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THE REMAGEN BRIDGEHEAD

7-17 March 1945

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PREPARED BY
RESEARCH AND EVALUATION DIVISION
4$* ARMORED SCHOOL
ils.
PREFACE
HE PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY is to collect all available facts
pertinent to the Remagen Bridgehead Operation, to col-
late these data in cases of conflicting reports, and to present
the processed material in such a form that it may be effi-
ciently utilized by an instructor in preparing a period of
instruction. The data on which this study is based was
obtained from interviews with personnel who took part in
the operation and from after action reports listed in
the bibliography. 5 This is an Armored School publication
and is not the official Department of the Army history of
the Remagen Operation. ¶ It must be remembered that the
Remagen Operation is an example of a rapid and successful
exploitation of an unexpected fortune of war. As such,
the inevitable confusion of facts and the normal fog of war
are more prevalent than usual. The absence of specific,
detailed prior plans, the frequent changes of command, and
the initial lack of an integrated force all make the details of
the operation most difficult to evaluate and the motives of
some decisions rather obscure. The operation started as a
two-battalion action and grew into a four-division operation
within a week. Units were initially employed in the bridge-
head, as they became available, where they were most
needed: a line of action that frequently broke up regiments.
In cases of conflicting accounts of the action, the authors
of this study have checked each action and each time of
action included in the study and have evaluated the various
reports in order to arrive at the most probable conclusions.

I
FOREWORD
The following comments are included in this study of the operation for the benefit
of those who will follow and who may be confronted with the responsibility of making
immediate, on-the-spot decisions that are far-reaching in their effect and that involve
higher echelons of command.
The details of the operation are valuable and should be studied, as many worthwhile'
lessons can be learned from them. In this study, which should be critical, the student
should approach them by "Working himself into the situation;" that is, by getting a
clear mental picture of the situation as it existed at the time it took place.
First and foremost, the operation is an outstanding proof that the American princi-
ples of warfare, with emphasis on initiative, resourcefulness, aggressiveness, and will-
ingness to assume great risks for great results, are sound. The commander must base
his willingness to assume those great risks upon his confidence in his troops.
Commanders of every echelon from the squad up who take unnecessary risks that
are rash, ill-conceived, and foolhardy should be removed from command.
Hence the need and value of good training.
In this particular operation the entire chain of command from the individual soldier,
squad, platoon, and on up through the highest echelon, SHAEF, saw the opportunity and
unhesitatingly drove through to its successful execution.
It is impossible to overemphasize this as an illustration of the American tradition and
training.
Military history is replete with incidents where wonderful opportunities were not
grasped, with resultant failure.
The fact stands out that positive, energetic actions were pursued to get across. The
traffic jams, the weather, the road nets, the change in plans, did not deter anyone from
the primary job of getting across the Rhine and exploiting this wonderful opportunity.
The results are history.
One other thought. When a reporter asked Sergeant Drabick, the first soldier across
the bridge, "Was the seizing of the bridge planned?" "I don't know about that, all I
know is that we took it," was his reply.
This sums it up in a nutshell. So much for the operation.
It might be well for future value to surmise what would have happened if the opera-
tion had failed. Assume for this purpose that 24 or 36 hours after the initial troops
crossed, the bridge had gone down from delayed time bombs or from air bombing or
the direct artillery fire, which was extremely accurate the first few days. It actually did
collapse on 17 March.
Those troops already across would have been lost.
Would the commanders who made the decisions have been severely criticized?
My purpose in this question is to create discussion. My hope is that your thinking
will result in the answer that they would not.
Commanders must have confidence not only in those under their command but also in
those under whom they serve.
In this specific case we had this confidence.

HN W. LEONARD
Major General, USA
Formerly Commander, 9th Armd Div
II

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
Introduction ........................................
1

Narrative ---------------------------------------- 6

Summary of Operations --------------------------------------- 921

Bibliography _--__---------_ _------------- ------------ _ _ 23

Appendices
I Detailed Unit Dispositions --------------------------------__-- 24
II Enemy Order of Battle ------------__
_.. _ 39
III Interrogation of General Bayerlein, Coilnandinig General,
LIII Corps -..................................... -41
11....
IV Names of Unit Commanders ----------------------------------
_ 45
V Maps ------------
_ _------------------ __..---........ 47
No. 1 First Army Plan
No. 2 Seizure of Ludendorf Bridge
No. 3 Build-up and Conduct of the Bridgehead
No. 4 Situation 102400 Mar 45
No. 5 Situation 132400 Mar 45
No. 6 Situation 162400 Mar 45
No. 7 Map of Remagen and vicinity
VI Ludendorf Bridge, 27 Mar 48

III
T1h g/ad Bm2ad-4a

4 tamREMAGEN BRIDGEHEAD
Preparedby the Research and Evaluation Division,
The Armored School.

INTRODUCTION: Seizure of the Ludendorf Bridge.


At 071256 March 1945, a task force of the About 062.30() March the III Corps coin-
United States 9th Armored Division broke out mander, Major General Mlilliken, had remarked
of the woods onto the bluffs overlooking the to Major General Leonard over the phonte,
RHINE RIVER at REMAGEN (F645200)*, "You see that black line on the miap. If you can
and saw the LUDENDORF BRIDGE stand- seize that your name will go down ill history,"
ing intact over the RHINE. Lieutenant or words to that effect. This referred to
Colonel Leonard E. Engeman, the task force the bridge.
commander, had under his command: one The plan of assault as formulated vythe
platoon of the 89th Reconnaissance Squadron, coluimn commander and as subselqulently exe-
the 14th Tank Battalion (-Companies B and cuted was an attack on REMAGEN (F6420)
C), the 27th Armored Infantry Battalion, and by one company of dismounted infantry and
one platoon of Company B, 9th Armored one platoon of tanks followed by the remain-
Engineer Battalion.' Beyond the river lay the der of the force in route column and supported
heartland of Germany, and presumably the by assault guns and mortars fromn the vicinlitv
organized defenses of the RHINE. Lieutenant of (F63:3204). 3 This plan obviated(l the neces-
Colonel Engeman's original orders were to sity of moving any vehicles within the columnr
capture REMAGEN (F645200) and KRIPP prior to the time of attack. The plan further
(F670180). However, in a meeting between provided that the assault tank platoon should
the Commanding Generals, 9th Armored Divi- move out 30 minutes after the( infantry, with
sion and Combat Command B of that division, the two forces joining at the east e'dge of town
it had been decided that if the LUDENDORF and executing a coordinated attack for the
BRIDGE at REMAGEN were passable, Com- capture of the bridge. 3 As enemy troops andl(
bat Command B would "grab it." This infor- vehicles were still moving east across the
mation had been sent to Lieutenant Colonel bridge at the time (1256), the collhmrn coir-
Engeman. 2 mander requested time fire on the bridge with

*For all map references in this study see Maps, appendix


1
Statement of Lt Col Engeman, CO, 14th Tank Battalion.
2
After Action Report, CCB, 9th Armored Division, March 1945, page 8.
3
After Action Report, 14th Tank Battalion, March 1945, page 12.
1
the dual purpose of inflicting casualties and of (F647205) at this time (1515) in an attempt to
preventing destruction of the structure. This build up a smoke screen over the bridge. A
request was refused due to the difficulty of strong, upstream wind prevented complete
coordinating the infantry and artillery during success, but partial concealment of the as-
the assault on the town.' saulting force was accomplished. 5 The use of
Company A, 27th Armored Infantry Battal- burning white phosphorus demoralized the
defenders and drove them to cover. The re-
ion, moved out at 1350 following the trail
which runs from (F629204) to (F635204). At mainder of Company A, 14th Tank Battalion,
1420, the 90-mm platoon of Company A, 14th arrived at the bridge and went into firing po-
Tank Battalion, left the woods at (F632204) sition downstream from the bridge. The 27th
and started down the steep, twisting, tree-lined Armored Infantry Battalion, less Company A,
road that enters REMAGEN at (F639201). 2 dismounted in the town and prepared to as-
The tank platoon arrived at the edge of town sault the bridge.'
before the infantry and, meeting no resistance, At 1520, a captured German soldier re-
continued on into the town. The infantry, ported that the bridge was to be blown at 1600
upon arriving at the edge of town, was able that day. This information, which appears to
to see the tanks already moving toward the have been widely known, was substantiated
bridge, so it followed along the main road by several citizens of REMAGEN (F6420).
running southwest through the center of RE- In order to evaluate properly the initial de-
MAGEN. l The town appeared deserted- cision to establish a bridgehead over the
the only resistance encountered was a small RHINE and the subsequent decisions of higher
amount of small-arms fire from within the commanders to exploit the operation, it is
town 2 and sporadic fire from 20-mm flak guns necessary to understand the plan of operation
which enfiladed the cross streets from positions at the time. The mission of the 9th Armored
along the east bank of the river. 3 The tank Division was to go east to the RHINE and
platoon reached the west end of the bridge at then cut south and establish bridgeheads over
15002 followed shortly by the company of in- the AHR RIVER preparatory to continuing
fantry. By 1512, the tanks were in position at south for a linkup with the Third Army. Com-
the western end of the bridge and were cover- bat Command B, 9th Armored Division, was on
ing the bridge with fire. At the same time, a
the north and east flank of the division,
charge went off on the causeway near the
charged with accomplishing the division mis-
west end of the bridge, followed shortly by
sion within the zone of the combat command.
another charge two thirds of the way across.
The first charge blew a large hole in the dirt The task force commanded by Lieutenant
causeway which ran from the road up to the Colonel Engeman was, of course, one of the
bridge; the second damaged a main member striking forces of the combat command. No
of the bridge and blew a 30-foot hole in the specific orders had been issued to anyone to
bridge structure. A hole in the bridge floor seize a RHINE bridge and attack to the east.
which the Germans were repairing made the The decision to cross the bridge and to build
bridge temporarily impassable for vehicles. 4 up the bridgehead required a command de-
The assault guns and mortars began firing cision at each echelon-a decision which was
white phosphorus on the town of ERPEL not as obvious as it appears at first glance.
IStatement of Lt Col Engemnan, CO, 14th Tank Battalion.
2
' Attcr Action Report, 14th Tank Battalion, March 1945, page 12.
3
Statenient of Maj Cecil E. Roberts, S-3, 14th Tank Battalion.
4
Statemnic ,t of Lt John Grimball, 1st Platoon, Company A, 14th Tank Battalion.
5
Aftcr Action Report, 14th Tank Battalion, March 1945, page 13.

2
It is probable that very few places along the Battalion, drove the German defenders from
whole stretch of the RHINE were less suited the bridge road surface and from the stone
for a large-scale river crossing. From a tactical piers of the bridge. In addition, the tanks en-
standpoint, the REMAGEN BRIDGE was on gaged the flak guns on the east bank whicl
the north shoulder of a shallow salient into the were opposing the crossing. s On gaining the
enemy side of the river. The ground on the far shore, Company A, 27th Armored Infantry
east bank rose precipitously from the river and Battalion, turned downstream and began
continued rising through rough wooded hills sweeping ERPEL (F647207). Company B
for 5000 meters inland. The primary road net scaled the cliffs immediately north of the
consisted of a river road and two mountain bridge and seized HILL 191 (F645208) while
roads, any of which could be easily blocked. Company C attacked toxward ORSBERGC
From a supply and reinforcement viewpoint, (F652216). 4 Troops from Company B, 9th Ar-
the bridge site was near the southern, army mored Engineer Battalion, moved onto the
boundary. Only one primary road ran into bridge with the assault infantry. These engi-
REMAGEN from the west, and that road did neers, moving rapidly across the bridge, cut
not run along the normal axis of supply. Fur- every wire in sight and threw the explosives
thermore, there had been no build-up of sup- into the river. 4 No effective repairs of the
plies at the crossing site in anticipation of a bridge could be accomplished until dark, how-
crossing at that point. As previously stated, ever, due to extremely accurate and heavy
therefore, the decision was not so obvious as fire from the snipers stationed on both banks
it first appears. The possibility of putting a of the river.5
force across the river only to have the bridge As the leading elements reached the far
fall and the force annihilated approached the shore, CCB received an order by radio that
probable. A negative decision which would missions to the east were to be abalndoled:
have ignored the possibility of seizing the "Proceed south along the west l)ank of the
bridge while insuring the accomplishment of RHINE." At 1615 the Commanding (;eneral,
the assigned mission would have been easy. Combat Command B, received an order issued
Probably the most important observation noted to his liaison officer by the division (G-3 at
on the whole operation is that each echelon 071050 March, ordering Combat (,oimnmand 13
of command did something positive, thereby to "seize or, if necessary, construct at least one
demonstrating not only a high degree of initia- bridge over the AIIR RIVER in the Combat
tive but also the flexibility of mind in com- Command B zone and( continmi to advance
manders toward which all armies strive but approximately five kilometers south of the
which they too rarely attain. AHIR; halt there and wait for further orders."
At 1550, Company A, 27th Armored Infan- Upon receiving this order, CGenelral Iloge
try Battalion, reached the east bank of the decided to continue exploitation of the bridge-
river, closely followed by Companies B and head until he could confer with the (:om-
C., 2 The crossings were made under spo- manding General, 9th Armored Division.
radic fire from 20-mm flak guns and uncoor- By 071650 March, the division anli Combat
dinated small-arms fire from both sides of the Command B commanders had conferred at
river. 2 The guns of Company A, 14th Tank BIRRESDORF (F580217), and the division
lAfter Action Report, 14th Tank Battalion, March 1945, page 13.
2After Action Report,
27th Armored Infantry Battalion, March 1945, page 6.
3
Statement of Lt John Grimball, Ist Platoon, Company A, 14th Tank Battalion.
4
After Action Report, CCB, 9th Armored Division, March 1945, page 9.
5
Statement of Maj Cecil E. Roberts, S-3, 14th Tank Battalion.
3
commander directed Combat Command B to harassing the engineers working on the
secure and expand the bridgehead;' Task bridge.3
Force Prince at SINZIG to be relieved by Late in the evening American Air inter-
Combat Command A and Task Force Robin-
cepted a German order directing a heavy
son on the north to be covered by one troop,
bombing attack on the bridge to be made at
89th Reconnaissance Squadron; division re-
080100 March. However, the bad weather
sponsible to the west end of the bridge. 2 This
prevented the German planes from getting
released for the bridgehead forces the follow-
ing units: off the ground. 2
Company C, 656th Tank Destroyer Bat- During the night, the two roads leading into
talion. REMAGEN from BIRRESDORF on the west
Troop C, 89th Reconnaissance Squadron. and SINZIG (657164) on the south, as well as
52d Armored Infantry Battalion. the streets of the town, became clogged with
1st Battalion, 310th Infantry. traffic; first by units of the combat command
1 platoon, Company B, 9th Armored En- being hurriedly assembled, and later by re-
gineer Battalion. inforcements being rushed up by III Corps.
The night was rainy and very dark, which
Provisions were made to guide these units necessitated great efforts from all concerned
to their areas, and a time schedule of crossing
to keep traffic moving at all. The bridge re-
was drawn up.3
pairs, completed by midnight, permitted one-
The command post of the bridgehead force way vehicular. traffic. Company A of the 14th
was set tip in REMAGEN 200 yards west of Tank Battalion, less its 90-mm platoon, crossed
the bridge at 1605. Combat Command B successfully; and Company C, 656th Tank
command post was established at BIRRES- Destroyer Battalion, followed. The leading
DORF (F580217) at 1200. tank destroyer slipped off the temporary run-
At 1855, the bridgehead commander re- way on the bridge in the darkness and became
ceived orders from Combat Command B to wedged between two cross members of the
secure the high ground around the bridgehead structure, thereby halting all vehicular traffic
alnd to mine securely all roads leading into the for a period of three hours. By 080530 March,
bridgehead from the east. In addition, he was when the tank destroyer was finally towed
informed that the necessary troops required to off the bridge, the traffic jam was impeding
perform this mission were on the way and that movement as far back as BIRRESDORF
the( division would protect the rear of the (580217). 5
task force.4 During the next 24 hours, the following-
A dismolunted platoon from Company D, designated units crossed the bridge:
14th Tank Battalion, swept the area between
the railroad and the woods on the high ground 080015 March
west and south of REMAGEN. This job, Company A, 14th Tank Battalion, less one
which was completed at 2040, silenced the flak platoon, crossed and set up a road block at
guns and drove out the snipers who had been (F642211) and one at (F656203).
1
After Action Report, 9th Armored Division, March 1945, pages 19, 20.
2
Statetment of Major General Leonard.
3
After Action Report, 14th Tank Battalion, March 1945, page 14.
4
'After Action Report, 14th Tank Battalion, March 1945, page 13.
5
After Action Report, CCB, 9th Armored Division, March 1945, page 10.

4
080200 March Following the 47th Infantry, the 311th In-
52d Armored Infantry Battalion, dismounted, fantry, 78th Division, crossed the river and
started across the bridge. The battalion went into an assembly area at (F647213).3 4
established its command post at ERPEL During the night of 8-9 March, traffic conll-
(F647207) at 0630 and took over the north gestion in REMAGEN became so bad that
half of the perimeter from U N K E L only one battalion of the 60th Infantry was
(F634224) to (F652227).' able to cross the river. One cause of the in-
080700 March creased traffic difficulty was the almost con-
tinuous artillery fire falling on the bridge and
1st Battalion, 310th Infantry, crossed and oc-
bridgehead, and the air strikes in the area. 5 ' 6
cupied the high ground south of the bridge
around OCKENFELS (F673200) in order to The command of the bridgehead changed
deny the enemy use of the locality for twice in 26 hours. At 080001 March, the Comn-
observation on the bridge. manding General, Combat Command B, 9th
Armored Division (General I-loge), assumed
080715 March command of the forces east of the RtIINE.
14th Tank Battalion, less Company A, crossed During the night of 7-8 March, he moved to
and went into mobile reserve. 2 the east bank all command posts of units
During the remainder of the day of 8 having troops across the river, so that a coordi-
March, the 47th Infantry, 9th Infantry Di- nated fight could continue even if the bridge
vision, crossed and took up defensive positions were blown. At 090235 March, the Command-
to the east and northeast of the 27th and 52d ing General, 9th Infantry I)ivision (General
Armored Infantry Battalions. By this time, Craig), assumed command of the bridgehead
the bridgehead was about one mile deep and forces, and directed the operation until the
two miles wide. breakout on 22 March. 7

lAfter Action Report, 52d Armored Infantry Battalion, pag


2
After Action Report, 14th Tank Battalion, March 1945, page 15.
3
After Action Report, CCB, 9th Armored Division, March 1945, page 9.
4After Action Report, CCB, 9th Armored Division, March 1945, page 10.
5
After Action Report, 9th Armored Division, March 1945, page 20.
6
Statement of Lt John Grimball, Company A, 14th Tank Battalion: ".... the first round of Germanll artillery fired
at the bridge came in on the morning of March 8 at about 1030 or 1100 o'clock. I rememler this very clearly . ."
7
After Action Report, CCB, 9th Armored Division, March 1945, pages 10, 11.

5
NARRATIVE: Build-up and Conduct of the Bridgehead
By the time the 9th Infantry Division as- attack was changed to the southeast, with
sumed command of the bridgehead, it had consequent changes in division boundaries
become a major effort. The activities which and objectives. The 1st Infantry Division's
then dominated the scene were threefold: (1) southern boundary was moved south so that
the close-in protection of the bridge and the the city of BONN (F5437) fell within the di-
building of additional crossings; (2) the enlarg- vision zone, and the division was directed to
ing of the bridgehead; and (3) the reinforcing seize BONN and cut by fire the RHINE
of the troops east of the RHINE. In order to RIVER bridge at that place. The southern
understand correctly these problems and their boundary of the 9th Infantry Division was also
solution, it is necessary to hark back several turned southeast so that the cities of BAD
days and study the progressive situation. GODESBURG (F5932) and LANNESDORF
6 March 1945 (F6129) became its objectives, and the 9th
Armored Division was directed to seize RE-
In the 9th Infantry Division zone the 47th
MAGEN (F6420) and crossings over the AHR
Infantry Regiment drove approximately three
RIVER in the vicinity of SINZIG (F6516),
miles past HEIMERZHEIM (F4135), a gain
of five miles. The 60th Infantry attacked HEIMERSHEIM (F6016), and BAD NEUEN-
AHR (F5716). The 78th Infantry Division
through the 39th Infantry Regiment and also
was directed to seize crossings over the AHR
advanced approximately five miles to BUSCH-
RIVER at AHRWEILER (F5416) and places
HOVEN (F4631), which was captured.
to the west of AHRWEILER (F5416), and was
Both Combat Command A and Combat
instructed to continue to protect the III Corps
Command B of the 9th Armored Division at-
right flank. All divisions were directed to clear
tacked to the southeast early in the morning,
the enemy from the west bank of the RHINE
and continued the attack through the day and
RIVER in their respective zones, and all ar-
night to advance nine or ten miles. Although
tillery was directed that pozit or time fuses
Combat Command A was held up for a
only would be used when firing on RHINE
number of hours at the city of RHEINBACH
(F4425), it captured that place during the late RIVER bridges.
morning and by midnight had taken VETTEL- During the night of 6-7 March, 9th Armored
HOVEN (F5219) and BOLINGEN (F5319). Division was directed to make its main effort
Combat Command B captured MPIEL (F4230) toward the towns of REMAGEN and BAD
and MORENHOVEN (F4430), and by 1530 NEUENAHR, and was informed that closing
had entered STADT MECKENHEIM (F4925). to the RHINE RIVER at MEHLEM (F6129)
The 78th Infantry Division's 311th Infantry, was of secondary importance.
which had crossed the corps southern bound-
ary into the V Corps zone in order to perform By 1900, First US Army, commanded by
reconnaissance and protect the corps south Lieutenant General Courtney H. Hodges, re-
flank, was relieved early by elements of the quested the Air Force not to bomb either
V Corps and attacked to the east. The regi- BONN or BAD GODESBURG. It was also
ment advanced up to five miles to MERZ- requested that all the RHINE RIVER bridges
BACH (F4322), QUECKENBERG (F4022), in III Corps zone be excluded from bombing,
LOCH (F4022), and EICHEN (F4216). although no objection was made to attacking
As a result of the changes of corps bound- ferry sites, pontoon bridges, boats, or barges
aries that had been directed by First US Army being used to ferry men and equipment across
during the night 5-6 March, the direction of the RHINE RIVER.
6
The III Corps command post opened at In the zone of the 9th Infantry Division, the
ZULPICH (F2333) at 1200. 60th Infantry Regiment attacked in the di-
rection of BONN, while the 39th Infantry
7 March 1945
Regiment continued to attack toward BAD
Corps continued its rapid advance of the GODESBERG (F5932). By midnight, after
preceding day and drove from five to 12 miles advances of several miles, elements were ill
along its entire front to seize the railroad position to attack BAD GODESBERG and
bridge across the RHINE RIVER at RE- objectives to the south along the RHINE.
MAGEN (F6420), as well as a number of cros- To the south, in the zone of the 79th Infan-
sings over the AHR RIVER in the vicinity of try Division, the 309th Infantry Regiment at-
SINZIG (F6516), BAD NEUENAHR (F5716), tacked through the 311th Infantry Regiment,
HEIMERSHEIM (F6016), and AHRWEILER
and advanced from eight to ten miles against
(F5416). On this day, enemy resistance ap- light resistance and seized crossings over the
peared to collapse, and opposition was
AHR RIVER.
scattered with no apparent organized lines of
defense. The little resistance encountered was The 9th Armored Division, having been
confined to towns, where small groups de- given the mission of seizing REMAGEN and
fended with small-arms fire, although at crossings over the AHR, moved out in the
HEIMERSHEIM and BAD NEUENAHR the morning with Coinbat Command A on the
enemy defended stubbornly. right and Combat Command B on the left.
The mission of Combat Command A was to
At 1400, III Corps was assigned a new seize crossings at BAD NEUENAIlR and
mission when Major General W. B. Kean, HEIMERSHEIM, while Combat Command
Chief of Staff, First US Army, visited the B was to take REMAGEN and KRIPP (F6718)
corps command post at ZULPICH with in- and seize crossings over the AJIR at SINZIG
structions directing the corps to advance south and BODENDORF (F6317). Combat Com-
along the west bank of the RHINE RIVER mand B consequently attacked in two columns,
and effect a junction with the Third US Army, one in the direction of each of its objectives,
which was driving north toward the RHINE with 1st Battalion, 310th Infantry, and a tank
at a point only a few miles south of the III destroyer company covering the left flank.
Corps right flank. A message cancelling this Although Combat Command A met stiff oppo-
mission was received at III Corps headquar- sition at BAD NEUENAHR, Combat Com-
ters at approximately 1845 when Brigadier mand B met practically none and captured
General T. C. Thorsen, G-3, First US Army, SINZIG and BODENDORF (F6317) by noon
in a telephone message, directed that "Corps with bridges intact, and by 1530 had captured
seize crossings on the AHR RIVER, but do not REMAGEN, against light opposition. Upon
move south of the road, KESSELING (F4909)- finding the bridge at REMAGEN intact,
STAFFEL (F5109)-RAMERSBACH (F5410)- Lieutenant Colonel Leonard Engeman, com-
KONIGSFELD (F6011), except on First US manding the north column of Combat Com-
Army order." A second telephone call from mand B, seized the bridge.
First US Army at approximately 2015 informed First news of the seizure of the bridge ar-
III Corps that it had been relieved of its mis- rived at the III Corps command post at ap-
sion to the south, but that the III Corps was to proximately 1700 when Colonel James H.
secure its bridges over the AHR RIVER, Phillips, Chief of Staff, received a telephone
where it would be relieved as soon as possible call from Colonel Harry Johnson, Chief of
by elements of the 2d Infantry Division Staff, 9th Armored Division. Colonel Phillips
(V Corps). was informed that the bridge was taken intact,
7
and was asked for instructions. At this time, for use in relieving the 9th Infantry Division;
the corps commander was at the command that elements of the 2d Infantry Division (V
post of the 78th Infantry Division, and al- Corps) would relieve the 78th Infantry Divi-
though First US Army had given no instruc- sion and CCA of the Eth Armored Division as
tions regarding the capture of the bridge, soon as possible; that a new V-III Corps
Colonel Phillips gave instructions for the 9th boundary was placed in effect immediately;
Armored Division (less CCA) to exploit the and that First Army was sending a 90-mm
bridgehead as far as possible, but to hold antiaircraft battalion, a treadway bridge com-
SINZIG. Colonel Phillips then relayed the pany, and a DUKW company to III Corps.
information to Major General Milliken, who Major General Robert W. Hasbrouck, Com-
confirmed these instructions and immediately manding General, 7th Armored Division, was
made plans to motorize the 47th Infantry instructed to immediately move one combat
Regiment (9th Infantry Division) and dispatch command, reinforced by one battalion of
it to REMAGEN. The 311th Infantry Regi- infantry, to an area MIEL (F4230)-MOREN-
ment of the 78th Infantry Division was alerted HOVEN (F4430)-BUSCHHOVEN (F4631)-
for movement to the bridgehead. DUNSTEKOVEN (F4333), where it would
III Corps was presented with the problem become attached temporarily to the 9th In-
of making troops available for immediate em- fantry Division. In turn, the 9th Infantry Di-
ployment in the bridgehead. The greater parts vision was informed of these arrangements,
of all three divisions were engaged. As an and was directed that the 60th Infantry Regi-
expedient, units had to be moved to the ment, after relief by Combat Command A, 7th
bridgehead in the order in which they could Armored Division, would become attached to
be made available. In order to achieve effec- the 9th Armored Division.
tive control and unity of command, it was
Other considerations were the need for
decided to attach all units initially, as they
artillery support, the protection of the bridge
crossed the river, to Combat Command B, 9th
against enemy air action and sabotage, the
Armored Division, for securing the initial
construction of additional bridges, and the
bridgehead.
problems of signal communication. The signal
As a result, the 47th Infantry Regiment, plan had been built around an axis of advance
having been motorized, became attached to to the south and did not envisage a need for
Combat Command B, 9th Armored Division, extensive communications in the REMAGEN
at 2100; and the 78th Infantry Division was area.
instructed to have the Commanding Officer,
Artillery plans also needed quick revision.
311th Infantry Regiment, with necessary staff
By 2230, one 4.5-inch gun battalion, one
officers, report to the Commanding General,
155-mm gun battalion, and one 8-inch how-
9th Armored Division. The 78th Infantry Di-
itzer battalion were in position, ready to deli-
vision was told that III Corps would furnish
ver fire. Heavy interdiction fires around the
trucks to the regiment at 080100 March, and
that movement would be upon call of the bridgehead were planned.
Commanding General, 9th Armored Division. By 080300 March the 482d Antiaircraft
First US Army, on being notified of the Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion had
day's developments, confirmed the decision established defense of the bridge. Assurance
to exploit the bridgehead. A telephone call was given by First Army that air cover would
to III Corps from First Army at 2015 included be provided from any base on the continent or
the information that the 7th Armored Divi- in the United Kingdom from which planes
sion was attached to III Corps immediately, were able to leave the ground.
8
Visibility during the day was fair, with low instructions were issued to Major General
clouds and scattered rains throughout. Heavy Edwin P. Parker, Commanding General, 78th
rains fell during the night. Infantrv Division, directing that the 3(09th
Infantry Regiment, upon relief by the 2d In-
8 March 1945
fantry Division, be assembled and marched
Activity on 8 March was concerned pri- on secondary roads to an area designated by
marily with reinforcing the troops across the Major General Leonard, Commanidimng (en -
river as rapidly as possible, expanding the eral, 9th Armored Division. Major (enseral
bridgehead, and clearing the enemy from the Parker, Commanding General, 78th Infantrl
west bank of the RHINE. Division, was instructed that control of his
East of the RHINE the enemy took no regiments would be returned to hilm as soon
concerted action. No counterattacks were as he was prepared to assume command of
launched and no organized defenses were his zone of action in the bridgehead area. At
encountered. KASBACH (F6620) and UNKEL 1755, the relief of the 309th Infantry IRegiment
(F6322) were captured, and at the day's end, was completed, and at that time, control of the
the 1st Battalion, 310th Infantry Regiment, zone of the 78th Infantry D1ivision plassed to
was fighting in LINZ (F6718). The 47th In- the Commanding General, 2d Infantry D)i-
fantry Regiment crossed the river in the after- vision. At 1815, two battalions of the 309th
noon and went into positions northeast of the Infantry Regiment were ordered to move
52d Armored Infantry Battalion. within seven hours, and the regiment began
The 78th Infantry Division was directed at crossing d(ining the night, closing ini the
0200 to cancel all attacks which had been bridgehead area on the following day.
scheduled for this day, and to hold the AHR Mlovement of the 7th Arrmored l)ivisioiv into
RIVER bridgehead until relief had been the zone of the 9th Infantry Division contiii-
effected by the 2d Infantry Division. Major ued throughout the day; al(l at 12:35, (C:omI)Iat
General Walter M. Robertson, Commanding Command A had closed ill the area anId ('-
General, 2d Infantry Division, had visited the came attached to the 9th Ilfaltry l)ivision.
78th Infantry Division command post, and had The 1st Battalion, 60th Infantry, lhad ie)('e
stated that the relief could be completed no assembled by' afternoon a(nd lhad clrossedl the
earlier than 0815 of that day. river bly early morniimig of 9 March. (Jomnulat
At this time the 309th Infantry Regiment Command B, 7th Armored l)ivision, bIcamc
was the only regiment under control of the attached to the 9th Infantry I)ivisiom at I 1()0,
78th Infantry Division which was actually and was directed to mnove dluring the aftel-
engaged. The 310th Infantry Regiment had nioon to relieve the :39th Ilfatr legimncllt.
Ifa
previously been attached to the 9th Armored At 1715, the (Commanding (;Gelral, 7th Ar-
Division, with which it was currently operat- mored Division, assumned comilmrnald(l of thie
ing, and the 311th Infantry Regiment, having zone, and all 7th Annrmored )ivisioin elencel ts,
been alerted for movement on the preceding plus those units of the 9th 1ifantry l)ivisioln
night, had been assembled and was prepared remaining in the zone, passed toi his conItrol.
to move by 0500. Movement of the 311th The anticipatedl attachment of the 99th
Infantry Regiment began during the morning, Infantry Division mlade it douib)ly im1)por tant
and by late afternoon the regiment closed in that some agency )e given the reslolmsiility of
the bridgehead area, where it became at- staging and moving troops west of the Rl II NE.
tached to the 9th Armored Division. Consequently, the Comrnalndliig CGeneral. 9th
At 0945, the 309th Infantry Regiment was Armored Division, was directed to conltilimc('
alerted for movement to the bridgehead, when to perform this function. The Col(
nmmllalding
9
Generals, 9th Infantry and 9th Armored Di- dropped into the river at five-minute intervals
visions, operated as a team, one furnishing during the night to discourage swimmers bent
troops to the other as called for. III Corps on demolishing the bridge.
set up the priority for the movements of By the end of the day, the forces in the
troops available west of the RHINE as rapidly bridgehead consisted of the 27th Armored In-
as they could be disengaged, and established fantry Battalion, the 52d Armored Infantry
a tactical command post at REMAGEN to (1) Battalion, the 14th Tank Battalion, the 47th
expedite information to corps, (2) give advice Infantry Regiment, the 311th Infantry Regi-
for solution of rising problems, (3) closely su- ment, the 1st Battalion of the 60th Infantry
pervise engineer operations, and (4) supervise Regiment, the 1st and 2d Battalions of the
traffic and control roads. A traffic circulation 310th Infantry Regiment, Company C of the
plan was placed in effect in which eastbound 656th Tank Destroyer Battalion, Troop C of
traffic moved on northerly roads, which were the 89th Reconnaissance Squadron, one pla-
not under enemy observation, and westbound toon of Company B of the 9th Armored Engi-
traffic moved on southerly routes. Thus, neer Battalion, and one and one half batteries
loaded vehicles ran less risk of receiving ar- of the 482d Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion.
tillery fire. In order that bridge traffic would The 309th Infantry Regiment was en route.
not be interrupted by westbound ambulance III Corps Operations Directive No. 10 was
traffic, it was decided that casualties would be published, which established three objectives,
returned by LCVPs, DUKWs, and ferries, known as lines Red, White, and Blue. The
which were soon placed in operation. seizure of line Red was to prevent small-arms
Because of poor weather conditions-the fire from being delivered on the bridge area;
day was cold with rain and low overcast- when line White had been reached, observed
fighter-bombers were grounded and were artillery fire would be eliminated; and the
unable to furnish cover protection for the seizure of line Blue would prevent medium
bridge. However, the enemy attempted ten artillery fire from being delivered on the
raids over the bridge with ten aircraft, eight bridge sites.
of which were Stukas. By afternoon, however, 9 March 1945
the 482d Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion had
On the third day of the bridgehead opera-
three batteries at the bridge site with three
tion, enemy opposition east of the RHINE
platoons on the east and three platoons on the
stiffened considerably, as elements of the 11th
west bank of the river, while the 413th Anti-
Panzer Division were contacted on the front.
aircraft Artillery Battalion (90-mm) went into
Enemy troops had been reported moving on
positions on the west bank; and of the ten
the autobahn with lights on during the night.
attacking aircraft, eight were shot down.
Although the 311th Infantry Regiment made
Because of the air attacks and the artillery good progress to the north, where it made
fire, the engineers at the bridge site requested gains of from 2000 to 3000 yards, strong re-
that smoke be employed, and requests were sistance was met in the south and center of the
again made of First US Army for a smoke bridgehead, and the enemy attacked with in-
generator unit. Because none was available at fantry, tanks, and aircraft. Fire of all types
this time, however, smoke pots were gathered was received, and heavy artillery fire landed
from all available sources. The 9th Armored in the vicinity of the bridge. During the early
Group was ordered to furnish CDLs (search afternoon, a direct hit on an ammunition
lights mounted on tanks) to assist in protecting truck which was crossing the bridge caused
the bridge against floating mines, swimmers, considerable damage, placing the bridge out
riverhoats, etc., and depth charges were of operation for several hours.
10
On the west of the RHINE, all organized revert to control of the Commanding General,
resistance ceased; and at 1125, the 7th Ar- 78th Infantry Division, at a time and place
mored Division was able to report that its agreed upon by the two division commanders,
zone had been cleared of the enemy from and that the Commanding General, 78th In-
boundary to boundary and to the river. Relief fantry Division, would assume control of the
of the 60th Infantry Regiment was completed north sector of the bridgehead. The Conm-
early in the afternoon, and at 1300, that regi- manding General, 9th Infantry Division, was
ment was relieved of attachment to the 7th instructed early in the morning to contille
Armored Division. The regiment, the 1st Bat- the attack and to seize line White.
talion of which had crossed to the east of the At 1015, the 99th Infantry Division, conm-
RHINE the preceding day, closed in the manded by Mlajor General Walter E. Laner,
bridgehead during the early morning hours of became attached to III Corps, and during the
the 10th. The 39th Infantry Regiment, having late afternoon the division began to move into
captured BAD GODESBERG (F5832), was an assembly area in the vicinity of STAI)T
relieved by elements of the 7th Armored Di- MECKENHEIEM (F4925). By mlidnight, the
vision by 1800, and prepared to move into the 393d and 394th Infantry RIegiiments had closed
bridgehead on the following day. The 7th in the area, and the 395th Infantry Regiment
Armored Division was directed to outpost was en route.
islands in the RHINE RIVER at (F627270)
and (F632270), opposite HONNEF, and to Instructions were issued directillg: (I) that
prevent movement of enemy upstream toward the 99th Infantry Division (-artilleryy), V ith
the bridge sites. the 535th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion tlhe
629th Tank Destroyer Battalion, and the 786tfl
Of the 78th Infantry Division, all but the Tank Battalion attached. wouil(d cross the
309th Infantry Regiment and elements of the RHINE, commencing at 1020()30 Marcll; (2)
310th Infantry Regiment, attached to Combat that the division would pass throulgh (elemenits
Command A, 9th Armored Division, had of Combat Command B, 9th Armo)r(e d l)ivisiomi,
crossed the RHINE on 7 and 8 March. The and attack to the south; and (:3) that one iii-
309th Infantry Regiment, having begun its fantry regiment (milrss one !battalion) vwas iot
movement across the river on 8 March, closed to be committed except on II Corps orders.
in the bridgehead late in the afternoon of 9 This regiment, the 395tlh was to move to an
March, and at 0930, elements of the 2d In- assembly area within one hour's nilarclhilng
fantry Division were moving into position to distance of the bridge site, ali(l Nas to close
relieve the 310th Infantry Regiment(-) in the there )bythe evening of 11 Mlarch.
AHR RIVER bridgeheads. That relief was
completed at approximately 1600. By 100400 Elements of thie 9th Armored ID)ivision.
March, the 310th Infantry Regiment had which were holdiig its bridgehead across the
crossed completely, and the only elements of Af11R IVER, were directed: (I) to tb ple)
the 78th Infantry Division remaining west of pared to move east of the iBIlNE o( III1 (Corps
the RHINE at that time were the division orders; (2) to continue to protect b)ridges over
artillery and spare parts. the AIIR RIVEIR; ancd (3) to maintain colrtalct
with the 2d Infantry Division (V Corps) on the
During the morning the command post, corps south flank.
9th Infantry Division, opened at ERPEL
(F647205). The Commanding General, 9th The III Corps Engineer was (lirecte(d to as-
Infantry Division, was directed that elements sume control of all engineer activity at the
of the 78th Infantry Division currently at- bridge site, thus relieving 9th Armored I)i-
tached to the 9th Infantry Division would vision engineers of that responsibility. At the
11
time, two ferries were already in operation, sistance was encountered in the area north-
and a third was nearing completion. Con- east of BRUCHHAUSEN (F6522), and strong
struction had been started at 091030 March points which delayed the advance were en-
on a treadway bridge at (F648202), and it was countered in the entire zone. Fire from small
planned that a heavy pontoon bridge would be arms, self-propelled weapons, mortars, and
built upstream at (F674186) (KRIPP). A con- artillery was received.
tact boomi, a log boom, and a net boom, de- In the north, the 311th Infantry Regiment
signed to protect the bridge from water-borne attacked HONNEF (F6427). The 309th In-
objects, were under construction upstream fantry Regiment, in the northeast portion of
from the bridge. the corps zone, advanced some 2000 yards to
Early in the dav, the 16th Antiaircraft Ar- the east after repulsing one counterattack, and
tillery Group was directed to employ all anti- in the center sector the 47th Infantry Regi-
aircraft artillery units for the protection of the ment received sharp counterattacks which
bridge, and consequently the antiaircraft de- forced a slight withdrawal. The regiment,
fense of the bridge site was strengthened by assisted by the 2d Battalion, 310th Infantry
the arrival of two additional battalions. The Regiment, repulsed these counterattacks, how-
109th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion be- ever, and during the afternoon the 3d Bat-
came operational on the west bank of the talion, 310th Infantry Regiment, followed by
RHINE, and the 6i34th Antiaircraft Artillery the 52d Armored Infantry Battalion (attached
Automatic Weapons Battalion crossed and to the 310th Infantry Regiment), attacked
went into position on the east bank. through the 47th Infantry Regiment and ad-
The corps command post opened at RHEIN- vanced up to 1000 yards. The 60th Infantry
BACH (F4425) at 1220. Regiment, in the southeast, attacked and
At the close of the day, the forces in the gained about 1500 yards. Combat Command
bridgehead had been strengthened by the B, 9th Armored Division (1st Battalion, 310th
arrival of the 309th Infantry Regiment, the Infantry Regiment, and 27th Armored Infan-
remainder of the 310th Infantry Regiment, try Battalion), plus elements of the 60th In-
the 60th Infantry Regiment, and additional fantry Regiment, attacked south and reached
antiaircraft protection. The antitank defense a point about 700 yards south of LINZ (F6718),
of the bridgehead had been bolstered by the capturing DATTENBERG (F6817) en route.
tank destroyers accompanying the regimental The movement of the 9th Infantry Division
combat teams, across the RHINE was completed at 1825,
Although no artillery-or at best an occa- when the 39th Infantry Regiment closed in the
sional battery-had as yet moved east of the bridgehead, in an assembly area in the vicinity
RHINE, the artillery of the divisions, as well of BRUCHHAUSEN (F6522). The Command-
as corps artillery, supported the operation ing General, 9th Infantry Division, requested
from positions on the west side. that he be relieved of responsibility for the
The day was cold, with visibility restricted security of the railroad bridge and bridging
by a low overcast which continued through- operations at REMAGEN, and consequently
out the day. No fighter-bombers flew in sup- the 14th Cavalry Group was directed to as-
port of the bridgehead, but medium bombers sume that responsibility. Instructions were
flew several missions. issued directing the group to move to an
assembly area in the vicinity of STADT
10 March 1945 MECKENHEIM (F4925)-ARZDORF (F5423)-
The expansion of the bridgehead continued RINGEN (F5419)-GELSDORF (F5021) on
against stiffening resistance. Very heavy re- 11 March.
12
The 99th Infantry Division closed in its as- 1400 the Commanding General, 99th Infantry
sembly area west of the RHINE early in the Division, assumed control of the southern sec-
morning, and at 1530 one regimental combat tor, at which time he assumed command of
team was directed by the corps to move into the 393d and 394th Infantry Regiments. As
the bridgehead. The 394th Infantry Regiment the attack of 'the 393d and 394th Infantrv
began to cross the RHINE during the night, Regiments progressed to the south and south-
and at 2100 the corps directed that the re- east. elements of Combat Command B, 9th
maining two infantry regiments plan to arrive Armored Division, were relieved in the line
at the bridge on the following morning. III and began to assemble, preparatory to going
Corps directed that the 99th Infantry Division into III Corps reserve. The 27th Armored
plan to take over in the southern sector of the Infantry Battalion assembled in the vicinity
bridgehead. of UNKEL (F6322). The 1st Battalion, 310th
III Corps Artillery, reinforced by V and Infantry Regiment, was detached from Conm-
VII Corps Artillery, fired heavy interdiction bat Command B, 9th Armored Division, and
and counterbattery missions during the day. reverted to control of the 9th Infantry Division
at 1200. Company A, 656th Tank Destroyer
11 March 1945
Battalion, and the 60th Armored Infantry
The attack to enlarge the bridgehead pro- Battalion were attached to Combat Comnmand
gressed slowly against continuous stubborn B, 9th Armored Division. The 395th Infantry
resistance. Few gains were made in the north Regiment was attached to the 9th Inlfantry
and central sectors. The 394th Infantry Regi- Division effective at 1200 anll designated as
ment, which had completed crossing early in bridgehead reserve.
the morning, attacked to the south through
Combat Command B, 9th Armored Division, The Commanding General, 78th Infantry
and gained up to 3000 yards, capturing Division, assumed control of the northern por-
LUEBSDORF (F6816) and ARIENDORF tion of the bridgehead at ()9()00, and at the
(F6814). Elsewhere in the bridgehead, some same time assumed command of the 309th
local objectives were taken and a number of and 311th Infantry Regiments, both of which
counterattacks, supported by tanks, were re- were attackinrg. The 310th Infantry Regiment,
pulsed. however, remained attached to the 9tl- In-
fantry Division, in whose zone it was heavily
The 394th Infantry Regiment, the first of the
engaged. The 39th Infantry Regiment, which
99th Infantry Division units to move into the
was operating in the zone of the 78th Infantry
bridgehead, completed its crossing early in
Division, became attached to that division.
the morning and became attached to the 9th
Effective at 11(X), Company C, 90th Chermical
Infantry Division at 0730. At 0830, the As-
Battalion, was attached to the 39th Infantry
sistant Division Commander, 99th Infantry
Regiment. III Corps directed the 78th Irfan-
Division, opened an advanced command post
try Division units currently operating in the
with the command post, 9th Infantry Division.
zone of the 9th Infantry Division, and 9th
By noontime, the 393d Infantry Regiment had
Infantry Division elements operating in the
closed east of the' RHINE. The 395th Infan-
zone of the 78th, to be relieved and returned
try Regiment moved out during the early
to their respective divisions as soonl as opera-
morning hours to an assembly area in the
tional conditions permitted. It was directed
vicinity of BODENDORF (F6317), and at ap-
proximately 1230 its 1st Battalion had crossed that details of relief would be agreed upon
by the division commanders concerned.
the RHINE, to be followed during the day
by the 2d and 3d Battalions. The division com- The 60th Armored Infantry Battalion, which
mand post opened at LINZ (F6718), and at had been attached to Combat Command B,
13
9th Armored Division, remained on a two- The antiaircraft defenses of the bridges
hour alert on the west bank of the RHINE. were strengthened during the day. The 134th
The 9th Infantry Division, having turned Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion became
over control of the greater portion of the operational on the west bank of the river.
bridgehead to the commanding generals of Three batteries of the 376th Antiaircraft Ar-
the 78th and 99th Infantry Divisions by 1400, tillery Automatic Weapons Battalion went into
continued its operations with the 47th and position on the west side of the river and one
60th Infantry Regiments plus the 310th In- on the east. Heavy concentrations were in-
fantry Regiment of the 78th Infantry Division. strumental in breaking up several German
Combat Command B, 9th Armored Division, counterattacks.
and the 395th Infantry Regiment remained The day was cool with intermittent rain.
attached to the 9th Infantry Division.
12 March 1945
The artillery of both the 9th and 7th Ar-
mored Divisions fired in support of the bridge- All three divisions attacked to expand the
head, and the 7th Armored Division occupied bridgehead in the face of very aggressive and
the island in the RHINE at (F628270). On the determined enemy resistance. Opposition was
east side, the 78th Infantry Division discov- encountered from tanks, infantry, self-pro-
ered a highway bridge leading to the island pelled guns, and fire of all types. A number of
at (F632270) and sent patrols to that island, counterattacks were repulsed. In the north,
whereupon the 7th Armored Division was the 309th Infantry Regiment was forced to de-
relieved of that mission. fend in position, and the 311th Infantry Regi-
ment received two counterattacks. At 1200,
In the vicinity of the bridge sites, the enemy
the 1st Battalion, 310th Infantry Regiment,
made desperate attempts to knock out the
was detached from the 9th Infantry Division
railroad bridge and prevent operation of the
and reverted to control of the 78th Infantry
treadway. The treadway was opened to traffic
Division. The battalion was then attached to
at 0700, but because of several damaged pon-
toons, was able to handle only light traffic the 311th Infantry Regiment. At 2300 the 60th
Armored Infantry Battalion was also attached
initially. Artillery fire was heavy throughout
to the 311th Infantry because of the strong
the night of 10-11 March and the morning of
enemy pressure in the regimental zone. The
11 March. At approximately 0515, the rail-
39th Infantry Regiment (attached to the 78th
road bridge was placed in operation again
Infantry Division) attacked, but made little
after having been temporarily closed be-
progress.
cause of damage from artillery fire. Although
it remained in operation throughout the day, In the central sector, the 9th Infantry Di-
the movement of traffic was hazardous be- vision made slow progress, although the 60th
cause of heavy interdiction fires. During the Infantry Regiment attacked to the outskirts of
night of 11 March, an enemy noncommissioned HARGARTEN (F7120), where heavy fighting
officer with radio was captured near the took place. The 310th Infantry Regiment
bridge. (-lst Battalion), after reaching its objective,
The heavy pontoon bridge at (F673186) the high ground in the vicinity of (F690240),
(KRIPP) was ready for operation at 1700, but received a counterattack and was forced to
was damaged by an LCVP, and it was 2400 withdraw.
before the bridge was reopened. It was In the south, however, the 99th Infantry
planned to divert traffic to the bridge begin- Division met lighter opposition initially. The
ning at 120500 March. The DUKW company 393d Infantry Regiment advanced up to 3000
and three ferry sites continued to be employed. yards to capture GINSTERHAHN (F7219)
14
and ROTHEKREUZ (F7218). On the high The 14th Cavalry Group assumed the re-
ground north of HONNINGEN, strong re- sponsibility of guarding the bridge and con-
sistance consisting primarily of self-propelled trolling traffic in the bridging area. The 16th
weapons and small-arms fire was encountered. Battalion Fusiliers (Belgian), scheduled to ar-
The 395th Infantry Regiment remained in rive in the III Corps area on 13 March, was
assembly areas under operational control of attached to the 8th Tank Destroyer Group,
the 9th Infantry Division until 1800, at which which had been charged with the responsi-
time it came under III Corps control as corps bility of guarding rear areas.
reserve. The 39th Infantry Regiment attacked At 1315, the III Corps command post moved
toward KALENBORN (F7024). The rugged from RHEINBACH (F4425) to BAD NEUEN-
terrain and determined defense prevented the AHR (F5716).
regiment from reaching its objective.
13 March 1945
At 1800, Combat Command B, 9th Armored
Division, was detached from the 9th Infantry Expansion of the bridgehead continued to
Division and came under III Corps control. be slow because of extremely difficult terrain
The 60th Armored Infantry Battalion, upon and stubborn and aggressive enemy resistance,
closing in the bridgehead area at 2300, was which included several infantry counterattacks
attached to the 78th Infantry Division, where supported by armor. In the south-central sec-
it became attached to the 311th Infantry tor the enemy employed an estimated 15 tanks,
Regiment. and in the northern area approximately 2100
artillery rounds were received. The terrain
The 7th Armored Division Artillery, rein- in this area consisted of steep slopes, heavily
forced by fires from the division tanks and forested areas, and a limited road net, which
attached tank destroyers, fired in support of restricted gains to approximately two kilo-
the 78th Infantry Division, while the 9th Ar- meters.
mored Division Artillery supported the opera-
tions of the 99th Infantry Division. Up to this The 78th Infantry Division's 311th Infantry
point in the operations, the artillery had been Regiment made the day's greatest gains-
able to support the division operations from approximately two kilometers-after repulsing
west of the river with excellent results, and by a counterattack of battalion strength. The
remaining west of the river had eased the 309th and 39th Infantry Regiments made some
resupply problem. On this day, four field artil- progress, and by dusk the 39th Infantry Regi-
lery battalions, two belonging to the 9th In- ment had secured observation of the town of
fantry Division and one each to the 78th and KALENBORN (F7024). In the center of the
the 99th Infantry Divisions, crossed the river; III Corps zone, the 9th Infantry Division
and a schedule which contemplated the cross- attacked along its entire front and made
ing of six additional artillery battalions was small advances. The 60th Infantry Regiment
set up for 13 March. cleared HARGARTEN (F71.3206) and con-
tinued to advance toward ST KATHERINEN
A marked decrease in enemy artillery ac- (F7221), but the 310th Infantry Regiment
tivity was noted during the night of 11-12 (-1st Battalion), with the 52d Armored In-
March and during the following day. fantry Battalion attached, met heavy resist-
During the period 120600 to 130600 March, ance from tanks, mortars, and artillery and
the enemy increased his efforts to destroy the was unable to take its objective.
bridges by aerial assault. A total of 58 raids The 99th Infantry Division moved out early
were made by 91 planes, 26 of which were in the morning, with the 393d Infantry Regi-
shot down and eight of which were damaged. ment attacking to the east. At 13300, the 2d
15
Battalion, 395th Infantry Regiment, was re- The two military bridges remained in opera-
leased from III Corps reserve and reverted to tion throughout the day, but the railroad
division control. At 1715, III Corps was bridge was closed in order to make permanent
notified that the 393d Infantry Regiment repairs necessitated by the damage caused by
was being held back because of the fear of the initial attempt to blow the bridge, and
overextending its lines. III Corps directed that subsequent damage caused by enemy artillery
the attack be pushed to secure the objective. fire and heavy traffic. The ferry sites, DUKWs,
The division was informed that an advance and LCVPs remained in operation, but three
on the part of the 393d Infantry Regiment heavy pontoon battalions were relieved of
would assist the advance of the 60th Infantry attachment to III Corps over the objection
Regiment (on its left) and that should the need of the corps engineer, who requested that the
arise, the remainder of the 395th Infantry Regi- corps be permitted to retain at least one.
ment would be released from corps reserve and At 2300, the 9th Infantry Division requested
returned to the division. This was done at "artificial moonlight" for its operations on the
1800, although it was directed that one night of 14-15 March, and III Corps arranged
battalion be held in regimental reserve and to have four lights released to the control of
'not be committed except by authority of the the 9th Infantry Division on the following
corps commander. morning.
During the morning, prior to the release of The enemy again made a desperate bid to
the 395th Infantry Regiment from corps re- knock out the bridges. Ninety planes made
serve. both the 395th Infantry Regiment and 47 raids between 130600 and 140600 March.
Combat Command B, 9th Armored Division, Twenty-six planes were destroyed and nine
were directed to prepare counterattack plans damaged. Enemy artillery activity continued
for employment in any portion of the corps light, but III Corps Artillery, assisted by V
zone. Routes and assembly areas were to be and VII Corps Artillery, fired heavy counter-
reconnoitered, and Combat Command B was battery programs.
further ordered to be prepared for attachment The 400th Armored Field Artillery Battalion
to any infantry division through which it and the 667th Field Artillery Battalion were
might pass. relieved of attachment to the 9th Armored
In an effort to further protect the bridge Division and were attached to the 9th and
against enemy waterborne attack, V corps, 99th Infantry Divisions respectively. The 9th
commanded by Major General Clarence R. Armored Division was directed to reinforce
Huebner, was informed at 1700 that it was the fires of the 99th Infantry Division. The
vital to use the utmost vigilance along the 7th Armored Division was directed to reinforce
river to prevent enemy swimmers, mines, the fires of the 78th Infantry Division.
boats, or midget submarines from moving The day was cool and clear with good
downstream. III Corps dispatched technical visibility. Six missions were flown in close
experts to the zone of the 7th Armored Divi- support of corps, and P-38s flew continuous
sion, where construction of a cable across the cover over the bridge sites.
river was under way to assist in converting
that cable into torpedo boom. One platoon 14 March 1945
(four CDLs) from Company C, 738th Tank The attack to expand the bridgehead con-
Battalion, was attached to the 7th Armored tinued, but progress was again slow because
Division, and the division was instructed to of stubborn enemy resistance and rugged
maintain observation and protection on the terrain. Although there was no appreciable
river and boom 24 hours per day. lessening of resistance, counterattacks were
16
fewer in number and smaller in size than 395th Infantry Regiment, began the relief of
during the past several days; and while re- elements of the 393d Infantry Regiment and
sistance in the north was generally light during continued the attack. At 1700, the 2d Battalion.
the first part of the day, opposition became 393d Infantry Regiment, passed to III Corps
increasingly heavier during the afternoon. The reserve. Patrols from the 394th Infantry Regi-
central sector showed a marked decline in ment, which was situated on the high ground
small-arms fire, although artillery and mortar north of HONNINGEN (F7012), entered the
fire was particularly heavy. In the south, north edge of that town.
progress was slowed by what was described
as moderate to heavy artillery fire. One coun- The 7th Armored Division completed con-
terattack by 40 to 50 dismounted enemy was struction of a double cable across the RIHINE.
broken up by friendly artillery fire. Combat Command B, 9th Armored I)ivision,
In the zone of the 78th Infantry Division, remained in III Corps reserve, and the 89th
the 39th Infantry Regiment attacked at 0630 Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron continued
with KALENBORN (F7024) as its objective. to maintain observation close on the west bank
It was planned that upon seizing this objective, of the RHINE.
the regiment would return to control of the At 2200, information was received that First
9th Infantry Division. The objective was not US Army was sending a barrage balloon unit
taken, and the regiment remained attached of 25 balloons aad 80 men to the bridgehead
to the 78th Infantry Division throughout the area to afford further prlotection against at-
day. The attack of the 311th and 309th In- tacks by aircraft.
fantry Regiments progressed slowly. The 309th
Infantry Regiment reached its objectives (1st III Corps Artillery continued to supl)Iort the
Battalion, the RJ near HIMBERG (F694281); operations, principally by firing coullterl)at-
2d Battalion, high ground south of AGIDIEN- tery programs, assisted by V and VII Corps
BERG (F694295); and 3d Battalion, RJ in the Artillery. Three additional field artillery bat-
vicinity of ROTTBITZE (F700276)). The 3d talions of division artillery crossed the river.
Battalion was driven off, but resumed the During the clay, informnationi was rec'eived
attack to retake its objective after severe hand- from First Army that the Ist Infantry Division
to-hand fighting. (VII) would cross the river through the III
In the center, the 9th Infantry Division at- Corps zone commencing on 15 March. It was
tacked toward N O T S C H E I D (F7122), decided that foot troops would be ferried
LORSCHEID (F7221), and KALENBORN across the river in LCVPs while other elements
(F7024). Although LORSCHEID was entered of the division would cross on the bridges and
and some ground was gained toward NOT- ferries. First US Army further directedl that
SCHEID, extremely stiff resistance, which at 161200 March, control of the 78th Infantry
included tanks, rockets, and automatic wea-
Division would he assumed by VII Corps,
pons fire, prevented extensive gains. The 52d
commanded by Major General J. I,awton
Armored Infantry Battalion received counter-
attacks during the afternoon by infantry sup- Collins. At that time the boundary in the
ported by approximately ten tanks. bridgehead between III and VII Corps wolldl
become effective.
In the south, the 99th Infantry Division
attacked with the 393d Infantry Regiment and Orders were issued to the 78th Infantry Di-
advanced about 1500 yards. At 1620, III Corps vision directing it to select assembly areas for
released the 2d Battalion, 395th Infantry Regi- two combat teams of the 1st Infantry Division,
ment, to division control. The 2d Battalion, which would be occupied on 15 and 16 March.
17
15 March 1945 mined that a sag of from six inches to one foot
As the attack continued and the 78th and had taken place, and that extensive work
9th Infantry Divisions neared the autobahn, would have to be done before the bridge
enemy resistance in the central sector con- would be ready for use. The ferries, DUKWs,
tinued to be stubborn, although it decreased and LCVPs continued to operate.
somewhat in the north and south. The 78th Enemy air activity over the bridge de-
Infantry Division attacked early, and its 311th creased sharply, as only seven raids by 12
Infantry Regiment made advances of up to aircraft were reported between 150600 and
2(00 yards; while the 39th Infantry Regiment 160600 March. Of the 12 planes, two were
at the close of the day had advanced more destroyed anid two damaged. Supporting air-
than 1(XX) yards to capture SCHWEIFELD craft flew two missions for III Corps; armed
(F7026), where it received several counter- reconnaissance was conducted to the corps
attacks. The :309th Infantry Regiment by the front, and P-38's flew continuous over the
day's end had advanced to within one mile bridge.
of the autolahn, and had observation of During the day, the 26th Infantry Regiment,
that road. 1st Infantry Division (VII Corps), completed
The 9th Infantry Division cleared NOT- its crossing, closing in the bridgehead at about
SCIIEIL) and LORSCIIEID, although the 1500. The regiment moved north, and it was
60th and 47th Infantry Regiments encoun- planned that the 18th Infantry Regiment
tered strong opposition throughout the day. would cross the river on 16 March.
The enemy strove bitterly to resist advances First US Army issued a Letter of Instruc-
to the alltobahn, employiIng tanks, self-pro- tion, dated 15 March, which established a new
pelled weapons, automatic weapons, and boundary between III and VII Corps and
small-armls fire. In the zone of the 99th In- designated three objectives: the initial objec-
fantry Divisioni, howcver, the enemy showed tive; initial bridgehead; and final bridgehead.
signs of weakening, its the division made good III Corps was directed to continue the attack
gains and reached its objectives. HAHNEN to secure the initial bridgehead, but no ad-
(F7318) and IIESSELN (F7317) were cleared, vance was to be made past that point except
an(d aclvanllcs of more than 1500 yards were on First US Army order. The boundary be-
made. At 1200, the 2d Battalion, 393d Infantry tween III and VII Corps was to becomne ef-
Regiment, was releasetd by III Corps to di- fective at 161200 March, at which time control
vision control, and the :3d Battalion, 395th of the 78th Infantry Division was to pass to
Inhfailtrv egimllnlt, becamle corps reserve. III VII Corps.
( orps dirccte(d that the battalion be motorized
As a result of these instructions issued by
andml oved to a position from which it could
First US Army, III Corps published Opera-
be re'adilv (emplOyc(l.
tions Directive No. 16, which confirmed frag-
()rdcrs (elrc recl(i\vc from the First US mentary orders already issued, announced the
A.rmyi that thile 7th Armlorel Division was not new boundaries and objectives, and directed a
to Ib(' cnplo)ycd in thet( bridgehead. Combat continuation of the attack to secure the initial
( omnmanl d !3 9th Armored D)ivision, remained objective. It contained tlhse additional in-
ill crps reser'(ve. The 14th Cavalry Group structions: (1) The 60th Armored Infantry
maintaill(d(! defteises of the t)ri(lges, and con- Battalion would be detached from the 78th
trolled traffic att the crossing sites. Infantry Division effective 161800 March and
Both military bridges remained in operation would revert to the control of Combat Com-
throughout the day, andl(repair work was con- malld B, 9th Armored Division, in corps
timlcd onl the railway blri(lge. It was deter- reserve; (2) Company B, 90th Chemical Bat-
18
talion, was relieved of attachment to the 78th and permission to retainl the battalion temn-
Infantry Division anld was attached to the 9th porarily was reclquested bv the (Colnanding
Infantry Division; (3) the 170th Field Artillery General, 78th Infantrv Division, and was
Battalion (155-mm Howitzer) was attached to granted by the corps. The 6)0th Armored In-
the 99th Infantry Division, effective 16 NMarch; fantry Battalion andI the two tank platoons
and (4) the 7th and 9th Armored Divisions were returnlle to Combat Command B, 9th
would continue their present missions. Armored Division, oil 17 Mlarch.
16 March 1945 The 9th Infantry Division ill tlie' center of
Although enemy resistance continued stub- the bridgehead continuled its attack early ill
born in the central sector, where he resisted the morning. 13y the close of the day, it was
bitterly the advance to cut the autobahn, fighting in STRiODT (F7322) all(lnd had cap-
lighter resistance in the south permitted the tured KALENBORN (F7024) anld all ol)jee-
99th Infantry Division's 393d Infantry Regi- tive ill the vicinity of (F7162:38). Thle :39thl
ment to advance some 4000 yards to the WEID Infantry Reginent, upon° relief, revertedl to
RIVER. The 394th Infantry Regiment ad- control of the C(ommanding (elleral, 9th In-
vanced approximately 2000 yards to the south fantry Dixisiomi. At 09:30, the :310th 1lhifaltrv
and entered HONNINGEN (F7012), where Regiment reverted to control of the 78th In-
house-to-house fighting took place during the fantrv Division.
night. The 395th Infantry Regiment (-3d Bat- At 2230, First UIS Army gasve permlissionl to
talion, which remained in corps reserve) at- have the 99th Ilnfantryv Divisiol c(ontimle the
tacked to the east to secure the high ground attack to the south if III Corps so desired, and
west of the WEID RIVER, capturing three accordingly the 99th Infantry l )i\isionl was
small towns. At the close of the day, the 99th directed oil the followinlg llmorilillg to (Omltilll('
Infantry Division had, on its south, reache(l the attack to the sotith.
the initial objective established by army and at The 18th llfantryv Regint't (lst Illfalltl
one point had crossed it to secure dominating l)ivisio(m) closed ill asslembhl] areas 'east of thie
terrain. RIHINE at abolt 1300.
In the zone of the 78th Infantry Division, 17 March 1945
the advance to cut the aultobahn continued.
At approximately 0200, the Comlmandinlg Gell- In the northern part of the b)ridgehlead(l, tihe
expansioln contililled(, advllancing frown 1()I)() to
eral, 78th Infantry Division, re(lquested the
use of two tank platoons to be employed ill
3(NX) vards againlst enlemy resistalnce thlat
his attack to the north in the vicinity of IT- maintaimned its stir blhorn attitude. lll the solrth-
el-r part of the zoe, gre(;ater gais were( lnmad('
TENBACH (F668313). The 9th Almoredl Di-
vision conse(luently was ordered to send two against a disorgalrized enlemy. Ill the zone of'
tank platoons to the control of the 78th Ill- the 9th Illfaltrty D ivision, oppositioni was c'n-
fantry Division. The attack was successful; countered fronl self-l)ropelled grins and tanks
surpported )y infanltry, with the e('I(ly II' ]Siig
and at approximately 1415, the 309th Infantry
Regiment was astride the autobahn. At 0930, villages anRd towns as strong poilts. Ill thel
the 39th Infantry Regiment reverted to the 99th Infantry I)iVisionI zone0, b)itter hoIuse-to-
control of the 9th Infantry Division, at which house fighting took place in 11O()NNI NEN
time the III and VII Corps boundary became (F7014), but elsewhere only small grouplls were
effective. The 60th Armored Infantry Bat- encoluntered in towns and inl isolated strong
talion was to have reverted to command of points.
Combat Command B, 9th Armored Division. The 99th Infantry Division attacked to the
Its employment during the day prevented this, south, and both the 393d and,394th Infantry
19

TIHE ARMY LIL ARY


WASHINGTON, D.C,
Regiments moved up rapidly, advancing 2000 falling in the vicinity of the bridges. The 32d
and 3000 yards respectively. The 393d In- Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron continued
fantry Regiment on its left secured the high its mission of protecting the bridges.
ground immediately west of the WEID Disaster overtook the sorely abused railway
RIVER, while on its right it seized SOL- bridge at approximately 1500, when, with no
SCHEID (F7613). Elements of the 394th warning, it buckled and collapsed, carrying
Infantry Regiment were engaged in house- with it a number of engineer troops who had
to-house fighting in HONNINGEN until mid- been making repairs in an attempt to put it
afternoon. Other elements drove south to back in operation.
take hills at (F753135) and (F716119). The In the morning, Combat Command B, 9th
18th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron was Armored Division, was directed to assemble
attached to the 99th Infantry Division in an-
in the general area OHLENBERG (F6721)-
ticipation of a further movement south.
OCKENFELS (F6720)-LINZ (F6718) (exclu-
Due to the success of the attack in the zone, sive)-DATTENBERG (F6817), and to revert
and the desire to secure the commanding ter- to the control of the 9th Armored Division
rain along the general line SOLSCHEID effective 172400 March. The 60th Armored
(F7613) ROCKENFELD (F7511)-HAMMER- Infantry Battalion, plus the tank platoons
STEIN (F7209), permission was requested for which had been attached to the 78th Infantry
that objective. It was also suggested to First Division, returned to the control of the 9th
US Army that it would be desirable to secure Armored Division during the day. The 52d
the high ground in the vicinity of RAHMS Armored Infantry Battalion was ordered to re-
(F7721). First US Army approved, and on vert to the 9th Armored Division as soon as
the following day, 18 March, instructions were operational conditions permitted. The 9th
issued which called for a limited objective at- Armored Division was instructed to prepare
tack to the south. plans for the employment of Combat Com-
The 9th Infantry Division advanced from mand B in any sector of III Corps zone east
1000 to 2000 yards to the east, cutting the of the RHINE.
autobahn at (F732372). STRODT was cap- III Corps Artillery supported corps oper-
tured, but the high ground to its east, although ations by a heavy counterbattery program,
frequently assaulted, was only partially occu- long-range interdiction and harassing fires, and
pied. VETTELSCHOSS (F7224) was cleared heavy close support fires upon call of the
during the night. As there was evidence of a divisions. On this day, Major General James
pending counterattack in that vicinity, it was A. Van Fleet assumed command of III Corps.
requested by the division that the 52d Ar- From 18 March to 22 March, all divisions
mored Infantry Battalion remain under con- within the bridgehead attacked to the east
trol of the 9th Infantry Division until the and regrouped their forces for the anticipated
situation cleared up. Permission was granted. break-through to come. By this time the auto-
The enemy attempted to destroy the bridges bahn was cut, thus denying the enemy its use.
with two as yet unused devices: Four swimmer The bridgehead had been expanded to a point
saboteurs towing explosives tried to reach the where it no longer was considered a bridge-
bridges but were either killed or captured; head operation, and a large-scale break-
and "V Bombs" made their appearance, six through was in the making.

20
SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS
Of the many highly significant and critical could be disengaged; and bv 9 March, a total
operations which the European Theater pro- of 17 battalions of infantry, with sulpporting
duced after the Allied landings oil the Nor- weapons, had been moved to the far side.
mandy Beaches, the seizure by the 9th First US Armny and III Corps Artillery was
Armored Division (commanded by Major Gen- emplaced to support the b)attalions in this
eral John W. Leonard) of the LUDENDORF mission, while artillery from V and VII1 Corps
BRIDGE ranks second to none. Climaxing a also fired in support of the bridgehead
swift advance across the COLOGNE PLAIN, operations.
the capture of the bridge had a profound in- There are no figures available oil the
fluence on the conduct of the war east of the amonllt of traffic which poured over thle rail-
RHINE, and may be said to be one of the road bridge initially; but durilng the 12-day
greatest single contributing factors to the period. 16-28 Mlarch, a total of 58.262 vehicles
subsequent early successes of the Allied crossed over all three pontoon bridlges, or
Forces. By its surprise crossing of the RHINE, all average of 4,.855 per day.' The treilnendots
that great water barrier, the First US Army amounts of traffic funneling over one road
secured a foothold on the eastern bank of the into the bridge arclt, especially durinlg the ini-
RHINE which not only drew enemy troops tial stage of the operation when enemly artil-
from the front of Ninth US Army, but served lery was interdicting the bridge, approaches,
as a springboard for the attack on the heart- and roads, were bounll to cause a certain
land of Germany. It undoubtedly made the amount of congestion despite the most rigid
crossing by the Third Army easier, and con- traffic control. Inlitiallv the 9th Arlnorcd I)i-
tributed to the success of Montgomery's drive vision controlled traffic, adli later the 14th
to the north. Consequently, this one incident Cavalry Groupt was used. A corps traffic'
not only overshadowed other First Army headquarters was establlished at E\IMX(A,(
EN.
activities, but dictated thle course of its opera- which regulated the flow of vehicles over the
tions subsequent to 7 Mlarch. Prior to that bridges as the direction of traffic, weight of
date, units of the First US Army had advanced vehicles, or condition of the blridges warrlanted;
rapidly across the COLOGNE PLAIN, initially and because road discipline was initiamlly poor,
expecting to drive east to the RHINE, and a traffic control p)ost was estal)lishled at
then later to tulrn south aind effect a junction GEISID()O F, nline miles west of l EMA(,EN.
with the Third US Arlny. This latter plani Hlere traffic was lhalt'ed alnd prol)cr distanice
was tupset by the capture of the bridge, and between vehicles cstal)lished. Five otlher coIn-
the second phase of the operationls-the slow trol posts inlsuredl thle mnaintellallmce of that
struggle to seclre aind expand a hlbridgehead- distance, an(d inot only conIge(stion b)lIt also
was begun. casualties restulting ftroi- iltemr(ldictirlg fire we(
( ,
The main problem at this time, thlerefore, greatly reduced.
was the establishment and expansion of a Two other prollelms, closel' related, de-
bridgehead. It would have been desirable to manlded immediate audI contimliloiis attention:
commit a complete infantry division in the (1) the secluritv of the l)ridge and (2) the ined
bridgehead, but nio such division was available. for suppl)nelltatry barieidges arid means of trans-
and the situation permitted no delay in inov- port across tlihe river. It was known that the
ilng troops across the river. Consequently, etllnyV would(l tnplol e vevry meatls availabl)e
units were ordered across as rapidly as they to attenltpt to destroy the Ilridge, ant( tlh(
I Figire's takenl from III (Corps After Action Report (smnllatt'ry of ,operatiols).

21
steps taken to frustrate his efforts have been continuous artillery fire and air attack.
called the most thorough and complete of DUKWs, LCVPs, and ferries were used to
their kind ever established. Within a few days augment the bridges; and before the LUDEN-
time, a total of nine antiaircraft automatic DORF BRIDGE collapsed, both the heavy
weapons battalions and four antiaircraft gun pontoon and treadway bridges were in opera.
battalions were emplaced for protection of the tion, so that the loss did not affect troop or
bridge site-one of the greatest, if not the supply movements.
greatest, concentration of antiaircraft artillery For the first 18 days, the expansion of the
ever assembled in so small an area. Barrage bridgehead was relatively slow, with advances
balloons were brought in, and continuous air made on foot and measured in terms of yards
cover was flown over the bridge. Contact, and feet. It has been said that no poorer place
log, and net booms were constructed across could have been selected for a crossing; the
the river to intercept water-borne objects; mountainous country not only restricted the
depth charges were dropped at an average of use of armor, but it was extremely difficult
12 per hour each night to discourage under- for the infantry to assault. The rugged, for-
water swimmers and submarines; radar was ested hills gave the enemy good observation,
employed to detect underwater craft; river and formed a natural fortress which he used
patrols were maintained; shore patrols were skillfully. Although his forces were weak ini-
on the alert 24 hours per day; at night, power- tially, the arrival of several divisions, begin-
ful lights illuminated the surface of the river ning with the 11th Panzer Division on 9
while high velocity guns were trained on all March, enabled him to conduct an aggressive
objects floating downstream; coordination was defense in which numerous and determined
effected between adjacent corps, who were counterattacks played a large part. (It is in-
assisted by river and shore patrols. That these teresting to note that it was the intention of
precautions proved their worth is. evidenced the 11th Panzer Division to cross the RHINE
by the failure of the many enemy air attacks at BONN and attack south on the west of the
to destroy the bridges and by the failure of river.) It was not until many days of hard
enemy saboteur swimmers to accomplish their fighting had driven the enemy across the auto-
missions. When the railroad bridge finally bahn that the 3d, 7th, and 9th Armored Di-
collapsed, it had already served its primary visions were able to break through to make the
purpose, and had survived the most desperate spectacular advances of the last days of
attempts to destroy it. the month.
The construction of the treadway bridge- NOTE: Caesar made his first RHINE cross-
the first tactical bridge to be thrown across the ing in 55 B.C. in the vicinity of ANDER-
RHIINE since Napoleon's day-was begun two NACH. Two thousand years later, in 1945,
days after the seizure of the railroad bridge, the American crossing was made 12 miles
while the bridge site was under heavy and north of the Roman bridge site.

22
BIBLIOGRAPHY
After Action Report, CCB, 9th Armored Di- Interview with Lt Col James D. Allgood, CO),
vision, March 1945. 1st Battalion, 47th Infantry, on 2 May 1945.
After Action Report, 9th Infantry Division, Interview with Capt Daniel Duncan, Acting
March 1945. CO, 2d Battalion, 47th Infantry, 10-18 Mlarch
1945, on 3 Mav 1945.
After Action Report, III Corps, March 1945.
Interview with Lt Col Leonard E. EnlgelnaIn,
After Action Report, 27th Armored Infantry
CO, 14th Tank Battalion.
Battalion, March 1945.
Interview with Maj N. J. Itennen, S-3, C6th
After Action Report, 52d Armored Infantry
Infantry, 9th Division, on 12 April 1945.
Battalion, March 1945.
Interview with Maj R. L. Illzer, Executive
After Action Report, 60th Armored Infantry
Officer, 3d Battalion, 47th Infantry, onl 4
Battalion, March 1945.
May 1945.
After Action Report, 89th Cavalry Reconnais-
Interview with 1st Lt Win. J. Mooney, Assist-
sance Battalion, March 1945.
ant S-3, 39th Infantry Regiment, oil 24
After Action Report, 78th Infantry Division, March 1945.
March 1945.
Report of Operations, First US Arny, 23
After Action Report, 656th Tank Destroyer February-8 May 1945.
Battalion, March 1945.
Statement of Lt John Criml)all, 1st Platoon,
After Action Report, 99th Infantry Division, Company A, 14th Tank Battalion.
March 1945.
Statement of Maj Cecil E'. lBoberts, S-,3, 14th
After Action Report, 9th Armored Engineer Tank Battalion.
Battalion, March 1945.
Statement of Maj Gen John W. Leonard,
After Action Report, 14th Tank Battalion, Commanding General, 9th Armored Di-
March 1945. vision.

23
APPENDIX I-DETAILED UNIT DISPOSITIONS
7 March 1945 Troop C, 89th Cavalry Reconnaissance Bat-
9TH ARMORED DIVISION talion4
(Major General John W. Leonard) Crossed the RHINE at 0700 and moved to
ERPEL. The troop was attached to the 52d
27th Armored Infantry Battalion
Armored Infantry Battalion and placed in re-
(See Seizure of the Bridge, section I.)
serve.
Companies A and C cleared ERPEL
(F647207) while Company B dug in on the Company C, 656th Tank Destroyer Battalion
high ground north of the bridge at (F654205).1 (-1st Platoon)5
Crossed the RHINE at 0600 and set up road
8 March 1945 blocks.
9TH ARMORED DIVISION 1st Platoon crossed at 1300 and set tip a
(Major General John W. Leonard) road block.
Conmpany B, 9th Armored Engineer Battalion6
27th Armored Infantry Battalion
Guarded tunnel. Repaired the LUDEN-
The 27th Armored Infantry Battalion as-
DORF BRIDGE and its approaches.
sisted the 52d Armored Infantry Battalion in
clearing UNKEL (F634224) of the enemy, and 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION
then went into reserve in UNKEL.2
(Major General Louis A. Craig)
52d Armored Infantry Battalion
47th Infantry Regiment
The 52d Armored Infantry Battalion crossed
The 1st Battalion crossed the RHINE
the R H I N E at 0330, cleared UNKEL
shortly after 0930 and proceeded directly to
(F634224) of scattered unorganized small Ger-
ORSBERG (F653217), where one company
man units, and occupied positions on the high
relieved the 27th Armored Infantry Battalion.
ground north and east of town. 3
The remainder of the battalion then con-
14th T'ank Battalion3 tinued on and occupied positions north of
Company A crossed the RHINE at 0015 and BRUCHHEAUSEN (F658226). 7
set up road blocks. The rest of the battalion The 2d Battalion crossed the RHINE at
crossed at 0715. Attachments were made as 0515, cleaned ORSBERG (F653217), and cap-
follows: tured BRUCIEIIAUSEN (F658226) late in the
Platoon of Company A with a platoon of afternoon. The battalion repulsed two strong
Company B to 2d Battalion, 310th Infantry, couniterattacks before dark. 8
attacking LINZ (F6718). The 3d Battalion crossed in the afternoon
C'ompaly C to 3d Battalion, 311th Infantry. and went into an assembly area in ERPEL
Platoon of Company D to the 52d Armored (F647207). At 1930, the battalion moved out
Infantry Battalion. to attack OHLENBERG (F677212). By march-

1Interview with Lt Col Engeman, CO, 14th Tank Battalion.


2
After Action Report, 27th Armored Infantry Battalion, March 1945, page 6.
3
After Action Report, 52d Armored Infaitry Battalion, March 1945, page 3.
4
After Action Report, 89th Cavalry Reconnaissance Battalion.
5
After Action Report, 656th Tank Destroyer Battalion.
6
After Action Report, 9th Armored Engineer Battalion.
7
Interview with Lt Col James D. Allgood, CO, 1st Battalion, 47th Infantry, 2 May 1945.
8
Interview with Capt Daniel Duncan, Acting CO, 2nd Battalion, 47th Infantry, 10-18 March
1945, on 3 May 1945.
24
ing all night over trails and cross-country, the 52d Armored Infantry Battalion
unit arrived at its objective just at daylight The battalion marched to K A S B A C II
on 9 March. 1 (F664204) to fill the gap between the 2d and
60th Infantry Regiment 3d Battalions of the 47th Infantry in the vi-
The 1st Battalion became attached to the cinity of that town..5
9th Armored Division at 1130, and crossed the 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION
REMAGEN BRIDGE at 1410. (Major General Louis A. Craig)
The 2d and 3d Battalions of the regiment
The Commanding General, 9th Infantry Di-
became attached to the 7th Armored Division
vision, assumed command of the bridgehead
at the same time, remaining west of the
at 0235 after establlishing his c(nomland post
RHINE during the day. 2 in ERPEL (F647207).6
78TH INFANTRY DIVISION
47th Infanltry Regiment
(Major General Edwin P. Parker)
The 1st Battalion attacked (at 04()) to the
310th Infantry Regiment
northeast to seize RJ 659235 just north of ST
1st Battalion
NMARIENBERG (F657231). The attacking
The 1st Battalion, 310th Infantry (at-
company reached the edge of thet woods at
tached to Combat Command B, 9th Armored
0600. At 0610, it ran into a two-battalion
Division, crossed the RHINE on the night of
counterattack which cut off the company until
7-8 March and went into attack on the morning
dark. The rest of the battalion hekl its posi-
of 8 March. KASBACH (F664204), OCKEN-
tions north and west of BIlUCI-IIAUSEN
FELS (F673200), and part of LINZ (F678187)
(F658226). 7
were captured during the day against negli-
gible resistance. 3 The 2d Battalion attacked to the nlortheast
on the morning of 9 March, but, hitting the
311th Infantry Regiment
same counterattack that struck the 1st Bat-
The 311th Infantry Regiment crossed the
talion, it withdrew to B131UCIII.JASEN
RHINE after the 47th Infantry and went into
(F658226), where hand-to-halnd fighting wvas
an assembly area in the vicinity of R-IEIN-
necessary to repulse the enerry.s Tlhe' 3d
BREITBACH (F642244), preparatory to at-
Battalion attacked (01ILENB3EI(; (F677212)
tacking north and east the following day. 3
at dawn against light resistance, clearing the
9 March 1945 town by 0 7 3 0 . 9 At 12:30 the battalion con-
9TH ARMORED DIVISION tinued its attack to take the road net in the
(Major General John W. Leonard) vicinity of OBEBERIL (F687216) and the few
27th Armored Infantry Battalion houses in the town. The battalion reached
The battalion continued in bridgehead re- the approaches to the town, where it was
serve in UNKEL (F634224). 4 pinned down by 20-mrm, nmachine-gun, and
Interview with Maj R. L. Inzer, Executive Officer, .3d Battalion, 47th Infantry, on ,4 May 1945.
2
Interview with Maj N. J. llennel-, S-:3, 60th Infantry, 9th Division, on 12 April 1.945.
3After Action Report, Combat Command B, 9th Armored DI)isison, NMarch 1945, page 1().
4
After Action Report, 27th Armored Infantry Battalion, March 1945, page 6.
5
After Action Report, 52d Armored Infantry Battalion, March 1945, page 4.
0After Action Report, 9th Infantry Division, March 1945, page 8.
7Interview with Lt Col James D. Allgood, CO, Ist Battalion, 47th Infantry, on 2 May 1945.
8Interview with Capt Daniel Duncan, Acting CO, 2d Battalion, 47th Infaintry, 10-18 March 1.915, on :3 May 1945.
9The After Action Report, 9th Infantry Division, for 9 March 1945 states that the resistance in ()01lE,NI3EH(;
(F677212) was determined and heavy. When this information was mentioned( to Ma;j llnzr, Ihe questioned
Capt Frazier, the company commander of Company L, and Ist Lt Ernest Smith, the exculitive oli(cr ,of
Company I, who both corroborated Maj Inzer's statement, which is given abome.

25
tank fire. Upon orders from regiment, the fended his positions with automatic weapons,
unit held its positions on the open slopes south- small arms, and mortar fire employed in
west of town during the night, suffering nu- well-disposed strong points. At sunset the bat-
merous casualties in the process.' talion consolidated the positions after cap-
60th Infantry Regiment turing the south half of the city. The defense
The 60th Infantry (-lst Battalion) crossed of HONNEF on this day was the most deter-
the RHINE at 0600 and went into an assembly mined and skillful that had been encountered
area east of the RHINE at LINZ (F678187).l up to that time.4
The 1st Battalion attacked through light The 2d Battalion attacked to clean out the
ground resistance and heavy to medium ar- area south of RHEINBREITBACH (F643244)
tillery fire at (F692199), where the battalion and east of SCHEUREN (F637232). This
was stopped by a well-defended enemy strong mission was accomplished against weak re-
point. I sistance, and the battalion was relieved by
elements of the 309th Infantry, at which time
78TH INFANTRY DIVISION the 2d Battalion, 311th Infantry, became the
(Major General Edwin P. Parker) regimental reserve.
309th Infantry Regiment The 3d Battalion attacked to seize RHEIN-
The 309th Infantry closed in its assembly BREITBACH (F643244) and SCHEUREN
area east of the RHINE at 1525.2 (F637232). The resistance in these two towns
The 1st Battalion relieved the 2d Battalion, was very light, and by 1430 both towns had
47th Infantry, 9th Division, in BRUCH- been secured. 4
HAUSEN (F658226) during the night of 9-10 10 March 1945
March. 3 9TH ARMORED DIVISION
The 2d Battalion attacked east on the right (Major General John W. Leonard)
(south) of the 1st Battalion and reached the 27th Armored Infantry Battalion
high ground in the vicinity of (F667225) be- The 27th Armored Infantry Battalion moved
yond BRUCHIIAUSEN (F658226). Heavy from UNKEL (F634224) to DATTENBERG
mortar and artillery fire caused the battalion (F686174) and relieved the 1st Battalion, 310th
to pull back into the towll.2 Infantry. 5
The 3d Battalion assembled in the vicinity 52d Arm ored Infantry Battalion
of (F646224) after crossing the RHINE.2 At 0925, the 52d Armored Infantry Battalion
31Oth Infantry Regiment was attached to the 2d Battalion, 310th In-
The 1st Battalion cleared LINZ (F678187) fantry, 78th Division. The battalion attacked
of isolated pockets of resistance and then went at 1230 to take HILL 448 (F690234). Again
into defensive positions in the vicinity of the battalion encountered heavy artillery con-
(F682195).2 centrations but little ground resistance. The
311th Infantry Regiment objective was reached during the middle of
The 1st Battalion attacked HIONNEF the night, but due to disorganization, con-
(F640275) and encountered extremely heavy fusion, and lack of communications, the bat-
resistance from a determined enemy who de- talion withdrew to the line of departures
IInterview with Maj N. J. llennen, S-3, 60th Infantry, 9th Division, on 12 April 1945.
2After Action Report, 78th Infantry Division, March 1945, pages 11, 12.
3
Interview with Capt D;laniel Dluncan, Acting CO, 2d Battalion, 47th Infantry, 10-18 March 1945, on 3 May 1945.
4
After Action Report, 78th Infantry Division, March 1945, page 12.
5
After Action Report, 27th Armored Infantry Battalion, March 1945, page 6.
6
After Action Report, 52d Armored Infantry Battalion, March 1945, page 4.

26
9TH INFANTRY DIVISION 78TIi INFANTRY DIVISION
(Major General Louis A. Craig) (Major General Edwin P. Parker)
39th Infantry Regiment 309th Infantry Regiment
The 39th Infantrv crossed the RHINE and The 1st Battalion advanced against strong
closed into assembly areas east of the river at opposition consisting of small-arms, self-pro-
1825.' pelled gun, mortar, and artillery fire to its two
The 1st Battalion went into an assembly objectives at (F66W3233) anld (F'66(244).2
area in the vicinity of BRUCHHAUSEN The 2(1 Battalion p)lshc( to til higlh igrolund
(F658226).' northeast of BIU(CIIIIAUSiN (F '658226).
The 2d Battalion went into an assembly area suffering heavy casualties from mlortar 1aml
in the vicinity of SCHEUREN (F637232).' artillery fire in taking the oljectivre. A strong
The 3d Battalion went into an assembly area counterattack suil))orted by wev(ll-directed( self-
in the vicinity of SCHEUREN (F(137232).' propelled gll fire causlled the cripl)hl'(
blattalion to withd(raw to the lc icinity ot
47th Infantry Regiment
(F673227).; 3
The 1st Battalion repulsed a strong coun-
terattack in the morning which, however-, dis- :3d Battalion occu'pied positions (as regi-
The
organized the battalion sufficiently to delay mental reserve) in the vicilnity of (F'6-16224).
its attack. At 1910, the battalion jumped off which closed the gatp ill the lilles.:'
and advanced to (F678223) by 2335, where it 31oth Infantry Relgilrent
was ordered to halt for the night. 2 The 1st Battalion attacked )ATT'll'NBI 1{((:
The 2d Battalion remained in position at (F686174) anti overcamln sex (re( resistancet
(F672203) as regimental and sector reserve. from heavy m-achie -gnll and 20-rnn AA gu11
The 3d Battalion received a strong counter- fire to capture tlme town 1)y early aft('ernoon.
attack and was driven back to (F678213), At .1435, the 27th Armored l nfaitrv Ba;Lttaliol
where it finally stopped the enemy thrust. 2 relieved the Ist Battalionl, whlich nI)O('d to
60th Infantry Reginlent the vicinity of (F6851 76). 4- i
The 1st Battalion captured the strong point The 2d Battalioln crosse(I thIe 1111Ni
N, e(ls-
of (F698204) and reorganized preparatory to ing ill an asseml)l area(' ii tit \'ic.ility of
continuing the attack. 2 ()IILENI ,I'E(. (JF677212) at 0()(H). \ stlonrg
The 2d Battalion successfully attacked an enemly coullterattack *aiusced the Ihatta.li, l to
enemy strong point at (F698204) and con- displace to a deftensi\v' p)ositi()n to th(' sO(lth
tinued its advance to (F700206). west which c(olldl( b ti(ed in with the 47th
The 3d Battalion jumped off at 0800 from Ilfantry..
east of LINZ (F678187) to capture the high The 3dtBattalion cir
osse(d th(e HiiilNl tlilr-ii-ing
ground in the vicinity of (F706197). Although the mnorling, assemnbling ini 11NZ ( f(i7 8187).
unexpected resistance was encountered in the At 1335, the battalion attacked east ai l(,
vicinity of RONIG (F7018), the battalion ad- overcoming mediuiln resistanlce, s(ccure(dl th('
vanced slowly to its objective, which was high ground northeast of ()!!I,'I;NBERi(
taken by nightfall. 2 (F677212).1

1Interview with 1st Lt Wm. J. Mooney, Assistant S-3, 39t h Infantry Regiment, on 24 Marcl 1945.
2
After Action Report, 9th Infantry Division, March 1945,
3After Action Report, 78th Infantry Division, March 1945,
4
After Action Report, 78th Infantry Division, March 1945, page 1'3.
5
After Action Report, 27th Armored Infantry Battalion, March 1945, page 6.
27
311th Infantry Regiment attached to the 78th Infantry Division for
The 1st Battalion continued its attack on operations at 0900.2
strong points in the vicinity of HONNEF The 1st Battalion moved from BRUCH-
(F640275), encountering artillery and mortar HAUSEN (F658226) at 1330 to continue
fire. At 1855, a tank-infantry counterattack the attack to the east with objectives, at
was repulsed, and by the end of the day re- HIMBERG (F694281) and REDERSCHEID
maining enemy resistance was confined to the (F712264). The advance was slow, and the
north end of town. t unit did not reach either objective during the
The 2(1d Battalion moved to RHEINBREIT- period. 2 , 5
BACII (F64:3244) and then to HONNEF The 2d Battalion moved from SCHEUREN
(F640275) as regimental reserve. (F637232) to drive east and relieve some of
The 3d Battalion attacked at 0830 to seize the pressure from the 1st Battalion. Gains
_MENZENBERG (F653257). The town was were made, but the battalion was stopped due
taken by 1305, and the attack continued until to darkness. 5
the high ground at (F668262) and (F672260) The 3d Battalion remained in SCHEUREN
had beenl taken. 2 (F637232).
11 MARCH 1945 47th Infantry Regiment
9TH ARMORED DIVISION The 1st Battalion attacked at 0830 toward
(Major General John W. Leonard) the vicinity of (F701217). The battalion
made slow progress against determined re-
27th Armored Infantry Battalion
sistance and halted at 1730 in the vicinity of
The 27th Armored Infantry Battalion was (F694209).6
relieved by the 2d and 3d Battalions of the
393d( Infantry, 99th Division, at 0930, at which The 2d Battalion attacked through Com-
time the battalion returned to UNKEL pany K at 1015, advancing to (F688222),
(F634224), where it remained in reserve until where it was stopped by heavy small-arms,
18 March 1945.;3 mortar, tank, and artillery fire. 6
52d Armnored Infantry Battalion The 3d Battalion remained inactive except
The battalion, which was still attached for Company K, which cleared the line of de-
to the 310th Infantry, 78th Division, went parture for the 2d Battalion and later cleared
into regimental reserve at (F688227). Com- the group of houses at (F688218). 6
pany C was employed astride the draw at 60th Infantry Regiment
(F662215) to prevent enemy infiltration toward
The 1st Battalion attacked at 0300, cleared
KASBACH (F664204). 4
a by-passed factory at (F692199), and con-
9TH INFANTRY DIVISION tinued on toward HARGARTEN (F713206). 7
(Major General Louis A. Craig) The 2d Battalion reorganized and then
39th Infantry Regiment advanced 500 yards toward HARGARTEN
The 39th Infantry, less the 3d Battalion, was (F713206). 7

1After Action Report, 78th Infantry Division, March 1945, page 12.
2
After Action Report, 78th Infantry Division, March 1945, page 13.
3
After Action Report, 27th Armored Infantry Battalion, March 1945, page 6.
4
After Action Report, 52d Armored Infantry Battalion, March 1945, page 4.
5
After Action Report, 78th Infantry Division, March 1945, page 14.
6
After Action Report, 9th Infantry Division, March 1945, page 9.
7
After Action Report, 9th Infantry Division, March 1945, page 8.

28
78TH INFANTRY DIVISION The 2d Battalion coordinated the defense of
(Major General Edwin P. Parker) HONNEF.'
The 78th Infantry Division assumed com- The 3d Battalion actively patrolled to
mand of the northern sector of the bridgehead (F676266).1
at 0900, at which time the 309th and 311th 99TH INFANTRY DIVISION
Infantry Regiments reverted to 78th Division (Major General Walter E. Lauer)
control. At 1100, the 39th Infantry, less the The 99th Infantyv Division completed cross-
3d Battalion, was attached to the division for ing the RHINE and assumed commland of the
operations. 1 southern sector of the bridgehead at 1400(). 4
309th Infantry Regiment 393d Infantry Regiment
The 1st Battalion attacked northeast of The 1st Battalion relieved the 3d Battalion,
BRUCHHAUSEN (F658226) at 0730 with the 60th Infantry, in the vicinity of (F708187).
mission of cutting the COLOGNE-FRANK- The battalion repulsed two counterattacks and
FURT autobahn. The battalion, working with advanced 3(X)yards northeast toward the high
3d Battalion, 309th Infantry, advanced 1500 ground east of LIARGARTEN (F713206().'
yards.' The 2d Battalion, echelonle(l to the left rear
The 2d Battalion, in regimental reserve, re- of the 1st Battalion, coordinated its attack
mained in the vicinity of (F673227).' with the 1st Battalion. 4
The 3d Battalion, in conjunction with the The 3d Battalion remained in reserv e in its
1st Battalion (see above), attacked to the north- assembly area. 4
east at 0730 and advanced 1500 yards.' 394th Infantry Regimifent
310th Infantry Regiment The 394th Infantry Regiment closed in its
assembly area east of the RIIINE at 0730 and
The 1st Battalion reverted to control of the
was attached to the 9th Infantry Division
9th Infantry Division at 1200 and moved to
from 0730 to 1400, 11 March 1945.'
the vicinity of (F660213) with the mission of
protecting the approaches to the bridge. 2 The 1st Battalion, with the 2d Battalion,
attacked south along the east bank of the
The 2d Battalion attacked at 0735 to take RHINE at 0830. The two battalions advanced
the hill at (F690234) and the rock quarry at 3000 yards, securing the towns of I,EUBS-
(F693227). The battalion was stopped short of DORF (F685166) and A R I E N I) () B F
its objective by heavy small-arms and artillery (F688148).4
fire. 2
2d Battalion (see 1st Battalion account
The 3d Battalion continued to organize its above). 4
position (F691228). 3 The 3d Battalion was in reserve, following
311th Infantry Regiment the 1st and 2d Battalions. 4
The 1st Battalion repulsed two counter- 395th Infantry Regiment
attacks consisting of tanks and infantry during The $395th Infantry Regiment closed in
the day. Both attacks, one at 0650, the other at assembly areas east of the RHINE at 18X), at
0945, were aimed at retaking HONNEF which time the regiment was attached to the
(F640275).' 9th Infantry Division as bridgehead reserve. 4
1
After Action Report, 76th Infantry Division, March 1945, page 1.3.
2
After Action Report, 9th Infantry Division, March 1945, page 9.
3
After Action Report, 78th Infantry Division, March 1945, page 14.
4
After Action Report, 99th Infantry Division, March 1945, page 8.

29
The 1st Battalion went into an assembly area The 2d Battalion attacked at 0530 toward an
in the vicinity of OHLENBERG (F677212).' objective in the vicinity of (F708217). Rough
The 2d Battalion went into an assembly terrain and heavy mortar and artillery fire
area in the vicinity of RHEINBREITBACH caused the battalion to halt short of its
(F643244),' objective. '
The 3d Battalion went into an assembly The 3d Battalion remained in defensive
area in the vicinity of BRUCHHAUSEN positions in the vicinity of (F678213).
(F658226).' 60th Infantry Regiment
12 March 1945 The 1st Battalion attacked through the 3d
9TH ARMORED DIVISION Battalion at 1940 and advanced slowly to
(Major General John W. Leonard)
(F702202).'
The 2d Battalion continued to advance
27th Armored Infantry Battalion
slowly and reached the high ground north and
The battalion continued in reserve in
west of HARGARTEN (F713206) at the end
UNKEL (F634224). of the day.'
52d Armored Infantry Battalion
The 3d Battalion passed through Company
The battalion continued in reserve in the
B and advanced to within 75 yards of HAR-
vicinity of (F688227). 2
GARTEN (F713206). At this point, the battal-
60th Armored Infantry Battalion ion encountered heavy fire from infantry and
The battalion crossed the RHINE, closing tanks and was forced to fall back to the line of
at UNKEL (F634224) 3 at 2315, when it was departure, where it reorganized and renewed
attached to the 311th Infantry. the attack, taking the road junction at
9TH INFANTRY DIVISION (F721205) before being passed through by the
(Major General Louis A. Craig) 1st Battalion.'
39th Infantry Regiment 78TH INFANTRY DIVISION
The Ist Battalion attacked east at 0630 with (Major General Edwin P. Parker)
the 2d Battalion to take the high ground west .309th Infantry Regiment
of KALENBORN (F706247). The rugged ter- The regiment supported the attack of the
rain and determined defense made the going
39th Infantry and protected the division right
very slow and prevented the battalions from flank. 4
reaching their objectives. 4
The 1st Battalion cleared up pockets of re-
2d Battalion (see 1st Battalion account
sistance within the regimental sector. 4
above). 4
The 2d Battalion remained in regimental
The 3d Battalion remained in reserve in
reserve in the vicinity of (F673227). 4
SCIIEUREN (F637232).
The 3d Battalion continued its attack, ad-
47th Infantry Regiment
vancing 500 yards to protect the division right
The 1st Battalion attacked at 0630 toward
(south) flank.4
its objective at (F705236) against medium to
heavy resistance and advanced to (F703219), 310th Infantry Regiment
where it was stopped by an enemy strong The 1st Battalion was detached from the 9th
point. 1 Infantry Division and reverted to division con-

IAfter Action Report, 9th Infantry Division, March 1945, page 9.


2
After Action Report, 52d Armored Infantry Battalion, March 1945, page 4.
3
After Action Report, 60th Armored Infantry Battalion, March 1945, page 6.
4
After Action Report, 78th Infantry Division, March 1945, page 14.

30
trol at 1200. It was then attached to the 311th 394th Infantry Regiment
Infantry. The battalion then moved to the The 1st Battalion reverted to regimental
vicinity of HONNEF (F640275). l reserve, remaining ill I, E U B S 1) 0 H F
The 2d Battalion attacked at 0645 to take (F685166). 4
the high ground in the vicinity of (F690240). The 2d Battalion, maintaining contact with
The battalion pushed through heavy resist- the 393d Infantry on the north, advanced
ance to its objective but received a tank- 3())0 yards to the southeast to (F716157) and
infantry counterattack which pushed it back (F721172).-
to (F680235). 2
The 3d Battalion attacked at (0i'30, ad-
The 3d Battalion remained in its defensive valcinlg approximately 30(X) yards alld( seemll-
positions in the vicinity of (F691228). 3 ing its objectives north of HIONNINCEEN
311th Infantry Regiment (F700127). The battalion reached (F694137)
The 1st Battalion continued mopping up and (F702145) by the end of the day.}
HONNEF (F640275).' 395th Infantry Reginl(tit
The 2d Battalion continued clearing HON- The 395th Infantry renlainedl ill bridgehllad
NEF (F640275).' reserx e ill its previouls locations, p)assilg to
The 3d Battalion reorganized and patrolled III Corps control at 1800. 4
to the northeast.'
13 March 1945
99TH INFANTRY DIVISION
9TH ARMORED DIVISION
(Major General Walter E. Lauer)
(Major General John W. Leonard)
393d Infantry Regiment
The 1st Battalion continued to spearhead 27th Armlored Infaitlry 13attaliotn
the regimental attack, advancing 3000 yards The battalion colltimllted ill reserv.e ill
to secure GINSTERHAHN (F723196) and UNKEL (Ff:34224).
ROTHEKREUZ (F723184). At 1735, an enemy
counterattack toward ROTIIEKREUZ was 52d Armnor(ed In fantryl Battalionl
initially successful. However, the battalion, The battalion, whicli was still attach.ed to
assisted by the 2d Battalion, repulsed the the 310th I nfantry, 78th Division, attacked at
attack and retook the town.4 0545 with the mlission of captulring KIBET-
HIAUS (F700244). While the ol)jectiv%'e was not
The 2d Battalion, echeloned to the left real,
attained, the l)attalionl did take the high
continued to coordinate its attack with that
groulnd southwest of KIIETI IAUS (lurinlg the
of the 1st Battalion. The battalion advanced
(lay.
about 3000 yards against light resistance and
assisted the 1st Battalion in regaining ROTHE- 60th Arimored Infantry Battalion
KREUZ (F723184) after the German coun- The l)attalion moved to RIIEINIhIqlT-
terattack.4 BACII (F64,3244) anld then to II()NNEFF
The 3d Battalion remained in reserve, dis- (F1640275) with the mission of assisting in se-
placing to (F692194). clring the towin., ;'

lAfter Action Report, 78th Infantry Division, March 1945, page 14.
2
After Action Report, 9th Infantry Division, March 1945, page 10.
3
After Action Report, 78th Infantry Division, March 1945, page 15.
4
After Action Report, 99th Infantry Division, March 1945, page 9.
5
After Action Report, 52d Armored Infantry Battalion, March 1945, page 5.
6
After Action Report, 60th Armored Infantry Battalion, March 1945, page 6.

.31
9TH INFANTRY DIVISION The 3d Battalion retook the road junction at
(Major General Louis A. Craig) (F722203), which had been lost in the counter-
attacks during the day. 3
39th Infantry Regiment
The regiment received orders from the 78TH INFANTRY DIVISION
78th Division to continue the attack, seize (Major General Edwin P. Parker)
KALENBORN (F706247), and swing north to
309th Infantry Regiment
secure REDERSCHEID (F712264).'
The regiment was ordered to coordinate
The 1st Battalion attacked at 0615 with the
its attack with that of the 39th Infantry and to
2d Battalion on the right. Together the two
assist in securing a line which ran from south
units gained the high ground just north and
of KONIGSWINTER (F617307) t h r o u g h
west of KALENBORN (F706247). 2
AGIDIENBERG (F694295) to ROTTBITZE
The 2d Battalion (see 1st Battalion account (F700275).'
above). 2
The 1st Battalion attacked to the northeast
The 3d Battalion attacked at 1200 around at 1510 against severe small-arms and auto-
the right flank of the 1st Battalion in an effort matic weapons fire, advancing 500 yards be-
to outflank the defenses of KALENBORN fore digging in for the night.1
(F706247). The attack was stopped just outside
The 2d Battalion reorganized and assumed
the town. 2
responsibility for the rear as the regiment
47th Infantry Regiment advanced.'
The 1st Battalion attacked at 0800 toward
The 3d Battalion attacked with the 1st Bat-
NOTSCIHEID (F717225) against strong small-
talion, advancing 500 yards before stopping for
arms and mortar fire. The battalion advanced
the night.'
slowly and cut the road at (F714229). 3
310th Infantry Regiment
The 2d Battalion attacked at 0800 toward
The 1st Battalion attacked to the northeast
(F702235) against heavy rifle fire and machine-
on the right of the 311th Infantry, and gained
gun fire and advanced to (F708232), where the
approximately 1000 yards.
battalion dug in for the night.3
The 3d Battalion attacked east in the gap The 2d Battalion continued to occupy and
between the 47th and 60th Infantry Regiments
organize defensive positions at (F680235). 2
and swept the rear area as far as (F687217).3 The 3d Battalion continued to organize its
60th Infantry Regiment positions at (F693227) on HILL 442.2
The 1st Battalion captured HARGARTEN .311th Infantry Regiment
(F713206) at 0400, after which the 2d Battalion The 1st Battalion continued to clean out
passed through it and the 1st Battalion went HONNEF (F640275).'
into reserve.3 The 2d Battalion attacked at 0630 (with the
The 2d Battalion passed through the 1st 3d Battalion) to the northeast in rough country
Battalion and attacked toward ST KATHAR- against well-defended positions manned by a
INEN (F7221). The advance was stopped by capable, alert enemy. The advance was slow;
tank fire and several small infantry counter- a counterattack was repulsed at 1120.'
attacks but was resumed after dark and ST The 3d Battalion (see 2d Battalion account
KATHARINEN was cleared by 2130.3 above).'

1After Action Report, 78th Infantry Division, March 1945, page 15.
2
After Action Report, 78th Infantry Division, March 1945, page 16.
3
After Action Report, 9th Infantry Division, March 1945, page 10.

32
99TH INFANTRY DIVISION tlr, and artillery weaponls, and(l took KlREIT-
(Major General Walter E. Lauer) HAUS (F7()0044) west of the railroad tracks
393d Infantry Reginment in co(njilction with tile 3d Battalion, :310th
The 1st Battalion advanced to a line from Infantr!. At 1600, iastrong tank-ilfanttry coun-
:
terattack was repIllse(d at (F699242).
(F724188) to (F724172), which was organized
for defense.' 60th Armtirrcld Infantrl Ba3tt'alion
The 2d Battalion went into reserve at The battalion attacke(l north and east fIrom
(F700185). a positioll east of II()NNEF (F6402 7 5) at
The 3d Battalion was in reserve at 0700, taking several hills and stopping 2i()
(F692194) yards solith of PERIENlsNIIAII)T (I6641307).
Three counterattacks were rlep'lsctl durinig
394th Infantry Reginlent
the day.4-
The 1st Battalion was in reserve in the vi-
cinity of LEUBSDORF (F684165). 9TH INFANTRY I)IVISION
The 2d Battalion organized its defensive (Major General Louis A. Craig)
positions at (F716157) and (F721172). 1 ,39th Infantry Rcegincnli
The 3d Battalion organized its objectives of The regiment attacked with all three bat-
the preceding day at (F694:137) and '
talions at 0()630 andl was imnlliatelv brought
under intense small-arms aniid sclf-plropelled
(F702145).'
gun fire which stopp)ed the attack aIt the ille
395th Infantry Regiment
of departure. The attack was resimed(l at 1845
The 1st Battalion remained in corps reserve
bluit again enicouintere(d the saile itter resist-
until 1800, when it reverted to 99th Division
al'e, which held the regiment to ('gligible
control in place.'
gainls. 5
The 2d Battalion was released from III
47th Infantry Ry'itcimctl
Corps control at 1300, at which time the bat-
The 1st Battalionl colitili'dl to attack to-
talion occupied positions east of LINZ (F6718)
ward N()TS(Cltl11) (F'717225) at 08(X) against
in the vicinity of (F695192). 2
heavv resistance, and at 2400()() was still short of
The 3d Battalion was released froln III its ol)jectie('.6
Corps control at 1800 and reverted in place to
The 2d Battlliol attackedt towar(l its ol)jec'-
the 99th Division. 2
tivce (I'704237) at 1(X)0. Thle battalion follght
14 March 1945 against (heavyrcsistailc' to (171:5 2 3 4 )/."
9TH ARMORED DIVISION The 3(1 Battalion r(,naii(ed in re(scr(xc at
(Major General John W. Leonard) (F687217).
27th Armored Infantry Battalion (0th Infantry Bcimcntl
The battalion remained in reserve in UN- The regimenit encoit'rudl (Idter('itnihd re-
KEL (F634224). sistanlce along the whole froIt d(triing thl( day.
52d Armored Infantry Battalion 3lhe Ist ;Battalion attlacke(d at 12()() to(war(l
The battalion continued its attack against NOTS(IIEII) (F717225) and at 24(X) was still
a determined defense employing tank, infai- 400 yards short of its obljec-tixv.' 7
iAfter Action Report, 99th Infantry I)ivision, March 1945, page 10.
2
After Action Report, 99th Infantry Division, March 1945, page 11.
3
After Action Report, 52d Armored Infantry Battalion, March 1945, page 5.
4After Action Report, 60th Armored Infantry Battalion, March 19 45, page 6.
5
After Action Report, 78th Infantry Div ision, March 1945, page 16.
6
After Action Report, 9th Infantry Division, March 1945, page 11.
7
After Action Report, 9th Infanitry Division, March 1945, page 10.
The 2d Battalion attacked at 2100 to take terattacks were launched from northeast of
LORSCHEID (F728218). By midnight the HONNEF (F640275), but all were repulsed. 3
battalion had gained the edge of the town. 1
99TH INFANTRY DIVISION
One company (L) of the 3d Battalion at- (Major General Walter E. Lauer)
tacked to, and occupied, an objective in the
vicinity of (F733209).2 393d Infantry Regiment
The 1st Battalion continued to occupy
78TH INFANTRY DIVISION d e f e n s i v e positions from (F724188) to
(Major General Edwin P. Parker) (F724172).4
309th Infantry Regiment The 2d Battalion occupied defensive posi-
The regiment fought against stiff resistance tions in the vicinity of GINSTERHAHN
during the entire day. At times hand-to-hand (F7219) until 1715, when the battalion came
fighting was necessary to drive the determined under III Corps control. The 2d Battalion
enemy from his positions. 3 then moved to (F712181) and relieved the 2d
The 1st Battalion attacked at 0800 and at Battalion, 395th Infantry, at 2315. 4
1430 seized the road junction just outside of The 3d Battalion moved on to an assembly
ItIMBERG (F694281). 3 area in the vicinity of (F700185). 4
The 2d Battalion attacked at 1430 through 394th Infantry Regiment
the 1st Battalion and seized the high ground The regiment continued to occupy the de-
south of AGIDIENBERG (F694295). 3 fensive positions of the day before. 4
The 3d Battalion attacked at 0800 and 395th Infantry Regiment
gained the road junction in the vicinity of The 1st Battalion attacked from (F722193)
ROTTBITZE (F7(00276) at dark.3 toward the east, with the 3d Battalion on its
310th Infantry Regniment right, at 0900. The battalion advanced over
The Ist Battalion continued to attack north rugged terrain against light resistance. 4
under the command of the 311th Infantry, The 2d Battalion was released to division
making very little headway against a deter- control at 1620 and immediately began the
mined enemy using tanks, machine guns, and relief of the 2d Battalion, 393d Infantry. 4
mortars with good effect. The 3d Battalion attacked with the 1st
The 2d Battalion followed the 52d Armored Battalion at 0900, gaining 1200 yards to the
Infantry Battalion to (F699242), where the east. At 1355, the 3d Battalion repulsed a
battalion organized a defensive position. At strong enemy tank-infantry counterattack.4
1600, a strong infantry-tank counterattack was
repullsed from this position. 15 March 1945
The 3d Battalion continued to occupy its 9TH ARMORED DIVISION
defensive position at (F693227) and to patrol (Major General John W. Leonard)
to the north.3 27th Armored Infantry Battalion
311th Infantry Regiment The battalion remained in reserve in UN-
The regiment attacked at 0700 against a KEL (F634224).
p)rogressively stiffening resistance. Rugged, 52d Armored Infantry Battalion
densely wooded terrain also made the ad- In conjunction with the 3d Battalion, 310th
vance slow and arduous. Four enemy coun- Infantry, the 52d Armored Infantry Battalion
lAfter Action Report, 9th Infantry Division, March 1945, page 11.
2
After Action Report, 9th Infantry Division, March 1945, page 10.
3
After Action Report, 78th Infantry Division, March 1945, page 16.
4
After Action Report, 99th Infantry Division, March 1945, page 11.

34
continued its attack on KRETHAUS, clearing the town by ISM() and occupied thlt high
the town by 1700 and continuing on to take ground to the east.
the high ground southwest of KALENBORN The 2d Battalion Inet heavv resistanlce oni
(F706247) and the small woods at (F702243).' the edge of LORSC(IEID (F728218), where a
60th Armored Infantry Battalion counterattack was initially successfll ill split-
The battalion attacked to the northeast on ting the battaliol. }However, the battalion
the right of the 3d Battalion, 311th Infantry. continued the attack and cleared the town
The battalion advanced against light resist- early in the afterlooll. 4
ance and captured MARGARENTHENHOF The 3d Battalion sent Company I,
Lwith tanks
(F658310). 2 and tank destroyers to occiupyi a position at
9TH INFANTRY DIVISION (F743214). This mission was accomnllished
(Major General Louis A. Craig) by noon11. 4
39th Infantry Regiment 78THI INFANTRY I)IVISION
The regiment continued its attack to the (Major General Edwin P. Parker)
east at 0630 with three battalions abreast, the 309th Infantry Re giment
2d Battalion on the north, the 3d Battalion The regiment occupied thle positions gained
on the south, and the 1st Battalion in the cen- on 14 \March, patrolled to the lortlheast, andl
ter. Gains of up to 1000 yards were made, covered the autol)ahn witli ol)servatioll aIl
with the 2d Battalion capturing SCHIWEI- fire. 3
FELD (F705260). 3
310th Infantry Regilment
47th Infantry Regiment The Ist Battalion assemlle(l in the vicinity
The 1st Battalion continued its attack on of IIIMBEI(; (F69428 1) witll the 21d Battalion
NOTSCHEID (F717225), clearing the town as division reserve3.
at 1800 jointly with the 1st Battalion, 60th
The 2d Battalion, rex ertillg to thle 7Stli )i-
Infantry, which entered the town from the
visiOIn, was attached to thle 311tl ltlfamltlrv ianI
south. 4
assembll)led ill th(e vicillity of 11N11iBEI(
The 2d Battalion attacked at 0630 and ad- (F694281 ) with the 1st 3Batt;alion as (livisioml
vanced against light resistance to its objectives reserve. 4
at (F710238) and (F708243), which were oc-
The 3d Battalion conltinulled its attack witi
cupied by 1200. 4
the 52d Armored Infantr y Battalion inider
The 3d Battalion attacked at 1000 and control of the 9th Ilfanlltry Division. l)lring
advanced slowly to the edge of its objective the day, the battalion seize(l the lhighl grolltml
at (F718238), where the assault company was sollthwest of KAI,ENB3()I N ( F7(62471) and
pinned down. At the end of the period Com- securled the wood(s at (F702243). :3 '
pany L was maneuvering to outflank the 311t/h Infantrt 1Rc-im(nt
resistance. Thile regiment cUlotilti((l its attack at ()630
60th Infantry Regiment with all three battalions in line: tlhe 1st Bat-
The 1st Battalion continued its attack on talinm oin the west, the 2d Battalion in tile
NOTSCHEID (F717225) at daybreak and celnter, alld the 3d Battalion oin th(c east flank.
with the 1st Battalion, 47th Infantry, cleared The hillv, woo(led terrain was the imain ob-

lAfter Action Report, 52d Armored Infal-try Battalion, March 1945, p;tage 5.
2
After Action Report, 60th Armored Infantry Battalion, March 1945, page 7.
3
After Action Report, 78th Infantry Division, March 1945, page 17.
4
After Action Report, 9th Infantry Division, March 1945, page 11.
stacle to progress as the units advanced up The 2d Battalion attacked at 0630 against
to 2000 yards. Later in the afternoon, patrols heavy rocket and artillery fire and light ground
entering KUCHUCKSTEIN (F642304) found resistance. The battalion captured an ob-
the town undefended and immediately seized jective in the vicinity of (F7419) and the town
and secured the place.' of HAHNEN (F739189) by 1040, and occupied
an enemy strong point at (F732192) at 1615.3
99TH INFANTRY DIVISION The 3d Battalion was released from division
(Major General Walter E. Lauer) control and became III Corps reserve at 1200,
393d Infantry Regiment at which time the battalion occupied an as-
The 1st Battalion attacked at 1315 and se- sembly area at (F733182). 3
cured the high ground in the vicinity of
1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
(F739163) and the town of REIDENBRUCH
(Major General Clift Andrus)
(F734168) against light resistance. 2
The 2d Battalion reverted to division 26th Infantry Regiment
control at 1200 and moved to ROTHEKREUZ The regiment, with normal combat team
(F725180), closing in the assembly area at attachments, closed in the bridgehead and
1710.3 moved north into the zone of the 78th
The 3d Battalion, which had the stiffest Division.4
fighting of the day, attacked at 0500. Over- 16 March 1945
coming determined but spotty resistance, the On 16 March, the defense against the RE-
battalion captured HESSLN (F733177) at 0920, MAGEN BRIDGEHEAD cracked wide open.
HILL 330 (F735172) at 1320, and KRUM- Large gains were made along the entire front
SCHEID (F744180) at 1810, and was attacking up to and beyond the bridgehead limits. By
GIRGENRATH (F742168) at 2400. A counter- the end of the day, the sector was a front
attack of 100 infantry was repulsed at 1000 rather than a bridgehead-an army sector
with heavy losses to the enemy. 2 which one week later erupted, sending ar-
394th Infantry Regiment mored columns north, east, and south to con-
The 1st Battalion attacked at 1330 and fuse and confound the last vestiges of the
captured the high ground in the vicinity of defenders of Fortress Europe. Thus, the ini-
(F712140) at 1900 against light resistance. 3 tiative and audacity of a two-battalion task
The 2d Battalion attacked at 1330 and ad- force in seizing a bridge unlocked the door
to the heartland of Germany.
vanced to the vicinity of (F732142) against
light resistance. 3 9TH ARMORED DIVISION
The 3d Battalion remained in reserve at (Major General John W. Leonard)
(F696142). 3 27th Armored Infantry Battalion
395th Infantry Regiment The battalion remained in reserve in UN-
The 1st Battalion continued to attack against KEL (F623224).
stubborn resistance. At 2400, the battalion 52d Armored Infantry Battalion
was in the outskirts of S T E I N H A R D T The battalion reverted to III Corps re-
(F747203).3 serve in KRETHAUS (F700224). 5

lAfter Action Report, 78th Infantry Division, March 1945, page 17.
2 AfterAction Report, 99th Infantry Division, March 1945, page 11.
3 AfterAction Report, 99th Infantry Division, March 1945, page 12.
4 AfterAction Report, III Corps, March 1945, page O39.
5 After Action Report, 52d Armored Infantry Battalion, March 1945, page 5.
36
60th Armored Infantry Battalion 78TH INFANTRY DIVISION
The battalion attacked to the northeast un- (Major General Edwin P. Parker)
der the 311th Infantry, advancing to the out- The division was released from III Corps
skirts of ITTENBACH (F668313). The rough, and attached to VII Corps at 1200. Operational
wooded terrain slowed the battalion's advance control of the 39th Infantry was terminated at
more than the defense of the area. 1' 2 1200, and the regiment reverted to the 9th
9TH INFANTRY DIVISION Infantry Division.
(Major General Louis A. Craig) 309th Infantry Regiment
39th Infantry Regiment During the day, the regiment secured 15()00
The regiment reverted to the 9th Infantry yards of the autobahn and advanced up to
Division at 0930.3 3500 yards.
The 1st Battalion continued its attack to The 1st Battalion attacked at 0845 to cut
(F698255). 3, 4 the autobahn. By 1415, the overpasses at
The 2d Battalion continued its attack to (F697302) and (F692305) had been seized in-
(F710265). 3 tact and by 2000, the town of BRUNGSBE1RC
The 3d Battalion cleared KALENBORN (F695309) had been secured. 3
(F706247) and at 2400 was fighting toward The 2d Battalion attacked at 0730 against
the crossroads at WILLSCHEID (F715250). 4 strong points in the towns and overwatching
47th Infantry Regiment self-propelled guns and captured IIOVEI,
The 1st Battalion continued attacking to the (F693302) at 1015 and A G I D I E N B E R G
east, reaching (F728228) by the end of the (F694295) at 1715. 5
day.4 The 3d Battalion continued to occupy
The 2d Battalion attacked in the afternoon defensive positions east of ROTTBITZE
to seize a line of departure for the attack on (F700275). 3
VETTLESCHOSS (F725245) on the following 310th Infantry Regiment
day.4 The 1st Battalion remained in division re-
The 3d Battalion occupied (F716238) at serve in HIMBERG (F694281).
1030. 4 The 3d Battalion went into reserve at
60th Infantry Regiment (F690234) and was attached to the 311th
The 1st Battalion attacked at 0300 against Infantry. 4
heavy resistance and captured STRODT 311th Infantry Regiment
(F735222) at 2400. 4 The regiment attacked at 0700 with all
The 2d Battalion occupied LORSCHEID three battalions in the assault, advancing up
(F728218). to 2000 yards against light resistance and cap-
The 3d Battalion continued to occupy de- turing most of KONIGSWINTER (F617307).
fensive positions at (F740214) and (F734217) Two counterattacks on KONIGSWINTER
until relieved by the 9th Reconnaissance were repulsed during the day, one at 1800
Troop at the end of the period. 4 and the other at 1920.4

lAfter Action Report, 60th Armored Infantry Battalion, March 1945, page 7.
2
After Action Report, 60th Armored Infantry Battalion, March 1945, page 8.
3
After Action Report, 78th Infantry Division, March 1945, page 18.
4
After Action Report, 9th Infantry Division, March 1945, page 12.
5
After Action Report, 78th Infantry Division, March 1945, page 17.

37
99TH INFANTRY DIVISION The 3d Battalion remained in reserve at
(Major General Walter E. Lauer) (F696142).

393d Infantry Regiment 395th Infantry Regiment


The 1st Battalion attacked at 0600, capturing The 1st Battalion attacked at 0540 against
WEISSFELD (F746155) at 1230. Resistance light small-arms fire, capturing STEIN-
was very light during the day.' HARDT (F747204) at 0845 and advancing to
The 2d Battalion remained in reserve at (F750206) during the day. 2
ROTHEKREUZ (F725188). The 2d Battalion attacked at 0330 against
light resistance, capturing HEEG (F749186)
The 3d Battalion attacked against light re-
and REIFERT (F753187) at 0815 and con-
sistance at 0010, capturing GIRGENRATH
tinuing to advance to (F754187). 2
(F742168) at 0845, BREMSCHEID (F751171)
at 0845, OVER (F7617) at 1605, STOPPERICH The 3d Battalion remained in III Corps
(F757167) at 1605, and FRORATH (F756185) reserve at (F733182).
at 1630. A counterattack at KRUMSCHEID 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
(F744180) was repulsed at 0420.1
(Major General Clift Andrus)
394th Infantry Regiment
The 1st Infantry Division continued to move
The 1st Battalion attacked at 0900 and cap- into the bridgehead area, closing into an area
tured part of HONNINGEN (F700127) after east of HONNEF about 1300. Later in the
advancing 2000 yards. 1 day the 18th and 26th Infantry Regiments
The 2d Battalion attacked against light re- moved to more advanced locations, prepara-
sistance and seized the high ground in the tory to launching an attack to the northeast
vicinity of STANBRICK (F737128).' through the 78th Infantry Division. 3

lAfter Action Report, 99th Infantry Division, March 1945, page 12.
2After Action Report, 99th Infantry Division, March 1945, page 1.3.
3
Sitrep No. 564 (After Action Report, III Corps, March 1945).

38
APPENDIX II-ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE
The period 6-9 March saw the complete The 89th Grenadier Regiment of the 12th
elimination of enemy forces west of the Volksgrenadier Division was identified on the
RHINE in the III Corps zone. German with- III Corps north boundary the last two days of
drawal was in full swing onl 6 March, and Febriuary. During the first few ldays of March.
rapid advances were made that day against this division wNas pushed out of VI 1 US (orIps
scattered delaying forces, not very eager to area into increasing contact oin III Cor)ps front.
fight. On 7 \March, enemy resistance oll the The principal surl)rise ill 'enemy id'lltifica-
south collapsed as American troops reached tions west of the RIlllNE was the conta(t
the AHR RIVER onl the south flank, capturing with the 39th and 78th Grenadlier iRegiments
bridges intact, and most important, capturing of the 26th Infantrv Division oii 5 March.
intact the railroad bridge over the RHtINE As the advance shifted slightly soiitheast in
RIVER at RENIAGEN (F645200). applroachinlg the IlI NE, e'lemlnents of the
Enlemv support for his infant'-y during this 277th Volksgrenadier D)ivision alld tlhe 89th
early phase in M\arch was not impressive. Infantry Division. f'ightimlg on V (Vorps firo t,
Initially, artillery and mortar fire were fairly w(ere identified.
heavy, while tanks and self-propelled gunis ill The surprise crossillng of the RIlilNE crc.ated
small numbers contributed to the delaying ivew Situati(onl froli all order of battle statnd-
action. Few reinforcements in mneni or mate- point. No enleny divisiotnal uiinits were ill
riel were received by the enemy; this policy position onl the east balnk; hence thie first :36
was probably due to lack of reserves as well horls of the l)rid(lgehea(l sXaw comlillitilllnt of
as to the desire to save replacement units for mniscellaneouls ghiineer, anttiaitcraft, and re-
rebuilding the beaten divisions behind the placement uinits only. The Il lthi Ialzer I)i-
RHINE barrier. vision arnri edl on 9 MlarchIl ami w\Las (:olllllitted
The crossing of the ROER RIV'ER o0n the agailst the )bridgehcad.Thlis div ision) hald Iee
entire III Corps front onl 1 Mlarch brought fighting west of the ri\ c far to tolH' i orth (o
identifications of all enemyv units known to IIl (Corl-p)s, leig witlhdrl.wll c st o'fthi. rivr
have been fighting between the ROER and onl about 5 Mlarcl-. It proc'ccded south with
the RHINE. While the 3d Parachute Division orders to recross the river at B()NN a;Iit at-
in the center had recently been reorganized, tack solitl-h; hliit alrivimigg after thl esciztll.l of
and its strength and morale were sufficient the ILUI)NIX)()R{I" BIDlI)(iE, it \Was, itsteadl,
to cause it to offer stubborn resistance, the cotlmmlitted agailnst the b)ridghcead. Th 10(6th
272d Volksgrenadier Division oil the soulth Panzer Brigade accoi. ailllicd the 11th Pa;llz'
was caught in the process of a sketchy re- Division, hb(ilg oin its south flaltk. ini tih
organization behind the ROER dams. The mlliddle of thle brildgehead.
35:3d Volksgrenadier Division, on the north The next divisions to t)e (o'l)mllitfttd a(;ainlst
flank of the 3d Parachute Division, had the the bridgelhead were i(helitific(l ol 1:3 March.
941st and 943d Grenadier Regimnents in fairly On) the soml)th, the' 272(1 Volksgrenadli(cr l)i-
good shape, but the 942d Grenadier Regiment visionl, which h;ad stilfered( sseverely in tlce
had not been re-formed. The 62d Volksgren- retreat across the HfIIINE, was rinfor'ced lby
adier Division remained in line against the some salvagedi elernments of tIle 326fth Volks-
V US Corps, on the south, until 6 March, grenadier Division and by the 80th Repl)ace-
when it too shifted north, and was contacted ment Battalion from (C()ILENZ (1,9095), aind
on III Corps front. was committed it. defenise of 11()NNIN(;EN
39
(F700127). On its right flank, the 277th Volks- captured earlier in the month by the 9th US
grenadier Division came in the same day, also Infantry Division.
in very bad condition from its retreat across On 17 March, the 26th Volksgrenadier Di-
the RHINE on the V Corps front. On the vision, an old enemy from the ARDENNES
north, the 62d Volksgrenadier Division and and the ROER RIVER battles, arrived on the
9th Panzer Division took over the defense of southern front, under General Kokott, an
the HONNEF area (F640275) on the same day. experienced straggler collector. This officer
These reinforcements enabled the 11th Pan- had partially filled out his command with
zer Division to narrow its zone, and with the remnants of the 277th Replacement Regiment
106th Brigade and elements of the 130th Pan- of BONN and 253d Replacement Battalion of
zer Lehr Division attached, it remained the AACHEN, and elements of the 18th Volks-
strongest division opposing the III Corps; grenadier Division and the 89th Infantry
especially as the division received 300 men Division.
from the Heidelberg NCO School 11 March,
A number of prisoners taken during the
and 450 reinforcements from the 139th Moun- period were of special interest. General
tain Replacement Battalion on 17 March.
Schimph, commanding the 3d Parachute Di-
On 14 March, the 340th Volksgrenadier Di- vision, took the order literally to hold the west
vision was identified on the southeast of the bank of the RHINE to the last; so did Lieu-
bridgehead. This division arrived in poor con- tenant Colonel Martin of the 941st Grenadier
dition from the Third US Army front on the Regiment, and Colonel Fromberger of the 78th
south, but it was to receive the largest group Grenadier Regiment, 26th Infantry Division.
of replacements to arrive in this area-Den- An officer who was the publisher of "The Skor-
mark Battalions I, II, and III, a regimental pion," of German propaganda leaflets for the
size unit from the 160th Training Division in Wehrmacht, and of English-language propa-
Denmark. The Denmark units soon melted ganda leaflets for British and American con-
away, however, as did later arrivals from sev- sumption, was apprehended before he could
eral replacement battalions from WEST- get back across the RHINE, while two groups
PHALIA. of trained saboteurs fell into our hands when
Also on 14 March, the 3d Parachute Division five of a squad of seven highly-trained swim-
came back on the III Corps north front, this mers were driven out of the RHINE before
time without General Schimph, who had been they could blow the REMAGEN BRIDGES.

40
APPENDIX III-COMMENTS OF GENERAL BAYERLEIN
COMMANDING GENERAL, GERMAN LIII CORPS
The following story, told to American in- was accepted as a normal thing, while 100 cas-
terrogators by General Lieutenant Fritz Bayer- ualties sustained from air bombardment was
lein, depicts, to some extent, the state of mind headlined as a crippling blow to the uinit-
of the German high command in the field a decisive factor in a subsequent defeat.
during March 1945. The subject, General General Bayerlein gives an excellent example
Bayerlein, became an officer in 1922. He of the German professional officer's state of
served with the panzers in the Polish Cam- mind in the closing days of the war. While,
paign (1939) and the French Campaign (1940), from the German point of view, the war was
and was Rommel's Chief of Staff in the Afrika irrevocably lost, Bayerlein continued to per-
Corps in 1943. After commanding the 3d Pan- form his duty to the best of his ability while
zer Division in Russia for a brief period, blaming his superior for poor decisions anld
General Bayerlein was ordered to France to making certain that no act of omission oc-
organize, train, and command the Panzer Lehr curred which could justify his court-martial.
Division-the unit especially equipped and
trained to repulse the Allied invasion of Comments of General Bayerlein to US in-
France. After the seizure of the LUDEN- terrogators:
DORF BRIDGE over the RHINE by the On 1 March 1945, General Bayerlein, Coin-
9th US Armored Division, General Bayerlein manding General, German I,III Corps, was in
was designated the commander of the LIII his headquarters at RIIEINFELD (F3879).
Corps, a battle group charged with the mission At this time, he received ani order which Hitler
of throwing the American forces back across sent to all units west of the RIIINE stating
the RHINE. that ".... no staff officers, under any circimin-
The interrogation is especially interesting stances, will cross the RIIINE"; the hope
for three reasons: It is a partial chronicle of evidently being that the contilued presence of
historical events, it indicates the German pre- high-ranking members of the German General
occupation with our air corps, and it details Staff west of the RIIINE would stimulate the
by example the state of mind of the German waning resistance. Bayerlein stated that he
officer corps when faced with certain defeat. was only too happy to comply, as it was clear
The careful student will note the lack of pre- to him that the defense of Germany was
vision demonstrated by General Bayerlein in finished. On 3 March, it became even clearer
his location of his units. This interrogation when US tanks fired directly into his com-
took place one month after the events re- mand post at RHEINFELD, driving him and
counted. At that time, the subject's recollec- his staff practically to the river bank across
tion of the events which transpired was most from BENRAT. Such a situation seemed "the
vague in contrast to his vivid remembrance of end of the world" to Bayerlein, he said; but on
personal danger or embarrassments. the night of 3-4 March, he received direct
While all but the most prejudiced will agree orders from Army I-eadquarters to cross over,
that Allied air power was a most important which he did in a small boat early on the
factor in the final outcome of the war, it is morning of 5 March. "It seemed that Army
interesting to note the importance given to Headquarters did not feel, as the Fuehrer did,
minor losses by German ground officers when that Germany had so many capable division
the losses were caused by air power. For in- and corps commanders she could sacrifice
stance, the loss of 100 men in ground action them for a gesture."
41
On 9 March, Bayerlein was ordered to (F1700127), and the next morning Model re-
OBERPLEIS (F676350) for a new assignment, fused to permit the attack through OBERERL,
and the situation at REMAGEN made it very insisting that the threat to the south be met
clear to him just what it would be. Although by an attack on LINZ (F678187).
there were no cohesive German units of any (NOTE: This decision was most illogical as:
size defending against the bridgehead, ele- (1) The tanks referred to were one platoon of
ments of the 11th and 9th Panzer Divisions the 14th Tank Battalion, which had been east
were marching toward the threatened area. of the river for a day and a half; (2) the main
(The size of these units was limited by the effort of the bridgehead was and had been
gasoline supply rather than by the number of north and east; and (3) the strategic objectives
troops and vehicles available.) The com- in the vicinity were the RUHR area in the
mander of the "Defense of the RHINE" was north and the autobahn to the east. There
an old man, one Kortzfleisch, of indeterminate was neither a logical objective nor good ma-
rank and comrnmading an assortment of Hitler neuver ground to the south. Furthermore,
Jugend and Volksturm. Kortzfleisch was in Model was a high-caliber officer and knew
jittering terror of being disgraced and shot that his only chance of success was to hit the
should the RHINE be crossed in his sector. bridgehead hard and early before the Ameri-
(General Bayerlein did not state the limits of cans had time to build up their forces east
Kortzfleisch's sector.) of the river. The only possible reasons for
Model arrived in person on 9 March and General Bayerlein's statement are that he was
gave General Bayerlein his assignment, which trying to put the blame for his failure on
was to take a battle group of the Panzer Lehr, Model or else that Model was insane, as many
and the 9th and 11th Panzer Divisions, and people claimed.)
wipe out the bridgehead. He was given a day On 12 March, Model appeared at OBER-
to study the situation and prepare a plan. PLEIS (F676350) with Marshal Kesselring,
(It should be noted that Model and Bayerlein who stated that lie was the new commander
were not particularly fond of each other. in the West over Model, who continued his
Shortly before the ARDENNES battle Bayer- same duties but under the direction of Kessel-
lein had requested that his unit, the Panzer ring. During the visit, Bayerlein explained
Lehr Division, be withdrawn from the front in his initial plan for destroying the bridgehead
order to permnit it to reorganize, re-equip, and to Marshal Kesselring, who became furious
retrain. Model censlred his division com- that the plan had not been executed. Model,
mander and told him to "reorganize in the perhaps to justify his decision, complained that
line. That is what we did in Russia." Bayer- he was being furnished nothing in the way of
lein replied that if that is what had been done troops and supplies. Inasmuch as the Ameri-
in Russia it apparently had not been too suc- cans had captured OBERERL by this time,
cessful. From that time on relations between the plan became unworkable and was dropped.
the two officers were rather strained.) Marshal Kesselring did order, however, that
General Bayerlein's plan for the reduction LEYBERG (HILL 359) (F668262) be retaken.
of the REMAGEN bridgehead, which he pre- On the night of 12-13 March, Bayerlein
sented to MNodel, was to attack along the line moved his headquarters to ASBACH (F780297)
OBERERL (F685217)-ERPEL (F647207) at in order to be more centrally located with
dusk on 10 March with whatever troops were respect to his sector. This move, like all moves
available at that time. During the night of of Bayerlein, was made at night to escape the
9-10 March, however, a few American tanks American tactical aircraft. Bayerlein claimed
crossed and moved south to HONNINGEN that, between NORMANDY and the end of
42
the war, he had lost the fighting strength of In compliance with the orders of Marshal
his division two and a half times from enemy Kesselring, General Bayerlein attacked LEY-
air action alone. Furthermore, the omni- BERG (F668262) on 13 March and retook the
present threat of air strikes on any column objective. An attack on HIONNEF (F640275)
so greatly restricted his freedom of movement the same day, however, failed.
that an active mobile defense was usually im- (NOTE: At 1:324(00 March, the 1st Battaliotn.
possible. The REMAGEN operation was no 309th Infantry, was reported 15(X) yardls east
exception to the general rule, although the of LEYBERG with the .3d Battalion, :31 th
rugged, heavily wooded terrain minimized Infantry, oni its north and the 2d Battalion.
the effectiveness of fighter-bombers on the 39th Infantry, oil its south. It is extremtely
battlefield proper. During the critical period doubtful that three battalions fromn three dif-
of the bridgehead, however, there was a con- ferent regiments of two divisions would falsify
tinual drumming of the rear areas. On 10 their locations by 15(X) vards. It is much 1iore
March, the 130th Infantry Regiment, arriving probable that G;eneral Baverleii reportel an111
from Denmark, was due to detrain at ALTEN- untrue "mission accomlplished" to the new
KIRCHEN (F935320). On the preceding day conlmander of the We\st, tlrustilng to the c('n-
ALTENKIRCHEN had been destroyed to the fusion ramlnpalnt at the timne to cover his false
point where the railroad station was unusable official report.)
and the streets impassable. It was necessary A second plan to smlash the )li(lgeh;ead \was
for the regiment to detour north and south by now (13 March) planned. consistilng of a;n at-
way of BACHENBURG (F938342) (north) and tack by the newly arrivedl 1:30th Illnfantryl g-
NIDER WAMBACH (F901257) (south). Such imenit throlugh BlUCIIIIATUSEN (FV5S2236)
situations were the usual thing and made and ORSBEBRt (F6.52216). Once llore Nlodel
time and space computations nearly impossi- stepped ill and, acclisirig l1ayc(rleii of "atollli-
ble, with the resultant piecemeal employment zations" of his forces, demandedl that the
of units. On 13-14 MNarch, FLAMMNERSFELD available offensive forces be colnsolidated with
(F854277) and the forest west of ALTEN- the 340th Volksgrelladicr Division miId(er tfli'
KIRCHEN (F935320) were heavily bombed. co1mmland( of (eeltral Tollslorf ( . . . lwho
While the heavy 17-cm guns which were shell- had estal)lishcd sonll sort of a rc 1p)llttlin ftoi
ing the bridge at RENIAGEN were located ill destroyinlg tanks with panizerfalists."). lIav ri
lein said that this divisior t:ollsisted of 2I(X)
these woods, no great damage resulted, which
nlein practically vithboit alrlis allrl (c(Ltiil Is
convinced Bayerlein that the Americans knew
without any heavy weaponis or prolper tri.i'tilig
the general location of the guns but did nlot tlnder Tolls(lorf, a grossly icoinl)pterlit leader.
have them pin-pointed. On 16 March, how- Nevertheless, Baverlein tillrnced over to Tolls-
ever, a trainload of gasoline, nearly the entire dcolf tlhe 15(X) good troops ill the available bat-
fuel reserve of the corps, was destroyed-a talions and assignedl them a sectSre ill frolit of
tragedy to the fuel-short unit. (In spite of the the atitobahnil. 3Baerleill sttated that I1)pon the
losses and inconveniences enumerated by Gen- employment of his last striking force hle
be-
eral Bayerlein, the REMAGEN operation ap- came convinced, a;id rel()ortt(l, that Im( (chalic(
pears to have been almost exclusively a ground re-mailled to elimninat the )lridgleh;ad.
force show in the plodding infantry style. As (N()TE: Ilndicative of thle nc~iital statins of
the general had no Luftwaffe under his com- the comminand ill the West at this tiume( is the
mand, it was an easy thing to place an undule example of an armrs co¢nnlall olrc' tillg a
lr l c(l
amount of weight on factors affecting the corps commandiler in his emplllovicniit of 15(0)
operation which were beyond his control.) men. Ilere we see high corrl'lial(l(rs withi so
4;3
few troops at hand that the countermanding not have been obeyed even if the military com-
of orders becomes the rule. Although General manders had desired to do so.) The effective-
Bayerlein stated that in his opinion, and in the ness of the defense was also impaired by the
opinion of other German General Staff officers, execution of five officers for dereliction of
Model was insane at this time, there is cer- duty in failing to destroy the LUDENDORF
tainly no proof of this accusation in this case. BRIDGE-an event that made the whole offi-
Bayerlein planned an attack through the cer corps extremely conscious of the personal
American assault forces, along the line responsibility for failure. As a consequence
BRUCHHAUSEN-ORSBERG to the river, the justification of acts and decisions became
with a three-battalion force totaling 1500 ef- the paramount thought in most minds. Bayer-
fectives. On 13 March, there were five Ameri- lein stated that when the American forces cut
can battalions in reserve within 2000 yards of the autobahn on 16 March, he had concen-
BRUCHHAUSEN and ORSBERG. It appears trated an especially strong defense at the
that Bayerlein was merely trying to build up northern edge of his sector so that this disaster
his own prestige by insinuating that his fore- at least could be debted to someone else. In
doomed plan would have been a success had it addition, a bridge complex swept the command
not been precluded by his superior. The which caused officers of all grades to spend
chronic cry from German corps commanders a disproportionate amount of time, energy,
that Model was mad could be due to his in- and explosives in blowing all sorts pf bridges,
tense and misdirected sense of duty or to the even senselessly. In many instances, bridges
human failing of subordinates covering a de- were blown in rear areas by high-ranking offi-
feat by blaming a superior. Certainly, it is cers, thereby crippling the war effort but
doubtful whether a disciplined officer of the clearing the individual of responsibility for an
mental ability of Model would become un- unblown bridge.
balanced because of a military defeat which The high command apparently concurred
he must have foreseen and which his training in Bayerlein's belief that the reduction of the
would indicate as being inevitable.) bridgehead was impossible, as he was ordered
On 16 March, Bayerlein received official on 18 March to pull out of the line and move
notification through channels that Hitler had north to the defense of the area east of
ordered the whole bridgehead area wiped out COLOGNE (F4560) and BONN (F550370).
with V-2 bombs, regardless of the resultant The Americans, however, unleashed a drive to
harm to the local population. While this dras- the east instead of to the north, so BAYER-
tic defense was never employed, the knowl- LEIN was ordered south again with his battle
edge of its possibility did not increase the
group to defend ALTENKIRCHEN (F935320).
German soldiers' will to resist on that par-
The result of all this jockeying around was
ticular piece of ground. (NOTE: In its after ac-
tion report for March 1945, III Corps reported that he was unable to put up a strong defense
six V-2 bombs landing in the bridgehead area. anywhere, being too preoccupied with moving
It is believed that General Bayerlein meant his troops to be able to fight them. As a con-
that while V-2 bombs were used in the opera- sequence he retired to the north, and, facing
tion, no cold-blooded effort was made to wipe south, extended his line to STEINBACH
out all living things within the bridgehead. (FM065352), from which position he continued
The order required a prohibitive number of to retreat north until captured in the last days
bombs in the first place and probably could of the RUHR pocket.

44
APPENDIX IV - NAMES OF UNIT COMMANDERS
7 March 1945

First United States Army ------------------ Lieutenant General Courtney II. Hodges
III Corps ................................ Major General John NMilliken
III Corps Artillery ...................... Brigadier General Paul V. Kane
VII Corps ................................ Major General J. Lawton Collins
9th Armored Division ...................... Major General John WV. Leonard
Combat Command A ................... Colonel Thomas L. Ilarrold
Combat Command B ------------------ Brigadier General William M. Hoge
Combat Command R ................... Colonel Walter Burnside
Division Artillery ....................... Colonel Joseph W. West
2d Tank Battalion ...................... Major Oliver W. Schantz
14th Tank Battalion ............ Lieutenant Colonel Leonard E. Engetlan
19th Tank Battalion .................... Lieutenant Colonlel Burton WV.Karsteter
27th Armored Infantry Battalion . ........ Murray Deeve-s
Major
52d Armored Infantry Battalion . .......... Colonel Willialm 1. Prince
Lieutenant
60th Armored Infantry Battalion . Lieutenant
........ Colonel Kenneth W. Collins
89th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron --- Lieutenant Colonel Caesar F. Fiore
9th Armored Engineer Battalion . Lieutenant
........ Colonel Sears Y. (:oker
656th Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP)
(attached) ------------------- ---- Lieutenant Colonel John (C. \eador
_---
482d Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic
Weapons Battalion (SP) (attached) . Lieutenant
....... Colonel Viinellt F. Ilut)illa(ci
7th Armored Division ..................... Major General Robert WV. ltasbrolick
1st Infantry Division ---------------------- Major General ('lift Andrus
2d Infantry Division ...................... Major General Walter M. Robertson
9th Infantry Division ….................MajorGeneral Louis A. Craig
78th Infantry Division .................... Major General Edwin P). Parker
99th Infantry Division -------------------- Major General Walter E. Laer

45

TIHE-ARMY LSBfUR
WASHINGTON, D. C.
,-a..
SKETCH MAP No. 1
APPENDIX V
N

a JULICH

DUREN
CY

OBERPLEISO

SKETCH MAP NO. I


'APPENDIX I , REMAGEN BRIDGEHEAD

FIRST ARMY PLAN

Stage 1. Support GRENADE (Ninth Army) by


seizing the high ground east of the
ERFT River north and northwest of
COLOGNE.
THIRD
Stage 2. Invest COLOGNE from north and
northwest. Launch a strong attack
to the southeast from the ZULPICH
area to converge with the attack of
Third Army.
Stage 3. Close to the RHINE in zone.

O 5 10 20
I · I
0111111111` .
MILES
SKETCH MAP No. 2
APPENDIX V
20 30 40 50 60
50

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OBERPLEIS
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SKETCH MAP NO. 2


APPENDIX V, REMAGEN

SEIZURE OF WDENDORF
BRIDGE
I 0 I 2 3 4 5
I 1
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SKETCH MAP No. 3
APPENDIX V
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APPENDIX v, REMAGEN BRIDGEHEAD
\e \
32
32 16 MAR
ITTE BUILD-UP AND CONDUCT OF
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SKETCH MAP No. 4
APPENDIX V
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76
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I - APPENDIX Z REMAGEN BRIDGEHEAD - 32
32 I
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APPENDIX V
6CD 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83
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32 32
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