tiva-dimate ja-tir eva-rtho na dravyam | dravyava-dimate tu
dravyam eva na ja-tihÞ . Hela-ra-ja goes on to say that the use of va- ‘or’ twice in the
ka-rika- indicates a third view: that a term signifies an individual qualified by a generic
property. This need not be discussed here.
63 What is more, as is pointed out in the VrÞtti on VP 1.24-26 (67: 1-2: sthitalaksÞ anÞ as
tu va- kyaru- popagrahahÞ kalpitodde-ś avibha- go viś isÞ tÞ a ekahÞ kriya- tma-
vicchinnapada-rthagrahanÞopa-yapratipa-dyahÞ ), in the Pa-nÞini-ya scheme of things, the fixed
meaning that is linked to a sentence is an action (kriya-tma-), qualified by the ka-rakas

that participate in bringing this to completion, and this meaning is conveyed using the
meanings of abstracted words as means. One such abstracted word is a verb form.
Accordingly, a separate samuddeśa is devoted to considering what an action is.
64 In what follows, I will use sa-dhuśabda (or simply śabda) and apaśabda (or
apabhraṁśa where appropriate) to refer to terms of the types (3) and (4), respectively.
In accordance with usage in various schools of thought, I will also use śakti (‘power,
capacity’) as a cover term to refer to several things: the capacity that a given term has
to produce a verbal cognition (bodhakatva) of a given meaning and a relation that
holds directly between a given term and a meaning. The latter is considered to be a
wish (iccha-) that a given meaning be understood from a term or that a term produce
the cognition of a given meaning as well as a signifier-significand relation
(va-cyava-cakabha-vasambandha). These positions are most prominently associated with
KaunÞ dÞ abhatÞÞta, the Naiya-yikas, and Na-geśa.
65 Conversely, if (3) is treated as derived from (4), the latter signify directly and the
former signify indirectly, through the intermediary of (4). See §4.4.4.
66 Bh I.5.20-22: laghi- ya- ñ śabdopadeśo gari- ya- n apaśabdopadeśahÞ | ekaikasya
śabdasya bahavo ’pabhraṁśa- hÞ | tad yatha- gaur ity asya śabdasya ga- vi- gonÞ -i
gopotalika-dayo ’pabhraṁśa-hÞ .
67 Bh I.10.6-8: jña-ne dharma iti cet tatha-dharmahÞ pra-pnoti | yo hi śabda-ñ ja-na-ty
apaśabda-n apy asau ja-na-ti | yathaiva śabdajña-ne dharma evam apaśabdajña-ne ’py
adharmahÞ | athava- bhu- ya- n adharmahÞ pra-pnoti | bhu- ya- ṁso ’paśabda- alpi-ya- ṁsahÞ
śabda-hÞ | ekaikasya śabdasya bahavo ’pabhraṁa-śhÞ | tad yatha- gaur ity asya śabdasya
ga-vi- gonÞi- gopotalika-dayo ’pabhraṁśa-hÞ . See Cardona 1997: 549 (§833).
68 Bh. I.8.20-22: evam iha- pi sama- na- ya- m arthagatau śabdena ca- paśabdena ca
dharmaniyamahÞ kriyate: śabdenaiva-rtho ’bhidheyo na-paśabdeneti. See Cardona 1997:
547 (§830).
69 Such items are not just nominals. They are also verb forms. Thus, in 1.3.1 vt. 12,
Ka-tya-yana says that one reason for listing verb bases in the Dha-tupa-Þt ha is to prevent
the class name dha- tu from applying to a set of terms a- nÞ apayati and so on
(bhu-va-dipa-ÞthahÞ pra-tipadika-nÞ apayatya-dinivrÞttyarthahÞ ). Patañjali gives as examples also
vatÞÞtati and vadÞ dÞ hati. These are clearly Middle Indic equivalents of Sanskrit a-jña-payati
‘commands’, vartate ‘occurs’, and vardhate ‘grows’, with active rather than middle
endings and phonological developments characteristic of Middle Indic.
70 From earliest known times, Pa-nÞ ini-yas maintained this, as is clear from Ka-tya-yana’s
first va-rttika (siddhe śabda-rthasambandhe lokato ’rthaprayukte śabdaprayoge śa-strenÞ a
dharmaniyamahÞ). In accordance with this, as interpreted in the Maha-bha-sÞ ya, BhartrÞhari
says that great rÞsÞ is—authors of su-tras such as Pa-nÞini, authors of va-rttikas and authors
of bha-sÞ yas—have handed down the tradition that linguistic units, their meanings, and
the relations between the two are eternal (VP 1.23: nitya-hÞ śabda-rthasambandha-s
tatra-mna-ta- maharsÞ ibhihÞ | su-tra-nÞa-ṁ sa-nutantra-nÞ a-ṁ bha-sÞ ya-nÞ a-ṁ ca pranÞ etrÞbhihÞ ).
71 Bh. I.19.21-23: aśaktija- nukaranÞ a- rthahÞ | aśaktya- kaya- cid bra- hmanÞ ya- rÞ taka iti
proyoktavya Þl taka iti prayuktam | tasya-nukaranÞ aṁ bra-hmanÞ y Þl taka ity a-ha kuma-ry Þl taka
ity a-heti.
72 JS 1.3.8.24: prayogotpattyaśa-stratva-c chabdesÞ u na vyavastha- sya-t.
73 ŚBh 1.3.8.24 (II.182-83): gaur ga- vi- gonÞ -i gopotalikety evama- dayahÞ śabda-
uda-haranÞ am | gośabdo yatha- sa-sna-dimati prama-nÞ aṁ kiṁ tatha- ga-vya-dayo ’py uta neti
sandehahÞ | kim atraikahÞ śabdo ’vicchinnapa-ramparyo ’rtha-bhidha-yi- itare ’pabhraṁśa- uta
sarve ’na-dayahÞ.
74 ŚBh 1.3.8.24 (II.183): sarva iti bru- mahÞ | kutahÞ | pratyaya- t | prati- yate hi
ga-vya-dibhyahÞ sa-sna-dima-n arthahÞ | tasma-d ito varsÞ aśate ’py asya-rthasya sambandha
a-si-d eva tatahÞ parenÞa tataś ca parenÞ ety ana-dita- | karta- ca-sya sambandhasya na-sti-ti
vyavasthitam eva. Cf. JS 1.1.1.5: autpattikas tu śabdasya-rthena sambandhahÞ ...
75 ŚBh 1.3.8.24 (II.183): tasma- t sarve sa-dhavahÞ sarvair bha- sÞ itavyam | sarve hi
sa-dhayanty artham yatha- hastahÞ karahÞ pa-nÞir iti.
76 ŚBh 1.3.8.24 (II.183): artha-ya hy eta ucca-ryante na-drÞsÞ Þt a-ya | na hy esÞ a-m ucca-ranÞ e
śa-stram asti | tasma-n na vyavatisÞ Þt heta kaścid eka eva sa-dhur itare ’sa-dhava iti.
77 JS 1.3.8.25: śabde prayatnanisÞ patter apara- dhasya bha- gitvam. I have taken
prayatnanisÞ pattehÞ as an ablative stating a reason. This is the first interpretation
Kuma- rila gives (TV II.211: prayatnanisÞ patter iti
- - - - -
purvoktanyayavadharitaprayatnabhivyaktir eva hetutvenopadiśyate), although he goes
on to give alternative interpretations, which cannot be considered here.
78 ŚBh 1.3.8.25 (II.210-13): tatra- para-dhyeta-py ucca-rayita- yatha- śusÞ ke patisÞ ya-mi-ti
kardame patati sakrÞ d upaspraksÞ ya- mi- ti dvir upasprÞ śati | tato ’para- dha- t pravrÞ tta-
ga-vya-dayo bhaveyur na niyogato ’vicchinnapa-ramparya- eveti.
79 JS 1.3.8.26: anya-yaś ca-nekaśabdatvam. Accepting many terms would require also
accepting many separate relations between these terms and the single meaning, thus
resulting in prolixity.
80 JS 1.3.8.27: tatra tattvam abhiyogaviśesÞ a-t. tatra can refer to the items under
discussion or to the doubt concerning them. tattvam (‘being that’) is best interpreted to
refer to the properties of being correct or incorrect. The property of being learned
(abhiyoga) characterizes the authoritative learned (abhiyukta) speakers who institute
restrictions, that is, the tradition of grammarians. Kuma-rila (TV II.215) and Someśvara
(Nya-yasudha- 310) explicitly bring in the connection with grammar.
81 ŚBh 1.3.8.27 (II.215): ... yam abhiyukta- upadiśanty esÞ a eva sa-dhur iti sa-dhur ity
avagantavyahÞ |
82 JS 1.3.8.28: tadaśaktiś ca-nuru-patva-t. See note 84.
83 TV 1.3.8.25 (II.214): yatha- ca prakrÞtisa- ru- pyadva- renÞ a- pabhraṁśa- hÞ pra- krÞti-m eva
śaktim a-virbha-vayanto ’rthapratipatta-v upayogaṁ gacchanti tatha- tadaśaktiś ca-nuru-pya-d
ity atra varnÞ ayisÞ yate. See below concerning Śabara’s description of what occurs.
84 ŚBh 1.3.8.28 (II.228): atha yad uktam artho ’vagamyate ga-vya-dibhyahÞ ata esÞ a-m
apy ana- dir arthena sambandha iti tadaśaktir esÞ a- ṁ gamyate | gośabdam
ucca-rayituka-mena kenacid aśaktya- ga-vi-ty ucca-ritam | aparenÞ a jña-taṁ sa-sna-dima-n asya
vivaksÞ itahÞ tadarthaṁ gaur ity ucca-rayituka-mo ga-vi-ty ucca-rayati | tatahÞ śiksÞ itva- ’pare ’pi
sa-sna-dimati vivaksÞ ite ga-vi-ty ucca-rayanti | tena ga-vya-dibhyahÞ sa-sna-dima-n avagamyate
| anuru-po hi ga-vya-dir gośabdasya. As shown, Śabara says tadaśaktir esÞ a-ṁ gamyate,
and esÞ a-m must refer contextually to the apabhraṁśa terms ga-vi- and so on, so that
tadaśaktihÞ has here to be interpreted as a sÞ asÞ Þt hi-tatpurusÞ a (= tesÞ a-m aśaktihÞ ) in which
tad refers to sa-dhu terms like go, and aśakti denotes the absence of śakti which
pertains to them: apabhraṁśa terms lack the śakti which sa-dhu terms have.
85 JS 1.3.8.29: ekadeśatva-c ca- vibhaktivyatyaye sya-t.
86 ŚBh 1.3.8.29 (II.228): ata eva vibhaktivyatyaye ’pi pratyayo bhavati | aśmakair
a-gaccha-mi-ty aśmakaikadeśa upalabhyate | aśmakebhya ity eva śabdahÞ smaryate | tato
’śmakebhya ity esÞ o ’rtha upalabhyate | evaṁ ga-vya-didarśana-d gośabdasmaranÞ aṁ tatahÞ
sa-sna-dima-n avagamyate. The examples are well chosen: ga-vi- and so on are Middle
Indic, and in Middle Indic the instrumental plural and ablative plural merge, with the
form etymologically equivalent to the Old Indo-Aryan instrumental serving both
functions.
87 The passage in question concerns the issue noted above. The claim is advanced
that there is no occasion to assume that the use of terms like ga-vi- in signifying what
is also signified by go had a beginning, since it is not recorded in any smrÞti that such
terms had their relation with their referent created by someone. This claim is refuted
by showing how there can be a beginning for the use of ga-vi- and so on. This occurs
in the way that a child pronounces while wishing to utter something else; e.g., katta-
and vinÞ nÞ uhÞ instead of karta- and visÞ nÞ uhÞ . (BrÞ hati- III.143: ... na ca ga- vya- di- na- ṁ
ghatÞa-di-na-m iva sambandhasya karta- smaryate | tasma-d a-dimatta-ya- avasara eva na-sti
| satyaṁ yady avasaro na asti tv asau | drÞ śyate hi ba- la- na- m
anyaśabdocca-ranÞ eccha-ya-m api śabda-ntarocca-ranÞ aṁ yatha- karteccha-ya-ṁ katteti visÞ nÞ ur
vinÞ nÞur iti).
88 R Þ juP III.143: idam atra- bhipretam: kenacid gośabdam ucca- rayituka- mena
apatÞ ukaranÞ ena prama- da- dina- va- ga- vi- ty ucca- ritam | tatra vrÞ ddha- ntarenÞ a kenacit
prakaranÞ a-dina- tadi-ya-ṁ vivaksÞ a-m avagamya gośabda-rthaṁ prati-tya tena vyavaha-rahÞ
pravartitahÞ | tatra-nya-bhya-m avyutpanna-bhya-ṁ bhra-ntyaivam avadha-ritam: ga-vi-śabda-d
eva-nena- yam artho ’vyavadha- nena pratipanna iti | tataś ca ta-bhya- ṁ sa- sna- dimati
va-cakatvaṁ ga- vi- śab̊dasya bhra- ntyaiva- vadha- ritam | tatha- vasa- yinau tena śabdena
vyavahrÞtavantau | tadvyavaha- ra-d ba-la- apare ’vyutpattya- vyavaharanti-ty a-dimattaya-
vyavaha-rasiddhihÞ.
89 I say this because Gaṅgeśa uses the perfect babhu-va (see note 90).
90 TC IV.2.642-43: nanu mleccha-di-na-ṁ saṁskrÞtam aja-nata-ṁ kathaṁ tacchaktya-ropahÞ
| ucyate | kenacid gaur iti śabde prayoktavye prama- da- d ga- vi- śabde prayukte
vyutpannas tena gośabdam unni- ya tato ga- ṁ prati- tya vyavahrÞ tava- n | yatha- huhÞ :
amba-mbeti yada- ba-lahÞ śiksÞ yama-nÞ ahÞ prabha-sÞ ate | avyaktaṁ ’tadvida-ṁ tena vyakte
bhavati nirnÞaya iti | pa-rśvasthaś ca vyutpitsur ga-vi-śabda-d eva-yaṁ ga-ṁ prati-tava-n ity
avagamya ga-vi-śabdam eva gośaktatvena prati-tya-nyesÞ a-ṁ vyutpa-dako babhu-veti | tatahÞ
prabhrÞty apabhraṁśe śaktatvabhramahÞ . The reference is to VP 1.179 (see §4.4.4).
Earlier (TC IV.641), Gaṅgeśa cites also JS 1.3.8.26 (see note 79) to buttress one of
the arguments against granting aprabhraṁśa terms the śakti relation. Na-geśa portrays
the same situation; see §4.6.4.
91 In order to shorten the presentation, I am taking the Vaiya-karanÞabhu-sÞ anÞ asa-ra as
my basic source, giving abbreviated references to the Vaiya- karanÞ abhu- sÞ anÞ a, as
appropriate. For the same reason, I do not deal with what BhatÞÞt oji says in his
Śabdakaustubha concerning what constitutes sa-dhutva and whether apabhraṁśa terms
signify—directly or indirectly—as well as what is said on the same topic in texts such
as the Padamañjari- and Uddyotana.
92 VBh 218 (end of ka-rika- 37): tasma-d bodhakatvaṁ śaktir iti mate na kaścid dosÞ a iti
siddham. Although this śakti is indeed a capacity that resides in words as signifiers,
it is not strictly speaking a relation.
93 VBhS 296: nanv evaṁ bha-sÞ a-dito bodhadarśana-d bodhakata-ru-pa- śaktis tatra-pi sya-t
| tatha- ca sa-dhuta-pi sya-t | śaktatvasyaiva sa-dhuta-ya- vya-karanÞ a-dhikaranÞ e pratipa-dana-t
.... VBh. 218 (introduction to ka-rika- 38): nanv evaṁ bha-sÞ a-dito ’pi bodhadarśana-t tatra-pi
śaktisvi-ka-ra a-vaśyakahÞ ... tatha- ca śaktimattva-viśesÞ a-d ga-vya-di-na-ṁ sa-dhuta-pattihÞ iti ced
.... The allusion in the Vaiya-karanÞ abhu-sÞ anÞasa-ra is to the section of the Jaiminisu-tras
discussed above in §4.2.1.
94 va-cakahÞ , glossed (VBhS 296) as bodhakahÞ .
95 anuma-nena. In the Vaiya-karanÞabhu-sÞ anÞ a, KaunÞ dÞ abhatÞÞta says this means ‘due to
remembering a sa- dhu term’ or ‘due to erroneously attributing śakti’ (VBh. 218:
anuma-nena sa-dhusmaranÞa-t śaktibhrama-d va-). In his shorter work, he explains this with
a parallel: apabhraṁśa terms serve for recalling sa-dhu terms (sa-dhuśabdam anuma-ya
“after recalling the sa-dhu term”) just as written symbols serve to recall spoken sounds;
they do not directly signify, so that they are not sa-dhu. VBhS 296: asa-dhur ga-vya-dir
anuma-nena śabdam anuma-ya va-cako bodhakahÞ kaiścid isÞ yate | tatha- ca lipivat tesÞ a-ṁ
sa-dhusmaranÞa evopayogo na tu sa-ksÞ a-ttaddva-cakatvam ato na sa-dhutvam iti bha-vahÞ.
Harivallabha (DarpanÞ a 296: anuma-nam atra smrÞtihÞ anu paśca-n ma-nam iti vyutpattehÞ
na tu vya-ptijña-nam tacchu-nya-na-m api śa-bdabodhadarśana-t) notes that anuma-na here

refers to recollection and that the anuma-na in question is not inference through
knowledge of pervasion, since one sees that even those who do not have a knowledge
of pervasion as applicable to inference have a verbal cognition from asa-dhu terms. The
VrÞtti on VP 1.180 invokes the example of fire and smoke (see §4.4.4, with note 135),
but this can be used as a parallel: an asa-dhu term calls to mind a sa-dhu term as
smoke calls fire to mind.
96 VBh 218: atra naiya-yika-di-na-ṁ sama-dhim a-ha prathama-rdhena: asa-dhur anuma-nena
va-cakahÞ kaiścid isÞ yate | va-ca-katva-viśesÞ e va- niyamahÞ punÞ yapa-payohÞ . This is ka-rika- 38
of BhatÞ tÞ oji’s Vaiya- karanÞ asiddha- ntaka- rika- . Although the verse is taken from the
Va-kyapadi-ya (3.3.30), KaunÞ dÞ abhatÞÞt a treats it simply as part of BhatÞÞt oji’s text upon
which he comments. Given that KaunÞ dÞ abhatÞÞt a was BhatÞÞt oji’s nephew, there is no
reason to doubt that this was intended. In the Vaiya-karanÞ abhu-sÞ anÞ asa-ra, KaunÞ dÞabhatÞÞta
introduces the ka-rika- saying that BhatÞÞt oji answers in two ways the doubt set forth
earlier (ity a-śaǹka- ṁ dvidha- sama- dhatte). However, he later (VBhS 298: ida- ni- ṁ
svamatam a-ha) introduces the second half of the verse saying that now BhatÞÞtoji states
his own view.
97 The interpretation preferred by commentators is that apabhraṁśa terms are
apparently identified with sa- dhu terms: Paddhati on VP 1.177 (141) (230.20-21:
ta-da- tmyam iti: sa- dhuśabda- tmata- ṁ pratipadya; DarpanÞ a 297: gopada ucca- ranÞ -i ye
karanÞ a- pa- tÞ avena ga- vi- ty ucca- ritam | vastuto gopadam evedam iti ta- da- tmyena
bha-sama- na- ga- vya- diśabda- gava- dipada- rthasya praka- śaka- ity arthah; Pari-ksÞa- 297:
ta-da-tmyeti: sa-dhuta-da-tm-yapraka-rakajña-naviśesÞ yata-ṁ pra-pya vety arthahÞ . There is also
another interpretation, under which apabÞ hraṁśa terms are identified with meanings just
as sa-dhu terms are; e.g., VBhSKa-śika- 422: ta-da-tmyam upagamyeveti: arthata-da-tmyaṁ
gagarya-diśabde grÞhi-tvety arthahÞ . In view of the comparison the VrÞtti draws between
this identification and the way of communicating through gestures (see $4.4.4, with
note 128), I consider the first interpretation preferable.
98 I assume that this has to do with a child learning to address its mother, so that the
mother uses the vocative; cf. Ra-maprasa-da Tripa-Þt hi- 1990: 129. Of course, amba-mbeti
can also refer to the nominative amba- repeated.
99 The reading bambeti yatha- ba-lahÞ in VP 1.179a is known from commentators (e.g.,
VBhS-Ka-śika- 423). See $4.4.4, with note 134.
100 smrÞtiśa-strenÞ a. In the first instance this encompasses grammars like Pa-nÞ ini’s, but
also includes other works, such as dictionaries, which have to do with the transmission
of speech, and other authoritative works. There is also a reading smrÞtima-trenÞ a.
101 VBhS 296-97: uktaṁ hi va-kyapadi-ye: te sa-dhusÞ v anuma-nena pratyayotpattihetavahÞ
| ta-da-tmyam upagamyeva śabda-rthasya praka-śaka-hÞ na śisÞ Þt air anugamyante parya-ya-
iva sa-dhavahÞ | te yatahÞ smrÞtiśa-strenÞ a tasma-t sa-ksÞ a-d ava-caka-hÞ amba-mbeti yada- ba-lahÞ
śiksÞ ama-nÞ ahÞ prabha-sÞ ate | avyaktaṁ tadvida-ṁ tena vyakte bhavati nirnÞ ayahÞ | evaṁ
sa-dhau prayoktavye yo ’pabhraṁsÞ ahÞ prayujyate | tena sa-dhuvyavahitahÞ kaścid artho
‘bhidhi-yate. These verses are cited in VBh 219 also after a short series of arguments
that ends with na ca- pabhraṁ ś a- d bodho na sya- d iti va- cyam vyutpannasya
sa-dhusmaranÞ a-d bodhopapattehÞ | uktaṁ hi va-kyapadi-ya a-gamasamuccayaka-nÞ dÞ aśesÞ e
“Nor should one say that there would be no cognition from an apabhraṁśa item, since
a cognition is accounted for from remembering a sa-dhu item. It has been said in the
-
supplement to the Agamasamuccayaka-nÞdÞ a in the Va-kyapadi-ya.” The verses are VP
1.177-80. I have given them as they appear in Aklujkar’s edition, which differs slightly
from Rau’s.
102 VBhS 297-98: nanv apabhraṁś a- na- ṁ sa- ksÞ a- d ava- cakatve kiṁ ma- naṁ
śaktikalpakavyavaha-ra-des tulyatva-d iti cet | satyam | tattaddeśabhinnesÞ u tesÞ u tesÞ u
śaktikalpane gaurava-t | na ca parya-yatulyata- śaṅkya- | tesÞ a-ṁ sarvadeśesÞ v ekatva-d

vinigamana-virahenÞ a sarvatra śaktikalpana- | na hy apabhraṁśe tatha- | anyatha-
bha-sÞ a- nÞ a- ṁ parya- yataya- ganÞ ana- pattehÞ | evañca śaktatvam eva- stu sa- dhutvam iti
naiya-yikami-ma-ṁsa-di-na-ṁ matam. KaunÞ dÞ abhatÞÞta speaks of verbal communication and
so on (vyavaha-ra-dehÞ ), since with respect to sa-dhu terms not only usage but also
grammar and lexicon have authority. As can be seen the arguments are those
considered earlier ($4.2.1). The claim that the same sa-dhu and apabhraṁśa terms are
differentiated in that the former are used everywhere is not acceptable even from
Pa-nÞ inian tradition, as Na-geśa later notes (see $4.3.2, with note 118).
103 VBhS 298-99: ida-ni- ṁ svamatam a- ha va- cakatva- viśesÞ e ceti | ayaṁ bha- vahÞ :
apabhraṁśa-na-m aśaktatve tato bodha eva na sya-t | na ca sa-dhusmaranÞ a-t tato bodhahÞ
| ta- n avidusÞ a- ṁ pa- mara- nÞ a- m api bodha- t | tesÞ a- ṁ sa- dhor abodha- c ca | na ca
śaktibhrama-t tebhyo bodhahÞ | bodhakatvasya-ba-dhena tadgrahasya-bhramatva-t. Cf. VBh
220: atrocyate: apabhraṁśa- na- m abodhakatve tato bodha eva na sya- t | na ca
sa-dhusmaranÞ a-d bodhahÞ | tam avidusÞ a-ṁ ja-yama-natva-t tasma-d aja-yama-natva-c ca ...
na-pi śaktibhrama-t tato bodhahÞ | bodhakatvasya-ba-dhena tajjña-nasya-bhramatva-t.
104 These speakers are usually viewed as incapable of pronouncing in certain ways
(vigunÞa ‘lacking a quality’) due to some fault in their articulatory organs. E.g., DarpanÞ a,
Pari-ksÞ a- 300: vaigunÞ yaṁ ca karanÞ a-pa-Þt avaru-pam. VrÞsÞ abha, on the other hand, says that
the speakers can be faulty also due to inattention, laziness, and deprivations such as
thirst, and hunger: Paddhati 232.25-233.1: vigunÞ esÞ v iti: [a]śakti[hÞ ]
prama-da-lasyatrÞÞtksÞ udha-di.
105 VbhS 300: uktaṁ ca va-kyapadi-ye: pa-ramparya-d apabhraṁśa- vigunÞ esÞ v abhidha-trÞsÞ u
| prasiddhim a-gata- yesÞ u tesÞ a-ṁ sa-dhur ava-cakahÞ | daivi- va-g vyavaki-rnÞ eyam aśaktair
abhidha-trÞbhihÞ | anityadarśina-ṁ tv asmin va-de buddhiviparyayahÞ iti. The ka-rika-s cited
are the next-but-final verses of the first ka-nÞ dÞa of the Va-kyapadi-ya (1.181-82). VBh 220
introduces the same verses with uktaṁ hi va-kyapadi-ye. KaunÞ dÞ abhatÞÞta does not give
an exegesis of the first ka-rika- cited but does say that by ava-cakahÞ is meant ‘which
does not produce a verbal cognition of a meaning’ (abodhakahÞ ), and he notes that this
is based on the position that the capacity in question consists only in producing a
cognition. VBh 220: ava-cakahÞ abodhakahÞ | bodhakatvasyaivoktari-tya- śaktitva- d iti
bha-vahÞ ; VBhS 300: ava-cakahÞ abodhakahÞ . I will take up the second verse in connection
with the Va-kyapadi-yavrÞtti interpretation (see $4.4.5).
106 VBhS 301-2: nanv evaṁ sa- dhuta- tesÞ a- ṁ sya- d ity ata a- ha niyama iti |
punÞ yajananabodhana- ya sa- dhu- na- ṁ sa- dhubhir bha- sÞ itavyam iti vidhihÞ |
pa-pajananabodhana- ya na- sa- dubhir iti nisÞ edhahÞ | tatha- ca punÞ yajananayogyatvaṁ
sa-dhutvam | tatra pa-pajananayogyatvam asa-dhutvam.
107 LM 125: sa- ca śaktihÞ sa- dhanesÞ v iva- pabhraṁśesÞv api áktigra- hakaśiromanÞ er
vyavaha-rasya tulyatva-t.
108 LM 125-26: na ca sa-dhusmaranÞ a-t tato bodhahÞ ... iti va-cyam.
109 LM 125-26: te sa-dhusÞ v anuma-nena pratyayotpattihetavahÞ | amba-mbeti yada- ba-lahÞ
śiksÞ yama- nÞ ahÞ | avyaktam Þ tadvida- ṁ tena vyakte bhavti niścayahÞ iti haryuktehÞ |
anuma-nam atra jña-nam | sa-dhuvisÞ ayasmaranÞ enety arthahÞ | tadvida-ṁ sa-dhuvida-ṁ |
asa-dhohÞ sa-dhuprakrÞtikatva-t sa-drÞśyena tajjña-nam.
110 LM 126: sa-dhusmaranÞ aṁ vina-pi bodha-nubhava-t tadva-cakasa-dhuśabdam aja-nata-ṁ
bodha-na-patteś ca. The second objection could equally apply with respect to persons
who know only apabhraṁśa usage. In my presentation, I have followed Vaidyana-tha’s
Kala- commentary on the assumption that, being Na-geśa’s direct student, he reflects
the author’s intent. The Kala- notes that there are two sorts of persons who are learned
in Sanskrit usage (vyutpanna-hÞ): those who know each particular Sanskrit word and
those who are lacking in such detailed knowledge. The second objection is intended
for the second type of speaker. Kala- 127: nanu vyutpanna- dvividha- hÞ
tattadva-cakasaṁskrÞtaviśesÞ ajña-navantahÞ tadvikala- ś ca | tatra- dya-na-ṁ tatha- bodhe ’pi
dviti-ya-nupapattir datta- | sa- na yukta- sa-ma-nyajña-pakatvena ru-penÞ a tatsa-dhusmaranÞa-d
bodhasambhava-t ata a-ha: tadartheti.
111 Kuñjika- 125: etadarthabodhakaṁ kiñcit sa-dhupadaṁ bhavisÞ yati-ty anuma-na-d bodha
iti mataṁ nira-karoti: na-rtheti.
112 LM 126: tadarthajña- pakatvena smaranÞ aṁ tu na- rthopastha- pakaṁ
śaktata-vacchedaka-nupu-rvyagraha-t.
113 LM 126: tadva-cakasarvana-masmaranÞ a-nanubhava-c ca.
114 In the present context, Na-geśa brings into play gagari- used in the same sense as
ghatÞa ‘jug, water pot, jar’. It is also possible in other contexts to consider this an
apabhraṁśa for gargari-, known as a sa-dhu term synonymous with manthani-, referring
to a vessel in which curds are put and churned; cf. Amarakośa 2.9.74: manthani-
gargari- same.
115 LM 126: ucca-ritasyaiva bodhakatvena smrÞtasa-dhuto bodha-sambhava-c ca.
116 LM 126-27: na ca śaktibhrama-d bodhahÞ pu-rvapu-rvabhrama-c cottarottarabhrama iti
pa- mara- nÞ a- ṁ ś aktyagrahe ’pi tadbhramopapattir iti va- cyam |
- - - - -
ghatÞ atvaviśisÞ tÞ aghatÞ a diru pa rthaniru pita y a - - - -
ghatÞ a dipadavrÞ ttitvena grÞ hi ta ya -
bhinna-nupu-rvi-katvaru-paviśesÞ adarśanasattvena sa-dha-ranÞ adharmadarśana-bha-vena ca
gagari-pada-dau bhrama-nupapattehÞ .
117 LM 127-28: yadi tu aśaktya- kenacid gagari-ti prayukte ’mba-mbetya-da-v iva ghatÞa iti
sa-dhuśabdasmaranÞ a-t prayojyasya bodhe tatÞasthasya gagari-śabda-d eva-sya bodha iti
bhramenÞ a- dyasya śaktibhramas tanmu- lakaś ca- nyesÞ a- m api | tad uktaṁ harinÞ a- :
ta-da-tmyam upagamyeva śabda-rthasya praka-śaka-hÞ | iti | ivaśabdena tadupagamasya
bhramatvaṁ su-citam. Na-geśa also has the defender of this view invoke JS 1.3.8.28
and Śabara (see §4.2.1), LM 130: tad uktaṁ jaiminina-: tadaśaktiś ca-nuru-patva-d iti
tadbha-sÞ yakrÞ ta- ca tatroktari- tya- śaktibhrama ity ucyate.... The section cited here,
beginning with yadi tu ... ity ucyate (“But if the following is said ...”) gives the argument
refuted immediately afterwards (see next note).
118 LM 130-31: ... tada- pratyekaṁ tattatsaṁskrÞ tasya tattadapabhraṁś ena
vinigamana-viraha-t tesÞ u śaktihÞ | na ca sakaladeśaśisÞ Þt aparigrÞhi-tatvaṁ vinigamakam |
śavatir gatikarma- kambojesÞ u vika- ra evainam a- rya- bha- sÞ anta itya- dibha- sÞ yari- tya-
tattaddeśaniyatasaṁskrÞtesÞ u śaktisiddhyana-pattehÞ . The reference is to a Maha-bha-sÞ ya
passage (I.9.24-10.1), where Patañjali illustrates dialectal usage. Na-geśa goes on to
give an additional argument, involving Prakrit poetry, which I omit.
119 LM 131: ata eva stri- śu- draba- la- na- ṁ prayukte sa- dha- v arthasaṁś aye
tadapabhraṁśena nirnÞ ayahÞ . Presumably Na-geśa reflects the kind of situation found
nowadays among panÞdÞ itas, who speak and write Sanskrit with what amounts to native
control but normally interact in a vernacular. In Varanasi, even rickshaw drivers control
a register of Hindi and Bhojpuri that is fairly Sanskritized, so that they can understand
a great many Sanskrit words. On the other hand, even the best panÞ dÞita sometimes
cannot make clear in Sanskrit alone something he wishes to explain and then resorts
to invoking a term from the vernacular (... iti bha-sÞ a-ya-m). The situation Na-geśa speaksÞ
of was known much earlier, since the VrÞtti on VP 1.181 speaks of this: see note 136.
See Aklujkar 1996, Deshpande 1979, Hock and Pandharipande 1976 for recent
discussions of issues concerning the use of Sanskrit at various times in Indian culture.
120 LM 139: sa- dhutvaṁ ca vya- karanÞ avyaṅ gyo ’rthaviś isÞ tÞ aś abdanisÞ tÞ ahÞ
punÞyajanakata-vacchedako ja-tiviśesÞ ahÞ .
121 PLM 49: sa- dhutvaṁ ca vya- karanÞ a- nva- khyeyatvaṁ
punÞyajanakatavacchedakadharmavattvaṁ va tadbhinnatvam asa-dhutvam. In accordance
- -
with manuscript evidence, I have emended tadbhinnam of Kapil Deva’s edition to
tadbhinnatvam, which appears in my critical edition (§19).
122 VP 1.175-176): śabdahÞ saṁska-rahi-no yo gaur iti prayuyuksÞ ite | tam apabhraṁśam
icchanti viśisÞ tÞ a- rthaniveśinam || asvagonÞ ya- dayahÞ śabda- hÞ sa- dhavo visÞ aya- ntare |
nimittabheda- t sarvatra sa- dhutvaṁ ca vyavasthitam. I have kept the reading
prayuyuksÞ ite, which appears in editions other than Rau’s. This has support from
manuscripts as well as commentaries and is also syntactically preferable. The reading
prayuyuksÞ yate is Rau’s compromise accounting for prayuyuksÞ ate, prayuyuṁksÞ ate, and
prayuyuksÞ ite found in ka-rika- manuscripts.
123 VPVr 1.176/140 (229.9): a-vapane gonÞ -i ti svaviprayoga-bhidha-ne ca-sva ity etayor
avasthitaṁ sa-dhutvam.
124 VPVr 1.176/140 (230.1-3): tatha- sa- sna- dimati hresÞ a- diliṅge ca nimitta- ntara- t
pravrÞttayor anyatra visÞ aye labdhasaṁska-rayohÞ sa-dhutvam eva vijãa-yate | gonÞ -i va gaur
iti bahuksÞ -i radha-ranÞ a-divisÞ aya-d a-vapanatvasa- ma-nya-d abhidhi-yate | tatha-vidyama-naṁ
svam asya so ’yam asva iti. The same is said in the Di-pika- (I.9.26-10.3) on the
Maha-bha-sÞ ya passage (I.2.19) where the verse yas tu prayuṅkte kuśaloviśesÞ e ... is
cited: sa eva śabdo ’rthaviśesÞ e kasmiṁścit sa-dhuhÞ kasmiṁścid asa-dhur ity a-khya-yate
| yatha- gonÞ -i śabdahÞ sa-sna-dimaty asa-dhuhÞ | tatha-śvaśabdahÞ kesara-dimati sa-dhur na
nihÞ sva iti | asva iti nirdha- ne sa-dhur naikaśapha-dilaksÞ anÞ e | yadi tu gonÞ -i śabdo ’pi
nimitta- ntara- t sa- sna- dimati prayujyate—gonÞ -i va gonÞ -i ti—sa- dhur eva sya- t | aśve
va-svaśabdaṁ dhana- bha- vadÞ va- rakaṁ prayuñji- ta sa sa- dhur eva. The VrÞ tti on VP
1.175/139 (229.5-6: te ca sa- sna- dimaty eva labdhasvaru- pa- hÞ sa- dhutvaṁ vijahati |
artha- ntare tu prayujyama- na- hÞ sa- dhava eva vijña- yante | na hy etesÞ a- ṁ
ru-pama- trapratibaddham asa- dhutvam) ends on the same note: terms considered
corruptions of others lose their status as sa-dhu terms only when they have a particular
form used with respect to a particular meaning, and the very same forms are
recognized as sa-dhu when used in some other meaning; their not being sa-dhu is not
linked solely to form.
125 VPVr 1.175/139 (229.1-5): śabdaprakrÞtir apabhraṁśa iti saṅgrahaka-rahÞ | na-prakrÞtir
apabhraṁśahÞ svatantrahÞ kaścid vidyate | sarvasyaiva hi sa-dhur eva-pabhraṁśasya
prakrÞtihÞ | prasiddhes tu ru- dÞ hita-m a-padyama-na-hÞ sva-tantryam eva kecid apabhraṁśa-
labhante | tatra gaur iti prayoktavye ’śaktya- prama-da-dibhir va- ga-vya-dayas tatprakrÞtayo
’pabhraṁśa-hÞ prayujyante.
126 VP 1.177: te sa-dhusÞ v anuma-nena pratyayotpattihetavahÞ | ta-da-tmyam upagamyeva
śabda-rthasya praka-śaka-hÞ . As VrÞsÞ abha notes, the ka- rika- is susceptible to different
interpretations that depend on different syntactic connections. I consider the
interpretation which takes anuma-nena in construction with sa-dhusÞ u to be preferable
both in that it maintains the integrity of the half-verse and in that the VrÞtti on VP 1.180
agrees with this (see note 135).
127 Such gestures are considered to convey certain meanings without one’s having to
use words. In the Maha- bha- sÞ ya on 2.1.1 (I.363.25-26) and 2.1.34-35 (I.388.3-4),
Patañjali remarks that many meanings are understood without the use of words:
antarenÞa khalv api śabdaprayogaṁ bahavo ’rtha-hÞ gamyante ’ksÞ inikocaihÞ pa-nÞ iviha-raiś ca
...
128 VPVr 1.177/141 (230.8-10): apabhraṁśa- hi sa- dhu- na- ṁ śabda- na- ṁ visÞ aye
prayujyama-na- yathaiva-ksÞ inikoca-dayahÞ paricaya-d upagrÞhi-tasvaru-pa- iva prasiddha-s tatha-
sa-dhupranÞ a-dÞ ikaya-rthaṁ pratya-yayanti. The same parallel is invoked in the VrÞtti on VP
1.24-26 (72.3), 1.183 (235.5).
129 Paddhati 230.25-231.1: yatha-ksÞ inikoca-dayo [na] sa-ksÞ a-c chabda-rthaṁ pratya-yayanti
api tu pu- rvaṁ saṅketava- kyam ... upagrÞ hi- tasvaru- pa- iveti: tasya saṅketava- kyasya
svaru-pam a-tmani niveśya tadru-pata-m a-padya sa-ksÞ a-d iva pratipa-dayanti.
130 VPVr 1.177/141 (230.9-10): tatra sa-ksÞ a-d abhidha-naṁ neti śloka-ntaropanya-sahÞ .
131 VrÞ tti, introduction to VP 1.178/142 (231.1-3): atha kasma- d ete gośabdasya
ga- vya- dayahÞ paryÞ a- yana vijña- yante | na hi śisÞ tÞ asama- ca- raprasiddher anyad
etatpraka-resÞ u smrÞ tinibandhanesÞ v arthesÞ u nimittam abhidhi- yate | ga- vya- dayaś cet
parya-ya-hÞ syur ete ’pi śisÞ Þt air laksÞ anÞair anugamyeran prayujyeraṁś ca.
132 VrÞtti, introduction to VP 1.178/142 (231.3-5): yaś ca pratyaksÞ paksÞ enÞ a prayojakesÞ v
arthesÞ v abhidheyesÞ u pravartate sa sa-dhuhÞ | sa-ksÞ a-t tu prayojakaṁ va-cyam artharu-paṁ
sa-dhubhihÞ pratya-yyate. Aklujkar suggests emending to asa-ksÞ a-t and asa-dhubhihÞ. On the
other hand, tu can be justified, since there is a contrast in that the second sentence
deals with the other side of the coin: the meaning that is to be signified in contrast to
the term which signifies.
133 VrÞtti, introduction to VP 1.178/142 (231.5), VP 1.178: tasma-d a-ha: na śisÞ Þt air
anugamyante parya-ya- iva sa-dhavahÞ | te yatahÞ smrÞtiśa-strenÞ a tasma-t sa-ksÞ a-d ava-caka-hÞ .
134 VP 1.179-181: amba- mbeti yada- ba- lahÞ śiksÞ ama- nÞ ahÞ prabha- sÞ ate | avyaktaṁ
tadvida-ṁ tena vyakte bhavati niścayahÞ || evaṁ sa-dhau prayoktavye yo ’pabhraṁsÞ ahÞ
prayujyate | tena sa-dhuvyavahitahÞ kaścid artho ’bhidhi-yate || pa-ramparya-d apabhraṁśa-
vigunÞ esÞ v abhidha- trÞ sÞ u | prasiddhim a- gata- yena tesÞ a- ṁ sa- dhur ava- cakahÞ . I have
accepted the readings amba-mbeti and prabha-sÞ ate found in most editions, including
Aklujkar’s. Rau has ambvambv iti and śiksÞ ama-nÞ o ’pabha-sÞ ate. See §4.3.1, with notes
98-99.
135 VPVr 1.180/144 (232.8-10): saṅkirnÞ a-ya-ṁ va-ci sa-dhuvisÞ aye ’paśabda-hÞ prayujyante
/ taihÞ śisÞ tÞ a- laksÞ anÞ avidahÞ sa- dhu- n pratipadyante | tair eva sa- dhubhis tadartham
abhidhi-yama-naṁ paśyanti | anuma- naṁ tudhu-ma iva-gner asa-dhur itaresÞ a-m. K. A.
Subramania Iyer and Raghuna-tha Śarma- both have anuma-nas tu in the VrÞtti text, but
this is an error. The Paddhati correctly has anuma- nam, which appears also in
Aklujkar’s edition. I have interpreted anuma-nam here as a derivate signifying an
instrument.
136 VPVr 1.181/145 (233.1-4): iha- bhya- sa- t stri- śu- draca- nÞ dÞ a- la- dibhir apabhraṁśa- hÞ
prayujyama-na-hÞ tatha- prama-dyatsu vaktrÞsÞ u ru-dÞhim upa-gata- yena tair eva prasiddhataro
vyavaha-rahÞ | sati ca sa- dhuprayoga-t saṁśaye yas tasya-pabhraṁśas tena samprati
nirnÞ ayahÞ kriyate | tam eva ca- sa-dhuṁ va-cakaṁ pratyaksÞ apaksÞ e manyante sa-dhuṁ
ca-numa-napaksÞ e vyavastha-payanti. The ka-rika- directly states that since apabhraṁśas
had become established among such speakers, for them a sa-dhu term does not signify
(sa-dhur ava-cakahÞ).
137 VrÞsÞ abha (Paddhati 233.20: vyatiki-rn-eti: sambhinna- ka-lusÞ yam upani-ta-) first glosses
vyatiki-rnÞ a- with sambhinna- (‘mixed, identical’), then adds ka-lusÞ yam upani-ta- ‘brought to
the state of being dirty’. The VrÞtti also interprets vyatiki-rnÞ a- to mean ‘mixed’, since it
uses saṅki-ryama- nÞ a- (see note 140) in speaking of speech becoming mixed with
apabhraṁśas. Elsewhere, BhartrÞhari refers to the impurities that affect speech and for
which grammar is the cure (VP 1.14ab: tad dva- ram apavargasya va- ṅmala- na- ṁ
cikitsitam) as well as of the impurities affecting the body, speech and the mind, which
are purified through teachings of medicine, grammar, and those teachings that concern
the inner self (VP 1.174: ka- yava- gbuddhivisÞ aya- ye mala- hÞ samavasthita- hÞ |
cikitsa-laksÞ anÞ a-dhya-tmaśa-strais tesÞ a-ṁ viśuddhayahÞ ). These impurities of speech are
apabhraṁśas. Accordingly, I have used “defiled” here.
138 VP 1.182: daivi- va-g vyatiki-rnÞ eyam aśaktair abhidha-trÞbhihÞ | anityadarśinaa-ṁ tv
asmin va-de buddhiviparyayahÞ.
139 VP 1.183: ubhayesÞ a-m aviccheda-d anyaśabdavivaksÞ aya- | yo ’nyahÞ prayujyate
śabdo na so ’rthasya- bhidha- yakahÞ . The Paddhati (234.20-21: aviccheda- d iti:
sa-dhvasa-dhuvibha-gasmaranÞasya-viccheda-t) relates the continuity to the distinction made
between sa-dhu and asa-dhu terms: the recollection of these being distinct is without
interruption. Raghuna- tha Śarma- (Amba- kartri- 1.183/155: ubhayesÞ a- ṁ śabda- na- m
apaśabda- na- ñ ca- na- dau saṁsa- re ’viccheda- t) relates the continuity to śabda and
apaśabda.
140 VPVr 1.182/146 (233.7-234.2): śru-yate: pura-kalpe svaśari-rajyotisÞ a-ṁ manusÞ ya-nÞa-ṁ
yathaiva-nrÞta-dibhir asaṅki-rnÞa- va-g a-si-t tatha- sarvair apabhraṁśaihÞ | sa- tu saṅki-ryama-nÞ a-
pu-rvadosÞ a- bhya- sabha- vana- nusÞ aṅga- t ka- lena prakrÞ tir iva tesÞ a- ṁ prayoktnÞ a- ṁ ru- dÞ him
upa-gata-.
141 The VrÞtti says simply anityava-dinahÞ. In view of what it says subsequently, the view
in question is that the sa-dhu terms are not eternal. This is a view explicitly mentioned
in the Di-pika- on Maha-bha-sÞ ya I.6.12 (kiṁ punar nityahÞ śabda a-hosvit ka-ryahÞ ), where
BhartrÞhari contrasts two views (Di-pika- I.16.28-17.2): kecid evaṁ manyante: ya evaite
pra-krÞta-hÞ śabda-s ta evaite nitya-hÞ | prakrÞtau bhava-hÞ pra-krÞta-hÞ | anye manyante: iyaṁ
daivi- va-k | sa- tu purusÞ a-śakter a-lasya-d va- praki-rnÞ a- yatha- svasti-ti śiksÞ ama-nÞ o ba-lo
’nyathocca-rayati-ti “Some say that pra-krÞta terms alone are eternal. These are pra-krÞta in
that they have their source in the original. Others maintain that divine speech has
become mixed with impurities due to the incapacity or laziness of men, as when a
child learning to say svasti pronounces this otherwise.”
142 Commenting on VP 1.12, the VrÞtti says that what is meant by va-cahÞ paramo rasahÞ
‘the highest essence of speech’ is the mass of words whose status as sa-dhu is
established because they signify and are sources of felicity (VPVr 42.6-7: paramo
rasahÞ : va- cakatva- bhyudayahetutva- c ca vyavasthitasa- dhubha- vahÞ ś abdasamu- ho
’bhidhi-yate). In the present context, this very set of words is viewed differently, by
those who do consider sa-dhu terms neither eternal nor sources of merit. For them,
sa-dhu terms are not original but derivate, and the original stuff (prakrÞti) from which
they derive as modifications (vika-ra) is the speech forms others call apaśabda and
apabhraṁśa. VrÞsÞ abha (Paddhati 234.15-16: prakrÞtau bhavam iti: prakrÞtihÞ svabha-vahÞ |
apabhraṁśa-hÞ sva-bha-vika-hÞ ) notes that prakrÞti signifies something’s nature (svabha-va),
but immediately goes on to say that apabhraṁśas are natural. That is, although from
the point of view of those who maintain that sa-dhu terms are eternal and original
apabhraṁśas are corruptions and only apparently have the status of original stuff
(prakrÞtir iva), from another point of view these very terms are treated as established
norms that are sources of artificial sa-dhu usage.
143 This is a view found elsewhere, as is well known. Thus, in his commentary on
Ka-vya-laṅka-ra 2.12, Namisa-dhu accounts for pra-krÞta in several ways. He first describes
it in the usual manner, as a derivate with the taddhita suffix anÞ added to a pada N-7,
with a seventh-triplet ending, to form a derivate meaning ‘located in X’ (tatra bhavahÞ :
AsÞ Þt a-dhya-yi- 4.3.53). He notes that pra-krÞtam thus derives from prakrÞti-i and means
prakrÞtau bhavam, and that the source denoted by prakrÞti here is the inherent speech
activity of all creatures, without the adornment endowed by grammar and such. He
then says that alternatively pra-krÞta is that speech itself (pra-krÞteti: sakalajantu-na-ṁ
vya-karanÞ a-dibhir ana-hitasaṁska-rahÞ sahajo vacanavya- pa-rahÞ prakrÞtihÞ | tatra bhavaṁ
saiva va- pra-krÞtam), then goes on to give other explanations; see Pischel and Jha-
1965: 14 (§16). In the GaüdÞ avaho (93ab: sayala-o imaṁ va-ya- visanti etto ya nÞ enti
va-ya-o) Va-kpati similarly says that all languages emanate from and go back to Pra-krÞta.
On tadbhava, see Kahrs 1992.
144 VrÞsÞ abha (Paddhati 234.16-18) remarks that sambhinnabuddhibhihÞ refers to men
who cannot discriminate between what women may be approached or not, what may
be said or not, and so on, and that this amounts to speaking of heretics (na-stika). He
is not alone in considering that sambhinnabuddhi refers to a special type of person, a
na-stika; KaiyatÞa does too (Pradi-pa II.389).
145 VPVr 1.182/146 (234.2-5): anityava-dinas tu ye sa-dhu-na-ṁ dharmahetutvaṁ na
pratipadyante mallasamaya-disadrÞśi-m [sa-dhva]sa-dhuvyavastha-ṁ manyante te prakrÞtau
bhavaṁ prakrÞtaṁ śabda-na-ṁ samu-ham a-caksÞ ate | vika-ras tu paśca-d vyavastha-pitahÞ
yahÞ sambhinnabuddhibhihÞ purusÞ aihÞ svarasaṁska-ra-dibhir nirnÞ -i yate.
146 VPVr 183/147 (235.1-5): yesÞ a-m api ca naiva pura-kalpo na ca daivi- va-g asaṅki-rnÞ a-
kada-cid a- si- t tesÞ a- m api gamya- gamya- divyavastha- vad iyaṁ sa- dhvasa- dhuvyavastha-
nityam avicchedena śisÞ Þt aihÞ smaryate | tatra-nyaśabdavivaksÞ aya- ba-laprala-pavad arthesÞ u
prayujyama-no yahÞ śabdo ru-dÞ ho yaś ca na ru-dÞ has ta-v ubha-v apy arthasya na va-cakau
bhavatahÞ | tatra tu sa- dhuvyavahita- va- bhavaty arthapratipattir abhya- sa- d va-
pramatta-na- m aksÞinikoca- divat sampratyayama- traṁ ja- yate. Aklujkar’s edition differs
slightly from that of K. A. Subramania Iyer, which I have followed above.
147 For Houben’s position on VP 1.183 see §4.6.1.
148 VPVr 1.27 (82.1-4): yathaiva- nya- ni dharmasa- dhana- ni
viśisÞ Þt opadeśapa-ramparya-gama-vicchedena-gata-ny anabhiśaṅkani-ya-ni vyavasthita-ni yatha-
ca pratisÞ iddha-ni hiṁsa-nrÞtasteya-di-ni aśisÞ Þt a-pratisÞ iddha-ni ca hikkitahasitakanÞ dÞ u-yita-di-ni
tatha- sa-dhvasa-dhuvyavastha-nam apy anavacchinnapa-rampar yam anabhiśaṅkani-yaṁ
yatha-gama-d eva siddham iti. I have adopted here the text that agrees best with the
Maha-bha-sÞ ya and the Paddhati.
149 sa- dhutvajn- a- navisÞ aya- seyaṁ vya- karanÞ asmrÞ tihÞ | avicchedena śisÞ tÞ a- na- m idaṁ
smrÞtinibandhanam. The second half of the verse is subject to different syntactic
interpretations. If idam is coreferential with smrÞtinibandhanam and the latter is a
sÞ asÞ Þthi-tatpurusÞ a, both refer to a composition relative to a smrÞti, a tradition. Under this
interpretation, śisÞ Þt a-na-ṁ smrÞtinibandhanam is a construction of the type devadattasya
gurukulam (“Devadatta’s teacher’s home”) such that śisÞ Þt a-na-m is construed with smrÞti,
referring to the recollection (smrÞtihÞ = smaranÞ am) of śisÞ Þt as. This recollection is carried
on without interruption (avicchedena). That is, śisÞ Þt as continue to carry on a tradition of
correct usage, which is memorialized in the grammar. On the other hand, if idam is
considered to refer to the grammar (vya-karanÞ am)—in accordance with vya-karanÞ asmrÞtihÞ
of the preceding half-verse—and smrÞtinibandhanam is interpreted as a bahuvri-hi, then
this refers to the grammar as a work whose cause is the continuous recollection of
śisÞ Þt as.
150 VPVr 1.158/133 (212.8-213.2): yathaiv
bhaksÞ ya bhaksÞ yagamya gamyava cya va cya divisÞ a ya vyavasthita smrÞ tayahÞ yasu
- - - - - - - -
nibaddhaṁ sama-ca-raṁ śisÞ Þt a- na vyatikra-manti tatheyam api va-cya-va-cyaviśesÞ avisÞ aya-
vya-karanÞ asmrÞtihÞ | smrÞto hy arthahÞ pa-ramparya-d avicchedena punahÞ punar nibadhyate
prasiddhasama-ca-ra-ya-ṁ ca smrÞta-v anibandhanaśabda-ya-ṁ śisÞ Þtasama-ca-ra-vicchedenaiva
smaryate. I have adopted Aklujkar’s reading instead of Subramania Iyer’s
prasiddhasamaya-ca-ra-ya-ṁ.
151 This is made also a theoretical issue: must one grant śakti to apaśabdas at the
risk of prolixity or is there some way to avoid this? However, BhartrÞhari does not go
into this debate.
152 Hela-ra-ja 3.3.30 (143.12-13): daivi- va-g aśaktair vyavaki-rnÞ a- ... anumitamu-laprakrÞtir
vidusÞ a-ṁ va-cika-. I have shown a lacuna where K. A. Subramania Iyer’s edition has
ba-lavad andha-divad (“as that of a child, as that of a blind person”). Aklujkar suggests
the emendation ba-lapada-mba-divad (“as a child’s word amba and such”). Houben says
(p. 364 note 687), “Emend to ba-lavad amba-divad” and translates (p. 364), “like [the
word] ‘amba-’ etc. [of incompetent persons] like children.” I suggest one should also
consider ba-labamba-divad, which has support from testimonia (see notes 99, 134).
153 vidusÞ a-m. These are clearly the śisÞ Þt as, speakers who know correct speech. As
Virendra Sharma suggests (1977: 235) these same learned persons can be referred to
by kaiścit in the ka-rika-, though KaunÞdÞ abhatÞÞta and BhatÞÞtoji consider kaiścit to refer to
other upholders of a particular view.
154 Hel. 3.3.30 (143.13-14): na hi vidva-ṁso ’rtham apaśabda-t sa-ksÞa-d avasyanti-ti
na-paśabda-na-m arthena kaścit sambandhahÞ .
155 Hel. 3.3.30 (143.14-18): ata eva pura-kalpe ’nrÞta-dibhir iva-pabhraṁśair api rahita- va-g
a-si-d iti brahmaka-nÞ dÞ a uktam | ava-caka- apabhraṁśa-hÞ | te tu sa-drÞśya-t sa-dhuśabdam
anuma-payanti tebhyo ’rthasampratyaya iti | tatha- ca saṅgrahaka- rahÞ śabdaprakrÞtir

apabhraṁśa iti. See notes 125, 140.
156 Hel. 3.3.30 (143.18-144.1): adyatve tv adharmaba-hulya-d anrÞta-divad va-ṅmala-na-ṁ
ru- dÞ hihÞ | tatha- ca- vyavadha- nenaiva- paś abdebhyo rthaprati- tau na mlecchitavai
na- pabha- sÞ itavai sa- dhubhir bha- sÞ itavyam iti ś a- strapra- ma- nÞ ya- t sa- dhu- na- m eva
dharma-ṅgatvam iti tadanusrÞtihÞ śa-strenÞ a. “na mlecchitavai ...” is an implicit reference to
Maha-bha-sÞya I.2.7-8. The phrase tadanusrÞtihÞ śa-strenÞ a “following after them by the
grammar” is like śisÞ Þt air anugamyante in VP 1.178 (see §§4.3.1, 4.4.3).
157 eva ‘only’: “that apaśabdas are preceded by an unsplit sa-dhuśabda is alone
concluded.” The view expressed accords with BhartrÞhari’s emphasis on granting
primacy to indivisible units from which parts are abstracted; see §3.2. Similarly, in the
Dravyasamuddeśa (VP 3.2. 16: va-cya- sa- sarvaśabda-na-ṁ śabda-ś ca na prÞthak tatahÞ
| aprÞthaktve ca sambandhas tayor na-na-tmanor iva), BhartrÞari stresses the unity in the
ultimate being (satta-), that is, in Brahman, of all words and all things signified: that
ultimate original source (para- prakrÞtihÞ ) spoken of in the preceding ka-rika- is what all
words signify and these words themselves are not distinct from it, so that there is a
relation between them only as though it were between two separate entities, although
there is no true distinctness.
158 Hel. 3.3.30 (144.1-3): tatha- ca bhedasya- bhedapu- rvakatva- t
purusÞ avikalpaniyamenanantatvad apaśabdanam abhinnasa- dhuśabdapu-rvakatvam eva
- - - - -
niści-yata iti śabdaprakrÞtir apaśabdahÞ siddha iti śabda eva vidya-. Hela-ra-ja literally says
that the śabda alone is knowledge (śabda eva vidya- ), but this is surely to be
understood as based on a śabda’s being the object of knowledge (vidya-visÞ ayahÞ), as
noted by Raghuna-tha Śarma- (Amba-kartri- 3.3.30, p. 260). The usage is comparable to
BhartrÞhari’s speaking of a sentence meaning as a flash of knowledge (pratibha-), since
it is the object of a single cognition.
159 The ultimate level of speech in BhartrÞhari’s system is identical with Brahman; see
the literature referred to in Cardona 1976: 302 with note 359.
160 Hel. 3.3.30 (144.3-5): tad atra yatha- vidya- vastha- bhinnabrahma- tmika- tatha-
sa-dhuśabda-vastha- vidya- yatha- ca vidya- ya-ṁ bhedo vitathahÞ tatha-pabhraṁśa-vastha-
va-ṅmalaru-peti parama-rthataditara-vastha-peksÞ o vikalpahÞ .
161 He does not also say artha-bhidha-ne “there being a signifying of a meaning.”
162 avakarnÞ ayanti. Cf. avakarnÞ ya in Śiśupa-lavadha 15.67: abhidha-ya ru-ksÞ mam iti ma-
sma gama iti prÞtha-suter -i rita-m | va-cam anunayapara-ṁ sa tatahÞ sahasa-varkarnÞ ya
niriya-ya saṁsadahÞ . “After delivering himself of the harsh statement and hearing with
scorn YudhisÞ tÞ hira’s conciliatory ‘Don’t go’, (Śiśupa- la) quickly left the assembly.”
Mallina-tha notes that avakarnÞ ya means “after hearing without respect” (ana-darenÞ a
śrutva-). I take avarkarnÞayanti as an impersonal third plural of the type a-huÞ h ‘... say’.
See §4.6.3.
163 Hel. 3.3.30 (144.5-9): avidya-daśa-peksÞ am eva sama-na-ya-m arthagatau śabdena
ca-paśabdena ceti bha-sÞ yam | arthagata-v iti vacana-d artha-bhidha-nam apaśabda-na-m
avakarnÞ ayanti | avidya-ya-ṁ bhu-yasa-paśabdair vyavaha-ra-d arthaprati-tima-traṁ bhaven
na-mety arthahÞ | ru-dÞhatva-t tu vyavaha-rasya-viśesÞ aṁ granthaka-ra a-ha | tatra ca śa-straṁ
niya- makam: sa- dhuś abdair eva- rtho vaktavyo na- paśabdaihÞ evaṁ kriyama- nÞ am
abhyudayaka-ri bhavati-ti.
164 This is accompanied by a note (373) in which Houben refers the reader to
“‘BhartrÞhari and the ancient VrÞtti’ (forth-coming, c)” for additional discussion of the
problem of authorship. His bibliography lists (p. 437) under “Houben” an entry “forthc.,
b ‘BhartrÞhari’s Va-kyapadi-ya and the ancient VrÞtti’,” which one must assume is meant.
An article entitled “BhartrÞhari’s Va-kyapadi-ya and the ancient VrÞtti (1): The VrÞtti and
VrÞsÞ abhadeva’s Paddhati on Va-kyapadi-ya 1.46a a-tmabhedaṁ / a-tmabhedas ...” and an
addendum to this entitled “Postscript: A note on Pt. Raghuna-tha Śarma-’s interpretation

of VP 1.46 and VrÞtti” are scheduled to appear in the Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental
Research Institute. Houben kindly sent me copies of these papers, and, with the
author’s permission, I have discussed them in §4.2.3 of Cardona, forthcoming.
165 Houben’s translation of VP 1.182 is (p. 239), “Divine speech is nowadays (iyam)
mixed up by incompetent speakers. But the propounders of the impermanent have with
regard to this doctrine the opposite view.”
166 In view of the content and the citation from the VrÞtti given at the end of this
paragraph, one must conclude that “182” and “181” are errors for “183” and “182.”
167 śisÞ tÞebhya a- gama- t siddha- hÞ sa- havo dharmasa- dhanam | arthapratya- yana- bhede
vipari-ta-s tv asa-dhavahÞ . As the Paddhati points out, asa-dhu terms can be contrary by
virtue of either of these (81.22-23: vipari-ta- iti: śisÞ tÞopdeśapa- ramparyenÞ a- navasthita-
adharmasa-dhanaṁ va-).
168 The Paddhati (81.21-22: yady api sa- ksÞ a- d anuma- neneti ca bhedas tatha- py
arthapratya- yanam abhinnam sa- dhu- na- m asa- dhu- na- ṁ ca tulyam) points this out.
Similarly, commenting on Bh I.8.21-22 (see note 68), the Pradi-pa notes that, although
under one thesis apabhraṁśas do not signify directly, they nevertheless still signify
indirectly, through the intermediary of sa-dhu terms. KaiyatÞa goes on to note that some
apabhraṁśas have gained established status through continuous transmission, so that
they convey meanings directly, without calling sa-dhu terms to mind. He also remarks
that some maintain apabhraṁśas signify directly jsut as do sa-dhu terms. Pr I.35: yady
api sa- ksÞ a- d apabhraṁ ś a- na va- caka- s tatha- pi
smaryama-nÞ asa- dhuśabdavyavadha- nena- rthaṁ pratya- yayanti | kecic ca- pabhraṁśa- hÞ
paramparaya- niru-dÞ him a-gata-hÞ sa- dhuśabda-n asma- rayanta eva-rthaṁ pratya-yayanti |
anye tu manyante: sa-dhuśabdavad apabhraṁśa- api sa-ksÞ a-d arthasya va-caka- iti. See
§4.6.4.
169 bha-sÞyaka-rahÞ : III.1: 235.16 (a-ha), 236.21-22 (manyate), 279.12, 296.18 (a-ha),
299.4-5 (pratya-casÞ Þt e), 305.18-19 (codayati), 336.23 (na pratya-caksÞ-i ta), 338.25-339.1
(manyate); III.2: 30.11 (necchati), 99.22-24 (a-ha), 104.14-15 (samarthayate), 301.20
(a-ha), 353.11, 361.17-18 (na-tra niradiksÞ at), 374.18 (pra-ha), 374.25 (pra-ha), 402.27
(a-dideśa), 408.9-10 (pratya-cakhyau); bha-sÞyaka-renÞ a: III.1: 107.14, 201.14, 202.6-7,
328.21; III.2: 3.2, 20.2, 124.3, 127.12, 127.16-17, 138.19, 166.4, 167.20, 314.27,
336.24, 356.15, 360.21, 386.7, 410.5; bha-sÞ yakrÞta-: III.1: 235.17-18; III.2: 22.7-8, 287.6;
bha-sÞ yaka-rasya: III.1: 352.11, III.2: 285.7, 340.14-15, 349.5, 371.23-24. References are
to pages and lines of K. A. Subramania Iyer 1963, 1973. These references are
available from the indices to these volumes, although only the stem forms bha-sÞ yaka-ra,
bha-sÞ yakrÞt appear in the indices. I have given references only to passages where
Hela-ra-ja uses case forms of these terms, omitting places where these appear in
derivates. I have also cited in parentheses verb forms, where these occur.
170 It is probable that BhartrÞhari used śakti not merely in the sense of power or
capacity but more specifically in the sense of the capacity inherent in a word to signify
its meaning. I say this because a passage such as the VrÞtti on VP 2.226 speaks of
extracting śakti from the meaning of a whole compound, which is associated with many
śaktis (VPVrÞ. 2.266 [p. 247]: samuda-ya-rtha-d anekaśaktehÞ śaktyapoddha-renÞa...). That
is, avyayi-bha-va, tatpurusÞ a, bahuvri-hi, and dvandva compounds are described by some
in terms of semantics, such that they are respectively compounds whose principal
meaning is that of the prior term, the last term, neither term, and both terms. The
whole is associated with a single meaning but one can extract partial meanings.
171 Ud I.35: niru- dÞ him a- gata- iti : te ca śaktibhramenÞ a bodhaka- iti bha- vahÞ |
śaktibhramaś cettham : kenacid ga- vi- ti prayukte gaur iti sa- dhuśabdasmaranÞ a- t
prayojyasya bodhe ’pi tatÞasthasya ga-vi-śabda-d eva-sya gobodha iti bhramahÞ tanmu-lako
’nyesÞ a-m api bhrama iti.
172 Ud I.35: vastuto vinigamaka-viraha-d bha-sÞ a-śabdesÞ v api śaktir evety a-ha : anye tv
iti. Similarly, the Ratnapraka- śa on the Maha- bha- }Alsya passage under discussion
directly remarks that Patañjali’s saying sama-na-ya-m arthagatau serves to refute those
pseudo-scholars who maintain that apabhraṁśas do not signify directly, as do sa-dhu
terms, and instead do so indirectly, through serving to recall sa-dhu terms. This is
because it conflicts with experience and with what the Bha-sÞ ya passage in question,
based on this, has to say and also because the understanding of meaning which
arises from apaśabdas for pa-maras, who do not know sa-dhu terms, cannot have the
recollection of sa-dhu terms as intermediary. RaPr I.91: sama-na-ya-m arthagatav iti :
etena apabhraṁśa- na- ṁ sa- dhuśabdasma- rakatvena- rthabodhakatvaṁ na tu sa- ksÞ a- t
sa- dhuś abdavad iti vadantahÞ panÞ dÞ itaṁ manya- nirasta- hÞ anubhavena
- - - - - - - - -
tanmulakaprakrÞtabhasÞ yenÞa ca virodhat sadhuśabdan ajanataṁ pamaranÞ am apaśabdair
ja-yama-nasya-rthabodhasya sa-dhuśabdasmaranÞadva-rakatva-sambhava-c ca.
173 Page 341, note 567: “... According to Hela-ra-ja tat in taddharmanÞos refers to tasya
saṁbandhasya; in my interpretation it refers to dharma in 5 and to atyantaparatantratva
in 4.”
174 na-bhidha-naṁ svadharmenÞ a sambandhasya-sti va-cakam | atyantaparatantratva-d
ru-paṁ na-sya-padiśyate. That is, as Hela-ra-ja notes, only a genitive ending is used in
conveying a relation qua relation.
175 atyantaparatantratva-t. Houben (pp. 170, 340) translates the second half of VP
3.3.4, “Because it is extremely dependent, its form cannot be pointed out”; earlier, K.
A. Subramania Iyer (1971: 80, “Being extremely dependent, its own form is never
cognized”) also translated using “extremely” for the Sanskrit atyanta. Both would have
done better using “absolutely.” For, as Hela-ra-ja points out, what is at issue is that a
relation is absolutely dependent, so that one can never refer to it separately as a
relation by means of a term other than a genitive ending. In this respect, a relation
differs from a quality (gunÞ a), which, though dependent, can be referred to as a quality
by means of a distinct term. For example, one can say śuklaṁ ru-pam ‘the color white’.
176 Bh II.218.14-19: kathaṁ punar atasmin sa ity etad bhavati | caturbhihÞ praka-rair
atasmin sa ity etad bhavati : ta-tsthya-t ta-ddharmya-t tatsa-mi-pya-t tatsa-hacarya-d iti |
ta- tsthya- t ta- vat : mañca- hasanti girir dahyate | ta- ddharmya- t : jatÞ inaṁ ya- ntaṁ
brahmadatta ity a-ha | brahmadatte ya-ni ka-rya-nÞ i jatÞiny api ta-ni kriyanta ity ato jatÞ-i
brahmadatta ity ucyate | tatsa- mi- pya- t : gaṅga- ya- ṁ ghosÞ ahÞ ku- pe gargakulam |
tatsa-hacarya-t : kunta-n praveśaya yasÞ Þt-i hÞ praveśayeti. The Bha-sÞ ya on 6.1.37 (III.32.12)
also mentions such extended usage due to Y being intended for X (ta-darthya-t), and
this relation too is used frequently in interpreting terms in u-tras. Cf. also Nya-yasu-tra
2.2.62.
177 Hel. 3.3.6 (129.10-11): pa-ratantryaṁ sambandhalaksÞ anÞ am iti saṁyogasamava-yayor
dravyagunÞa-disÞ u tattva-t sambandhaśabdapravrÞttihÞ.
178 Hel. 3.3.6 (129.11): tasya sambandhasyeva dharmahÞ pa-ratantryalaksÞ anÞo yayos tau
taddharma-nÞau.
179 Cf. Maha-bha-sÞ ya on 1.1.70 (I.180.18-19): uttarapadalopo ’tra drasÞ Þt avyahÞ | tad yatha-
usÞ tÞ ramukham iva mukhaṁ yasya so ’yam usÞ tÞ ramukhahÞ kharamukhahÞ evaṁ
tatka-laka-las tatka-lahÞ tatka-lasyeti. It is neither possible nor necessary to discuss here
how such compounds are obtained and interpreted without assuming deletion of a
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1

AUTHOR: GEORGE CARDONA

VBh: Vaiya-karanÞ abhu-sÞ anÞ a: see BhatÞÞta-cha-rya.

meanings (va-kya-rtha) or merely assumed units abstracted formally from indivisible

stream of both sorts of speech units—sa-dhuśabda and apaśabda—so that there is no

tasyeva dharmo yayohÞ .(FN178) Taddharman used here is then equivalent to

13 VP 1.2: ekam eva yad a-mna-taṁ bhinnaśaktivyapa-śraya-t | aprÞthaktve ’pi śaktibhyahÞ

41 K. A. Subramania Iyer’s edition reads ekasyaiva-rthata-m “only one has meaning,”

prakrÞ tipratyayabha- gakalpanena kalpita- bhya- m anvayavyatireka- bhya- ṁ

meaning that is linked to a sentence is an action (kriya-tma-), qualified by the ka-rakas

na tu vya-ptijña-nam tacchu-nya-na-m api śa-bdabodhadarśana-t) notes that anuma-na here

śaktikalpane gaurava-t | na ca parya-yatulyata- śaṅkya- | tesÞ a-ṁ sarvadeśesÞ v ekatva-d

anuma-payanti tebhyo ’rthasampratyaya iti | tatha- ca saṅgrahaka- rahÞ śabdaprakrÞtir

addendum to this entitled “Postscript: A note on Pt. Raghuna-tha Śarma-’s interpretation

Aklujkar, Ashok N. 1996. “The Early History of Sanskrit as a Supreme Language.”

Ka-ma-khya-na-tha Tarkava-gi-R c a. 1901. The Tattva-Cinta-manÞ i by Gangec Ra Upa-dhya-ya,

Subramania Iyer, K. A. 1971. The Va-kyapadi-ya of BhartrÞhari: Chapter III, Part i.

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