G.R. No.

L-21897 October 22, 1963

RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner, 

vs.
RUFINO G. HECHANOVA, as Executive Secretary, MACARIO PERALTA, JR., as Secretary of Defense, PEDRO
GIMENEZ, as Auditor General, CORNELIO BALMACEDA, as Secretary of Commerce and Industry, and SALVADOR
MARINO, Secretary of Justice, respondents.

Facts:

It is not disputed that on September 22, 1963, respondent Executive Secretary authorized the importation of
67,000 tons of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources, and created a rice procurement committee
composed of the other respondents for the implementation of said proposed importation.

On September 25, 1963, petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales — a rice planter, and president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn
Planters Association, whose members are, likewise, engaged in the production of rice and corn — filed the petition
herein, averring that, in making or attempting to make said importation of foreign rice, the aforementioned
respondents "are acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction", because Republic Act No. 3452 which
allegedly repeals or amends Republic Act No. 220 — explicitly prohibits the importation of rice and corn "the Rice
and Corn Administration or any other government agency;" that petitioner has no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; and that a preliminary injunction is necessary for the preservation
of the rights of the parties during the pendency this case and to prevent the judgment therein from coming
ineffectual. Petitioner prayed, therefore, that said petition be given due course; that a writ of preliminary
injunction be forthwith issued restraining respondent their agents or representatives from implementing the
decision of the Executive Secretary to import the aforementioned foreign rice; and that, after due hearing,
judgment be rendered making said injunction permanent.

The contracts with Vietnam and Burma 

It is lastly contended that the Government of the Philippines has already entered into two (2) contracts for the
Purchase of rice, one with the Republic of Vietnam, and another with the Government of Burma; that these
contracts constitute valid executive agreements under international law; that such agreements became binding
effective upon the signing thereof by representatives the parties thereto; that in case of conflict between Republic
Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452 on the one hand, and aforementioned contracts, on the other, the latter should prevail,
because, if a treaty and a statute are inconsistent with each other, the conflict must be resolved — under the
American jurisprudence — in favor of the one which is latest in point of time; that petitioner herein assails the
validity of acts of the Executive relative to foreign relations in the conduct of which the Supreme Court cannot
interfere; and the aforementioned contracts have already been consummated, the Government of the Philippines
having already paid the price of the rice involved therein through irrevocable letters of credit in favor of the sell of
the said commodity. We find no merit in this pretense.

Issue:

W/N the sufficiency of petitioner's cause of action upon the theory that the proposed importation in question is
not governed by Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, but was authorized by the President as Commander-in-Chief
"for military stock pile purposes" in the exercise of his alleged authority under Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No.
1?

Held:

This theory is devoid of merit. The Department of National Defense and the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as
well as respondents herein, and each and every officer and employee of our Government, our government
agencies and/or agents.

In the contracts with Vietnam and Burma, the Court is not satisfied that the status of said tracts as alleged
executive agreements has been sufficiently established. The parties to said contracts do not pear to have regarded
the same as executive agreements. But, even assuming that said contracts may properly considered as executive
agreements, the same are unlawful, as well as null and void, from a constitutional viewpoint, said agreements
being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. Although the President may, under the
American constitutional system enter into executive agreements without previous legislative authority, he may
not, by executive agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto. Under
the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not
interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He
may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of law, by indirectly repealing the same
through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.

The writ of preliminary injunction

The members of the Court have divergent opinions on the question whether or not respondents herein should be
enjoined from implementing the aforementioned proposed importation. However, the majority favors the
negative view, for which reason the injunction prayed for cannot be granted.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that respondent Executive Secretary had and has no power to
authorize the importation in question; that he exceeded his jurisdiction in granting said authority; said importation
is not sanctioned by law and is contrary to its provisions; and that, for lack of the requisite majority, the injunction
prayed for must be and is, accordingly denied. It is so ordered.

Tuesday, July 28, 2009

Gonzales vs. Hechanova 9 SCRA 230
Facts:

Respondent executive secretary authorized importation of 67,000 tons of foreign rice to be purchased from private
sources. Ramon A. Gonzales, a rice planter and president of ilo-ilo palay and corn planters asso., filed and averring
that in making or attempting to make importation of foreign rice are acting without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction because RA 2207, explicitly prohibits the importation of rice and corn by Rice and Corn Administration
or any government agency.

Issue:

Whether an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts.

Held:

The power of judicial review is vested with the supreme court in consonace to section 2 art. VIII of the constitution.
the alleged consummation of the contracts with vietnam and burma does not render this case academic. RA 2207,
enjoins our government not from entering contracts for the purchase of rice, but from entering rice, except under
conditions prescribed in said act.

A judicial declaration of illegality of the proposed importation would not compel our government to default in the
performance of such obligations as it mat have contracted with the sellers of rice in question because aside from
the fact that said obligations may be complied without importing the said commodity into the phils., the proposed
importation may still be legalized by complying with the provisions of the aforementioned law.

Ichong v Hernandez, 101 Phil. 115

Facts: Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships
adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration
that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him,
particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of
the Act, contending among others that: it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives
them of their liberty and property without due process of law; it violates international and treaty obligations of the
Republic of the Philippines; and its provisions against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru
hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to
engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the
Constitution.

Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it nationalizes the retail trade
business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and
against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the
Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception from the above prohibition in
favor of aliens actually engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engage therein,
unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in case of
natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case of juridical
persons; (3) an exception therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a provision for
the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail business) for violation of the laws on nationalization, economic
control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition
against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or
branches of retail business, (6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present for
registration with the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses, giving, among other
matters, the nature of the business, their assets and liabilities and their offices and principal offices of juridical
entities; and (7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to continue
such business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation.

Held: The Court held that the Act was approved in the exercise of the police power. It has been said that police
power is so far-reaching in scope, that it has become almost impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence
from the very existence of the State itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be
co- extensive with self-protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental
processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework
where the demands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field and
scope of police power has become almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have
become almost all- embracing and have transcended human foresight. Otherwise stated, as we cannot foresee the
needs and demands of public interest and welfare in this constantly changing and progressive world, so we cannot
delimit beforehand the extent or scope of police power by which and through which the State seeks to attain or
achieve public interest or welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or extent of the police power
of the State; what they do is to set forth the limitations thereof. The most important of these are the due process
clause and the equal protection clause.

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in
the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality
among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions
both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation
which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class,
and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do
not.

The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the police power,
Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the legislature's purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient
foundation or reason in connection with the matter involved; or has there not been a capricious use of the
legislative power? Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an unjustified
interference with private interest? These are the questions that we ask when the due process test is applied.

The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws
is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing
is the essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any
democratic society. There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can
neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of life,
liberty and property, provided there is due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and groups,
provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police
power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist
between purposes and means. And if distinction and classification has been made, there must be a reasonable
basis for said distinction.

The disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien
dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from such dominance and control; that
the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects
its own personality and insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal protection clause of
the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the
occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and
recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that
the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident — as a matter of
fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary — and that in any case such matter falls within the
prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may
not interfere; that the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and
has not misled the legislators or the segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for
supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the
police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement. The Treaty
of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China of April 18, 1947 is also claimed to be
violated by the law in question. All that the treaty guarantees is equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals
"upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country." But the nationals of China are not discriminated
against because nationals of all other countries, except those of the United States, who are granted special rights
by the Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. But even supposing that the law infringes
upon the said treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law , and the
same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the State.
Ichong vs Hernandez

Facts: Republic Act 1180 or commonly known as “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business” was passed. The said law
provides for a prohibition against foreigners as well as corporations owned by foreigners from engaging from retail
trade in our country. This was protested by the petitioner in this case. According to him, the said law violates the
international and treaty of the Philippines therefore it is unconstitutional. Specifically, the Treaty of Amity between
the Philippines and China was violated according to him.

Issue: Whether or Not Republic Act 1180 is a valid exercise of police power.

Held: According to the Court, RA 1180 is a valid exercise of police power. It was also then provided that police
power can not be bargained away through the medium of a treaty or a contract. The Court also provided that RA
1180 was enacted to remedy a real and actual danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control.
If ever the law infringes upon the said treaty, the latter is always subject to qualification or amendment by a
subsequent law and the same may never curtain or restrict the scope of the police power of the state.

Kuroda vs Jalandoni
83 Phil 171

Facts:

Shinegori Kuroda, a former lieutenant-general of the Japanese Imperial Army and commanding general of the
Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines was charged before the Philippine Military Commission for war crimes.
Being the commanding general of the enemy forces during the war period, he was tried for failing to discharge his
duties well and permitting the brutal atrocities and other high crimes committed by his men against noncombatant
civilians and prisoners of the Japanese forces, in clear violation of the laws and customs of war.

Kuroda, in his petition, argues that the Military Commission is not a valid court because the law that created it,
Executive Order No. 68, is unconstitutional. He further contends that using as basis the Hague Convention’s Rules
and Regulations covering Land Warfare for the war crimes committed cannot stand ground as the Philippines was
not a signatory of such rules in such convention. Furthermore, he alleges that the United States is not a party of
interest in the case and that the two US prosecutors cannot practice law in the Philippines.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Executive Order No. 68 is constitutional.

2. Whether or not the US is a party of interest to this case.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that Executive Order No. 68, creating the National War Crimes Office and prescribing
rules on the trial of accused war criminals is constitutional as it is aligned with Sec. 3, Article 2 of the Constitution
which states that, “The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation.” The generally accepted principles of
international law includes those formed during the Hague Convention, the Geneva Convention and other
international jurisprudence established by the United Nations. These include the principle that all persons, military
or civilian, who have been guilty of planning, preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of
crimes and offenses in violation of laws and customs of war, are to be held accountable. In the doctrine of
incorporation, the Philippines abides by these principles and therefore has a right to try persons that commit such
crimes and most especially when it is committed againsts its citizens. It abides with it even if it was not a signatory
to these conventions by the mere incorporation of such principles in the constitution.

The United States is a party of interest because the country and its people have been equally, if not more greatly,
aggrieved by the crimes with which the petitioner is charged for. By virtue of Executive Order No. 68, the Military
Commission is a special military tribunal and that the rules as to parties and representation are not governed by
the rules of court but by the very provisions of this special law.

Kuroda vs Jalandoni, 83 Phil. 195, L-2662, March 26, 1949

Facts : Shigenori Kuroda, a former Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General of
the Imperial Forces of the Philippines was charged before a Military Commission convened by the Chief of Staff of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines. He had unlawfully disregarded and failed to discharge his duties as a
commander to control the operations of members of his command.
Petitioner was duly prosecuted for acts committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva
Convention through the issuance and enforcement of Executive Order No. 68.
Executive Order No. 68 provided the organization of such military commissions, established National War Crimes
Office and prescribing rules and regulations governing the trial of accused war criminals.
Attorneys Melville Hussey and Robert Port of the United States of America participated in the prosecution of the
case in behalf of the United States of America.

Issue : Whether or not Executive Order No. 68 is legal and constitutional.

Held : This court holds that the Executive Order No. 68 is legal and constitutional as provided in Sec. 3, Art. II of the
Constitution, that-

“ The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of the nation.”

The participation of the two American attorneys although under our law, they are not qualified to practice law is
valid and constitutional. Military Commission is a special military tribunal governed by special law not by Rules of
the Court, which govern ordinary civil courts. There is nothing in Executive Order No.68 which requires counsels
need to be qualified to practice law in the Philippines. In fact, it is common in military tribunals that counsels for
the parties are usually military personnel.
Under the doctrine of incorporation, although the Philippines was not a signatory of the Hague and Geneva
Conventions, international jurisprudence is automatically incorporated in Philippine law, thus making war crimes
punishable in the Philippines.
The Military Commission having been convened by virtue of a valid law, with jurisdiction over the crimes charged
which fall under the provisions of Executive Order No 68, and having jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner
by having said petitioner in its custody, the court will not interfere with the due process of such Military
Commission.
Petition is denied with costs de oficio.

Agustin vs Edu, 88 SCRA 195, L- 49112, February 22, 1979

Facts : This is a petition questioning the validity of a Letter of Instruction providing for an early warning device
mandatory for motor vehicles. It is assailed in this prohibition proceeding as being violative to the constitutional
guarantee of due process in as far as the rules and regulations for its implementation are concerned.
The assailed Letter of Instruction No. 229 of President Ferdinand Marcos aimed to prevent road accidents and in
the interest of safety on all streets, highways including expressways. All motorist and motor vehicle owners shall
have at all times one pair of early warning device. These hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been
recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Roads and Signs
and the United Nations Organization (UN). Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207 ratified the said Vienna
convention requiring the installation of road signs and devices.
Herein respondent Edu in his capacity as Land Transportation Commisioner set forth the implementing rules and
regulations of the said instruction.

Issue : Whether or not the assailed Letter of Instruction is invalid and violated constitutional guarantees of due
process.

Held : The assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of police power and there was no unlawful delegation
of legislative power on the part of the respondent. As identified, police power is a state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. In this case, the
particular exercise of police power was clearly intended to promote public safety.
It cannot be disputed that the Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses relevance: The
Philippines ------ adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation.”
Thus, as impressed in the 1968 Vienna Convention it is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it
had pledged its word. Our country’s word was resembled in our own act of legislative ratification of the said Hague
and Vienna Conventions thru P.D. No. 207 . The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an
attitude which is, moreoever, at war with the principle of international morality. 
In Santiago vs Far Eatern Broadcasting Company , it was held that the constitutionality of the law will not be
considered unless the point is specially pleaded, insisted upon and adequately argued. Equal protection is not a
talismanic formula at the mere invocation of which a party to a lawsuit can rightfully expect success will crown his
efforts. The law is anything but that.
Petition is DISMISSED and the restraining order is lifted.

AGUSTIN vs EDU
88 SCRA 195

FACTS: This was an original action in the Supreme Court for prohibition.Petitioner was an owner of a volkswagen
beetle car,model 13035 already properly equipped when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights
which could serve as an early warning device in case of the emergencies mentioned in Letter of Instructions No
229, as amended, as well as the Implementing rules and regulations in Administrative Order No 1 issued by Land
transportation Commission.Respondent Land Transportation commissioner Romeo Edu issued memorandum
circular no 32 pursuant to Letter of Instructions No.229,as amended. It required the use of early Warning Devices
(EWD) on motor vehicles. Petitioner alleged that the letter of instructions, as well as the implementing rules and
regulations were unlawful and unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Whether the Letter of Instruction were considered valid and constitutional?

HELD: YES, The court held that the letter of Instruction No.229,as amended as well as the implementing rules and
regulations were valid and constitutional as a valid measure of police power. The Vienna Convention on Road signs
and signals and the United Nations Organization was ratified by the Philippine local legislation for the installation
of road safety signs and devices.It cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in the
Constitution possesses relevance,between the International law and municipal law in applying the rule municipal
law prevails.

Secretary of Justice vs. Hon. Ralph C. Lantion

Facts:

On January 13, 1977 P.D. 1069 was issued prescribing the Procedure of the Extradition of Persons who have
committed Crimes in a Foreign Country. The Decree is founded on The Doctrine of Incorporation under the
Constitution Art II, Sec 2 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

On November 13, 1994 Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon signed in Manila the Extradition Treaty Between the
Government of the Philippines and the Government of U.S.A. It was ratified by the Senate.

On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs of U. S. a request for
the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United States who are charged in the U.S. with the violation of the
following: conspiracy, attempt to evade tax, false statement or entry, election contributions in the name of
another.

Pending evaluation of the extradition documents, Mark Jimenez, through a counsel, on July 1, 1999, requested
copies of the official extradition request from the U.S. Government as well as all documents and papers submitted
therewith, and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall received copies of the
requested papers.

Mark Jimenez insisted the constitutional rights particularly the following:

1. the right to be furnished the request and supporting papers;

2. the right to be heard which consists in having a reasonable period of time to oppose the request, and to present
evidence is support of the opposition;

The Depart of Justice Denied the request.

On Aug 6, 1999 Mark Jimenez filed with the R.T.C against the Secretary of Justice, Secretary of Foreign Affairs and
the Director of the NBI for Mandamus (to compel them to furnish to Mark Jimenez the extradition documents.),
Certiorari (to set aside the Sec. of Justice letter dated July 13, 1999), Prohibition (to restrain the Sec of Justice from
considering the extradition request).

On August 10, 1999 the Judge ordered:

The Secretary of Justice et al …ordered to maintain the status quo by refraining from committing the acts
complained of.

Thus this petition, arguing that Honorable Lantion (Presiding Judge of RTC Manila)acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or abuse discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the TRO:

1. …by ordering the Secretary of Justice to refrain from committing the acts complained of (i.e to desist from
refusing Mark Jimenez access to the official extradition request and documents.)

2. Secretary of Justice was unqualifiedly prevented from performing legal duties under the extradition treaty and
the Philippine Extradition Law.

Issue:

Would Mark Jimenez’ entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute
a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty?

Held:

Petition Dismissed.

Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its
supporting papers, and to grant him (Mark Jimenez) a reasonable period within which to file his comment with
supporting evidence.

“Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no further
legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere.

“The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in which
there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute
of the local state.

“Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that
municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in
observance of the incorporation clause in the above cited constitutional provision.

“In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of
international law and a municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal
courts, for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all
circumstances.

“The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy
of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as
applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not
superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogate priori takes effect – a
treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the Constitution is the highest law of
the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in
conflict with the constitution

Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion

Posted on June 29, 2008 by asteroids08
FACTS:
Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in
Manila the “extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the Government of the U.S.A.  The
Philippine Senate ratified the said Treaty.
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S Note Verbale No.
0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jiminez to the United States.
On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the
case.  Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Mark Jiminez through counsel, wrote a letter
to Justice Secretary requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S Government and that he be
given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers but the
petitioner denied the request  for the consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US  Extradition Treaty stated in Article 7
that the Philippine Government must present the interests of the United States in any proceedings arising out of a
request for extradition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not to uphold a citizen’s basic due process rights or the governments ironclad duties under a treaty.
RULING:
Petition dismissed.
The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien , and the rights of the accused guaranteed in our Constitution
should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the government to the
individual deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the government of
another state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally accepted
principles of international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situation in which there
appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provision of the constitution or statute of the
local state.

PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE vs DUQUE  III

March 6, 2009 by raquel

PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINESvs. HEALTH SECRETARY FRANCISCO T.
DUQUE III

FACTS: On October 28, 1986, Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino by virtue
of the legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom Constitution. The Milk Code states that the
law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a
code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several
Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be
ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes. the Philippines ratified the
International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties should
take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all segments of society, specially
parents and children, are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding. the DOH issued RIRR which was to take
effect on July 7, 2006. a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify Revised
Implementing Rules and Regulations of The “Milk Code,” assailing that the RIRR was going beyond the provisions of
the Milk Code, thereby amending and expanding the coverage of said law.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents officers of the DOH acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and in violation of the provisions of the Constitution
in promulgating the RIRR
RULING:

 The Supreme Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the petition. Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 of Administrative Order No. 2006-
0012 dated May 12, 2006 are declared NULL and VOID for being ultra vires. The Department of Health and
respondents are PROHIBITED from implementing said provisions. The international instruments pointed out by the
respondents, UNRC, ICESR, CEDAW, are deemed part of the law of the land and therefore the DOH may implement
them through the RIRR. Customary international law is deemed incorporated into our domestic system. Custom or
customary international law means “a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of
legal obligation (opinio juris). Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of
domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international
law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. “Generally
accepted principles of international law” refers to norms of general or customary international law which are
binding on all states. The Milk Code is a verbatim reproduction of the (ICMBS), but it did not prohibit advertising or
other forms of promotion to the general public of products. Instead, the Milk Code expressly provides that
advertising, promotion, or other marketing materials may be allowed if such materials are duly authorized and
approved by the Inter-Agency Committee (IAC). In this regard, the WHA Resolutions adopting the ICMBS are
merely recommendatory and legally non-binding. This may constitute “soft law” or non-binding norms, principles
and practices that influence state behavior. Respondents have not presented any evidence to prove that the WHA
Resolutions, although signed by most of the member states, were in fact enforced or practiced by at least a
majority of the member states and obligatory in nature. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be
considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law
enacted by the legislature. On the other hand, the petitioners also failed to explain and prove by competent
evidence just exactly how such protective regulation would result in the restraint of trade. Since all the regulatory
provisions under the Milk Code apply equally to both manufacturers and distributors, the Court sees no harm in
the RIRR. Except Sections 4(f), 11 and 46, the rest of the provisions of the RIRR are in consonance with the
objective, purpose and intent of the Milk Code.