A.C. No.

L-1117 March 20, 1944

THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, complainant,

vs.
ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT, respondent.

Office of the Solicitor General De la Costa and Solicitor Feria for complainant.
Francisco Claravall for respondent.

OZAETA, J.:

The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with malpractice for having published an
advertisement in the Sunday Tribune of June 13, 1943, which reads as follows:

Marriage

license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if
desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free for the
poor. Everything confidential.

Legal assistance service

12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105
Tel. 2-41-60.

Appearing in his own behalf, respondent at first denied having published the said advertisement; but
subsequently, thru his attorney, he admitted having caused its publication and prayed for "the
indulgence and mercy" of the Court, promising "not to repeat such professional misconduct in the
future and to abide himself to the strict ethical rules of the law profession." In further mitigation he
alleged that the said advertisement was published only once in the Tribune and that he never had
any case at law by reason thereof.

Upon that plea the case was submitted to the Court for decision.

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the
ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule
127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly
unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a
profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and
adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a
member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers
of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worth and effective advertisement possible, even for
a young lawyer, . . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon
27, Code of Ethics.)

In In re Tagorda, 53 Phil., the respondent attorney was suspended from the practice of law for the
period of one month for advertising his services and soliciting work from the public by writing circular
letters. That case, however, was more serious than this because there the solicitations were
repeatedly made and were more elaborate and insistent.
Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the misconduct, the Court is of the
opinion and so decided that the respondent should be, as he hereby is, reprimanded.

Yulo, C.J., Moran, Horrilleno, Paras and Bocobo, JJ., concur.

A.M. No. SDC-97-2-P February 24, 1997

SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant,

vs.
ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District Court, Marawi City, respondent.

NARVASA, C.J.:

Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of E.B. Villarosa &
Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the
incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City, They were
classmates, and used to be friends.

It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by
Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa
& Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National
Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).

Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the
President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He wrote:

. . I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my intent to

terminate the Contract/Agreement entered into between me and your company, as
represented by your Sales Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your company's
branch office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the grounds that my consent was
vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which made said contract void ab initio. Said
sales agent acting in bad faith perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts which
made said contract an Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights and interests. He
then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic language on the
"grounds which could evidence the bad faith. deceit, fraud, misrepresentation,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous sales agent . . .;" and
closed with the plea that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the mutual rescission of our
contract, even as I inform you that I categorically state on record that I am
terminating the contract . . . I hope I do not have to resort to any legal action before
said onerous and manipulated contract against my interest be annulled. I was
actually fooled by your sales agent, hence the need to annul the controversial
contract."

Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro,
Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope containing it, and which actually went
 through the post, bore no stamps. Instead at the right hand corner above the
description of the addressee, the words, "Free Postage - PD 26," had been typed.

On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga,
Vice-President, Credit & Collection Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City, repudiating as fraudulent and
void his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation of his housing loan
in connection therewith, which was payable from salary deductions at the rate of
P4,338.00 a month. Among other things, he said:

. . . (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul,

cancel, rescind and voided, the "manipulated contract" entered into
between me and the E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd., as
represented by its sales agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who
maliciously and fraudulently manipulated said contract and unlawfully
secured and pursued the housing loan without my authority and
against my will. Thus, the contract itself is deemed to be void ab
initio in view of the attending circumstances, that my consent was
vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of
confidence; and that there was no meeting of the minds between me
and the swindling sales agent who concealed the real facts from me.

And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took to be the
anomalous actuations of Sophia Alawi.

Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21, 1996, April 15,
1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the same reasons already cited, he insisted on the
cancellation of his housing loan and discontinuance of deductions from his salary on account
thereof. a He also wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoñez, Head of the Fiscal
Management & Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance Division, both of this Court, to stop
deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in question, again asserting the anomalous manner
by which he was allegedly duped into entering into the contracts by "the scheming sales agent." b

The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court requesting it to stop
deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May 1996." and began negotiating with Villarosa & Co.
" for the buy-back of . . . (Alauya's) mortgage. and . . the refund of . . (his) payments." c

On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed with this
Court a verified complaint dated January 25, 1996 — to which she appended a copy of the letter,
and of the above mentioned envelope bearing the typewritten words, "Free Postage - PD 26." 1 In
that complaint, she accused Alauya of:

1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through

manifest ignorance and evident bad faith;"

2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established reputation;"

3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage . . .;" and

4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine
Bar may properly use.
She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous swindler, forger, manipulator, etc."
without "even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations with the essence of truth," denouncing
his imputations as irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled with manifest ignorance
and evident bad faith," and asserting that all her dealings with Alauya had been regular and
completely transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya "be dismissed from the senice, or be
appropriately desciplined (sic) . . ."

The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint, Conformably with established
usage that notices of resolutions emanate from the corresponding Office of the Clerk of Court,
the notice of resolution in this case was signed by Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant Division
Clerk of Court. 2

Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment" 3 in which he questioned the authority of Atty.
Marasigan to require an explanation of him, this power pertaining, according to him, not to "a mere
Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating an Executive Clerk of Court." but only to the District Judge, the
Court Administrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced the suspicion that the Resolution was the result
of a "strong link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's office. He also averred that the complaint
had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for being not only "the Executive Clerk of Court and
ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar." but also "a scion of a Royal Family . . ." 4

In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive, even obsequious
tones, 5 Alauya requested the former to give him a copy of the complaint in order that he might
comment thereon. 6 He stated that his acts as clerk of court were done in good faith and within the
confines of the law; and that Sophia Alawi, as sales agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his
signature, fraudulently bound him to a housing loan contract entailing monthly deductions of
P4,333.10 from his salary.

And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya contended that it was
he who had suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold
financial suffering," considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his
salary. 7 He declared that there was no basis for the complaint; in communicating with Villarosa & Co.
he had merely acted in defense of his rights. He denied any abuse of the franking privilege, saying
that he gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a subordinate whom he entrusted with the mailing of
certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage - PD 26," were typewritten on the envelope by some
other person, an averment corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV
(subscribed and sworn to before respondent himself, and attached to the comment as Annex
J); 8 and as far as he knew, his subordinate mailed the letters with the use of the money he had given
for postage, and if those letters were indeed mixed with the official mail of the court, this had
occurred inadvertently and because of an honest mistake. 9

Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with
"Counsellors-at-law." a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the
title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal" or the Maranao
term "consial," connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider
himself a lawyer.

He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of any man unduly
prejudiced and injured." 10 He claims he was manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi, a classmate
and friend. 11 He was induced to sign a blank contract on Alawi's assurance that she would show the
completed document to him later for correction, but she had since avoided him; despite "numerous
letters and follow-ups" he still does not know where the property — subject of his supposed
agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa & Co. — is situated; 12He says Alawi somehow got his
GSIS policy from his wife, and although she promised to return it the next day, she did not do so until
after several months. He also claims that in connection with his contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi
forged his signature on such pertinent documents as those regarding the down payment, clearance,
lay-out, receipt of the key of the house, salary deduction, none of which he ever saw. 13

Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays for the dismissal of
the complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of "fallacious, malicious and baseless allegations." and
complainant Alawi having come to the Court with unclean hands, her complicity in the fraudulent
housing loan being apparent and demonstrable.

It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of Court Marasigan
(dated April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier letters both dated December 15,
1996 — all of which he signed as "Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" — in his Comment of June 5, 1996, he
does not use the title but refers to himself as "DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA."

The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and
recommendation. 14

The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made "malicious and libelous
charges (against Alawi) with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith,
resulting in "undue injury to (her) and blemishing her honor and established reputation." In those
letters, Alauya had written inter alia that:

1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"

2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated . . . illegal and unauthorized acts . . . prejudicial to . . (his)
rights and interests;"

3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him by "deceit, fraud,
misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and

4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with Villarosa & Co., and
unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without . . (his) authority and against . . (his) will,"
and "concealed the real facts . . ."

Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely acting in defense of
his rights, and doing only what "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured," who had
suffered "mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering,
considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary. 15

The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713) inter
alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in
the public service. 16 Section 4 of the Code commands that "(p)ublic officials and employees . . at all
times respect the rights of others, and . . refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good
customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public interest." 17 More than once has this
Court emphasized that "the conduct and behavior of every official and employee of an agency
involved in the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be
characterized by, among others, strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of
the public for the judiciary."18
Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or public policy, or
respect for the rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts believed — however sincerely — to
be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language.
Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right of action against Sophia Alawi. The law requires
that he exercise that right with propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone;
in a manner consistent with good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, supra; or
otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith." 19 Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to vituperative language, or
downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to
a standard of conduct more stringent than for most other government workers. As a man of the law,
he may not use language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise
improper. 20 As a judicial employee, it is expected that he accord respect for the person and the
rights of others at all times, and that his every act and word should be characterized by prudence,
restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary norms might perhaps be
mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly held conviction that he had been grievously
wronged.

As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare that
persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may
only practice law before Shari'a courts. 21 While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and
one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the
sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The
title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law
and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to
practice law in this jurisdiction.

Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law, " because in his
region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that given to local
legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment. His disinclination to use the title of
"counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of attorney.

Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege, 22

the record contains
no evidence adequately establishing the accusation.

WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively
intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial officer, and for
usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that any similar or other impropriety or misconduct in
the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Melo, Francisco and Panganiban, Jr., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-18727 August 31, 1964

JESUS MA. CUI, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANTONIO MA. CUI, defendant-appellant,
ROMULO CUI, Intervenor-appellant.

Jose W. Diokno for plaintiff-appellee.

Jaime R. Nuevas and Hector L. Hofileña for defendant-appellant.
Romulo Cui in his own behalf as intervenor-appellants.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

This is a proving in quo warranto originally filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The office in
contention is that of Administrator of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili. Judgment was rendered on
27 April 1961 in favor of the plaintiff, Jesus Ma. Cui, and appealed to us by the defendant, Antonio
Ma. Cui, and by the intervenor, Romulo Cui.

The Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doña Benigna
Cui, now deceased, "for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated
and helpless persons." It acquired corporate existence by legislation (Act No. 3239 of the Philippine
Legislature passed 27 November 1925) and endowed with extensive properties by the said spouses
through a series of donations, principally the deed of donation executed on 2 January 1926.

Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gave the initial management to the founders jointly and, in case of their
incapacity or death, to "such persons as they may nominate or designate, in the order prescribed to
them." Section 2 of the deed of donation provides as follows:

Que en caso de nuestro fallecimiento o incapacidad para administrar, nos sustituyan nuestro
legitime sobrino Mariano Cui, si al tiempo de nuestra muerte o incapacidad se hallare
residiendo en la caudad de Cebu, y nuestro sobrino politico Dionisio Jakosalem. Si nuestro
dicho sobrino Mariano Cui no estuviese residiendo entonces en la caudad de Cebu,
designamos en su lugar a nuestro otro sobrino legitime Mauricio Cui. Ambos sobrinos
administraran conjuntamente el HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI. A la muerte o
incapacidad de estos dos administradores, la administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE
DE BARILI pasara a una sola persona que sera el varon, mayor de edad, que descienda
legitimainente de cualquiera de nuestros sobrinos legitimos Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui,
Vicente Cui y Victor Cui, y que posea titulo de abogado, o medico, o ingeniero civil, o
farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos, el que pague al Estado mayor impuesto o
contribution. En igualdad de circumstancias, sera preferida el varon de mas edad
descendiente de quien tenia ultimamente la administracion. Cuando absolutamente faltare
persona de estas cualificaciones, la administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE
BARILI pasara al senor Obispo de Cebu o quien sea el mayor dignatario de la Iglesia
Catolica, apostolica, Romana, que tuviere asiento en la cabecera de esta Provincia de
Cebu, y en su defecto, al Gobierno Provincial de Cebu.

Don Pedro Cui died in 1926, and his widow continued to administer the Hospicio until her death in
1929. Thereupon the administration passed to Mauricio Cui and Dionisio Jakosalem. The first died
on 8 May 1931 and the second on 1 July 1931. On 2 July 1931 Dr. Teodoro Cui, only son of
Mauricio Cui, became the administrator. Thereafter, beginning in 1932, a series of controversies and
court litigations ensued concerning the position of administrator, to which, in so far as they are
pertinent to the present case, reference will be made later in this decision.

Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of Mariano Cui,
one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doña Benigna Cui. On 27 February 1960 the
then incumbent administrator, Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned in favor of Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a
"convenio" entered into between them and embodied in a notarial document. The next day, 28
February, Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of office. Jesus Ma. Cui, however, had no prior notice of
either the "convenio" or of his brother's assumption of the position.

Dr. Teodoro Cui died on 27 August 1960; on 5 September 1960 the plaintiff wrote a letter to the
defendant demanding that the office be turned over to him; and on 13 September 1960, the demand
not having been complied with the plaintiff filed the complaint in this case. Romulo Cui later on
intervened, claiming a right to the same office, being a grandson of Vicente Cui, another one of the
nephews mentioned by the founders of theHospicio in their deed of donation.

As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon their respective qualifications to the
position of administrator. Jesus is the older of the two and therefore under equal circumstances
would be preferred pursuant to section 2 of the deed of donation. However, before the test of age
may be, applied the deed gives preference to the one, among the legitimate descendants of the
nephews therein named, "que posea titulo de abogado, o medico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o
a falta de estos titulos el que pague al estado mayor impuesto o contribucion."

The specific point in dispute is the mealing of the term "titulo de abogado." Jesus Ma. Cui holds the
degree of Bachelor of Laws from the University of Santo Tomas (Class 1926) but is not a member of
the Bar, not having passed the examinations to qualify him as one. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other
hand, is a member of the Bar and although disbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957 (administrative
case No. 141), was reinstated by resolution promulgated on 10 February 1960, about two weeks
before he assumed the position of administrator of theHospicio de Barili.

The Court a quo, in deciding this point in favor of the plaintiff, said that the phrase "titulo de
abogado," taken alone, means that of a full-fledged lawyer, but that has used in the deed of donation
and considering the function or purpose of the administrator, it should not be given a strict
interpretation but a liberal one," and therefore means a law degree or diploma of Bachelor of Laws.
This ruling is assailed as erroneous both by the defendant and by the intervenor.

We are of the opinion, that whether taken alone or in context the term "titulo de abogado" means not
mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after due
admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law. In Spanish the word "titulo" is defined as
"testimonies o instrumento dado para ejercer un empleo, dignidad o profesion" (Diccionario de la
Lengua Española, Real Academia Espanola, 1947 ed., p. 1224) and the word "abogado," as follows:
"Perito en el derecho positivo que se dedica a defender en juicio, por escrito o de palabra, los
derechos o intereses de los litigantes, y tambien a dar dictmen sobre las cuestiones o puntos
legales que se le consultan (Id., p.5) A Bachelor's degree alone, conferred by a law school upon
completion of certain academic requirements, does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal
profession. The English equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer or attorney-at-law. This term has a fixed
and general signification, and has reference to that class of persons who are by license officers of
the courts, empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, and upon whom peculiar duties,
responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.

In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is under the authority of the
Supreme Court. According to Rule 138 such admission requires passing the Bar examinations,
taking the lawyer's oath and receiving a certificate from the Clerk of Court, this certificate being his
license to practice the profession. The academic degree of Bachelor of Laws in itself has little to do
with admission to the Bar, except as evidence of compliance with the requirements that an applicant
to the examinations has "successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a law school or
university, officially approved by the Secretary of Education." For this purpose, however, possession
of the degree itself is not indispensable: completion of the prescribed courses may be shown in
some other way. Indeed there are instances, particularly under the former Code of Civil Procedure,
where persons who had not gone through any formal legal education in college were allowed to take
the Bar examinations and to qualify as lawyers. (Section 14 of that code required possession of "the
necessary qualifications of learning ability.") Yet certainly it would be incorrect to say that such
persons do not possess the "titulo de abogado" because they lack the academic degree of Bachelor
of Laws from some law school or university.

The founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili must have established the foregoing test
advisely, and provided in the deed of donation that if not a lawyer, the administrator should be a
doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or failing all these, should be the one who
pays the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified. A lawyer, first of all, because under Act No.
3239 the managers or trustees of the Hospicio shall "make regulations for the government of said
institution (Sec. 3, b); shall "prescribe the conditions subject to which invalids and incapacitated and
destitute persons may be admitted to the institute" (Sec. 3, d); shall see to it that the rules and
conditions promulgated for admission are not in conflict with the provisions of the Act; and shall
administer properties of considerable value — for all of which work, it is to be presumed, a working
knowledge of the law and a license to practice the profession would be a distinct asset.

Under this particular criterion we hold that the plaintiff is not entitled, as against the defendant, to the
office of administrator. But it is argued that although the latter is a member of the Bar he is
nevertheless disqualified by virtue of paragraph 3 of the deed of donation, which provides that the
administrator may be removed on the ground, among others, of ineptitude in the discharge of his
office or lack of evident sound moral character. Reference is made to the fact that the defendant was
disbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957 for immorality and unprofessional conduct. It is also a fact,
however, that he was reinstated on 10 February 1960, before he assumed the office of
administrator. His reinstatement is a recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon proof no less than
that required for his admission to the Bar in the first place.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove
their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët

Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated rests to a great extent in the sound
discretion of the court. The court action will depend, generally speaking, on whether or not it
decides that the public interest in the orderly and impartial administration of justice will be
conserved by the applicant's participation therein in the capacity of an attorney and
counselor at law. The applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the
court that he is a person of good moral character — a fit and proper person to practice law.
The court will take into consideration the applicant's character and standing prior to the
disbarment, the nature and character of the charge for which he was disbarred, his conduct
subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed between the disbarment and
the application for reinstatement. (5 Am. Jur., Sec. 301, p. 443)

Evidence of reformation is required before applicant is entitled to reinstatement,

notwithstanding the attorney has received a pardon following his conviction, and the
requirements for reinstatement have been held to be the same as for original admission to
the bar, except that the court may require a greater degree of proof than in an original
admission. (7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client, Sec. 41, p. 815.)

The decisive questions on an application for reinstatement are whether applicant is "of good
moral character" in the sense in which that phrase is used when applied to attorneys-at-law
and is a fit and proper person to be entrusted with the privileges of the office of an attorney,
 and whether his mental qualifications are such as to enable him to discharge efficiently his
duty to the public, and the moral attributes are to be regarded as a separate and distinct from
his mental qualifications. (7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client, Sec. 41, p. 816).

As far as moral character is concerned, the standard required of one seeking reinstatement to the
office of attorney cannot be less exacting than that implied in paragraph 3 of the deed of donation as
a requisite for the office which is disputed in this case. When the defendant was restored to the roll
of lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting from his previous disbarment were wiped out.

This action must fail on one other ground: it is already barred by lapse of time amounting the
prescription or laches. Under Section 16 of Rule 66 (formerly sec. 16, Rule 68, taken from section
216 of Act 190), this kind of action must be filed within one (1) year after the right of plaintiff to hold
the office arose.

Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui believed himself entitled to the office in question as long ago as 1932. On
January 26 of that year he filed a complaint in quo warranto against Dr. Teodoro Cui, who assumed
the administration of theHospicio on 2 July 1931. Mariano Cui, the plaintiff's father and Antonio Ma.
Cui came in as intervenors. The case was dismissed by the Court of First Instance upon a demurrer
by the defendant there to the complaint and complaint in intervention. Upon appeal to the Supreme
Court from the order of dismissal, the case was remanded for further proceedings (Cui v. Cui, 60
Phil. 37, 48). The plaintiff, however, did not prosecute the case as indicated in the decision of this
Court, but acceded to an arrangement whereby Teodoro Cui continued as administrator, Mariano
Cui was named "legal adviser" and plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui accepted a position as assistant
administrator.

Subsequently the plaintiff tried to get the position by a series of extra-judicial maneuvers. First he
informed the Social Welfare Commissioner, by letter dated 1 February 1950, that as of the previous
1 January he had "made clear" his intention of occupying the office of administrator of the Hospicio."
He followed that up with another letter dated 4 February, announcing that he had taken over the
administration as of 1 January 1950. Actually, however, he took his oath of office before a notary
public only on 4 March 1950, after receiving a reply of acknowledgment, dated 2 March, from the
Social Welfare Commissioner, who thought that he had already assumed the position as stated in
his communication of 4 February 1950. The rather muddled situation was referred by the
Commissioner to the Secretary of Justice, who, in an opinion dated 3 April 1950 (op. No. 45, S.
1950), correcting another opinion previously given, in effect ruled that the plaintiff, not beings lawyer,
was not entitled to the administration of theHospicio.

Meanwhile, the question again became the subject of a court controversy. On 4 March 1950,
the Hospiciocommenced an action against the Philippine National Bank in the Court of First Instance
of Cebu (Civ. No. R-1216) because the Bank had frozen the Hospicio's deposits therein. The Bank
then filed a third-party complaint against herein plaintiff-appellee, Jesus Ma. Cui, who had, as stated
above, taken oath as administrator. On 19 October 1950, having been deprived of recognition by the
opinion of the Secretary of Justice he moved to dismiss the third-party complaint on the ground that
he was relinquishing "temporarily" his claim to the administration of theHospicio. The motion was
denied in an order dated 2 October 1953. On 6 February 1954 he was able to take another oath of
office as administrator before President Magsaysay, and soon afterward filed a second motion to
dismiss in Civil case No. R-1216. President Magsaysay, be it said, upon learning that a case was
pending in Court, stated in a telegram to his Executive Secretary that "as far as (he) was concerned
the court may disregard the oath" thus taken. The motion to dismiss was granted nevertheless and
the other parties in the case filed their notice of appeal from the order of dismissal. The plaintiff then
filed an ex-parte motion to be excluded as party in the appeal and the trial Court again granted the
motion. This was on 24 November 1954. Appellants thereupon instituted a mandamus proceeding in
the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-8540), which was decided on 28 May 1956, to the effect that Jesus
Ma. Cui should be included in the appeal. That appeal, however, after it reached this Court was
dismiss upon motion of the parties, who agreed that "the office of administrator and trustee of
the Hospicio ... should be ventilated in quo warranto proceedings to be initiated against the
incumbent by whomsoever is not occupying the office but believes he has a right to it" (G.R. No. L-
9103). The resolution of dismissal was issued 31 July 1956. At that time the incumbent administrator
was Dr. Teodoro Cui, but no action in quo warranto was filed against him by plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui
as indicated in the aforesaid motion for dismissal.

On 10 February 1960, defendant Antonio Ma. Cui was reinstated by this Court as member of the
Bar, and on the following 27 February Dr. Teodoro Cui resigned as administrator in his favor,
pursuant to the "convenio" between them executed on the same date. The next day Antonio Ma. Cui
took his oath of office.

The failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his claim judicially after this Court decided the first case of Cui
v. Cui in 1934 (60 Phil. 3769), remanding it to the trial court for further proceedings; his acceptance
instead of the position of assistant administrator, allowing Dr. Teodoro Cui to continue as
administrator and his failure to file an action inquo warranto against said Dr. Cui after 31 July 1956,
when the appeal in Civil Case No. R-1216 of the Cebu Court was dismissed upon motion of the
parties precisely so that the conflicting claims of the parties could be ventilated in such an action —
all these circumstances militate against the plaintiff's present claim in view of the rule that an action
in quo warranto must be filed within one year after the right of the plaintiff to hold the office arose.
The excuse that the plaintiff did not file an action against Dr. Teodoro Cui after 31 July 1956
because of the latter's illness did not interrupt the running of the statutory period. And the fact that
this action was filed within one year of the defendant's assumption of office in September 1960 does
not make the plaintiff's position any better, for the basis of the action is his own right to the office and
it is from the time such right arose that the one-year limitation must be counted, not from the date the
incumbent began to discharge the duties of said office. Bautista v. Fajardo, 38 Phil. 624; Lim vs.
Yulo, 62 Phil. 161.

Now for the claim of intervenor and appellant Romulo Cui. This party is also a lawyer, grandson of
Vicente Cui, one of the nephews of the founders of the Hospicio mentioned by them in the deed of
donation. He is further, in the line of succession, than defendant Antonio Ma. Cui, who is a son of
Mariano Cui, another one of the said nephews. The deed of donation provides: "a la muerte o
incapacidad de estos administradores (those appointed in the deed itself) pasara a una sola persona
que sera el varon, mayor de edad, que descienda legitimamente de cualquiera de nuestros sobrinos
legitimos Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui, Victor Cui, y que posea titulo de abogado ... En
igualdad de circumstancias, sera preferido el varon de mas edad descendiente de quien tenia
ultimamente la administration." Besides being a nearer descendant than Romulo Cui, Antonio Ma.
Cui is older than he and therefore is preferred when the circumstances are otherwise equal. The
intervenor contends that the intention of the founders was to confer the administration by line and
successively to the descendants of the nephews named in the deed, in the order they are named.
Thus, he argues, since the last administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, who belonged to the Mauricio Cui
line, the next administrator must come from the line of Vicente Cui, to whom the intervenor belongs.
This interpretation, however, is not justified by the terms of the deed of donation.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is reversed and
set aside, and the complaint as well as the complaint in intervention are dismissed, with costs
equally against plaintiff-appellee and intervenor-appellant.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes and Regala, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959

PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, petitioner,

vs.
CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office, respondent.

Arturo A. Alafriz for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for respondent.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for prohibition and injunction against
Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office.

On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June
27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent
attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office, the said examination to cover patent law and
jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said office. According to the circular, members of the
Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are
qualified to take the said examination. It would appear that heretofore, respondent Director has been
holding similar examinations.

It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one who has passed the bar
examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in
good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office, and that
consequently, the cat of the respondent Director requiring members of the Philippine Bar in good
standing to take and pass an examination given by the Patent Office as a condition precedent to
their being allowed to practice before said office, such as representing applicants in the preparation
and prosecution of applications for patent, is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.

In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the prosecution of
patent cases "does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the application of
scientific and technical knowledge and training, so much so that, as a matter of actual practice, the
prosecution of patent cases may be handled not only by lawyers, but also engineers and other
persons with sufficient scientific and technical training who pass the prescribed examinations as
given by the Patent Office; . . . that the Rules of Court do not prohibit the Patent Office, or any other
quasi-judicial body from requiring further condition or qualification from those who would wish to
handle cases before the Patent Office which, as stated in the preceding paragraph, requires more of
an application of scientific and technical knowledge than the mere application of provisions of law; . .
. that the action taken by the respondent is in accordance with Republic Act No. 165, otherwise
known as the Patent Law of the Philippines, which similar to the United States Patent Law, in
accordance with which the United States Patent Office has also prescribed a similar examination as
that prescribed by respondent. . . .

Respondent further contends that just as the Patent law of the United States of America authorizes
the Commissioner of Patents to prescribe examinations to determine as to who practice before the
United States Patent Office, the respondent, is similarly authorized to do so by our Patent Law,
Republic Act No. 165.

Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, in the past, would appear to have been holding
tests or examinations the passing of which was imposed as a required qualification to practice
before the Patent Office, to our knowledge, this is the first time that the right of the Director of
Patents to do so, specially as regards members of the bar, has been questioned formally, or
otherwise put in issue. And we have given it careful thought and consideration.

The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines1 and to any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may
practice law anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in
the Philippines. Naturally, the question arises as to whether or not appearance before the patent
Office and the preparation and the prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitutes or is included
in the practice of law.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts,
and in addition, conveying. In general, alladvice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law corporation services, assessment and condemnation
services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the
work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied).

Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside
of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces
conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation
and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations
and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court
proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many
aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great
capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an
attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the
courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be
drawn between that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is
of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be
performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character,
and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all
attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 (1953 ed.), p. 665-666, citing In
re Opinion of the Justices (Mass.), 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. vs.
Automobile Service Assoc. (R. I. ) 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis ours).

In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the
representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications
for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. In the first
place, although the transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the use and application of
technical and scientific knowledge and training, still, all such business has to be rendered in
accordance with the Patent Law, as well as other laws, including the Rules and Regulations
promulgated by the Patent Office in accordance with law. Not only this, but practice before the
Patent Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles, as well as
the existence of facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. For
instance: Section 8 of our Patent Law provides that an invention shall not be patentable if it is
contrary to public order or morals, or to public health or welfare. Section 9 says that an invention
shall not be considered new or patentable if it was known or used by others in the Philippines before
the invention thereof by the inventor named in any printed publication in the Philippines or any
foreign country more than one year before the application for a patent therefor, or if it had been in
public use or on sale in the Philippines for more than one year before the application for the patent
therefor. Section 10 provides that the right to patent belongs to the true and actual inventor, his
heirs, legal representatives or assigns. Section 25 and 26 refer to connection of any mistake in a
patent. Section 28 enumerates the grounds for cancellation of a patent; that although any person
may apply for such cancellation, under Section 29, the Solicitor General is authorized to petition for
the cancellation of a patent. Section 30 mentions the requirements of a petition for cancellation.
Section 31 and 32 provide for a notice of hearing of the petition for cancellation of the patent by the
Director of Patents in case the said cancellation is warranted. Under Section 34, at any time after the
expiration of three years from the day the patent was granted, any person patent on several
grounds, such as, if the patented invention is not being worked in the Philippines on a commercial
scale, or if the demand for the patented article in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the
demand for the patented article in the Philippines is not being met to an adequate extent and
reasonable terms, or if by reason of the patentee's refusal to grant a license on reasonable terms or
by reason of the condition attached by him to the license, purchase or use of the patented article or
working of the patented process or machine of production, the establishment of a new trade or
industry in the Philippines is prevented; or if the patent or invention relates to food or medicine or is
necessary to public health or public safety. All these things involve the applications of laws, legal
principles, practice and procedure. They call for legal knowledge, training and experience for which a
member of the bar has been prepared.

In support of the proposition that much of the business and many of the act, orders and decisions of
the Patent Director involve questions of law or a reasonable and correct evaluation of facts, the very
Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, Section 61, provides that:

. . . . The applicant for a patent or for the registration of a design, any party to a proceeding
to cancel a patent or to obtain a compulsory license, and any party to any other proceeding
in the Office may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or decision of the
director.

In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If the transaction of business in the Patent Office
and the acts, orders and decisions of the Patent Director involved exclusively or mostly technical and
scientific knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial
body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case.

Another aspect of the question involves the consideration of the nature of the functions and acts of
the Head of the Patent Office.

. . . . The Commissioner, in issuing or withholding patents, in reissues, interferences, and

extensions, exercises quasi-judicial functions. Patents are public records, and it is the duty of
the Commissioner to give authenticated copies to any person, on payment of the legal fees.
(40 Am. Jur. 537). (Emphasis supplied).

. . . . The Commissioner has the only original initiatory jurisdiction that exists up to the
granting and delivering of a patent, and it is his duty to decide whether the patent is new and
 whether it is the proper subject of a patent; and his action in awarding or refusing a patent is
a judicial function. In passing on an application the commissioner should decide not only
questions of law, but also questions of fact, as whether there has been a prior public use or
sale of the article invented. . . . (60 C.J.S. 460). (Emphasis supplied).

The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is reasonable to

hold that a member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and training, should be allowed to
practice before the Patent Office, without further examination or other qualification. Of course, the
Director of Patents, if he deems it advisable or necessary, may require that members of the bar
practising before him enlist the assistance of technical men and scientist in the preparation of papers
and documents, such as, the drawing or technical description of an invention or machine sought to
be patented, in the same way that a lawyer filing an application for the registration of a parcel of land
on behalf of his clients, is required to submit a plan and technical description of said land, prepared
by a licensed surveyor.

But respondent Director claims that he is expressly authorized by the law to require persons desiring
to practice or to do business before him to submit an examination, even if they are already members
of the bar. He contends that our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, is patterned after the United
States Patent Law; and of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases prescribes an
examination similar to that which he (respondent) has prescribed and scheduled. He invites our
attention to the following provisions of said Rules of Practice:

Registration of attorneys and agents. — A register of an attorneys and a register agents are
kept in the Patent Office on which are entered the names of all persons recognized as
entitled to represent applicants before the Patent Office in the preparation and prosecution of
applicants for patent. Registration in the Patent Office under the provisions of these rules
shall only entitle the person registered to practice before the Patent Office.

(a) Attorney at law. — Any attorney at law in good standing admitted to practice before any
United States Court or the highest court of any State or Territory of the United States who
fulfills the requirements and complied with the provisions of these rules may be admitted to
practice before the Patent Office and have his name entered on the register of attorneys.

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Requirement for registration. — No person will be admitted to practice and register unless
he shall apply to the Commissioner of Patents in writing on a prescribed form supplied by the
Commissioner and furnish all requested information and material; and shall establish to the
satisfaction of the Commissioner that he is of good moral character and of good repute and
possessed of the legal and scientific and technical qualifications necessary to enable him to
render applicants for patent valuable service, and is otherwise competent to advise and
assist him in the presentation and prosecution of their application before the Patent Office. In
order that the Commissioner may determine whether a person seeking to have his name
placed upon either of the registers has the qualifications specified, satisfactory proof of good
moral character and repute, and of sufficient basic training in scientific and technical matters
must be submitted and an examination which is held from time to time must be taken and
passed. The taking of an examination may be waived in the case of any person who has
served for three years in the examining corps of the Patent Office.

Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the United States Patent Office
in Patent Cases is authorized by the United States Patent Law itself, which reads as follows:
 The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce may
prescribe rules and regulations governing the recognition of agents, attorneys, or other
persons representing applicants or other parties before his office, and may require of such
persons, agents, or attorneys, before being recognized as representatives of applicants or
other persons, that they shall show they are of good moral character and in good repute,
are possessed of the necessary qualifications to enable them to render to applicants or other
persons valuable service, and are likewise to competent to advise and assist applicants or
other persons in the presentation or prosecution of their applications or other business
before the Office. The Commissioner of Patents may, after notice and opportunity for a
hearing, suspend or exclude, either generally or in any particular case from further practice
before his office any person, agent or attorney shown to be incompetent or disreputable, or
guilty of gross misconduct, or who refuses to comply with the said rules and regulations, or
who shall, with intent to defraud in any matter, deceive, mislead, or threaten any applicant or
prospective applicant, or other person having immediate or prospective applicant, or other
person having immediate or prospective business before the office, by word, circular, letter,
or by advertising. The reasons for any such suspension or exclusion shall be duly recorded.
The action of the Commissioner may be reviewed upon the petition of the person so refused
recognition or so suspended by the district court of the United States for the District of
Columbia under such conditions and upon such proceedings as the said court may by its
rules determine. (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being similar to the
provisions of law just reproduced, then he is authorized to prescribe the rules and regulations
requiring that persons desiring to practice before him should submit to and pass an examination. We
reproduce said Section 78, Republic Act No. 165, for purposes of comparison:

SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. — The Director subject to the approval of the Secretary of
Justice, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for
the conduct of all business in the Patent Office.

The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are different from the provisions of the
United States Patent Law as regards authority to hold examinations to determine the qualifications of
those allowed to practice before the Patent Office. While the U.S. Patent Law authorizes the
Commissioner of Patents to require attorneys to show that they possess the necessary qualifications
and competence to render valuable service to and advise and assist their clients in patent cases,
which showing may take the form of a test or examination to be held by the Commissioner, our
Patent Law, Section 78, is silent on this important point. Our attention has not been called to any
express provision of our Patent Law, giving such authority to determine the qualifications of persons
allowed to practice before the Patent Office.

Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief of bureau to prescribe forms
and make regulations or general orders not inconsistent with law, to secure the harmonious and
efficient administration of his branch of the service and to carry into full effect the laws relating to
matters within the jurisdiction of his bureau. Section 608 of Republic Act 1937, known as the Tariff
and Customs Code of the Philippines, provides that the Commissioner of Customs shall, subject to
the approval of the Department Head, makes all rules and regulations necessary to enforce the
provisions of said code. Section 338 of the National Internal Revenue Code, Commonwealth Act No.
466 as amended, states that the Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the Collector of
Internal Revenue, shall promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of
the provisions of the code. We understand that rules and regulations have been promulgated not
only for the Bureau of Customs and Internal Revenue, but also for other bureaus of the Government,
to govern the transaction of business in and to enforce the law for said bureaus.
Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and clear provision of law giving
the necessary sanction, to require lawyers to submit to and pass on examination prescribed by it
before they are allowed to practice before said Patent Office, then there would be no reason why
other bureaus specially the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Customs, where the business in the
same area are more or less complicated, such as the presentation of books of accounts, balance
sheets, etc., assessments exemptions, depreciation, these as regards the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, and the classification of goods, imposition of customs duties, seizures, confiscation, etc.,
as regards the Bureau of Customs, may not also require that any lawyer practising before them or
otherwise transacting business with them on behalf of clients, shall first pass an examination to
qualify.

In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this
Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent
Office, for the reason that much of the business in said office involves the interpretation and
determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as
the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent
director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are,
under the law, taken to the Supreme Court.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent Director is
hereby prohibited from requiring members of the Philippine Bar to submit to an examination or tests
and pass the same before being permitted to appear and practice before the Patent Office. No costs.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L. and
Endencia, JJ., concur.

December 3, 1948

In re Investigation of ANGEL J. PARAZO for alleged leakage of questions in some subjects in

the 1948 Bar Examinations.

Felixberto M. Serrano for respondent.

Enrique M. Fernando and Francisco A. Rodrigo, Abelardo Subido, and Arturo A. Alafriz (for the
Philippine Lawyers' Association) as amici curiae.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

The present case had its origin in a story or news item prepared and written by the defendant, Angel
J. Parazo, a duly accredited reporter of the Star Reporter, a local daily of general circulation, that
appeared on the front page of the issue of September 14, 1948. The story was preceded by the
headline in large letters — "CLAIM 'LEAK' IN LAST BAR TESTS," followed by another in slightly
smaller letters — "Applicants In Uproar, Want Anomaly Probed; One School Favored," under the
name — "By Angel J. Parazo of the Star Reporter Staff." For purposes of reference we quote the
news item in full:
 Leakage in some subjects in the recent bar examinations were denounced by some of the
law graduates who took part in the tests, to the Star Reporter this morning.

These examinees claim to have seen mimeograph copies of the questions in one subject,
days before the tests were given, in the Philippine Normal School.

Only students of one private university in Sampaloc had those mimeographed questions on
said subject fully one week before the tests.

The students who made the denunciation to the Star Reporter claim that the tests actually
given were similar in every respect to those they had seen students of this private university
holding proudly around the city.

The students who claim to have seen the tests which leaked are demanding that the
Supreme Court institute an immediate probe into the matter, to find out the source of the
leakage, and annul the test papers of the students of the particular university possessed of
those tests before the examinations.

The discovery of the alleged leakage in the tests of the bar examinations came close on the
heels of the revelations in the Philippine Collegian, official organ of the student body of the
University of the Philippines, on recent government tests wherein the questions had come
into the possession of nearly all the graduates of some private technical schools.

To the publication, evidently, the attention of the Supreme Court must have been called, and Mr.
Justice Padilla, who had previously been designated Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners
for this year, by authority of the Court, instructed Mr. Jose de la Cruz as Commissioner with the
assistance of Mr. E. Soriano, Clerk of Court to cite Mr. Parazo for questioning and investigation. In
this connection, and for purposes of showing the interest of the Supreme Court in the news item and
its implications, it may here be stated that this Court is and for many years has been, in charge of
the Bar Examinations held every year, including that of this year, held in August, 1948. Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution of the Philippines authorizes this Court to promulgate rules concerning
admission to the practice of law, and pursuant to that authority, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court was
promulgated, under which rule, this Court conducts the Bar Examinations yearly, appoints a
Committee of Bar Examiners to be presided by one of the Justices, to serve for one year, acts on the
report of the committee and finally, admits to the Bar and to the practice of law, the candidates and
examinees who have passed the examinations.

The investigation of Mr. Parazo was conducted on September 18, 1948, on which occasion he
testified under oath and, answering questions directed to him by Messrs. Cruz and Soriano admitted
that he was the author of the news item; that he wrote up the story and had it published, in good faith
and in a spirit of public service; and that he knew the persons who gave him the information which
formed the basis of his publication but that he declined to reveal their names because the
information was given to him in confidence and his informants did not wish to have their identities
revealed. The investigators informed Parazo that this was a serious matter involving the confidence
of the public in the regularity and cleanliness of the Bar Examinations and also in the Supreme Court
which conducted said examinations, and repeatedly appealed to his civic spirit and sense of public
service, pleading with and urging him to reveal the names of his informants so that the Supreme
Court may be in a position to start and conduct the necessary investigation in order to verify their
charge and complaint and take action against the party or parties responsible for the alleged
irregularity and anomaly, if found true, but Parazo consistently refused to make the revelation.
In the meantime, the writer of this opinion who was appointed to the Supreme Court as associate
Justice in the latter part of August, 1948, was designated to succeed Mr. Justice Padilla as
Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners when the said Justice was appointed Secretary of
Justice. The writer of this opinion was furnished a copy of the transcript of the investigation
conducted on September 18, 1948, and he made a report thereof to the Court in banc, resulting in
the issuance of the resolution of this Court dated October 7, 1948, which reads as follows:

In relation with the news item that appeared in the front page of the Star Reporter, issue of
September 14, 1948, regarding alleged leakage in some bar examination questions, which
examinations were held in August 1948, Mr. Jose de la Cruz, as Commissioner, and Mr. E.
Soriano, as Clerk of Court, were authorized by Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla then chairman of
the committee of bar examiners to conduct an investigation thereof, particularly to receive
the testimony of Mr. Angel J. Parazo, the reporter responsible for and author of said news
item. An investigation was conducted on September 18, 1948; stenographic notes were
taken of the testimony of Mr. Parazo, and Mr. Justice Marcelino R. Montemayor, the new
chairman of the committee of bar examiners, has submitted the transcript of said notes for
the consideration of this Court.

From the record of said investigation, it is clear that Mr. Parazo has deliberately and
consistently declined and refused to reveal the identity of the persons supposed to have
given him the data and information on which his news item was based, despite the repeated
appeals made to his civic spirit, and for his cooperations, in order to enable this Court to
conduct a thorough investigation of the alleged bar examination anomaly, Resolved, to
authorize Mr. Justice Montemayor to cite Mr. Parazo before him, explain to him that the
interests of the State demand and so this Court requires that he reveal the source or sources
of his information and of his news item, and to warn him that his refusal to make the
revelation demanded will be regarded as contempt of court and penalized accordingly. Mr.
Justice Montemayor will advise the Court of the result.

Acting upon this resolution, the writer of this opinion cited Mr. Parazo to appear before him on
October 13, 1948. He appeared on the date set and it was clearly explained to him that the interest
of the State demands and this court requires that he reveal the source of sources of his information
and of his news item; that this was a very serious matter involving the confidence of the people in
general and the law practitioners and bar examinees in particular, in the regularity and cleanliness of
the bar examinations; that it also involves the good name and reputation of the bar examiners who
are appointed by this Court to prepare the bar examinations questions and later pass upon and
correct the examinations questions and last but not least, it also involves and is bound to affect the
confidence of the whole country in the very Supreme Court which is conducting the bar
examinations. It was further explained to him that the Supreme Court is keenly interested in
investigating the alleged anomaly and leakage of the examination questions and is determined to
punish the party or parties responsible therefor but that without his help, specially the identities of the
persons who furnished him the information and who could give the court the necessary data and
evidence, the Court could not even begin the investigation because there would be no basis from
which to start, not even a clue from which to formulate a theory. Lastly, Parazo was told that under
the law he could be punished if he refused to make the revelation, punishment which may even
involve imprisonment.

Because of the seriousness of the matter, Parazo was advised to think it over and consider the
consequences, and if he need time within which to do this and so that he might even consult the
editor and publisher of his paper, the Star Reporter, he could be given an extension of time, and at
his request, the investigation was postponed to October 15, 1948. On that date he appeared,
accompanied by his counsel, Atty. Felixberto M. Serrano. The writer of this opinion in the presence
of his counsel, several newspapermen, Clerk of Court Soriano, Deputy Clerk of Court Cruz, and Mr.
Chanliongco made a formal demand on Mr. Parazo to reveal the identities of his informants, under
oath, but he declined and refused to make the revelation. At the request of his counsel, that before
this Court take action upon his refusal to reveal, he be accorded a hearing, with the consent of the
Court first obtained, a public hearing was held on the same day, October 15, 1948 in the course of
which, Attorney Serrano extensively and ably argued the case of his client, invoking the benefits of
Republic Act No. 53, the first section of which reads as follows:

SECTION 1. The publisher, editor or duly accredited reporter of any newspaper, magazine or
periodical of general circulation cannot be compelled to reveal the source of any news-report
or information appearing in said publication which was related in confidence to such
publisher, editor or reporter, unless the court or a House or committee of Congress finds that
such revelation is demanded by the interest of the state.

This Court has given this case prolonged, careful and mature consideration, involving as it does
interesting and important points of law as well as questions of national importance. Counsel
contends that the phrase "interest of the state" found at the end of section 1 of Republic Act No. 53
means and refers only to the security of the state, that is to say — that only when National
Security or public safety is involved, may this Court compel the defendant to reveal the source or
sources of his news report or information. We confess that it was not easy to decide this legal
question on which the conviction or acquittal of Parazo hinges. As a matter of facts, the vote of the
Justice is not unanimous.

In an effort to determine the intent of the Legislature that passed Republic Act No. 53, particularly
the Senate were it originated, we examined the record of the proceedings in said legislative body
when this Act, then Senate Bill No. 6 was being discussed. We gathered from the said record that
the original bill prepared by Senator Sotto provided that the immunity to be accorded a publisher,
editor, or reporter of any newspaper was absolute and that under no circumstance could he be
compelled to reveal the source of his information or news report. The committee, however, under the
chairmanship of Senator Cuenco inserted an amendment or change, by adding to the end of section
1 of the clause "unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded by the public interest."

When the bill as amended was recommended for approval on second reading, Senator Sotto, the
author of the original bill proposed an amendment by eliminating the clause added by the committee
— "unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded by the public interest," claiming that said
clause would kill the purposed of the bill. This amendment of Senator Sotto was discussed. Various
Senators objected to the elimination of the clause already referred to on the ground that without such
exception and by giving complete immunity to editors, reporters, etc., many abuses may be
committed. Senator Cuenco, Committee chairman, in advocating the disapproval of the Sotto
amendment, and in defending the exception embodied in the amendment introduced by the
Committee, consisting in the clause: "unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded by the
public interest," said that the Committee could not accept the Sotto amendment because there may
be cases, perhaps few, in which the interest of the public or the interest of the state required that the
names of the informants be published or known. He gave as one example a case of a
newspaperman publishing information referring to a theft of the plans of forts or fortifications. He
argued that if the immunity accorded a newspaperman should be absolute, as sought by the Sotto
amendment, the author of the theft might go scott-free. When the Sotto amendment was put to a
vote, it was disapproved. Finally, Senator Sotto proposed another amendment by changing the
phrase "public interest" at the end of section 1 as amended by the Committee be changed to and
substituted by the phrase "interest of the state," claiming that the phrase public interest was too
elastic. Without much discussion this last amendment was approved, and this phrase is now found in
the Act as finally approved.
In view of the contention now advanced, that the phrase "interest of the state" is confined to cases
involving the "security of the state" or "public safety," one might wonder or speculate on why the last
amendment proposed by Senator Sotto, changing the phrase "public interest" to "interest of the
state," was approved without much discussion. But we notice from the records of the deliberations
on and discussion of the bill in the Senate that the phrase "public interest" was used interchangeably
by some Senators with the phrase "interest of the state." For instance, although the bill, as amended
by the Committee presided by Senator Cuenco, used the words "public interest, "when Senator
Cuenco sponsored the bill before the Senate he used in his speech or remarks the phrase "interest
of the State" (interes del Estado). Again, although the bill, as sponsored by the Cuenco Committee
and discussed by the Senate, used the words "public interest, "Senator Sebastian referred to the
exception by using the phrase "interest of the state." This understanding of at least two of the
Senators, who took part in the discussion, about the similarity or interchangeability of the two
phrases "public interest" and "interest of the estate," may account for the readiness or lack of
objection on the part of the Senate, after it had rejected the first Sotto amendment, to accept the
second Sotto amendment, changing the phrase "public interest" to "interest of the state."

In referring to a case wherein the security of the state or public safety was involved, such as the theft
of the plans of fortifications, Senator Cuenco was obviously giving it only as an example of what he
meant by "interest of the state;" it was not meant to be the only case or example. We do not propose
to define or fix the limits or scope of the phrase "interest of the state;" but we can say that the phrase
"interest of the state" can not be confined and limited to the "security of the state" or to "public
safety" alone. These synonymous phrases, — "security of the state" and "public safety," — are not
uncommon terms and we can well presume that the legislators were familiar with them. The
phrase "public safety," is used in Article III, section 1(5) of the Constitution of the Philippines, where
it says that "the privacy of communications and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court or when public safety and order require otherwise;" and Article VII, section
10(2) of the same Constitution provided that the President may suspend the privileges of the writ of
habeas corpus, in case of invasion, insurrection, etc., when the public safety requires it.

The phrase "National Security" is used at the beginning of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, thus:
Title I, — Crimes against National Security and the law of Nations, Chapter I, — Crimes
against National Security. Then, more recently, the phrase "National Security" was used in section 2,
and the phrase "public security" was equally used in section 19, of Commonwealth Act No. 682
creating the People's Court, promulgated on September 25, 1945. If, as contended, the Philippine
Congress, particularly the Philippine Senate, had meant to limit the exception to the immunity of
newspapermen only to cases where the "security of the state," i.e., "National Security" is involved, it
could easily and readily have used such phrase or any one of similar phrases like "public
safety,""National Security," or "public security" of which it must have been familiar. Since it did not do
so, there is valid reason to believe that that was not in the mind and intent of the legislators, and
that, in using the phrase "interest of the state," it extended the scope and the limits of the exception
when a newspaperman or reporter may be compelled to reveal the sources of his information.

The phrase "interest of the state" is quite broad and extensive. It is of course more general and
broader than "security of the state." Although not as broad and comprehensive as "public interest"
which may include most anything though of minor importance, but affecting the public, such as for
instance, the establishment and maintenance of barrio roads, electric light and ice plants, parks,
markets, etc., the phrase "interest of the estate" even under a conservative interpretation, may and
does include cases and matters of national importance in which the whole state and nations, not
only a branch or instrumentality thereof such as a province, city or town, or a part of the public, is
interested or would be affected, such as the principal functions of Government like administration of
justice, public school system, and such matters like social justice, scientific research, practice of law
or of medicine, impeachment of high Government officials, treaties with other nations, integrity of the
three coordinate branches of the Government, their relations to each other, and the discharge of
their functions, etc.

We are satisfied that the present case easily comes under the phrase "interest of the state." Under
constitutional provision, article VIII, section 13, Constitution of the Philippines, the Supreme Court
takes charge of the admission of members to the Philippine Bar. By its Rules of Court, it has
prescribed the qualifications of the candidates to the Bar Examinations, and it has equally prescribed
the subject of the said Bar Examinations. Every year, the Supreme Court appoints the Bar
examiners who prepare the questions, then correct the examination papers submitted by the
examinees, and later make their report to the Supreme Court. Only those Bar Examination
candidates who are found to have obtained to passing grade are admitted to the Bar and licensed to
practice law. There are now thousands of members of the Philippine Bar, scattered all over the
Philippines, practicing law or occupying important Government posts requiring membership in the
Bar as a prerequisite, and every year, quite a number, sometimes several hundreds, are added to
the legal fold. The Supreme Court and the Philippine Bar have always tried to maintain a high
standard for the legal profession, both in academic preparation and legal training, as well as in
honesty and fair dealing. The Court and the licensed lawyers themselves are vitally interested in
keeping this high standard; and one of the ways of achieving this end is to admit to the practice of
this noble profession only those persons who are known to be honest, possess good moral
character, and show proficiency in and knowledge of the law by the standard set by this Court by
passing the Bar Examinations honestly and in the regular and usual manner. It is of public
knowledge that perhaps by general inclination or the conditions obtaining in this country, or the great
demand for the services of licensed lawyers, law as compared to other professions, is the most
popular in these islands. The predominantly greater number of members of the Bar, schools and
colleges of law as compared to those of other learned professions, attest to this fact. And one
important thing to bear in mind is that the Judiciary, from the Supreme Court down to the Justice of
the Peace Courts, provincial fiscalships and other prosecuting attorneys, and the legal departments
of the Government, draw exclusively from the Bar to fill their positions. Consequently, any charge or
insinuation of anomaly in the conduct of Bar Examinations, of necessity is imbued with wide and
general interest and national importance.

If it is true that Bar Examination questions, for some reason or another, find their way out and get
into the hands of Bar examinees before the examinations are actually given, and as a result thereof
some examinees succeed in illegally and improperly obtaining passing grades and are later admitted
to the Bar and to the practice of law, when otherwise they should not be, then the present members
of the legal profession would have reason to resent and be alarmed; and if this is continued it would
not be long before the legal profession will have fallen into disrepute. The public would naturally lose
confidence in the lawyers, specially in the new ones, because a person contemplating to go to court
to seek redress or to defend himself before it would not know whether a particular lawyer to whom
he is entrusting his case has legally passed the Bar Examinations because of sufficient and
adequate preparation and training, and that he is honest, or whether he was one of those who had
succeeded in getting hold of Bar Examination questions in advance, passed the Bar Examinations
illegally, and then started his legal career with this act of dishonesty. Particularly, the Bar examinees
who, by intense study and conscientious preparations, have honestly passed the Bar Examinations
and are admitted to practice law, would be affected by this anomaly, because they would ever be
under a cloud of suspicion, since from the point of view of the public, they might be among those
who had made use of Bar Examination questions obtained before hand. And, incidentally, the
morale of the hundreds of students and graduates of the different law schools, studying law and later
preparing for the Bar Examinations, would be affected, even disastrously, for in them may be born
the idea that there is no need of much law study and preparation inasmuch as it is possible and not
difficult to obtain copies of questions before the examinations and pass them and be admitted to the
Bar.
The cloud of suspicion would, equally, hang over the Bar examiners themselves, eight eminent
lawyers who in a spirit of public service and civic spirit, have consented to serve on the Committee of
Examiners at the request and designation of this Court. They would be suspected, — one or two or
more of them — that through negligence, or connivance, or downright corruption, they have made
possible the release if they have not themselves actually released, before examination day, the
questions they had prepared. The employees of the Supreme Court in charge of the Bar
Examinations, specially those who copy or mimeograph the original copies furnished by the Bar
examiners, would all be under suspicion. And, lastly, and more important still, the Supreme Court
itself which has to overall supervision and control over the examinations, would share the suspicion,
as a result of which the confidence of the people in this High Tribunal, which public confidence, the
members of this Court like to think and believe, it still enjoys, might be affected and shaken. All these
considerations of vital importance, in our opinion, can and will sufficiently cause the present case to
fall and be included within the meaning of the phrase "interest of the state," involving as it does, not
only the interests of students and graduates of the law schools and colleges, and of the entire legal
profession of this country as well as the good name and reputation of the members of the Committee
of Bar Examiners, including the employees of the Supreme Court having charge of and connections
with said examinations, but also the highest Tribunal of the land itself which represents one of the
three coordinate and independent branches or departments of the Philippine Government.

In support of if not in addition to the power granted by section 1 of Republic Act. No. 53 to this Court,
we have the inherent power of courts in general, specially of the Supreme Court as representative of
the Judicial Department, to adopt proper and adequate measures to preserve their integrity, and
render possible and facilitate the exercise of their functions, including, as in the present case, the
investigation of charges of error, abuse or misconduct of their officials and subordinates, including
lawyers, who are officers of the Court. (Province of Tarlac vs. Gale, 26 Phil., 350; 21 C.J.S. 41, 138.)
As we have previously stated, the revelation demanded of the respondent, of the identity of his
informants, is essential and necessary to the investigation of the charge contained in the publication
already mentioned.

It will be noticed from Parazo's news item as quoted in the first part of this decision, that, informants,
law graduates and bar examinees, were denouncing the supposed anomaly — consisting of the
alleged leakage of the Bar Examination questions — to the Supreme Court for due investigation. If
those persons really meant and intended to make a bona fide and effective denunciation, with
expectation of results, the right place to air their grievance was the Supreme Court itself, not a
newspaper; and if they truly wanted an investigation, they should have come forward and furnished
or stood ready to furnish the facts on which to base and from which to start an investigation, instead
of concealing themselves behind the curtain of press immunity.

Examining the news item in question, it is therein claimed and assured that Bar Examination
questions in at least one subject had been obtained and used by bar examinees coming from a
certain university, one week before the examinations were actually held. Parazo in his statements
and answers during the investigation said that examination questions in several subjects were
involved in the anomaly. But no copy or copies of said examination questions were furnished us. No
one is willing to testify that he actually saw said alleged copies of examination questions; that they
were actually and carefully compared with the legitimate examination questions given out on the day
of the examination and found to be identical; no one is ready and willing to reveal the identity of the
persons or bar examinees said to have been seen with the said Bar Examination questions,
although they as well as the university where they came from, was known; and even the law
subjects to which the questions pertained are not disclosed; and, lastly, we are not allowed to know
even the identity of respondent Parazo's informants who claim to have seen all these things.
In this connection it may be stated that in the las Bar Examinations held in August, 1948,
approximately nine hundred candidates took them, each candidate writing his answers in a book for
each subject. There were eight subjects, each belonging to and corresponding to each one of the
eight bar examiners. There were therefore eight sets of bar examination questions, and multiplying
these eight sets of questions by nine hundred candidates, gives a total of seven thousand two
hundred (7,200) examination papers involved, in the hand of eight different examiners. The
examination books or papers bear no names or identifications of their writers or owners and said
ownership and identification will not be known until the books or papers are all corrected and graded.
Without definite assurance based on reliable witnesses under oath that the alleged anomaly had
actually been committed, — evidence on the identity of the persons in possession of the alleged
copies of questions prematurely released or illegally obtained and made use of, the law subjects or
subjects involved, the university from which said persons come, this Court does not feel capable of
or warranted in taking any step, such as blindly and desperately revising each and every one of the
7,200 examination books with the fond but forlorn hope of finding any similarity or identity in the
answers of any group of examinees and basing thereon any definite finding or conclusion. Apart
from the enormity of the task and its hopelessness, this Court may not and cannot base its findings
and conclusions, especially in any serious and delicate matter as is the present, on that kind of
evidence. Under these circumstances, this Court, for lack of basis, data and information, is unable to
conduct, nay, even start, an investigation; and, unless and until the respondent herein reveals the
identities of his informants, and those informants and or others with facts and reliable evidence, aid
and cooperate with the Court in its endeavor to further examine and probe into the charges
contained in the news items, said charges are considered and held to be without basis, proof or
foundation.

When the Supreme Court decided to demand of the respondent herein that he reveal the names of
his informants, it was not impelled or motivated by mere idle curiosity. It truly wanted information on
which to start an investigation because it is vitally interested in keeping the Bar Examinations clean
and above board and specially, not only to protect the members of the Bar and those aspiring for
membership therein and the public dealing with the members thereof and the Bar Examiners who
cooperate with and act as agents of this Court in preparing the examination questions and correcting
the examination papers, but also, as already stated, to keep the confidence of the people in this High
Tribunal as regards the discharge of its function relative to the admission to the practice of law.
These, it can only do by investigating any Bar Examination anomaly, fixing responsibility and
punishing those found guilty, even annulling examinations already held, or else declaring the
charges as not proven, if, as a result of the investigation, it is found that there is insufficiency or lack
of evidence. In demanding from the respondent that he reveal the sources of his information, this
Court did not intend to punish those informants or hold them liable. It merely wanted their help and
cooperation. In this Court's endeavor to probe thoroughly the anomaly, or irregularity allegedly
committed, it was its intention not only to adopt the necessary measures to punish the guilty parties,
if the charges are found to be true, but also even to annul the examinations themselves, in justice to
the innocent parties who had taken but did not pass the examinations. We say this because in every
examination, whether conducted by the Government or by a private institution, certain standards are
unconsciously adopted on which to base the passing grade. For instance, if, as a result of the
correction of many or all of the examination papers, it is found that only very few have passed it, the
examiner might reasonably think that the questions he gave were unduly difficult or hard to
understand, or too long, as a result of which he may be more liberal and be more lenient and make
allowances. On the hand, if too many obtain passing grade, the examiner may think that the
examination questions were too easy and constitute an inadequate measure of the legal knowledge
and training required to be a lawyer, and so he may raise his standard and become more strict in his
correction of the papers and his appreciation of the answers. So, in a case where examinees,
especially if many, succeed in getting hold of questions long before examinations day, and study and
prepare the answers to those questions, it may result that when the examiner finds that many of the
examinees have easily and correctly answered the questions, he may think that said questions were
too easy, raise the standard by being strict in his correction of the papers, thereby giving a grade
below passing to a number of examinees who otherwise would have validly passed the
examinations.

In conclusion, we find that the interest of the state in the present case demands that the respondent
Angel J. Parazo reveal the source or sources of his information which formed the basis of his news
items or story in the September 14, 1948 issue of the Star Reporter, quoted at the beginning of his
decision, and that, in refusing to make the revelation which this Court required of him, he committed
contempt of Court. The respondent repeatedly stated during the investigation that he knew the
names and identities of the persons who furnished him the information. In other words, he omitted
and still refuses to do an act commanded by this Court which is yet in his power to perform. (Rule
64, section 7, Rules of Court.)Ordinarily, in such cases, he can and should be imprisoned indefinitely
until he complied with the demand. However, considering that case like the present are not common
or frequent, in this jurisdiction, and that there is no reason and immediate necessity for imposing a
heavy penalty, as may be done in other cases where it is advisable or necessary to mete out severe
penalties to meet a situation of an alarming number of cases of a certain offense or a crime wave,
and, considering further the youthful age of the respondent, the majority of the members of this
Court have decided to order, as it hereby orders, his immediate arrest and confinement in jail for a
period of one (1) month, unless, before the expiration of that period he makes to this Court the
revelation demanded of him. So ordered.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, and Tuason, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-961 September 21, 1949

BLANDINA GAMBOA HILADO, petitioner,

vs.
JOSE GUTIERREZ DAVID, VICENTE J. FRANCISCO, JACOB ASSAD and SELIM JACOB
ASSAD, respondents.

Delgado, Dizon and Flores for petitioner.

Vicente J. Francisco for respondents.

TUASON, J.:

It appears that on April 23, 1945, Blandina Gamboa Hilado brought an action against Selim Jacob
Assad to annul the sale of several houses and lot executed during the Japanese occupation by Mrs.
Hilado's now deceased husband.

On May 14, Attorneys Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita filed an answer on behalf of the defendant; and
on June 15, Attorneys Delgado, Dizon, Flores and Rodrigo registered their appearance as counsel
for the plaintiff. On October 5, these attorneys filed an amended complaint by including Jacob Assad
as party defendant.

On January 28, 1946, Attorney Francisco entered his appearance as attorney of record for the
defendant in substitution for Attorney Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita who had withdrawn from the
case.
On May 29, Attorney Dizon, in the name of his firm, wrote Attorney Francisco urging him to
discontinue representing the defendants on the ground that their client had consulted with him about
her case, on which occasion, it was alleged, "she turned over the papers" to Attorney Francisco, and
the latter sent her a written opinion. Not receiving any answer to this suggestion, Attorney Delgado,
Dizon, Flores and Rodrigo on June 3, 1946, filed a formal motion with the court, wherein the case
was and is pending, to disqualify Attorney Francisco.

Attorney Francisco's letter to plaintiff, mentioned above and identified as Exhibit A, is in full as
follows:

VICENTE J. FRANCISCO
Attorney-at-Law
1462 Estrada, Manila

July 13, 1945.

Mrs. Blandina Gamboa Hilado

Manila, Philippines

My dear Mrs. Hilado:

From the papers you submitted to me in connection with civil case No. 70075 of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, entitled "Blandina Gamboa Hilado vs. S. J. Assad," I find that the
basic facts which brought about the controversy between you and the defendant therein are
as follows:

(a) That you were the equitable owner of the property described in the complaint, as the
same was purchased and/or built with funds exclusively belonging to you, that is to say, the
houses and lot pertained to your paraphernal estate;

(b) That on May 3, 1943, the legal title to the property was with your husband, Mr. Serafin P.
Hilado; and

(c) That the property was sold by Mr. Hilado without your knowledge on the aforesaid date of
May 3, 1943.

Upon the foregoing facts, I am of the opinion that your action against Mr. Assad will not
ordinarily prosper. Mr. Assad had the right to presume that your husband had the legal right
to dispose of the property as the transfer certificate of title was in his name. Moreover, the
price of P110,000 in Japanese military notes, as of May 3, 1943, does not quite strike me as
so grossly inadequate as to warrant the annulment of the sale. I believe, lastly, that the
transaction cannot be avoided merely because it was made during the Japanese occupation,
nor on the simple allegation that the real purchaser was not a citizen of the Philippines. On
his last point, furthermore, I expect that you will have great difficulty in proving that the real
purchaser was other than Mr. Assad, considering that death has already sealed your
husband's lips and he cannot now testify as to the circumstances of the sale.

For the foregoing reasons, I regret to advise you that I cannot appear in the proceedings in
your behalf. The records of the case you loaned to me are herewith returned.
 Yours very truly,

(Sgd.) VICENTE J. FRANCISCO

VJF/Rag.

In his answer to plaintiff's attorneys' complaint, Attorney Francisco alleged that about May, 1945, a
real estate broker came to his office in connection with the legal separation of a woman who had
been deserted by her husband, and also told him (Francisco) that there was a pending suit brought
by Mrs. Hilado against a certain Syrian to annul the sale of a real estate which the deceased Serafin
Hilado had made to the Syrian during the Japanese occupation; that this woman asked him if he was
willing to accept the case if the Syrian should give it to him; that he told the woman that the sales of
real property during the Japanese regime were valid even though it was paid for in Japanese military
notes; that this being his opinion, he told his visitor he would have no objection to defending the
Syrian;

That one month afterwards, Mrs. Hilado came to see him about a suit she had instituted against a
certain Syrian to annul the conveyance of a real estate which her husband had made; that according
to her the case was in the hands of Attorneys Delgado and Dizon, but she wanted to take it away
from them; that as he had known the plaintiff's deceased husband he did not hesitate to tell her
frankly that hers was a lost case for the same reason he had told the broker; that Mrs. Hilado
retorted that the basis of her action was not that the money paid her husband was Japanese military
notes, but that the premises were her private and exclusive property; that she requested him to read
the complaint to be convinced that this was the theory of her suit; that he then asked Mrs. Hilado if
there was a Torrens title to the property and she answered yes, in the name of her husband; that he
told Mrs. Hilado that if the property was registered in her husband's favor, her case would not
prosper either;

That some days afterward, upon arrival at his law office on Estrada street, he was informed by
Attorney Federico Agrava, his assistant, that Mrs. Hilado had dropped in looking for him and that
when he, Agrava, learned that Mrs. Hilado's visit concerned legal matters he attended to her and
requested her to leave the "expediente" which she was carrying, and she did; that he told Attorney
Agrava that the firm should not handle Mrs. Hilado's case and he should return the papers, calling
Agrava's attention to what he (Francisco) already had said to Mrs. Hilado;

That several days later, the stenographer in his law office, Teofilo Ragodon, showed him a letter
which had been dictated in English by Mr. Agrava, returning the "expedients" to Mrs. Hilado; that
Ragodon told him (Attorney Francisco) upon Attorney Agrava's request that Agrava thought it more
proper to explain to Mrs. Hilado the reasons why her case was rejected; that he forthwith signed the
letter without reading it and without keeping it for a minute in his possession; that he never saw Mrs.
Hilado since their last meeting until she talked to him at the Manila Hotel about a proposed
extrajudicial settlement of the case;

That in January, 1946, Assad was in his office to request him to handle his case stating that his
American lawyer had gone to the States and left the case in the hands of other attorneys; that he
accepted the retainer and on January 28, 1946, entered his appearance.

Attorney Francisco filed an affidavit of stenographer Ragodon in corroboration of his answer.

The judge trying the case, Honorable Jose Gutierrez David, later promoted to the Court of Appeals,
dismissed the complaint. His Honor believed that no information other than that already alleged in
plaintiff's complaint in the main cause was conveyed to Attorney Francisco, and concluded that the
intercourse between the plaintiff and the respondent did not attain the point of creating the relation of
attorney and client.

Stripped of disputed details and collateral matters, this much is undoubted: That Attorney
Francisco's law firm mailed to the plaintiff a written opinion over his signature on the merits of her
case; that this opinion was reached on the basis of papers she had submitted at his office; that Mrs.
Hilado's purpose in submitting those papers was to secure Attorney Francisco's professional
services. Granting the facts to be no more than these, we agree with petitioner's counsel that the
relation of attorney and client between Attorney Francisco and Mrs. Hilado ensued. The following
rules accord with the ethics of the legal profession and meet with our approval:

In order to constitute the relation (of attorney and client) a professional one and not merely
one of principal and agent, the attorneys must be employed either to give advice upon a
legal point, to prosecute or defend an action in court of justice, or to prepare and draft, in
legal form such papers as deeds, bills, contracts and the like. (Atkinson vs. Howlett, 11 Ky.
Law Rep. (abstract), 364; cited in Vol. 88, A. L. R., p. 6.)

To constitute professional employment it is not essential that the client should have
employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion. . . . It is not necessary that
any retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material that the
attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was
had. If a person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his
attorney in his professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional advice or
assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the
professional employment must be regarded as established. . . . (5 Jones Commentaries on
Evidence, pp. 4118-4119.)

An attorney is employed-that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a lawyer or

counselor-when he is listening to his client's preliminary statement of his case, or when he is
giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his client's pleadings, or
advocating his client's cause in open court. (Denver Tramway Co. vs. Owens, 20 Colo., 107;
36 P., 848.)

Formality is not an essential element of the employment of an attorney. The contract may be
express or implied and it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of the attorney is sought
and received, in matters pertinent to his profession. An acceptance of the relation is implied
on the part of the attorney from his acting in behalf of his client in pursuance of a request by
the latter. (7 C. J. S., 848-849; see Hirach Bros. and Co. vs. R. E. Kennington Co., 88 A. L.
R., 1.)

Section 26 (e), Rule 123 of the Rules of Court provides that "an attorney cannot, without the consent
of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given
thereon in the course of professional employment;" and section 19 (e) of Rule 127 imposes upon an
attorney the duty "to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the
secrets of his client." There is no law or provision in the Rules of Court prohibiting attorneys in
express terms from acting on behalf of both parties to a controversy whose interests are opposed to
each other, but such prohibition is necessarily implied in the injunctions above quoted. (In re De la
Rosa, 27 Phil., 258.) In fact the prohibition derives validity from sources higher than written laws and
rules. As has been aptly said in In re Merron, 22 N. M., 252, L.R.A., 1917B, 378, "information so
received is sacred to the employment to which it pertains," and "to permit it to be used in the interest
of another, or, worse still, in the interest of the adverse party, is to strike at the element of confidence
which lies at the basis of, and affords the essential security in, the relation of attorney and client."

That only copies of pleadings already filed in court were furnished to Attorney Agrava and that, this
being so, no secret communication was transmitted to him by the plaintiff, would not vary the
situation even if we should discard Mrs. Hilado's statement that other papers, personal and private in
character, were turned in by her. Precedents are at hand to support the doctrine that the mere
relation of attorney and client ought to preclude the attorney from accepting the opposite party's
retainer in the same litigation regardless of what information was received by him from his first client.

The principle which forbids an attorney who has been engaged to represent a client from
thereafter appearing on behalf of the client's opponent applies equally even though during
the continuance of the employment nothing of a confidential nature was revealed to the
attorney by the client. (Christian vs. Waialua Agricultural Co., 30 Hawaii, 553, Footnote 7, C.
J. S., 828.)

Where it appeared that an attorney, representing one party in litigation, had formerly
represented the adverse party with respect to the same matter involved in the litigation, the
court need not inquire as to how much knowledge the attorney acquired from his former
during that relationship, before refusing to permit the attorney to represent the adverse party.
(Brown vs. Miller, 52 App. D. C. 330; 286, F. 994.)

In order that a court may prevent an attorney from appearing against a former client, it is
unnecessary that the ascertain in detail the extent to which the former client's affairs might
have a bearing on the matters involved in the subsequent litigation on the attorney's
knowledge thereof. (Boyd vs. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 274 P., 7; 51 Nev., 264.)

This rule has been so strictly that it has been held an attorney, on terminating his
employment, cannot thereafter act as counsel against his client in the same general matter,
even though, while acting for his former client, he acquired no knowledge which could
operate to his client's disadvantage in the subsequent adverse employment. (Pierce vs.
Palmer [1910], 31 R. I., 432; 77 Atl., 201, Ann. Cas., 1912S, 181.)

Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of litigations, a complicated
affair, consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well known facts. In the complexity
of what is said in the course of the dealings between an attorney and a client, inquiry of the nature
suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial, of other matters that might only
further prejudice the complainant's cause. And the theory would be productive of other un salutary
results. To make the passing of confidential communication a condition precedent; i.e., to make the
employment conditioned on the scope and character of the knowledge acquired by an attorney in
determining his right to change sides, would not enhance the freedom of litigants, which is to be
sedulously fostered, to consult with lawyers upon what they believe are their rights in litigation. The
condition would of necessity call for an investigation of what information the attorney has received
and in what way it is or it is not in conflict with his new position. Litigants would in consequence be
wary in going to an attorney, lest by an unfortunate turn of the proceedings, if an investigation be
held, the court should accept the attorney's inaccurate version of the facts that came to him. "Now
the abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good cause is by hypothesis an evil which is fatal to
the administration of justice." (John H. Wigmore's Evidence, 1923, Section 2285, 2290, 2291.)

Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of attorney and client as
the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent
the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the honest lawyer from
unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice. (Strong vs. Int. Bldg., etc.; Ass'n, 183 Ill., 97; 47
L.R.A., 792.) It is founded on principles of public policy, on good taste. As has been said in another
case, the question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney
has adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys,
like Caesar's wife, not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance
of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to
their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.

So without impugning respondent's good faith, we nevertheless can not sanction his taking up the
cause of the adversary of the party who had sought and obtained legal advice from his firm; this, not
necessarily to prevent any injustice to the plaintiff but to keep above reproach the honor and integrity
of the courts and of the bar. Without condemning the respondents conduct as dishonest, corrupt, or
fraudulent, we do believe that upon the admitted facts it is highly in expedient. It had the tendency to
bring the profession, of which he is a distinguished member, "into public disrepute and suspicion and
undermine the integrity of justice."

There is in legal practice what called "retaining fee," the purpose of which stems from the realization
that the attorney is disabled from acting as counsel for the other side after he has given professional
advice to the opposite party, even if he should decline to perform the contemplated services on
behalf of the latter. It is to prevent undue hardship on the attorney resulting from the rigid
observance of the rule that a separate and independent fee for consultation and advice was
conceived and authorized. "A retaining fee is a preliminary fee given to an attorney or counsel to
insure and secure his future services, and induce him to act for the client. It is intended to
remunerate counsel for being deprived, by being retained by one party, of the opportunity of
rendering services to the other and of receiving pay from him, and the payment of such fee, in the
absence of an express understanding to the contrary, is neither made nor received in payment of the
services contemplated; its payment has no relation to the obligation of the client to pay his attorney
for the services which he has retained him to perform." (7 C.J.S., 1019.)

The defense that Attorney Agrava wrote the letter Exhibit A and that Attorney Francisco did not take
the trouble of reading it, would not take the case out of the interdiction. If this letter was written under
the circumstances explained by Attorney Francisco and he was unaware of its contents, the fact
remains that his firm did give Mrs. Hilado a formal professional advice from which, as heretofore
demonstrated, emerged the relation of attorney and client. This letter binds and estop him in the
same manner and to the same degree as if he personally had written it. An information obtained
from a client by a member or assistant of a law firm is information imparted to the firm. (6 C. J., 628;
7 C. J. S., 986.) This is not a mere fiction or an arbitrary rule; for such member or assistant, as in our
case, not only acts in the name and interest of the firm, but his information, by the nature of his
connection with the firm is available to his associates or employers. The rule is all the more to be
adhered to where, as in the present instance, the opinion was actually signed by the head of the firm
and carries his initials intended to convey the impression that it was dictated by him personally. No
progress could be hoped for in "the public policy that the client in consulting his legal adviser ought
to be free from apprehension of disclosure of his confidence," if the prohibition were not extended to
the attorney's partners, employers or assistants.

The fact that petitioner did not object until after four months had passed from the date Attorney
Francisco first appeared for the defendants does not operate as a waiver of her right to ask for his
disqualification. In one case, objection to the appearance of an attorney was allowed even on appeal
as a ground for reversal of the judgment. In that case, in which throughout the conduct of the cause
in the court below the attorney had been suffered so to act without objection, the court said: "We are
all of the one mind, that the right of the appellee to make his objection has not lapsed by reason of
failure to make it sooner; that professional confidence once reposed can never be divested by
expiration of professional employment." (Nickels vs. Griffin, 1 Wash. Terr., 374, 321 A. L. R. 1316.)

The complaint that petitioner's remedy is by appeal and not by certiorari deserves scant attention.
The courts have summary jurisdiction to protect the rights of the parties and the public from any
conduct of attorneys prejudicial to the administration of the justice. The summary jurisdiction of the
courts over attorneys is not confined to requiring them to pay over money collected by them but
embraces authority to compel them to do whatever specific acts may be incumbent upon them in
their capacity of attorneys to perform. The courts from the general principles of equity and policy, will
always look into the dealings between attorneys and clients and guard the latter from any undue
consequences resulting from a situation in which they may stand unequal. The courts acts on the
same principles whether the undertaking is to appear, or, for that matter, not to appear, to answer
declaration, etc. (6 C.J., 718 C.J.S., 1005.) This summary remedy against attorneys flows from the
facts that they are officers of the court where they practice, forming a part of the machinery of the
law for the administration of justice and as such subject to the disciplinary authority of the courts and
to its orders and directions with respect to their relations to the court as well as to their clients.
(Charest vs. Bishop, 137 Minn., 102; 162, N.W., 1062, Note 26, 7 C. J. S., 1007.) Attorney stand on
the same footing as sheriffs and other court officers in respect of matters just mentioned.

We conclude therefore that the motion for disqualification should be allowed. It is so ordered, without
costs.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Feria, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes and Torres, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE

RAUL ALMACEN In L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO,

vs.

VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.

RESOLUTION

CASTRO, J.:

Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," filed on
September 25, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice committed
against his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal
"peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own
applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he
continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the
sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the classic
symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that justice as administered by the
present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to
argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent
injustice's committed by this Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were
committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that

... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the
undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any
time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may
retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest profession.

He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned petition. Thus, on
September 26, 1967, the Manila Times published statements attributed to him, as follows:

Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did it to expose the

tribunal's"unconstitutional and obnoxious" practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or
appeals without any reason.

Because of the tribunal's "short-cut justice," Almacen deplored, his client was
condemned to pay P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case.

xxx xxx xxx

There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, "where our
Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who
ignore without reason their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations
of the Constitution with impunity.

xxx xxx xxx

He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his
living, the present members of the Supreme Court "will become responsive to all
cases brought to its attention without discrimination, and will purge itself of those
unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit" or "denied resolutions. (Emphasis
supplied)

Atty. Almacen's statement that

... our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of
[sic] justice, who ignore their own applicable decisions and commit culpable
violations of the Constitution with impunity

was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila Chronicle of September 28,
1967. In connection therewith, Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen had "accused the high tribunal
of offenses so serious that the Court must clear itself," and that "his charge is one of the
constitutional bases for impeachment."

The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs. Antonio
H. Calero,1 in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court, after due hearing,
rendered judgment against his client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a copy of the
decision. Twenty days later, or on July 5, 1966, he moved for its reconsideration. He served on the
adverse counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify the latter of the time and place of hearing on
said motion. Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment. For
"lack of proof of service," the trial court denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the
adverse party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a
second motion for reconsideration to which he attached the required registry return card. This
second motion for reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30,
1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who, earlier, that is, on August 22, 1966, had
already perfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed no objection to the record on appeal
and appeal bond, the trial court elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.

But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila Surety & Fidelity Co.,
Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed the appeal, in the following
words:

Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed by plaintiff-appellee
praying that the appeal be dismissed, and of the opposition thereto filed by
defendant-appellant; the Court RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as it hereby dismisses, the
appeal, for the reason that the motion for reconsideration dated July 5, 1966 (pp. 90-
113, printed record on appeal) does not contain a notice of time and place of hearing
thereof and is, therefore, a useless piece of paper (Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc.
vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636, June 24, 1965), which did not
interrupt the running of the period to appeal, and, consequently, the appeal was
perfected out of time.

Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. is not
decisive. At the same time he filed a pleading entitled "Latest decision of the Supreme Court in
Support of Motion for Reconsideration," citing Republic of the Philippines vs. Gregorio A.
Venturanza, L-20417, decided by this Court on May 30, 1966, as the applicable case. Again, the
Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration, thus:

Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9, 1967 and the
supplement thereto of the same date filed by defendant- appellant, praying for
reconsideration of the resolution of May 8, 1967, dismissing the appeal.

Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions between this case and
that of Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-
16636, June 24, 1965, relied upon by this Court in its resolution of May 8, 1967.
Appellant further states that in the latest case,Republic vs. Venturanza, L-20417,
May 30, 1966, decided by the Supreme Court concerning the question raised by
appellant's motion, the ruling is contrary to the doctrine laid down in the Manila
Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. case.

There is no substantial distinction between this case and that of Manila Surety &
Fidelity Co.

In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution denying the motion to dismiss
the appeal, based on grounds similar to those raised herein was issued on
November 26, 1962, which was much earlier than the date of promulgation of the
decision in the Manila Surety Case, which was June 24, 1965. Further, the resolution
in the Venturanza case was interlocutory and the Supreme Court issued it "without
prejudice to appellee's restoring the point in the brief." In the main decision in said
case (Rep. vs. Venturanza the Supreme Court passed upon the issue sub silencio
presumably because of its prior decisions contrary to the resolution of November 26,
 1962, one of which is that in the Manila Surety and Fidelity case. Therefore Republic
vs. Venturanza is no authority on the matter in issue.

Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We refused to take the case, and by minute
resolution denied the appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his motion for reconsideration as well as
his petition for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and for extension of time. Entry of
judgment was made on September 8, 1967. Hence, the second motion for reconsideration filed by
him after the Said date was ordered expunged from the records.

It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his "Petition to
Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," already adverted to — a pleading that is interspersed from
beginning to end with the insolent contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory remarks
hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as well as its individual members, a behavior that is as
unprecedented as it is unprofessional.

Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28, 1967 to withhold action on his petition
until he shall have actually surrendered his certificate. Patiently, we waited for him to make good his
proffer. No word came from him. So he was reminded to turn over his certificate, which he had
earlier vociferously offered to surrender, so that this Court could act on his petition. To said reminder
he manifested "that he has no pending petition in connection with Case G.R. No. L-27654, Calero
vs. Yaptinchay, said case is now final and executory;" that this Court's September 28, 1967
resolution did not require him to do either a positive or negative act; and that since his offer was not
accepted, he "chose to pursue the negative act."

In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for contumely and gross
misconduct, this Court on November 17, 1967 resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show cause "why
no disciplinary action should be taken against him." Denying the charges contained in the November
17 resolution, he asked for permission "to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should
be taken against him ... in an open and public hearing." This Court resolved (on December 7) "to
require Atty. Almacen to state, within five days from notice hereof, his reasons for such request,
otherwise, oral argument shall be deemed waived and incident submitted for decision." To this
resolution he manifested that since this Court is "the complainant, prosecutor and Judge," he
preferred to be heard and to answer questions "in person and in an open and public hearing" so that
this Court could observe his sincerity and candor. He also asked for leave to file a written
explanation "in the event this Court has no time to hear him in person." To give him the ampliest
latitude for his defense, he was allowed to file a written explanation and thereafter was heard in oral
argument.

His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers -no apology. Far from
being contrite Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of lamentations, this time
embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and innuendo. Thus:

At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible, Chapter 7, St. Matthew: —

"Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For with what judgment
you judge, you shall be judged, and with what measure you measure,
it shall be measured to you. But why dost thou see the speck in thy
brother's eye, and yet dost not consider the beam in thy own eye? Or
how can thou say to thy brother, "Let me cast out the speck from thy
eye"; and behold, there is a beam in thy own eye? Thou hypocrite,
first cast out the beam from thy own eye, and then thou wilt see
clearly to cast out the speck from thy brother's eyes."
 "Therefore all that you wish men to do to you, even to do you also to
them: for this is the Law and the Prophets."

xxx xxx xxx

Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements mentioned in his

petition. On the contrary, he refirms the truth of what he stated, compatible with his
lawyer's oath that he will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court.
But he vigorously DENY under oath that the underscored statements contained in
the CHARGE are insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory to the
individual members of the Court; that they tend to bring the entire Court, without
justification, into disrepute; and constitute conduct unbecoming of a member of the
noble profession of law.

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by TRUTH and has been
asserted with NO MALICE BEFORE AND AFTER THOUGHT but mainly motivated
with the highest interest of justice that in the particular case of our client, the
members have shown callousness to our various pleas for JUSTICE, our pleadings
will bear us on this matter, ...

xxx xxx xxx

To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility, appeals for charity,

generosity, fairness, understanding, sympathy and above all in the highest interest of
JUSTICE, — what did we get from this COURT? One word, DENIED, with all its
hardiness and insensibility. That was the unfeeling of the Court towards our pleas
and prayers, in simple word, it is plain callousness towards our particular case.

xxx xxx xxx

Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the Court that
notwithstanding the violation of the Constitution, you remained unpunished, this
Court in the reverse order of natural things, is now in the attempt to inflict punishment
on your respondent for acts he said in good faith.

Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications for JUSTICE,
CHARITY, GENEROSITY and FAIRNESS? Did His Honors attempt to justify their
stubborn denial with any semblance of reason, NEVER. Now that your respondent is
given the opportunity to face you, he reiterates the same statement with emphasis,
DID YOU? Sir. Is this. the way of life in the Philippines today, that even our own
President, said: — "the story is current, though nebulous ,is to its truth, it is still being
circulated that justice in the Philippines today is not what it is used to be before the
war. There are those who have told me frankly and brutally that justice is a
commodity, a marketable commodity in the Philippines."

xxx xxx xxx

We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS, not the ACTOR. We
attack the decision of this Court, not the members. ... We were provoked. We were
 compelled by force of necessity. We were angry but we waited for the finality of the
decision. We waited until this Court has performed its duties. We never interfered nor
obstruct in the performance of their duties. But in the end, after seeing that the
Constitution has placed finality on your judgment against our client and sensing that
you have not performed your duties with "circumspection, carefulness, confidence
and wisdom", your Respondent rise to claim his God given right to speak the truth
and his Constitutional right of free speech.

xxx xxx xxx

The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and the further violations we
sought to be prevented is impliedly shared by our President. ... .

xxx xxx xxx

What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things that were applied to us. Recalling
Madam Roland's famous apostrophe during the French revolution, "O Liberty, what crimes are
committed in thy name", we may dare say, "O JUSTICE, what technicalities are committed in thy
name' or more appropriately, 'O JUSTICE, what injustices are committed in thy name."

xxx xxx xxx

We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of any abuses, but who
would correct such abuses considering that yours is a court of last resort. A strong
public opinion must be generated so as to curtail these abuses.

xxx xxx xxx

The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can be found in all courts
and government offices. We have added only two more symbols, that it is also deaf
and dumb. Deaf in the sense that no members of this Court has ever heard our cries
for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding sympathy and for justice; dumb in the
sense, that inspite of our beggings, supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons
why our appeal has been DENIED, not one word was spoken or given ... We refer to
no human defect or ailment in the above statement. We only describe the.
impersonal state of things and nothing more.

xxx xxx xxx

As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this
Court and for which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN
TRUST ONLY. Because what has been lost today may be regained tomorrow. As the
offer was intended as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we alone may decide as to
when we must end our self-sacrifice. If we have to choose between forcing ourselves
to have faith and confidence in the members of the Court but disregard our
Constitution and to uphold the Constitution and be condemned by the members of
this Court, there is no choice, we must uphold the latter.

But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he claims is not intended as a studied
disrespect to this Court, let us examine the grain of his grievances.
He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. We are quite aware of the
criticisms2 expressed against this Court's practice of rejecting petitions by minute resolutions. We
have been asked to do away with it, to state the facts and the law, and to spell out the reasons for
denial. We have given this suggestion very careful thought. For we know the abject frustration of a
lawyer who tediously collates the facts and for many weary hours meticulously marshalls his
arguments, only to have his efforts rebuffed with a terse unadorned denial. Truth to tell, however,
most petitions rejected by this Court are utterly frivolous and ought never to have been lodged at
all.3The rest do exhibit a first-impression cogency, but fail to, withstand critical scrutiny. By and large,
this Court has been generous in giving due course to petitions for certiorari.

Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for every petition we reject, we
would be unable to carry out effectively the burden placed upon us by the Constitution. The proper
role of the Supreme Court, as Mr. Chief Justice Vinson of the U.S. Supreme Court has defined it, is
to decide "only those cases which present questions whose resolutions will have immediate
importance beyond the particular facts and parties involved." Pertinent here is the observation of Mr.
Justice Frankfurter in Maryland vs. Baltimore Radio Show, 94 L. ed 562, 566:

A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to the same petition
different reasons may read different justices to the same result ... .

Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed, even confusing reasons for
denying petitions for certiorari, it has been suggested from time to time that the Court
indicate its reasons for denial. Practical considerations preclude. In order that the
Court may be enabled to discharge its indispensable duties, Congress has placed
the control of the Court's business, in effect, within the Court's discretion. During the
last three terms the Court disposed of 260, 217, 224 cases, respectively, on their
merits. For the same three terms the Court denied, respectively, 1,260, 1,105,1,189
petitions calling for discretionary review. If the Court is to do its work it would not be
feasible to give reasons, however brief, for refusing to take these cases. The tune
that would be required is prohibitive. Apart from the fact that as already indicated
different reasons not infrequently move different members of the Court in concluding
that a particular case at a particular time makes review undesirable.

Six years ago, in Novino, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 1,21098, May 31, 1963 (60 O.G. 8099),
this Court, through the then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated its considered view on this
matter. There, the petitioners counsel urged that a "lack of merit" resolution violates Section 12 of
Article VIII of the Constitution. Said Chief Justice Bengzon:

In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question has been raised
before; and we held that these "resolutions" are not "decisions" within the above
constitutional requirement. They merely hold that the petition for review should not be
entertained in view of the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and even
ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it. It should be remembered that a
petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of
sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the court's denial.
For one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals'
opinion.

By the way, this mode of disposal has — as intended — helped the Court in
alleviating its heavy docket; it was patterned after the practice of the U.S. Supreme
Court, wherein petitions for review are often merely ordered "dismissed".
We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions for certiorari from the Court of
Appeals have had the benefit of appellate review. Hence, the need for compelling reasons to
buttress such petitions if this Court is to be moved into accepting them. For it is axiomatic that the
supervisory jurisdiction vested upon this Court over the Court of Appeals is not intended to give
every losing party another hearing. This axiom is implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
which recites:

Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary.—A review is not a matter of right

but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and
important reasons therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor fully
measuring the court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons which will be
considered:

(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance, not theretofore
determined by the Supreme Court, nor has decided it in a way probably not in accord
with law or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court;

(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such departure by the lower
court, as to call for the exercise of the power of supervision.

Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found, upon a thoroughgoing examination of the
pleadings. and records, that the Court of Appeals had fully and correctly considered the dismissal of
his appeal in the light of the law and applicable decisions of this Court. Far from straying away from
the "accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings," it traced the procedural lines etched by this
Court in a number of decisions. There was, therefore, no need for this Court to exercise its
supervisory power.

As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew — or
ought to have known — that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the period of
appeal, the movant must not only serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party (which he did),
but also notify the adverse party of the time and place of hearing (which admittedly he did not). This
rule was unequivocally articulated in Manila Surety & Fidelity vs. Batu Construction & Co., supra:

The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions in general by Rule
15, Sections 4 and 5 (formerly Rule 26), which provides that such notice shall state
the time, and place of hearing and shall be served upon all the Parties concerned at
least three days in advance. And according to Section 6 of the same Rule no motion
shall be acted upon by the court without proof of such notice. Indeed it has been held
that in such a case the motion is nothing but a useless piece of paper (Philippine
National Bank v. Damasco, I,18638, Feb. 28, 1963; citing Manakil v. Revilla, 42 Phil.
81; Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of Unisan, 41 Phil. 866; and
Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117). The reason is obvious: Unless the movant
sets the time and place of hearing the Court would have no way to determine
whether that party agrees to or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear him
on his objection, since the Rules themselves do not fix any period within which he
may file his reply or opposition.

If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's judgment, he has only
himself to blame. His own negligence caused the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal, which,
incidentally, is not a matter of right. To shift away from himself the consequences of his
carelessness, he looked for a "whipping boy." But he made sure that he assumed the posture of a
martyr, and, in offering to surrender his professional certificate, he took the liberty of vilifying this
Court and inflicting his exacerbating rancor on the members thereof. It would thus appear that there
is no justification for his scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.

Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most circumspect consideration.
We know that it is natural for a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction each time he loses what he
sanguinely believes to be a meritorious case. That is why lawyers are given 'wide latitude to differ
with, and voice their disapproval of, not only the courts' rulings but, also the manner in which they
are handed down.

Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers.
This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority,4 or that it is
articulated by a lawyer.5Such right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded
litigation,6 because then the court's actuations are thrown open to public consumption.7 "Our
decisions and all our official actions," said the Supreme Court of Nebraska,8 "are public property, and
the press and the people have the undoubted right to comment on them, criticize and censure them
as they see fit. Judicial officers, like other public servants, must answer for their official actions
before the chancery of public opinion."

The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on one's integrity, competence
and honesty, with "imminent danger to the administration of justice," is the reason why courts have
been loath to inflict punishment on those who assail their actuations.9 This danger lurks especially in
such a case as this where those who Sit as members of an entire Court are themselves collectively
the aggrieved parties.

Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their
actuations. 10 For courageous and fearless advocates are the strands that weave durability into the
tapestry of justice. Hence, as citizen and officer of the court, every lawyer is expected not only to
exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings and indiscretions of
courts and judges. 11

Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and expect critical evaluation of their
performance. 13 For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil
of democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to
serve.

Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to
criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges.
The reason is that

An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place accorded to him in
the administration of justice, his right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the
courts in a fair and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of
the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts. (In re Ades, 6 F Supp. 487)
.

Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the traditional work of the bar. In the
prosecution of appeals, he points out the errors of lower courts. In written for law journals he
dissects with detachment the doctrinal pronouncements of courts and fearlessly lays bare for -all to
see that flaws and inconsistence" of the doctrines (Hill v. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). As aptly stated
by Chief Justice Sharswood in Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641:
 No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expansion or
publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than
members of the bar. They have the best opportunities for observing and forming a
correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. ... To say that an
attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account
and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood, by the judge or judges whom he
may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be
entertained. ... .

Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but
also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he
"professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not
expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dee. 657, 665).

Above all others, the members of the bar have the beat Opportunity to become
conversant with the character and efficiency of our judges. No class is less likely to
abuse the privilege, as no other class has as great an interest in the preservation of
an able and upright bench. (State Board of Examiners in Law v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212,
216)

To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is to seal the lips of
those in the best position to give advice and who might consider it their duty to speak disparagingly.
"Under such a rule," so far as the bar is concerned, "the merits of a sitting judge may be rehearsed,
but as to his demerits there must be profound silence." (State v. Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 196)

But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over
the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the One hand,
and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair
criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is Such a misconduct that subjects a
lawyer to disciplinary action.

For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere flux
and ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden more
basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the courts. He
vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity ... to the courts; 14 and the Rules of Court
constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial
officers." 15 The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful
attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of
its supreme importance."

As Mr. Justice Field puts it:

... the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express
declaration take upon themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is not merely
to be obedient to the Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all times the respect
due to courts of justice and judicial officers. This obligation is not discharged by
merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but includes
abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward
judges personally for their judicial acts. (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly
administration of justice. Hence, in the — assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers — even those
gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.

The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the
judge, and it may tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings which he regards
as incorrect, but discipline and self-respect are as necessary to the orderly
administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of an army. The decisions of
the judge must be obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and the
bar should at all times be the foremost in rendering respectful submission. (In Re
Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)

We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment That is his
privilege. And he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. That is
his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden
into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the
time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. (Per Justice Sanchez
in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979. June 26, 1967)

In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one
time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private conversations
or communications 16 or in the course of a political, campaign, 17 if couched in insulting language as
to bring into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary
action.

Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of relevant parallel precedents.

1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor immune to public criticism of
his conduct in office," the Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, 608,
nevertheless declared that "any conduct of a lawyer which brings into scorn and disrepute the
administration of justice demands condemnation and the application of appropriate penalties,"
adding that:

It would be contrary to, every democratic theory to hold that a judge or a court is
beyond bona fide comments and criticisms which do not exceed the bounds of
decency and truth or which are not aimed at. the destruction of public confidence in
the judicial system as such. However, when the likely impairment of the
administration of justice the direct product of false and scandalous accusations then
the rule is otherwise.

2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was suspended for putting out and circulating a
leaflet entitled "JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA," which accused a municipal judge of having committed
judicial error, of being so prejudiced as to deny his clients a fair trial on appeal and of being subject
to the control of a group of city officials. As a prefatory statement he wrote: "They say that Justice is
BLIND, but it took Municipal Judge Willard to prove that it is also DEAF and DUMB!" The court did
not hesitate to find that the leaflet went much further than the accused, as a lawyer, had a right to
do.

The entire publication evidences a desire on the part Of the accused to belittle and
besmirch the court and to bring it into disrepute with the general public.
3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the two-year
suspension of an attorney who published a circular assailing a judge who at that time was a
candidate for re-election to a judicial office. The circular which referred to two decisions of the judge
concluded with a statement that the judge "used his judicial office to enable -said bank to keep that
money." Said the court:

We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no limit to the criticism
members of the bar may make regarding the capacity, impartiality, or integrity of the
courts, even though it extends to the deliberate publication by the attorney capable of
correct reasoning of baseless insinuations against the intelligence and integrity of the
highest courts. See State Board, etc. v. Hart. 116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA (N.S.) 585, 15
Ann Cas 197 and note: Ex parte Steinman 95 Pac. 220, 40 Am. Rep. 637. In the first
case mentioned it was observed, for instance:

"It may be (although we do not so decide) that a libelous publication

by an attorney, directed against a judicial officer, could be so vile and
of such a nature as to justify the disbarment of its author."

Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were of graver character than
those made by the respondent here. But, in our view, the better rule is that which
requires of those who are permitted to enjoy the privilege of practicing law the
strictest observance at all times of the principles of truth, honesty and fairness,
especially in their criticism of the courts, to the end that the public confidence in the
due administration of justice be upheld, and the dignity and usefulness of the courts
be maintained. In re Collins, 81 Pac. 220.

4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an attorney, representing a woman
who had been granted a divorce, attacked the judge who set aside the decree on bill of review. He
wrote the judge a threatening letter and gave the press the story of a proposed libel suit against the
judge and others. The letter began:

Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up so that my name is

protected from the libel, lies, and perjury committed in the cases involved, I shall be
compelled to resort to such drastic action as the law allows and the case warrants.

Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to allow such dastardly work to go
unchallenged," and said that he was engaged in dealing with men and not irresponsible political
manikins or appearances of men. Ordering the attorney's disbarment, the Supreme Court of Illinois
declared:

... Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever there is proper ground for
serious complaint against a judge, it is the right and duty of a lawyer to submit his
grievances to the proper authorities, but the public interest and the administration of
the law demand that the courts should have the confidence and respect of the
people. Unjust criticism, insulting language, and offensive conduct toward the judges
personally by attorneys, who are officers of the court, which tend to bring the courts
and the law into disrepute and to destroy public confidence in their integrity, cannot
be permitted. The letter written to the judge was plainly an attempt to intimidate and
influence him in the discharge of judicial functions, and the bringing of the
unauthorized suit, together with the write-up in the Sunday papers, was intended and
calculated to bring the court into disrepute with the public.
5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state of being influenced by
corruption and greed, saying that the seats of the Supreme Court were bartered. It does not appear
that the attorney had criticized any of the opinions or decisions of the Court. The lawyer was charged
with unprofessional conduct, and was ordered suspended for a period of two years. The Court said:

A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to weaken the authority of the
court against whose members it was made, bring its judgments into contempt,
undermine its influence as an unbiased arbiter of the people's right, and interfere with
the administration of justice. ...

Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not, under the guise of
disciplinary proceedings, deprive him of any part of that freedom of speech which he
possesses as a citizen. The acts and decisions of the courts of this state, in cases
that have reached final determination, are not exempt from fair and honest comment
and criticism. It is only when an attorney transcends the limits of legitimate criticism
that he will be held responsible for an abuse of his liberty of speech. We well
understand that an independent bar, as well as independent court, is always a
vigilant defender of civil rights. In Re Troy, 111 Atl. 723. 725.

6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended for six months for submitting to an
appellate court an affidavit reflecting upon the judicial integrity of the court from which the appeal
was taken. Such action, the Court said, constitutes unprofessional conduct justifying suspension
from practice, notwithstanding that he fully retracted and withdrew the statements, and asserted that
the affidavit was the result of an impulse caused by what he considered grave injustice. The Court
said:

We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing habit in the profession of
criticising the motives and integrity of judicial officers in the discharge of their duties,
and thereby reflecting on the administration of justice and creating the impression
that judicial action is influenced by corrupt or improper motives. Every attorney of this
court, as well as every other citizen, has the right and it is his duty, to submit charges
to the authorities in whom is vested the power to remove judicial officers for any
conduct or act of a judicial officer that tends to show a violation of his duties, or would
justify an inference that he is false to his trust, or has improperly administered the
duties devolved upon him; and such charges to the tribunal, if based upon
reasonable inferences, will be encouraged, and the person making them
protected. ... While we recognize the inherent right of an attorney in a case decided
against him, or the right of the Public generally, to criticise the decisions of the
courts, or the reasons announced for them, the habit of criticising the motives of
judicial officers in the performance of their official duties, when the proceeding is not
against the officers whose acts or motives are criticised, tends to subvert the
confidence of the community in the courts of justice and in the administration of
justice; and when such charges are made by officers of the courts, who are bound by
their duty to protect the administration of justice, the attorney making such charges is
guilty of professional misconduct.

7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this statement:

I accepted the decision in this case, however, with patience, barring possible
temporary observations more or less vituperative and finally concluded, that, as my
clients were foreigners, it might have been expecting too much to look for a decision
in their favor against a widow residing here.
The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:

... the expressions above set out, not only transcend the bounds of propriety and
privileged criticism, but are an unwarranted attack, direct, or by insinuation and
innuendo, upon the motives and integrity of this court, and make out a prima
facie case of improper conduct upon the part of a lawyer who holds a license from
this court and who is under oath to demean himself with all good fidelity to the court
as well as to his client.

The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney apologized to the Court.

8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an attorney published in a newspaper an
article in which he impugned the motives of the court and its members to try a case, charging the
court of having arbitrarily and for a sinister purpose undertaken to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus. The Court suspended the respondent for 30 days, saying that:

The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is one most subversive of
the public good, if the conduct of such members does not measure up to the
requirements of the law itself, as well as to the ethics of the profession. ...

The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial determination is of prime
importance under our system and ideals of government. No right thinking man would
concede for a moment that the best interest to private citizens, as well as to public
officials, whether he labors in a judicial capacity or otherwise, would be served by
denying this right of free speech to any individual. But such right does not have as its
corollary that members of the bar who are sworn to act honestly and honorably both
with their client and with the courts where justice is administered, if administered at
all, could ever properly serve their client or the public good by designedly misstating
facts or carelessly asserting the law. Truth and honesty of purpose by members of
the bar in such discussion is necessary. The health of a municipality is none the less
impaired by a polluted water supply than is the health of the thought of a community
toward the judiciary by the filthy wanton, and malignant misuse of members of the
bar of the confidence the public, through its duly established courts, has reposed in
them to deal with the affairs of the private individual, the protection of whose rights
he lends his strength and money to maintain the judiciary. For such conduct on the
part of the members of the bar the law itself demands retribution — not the court.

9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the filing of an affidavit by an attorney in
a pending action using in respect to the several judges the terms criminal corrupt, and wicked
conspiracies,," "criminal confederates," "colossal and confident insolence," "criminal prosecution,"
"calculated brutality," "a corrupt deadfall," and similar phrases, was considered conduct unbecoming
of a member of the bar, and the name of the erring lawyer was ordered stricken from the roll of
attorneys.

10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring attorney claimed that greater
latitude should be allowed in case of criticism of cases finally adjudicated than in those pending. This
lawyer wrote a personal letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Minnesota impugning
both the intelligence and the integrity of the said Chief Justice and his associates in the decisions of
certain appeals in which he had been attorney for the defeated litigants. The letters were published
in a newspaper. One of the letters contained this paragraph:
 You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no better right to it than the
burglar to his plunder. It seems like robbing a widow to reward a fraud, with the court
acting as a fence, or umpire, watchful and vigilant that the widow got no undue
advantage. ... The point is this: Is a proper motive for the decisions discoverable,
short of assigning to the court emasculated intelligence, or a constipation of morals
and faithlessness to duty? If the state bar association, or a committee chosen from
its rank, or the faculty of the University Law School, aided by the researches of its
hundreds of bright, active students, or if any member of the court, or any other
person, can formulate a statement of a correct motive for the decision, which shall
not require fumigation before it is stated, and quarantine after it is made, it will gratify
every right-minded citizen of the state to read it.

The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of the attorney for six months,
delivered its opinion as follows:

The question remains whether the accused was guilty of professional misconduct in
sending to the Chief Justice the letter addressed to him. This was done, as we have
found, for the very purpose of insulting him and the other justices of this court; and
the insult was so directed to the Chief Justice personally because of acts done by
him and his associates in their official capacity. Such a communication, so made,
could never subserve any good purpose. Its only effect in any case would be to
gratify the spite of an angry attorney and humiliate the officers so assailed. It would
not and could not ever enlighten the public in regard to their judicial capacity or
integrity. Nor was it an exercise by the accused of any constitutional right, or of any
privilege which any reputable attorney, uninfluenced by passion, could ever have any
occasion or desire to assert. No judicial officer, with due regard to his position, can
resent such an insult otherwise than by methods sanctioned by law; and for any
words, oral or written, however abusive, vile, or indecent, addressed secretly to the
judge alone, he can have no redress in any action triable by a jury. "The sending of a
libelous communication or libelous matter to the person defamed does not constitute
an actionable publication." 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1017. In these
respects the sending by the accused of this letter to the Chief Justice was wholly
different from his other acts charged in the accusation, and, as we have said, wholly
different principles are applicable thereto.

The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable; but so far as he
exercised the rights of a citizen, guaranteed by the Constitution and sanctioned by
considerations of public policy, to which reference has been made, he was immune,
as we hold, from the penalty here sought to be enforced. To that extent his rights as
a citizen were paramount to the obligation which he had assumed as an officer of this
court. When, however he proceeded and thus assailed the Chief Justice personally,
he exercised no right which the court can recognize, but, on the contrary, willfully
violated his obligation to maintain the respect due to courts and judicial officers. "This
obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in
open court, but it includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and
offensive conduct toward the judges personally for their official acts."Bradley v.
Fisher, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 355, 20 L. Ed. 646. And there appears to be no distinction, as
regards the principle involved, between the indignity of an assault by an attorney
upon a judge, induced by his official act, and a personal insult for like cause by
written or spoken words addressed to the judge in his chambers or at his home or
elsewhere. Either act constitutes misconduct wholly different from criticism of judicial
acts addressed or spoken to others. The distinction made is, we think entirely logical
and well sustained by authority. It was recognized in Ex parte McLeod supra. While
 the court in that case, as has been shown, fully sustained the right of a citizen to
criticise rulings of the court in actions which are ended, it held that one might be
summarily punished for assaulting a judicial officer, in that case a commissioner of
the court, for his rulings in a cause wholly concluded. "Is it in the power of any
person," said the court, "by insulting or assaulting the judge because of official acts, if
only the assailant restrains his passion until the judge leaves the building, to compel
the judge to forfeit either his own self-respect to the regard of the people by tame
submission to the indignity, or else set in his own person the evil example of
punishing the insult by taking the law in his own hands? ... No high-minded, manly
man would hold judicial office under such conditions."

That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge personally, constitutes

professional delinquency for which a professional punishment may be imposed, has
been directly decided. "An attorney who, after being defeated in a case, wrote a
personal letter to the trial justice, complaining of his conduct and reflecting upon his
integrity as a justice, is guilty of misconduct and will be disciplined by the court."
Matter of Manheim 133 App. Div. 136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87 The same is held in Re
Griffin (City Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City Ct.) 3 N.Y. In the latter case it
appeared that the accused attorney had addressed a sealed letter to a justice of the
City Court of New York, in which it was stated, in reference to his decision: "It is not
law; neither is it common sense. The result is I have been robbed of 80." And it was
decided that, while such conduct was not a contempt under the state, the matter
should be "called to the attention of the Supreme Court, which has power to
discipline the attorney." "If," says the court, "counsel learned in the law are permitted
by writings leveled at the heads of judges, to charge them with ignorance, with unjust
rulings, and with robbery, either as principals or accessories, it will not be long before
the general public may feel that they may redress their fancied grievances in like
manner, and thus the lot of a judge will be anything but a happy one, and the
administration of justice will fall into bad repute."

The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in this respect much
the same as the case at bar. The accused, an attorney at law, wrote and mailed a
letter to the circuit judge, which the latter received by due course of mail, at his
home, while not holding court, and which referred in insulting terms to the conduct of
the judge in a cause wherein the accused had been one of the attorneys. For this it
was held that the attorney was rightly disbarred in having "willfully failed to maintain
respect due to him [the judge] as a judicial officer, and thereby breached his oath as
an attorney." As recognizing the same principle, and in support of its application to
the facts of this case, we cite the following: Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.) 364, 19 L.
Ed. 214; Beene v. State, 22 Ark. 149;Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas.
408; People v. Green, 7 Colo 237, 244, 3 Pac. 65, 374, 49 Am. Rep. 351; Smith's
Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36 Atl. 134; Scouten's Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481.

Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have been so far sustained
as to make it our duty to impose such a penalty as may be sufficient lesson to him
and a suitable warning to others. ...

11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court affirmed a lawyer's suspension for 18 months for
publishing a letter in a newspaper in which he accused a judge of being under the sinister influence
of a gang that had paralyzed him for two years.
12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an attorney's unjustifiable attack against the
official acts and decisions of a judge constitutes "moral turpitude." There, the attorney was disbarred
for criticising not only the judge, but his decisions in general claiming that the judge was dishonest in
reaching his decisions and unfair in his general conduct of a case.

13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published newspaper articles after the trial of cases,
criticising the court in intemperate language. The invariable effect of this sort of propaganda, said the
court, is to breed disrespect for courts and bring the legal profession into disrepute with the public,
for which reason the lawyer was disbarred.

14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied with the loss of a case, prepared
over a period of years vicious attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma Supreme Court declared that his
acts involved such gross moral turpitude as to make him unfit as a member of the bar. His
disbarment was ordered, even though he expressed an intention to resign from the bar.

The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive affluence of judicial
pronouncements is indubitable: Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers, critical of
the courts and their judicial actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, which transcend the
permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tend to bring them into
disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their integrity and in the orderly administration of justice,
constitute grave professional misconduct which may be visited with disbarment or other lesser
appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme Court in the exercise of the prerogatives inherent
in it as the duly constituted guardian of the morals and ethics of the legal fraternity.

Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the face of unwarranted outbursts of
counsel such as those catalogued in the above-cited jurisprudence. Cases of comparable nature
have generally been disposed of under the power of courts to punish for contempt which, although
resting on different bases and calculated to attain a different end, nevertheless illustrates that
universal abhorrence of such condemnable practices.

A perusal of the more representative of these instances may afford enlightenment.

1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the denial of his motion for
reconsideration as "absolutely erroneous and constituting an outrage to the rigths of the petitioner
Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls," this Court, although
conceding that

It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his
client, should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not,
and never will be so for him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or
proceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts requires.
The reason for this is that respect for the courts guarantees the stability of their
institution. Without such guaranty, said institution would be resting on a very shaky
foundation,

found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the statements made disclosed

... an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional contempt
of its dignity, because the court is thereby charged with no less than having
proceeded in utter disregard of the laws, the rights to the parties, and 'of the
untoward consequences, or with having abused its power and mocked and flouted
the rights of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client ... .
2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the author of the Press Freedom Law, reaching
to, the imprisonment for contempt of one Angel Parazo, who, invoking said law, refused to divulge
the source of a news item carried in his paper, caused to be published in i local newspaper a
statement expressing his regret "that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said
law, but it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority
of its members," and his belief that "In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately
committed during these last years, ... the only remedy to put an end to go much evil, is to change the
members of the Supreme Court," which tribunal he denounced as "a constant peril to liberty and
democracy" and "a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of justice of those memorable times of
Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor
and glory of the Philippine Judiciary." He there also announced that one of the first measures he
would introduce in then forthcoming session of Congress would have for its object the complete
reorganization of the Supreme Court. Finding him in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and
his invocation of the guarantee of free speech, this Court declared:

But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in the

press, the respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the
Parazo case, which was then and still is pending consideration by this Court upon
petition of Angel Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate the members of this Court
with the presentation of a bill in the next Congress, of which he is one of the
members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the number of Justices from
eleven, so as to change the members of this Court which decided the Parazo case,
who according to his statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in order to
influence the final decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct
the administration of justice. But the respondent also attacks the honesty and
integrity of this Court for the apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court
into disrepute and degrading the administration. of justice ... .

To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing
deliberately so many blunders and injustices, that is to say, that it has been deciding
in favor of Que party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse
party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases
decided during the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of
the people in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and
consequently to lower ,or degrade the administration of justice by this Court. The
Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which
the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their
rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the
honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot
expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands,
and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar and an
officer of the courts, Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the
dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he
has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which
without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation.

Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that

... an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful in

his conduct and communication to the courts; he may be removed from office or
 stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct (17 L.R.A.
[N.S.], 586, 594.)

3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et al.,
supra, where counsel charged this Court with having "repeatedly fallen" into ,the pitfall of blindly
adhering to its previous "erroneous" pronouncements, "in disregard of the law on jurisdiction" of the
Court of Industrial Relations, our condemnation of counsel's misconduct was unequivocal.
Articulating the sentiments of the Court, Mr. Justice Sanchez stressed:

As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in the motion for
reconsideration, implications there are which inescapably arrest attention. It speaks
of one pitfall into which this Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the jurisdiction of
the Court of Industrial Relations comes into question. That pitfall is the tendency of
this Court to rely on its own pronouncements in disregard of the law on jurisdiction. It
makes a sweeping charge that the decisions of this Court, blindly adhere to earlier
rulings without as much as making any reference to and analysis of the pertinent
statute governing the jurisdiction of the industrial court. The plain import of all these
is that this Court is so patently inept that in determining the jurisdiction of the
industrial court, it has committed error and continuously repeated that error to the
point of perpetuation. It pictures this Court as one which refuses to hew to the line
drawn by the law on jurisdictional boundaries. Implicit in the quoted statements is
that the pronouncements of this Court on the jurisdiction of the industrial court are
not entitled to respect. Those statements detract much from the dignity of and
respect due this Court. They bring into question the capability of the members — and
some former members of this Court to render justice. The second paragraph quoted
yields a tone of sarcasm which counsel labelled as "so called" the "rule against
splitting of jurisdiction."

Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other cases 18 which, in the interest of
brevity, need not now be reviewed in detail.

Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited cases — all of them involved
contumacious statements made in pleadings filed pending litigation. So that, in line with the doctrinal
rule that the protective mantle of contempt may ordinarily be invoked only against scurrilous remarks
or malicious innuendoes while a court mulls over a pending case and not after the conclusion
thereof, 19 Atty. Almacen would now seek to sidestep the thrust of a contempt charge by his studied
emphasis that the remarks for which he is now called upon to account were made only after this
Court had written finis to his appeal. This is of no moment.

The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has terminated, has lost much of its vitality.
For sometime, this was the prevailing view in this jurisdiction. The first stir for a modification thereof,
however, came when, inPeople vs. Alarcon, 20 the then Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran dissented
with the holding of the majority, speaking thru Justice Jose P. Laurel, which upheld the rule above-
adverted to. A complete disengagement from the settled rule was later to be made in In re
Brillantes, 21 a contempt proceeding, where the editor of the Manila Guardianwas adjudged in
contempt for publishing an editorial which asserted that the 1944 Bar Examinations were conducted
in a farcical manner after the question of the validity of the said examinations had been resolved and
the case closed. Virtually, this was an adoption of the view expressed by Chief Justice Moran in his
dissent inAlarcon to the effect that them may still be contempt by publication even after a case has
been terminated. Said Chief Justice Moran in Alarcon:
 A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in
administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt
which is 'summarily punishable by courts. A publication which tends to degrade the
courts and to destroy public confidence in them or that which tends to bring them in
any way into disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal contempt, and is equally
punishable by courts. What is sought, in the first kind of contempt, to be shielded
against the influence of newspaper comments, is the all-important duty of the courts
to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. In the second kind of
contempt, the punitive hand of justice is extended to vindicate the courts from any act
or conduct calculated to bring them into disfavor or to destroy public confidence in
them. In the first there is no contempt where there is no action pending, as there is
no decision which might in any way be influenced by the newspaper publication. In
the second, the contempt exists, with or without a pending case, as what is sought to
be protected is the court itself and its dignity. Courts would lose their utility if public
confidence in them is destroyed.

Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance that his statements and
actuations now under consideration were made only after the judgment in his client's appeal had
attained finality. He could as much be liable for contempt therefor as if it had been perpetrated
during the pendency of the said appeal.

More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be held liable for contempt for
such post litigation utterances and actuations, is here immaterial. By the tenor of our Resolution of
November 17, 1967, we have confronted the situation here presented solely in so far as it concerns
Atty. Almacen's professional identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an officer of this
Court, in the exercise of the disciplinary power the morals inherent in our authority and duty to
safeguard and ethics of the legal profession and to preserve its ranks from the intrusions of
unprincipled and unworthy disciples of the noblest of callings. In this inquiry, the pendency or non-
pendency of a case in court is altogether of no consequence. The sole objective of this proceeding is
to preserve the purity of the legal profession, by removing or suspending a member whose
misconduct has proved himself unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
belonging to the office of an attorney.

Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional mandate, 22 our is the solemn
duty, amongst others, to determine the rules for admission to the practice of law. Inherent in this
prerogative is the corresponding authority to discipline and exclude from the practice of law those
who have proved themselves unworthy of continued membership in the Bar. Thus —

The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an inherent and
incidental power in courts of record, and one which is essential to an orderly discharge of
judicial functions. To deny its existence is equivalent to a declaration that the conduct of
attorneys towards courts and clients is not subject to restraint. Such a view is without
support in any respectable authority, and cannot be tolerated. Any court having the right
to admit attorneys to practice and in this state that power is vested in this court-has the
inherent right, in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion to exclude them from
practice. 23

This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a representation to all that he is
worthy of their confidence and respect. So much so that —

... whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is no longer worthy of the
trust and confidence of the public and of the courts, it becomes, not only the right, but the
duty, of the court which made him one of its officers, and gave him the privilege of
 ministering within its bar, to withdraw the privilege. Therefore it is almost universally held
that both the admission and disbarment of attorneys are judicial acts, and that one is
admitted to the bar and exercises his functions as an attorney, not as a matter of right,
but as a privilege conditioned on his own behavior and the exercise of a just and sound
judicial discretion. 24

Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above being a mere inherent
or incidental power. It has been elevated to an express mandate by the Rules of Court. 25

Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now proceed to make an assessment
of whether or not the utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in question are properly the
object of disciplinary sanctions.

The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely potestative on Atty. Almacen's
part. Unorthodox though it may seem, no statute, no law stands in its way. Beyond making the mere
offer, however, he went farther. In haughty and coarse language, he actually availed of the said
move as a vehicle for his vicious tirade against this Court. The integrated entirety of his petition
bristles with vile insults all calculated to drive home his contempt for and disrespect to the Court and
its members. Picturing his client as "a sacrificial victim at the altar of hypocrisy," he categorically
denounces the justice administered by this Court to be not only blind "but also deaf and dumb." With
unmitigated acerbity, he virtually makes this Court and its members with verbal talons, imputing to
the Court the perpetration of "silent injustices" and "short-cut justice" while at the same time branding
its members as "calloused to pleas of justice." And, true to his announced threat to argue the cause
of his client "in the people's forum," he caused the publication in the papers of an account of his
actuations, in a calculated effort ;to startle the public, stir up public indignation and disrespect toward
the Court. Called upon to make an explanation, he expressed no regret, offered no apology. Instead,
with characteristic arrogance, he rehashed and reiterated his vituperative attacks and, alluding to the
Scriptures, virtually tarred and feathered the Court and its members as inveterate hypocrites
incapable of administering justice and unworthy to impose disciplinary sanctions upon him.

The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral argumentation speaks
for itself. The vicious language used and the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far transcend the
permissible bounds of legitimate criticism. They could never serve any purpose but to gratify the
spite of an irate attorney, attract public attention to himself and, more important of all, bring ;this
Court and its members into disrepute and destroy public confidence in them to the detriment of the
orderly administration of justice. Odium of this character and texture presents no redeeming feature,
and completely negates any pretense of passionate commitment to the truth. It is not a whit less
than a classic example of gross misconduct, gross violation of the lawyer's oath and gross
transgression of the Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be allowed to go unrebuked. The
way for the exertion of our disciplinary powers is thus laid clear, and the need therefor is
unavoidable.

We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like any other
Government entity in a viable democracy, the Court is not, and should not be, above criticism. But a
critique of the Court must be intelligent and discriminating, fitting to its high function as the court of
last resort. And more than this, valid and healthy criticism is by no means synonymous to obloquy,
and requires detachment and disinterestedness, real qualities approached only through constant
striving to attain them. Any criticism of the Court must, possess the quality of judiciousness and must
be informed -by perspective and infused by philosophy. 26

It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in ;the premises, that, as
Atty. Almacen would have appear, the members of the Court are the "complainants, prosecutors and
judges" all rolled up into one in this instance. This is an utter misapprehension, if not a total
distortion, not only of the nature of the proceeding at hand but also of our role therein.

Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis.
Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not — and does not involve — a trial of an
action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. 27 Not being
intended to. inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a
plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. 28 Public interest is its
primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit
person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the
Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court
with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved
themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the
office of an attorney. 29 In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or
a prosecutor.

Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade against
the Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so against the individual members
thereof. But in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity separate and
distinct from the individual personalities of its members. Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a
collegiate court, the individual members act not as such individuals but. only as a duly constituted
court. Their distinct individualities are lost in the majesty of their office.30 So that, in a very real sense,
if there be any complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the Court itself, not the individual
members thereof — as well as the people themselves whose rights, fortunes and properties, nay,
even lives, would be placed at grave hazard should the administration of justice be threatened by the
retention in the Bar of men unfit to discharge the solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal
fraternity.

Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of the
power to admit persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this power is vested exclusively in
this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction
legally invested upon it. 31 So that even if it be conceded that the members collectively are in a sense
the aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and cannot disqualify them from the exercise of that
power because public policy demands that they., acting as a Court, exercise the power in all cases
which call for disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In the end, the imagined anomaly of
the merger in one entity of the personalities of complainant, prosecutor and judge is absolutely
inexistent.

Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the sanctions that may be visited upon Atty.
Almacen for his transgressions. As marked out by the Rules of Court, these may range from mere
suspension to total removal or disbarment. 32 The discretion to assess under the circumstances the
imposable sanction is, of course, primarily addressed to the sound discretion of the Court which,
being neither arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, should ever
be controlled by the imperative need that the purity and independence of the Bar be scrupulously
guarded and the dignity of and respect due to the Court be zealously maintained.

That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be

overemphasized. However, heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never be decreed
where a lesser sanction would accomplish the end desired, and believing that it may not perhaps be
futile to hope that in the sober light of some future day, Atty. Almacen will realize that abrasive
language never fails to do disservice to an advocate and that in every effervescence of candor there
is ample room for the added glow of respect, it is our view that suspension will suffice under the
circumstances. His demonstrated persistence in his misconduct by neither manifesting repentance
nor offering apology therefor leave us no way of determining how long that suspension should last
and, accordingly, we are impelled to decree that the same should be indefinite. This, we are
empowered to do not alone because jurisprudence grants us discretion on the matter 33 but also
because, even without the comforting support of precedent, it is obvious that if we have authority to
completely exclude a person from the practice of law, there is no reason why indefinite suspension,
which is lesser in degree and effect, can be regarded as falling outside of the compass of that
authority. The merit of this choice is best shown by the fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to
determine for himself how long or how short that suspension shall last. For, at any time after the
suspension becomes effective he may prove to this Court that he is once again fit to resume the
practice of law.

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is
hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect
immediately.

Let copies of this resolution. be furnished the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General and the
Court of Appeals for their information and guidance.

Concepcion,. C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Teehankee, Barredo and
Villamor JJ., concur.

Fernando, J., took no part.

G.R. No. L-19450 May 27, 1965

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Magno T. Buese for defendant-appellant.

PAREDES, J.:

On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva with
the Crime of Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. Said
accused was represented by counsel de officio but later on replaced by counsel de parte. The
complainant in the same case was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City,
having entered his appearance as private prosecutor, after securing the permission of the Secretary
of Justice. The condition of his appearance as such, was that every time he would appear at the trial
of the case, he would be considered on official leave of absence, and that he would not receive any
payment for his services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was
questioned by the counsel for the accused, invoking the case of Aquino, et al. vs. Blanco, et al.,
L-1532, Nov. 28, 1947, wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney had been appointed to the
position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he
ceased to engage in private law practice." Counsel then argued that the JP Court in entertaining the
appearance of City Attorney Fule in the case is a violation of the above ruling. On December 17,
1960 the JP issued an order sustaining the legality of the appearance of City Attorney Fule.

Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule
from Acting as Private Prosecutor in this Case," this time invoking Section 32, Rule 27, now Sec. 35,
Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing. Counsel claims that
City Attorney Fule falls under this limitation. The JP Court ruled on the motion by upholding the right
of Fule to appear and further stating that he (Fule) was not actually enagaged in private law practice.
This Order was appealed to the CFI of Laguna, presided by the Hon. Hilarion U. Jarencio, which
rendered judgment on December 20, 1961, the pertinent portions of which read:

The present case is one for malicious mischief. There being no reservation by the offended
party of the civil liability, the civil action was deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal
action. The offended party had, therefore, the right to intervene in the case and be
represented by a legal counsel because of her interest in the civil liability of the accused.

Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice of the peace a
party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him
for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in the
Justice of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of the offended party. It does not appear
that he was being paid for his services or that his appearance was in a professional capacity.
As Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo he had no control or intervention whatsoever in the
prosecution of crimes committed in the municipality of Alaminos, Laguna, because the
prosecution of criminal cases coming from Alaminos are handled by the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal and not by the City Attornev of San Pablo. There could be no possible
conflict in the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule as Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo
and as private prosecutor in this criminal case. On the other hand, as already pointed out,
the offended party in this criminal case had a right to be represented by an agent or a friend
to protect her rights in the civil action which was impliedly instituted together with the criminal
action.

In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule may appear
before the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor in this
criminal case as an agent or a friend of the offended party.

WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos,
Laguna, allowing the apprearance of Ariston D. Fule as private prosecutor is dismissed,
without costs.

The above decision is the subject of the instant proceeding.

The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being without merits. 1äwphï1.ñët

Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge, heretofore reproduced, and which
we consider plausible, the fallacy of the theory of defense counsel lies in his confused interpretation
of Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules), which provides that "no judge or
other official or employee of the superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage
in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients." He claims that City
Attorney Fule, in appearing as private prosecutor in the case was engaging in private practice. We
believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice within
the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it
consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is
frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of
law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding
one's self out to the public, as customarily and demanding payment for such services (State vs.
Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive
as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. The following observation of the
Solicitor General is noteworthy:

Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to
be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional
services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services.

For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his
immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is
a relative.

CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it is
hereby affirmed, in all respects, with costs against appellant..

Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and
Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., took no part.

Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,

vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.

R E SO L U T I O N

REGALADO, J.:

Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing advertisements
similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition) and to perpetually
prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law
profession other than those allowed by law."

The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:

Annex A

SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
 Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.

THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am— 6:00
pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.

Annex B

GUAM DIVORCE.

DON PARKINSON

an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal
Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.

Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-

quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina
Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina
Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.

THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC,
INC. 1 Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous,
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in
the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed
and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore
quoted.

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement at its
instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support
services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines.
Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of
advertising these services should be allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, 2 reportedly
decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.

Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we required
the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine
Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers
Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to
submit their respective position papers on the controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The
said bar associations readily responded and extended their valuable services and cooperation of
which this Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude.

The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered by
respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case,
whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.

Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper and
enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the
aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in
this bar matter.

1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:

xxx xxx xxx

Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish

the two terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common sense
would readily dictate that the same are essentially without substantial distinction. For
who could deny that document search, evidence gathering, assistance to layman in
need of basic institutional services from government or non-government agencies
like birth, marriage, property, or business registration, obtaining documents like
clearance, passports, local or foreign visas, constitutes practice of law?

xxx xxx xxx

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with
respondent's foreign citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its position
manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the
effect that today it is alright to advertise one's legal services).

The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's act
of establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same through
newspaper publications.

The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable Court to
perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking highly unethical activities in the field of
law practice as aforedescribed. 4

xxx xxx xxx

A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that respondent
corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal services.

While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the
advertisements in question give the impression that respondent is offering legal
services. The Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned,
apparently because this (is) the effect that the advertisements have on the reading
public.

The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all,
to the very name being used by respondent — "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name,
it is respectfully submitted connotes the rendering of legal services for legal
problems, just like a medical clinic connotes medical services for medical problems.
More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic
connotes doctors.

Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements subject of

the present case, appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces
the impression that it is being operated by members of the bar and that it offers legal
services. In addition, the advertisements in question appear with a picture and name
of a person being represented as a lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes
whatever doubt may still remain as to the nature of the service or services being
offered.

It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support

services" as claimed by it, or whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively
engaged in law practice does. And it becomes unnecessary to make a distinction
between "legal services" and "legal support services," as the respondent would have
it. The advertisements in question leave no room for doubt in the minds of the
reading public that legal services are being offered by lawyers, whether true or not.

B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts

contrary to law, morals, public order and public policy.

It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question

are only meant to inform the general public of the services being offered by it. Said
advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam divorce, and any law student ought to
know that under the Family Code, there is only one instance when a foreign divorce
is recognized, and that is:

Article 26. . . .

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly

celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.

It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows:

Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent union between a

man and woman entered into accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the
family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property
relation during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message

being conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage
celebrated in accordance with our law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is
not only misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce, violation of Philippine law.
At the very least, this can be considered "the dark side" of legal practice, where
certain defects in Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is
outright malpractice.

Rule 1.02. — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at

defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.

In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that
shown in Annex "A" of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with
the words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems to address those planning a
"secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret marriage," makes light of the "special
contract of permanent union," the inviolable social institution," which is how the
Family Code describes marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity and inviolability.
Worse, this particular advertisement appears to encourage marriages celebrated in
secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral publication of applications for a marriage
license.

If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be concluded
that the above impressions one may gather from the advertisements in question are
accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone confirms what the
advertisements suggest. Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged
or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the
jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not extend to the place where the crime is
committed.

Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services" respondent offers
do not constitute legal services as commonly understood, the advertisements in
question give the impression that respondent corporation is being operated by
lawyers and that it offers legal services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical
consequence is that, in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader, members of the
bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the performance of acts which are
contrary to law, morals, good customs and the public good, thereby destroying and
demeaning the integrity of the Bar.

xxx xxx xxx

It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the

publication of the advertisements in question, or any other advertisements similar
thereto. It is also submitted that respondent should be prohibited from further
performing or offering some of the services it presently offers, or, at the very least,
from offering such services to the public in general.

The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic
data gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms, investigators for
gathering of evidence, and like services will greatly benefit the legal profession and
should not be stifled but instead encouraged. However, when the conduct of such
business by non-members of the Bar encroaches upon the practice of law, there can
be no choice but to prohibit such business.

Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed
by specialists in other fields, such as computer experts, who by reason of their
having devoted time and effort exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting
requirements for admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the
legal profession will deny the profession of the great benefits and advantages of
modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a computer will be doing better than a
lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.

Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate the
illegal practice of law in any form, not only for the protection of members of the Bar
but also, and more importantly, for the protection of the public. Technological
development in the profession may be encouraged without tolerating, but instead
ensuring prevention of illegal practice.

There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its

services, but only if such services are made available exclusively to members of the
Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering technical assistance, not legal
services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully distinguishing between
which service may be offered to the public in general and which should be made
available exclusively to members of the Bar may be undertaken. This, however, may
require further proceedings because of the factual considerations involved.

It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to be

prohibited outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad
of marriages which are bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under Philippine law.
While respondent may not be prohibited from simply disseminating information
regarding such matters, it must be required to include, in the information given, a
disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law, that certain course of action may
be illegal under Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable of rendering a legal
opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted before deciding on which course of action
to take, and that it cannot recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself
to possible sanctions for illegal practice of law.

If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at

members of the Bar, with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized
to practice law or perform legal services.

The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should be
allowed to represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such term being clearly
defined by rule or regulation, and without any adequate and effective means of regulating
his activities. Also, law practice in a corporate form may prove to be advantageous to the
legal profession, but before allowance of such practice may be considered, the
corporation's Article of Incorporation and By-laws must conform to each and every
provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Court. 5

2. Philippine Bar Association:

xxx xxx xxx.

Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in
giving legal support services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced paralegals,
with the use of modern computers and electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3,
Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding out itself to
the public under the trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment
for its enumerated services fall within the realm of a practice which thus yields itself
to the regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is
merely engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity. Respondent's own
commercial advertisement which announces a certainAtty. Don Parkinson to be
handling the fields of law belies its pretense. From all indications, respondent "The
Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and rendering legal services through its reserve of
lawyers. It has been held that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions, and
advising clients as to their legal right and then take them to an attorney and ask the
latter to look after their case in court See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed.,
p. 39).

It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and such
limitation cannot be evaded by a corporation employing competent lawyers to practice for
it. Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc."
holds out itself to the public and solicits employment of its legal services. It is an odious
vehicle for deception, especially so when the public cannot ventilate any grievance
for malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely, the limitation of practice of law to
persons who have been duly admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised
Rules of Court) is to subject the members to the discipline of the Supreme Court.
Although respondent uses its business name, the persons and the lawyers who act for it
are subject to court discipline. The practice of law is not a profession open to all who wish
to engage in it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal
right limited to persons who have qualified themselves under the law. It follows that not
only respondent but also all the persons who are acting for respondent are the persons
engaged in unethical law practice. 6

3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:

The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated herein,
are wit:

1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;

2. Such practice is unauthorized;

3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading and
patently immoral; and

4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the Legal
Clinic and its corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its
unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it merely
renders "legal support services" to answers, litigants and the general public as
enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation. (See
pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But its advertised services, as enumerated
above, clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed engaged in law practice, albeit
outside of court.

As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and
Family Relations Law, particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of
marriages, secret marriages, absence and adoption; Immigration Laws, particularly
on visa related problems, immigration problems; the Investments Law of the
Philippines and such other related laws.

Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid law, the
legal principles and procedures related thereto, the legal advices based thereon and
which activities call for legal training, knowledge and experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of
respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally term as
"the practice of law." 7

4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:

In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration should
be given to the protection of the general public from the danger of being exploited by
unqualified persons or entities who may be engaged in the practice of law.

At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of

study on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and
pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.

While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to the

administration of justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or
standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal with the general public as
such. While it may now be the opportune time to establish these courses of study
and/or standards, the fact remains that at present, these do not exist in the
Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable Court may decide to make measures to
protect the general public from being exploited by those who may be dealing with the
general public in the guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so.

In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the dangers which
may be brought about by advertising of legal services. While it appears that lawyers are
prohibited under the present Code of Professional Responsibility from advertising, it
appears in the instant case that legal services are being advertised not by lawyers but by
an entity staffed by "paralegals." Clearly, measures should be taken to protect the
general public from falling prey to those who advertise legal services without being
qualified to offer such services. 8

A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to give

the impression that information regarding validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of
marriage, immigration, visa extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and foreign
investment, which are in essence, legal matters , will be given to them if they avail of
its services. The Respondent's name — The Legal Clinic, Inc. — does not help
matters. It gives the impression again that Respondent will or can cure the legal
problems brought to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely
by paralegals, it also gives the misleading impression that there are lawyers involved
in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in any medical clinic, when only
"paralegals" are involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.

Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President and
majority stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and main
purpose of Respondent corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek" article." 9

5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:

Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the
purpose of gain which, as provided for under the above cited law, (are) illegal and
against the Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit
cases, but it is illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc.,
could work out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage which is not only illegal but
immoral in this country. While it is advertised that one has to go to said agency and
pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly fooling the public for valid marriages in
the Philippines are solemnized only by officers authorized to do so under the law.
And to employ an agency for said purpose of contracting marriage is not necessary.

No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is
towards allowing lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable people to obtain
from qualified practitioners legal services for their particular needs can justify the use
of advertisements such as are the subject matter of the petition, for one (cannot)
justify an illegal act even by whatever merit the illegal act may serve. The law has yet
to be amended so that such act could become justifiable.

We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret
marriages and divorce are possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is not so,
are highly reprehensible.

It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about
having a secret marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and
seek advice on divorce, where in this country there is none, except under the Code
of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also against good morals and is
deceitful because it falsely represents to the public to be able to do that which by our
laws cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals should not be done.

In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation for
clients by an attorney by circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional, and offenses of
this character justify permanent elimination from the Bar. 10

6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:

xxx xxx xxx

1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as management
consultancy firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or not, perform the
services rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein, however, the fact that
the business of respondent (assuming it can be engaged in independently of the
practice of law) involves knowledge of the law does not necessarily make respondent
guilty of unlawful practice of law.

. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can render

effective service unless he is familiar with such statutes and
regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a course of conduct
which the law forbids. It seems . . . .clear that (the consultant's)
knowledge of the law, and his use of that knowledge as a factor in
determining what measures he shall recommend, do not constitute
the practice of law . . . . It is not only presumed that all men know the
law, but it is a fact that most men have considerable acquaintance
with broad features of the law . . . . Our knowledge of the law —
accurate or inaccurate — moulds our conduct not only when we are
acting for ourselves, but when we are serving others. Bankers, liquor
dealers and laymen generally possess rather precise knowledge of
the laws touching their particular business or profession. A good
example is the architect, who must be familiar with zoning, building
and fire prevention codes, factory and tenement house statutes, and
who draws plans and specification in harmony with the law. This is
not practicing law.

But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower,
replies that it is required by the statute. Or the industrial relations
expert cites, in support of some measure that he recommends, a
decision of the National Labor Relations Board. Are they practicing
law? In my opinion, they are not, provided no separate fee is charged
for the legal advice or information, and the legal question is
subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem.

It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.

If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to

engage a lawyer to advise him and the architect in respect to the
building code and the like, then an architect who performed this
function would probably be considered to be trespassing on territory
reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the industrial relations
field had been pre-empted by lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer
always at the elbow of the lay personnel man. But this is not the case.
The most important body of the industrial relations experts are the
officers and business agents of the labor unions and few of them are
lawyers. Among the larger corporate employers, it has been the
practice for some years to delegate special responsibility in employee
matters to a management group chosen for their practical knowledge
and skill in such matter, and without regard to legal thinking or lack of
it. More recently, consultants like the defendants have the same
service that the larger employers get from their own specialized staff.

The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized

profession for which appropriate courses are offered by our leading
universities. The court should be very cautious about declaring [that]
a widespread, well-established method of conducting business is
unlawful, or that the considerable class of men who customarily
perform a certain function have no right to do so, or that the technical
education given by our schools cannot be used by the graduates in
their business.

In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider

his work for any particular client or customer, as a whole. I can
imagine defendant being engaged primarily to advise as to the law
defining his client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client's
obligations to his employees, to guide his client along the path
charted by law. This, of course, would be the practice of the law. But
such is not the fact in the case before me. Defendant's primarily
efforts are along economic and psychological lines. The law only
provides the frame within which he must work, just as the zoning
 code limits the kind of building the limits the kind of building the
architect may plan. The incidental legal advice or information
defendant may give, does not transform his activities into the practice
of law. Let me add that if, even as a minor feature of his work, he
performed services which are customarily reserved to members of
the bar, he would be practicing law. For instance, if as part of a
welfare program, he drew employees' wills.

Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the

employer in the adjustment of grievances and in collective
bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is not per se the practice
of law. Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and may select an
agent particularly skilled in the subject under discussion, and the
person appointed is free to accept the employment whether or not he
is a member of the bar. Here, however, there may be an exception
where the business turns on a question of law. Most real estate sales
are negotiated by brokers who are not lawyers. But if the value of the
land depends on a disputed right-of-way and the principal role of the
negotiator is to assess the probable outcome of the dispute and
persuade the opposite party to the same opinion, then it may be that
only a lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a controversy between
an employer and his men grows from differing interpretations of a
contract, or of a statute, it is quite likely that defendant should not
handle it. But I need not reach a definite conclusion here, since the
situation is not presented by the proofs.

Defendant also appears to represent the employer before

administrative agencies of the federal government, especially before
trial examiners of the National Labor Relations Board. An agency of
the federal government, acting by virtue of an authority granted by
the Congress, may regulate the representation of parties before such
agency. The State of New Jersey is without power to interfere with
such determination or to forbid representation before the agency by
one whom the agency admits. The rules of the National Labor
Relations Board give to a party the right to appear in person, or by
counsel, or by other representative. Rules and Regulations,
September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel' here means a licensed
attorney, and ther representative' one not a lawyer. In this phase of
his work, defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor Board
allows, even arguing questions purely legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53
A. 2d 800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp.
154-156.).

1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling
(which may involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law
provided that:

(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;.

(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar; .

(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.

All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a
whole.

1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional
Responsibility succintly states the rule of conduct:

Rule 15.08 — A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation

concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is
acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.

1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See
Annex "A" Petition). Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like securing a
marriage license, and making arrangements with a priest or a judge, may not
constitute practice of law. However, if the problem is as complicated as that
described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-
Richard Gomez case, then what may be involved is actually the practice of law. If a
non-lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such services then it is engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law.

1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence,
annulment of marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely giving
informational materials may not constitute of law. The business is similar to that of a
bookstore where the customer buys materials on the subject and determines on the
subject and determines by himself what courses of action to take.

It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information, the
Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply the law to the particular problem of the client,
and give legal advice. Such would constitute unauthorized practice of law.

It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which

publication of a legal text which purports to say what the law is
amount to legal practice. And the mere fact that the principles or rules
stated in the text may be accepted by a particular reader as a
solution to his problem does not affect this. . . . . Apparently it is urged
that the conjoining of these two, that is, the text and the forms, with
advice as to how the forms should be filled out, constitutes the
unlawful practice of law. But that is the situation with many approved
and accepted texts. Dacey's book is sold to the public at large. There
is no personal contact or relationship with a particular individual. Nor
does there exist that relation of confidence and trust so necessary to
the status of attorney and client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF
LEGAL PRACTICE — THE REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF
A PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most
the book assumes to offer general advice on common problems, and
does not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem
peculiar to a designated or readily identified person. Similarly the
defendant's publication does not purport to give personal advice on a
specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person
in a particular situation — in their publication and sale of the kits,
such publication and sale did not constitutes the unlawful practice of
law . . . . There being no legal impediment under the statute to the
sale of the kit, there was no proper basis for the injunction against
 defendant maintaining an office for the purpose of selling to persons
seeking a divorce, separation, annulment or separation agreement
any printed material or writings relating to matrimonial law or the
prohibition in the memorandum of modification of the judgment
against defendant having an interest in any publishing house
publishing his manuscript on divorce and against his having any
personal contact with any prospective purchaser. The record does
fully support, however, the finding that for the change of $75 or $100
for the kit, the defendant gave legal advice in the course of personal
contacts concerning particular problems which might arise in the
preparation and presentation of the purchaser's asserted matrimonial
cause of action or pursuit of other legal remedies and assistance in
the preparation of necessary documents (The injunction therefore
sought to) enjoin conduct constituting the practice of law, particularly
with reference to the giving of advice and counsel by the defendant
relating to specific problems of particular individuals in connection
with a divorce, separation, annulment of separation agreement
sought and should be affirmed. (State v. Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270
[1973], cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).

1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic, non-
advisory. "It is not controverted, however, that if the services "involve giving legal
advice or counselling," such would constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It
is in this light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be necessary for the
judicious disposition of this case.

xxx xxx xxx

2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or
perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage. With all the solemnities,
formalities and other requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code),
no Philippine marriage can be secret.

2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph thereof
(which is not necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only
"paralegal services?" or "legal support services", and not legal services, are available." 11

A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for the
proper determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the
clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial construction and interpretation. The
courts have laid down general principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the
term, some of which we now take into account.

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform
those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or
render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and
counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured,
although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types
of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and
obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not
possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess
power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to
assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law. 14

When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of
law. 15 One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the
business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing
law. 16 Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the
conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to the
proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18

In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid
down the test to determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not
limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but
embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds,
and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all
actions taken for them in matters connected with the law.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co.
v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the practice of law
when he:

. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms,

associations or corporations as to their right under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings, pending or prospective,
before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission
constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
representative capacity, performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights
under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside
of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v.
C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).

This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177),stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance
before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's
 claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters or estate and guardianship have been held to constitute
law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work
done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts
and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).

Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed
outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It
embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects and
the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of
business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have
no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become
involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and
complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law
bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid
distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn
between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and
that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of
importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be
performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral
character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which
rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.],
pp. 665-666, citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in
Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).

The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the
aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of
the aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice
of law."

The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously
considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services
it has been offering, to wit:

Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by trained paralegals
to laymen and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory, through the
extensive use of computers and modern information technology in the gathering,
processing, storage, transmission and reproduction of information and communication,
such as computerized legal research; encoding and reproduction of documents and
pleadings prepared by laymen or lawyers; document search; evidence gathering; locating
parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding investigations; and assistance to laymen in
need of basic institutional services from government or non-government agencies, like
birth, marriage, property, or business registrations; educational or employment records or
certifications, obtaining documentation like clearances, passports, local or foreign visas;
giving information about laws of other countries that they may find useful, like foreign
divorce, marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory to emigration to the
foreign country, and other matters that do not involve representation of clients in court;
designing and installing computer systems, programs, or software for the efficient
management of law offices, corporate legal departments, courts and other entities
engaged in dispensing or administering legal services. 20
While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and
technical knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient
management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials, these will not
suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.

What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and
lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than
real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it
strains the credulity of this Court that all the respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law,
furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys
and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and
advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law.
That is what its advertisements represent and for the which services it will consequently charge and
be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a
conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in
court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice,
contract drafting and so forth.

The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991
issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal
Problems," where an insight into the structure, main purpose and operations of respondent
corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:

This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with
offices on the seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in Manila. No
matter what the client's problem, and even if it is as complicated as the Cuneta-
Concepcion domestic situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like
doctors are "specialists" in various fields can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc.
has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation,
and family law. These specialist are backed up by a battery of paralegals,
counsellors and attorneys.

Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical
field toward specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford the services of the
big law firms.

The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start by
analyzing the problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask you how you
contracted what's bothering you, they take your temperature, they observe you for
the symptoms and so on. That's how we operate, too. And once the problem has
been categorized, then it's referred to one of our specialists.

There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up
treatment. These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like
preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our
staff or, if this were a hospital the residents or the interns. We can take care of these
matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa hospital, out-patient, hindi
kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common cold or diarrhea," explains Atty.
Nogales.

Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If you
had a rich relative who died and named you her sole heir, and you stand to inherit
 millions of pesos of property, we would refer you to a specialist in taxation. There would
be real estate taxes and arrears which would need to be put in order, and your relative is
even taxed by the state for the right to transfer her property, and only a specialist in
taxation would be properly trained to deal with the problem. Now, if there were other heirs
contesting your rich relatives will, then you would need a litigator, who knows how to
arrange the problem for presentation in court, and gather evidence to support the case. 21

That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is
important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders
which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which
it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding.

Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts
sufficiently establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for
various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple documentation to
complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the
domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law. 22

It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which
constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a
member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of
Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23

Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in
education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional
conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from the incompetence
or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the
court. 24

The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to draw
support for his thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to those who
meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes or rules
specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful business except for members of the bar
who have complied with all the conditions required by statute and the rules of court. Only those
persons are allowed to practice law who, by reason of attainments previously acquired through
education and study, have been recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of
legal science entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights claims, or liabilities
of their clients, with respect to the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The
justification for excluding from the practice of law those not admitted to the bar is found, not in the
protection of the bar from competition, but in the protection of the public from being advised and
represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons over whom the judicial
department can exercise little control. 27

We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the United
States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this
jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be a
matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has done.

Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are
schools and universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there
are none in the Philippines.28 As the concept of the "paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved in the
United States, standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of the major
standards or guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for
the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed to
certify legal assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the United States with their own
code of professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the
American Paralegal Association. 29

In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be
considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice
law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to render legal services,
but such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting
permission therefor. 30

Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional or
statutory authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the
proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized
and unskilled person into the practice of law. 31 That policy should continue to be one of encouraging
persons who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from
persons licensed to practice law in the state. 32

Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest,
fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit
the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement
or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something of value
to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal
business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of
Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements for
professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his
photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or
concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the
lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation. 36

The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer
cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a manner
similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The prescription against advertising of legal services
or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the that the practice of law is
a profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an
advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in the present proceeding, 39 was
held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.

The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the

respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business
from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that
"the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an
attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a
profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who
stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or
offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice
 with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of
Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young
lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of
character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).

We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a
well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the
outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community
has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of
effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus
to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-
product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40

Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession
enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which
they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those which are
expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41

The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the
standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data
must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his
professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law
practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of
graduation, degrees and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor;
legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and
committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other
reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the
names of clients regularly represented." 42

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally
for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and
informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer
permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management or contents of which are
calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the
profession. 43

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a
statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone
number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the
opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being
for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in
a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. 44

Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which respondent
is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent
corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the same definitely do not and
conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.

The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and
constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar.
Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an
exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees
for an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate
of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such exception is provided for, expressly or
impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional
Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the
exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such
authority in that state." 46 This goes to show that an exception to the general rule, such as that being
invoked by herein respondent, can be made only if and when the canons expressly provide for such
an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.

It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision in
Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was found
that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to these characteristics of lawyers:

Trustworthy from 71% to 14%

Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%

Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow
the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what
is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been
under attack lately by media and the community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost
importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that
level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high
esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.

In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to
advertise his services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice
of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder
and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded,
with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will
be dealt with more severely.

While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which
the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and determined, we are constrained to
refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the adjudicative
parameters of the present proceeding which is merely administrative in nature. It is, of course,
imperative that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a different proceeding and forum, since,
under the present state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized for or
engage in the practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule against unethical
advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the
alleged support services.

The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and province of
the Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after due
ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the grant of respondent's corporate charter, in
light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the
Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary under the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal
Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form
which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from
conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code
of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for
appropriate action in accordance herewith.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo,
Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur

.C. No. 5738 February 19, 2008

WILFREDO M. CATU, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA, respondent.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot1 and the building erected thereon located at 959
San Andres Street, Malate, Manila. His mother and brother, Regina Catu and Antonio Catu,
contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu2 and Antonio Pastor3 of one of the units in the
building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was
initiated against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of
Manila4 where the parties reside.

Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to conciliation

meetings.5 When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a
certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.

Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 11. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for
the defendants in that case. Because of this, complainant filed the instant administrative
complaint,6 claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public
officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the
conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay.

In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to hear
complaints referred to the barangay's Lupong Tagapamayapa. As such, he heard the complaint of
Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. As head of the Lupon, he performed his task with
utmost objectivity, without bias or partiality towards any of the parties. The parties, however, were
not able to amicably settle their dispute and Regina and Antonio filed the ejectment case. It was then
that Elizabeth sought his legal assistance. He acceded to her request. He handled her case for free
because she was financially distressed and he wanted to prevent the commission of a patent
injustice against her.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. As there was no factual issue to thresh out, the IBP's Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) required the parties to submit their respective position papers. After evaluating the
contentions of the parties, the IBP-CBD found sufficient ground to discipline respondent. 7

According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that, as punong barangay, he presided over the
conciliation proceedings and heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and
Pastor. Subsequently, however, he represented Elizabeth and Pastor in the ejectment case filed
against them by Regina and Antonio. In the course thereof, he prepared and signed pleadings
including the answer with counterclaim, pre-trial brief, position paper and notice of appeal. By so
doing, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he intervened while in said service.

Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition under Section 7(b)(2) of
RA 6713:8

SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions of public
officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following
shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official ands employee and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials and employees
during their incumbency shall not:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the

Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict
with their official functions; xxx (emphasis supplied)

According to the IBP-CBD, respondent's violation of this prohibition constituted a breach of Canon 1
of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND, PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. (emphasis supplied)

For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondent's suspension from the practice of
law for one month with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be dealt
with more severely.9 This was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors.10

We modify the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as the
recommendation on the imposable penalty.

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Applies Only to Former Government
Lawyers
Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. As worded, that Rule applies only to a lawyer who has left government service and in
connection "with any matter in which he intervened while in said service." In PCGG v.
Sandiganbayan,11 we ruled that Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting
"engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which [they] had intervened while in
said service."

Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act complained of.
Therefore, he was not covered by that provision.

Section 90 of RA 7160, Not Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, Governs The Practice of Profession of
Elective Local Government Officials

Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during their incumbency, from
engaging in the private practice of their profession "unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions." This is the
general law which applies to all public officials and employees.

For elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA 716012 governs:

SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. - (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited
from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their
functions as local chief executives.

(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach
in schools except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are
members of the Bar shall not:

(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government
unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;

(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the
national or local government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his
office;

(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the
local government unit of which he is an official; and

(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when

the sanggunian member concerned is defending the interest of the Government.

(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work only
on occasions of emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not derive monetary
compensation therefrom.

This is a special provision that applies specifically to the practice of profession by elective local
officials. As a special law with a definite scope (that is, the practice of profession by elective local
officials), it constitutes an exception to Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, the general law on engaging in
the private practice of profession by public officials and employees. Lex specialibus derogat
generalibus.13
Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays are the
following: the governor, the vice governor and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan for
provinces; the city mayor, the city vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang panlungsod for
cities; the municipal mayor, the municipal vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang
bayan for municipalities and the punong barangay, the members of the sangguniang barangay and
the members of the sangguniang kabataan for barangays.

Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are prohibited from
practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as
local chief executives. This is because they are required to render full time service. They should
therefore devote all their time and attention to the performance of their official duties.

On the other hand, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang

panlungsod or sangguniang bayanmay practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or
teach in schools except during session hours. In other words, they may practice their professions,
engage in any occupation, or teach in schools outside their session hours. Unlike governors, city
mayors and municipal mayors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,sangguniang
panlungsod or sangguniang bayan are required to hold regular sessions only at least once a
week.14 Since the law itself grants them the authority to practice their professions, engage in any
occupation or teach in schools outside session hours, there is no longer any need for them to secure
prior permission or authorization from any other person or office for any of these purposes.

While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial board
members and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice their
profession or engage in any occupation, no such interdiction is made on the punong barangay and
the members of the sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.15 Since they are
excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to practice their profession.
And this stands to reason because they are not mandated to serve full time. In fact, the sangguniang
barangay is supposed to hold regular sessions only twice a month.16

Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his profession.
However, he should have procured prior permission or authorization from the head of his
Department, as required by civil service regulations.

A Lawyer In Government Service Who Is Not Prohibited To Practice Law Must Secure Prior
Authority From The Head Of His Department

A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the
disposal of the government can engage in the private practice of law only with the written permission
of the head of the department concerned.17 Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules
provides:

Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation,
or professionor be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial
undertaking without a written permission from the head of the Department: Provided,
That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose
duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the
Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in
outside activities, time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to
the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or employee:
And provided, finally, that no permission is necessary in the case of investments, made by
an officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent conflict between his private
 interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he
shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or become an officer of the board of
directors. (emphasis supplied)

As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written permission of the
Secretary of Interior and Local Government before he entered his appearance as counsel for
Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do.

The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules
constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. Lawyers are servants of the
law, vires legis, men of the law. Their paramount duty to society is to obey the law and promote
respect for it. To underscore the primacy and importance of this duty, it is enshrined as the first
canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission, respondent not
only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil service rules which is a
breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct. (emphasis supplied)

For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of the
legal profession, respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:

CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE
DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis supplied)

Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and
disgraces the dignity of the legal profession.

Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper
conduct of a member of the bar.18 Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that
promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. 19

A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for violation of
the lawyer's oath20 and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional

misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
six months effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any repetition of
similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.

Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered into the records
of respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa. The Office of the Court Administrator shall furnish copies to
all the courts of the land for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

B.M. No. 712 March 19, 1997

RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYERS OATH

RESOLUTION

PADILLA, J.:

Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court however
deferred his oath-taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In
Homicide.

The criminal case which resulted in petitioner's conviction, arose from the death of a neophyte during
fraternity initiation rites sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other accused initially
entered pleas of not guilty to homicide charges. The eight (8) accused later withdrew their initial
pleas and upon re-arraignment all pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.

On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11 February 1993 imposing on
each of the accused a sentence of imprisonment of from two (2) years four (4) months :and one (1)
day to four (4) years.

On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for probation.

On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6 April 1994 submitted by
the Probation Officer recommending petitioner's discharge from probation.

On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath
based on the order of his discharge from probation.

On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a
resolution requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he may now be
regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking
admission to the bar.

In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15)
certifications/letters executed by among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6)
members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that a scholarship foundation
had been established in honor of Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint efforts of the
latter's family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal case.

On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty. Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment on
petitioner's prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.
In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:

a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the death of his son was
deliberate rather than accidental. The offense therefore was not only homicide but murder since the
accused took advantage of the neophyte's helplessness implying abuse of confidence, taking
advantage of superior strength and treachery.

b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide only out of pity for the mothers of the accused and a pregnant wife of one of the accused
who went to their house on Christmas day 1991 and Maundy Thursday 1992, literally on their knees,
crying and begging for forgiveness and compassion. They also told him that the father of one of the
accused had died of a heart attack upon learning of his son's involvement in the incident.

c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of his son. However, as
a loving father who had lost a son whom he had hoped would succeed him in his law practice, he
still feels the pain of an untimely demise and the stigma of the gruesome manner of his death.

d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the bar. He
therefore submits the matter to the sound discretion of the Court.

The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral
qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient administration of
justice. It is the sworn duty of this Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who have become a disgrace
to the noble profession of the law but, also of equal importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the
lawyer's oath, thereby further tarnishing the public image of lawyers which in recent years has
undoubtedly become less than irreproachable.

The resolution of the issue before us required weighing and reweighing of the reasons for allowing or
disallowing petitioner's admission to the practice of law. The senseless beatings inflicted upon Raul
Camaligan constituted evident absence of that moral fitness required for admission to the bar since
they were totally irresponsible, irrelevant and uncalled for.

In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:

. . . participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior, [which] makes

impossible a finding that the participant [herein petitioner] was then possessed of
good moral character. 1

In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared to consider de novo the
question of whether petitioner has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character
referred to above.

Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert Camaligan.
The death of one's child is, for a parent, a most traumatic experience. The suffering becomes even
more pronounced and profound in cases where the death is due to causes other than natural or
accidental but due to the reckless imprudence of third parties. The feeling then becomes a struggle
between grief and anger directed at the cause of death.

Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court- manifesting his having forgiven the accused is no less
than praiseworthy and commendable. It is exceptional for a parent, given the circumstances in this
case, to find room for forgiveness.
However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state if petitioner is now morally fit
to be a lawyer.

After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to
take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following
admonition:

In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not
inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout
Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service.

The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul
Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general
tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.

We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing
law. Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he
makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the
lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will
undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned.

The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been giving to
his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other services to
the more unfortunate members of society.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the

lawyer's oath on a date to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to
practice the legal profession.

SO ORDERED.

July 30, 1979

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE TO USE THE

FIRM NAME “OZAETA, ROMULO, ETC.

FACTS:

Two petitions. One petitioner prays for the continued use of the name
of Alexander Sycip – a deceased partner of the law firm. The other petition
prays for the continued use of the name of Herminio Ozaeta, likewise a
deceased partner of another law firm.

ISSUE/S:
WHETHER OR NOT SURVIVING PARTNERS MAY CONTINUE USING THE
DECEASED PARTNERS IN THEIR LAW FIRMS.

RULING:

Petition denied. The names of deceased partners may not be used

because in 1958, the Supreme Court ruled:

“After carefully considering the reasons given by Attorneys Alfonso

Ponce Enrile and Associates for their continued use of the name of the
deceased E. G. Perkins, the Court found no reason to depart from the policy
it adopted in June 1953 when it required Attorneys Alfred P. Deen of Cebu
City to desist from including in their firm designation, the name of C. D.
Johnston, deceased. The Court believes that, in view of the personal and
confidential nature of the relations between attorney and client, and the high
standards demanded in the canons of professional ethics, no practice should
be allowed which even in a remote degree could give rise to the possibility of
deception. Said attorneys are accordingly advised to drop the name
“PERKINS” from their firm name.”

The Courts finds no sufficient reason to depart from the rulings it laid
down.

“Inasmuch as “Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo” and

“Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta and Reyes” are partnerships, the use in
their partnership names of the namese of deceased partners will run counter
to Article 1815 of the Civil Code which provides:

Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operate under a firm name, which may
or may not include the name of one or more of the partners.

Those who, not being members of the partnership, include their names in
the firm name, shall be subject to the liability of a partner.”

The possibility of deception upon the public, real or consequential,

where the name of a deceased partner continues to be used cannot be ruled
out. A person in search of legal counsel might be guided by the familiar ring
of a distinguished name appearing in a firm title.
 Moreover, judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws form part
of the legal system. When the Supreme Court in the Deen and Perkins cases
issued its Resolutions directing lawyers to desist from including the names of
deceased partners in their firm designation, it laid down a legal rule against
which no custom or practice to the contrary, even if provern, can prevail.
This is not to speak of our civil law which clearly ordains that a partnership is
dissolved by the death of any partner. Customs which are contrary to law,
public order or public policy shall not be countenanced.

G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991

RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,

vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and
HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, respondents.

Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.

Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:p

We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues
are involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the
political aspect of our national existence.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:

There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six

Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time
of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and
must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding
-elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of
the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years. (Emphasis supplied)

The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which
similarly provides:

There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight

Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority
thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)

Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a

legal qualification to an appointive office.

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not
limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but
embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds,
and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all
actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the
practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using
a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters,
negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting
fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co.
v. Dworken,129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law
when he:

... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms,
associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective,
before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission
constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights
under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside
of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick
v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)

This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in mattersconnected with the law incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance
before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's
claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute
law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work
done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts
and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)
 Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed
outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It
embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and
the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of
business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have
no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become
involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and
complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law
bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid
distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn
between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and
that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of
importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be
performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral
character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which
rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] ,
p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted
in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144).
(Emphasis ours)

The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers
(1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy,
counselling and public service.

One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the

profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for
attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he follows some
one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within
the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render
any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or
skill." (111 ALR 23)

The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal
interpretation of the term "practice of law."

MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a

manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of the provisions
on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief
statement?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).

The Commissioner will please proceed.

MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the
Commission on Audit. Among others, the qualifications provided for
by Section I is that "They must be Members of the Philippine Bar" — I
 am quoting from the provision — "who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years".

To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar
who are now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make
the clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar
does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA We have
to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA
are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA,
then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as members or
commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.

This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and

Agencies and we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation
may be made available whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards
members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is
taken up.

MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a

lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that is set
forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?

MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although
it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal
work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now would
have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the Provision on
qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And,
therefore, the answer is yes.

MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is
equivalent to the practice of law.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Thank you.

... ( Emphasis supplied)

Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and
two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants
with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)

Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the
word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that
the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM
Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood,
means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.).
Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called
"firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may
be organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the
members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more
inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).

The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially
tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W.
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law
is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the
practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870
[1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because
lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a
definition would obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).

The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role
for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in
courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p.
593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much
of both the public image and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).

In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.).
Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the
importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed
laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The
members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most
developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the
courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that
in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as
business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner,
the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in
medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal
tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients,
and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig
usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow
specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to
an importantly different one such as representing a client before an administrative agency.
(Wolfram, supra, p. 687).

By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare
types — a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will
require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling,
advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of
evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).

Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very
important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of
adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some
lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which
the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles are
those of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).

In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in
corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.

We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in

corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those
members participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that
understanding the major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to
intelligent decision-making.

Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate

understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law research function
accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The recognition of
the need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-
making" and "contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of
traditional procedures in many decisional contexts.

In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and
weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the
necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of action, and the need
for fast decision and response in situations of acute danger have prompted the use
of sophisticated concepts of information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic
data processing, and electronic computing equipment. Understandably, an improved
decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the policy-making
process, wherein a "model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is
developed to test projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects
flowing therefrom.

Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and
projecting the trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received
relatively little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing
corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal
research has become a vital necessity.

Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained

primarily in the law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable
decisional context and the various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers,
particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in business administration or
management, functioning at the legal policy level of decision-making now have some
appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of other professions which
are currently engaged in similar types of complex decision-making.

Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the
services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise
from each and every necessary step in securing and maintaining the business issue
raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the
"abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a
clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and industry.

Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain
what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed
by a single corporation will vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many
smaller and some large corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law
firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation
have a staff large enough to handle most legal problems in-house.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal
affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia:
corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in
board meetings), appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies
(including the Securities and Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which
require an ability to deal with the law.

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal
affairs of the business of the corporation he is representing. These include such
matters as determining policy and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis
supplied.)

In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the
action, or not understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the
orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his
work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be
more closely involved in the running of the business.

Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a

multinational corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few
opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After
all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of companies and law
firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous, tills
is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas jobs
go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their "international
practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p.
4).

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To
borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer
is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties,
and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate
Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to
speak. No longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining
the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion
as well into the intertwining modern management issues.

Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of
learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular
significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skins
applicable to a corporate counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion
to the organization and management of the legal function itself.

These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared
area linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it
forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total learning.

Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For
that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the
resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required to
make, and the need to think about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The
salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with global
multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms
increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with each other — often with
those who are competitors in other arenas.

Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the

corporation is rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role
as a stakeholder — in some cases participating in the organization and operations of
governance through participation on boards and other decision-making roles. Often
these new patterns develop alongside existing legal institutions and laws are
perceived as barriers. These trends are complicated as corporations organize for
global operations. ( Emphasis supplied)

The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward
the promotion and management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for
promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require
approaches from industry that differ from older, more adversarial relationships and
traditional forms of seeking to influence governmental policies. And there are lessons
to be learned from other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples
of collaborative efforts between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world
famous. (Emphasis supplied)

Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel
comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of
organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within
organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the group-
context interaction such as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the
environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team achievements within
the organization. In general, such external activities are better predictors of team
performance than internal group processes.

In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis
the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking
ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand
relationships of financial liability and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)

Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:

First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective
tool for new managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate
problems. An understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates
of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems — physical,
economic, managerial, social, and psychological. New programming techniques now
make the system dynamics principles more accessible to managers — including
corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied)

Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving
complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to
appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize
the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)

Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used

directly by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such
tools provide coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on
instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture
may be used to illustrate the point.

[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern
three pointed areas of consideration, thus:

Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a

major part of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial
law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and
maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time when transactional or
similar facts are being considered and made.

Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those
activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly
supportive of this nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms
change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The practice and
theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to
make a global economy work.

Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general

counsel has emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the
legal profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the
firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global operations, managing improved
relationships with an increasingly diversified body of employees, managing expanded
liability exposure, creating new and varied interactions with public decision-makers,
coping internally with more complex make or by decisions.

This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough
to make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how
the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate lawyer's aim
is not the understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the
very least, also gain a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be
able to grasp not only the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem
corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).

The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a
passing knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many
would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires
 next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk
opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on
Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does
not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as

Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he
assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's

nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition
praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of
1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as
lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in
the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as
an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting
acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic,
and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco
Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business
conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and
economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National
Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He
appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy,
Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's
Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the
farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the
agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal
knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted
numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and
Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the
President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to
reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list
system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)

Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.

In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is
adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a
negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal
officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an operations
officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the
 members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for
Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines,
Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)

After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the
law as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan
Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business
terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5)
events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).

In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program.
For aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they
score national development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries'
sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development
Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal
adviser of the United States Agency for International Development, during the
Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in
Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31,
1973). ( Emphasis supplied)

Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely

renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and
agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work
with an international business specialist or an economist in the formulation of a
model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract agreements contain such a
mixture of technical language that they should be carefully drafted and signed only
with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of adequate
technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the Philippine
External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987,
p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied)

A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of

terms and conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to
perform one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only
define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the recourse open to
either party when the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt
restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis
is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in
domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but
where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and
serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign
Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third
and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern
concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the
framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-
manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator
of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the

officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that
the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the
appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified
who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations
of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)

No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171
SCRA 744) where it stated:

It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other
legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to
the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no
authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more
qualified for a particular position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of
a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion
vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the
discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the
appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)

The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1)
nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in
the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of
confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking,
posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on
Public Officers, p. 200)

The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of
the Constitution which provides:

The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven
years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of
the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.

Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition
of the practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as
distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law, which modern
connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987
Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would require generally a habitual
law practice, perhaps practised two or three times a week and would outlaw say, law
practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the
constitutional intent.

Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I
made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that
law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition
but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by
"traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the
phrase itself that is being defined.

Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most
individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually
practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a
lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This is
different from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.

Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the
Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt.
For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming
that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent
President?

We now proceed:

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by
law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is
beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such
grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment.
In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no
abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction
and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.

Additionally, consider the following:

(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the
Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment?
Clearly, the answer is in the negative.

(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission
has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.

(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress)
decides to confirma Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S.
Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.

Finally, one significant legal maxim is:

We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.

Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah
(who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —

No blade shall touch his skin;

 No blood shall flow from his veins.

When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning
white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon
hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming
with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied:
"Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying
on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.

In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 100643 December 12, 1995

ADEZ REALTY, INCORPORATED, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Br.
79, Morong Rizal, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR QUEZON CITY, and AGUEDO
EUGENIO, respondents.

RESOLUTION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

On 30 October 1992 the Court found movant, Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay, guilty of intercalating a
material fact in a decision of the Court of Appeals, which he appealed to this Court on certiorari,
thereby altering the factual findings of the Court of Appeals with the apparent purpose of misleading
this Court in order to obtain a favorable judgment. Consequently, Atty. Dacanay was disbarred from
the practice of law. 1

On 20 November 1992 movant filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Leave to Offer Evidence Re
Charge of Unauthorized Intercalation in a Judicial Record dated 18 November 1992. He claimed that
the inserted words were written by his client, the President of Adez Realty, Inc., in the draft of the
petition to be filed before the Supreme Court and unwittingly adopted by movant's secretary when
the latter formalized the petition. He manifested that he would not risk committing the act for which
he was found guilty considering that he was a nominee of the Judicial and Bar Council to the
President for appointment as regional trial judge. 2 But the Court on 3 December 1992 denied the
motion for want of a compelling reason to justify a reversal of the questioned resolution. 3

On 23 February 1994 movant Dacanay filed a Motion to Lift (Disbarment) stating that he was already
62 years old, has learned his lesson from his mistake, was terribly sorry for what he had done, and
in all candor promised that if given another chance he would live up to the exacting demands of the
legal profession. He appended to his motion certifications of good moral character from: Fr. Celso
Fernando, Parochial Vicar, Parish of St. Michael Archangel, Marilao, Bulacan; Fr. Lauro V. Larlar,
OAR, Rector, San Sebastian College-Recoletos; Sis. Aniceta B. Abion, EMM, Chairperson, Center
for Housing and Ecology Development Foundation, Inc.; Dean Rufus B. Rodriquez, College of Law,
San Sebastian College-Recoletos; Judge Pedro T. Santiago, Executive Judge, RTC, Quezon City;
Judge Teodoro P. Regino, RTC-Br. 84, Quezon City; Judge Antonio P. Solano, RTC-Br. 86, Quezon
City; and Judge Gregorio D. Dayrit, MTC-Br. 35, Quezon City. 4 However, on 11 August 1994 the
Court denied the motion. 5

On 1 December 1994 movant again filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Lift Disbarment alleging among
others that he had been deprived of his means to life; he had pursued civic, religious and community
work, especially for the poor and the underprivileged short of extending legal assistance because of
his incapacity; he had admitted "with profound regret and with utmost humility his commission of an
unpardonable mistake and ask(ed) that he be given another chance;" and, he was "remorseful for
what he has done and comes to this Honorable Court with a contrite heart." 6

His wife Norma M. Dacanay likewise wrote the Court on 1 December 1994 saying that while she did
not condone what her husband had done, it had been her fervent wish that the Court took a second
look into its decision disbarring her husband as her entire family had been traumatized by his
disbarment. 7

On 6 March 1995 movant sent a letter addressed to the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of
the Court reiterating his Ex-Parte Motion to Lift Disbarment of 1 December 1994. Thus —

I am truly penitent for the serious offense I committed and admit full responsibility for
it. I realize it was dishonest and unfair to pass the blame to my secretary who was
merely following my instructions. The intercalation was my own act and I am justly
punished for it.

Your Honors, I do not question your decision but I only beg for your mercy. I have a
wife and children to support but my only means of livelihood has been withdrawn
from me. I am destitute and desperate and can only turn to you for relief . . . .

Looking back, I cannot imagine how I could have even thought of blackening the law
profession, to which I owe so much. Please let me redeem myself by admitting me back
to its precincts, where I swear to live strictly according to its canons . . . . 8

On 21 March 1995 the Court noted the letter of 6 March 1995 of movant Dacanay.

On 4 August 1995 movant again prayed for his reinstatement —

It has been 33 long months since my disbarment, during which time I have been
struggling to make both ends meet to provide for my wife and three children. Please give
me the chance to prove that I am a reformed offender who will henceforth do nothing
whatsoever to dishonor the legal profession. 9

On 12 September 1995 the Court noted respondent's 4 August 1995 letter. 10

On 17 November, 1995 movant once more wrote the Court —

I humbly acknowledge again that I committed a grievous offense for which I was
justly punished at the time with the extreme sanction of disbarment.
 I have been suffering much since my disbarment more than 36 months ago, but it is my
wife and children who have suffered more for my transgression. Although innocent, they
bear with me the stigma and burden of my punishment. 11

The disbarment of movant Benjamin M. Dacanay for three (3) years has, quite apparently, given him
sufficient time and occasion to soul-search and reflect on his professional conduct, redeem himself
and prove once more that he is worthy to practice law and be capable of upholding the dignity of the
legal profession. His admission of guilt and repeated pleas for compassion and reinstatement show
that he is ready once more to meet the exacting standards the legal profession demands from its
practitioners. Accordingly, the Court lifts the disbarment of Benjamin M. Dacanay. However he
should be sternly warned that —

[T]he practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid
standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful
compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the conditions required for remaining
a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. The
Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal profession, has ultimate disciplinary power over
attorneys. This authority to discipline its members is not only a right, but a bounden duty
as well . . . That is why respect and fidelity to the Court is demanded of its members . . . 12

WHEREFORE, the disbarment of BENJAMIN M. DACANAY from the practice of law is LIFTED and
he is therefore allowed to resume the practice of law upon payment of the required legal fees. This
resolution is effective immediately.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr. and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

CBD Case No. 176 January 20, 1995

SALLY D. BONGALONTA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO and ALFONSO M. MARTIJA, respondents.

RESOLUTION

MELO, J.:

In a sworn letter-complaint dated February 15, 1995, addressed to the Commission on Bar
Discipline, National Grievance Investigation Office, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, complainant
Sally Bongalonta charged Pablito M. Castillo and Alfonso M. Martija, members of the Philippine Bar,
with unjust and unethical conduct, to wit: representing conflicting interests and abetting a scheme to
frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment which complainant might obtain.

The letter-complaint stated that complainant filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Criminal
Case No. 7635-55, for estafa, against the Sps. Luisa and Solomer Abuel. She also filed, a separate
civil action Civil Case No. 56934, where she was able to obtain a writ of preliminary attachment and
by virtue thereof, a piece of real property situated in Pasig, Rizal and registered in the name of the
Sps. Abuel under TCT No. 38374 was attached. Atty. Pablito Castillo was the counsel of the Sps.
Abuel in the aforesaid criminal and civil cases.

During the pendency of these cases, one Gregorio Lantin filed civil Case No. 58650 for collection of
a sum of money based on a promissory note, also with the Pasig Regional Trial Court, against the
Sps. Abuel. In the said case Gregorio Lantin was represented by Atty. Alfonso Martija. In this case,
the Sps. Abuel were declared in default for their failure to file the necessary responsive pleading and
evidence ex-parte was received against them followed by a judgment by default rendered in favor of
Gregorio Lantin. A writ of execution was, in due time, issued and the same property previously
attached by complainant was levied upon.

It is further alleged that in all the pleadings filed in these three (3) aforementioned cases, Atty.
Pablito Castillo and Atty. Alfonso Martija placed the same address, the same PTR and the same IBP
receipt number to wit" Permanent Light Center, No. 7, 21st Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City, PTR No.
629411 dated 11-5-89 IBP No. 246722 dated 1-12-88.

Thus, complainant concluded that civil Case No. 58650 filed by Gregorio Lantin was merely a part of
the scheme of the Sps. Abuel to frustrate the satisfaction of the money judgment which complainant
might obtain in Civil Case No. 56934.

After hearing, the IBP Board of Governors issued it Resolution with the following findings and
recommendations:

Among the several documentary exhibits submitted by Bongalonta and attached to

the records is a xerox copy of TCT No. 38374, which Bongalonta and the
respondents admitted to be a faithful reproduction of the original. And it clearly
appears under the Memorandum of Encumbrances on aid TCT that the Notice of
Levy in favor of Bongalonta and her husband was registered and annotated in said
title of February 7, 1989, whereas, that in favor of Gregorio Lantin, on October 18,
1989. Needless to state, the notice of levy in favor of Bongalonta and her husband is
a superior lien on the said registered property of the Abuel spouses over that of
Gregorio Lantin.

Consequently, the charge against the two respondents (i.e. representing conflicting
interests and abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a
judgment which Bongalonta and her husband might obtain against the Abuel
spouses) has no leg to stand on.

However, as to the fact that indeed the two respondents placed in their appearances
and in their pleadings the same IBP No. "246722 dated
1-12-88", respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo deserves to be SUSPENDED for using,
apparently thru his negligence, the IBP official receipt number of respondent Atty.
Alfonso M. Martija. According to the records of the IBP National Office, Atty. Castillo
paid P1,040.00 as his delinquent and current membership dues, on February 20,
 1990, under IBP O.R. No. 2900538, after Bongalonta filed her complaint with the IBP
Committee on Bar Discipline.

The explanation of Atty. Castillo's Cashier-Secretary by the name of Ester Fraginal

who alleged in her affidavit dated March 4, 1993, that it was all her fault in placing the
IBP official receipt number pertaining to Atty. Alfonso M. Martija in the appearance
and pleadings Atty. Castillo and in failing to pay in due time the IBP membership
dues of her employer, deserves scant consideration, for it is the bounded duty and
obligation of every lawyer to see to it that he pays his IBP membership dues on time,
especially when he practices before the courts, as required by the Supreme Court.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Pablito M. Castillo be

SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months for using the IBP
Official Receipt No. of his co-respondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija.

The complaint against Atty. Martija is hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence. (pp.
2-4, Resolution)

The Court agrees with the foregoing findings and recommendations. It is well to stress again that the
practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they
possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such
privilege. One of these requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. Courts are entitled to
expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A
lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation. for this reason, he is
required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court.

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo guilty committing a falsehood in violation
of his lawyer's oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND
him from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a warning that commission of the
same or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty. A copy of
the Resolution shall be spread on the personal record of respondent in the Office of the Bar
Confidant.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Vitug, JJ., concur.

BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999

RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR,

vs.

VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.

RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:

Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father
validly elect Philippine citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age of majority? This
is the question sought to be resolved in the present case involving the application for admission to
the Philippine Bar of Vicente D. Ching.

The facts of this case are as follows:

Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A.
Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Ching
has resided in the Philippines.

On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis
University in Baguio City, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution of
this Court, dated 1 September 1998, he was allowed to take the Bar Examinations, subject to the
condition that he must submit to the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship.

In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18 November 1998, the following
documents:

1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the Board of Accountancy of the

Professional Regulations Commission showing that Ching is a certified public
accountant;

2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, Election

Officer of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in Tubao La Union showing that
Ching is a registered voter of the said place; and

3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, showing

that Ching was elected as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union
during the 12 May 1992 synchronized elections.

On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were released and Ching was one of the
successful Bar examinees. The oath-taking of the successful Bar examinees was scheduled on 5
May 1999. However, because of the questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed
to take his oath. Pursuant to the resolution of this Court, dated 20 April 1999, he was required to
submit further proof of his citizenship. In the same resolution, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) was required to file a comment on Ching's petition for admission to the bar and on the
documents evidencing his Philippine citizenship.

The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching, being the "legitimate child of a
Chinese father and a Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen and
continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship" 1 in
strict compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An Act Providing for the
Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person Whose
Mother is a Filipino Citizen." The OSG adds that "(w)hat he acquired at best was only an inchoate
Philippine citizenship which he could perfect by election upon reaching the age of majority." 2 In this
regard, the OSG clarifies that "two (2) conditions must concur in order that the election of Philippine
citizenship may be effective, namely: (a) the mother of the person making the election must be a
citizen of the Philippines; and (b) said election must be made upon reaching the age of
majority." 3 The OSG then explains the meaning of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority:"

The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" has been construed to mean a
reasonable time after reaching the age of majority which had been interpreted by the
Secretary of Justice to be three (3) years (VELAYO, supra at p. 51 citing Op., Sec. of
Justice No. 70, s. 1940, Feb. 27, 1940). Said period may be extended under certain
circumstances, as when a (sic) person concerned has always considered himself a
Filipino (ibid., citing Op. Nos. 355 and 422, s. 1955; 3, 12, 46, 86 and 97, s. 1953).
But in Cuenco, it was held that an election done after over seven (7) years was not
made within a reasonable time.

In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship and, if
ever he does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by present jurisprudence.
However, due to the peculiar circumstances surrounding Ching's case, the OSG recommends the
relaxation of the standing rule on the construction of the phrase "reasonable period" and the
allowance of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his
oath as a member of the Philippine Bar.

On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his Affidavit of Election of
Philippine Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance, both dated 15 July 1999. In his Manifestation,
Ching states:

1. I have always considered myself as a Filipino;

2. I was registered as a Filipino and consistently declared myself as one in my school

records and other official documents;

3. I am practicing a profession (Certified Public Accountant) reserved for Filipino

citizens;

4. I participated in electoral process[es] since the time I was eligible to vote;

5. I had served the people of Tubao, La Union as a member of the Sangguniang

Bayan from 1992 to 1995;

6. I elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999 in accordance with

Commonwealth Act No. 625;

7. My election was expressed in a statement signed and sworn to by me before a

notary public;

8. I accompanied my election of Philippine citizenship with the oath of allegiance to

the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines;

9. I filed my election of Philippine citizenship and my oath of allegiance to (sic) the

Civil Registrar of Tubao La Union, and

10. I paid the amount of TEN PESOS (Ps. 10.00) as filing fees.
Since Ching has already elected Philippine citizenship on 15 July 1999, the question raised is
whether he has elected Philippine citizenship within a "reasonable time." In the affirmative, whether
his citizenship by election retroacted to the time he took the bar examination.

When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution. Under Article IV,
Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother
and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority,
the child elected Philippine citizenship. 4 This right to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in
the 1973 Constitution when it provided that "(t)hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are citizens of the
Philippines. 5 Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987
Constitution which states that "(t)hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority" are Philippine citizens. 6 It should be noted,
however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship
should not be understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of
citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. 7 If the citizenship of a person was subject to
challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if the
judicial challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new Constitution. 8

C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution,
prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine
citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine
citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party
concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil
registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and the Government of the Philippines."

However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the
election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election
should be made "upon reaching the age of majority." The age of majority then commenced upon
reaching twenty-one (21) years. 9 In the opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases involving the
validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on
the decisions of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the
proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the
Department of State of the United States Government to the effect that the election should be made
within a "reasonable time" after attaining the age of majority. 10 The phrase "reasonable time" has
been interpreted to mean that the election should be made within three (3) years from reaching the
age of
majority. 11 However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, 12 that the three (3) year period is
not an inflexible rule. We said:

It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable period after
reaching the age of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that three (3)
years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenship under the constitutional
provision adverted to above, which period may be extended under certain
circumstances, as when the person concerned has always considered himself a
Filipino. 13

However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect Philippine citizenship is
not indefinite:
 Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He became
of age on February 16, 1944. His election of citizenship was made on May 15, 1951,
when he was over twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over seven (7) years after he
had reached the age of majority. It is clear that said election has not been made
"upon reaching the age of majority." 14

In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirty-five (35) years old
when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen (14)
years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on the interpretation of the phrase "upon
reaching the age of majority," Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the
allowable period within which to exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in this connection, that
the special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the
Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a registered voter and a former elected public
official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down the requirements
for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.

Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot constitute what Ching erroneously labels as
informal election of citizenship. Ching cannot find a refuge in the case of In re: Florencio
Mallare, 15 the pertinent portion of which reads:

And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were (sic) legally married to an alien,
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. It has been established that Esteban
Mallare was a registered voter as of April 14, 1928, and that as early as 1925 (when
he was about 22 years old), Esteban was already participating in the elections and
campaigning for certain candidate[s]. These acts are sufficient to show his
preference for Philippine citizenship. 16

Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts and circumstances obtaining therein are very
different from those in the present case, thus, negating its applicability. First, Esteban Mallare was
born before the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution and the enactment of C.A. No. 625. Hence, the
requirements and procedures prescribed under the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 for electing
Philippine citizenship would not be applicable to him. Second, the ruling in Mallare was an obiter
since, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, it was not necessary for Esteban Mallare to elect
Philippine citizenship because he was already a Filipino, he being a natural child of a Filipino
mother. In this regard, the Court stated:

Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a

Filipino, and no other act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights and
privileges attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332;
Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543, Serra vs. Republic,
L-4223, May 12, 1952, Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano
vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954). Neither could any act be taken on the
erroneous belief that he is a non-filipino divest him of the citizenship privileges to
which he is rightfully entitled. 17

The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and further elaborated in Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House
of Representatives, 18 where we held:

We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal

process.
 In the case of In re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the
exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the
Court, we held:

Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age

constitutes a positive act of Philippine citizenship. (p. 52: emphasis
supplied)

The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his
life here in the Philippines.

For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be excepted to have
elected Philippine citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In Re
Mallare rule.

xxx xxx xxx

The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who
still have to elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came
up, there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a
profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is a
qualification, voting during election time, running for public office, and other
categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations for these
persons.

An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien.

Or his status is doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt
in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21).

We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private
respondent would not only have been superfluous but it would also have resulted in
an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship? 19

The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of Ching. However, even if we consider the
special circumstances in the life of Ching like his having lived in the Philippines all his life and his
consistent belief that he is a Filipino, controlling statutes and jurisprudence constrain us to disagree
with the recommendation of the OSG. Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to validly elect
Philippine citizenship. The span of fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the time he reached the age
of majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond
the contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon reaching the age of majority." Moreover,
Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship. The prescribed
procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that
is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter,
file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable and unexplained delay in making
his election cannot be simply glossed over.

Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and
suppressed when convenient. 20 One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an
inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and
promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as
a result. this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's application for
admission to the Philippine Bar.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo,
Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

A.M. No. L-363 July 31, 1962

IN RE: DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ATTY. DIOSDADO Q. GUTIERREZ, respondent.

Victoriano A. Savellano for complaint.

Nestor M. Andrada for respondent.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

Respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez is a member of the Philippine Bar, admitted to it on October 5,

1945. In criminal case No. R-793 of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro he was convicted
of the murder of Filemon Samaco, former municipal mayor of Calapan, and together with his co-
conspirators was sentenced to the penalty of death. Upon review by this Court the judgment of
conviction was affirmed on June 30, 1956 (G.R. No. L-17101), but the penalty was changed
to reclusion perpetua. After serving a portion of the sentence respondent was granted a conditional
pardon by the President on August 19, 1958. The unexecuted portion of the prison term was
remitted "on condition that he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines."

On October 9, 1958 the widow of the deceased Filemon Samaco, victim in the murder case, filed a
verified complaint before this Court praying that respondent be removed from the roll of lawyers
pursuant to Rule 127, section 5. Respondent presented his answer in due time, admitting the facts
alleged by complainant regarding pardon in defense, on the authority of the decision of this Court in
the case of In re Lontok, 43 Phil. 293.

Under section 5 of Rule 127, a member of the bar may be removed suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a crime insolving moral turpitude.
Murder is, without doubt, such a crime. The term "moral turpitude" includes everything which is done
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. In re Carlos S. Basa, 41 Phil. 275. As used in
disbarment statutes, it means an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social
duties which a man owes to his fellowmen or to society in general, contrary to the accepted rule of
right and duty between man and man. State ex rel. Conklin v. Buckingham, 84 P. 2nd 49; 5 Am. Jur.
Sec. 279. pp. 428-429.

The only question to be resolved is whether or not the conditional pardon extended to respondent
places him beyond the scope of the rule on disbarment aforecited. Reliance is placed by him
squarely on the Lontok case. The respondent therein was convicted of bigamy and thereafter
pardoned by the Governor-General. In a subsequent viction, this Court decided in his favor and held:
"When proceedings to strike an attorney's name from the rolls the fact of a conviction for a felony
ground for disbarment, it has been held that a pardon operates to wipe out the conviction and is a
bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of the attorney after the pardon has been granted."
It is our view that the ruling does not govern the question now before us. In making it the Court
proceeded on the assumption that the pardon granted to respondent Lontok was absolute. This is
implicit in the ratio decidendi of the case, particularly in the citations to support it, namely. In Re
Emmons, 29 Cal. App. 121; Scott vs. State, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 343; and Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 380.
Thus in Scott vs. State the court said:

We are of opinion that after received an unconditional pardon the record of the felony
conviction could no longer be used as a basis for the proceeding provided for in article 226.
The record, when offered in evidence, was met with an unconditional pardon, and could not,
therefore, properly be said to afford "proof of a conviction of any felony." Having been thus
cancelled, all its force as a felony conviction was taken away. A pardon falling short of this
would not be a pardon, according to the judicial construction which that act of executive
grace was received. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 344; Knote v. U.S., 95 U.S. 149, and cases
there cited; Young v. Young, 61 Tex. 191.

And the portion of the decision in Ex parte Garland quoted with approval in the Lontok case is as
follows:

A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the
offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out the existence
of guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed
the offense. It granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities,
consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the
penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights it makes him, as it were, a
new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity.

The pardon granted to respondent here is not absolute but conditional, and merely remitted the
unexecuted portion of his term. It does not reach the offense itself, unlike that in Ex parte Garland,
which was "a full pardon and amnesty for all offense by him committed in connection with rebellion
(civil war) against government of the United States."

The foregoing considerations rendered In re Lontok are inapplicable here. Respondent Gutierrez
must be judged upon the fact of his conviction for murder without regard to the pardon he invokes in
defense. The crime was qualified by treachery and aggravated by its having been committed in
hand, by taking advantage of his official position (respondent being municipal mayor at the time) and
with the use of motor vehicle. People vs. Diosdado Gutierrez, supra. The degree of moral turpitude
involved is such as to justify his being purged from the profession.

The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain rigid standards
of mental and moral fitness. For the admission of a candidate to the bar the Rules of Court not only
prescribe a test of academic preparation but require satisfactory testimonials of good moral
character. These standards are neither dispensed with nor lowered after admission: the lawyer must
continue to adhere to them or else incur the risk of suspension or removal. As stated in Ex
parte Wall, 107 U.S. 263, 27 Law ed., 552, 556: "Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most
sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to
repudiate and override the laws, to trample them under foot and to ignore the very bonds of society,
argues recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and
dangerous elements of the body politic.

WHEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 127, Section 5, and considering the nature of the crime for which
respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez has been convicted, he is ordered disbarred and his name
stricken from the roll of lawyers.
Bengzon, C.J., Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Regala, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.

A.C. No. 376 April 30, 1963

JOSEFINA ROYONG, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ARISTON OBLENA, respondent.

BARRERA, J.:

In a verified complaint filed with this Court on January 14, 1959, complainant Josefina Royong
charged the respondent Ariston J. Oblena, a member of the Philippine Bar, with rape allegedly
committed on her person in the manner described therein. Upon requirement of this Court, the
respondent filed his answer denying all the allegations in the complaint and praying that he be not
disbarred. On February 3, 1959, this Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation.

On July 10, 1961, the Solicitor General submitted his report on the case with the recommendation
that the respondent "be permanently removed from his office lawyer and his name be stricken from
the roll of attorneys". The pertinent part of the report reads as follows:

The complainant testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958, Cecilia Angeles, her foster
mother, left her alone in their house and went down to the pig sty to feed the pigs. At about
1:00 p.m., while she" (complainant) was ironing clothes on the second floor of the house the
respondent entered and read a newspaper at her back. Suddenly he covered her mouth with
one hand and with the other hand dragged her to one of the bedrooms of the house and
forced her to lie down on the floor. She did not shout for help because he threatened her and
her family with death. He next undressed as she lay on the floor, then had sexual intercourse
with her after he removed her panties and gave her hard blows on the thigh with his fist to
subdue her resistance. After the sexual intercourse, he warned her not to report him to her
foster parents, otherwise, he would kill her and all the members of her family. She resumed
ironing clothes after he left until 5:00 o'clock that afternoon when she joined her foster
mother on the first floor of the house. As a result of the sexual intercourse she became
pregnant and gave birth to a baby on June 2, 1959 (pp. 4-8, 21, 23, 26, 27, t.s.n., hearing of
Aug. 5, 1959).

She admitted that had she shouted for help she would have been heard by the neighbors
that she did not report the outrage to anyone because of the threat made by the respondent;
that she still frequented the respondent's house after August 5, 1959, sometimes when he
was alone, ran errands for him, cooked his coffee, and received his mail for him. Once, on
November 14, 1958, when respondent was sick of influenza, she was left alone with him in
his house while her aunt Briccia Angeles left for Manila to buy medicine (pp. 11, 14-18, 24,
t.s.n., hearing of August 5, 1959).

The respondent on the witness stand denied that he raped the complainant (p. 3, t.s.n.,
hearing of March 25 1960). He testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958, he went to the
Commission Of Civil Service to follow up his appointment as technical assistant in the office
of the mayor of Makati, Rizal, and read the record of the administrative case against
Buenaventura Perez (pp. 23, 24, 34, t.s.n., hearing of March 25, 1960, Exhs. 1 and 2).

The respondent, however, admitted that he had illicit relations with the complainant from
January, 1957 to December, 1958, when their clandestine affair was discovered by the
complainant's foster parents, but to avoid criminal liability for seduction, according to him, he
limited himself to kissing and embracing her and sucking her tongue before she completed
her eighteenth birthday. They had their first sexual intercourse on May 11, 1958, after she
had reached eighteen, and the second one week later, on May 18. The last intercourse took
place before Christmas in December, 1958. In all, they had sexual intercourse about fifty
times, mostly in her house and sometimes in his house whenever they had the opportunity.
He intended to marry her when she could legally contract marriage without her foster
parents' intervention, 'in case occasion will permit ... because we cannot ask permission to
marry, for her foster parents will object and even my common-law wife, will object.' After the
discovery of their relationship by the complainant's foster parents, he confessed the affair to
Briccia, explaining that he wanted to have a child, something she (Briccia) could not give
him. (pp. 14-16, 19-25, t.s.n., hearing of March 25, 1960).

xxx xxx xxx

FINDINGS AND COMMENT

There is no controversy that the respondent had carnal knowledge of the complainant. The
complainant claims she surrendered to him under circumstances of violence and
intimidation, but the undersigned are convinced that the sexual intercourse was performed
not once but repeatedly and with her consent. From her behaviour before and after the
alleged rape, she appears to have been more a sweetheart than of the victim of an outrage
involving her honor ....

But the foregoing observations notwithstanding, the undersigned cannot in conscience

recommend respondent's exoneration. The respondent tempted Briccia Angeles to live
maritally with him not long after she and her husband parted, and it is not improbable that the
spouses never reconciled because of him. His own evidence shows that, tiring of her after
more than fifteen years of adulterous relationship with her and on the convenient excuse that
she, Briccia Angeles, could not bear a child, he seduced Josefina Andalis, then 17 or 18
years of age, resulting in her pregnancy and the birth of a child, on June 2, 1959. The
seduction was accomplished with grave abuse of confidence and by means of promises of
marriage which he knew he could not fulfill without grievous injury to the woman who forsook
her husband so that he, respondent, could have all of her. He also took advantage of his
moral influence over her. From childhood, Josefina Andalis, treated him as an uncle and
called him 'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a sister of her mother.
Considering her age (she was 17 or 18 years old then), it is not difficult to see why she could
not resist him.

The evidence further shows that on July 22, 1954, the respondent filed a sworn petition
dated May 22, 1954 alleging "that he is a person of good moral character" (Par. 3) and
praying that the Supreme Court permit him "to take the bar examinations to be given on the
first Saturday of August, 1954, or at any time as the Court may fix.."

But he was not then the person of good moral character he represented himself to be. From
1942 to the present, he has continuously lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles whose
 husband is still alive, knowing that his concubine is a married woman and that her marriage
still subsists. This fact permanently disqualified him from taking the bar examinations, and
had it been known to the Supreme Court in 1954, he would not have been permitted to take
the bar examinations that year or thereafter, or to take his oath of office as a lawyer. As he
was then permanently disqualified from admission to the Philippine Bar by reason of his
adulterous relations with a married woman, it is submitted that the same misconduct should
be sufficient ground for his permanent disbarment, unless we recognize a double standard of
morality, one for membership to the Philippine Bar and another for disbarment from the office
of a lawyer.

xxx xxx xxx

RECOMMENDATION

Wherefore, the undersigned respectfully recommend that after due hearing, respondent
Ariston J. Oblena be permanently removed from his office as a lawyer and his name be
stricken from the roll of attorneys.

In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if respondent did not commit the
alleged rape nevertheless he was guilty of other misconduct, the Solicitor General formulated
another complaint which he appended to his report, charging the respondent of falsely and
deliberately alleging in his application for admission to the bar that he is a person of good moral
character; of living adulterously with Briccia Angeles at the same time maintaining illicit relations with
the complainant Josefina Royong, niece of Briccia, thus rendering him unworthy of public confidence
and unfit and unsafe to manage the legal business of others, and praying that this Court render
judgment ordering "the permanent removal of the respondent ... from his office as a lawyer and the
cancellation of his name from the roll of attorneys."

In his answer to this formal complaint, respondent alleged the special defense that "the complaint
does not merit action", since the causes of action in the said complaint are different and foreign from
the original cause of action for rape and that "the complaint lacks the necessary formalities called for
in Sec. 1, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court." Respondent prayed that after due notice and hearing for
additional evidence, the complaint be dismissed.

On September 13, 1961, this Court designated the Court Investigators to receive the additional
evidence. Accordingly the case was set for hearing of which the parties were duly notified. On
September 29, 1961, respondent asked leave to submit a memorandum which was granted, and on
October 9, 1961 the same was filed, alleging the following: 1) That the charge of rape has not been
proven; 2) That no act of seduction was committed by the respondent; 3) That no act of perjury or
fraudulent concealment was committed by the respondent when he filed his petition for admission to
the bar; and 4) That the respondent is not morally unfit to be a member of the bar.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove
their case not covered by this stipulation of facts.1äwphï1.ñët

At the hearing on November 16, 1961, respondent presented his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles,
who testified as follows:

... Respondent is her common-law husband (t.s.n. 23). She first met respondent on
December 16, 1941 at Cavinti, Laguna (t.s.n. 23). She and her sister Cecilia Angeles-
Royong were evacuated to Cavinti by the Red Cross (t.s.n. 23). She was already married (to
 Teodoro Arines) at the time (t.s.n. 24). She and Arines are from Iriga, Camarines Sur (t.s.n.
24). Respondent and one Mr. Flores registered them (t.s.n. 24) as evacuees. When Mr.
Flores asked her about her status she told him she was 'single' (t.s.n. 25). She and her
sister, Cecilia, were then told to stay at respondent's house, respondent courted her (t.s.n.
26). Respondent asked her if she was married and she told him 'we will talk about that later
on' (t.s.n. 26). She told respondent she was married (to Arines) when she and respondent
were already living together as 'husband and wife', in 1942( t.s.n. 26). Respondent asked her
to marry him, when they were living as husband and wife (t.s.n. 27). Her sister Cecilia left
Cavinti 2 months after their arrival thereat, but she did not go with her because she and
respondent 'had already a good understanding'(sexual relations) [t.s.n. 27]. Later, she left
Cavinti and went to her hometown in Iriga, Camarines Sur, because respondent was already
reluctant to live with her and he told her it was better for her to go home to Iriga (t.s.n. 25).
Arriving at Iriga, she met her legitimate husband (Arines), who told her he had already a wife,
named Conching Guevara (t.s.n. 28-29). She then went back to Cavinti (in 1943), with her
father, and lived with respondent (t.s.n. 29). Respondent eventually agreed that she live with
him (t.s.n. 35); in fact, she is still presently living with respondent (t.s.n. 35) [Report of Court
Investigators, March 6, 1962, pp. 5-6]."

Thereafter, respondent requested permission to submit an affidavit at a later date, which request
was also granted. The affidavit was filed on December 16, 1961, the respondent averring, among
others, the following:.

... That he never committed any act or crime of seduction against the complainant, because
the latter was born on February 19, 1940, and his first sexual intercourse with her took place
on May 11, 1958, when she was already above 18 years of age; that he had been living with
his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, for almost 20 years, but from the time he began
courting her, he 'had no intention to alienate' her love for her husband, Arines, or to commit
the crime of adultery; that he courted Briccia on October 16, 1941, and was shortly thereafter
accepted by her; that on February 21, 1942, he found Briccia alone in his house, who told
him that her sister, Cecilia, had gone to Pagsanjan with the other evacuees; that from said
date (February 21), to the present, he and Briccia had been living together as common-law
husband and wife; that 2 or 3 weeks thereafter, he asked Briccia to marry him, but she
confessed she was already married, and maybe her husband (Arines) was still living in Iriga;
that he could not then drive Briccia away, because she was a stranger in the place, nor could
he urge her to join her sister Cecilia, as the latter had left Pagsanjan; that in 1943 she told
Briccia to separate from him and to return to Iriga, and urged her never to see him again;
that contrary to his expectations, Briccia returned to Cavinti 3 months thereafter; that Briccia
strongly insisted to live with him again, telling him that she cannot separate from him
anymore, as he was ashamed; that Briccia's father told him that Briccia's husband (Arines)
had agreed not to molest them as in fact he (Arines) was already living with another woman;
that he had 'no choice but to live with her' (Briccia) again; that when he filed his petition to
take the bar examinations in 1954, he 'did not have the slightest intention to hide' from this
Court the fact of his 'open cohabitation with a married woman' (Briccia Angeles); that he did
not state said fact in his petition, because he did not see in the form of the petition being
used in 1954 that the fact must be stated; and that since his birth, he thought and believed
he was a man of good moral character, and it was only from the Solicitor General that he first
learned he was not so; and that he did not commit perjury or fraudulent concealment when
he filed his petition to take the bar examinations in 1954." (Report of the Court Investigators,
pp. 6-8, March 6, 1962).

After hearing, the investigators submitted a report with the finding that: 1) Respondent used his
knowledge of the law to take advantage by having illicit relations with complainant, knowing as he
did, that by committing immoral acts on her, he was free from any criminal liability; and 2)
Respondent committed gross immorality by continuously cohabiting with a married woman even
after he became a lawyer in 1955 to the present; and 3) That respondent falsified the truth as to his
moral character in his petition to take the 1954 bar examinations, being then immorally (adulterously)
in cohabitation with his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, a married woman. The investigators also
recommended that the respondent be disbarred or alternatively, be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of one year.

Upon the submission of this report, a copy of which was served on respondent, through his counsel
of record, the case was set for hearing before the Court on April 30, 1962. Respondent asked leave
to file his memorandum in lieu of oral argument. This was granted and the corresponding
memorandum was duly filed.

It is an admitted and uncontroverted fact that the respondent had sexual relations with the
complainant several times, and as a consequence she bore him a child on June 2, 1959; and that he
likewise continuously cohabited with Briccia Angeles, in an adulterous manner, from 1942 up to the
present.

The main point in issue is thus limited illicit relations with the complainant Josefina Royong the and
the open cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, are sufficient grounds to cause the
respondent's disbarment.

It is argued by the respondent that he is not liable for disbarment notwithstanding his illicit relations
with the complainant and his open cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, because he
has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. It is true that the respondent has not
been convicted of rape, seduction, or adultery on this count, and that the grounds upon which the
disbarment proceedings is based are not among those enumerated by Section 25, Rule 127 of the
Rules of Court for which a lawyer may be disbarred. But it has already been held that this
enumeration is not exclusive and that the power of the courts to exclude unfit and unworthy
members of the profession is inherent; it is a necessary incident to the proper administration of
justice; it may be exercised without any special statutory authority, and in all proper cases unless
positively prohibited by statute; and the power may be exercised in any manner that will give the
party be disbarred a fair trial and a fair opportunity to be heard. (1 Francisco, Rules of Court [1958
ed.] 698, citing In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). Although it is a well settled rule that the legislature (or
the Supreme Court by virtue of its rule-making power) may provide that certain acts or conduct shall
require disbarment, the accepted doctrine is that statutes and rules merely regulate the power to
disbar instead of creating it, and that such statutes (or rules) do not restrict the general powers of the
court over attorneys, who are its officers, and that they may be removed for other than statutory
grounds (7 C.J.S. 734). In the United States, where from our system of legal ethics is derived, "the
continued possession of a fair private and professional character or a good moral character is a
requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of law for one who has been admitted,
and its loss requires suspension or disbarment even though the statutes do not specify that as a
ground of disbarment". The moral turpitude for which an attorney may be disbarred may consist of
misconduct in either his professional or non-professional activities (5 Am. Jur. 417). The tendency of
the decisions of this Court has been toward the conclusion that a member of the bar may be
removed or suspended from office as a lawyer for other than statutory grounds. Indeed, the rule is
so phrased as to be broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer (In Re Pelaez, 44
Phil. 567). In the case at bar, the moral depravity of the respondent is most apparent. His pretension
that before complainant completed her eighteenth birthday, he refrained from having sexual
intercourse with her, so as not to incur criminal liability, as he himself declared — and that he limited
himself merely to kissing and embracing her and sucking her tongue, indicates a scheming mind,
which together with his knowledge of the law, he took advantage of, for his lurid purpose.
Moreover, his act becomes more despicable considering that the complainant was the niece of his
common-law wife and that he enjoyed a moral ascendancy over her who looked up to him as her
uncle. As the Solicitor General observed: "He also took advantage of his moral influence over her.
From childhood, Josefina Andalis (Royong), treated him as an uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle),
undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a sister of her mother. Considering her age (she was 17
or 18 years old then), her inexperience and his moral ascendency over her, it is not difficult to see
why she could not resist him." Furthermore, the blunt admission of his illicit relations with the
complainant reveals the respondent to be a person who would suffer no moral compunction for his
acts if the same could be done without fear of criminal liability. He has, by these acts, proven himself
to be devoid of the moral integrity expected of a member of the bar.

The respondent's misconduct, although unrelated to his office, may constitute sufficient grounds for
disbarment. This is a principle we have followed since the ruling in In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, where
this Court quoted with approval the following portion of the decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas
in the case of Peyton's Appeal (12 Kan. 398, 404), to wit:.

The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and client, as well as
between court and attorney, and the statutory rule prescribing the qualifications of attorneys,
uniformly require that an attorney be a person of good moral character. If that qualification is
a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of the law, it would
seem to be equally essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the
privilege. So it is held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and
dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his
professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges
which his license and the law confer upon him. (Emphasis supplied).

Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly bearing on his
profession, has nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer. We
cannot give sanction to his acts. For us to do so would be — as the Solicitor General puts it —
recognizing "a double standard of morality, one for membership to the Philippine Bar, and another
for disbarment from the office of the lawyer." If we concede that respondent's adulterous relations
and his simultaneous seduction of his paramour's niece did not and do not disqualify him from
continuing with his office of lawyer, this Court would in effect be requiring moral integrity as an
essential prerequisite for admission to the bar, only to later on tolerate and close its eyes to the
moral depravity and character degeneration of the members of the bar.

The decisions relied upon by the respondent in justifying his stand that even if he admittedly
committed fornication, this is no ground for disbarment, are not controlling. Fornication, if committed
under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as have proven in this case, as to shock common
sense of decency, certainly may justify positive action by the Court in protecting the prestige of the
noble profession of the law. The reasons advanced by the respondent why he continued his
adulterous relations with Briccia Angeles, in that she helped him in some way finish his law studies,
and that his "sense of propriety and Christian charity" did not allow him to abandon her after his
admission to the bar after almost 13 years of cohabitation, are hardly an excuse for his moral
dereliction. The means he employed, as he stated, in order to extricate himself from the predicament
he found himself in, by courting the complainant and maintaining sexual relations with her makes his
conduct more revolting. An immoral act cannot justify another immoral act. The noblest means he
could have employed was to have married the complainant as he was then free to do so. But to
continue maintaining adulterous relations with a married woman and simultaneously maintaining
promiscuous relations with the latter's niece is moral perversion that can not be condoned.
Respondent's conduct therefore renders him unfit and unworthy for the privileges of the legal
profession. As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice,
he may be removed therefrom whenever he ceases to possess such character (7 C.J.S. 735).

The respondent further maintains that the Solicitor General exceeded his authority in filing the
present complaint against him for seduction, adultery and perjury, as it charges an offense or
offenses different from those originally charged in the complaint of January 14, 1959 for rape, and
cites as authority Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, which state:.

SEC. 4. Report of the Solicitor General.— Based upon the evidence adduced at the hearing,
if the Solicitor General finds no sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent, he shall
submit a report to the Supreme Court containing his findings of fact and conclusion,
whereupon the respondent shall be exonerated unless the court orders differently.

SEC. 5. Complaint of the Solicitor General. Answer of the respondent. — If the Solicitor
General finds sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent, he shall file the
corresponding complaint, accompanied with all the evidence introduced in his investigation,
with the Supreme Court, and the respondent shall be served by the clerk of the Supreme
Court with a copy of the complaint with direction to answer the same within fifteen days.

The contention is devoid of merit. Nothing in the language of the foregoing rules requires the
Solicitor General to charge in his complaint the same offense charged in the complaint originally filed
by the complainant for disbarment. Precisely, the law provides that should the Solicitor General find
sufficient grounds to proceed against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint,
accompanied by the evidence introduced in his investigation. The Solicitor General therefore is at
liberty to file any case against the respondent he may be justified by the evidence adduced during
the investigation..

The respondent also maintains that he did not falsify his petition to take the bar examinations in
1954 since according to his own opinion and estimation of himself at that time, he was a person of
good moral character. This contention is clearly erroneous. One's own approximation of himself is
not a gauge to his moral character. Moral character is not a subjective term, but one which
corresponds to objective reality. Moral character is what a person really is, and not what he or other
people think he is. As former Chief Justice Moran observed: An applicant for license to practice law
is required to show good moral character, or what he really is, as distinguished from good reputation,
or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the
place where he is known. As has been said, ante the standard of personal and professional integrity
which should be applied to persons admitted to practice law is not satisfied by such conduct as
merely enables them to escape the penalties of criminal law. Good moral character includes at least
common honesty (3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, [1957 ed.] 626, citing In Re Weinstein,
42 P. [2d] 744 B.L.D., Cooper v. Greeley. 1 Den. [N.Y.] 3447; In Re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399; and
People v. Macauley, 82 N.E. 612). Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good moral character
at the time he applied for admission to the bar. He lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles, and
the fact that people who knew him seemed to have acquiesced to his status, did not render him a
person of good moral character. It is of no moment that his immoral state was discovered then or
now as he is clearly not fit to remain a member of the bar.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered striking the name of herein respondent, Ariston J.
Oblena, from the roll of attorneys.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Paredes, Regala and Makalintal, JJ.,
concur.
Padilla, Reyes, J.B.L., and Dizon, JJ., took no part.
A.M. No. 491 October 6, 1989

IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE 1989 ELECTIONS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF
THE PHILIPPINES.

PER CURIAM:

In the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereafter "IBP") held
on June 3, 1989 at the Philippine International Convention Center (or PICC), the following were
elected by the House of Delegates (composed of 120 chapter presidents or their alternates) and
proclaimed as officers:

NAME POSITION

Atty. Violeta Drilon President

Atty. Bella Tiro Executive Vice-President

Atty. Salvador Lao Chairman, House of Delegates

Atty. Renato F. Ronquillo Secretary, House of Delegates

Atty. Teodoro Quicoy Treasurer, House of Delegates

Atty. Oscar Badelles Sergeant at Arms, House of Delegates

Atty. Justiniano Cortes Governor & Vice-President for Northern Luzon

Atty. Ciriaco Atienza Governor & Vice-President for Central Luzon

Atty. Mario Jalandoni Governor & Vice-President for Metro Manila

Atty. Jose Aguilar Grapilon Governor & Vice-President for Southern Luzon

Atty. Teodoro Almine Governor & Vice-President for Bicolandia

Atty. Porfirio Siyangco Governor & Vice-President for Eastern Visayas

Atty. Ricardo Teruel Governor & Vice-President for Western Visayas

Atty. Gladys Tiongco Governor & Vice-President for Eastern Mindanao

Atty. Simeon Datumanong Governor & Vice-President for Western Mindanao

The newly-elected officers were set to take the their oath of office on July 4,1989, before the
Supreme Court en banc. However,disturbed by the widespread reports received by some members
of the Court from lawyers who had witnessed or participated in the proceedings and the adverse
comments published in the columns of some newspapers about the intensive electioneering and
overspending by the candidates, led by the main protagonists for the office of president of the
association, namely, Attorneys Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce, and Violeta C. Drilon, the alleged use
of government planes, and the officious intervention of certain public officials to influence the voting,
all of which were done in violation of the IBP By-Laws which prohibit such activities. The Supreme
Courten banc, exercising its power of supervision over the Integrated Bar, resolved to suspend the
oath-taking of the IBP officers-elect and to inquire into the veracity of the reports.

It should be stated at the outset that the election process itself (i.e. the voting and the canvassing of
votes on June 3, 1989) which was conducted by the "IBP Comelec," headed by Justice Reynato
Puno of the Court of Appeals, was unanimously adjudged by the participants and observers to be
above board. For Justice Puno took it upon himself to device safeguards to prevent tampering with,
and marking of, the ballots.

What the Court viewed with considerable concern was the reported electioneering and extravagance
that characterized the campaign conducted by the three candidates for president of the IBP.

I. MEDIA ACCOUNT OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN.

Emil Jurado, in his column "IBP Group Questions Drilon Election" (Manila Standard, Sunday, June
17, 1989), Luis Mauricio, in two successive columns: "The Invertebrated Bar" (Malaya, June 10,
1989) and "The Disintegrating Bar" (Malaya, June 20, 1989), and Teodoro Locsin Jr. in an article,
entitled "Pam-Pam" (The Philippines Free Press, July 8,1989), and the editorial, entitled 'Wrong
Forum" of the Daily Globe (June 8, 1989), were unanimously critical of the "vote-buying and
pressure tactics" allegedly employed in the campaign by the three principal candidates: Attys.
Violeta C. Drilon, Nereo Paculdo and Ramon Nisce who reportedly "poured heart, soul, money and
influence to win over the 120 IBP delegates."

Mr. Jurado mentioned the resentment of Atty. Drilon's rivals who felt at a disadvantage because Atty.
Drilon allegedly used PNB helicopters to visit far-flung IBP chapters on the pretext of distributing
Bigay Puso donations, and she had the added advantage of having regional directors and labor
arbiters of the Department of Labor and Employment (who had been granted leaves of absence by
her husband, the Labor Secretary) campaigning for her. Jurado's informants alleged that there was
rampant vote-buying by some members of the U.P. Sigma Rho Fraternity (Secretary Drilon's
fraternity), as well as by some lawyers of ACCRA (Angara, Concepcion, Cruz, Regala and Abello
Law Office) where Mrs. Drilon is employed, and that government positions were promised to others
by the office of the Labor Secretary.

Mr. Mauricio in his column wrote about the same matters and, in addition, mentioned "talk of
personnel of the Department of Labor, especially conciliators and employers, notably Chinese
Filipinos, giving aid and comfort to her (Atty. Drilon's) candidacy," the billeting of out-of-town
delegates in plush hotels where they were reportedly "wined and dined continuously, womened and
subjected to endless haggling over the price of their votes x x x" which allegedly "ranged from
Pl5,000 to P20,000, and, on the day of the election, some twelve to twenty votes which were
believed crucial, appreciated to P50,000."

In his second column, Mr. Mauricio mentioned "how a top official of the judiciary allegedly involved
himself in IBP politics on election day by closeting himself with campaigners as they plotted their
election strategy in a room of the PICC (the Philippine International Convention Center where the
convention/election were held) during a recess x x x."

Mr. Locsin in his column and editorial substantially re-echoed Mauricio's reports with some
embellishments.
II. THE COURT'S DECISION TO INVESTIGATE.

Responding to the critical reports, the Court, in its en banc resolution dated June 15, 1989, directed
the outgoing and incoming members of the IBP Board of Governors, the principal officers and
Chairman of the House of Delegates to appear before it on Tuesday, June 20, 1989, at 2:00 o'clock
p.m., and there to inform the Court on the veracity of the aforementioned reports and to recommend,
for the consideration of the Court, appropriate approaches to the problem of confirming and
strengthening adherence to the fundamental principles of the IBP.

In that resolution the Court "call[ed] to mind that a basic postulate of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), heavily stressed at the time of its organization and commencement of existence, is
that the IBP shall be non-political in character and that there shall be no lobbying nor campaigning in
the choice of members of the Board of Governors and of the House of Delegates, and of the IBP
officers, national, or regional, or chapter. The fundamental assumption was that officers, delegates
and governors would be chosen on the basis of professional merit and willingness and ability to
serve."

The resolution went on to say that the "Court is deeply disturbed to note that in connection with the
election of members of the Board of Governors and of the House of Delegates, there is a
widespread belief, based on reports carried by media and transmitted as well by word of mouth, that
there was extensive and intensive campaigning by candidates for IBP positions as well as
expenditure of considerable sums of money by candidates, including vote-buying, direct or indirect."

The venerable retired Supreme Court Justice and IBP President Emeritus, Jose B.L. Reyes,
attended the dialogue, upon invitation of the Court, to give counsel and advice. The meeting
between the Court en banc on the one hand, and the outgoing and in coming IBP officers on the
other, was an informal one. Thereafter, the Court resolved to conduct a formal inquiry to determine
whether the prohibited acts and activities enumerated in the IBP By-Laws were committed before
and during the 1989 elections of IBP's national officers.

The Court en banc formed a committee and designated Senior Associate Justice Andres R.
Narvasa, as Chairman, and Associate Justices Teodoro R. Padilla, Emilio A. Gancayco, Abraham F.
Sarmiento, and Carolina C. Griño-Aquino, as members, to conduct the inquiry. The Clerk of Court,
Atty. Daniel Martinez, acted as the committee's Recording Secretary.

A total of forty-nine (49) witnesses appeared and testified in response to subpoenas issued by the
Court to shed light on the conduct of the elections. The managers of three five-star hotels the
Philippine Plaza, the Hyatt, and the Holiday Inn where the three protagonists (Drilon, Nisce and
Paculdo) allegedly set up their respective headquarters and where they billeted their supporters
were summoned. The officer of the Philippine National Bank and the Air Transport Office were called
to enlighten the Court on the charge that an IBP presidential candidate and the members of her slate
used PNB planes to ferry them to distant places in their campaign to win the votes of delegates. The
Philippine Airlines officials were called to testify on the charge that some candidates gave free air
fares to delegates to the convention. Officials of the Labor Department were also called to enable
the Court to ascertain the truth of the reports that labor officials openly campaigned or worked for the
election of Atty. Drilon.

The newspaper columnists, Messrs. Luis Mauricio, Jesus Bigornia and Emil Jurado were
subpoenaed to determine the nature of their sources of information relative to the IBP elections.
Their stories were based, they said, on letters, phone calls and personal interviews with persons
who claimed to have knowledge of the facts, but whom they, invoking the Press Freedom Law,
refused to identify.
The Committee has since submitted its Report after receiving, and analyzing and assessing
evidence given by such persons as were perceived to have direct and personal knowledge of the
relevant facts; and the Court, after deliberating thereon, has Resolved to accept and adopt the
same.

III. PROHIBITED ACTS AND PRACTICES UNDER IBP BY-LAWS.

Article I, Section 4 of the IBP By-Laws emphasizes the "strictly non-political" character of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, thus:

"SEC. 4. Non-political Bar. — The Integrated Bar is strictly non-political, and every
activity tending to impair this basic feature is strictly prohibited and shall be penalized
accordingly. No lawyer holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory
office in the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof shall
be eligible for election or appointment to any position in the Integrated Bar or any
Chapter thereof. A Delegate, Governor, officer or employee of the Integrated Bar, or
an officer or employee of any Chapter thereof shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his position as of the moment he files his certificate of candidacy for any
elective public office or accepts appointment to any judicial, quasi-judicial, or
prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality
thereof. "'

Section 14 of the same By-Laws enumerates the prohibited acts relative to IBP
elections:

SEC. 14. Prohibited acts and practices relative to elections. — The following acts
and practices relative to election are prohibited, whether committed by a candidate
for any elective office in the Integrated Bar or by any other member, directly or
indirectly, in any form or manner, by himself or through another person:

(a) Distribution, except on election day, of election campaign material;

(b) Distribution, on election day, of election campaign material other than a statement
of the biodata of a candidate on not more than one page of a legal-size sheet of
paper; or causing distribution of such statement to be done by persons other than
those authorized by the officer presiding at the elections;

(c) Campaigning for or against any candidate, while holding an elective, judicial,
quasi-judicial or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof;

(d) Formation of tickets, single slates, or combinations of candidates, as well as the

advertisement thereof;

(e) For the purpose of inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or to
vote for or against a candidate, (1) payment of the dues or other indebtedness of any
member; (2) giving of food, drink, entertainment, transportation or any article of
value, or any similar consideration to any person; or (3) making a promise or causing
an expenditure to be made, offered or promised to any person."

Section 12(d) of the By-Laws prescribes sanctions for violations of the above rules:
 (d) Any violation of the rules governing elections or commission of any of the
prohibited acts and practices defined in Section 14 prohibited Acts and Practices
relative to elections) of the by-laws of the Integrated Bar shall be a ground for the
disqualification of a candidate or his removal from office if elected, without prejudice
to the imposition of sanctions upon any erring member pursuant to the By-laws of the
Integrated Bar.

At the formal investigation which was conducted by the investigating committee, the following
violations were established:

(1) Prohibited campaigning and solicitation of votes by the candidates for president, executive vice-
president, the officers of candidate the House of Delegates and Board of Governors.

The three candidates for IBP President Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo began travelling around the
country to solicit the votes of delegates as early as April 1989. Upon the invitation of IBP President,
Leon Garcia, Jr. (t.s.n., July 13,1989, p. 4), they attended the Bench and Bar dialogues held in
Cotabato in April 1989 (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, p. 123), in Tagaytay City, Pampanga, and in Baguio
City (during the conference of chapter presidents of Northern Luzon (t.s.n., July 3,1989, p. 113;
t.s.n., July 10, p. 41; t.s.n., July 13, p. 47) where they announced their candidacies and met the
chapter presidents.

Atty. Nisce admitted that he went around the country seeking the help of IBP chapter officers,
soliciting their votes, and securing their written endorsements. He personally hand-carried
nomination forms and requested the chapter presidents and delegates to fill up and sign the forms to
formalize their commitment to his nomination for IBP President. He started campaigning and
distributing the nomination forms in March 1989 after the chapter elections which determined the
membership of the House of Delegates composed of the 120 chapter presidents (t.s.n., June 29,
1989, pp. 82-86). He obtained forty (40) commitments. He submitted photocopies of his nomination
forms which read:

"Nomination Form

I Join in Nominating

RAMON M. NISCE

as

National President of the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines

______________ _______________

Chapter Signature"
Among those who signed the nomination forms were: Onofre P. Tejada, Candido P. Balbin, Jr.,
Conizado V. Posadas, Quirico L. Quirico Ernesto S. Salun-at, Gloria C. Agunos, Oscar B. Bernardo,
Feliciano F. Wycoco, Amor L. Ibarra, Jose M. Atienza, Jose N. Contreras, Romeo T. Mendoza, Leo
C. Medialdea, Jr., Paulino G. Clarin, Julius Z. Neil, Roem J. Arbolado Democrito M. Perez, Abelardo
Fermin, Diosdado B. Villarin, Jr., Daniel C. Macaraeg, Confesor R. Sansano Dionisio E. Bala, Jr.,
Emesto A. Amores, Romeo V. Pefianco, Augurio C. Pamintuan, Atlee T. Viray, Ceferino C.
Cabanas, Jose S. Buban, Diosdado Z. Reloj, Jr., Cesar C. Viola, Oscar C. Fernandez, Ricardo B.
Teruel Rodrigo R. Flores, Sixto Marella, Jr., Arsenio C. Villalon, Renato F. Ronquillo, Antonio G.
Nalapo Romualdo A. Din Jr., Jose P. Icaonapo Jr., and Manuel S. Person.

Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms at the Hyatt Hotel based on the commitments he had
obtained (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, pp. 82-85). Unfortunately, despite those formal commitments, he
obtained only 14 votes in the election (t.s.n., June 29, 1 989, p. 86). The reason, he said, is that.
some of those who had committed their votes to him were "manipulated, intimidated, pressured, or
remunerated" (t.s.n., June 29,1989, pp. 8695; Exhibit "M-4-Nisce," t.s.n., July 4, 1989, pp. 100-1 04).

(2) Use of PNB plane in the campaign.

The records of the Philippine National Bank (Exhibit C-1-Crudo and Exhibit C-2-Crudo) show that
Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. of the Department of Environment & Natural Resources
(DENR) borrowed a plane from the Philippine National Bank for his Bicol CORD (Cabinet Officers for
Regional Development) Assistant, Undersecretary Antonio Tria. The plane manifest (Exh. C-2-
Crudo) listed Atty. Violeta Drilon, Arturo Tusi (Tiu), Assistant Secretary for Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Tony Tria, Atty. Gladys Tiongco, and Amy Wong. Except for Tony Tria, the rest
of the passengers were IBP candidates.

Atty. Drilon admitted that she "hitched" a ride on a PNB plane. She said that she was informed by
Atty. Tiu about the availability of a PNB plane (t.s.n., July 3,1989, pp. 116-118).

Atty. Tiu, who ran for the position of IBP executive vice-president in the Drilon ticket, testified that
sometime in May 1989 he failed to obtain booking from the Philippine Airlines for the projected trip of
his group to Bicol. He went to the DENR allegedly to follow up some papers for a client. While at the
DENR, he learned that Assistant Secretary Tria was going on an official business in Bicol for
Secretary Fulgencio Factoran and that he would be taking a PNB plane. As Assistant Secretary Tria
is his fraternity brother, he asked if he, together with the Drilon group, could hitch a ride on the plane
to Bicol. His request was granted. Their purpose in going to Bicol was to assess their chances in the
IBP elections. The Drilon company talked with the IBP chapter presidents in Daet, Naga, and
Legaspi, and asked for their support (t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp. 549).

Assistant Secretary Antonio S. Tria confirmed the use of a PNB plane by Atty. Drilon and her group.
He recalled that on May 23,1989, DENR Secretary Factoran instructed him to go to Bicol to monitor
certain regional development projects there and to survey the effect of the typhoon that hit the region
in the middle of May. On the same day, Atty. Tiu, a fraternity brother (meaning that Tiu belongs to
the Sigma Rho fraternity) went to the DENR office and requested the Secretary (Factoran) if he (Tiu)
could be allowed to hitch a ride on the plane. Assistant Secretary Tria, together with the Drilon group
which included Attorneys Drilon, Grapilon, Amy Wong, Gladys Tiongco, and Tiu, took off at the
Domestic Airport bound for Naga, Daet and Legaspi. In Legaspi the Drilon group had lunch with Atty.
Vicente Real, Jr., an IBP chapter president (t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp. 54-69).

(3) Formation of tickets and single slates.

The three candidates, Paculdo, Nisce and Drilon, admitted having formed their own slates for the
election of IBP national officers on June 3, 1989.

Atty. Paculdo's slate consisted of — himself for President; Bella D. Tiro, for Executive Vice-
President; and for Governors: Justiniano P. Cortez (Northern Luzon), Oscar C. Fernandez (Central
Luzon), Mario C.V. Jalandoni (Greater Manila), Petronilo A. de la Cruz (Southern Luzon), Teodorico
C. Almine, Jr. (Bicolandia), Ricardo B. Teruel (Western Visayas), Porfirio P. Siyangco (Eastern
Visayas), Jesus S. Anonat (Western Mindanao), Guerrero A. Adaza, Jr. (Eastern Mindanao) (Exhibit
M-Nisce).

The Drilon ticket consisted of. Violeta C. Drilon for President, Arturo Tiu for Executive Vice
President, Salvador Lao for Chairman of the House of Delegates, and, for Governors: Basil Rupisan
(Northern 'Luzon), Acong Atienza (Central Luzon), Amy Wong (Metro Manila), Jose Grapilon
(Southern Tagalog), Teodoro Almine (Bicolandia), Baldomero Estenzo (Eastern Visayas), Joelito
Barrera (Western Visayas), Gladys Tiongco (Eastern Mindanao), Simeon Datumanong (Western
Mindanao) (Exhibit M-1-Nisce).

Atty. Ramon N. Nisce's line-up listed himself and Confessor B. Sansano Benjamin B. Bernardino,
Antonio L. Nalapo Renato F. Ronquillo, Gloria C. Agunos, Mario Valderrama, Candido P. Balbin Jr.,
Oscar C. Fernandez, Cesar G. Viola, Leo C. Medialdea, Jr., Vicente P. Tordilla, Jr., Jose S. Buban,
Joel A. Llosa, Jesus T. Albacite and Oscar V. Badelles.

(4) Giving free transportation to out-of-town delegates and alternates.

Atty. Nisce admitted having bought plane tickets for some delegates to the convention. He
mentioned Oscar Badelles to whom he gave four round-trip tickets (worth about P10,000) from Iligan
City to Manila and back. Badelles was a voting delegate. Nisce, however, failed to get a written
commitment from him because Atty. Medialdea assured him (Nisce) "sigurado na 'yan, h'wag mo
nang papirmahin." Badelles won as sergeant-at-arms, not in Nisce's ticket, but in that of Drilon.

Badelles admitted that Nisce sent him three airplane tickets, but he Badelles said that he did not use
them, because if he did, he would be committed to Nisce, and he Badelles did not want to be
committed (t.s.n., July 4,1989, pp. 77-79, 95-96).

Nisce also sent a plane ticket to Atty. Atilano, who was his candidate, and another ticket to Mrs.
Linda Lim of Zamboanga. Records of the Philippine Airlines showed that Atty. Nisce paid for the
plane tickets of Vicente Real, Jr. (Exh. D-1-Calica), Romeo Fortes (Exh. D-1-Calica), Cesar Batica
(Exh. D-2-Calica), Jose Buban of Leyte (Exh. D-2-Calica), Delsanto Resuello (Exh. D-3- Calica), and
Ceferino Cabanas (Exh. D-3-Calica).

In spite of his efforts and expense, only one of Nisce's candidates won: Renato Ronquillo of Manila
4, as Secretary of the House of Delegates (t.s.n. July 3, p. 161).

(5) Giving free hotel accommodations, food, drinks, entertainment to delegates.

(a) ATTY. NEREO PACULDO

Atty. Paculdo alleged that he booked 24 regular rooms and three suites at the Holiday Inn, which
served as his headquarters. The 24 rooms were to be occupied by his staff (mostly ladies) and the
IBP delegates. The three suites were to be occupied by himself, the officers of the Capitol Bar
Association, and Atty. Mario Jalandoni. He paid P150,000 for the hotel bills of his delegates at the
Holiday Inn, where a room cost P990 per day with breakfast.

Those listed as guests of Atty. Paculdo at the Holiday Inn were: Emesto C. Perez, Tolomeo Ligutan
Judge Alfonso Combong, Ricardo Caliwag, Antonio Bisnar, Benedicto Balajadia, Jesus Castro,
Restituto Villanueva, Serapio Cribe Juanita Subia, Teodorico J. Almine, Rudy Gumban, Roem
Arbolado, Ricardo Teruel, Shirley Moises, Ramon Roco, Alberto Trinidad, Teodoro Quicoy Manito
Lucero, Fred Cledera Vicente Tordilla, Julian Ocampo, Francisco Felizmenio Marvel Clavecilla,
Amador Capiral, Eufronio Maristela, Porfirio Siyangco, William Llanes, Jr., Marciano Neri, Guerrero
Adaza, Diosdado Peralta, Luis C. Formilleza, Jr., Democrito Perez, Bruno Flores, Dennis Rendon,
Judge Ceferino Chan, Mario Jalandoni, Kenneth Siruelo Bella Tiro, Antonio Santos, Tiburcio Edano
James Tan, Cesilo A. Adaza, Francisco Roxas, Angelita Gacutan, Jesse Pimentel, Judge Jaime
Hamoy, Jesus Anonat, Carlos Egay, Judge Carlito Eisma, Judge Jesus Carbon, Joven Zach, and
Benjamin Padon.

Noel de Guzman, Holiday Inn's credit manager, testified that Atty. Paculdo booked 52 (not 24)
rooms, including the presidential suite, which was used as the Secretariat. The group bookings were
made by Atty. Gloria Paculdo, the wife of Nereo Paculdo (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 63-68). The total
sum of P227,114.89 was paid to Holiday Inn for the use of the rooms.

(b) ATTY. VIOLETA C. DRILON

The delegates and supporters of Atty. Drilon were billeted at the Philippine Plaza Hotel where her
campaign manager, Atty. Renato Callanta, booked 40 rooms, 5 of which were suites. According to
Ms. Villanueva, Philippine Plaza banquet and conventions manager, the contract that Atty. Callanta
signed with the Philippine Plaza was made in the name of the "IBP c/o Atty. Callanta."

Mrs. Lourdes Juco, a sales manager of the Philippine Plaza, recalled that it was Mr. Mariano
Benedicto who first came to book rooms for the IBP delegates. She suggested that he obtain a
group (or discounted) rate. He gave her the name of Atty. Callanta who would make the
arrangements with her. Mr. Benedicto turned out to be the Assistant Secretary of the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE).

The total sum of P316,411.53 was paid by Atty. Callanta for the rooms, food, and beverages
consumed by the Drilon group, with an unpaid balance of P302,197.30. Per Attorney Daniel
Martinez's last telephone conversation with Ms. Villanueva, Atty. Callanta still has an outstanding
account of P232,782.65 at Philippine Plaza.

Atty. Callanta admitted that he signed the contract for 40 rooms at the Philippine Plaza. He made a
downpayment of P123,000. His "working sheet' showed that the following persons contributed for
that down payment:

(a) Nilo Pena (Quasha Law Office) P 25,000

(b) Antonio Carpio 20,000

(c) Toto Ferrer (Carpio Law Office) 10,000

(d) Jay Castro 10,000

(e) Danny Deen 20,000

 (f) Angangco Tan (Angara Law Office) 10,000

(g) Alfonso Reyno 20,000

(h) Cosme Rossel 15,300

(t.s.n. July 4, 1 989, pp. 3-4)

Atty. Callanta explained that the above listed persons have been contributing money every time the
IBP embarks on a project. This time, they contributed so that their partners or associates could
attend the legal aid seminar and the IBP convention too.

Atty. Drilon alleged that she did not know that Atty. Callanta had billeted her delegates at the
Philippine Plaza. She allegedly did not also know in whose name the room she occupied was
registered. But she did ask for a room where she could rest during the convention. She admitted,
however, that she paid for her hotel room and meals to Atty. Callanta, through Atty. Loanzon (t.s.n.
July 3,1989).

The following were listed as having occupied the rooms reserved by Atty. Callanta at the Philippine
Plaza: Violeta Drilon, Victoria A. Verciles, Victoria C. Loanzon, Leopoldo A. Consulto Ador Lao,
Victoria Borra, Aimee Wong, Callanta, Pena, Tiu, Gallardo, Acong Atienza, D. Bernardo, Amores,
Silao Caingat, Manuel Yuson, Simeon Datumanong, Manuel Pecson, Sixto Marella, Joselito Barrera,
Radon Macalalag, Oscar Badelles, Antonio Acyatan, Ildefonso C. Puerto, Nestor Atienza, Gil Batula
Array Corot, Dimakuta Corot Romeo Fortes Irving Petilla, Teodoro Palma, Gil Palma, Danilo Deen,
Delsanto, Resuello, Araneta, Vicente Real, Sylvio Casuncad Espina, Guerrero, Julius Neri, Linda
Lim, Ben Lim, C. Batica, Luis Formilleza, Felix Macalag Mariano Benedicto, Atilano, Araneta, Renato
Callanta.

Atty. Nilo Pena admitted that the Quasha Law Office of which he is a senior partner, gave P25,000
to Callanta for rooms at the Philippine Plaza so that some members of his law firm could campaign
for the Drilon group (t.s.n. July 5,1989, pp. 7678) during the legal aid seminar and the IBP
convention. Most of the members of his law firm are fraternity brothers of Secretary Drilon (meaning,
members of the Sigma Rho Fraternity). He admitted being sympathetic to the candidacy of Atty.
Drilon and the members of her slate, two of whom Jose Grapilon and Simeon Datumanong — are
Sigma Rhoans. They consider Atty. Drilon as a "sigma rho sister," her husband being a sigma rhoan.

Atty. Antonio Carpio, also a Sigma Rhoan, reserved a room for the members of his own firm who
attended the legal aid seminar and the convention. He made the reservation through Atty. Callanta
to whom he paid P20,000 (t.s.n. July 6,1989, pp. 30-34).

Atty. Carpio assisted Atty. Drilon in her campaign during the convention, by soliciting the votes of
delegates he knew, like Atty. Albacite his former teacher (but the latter was already committed to
Nisce), and Atty. Romy Fortes, a classmate of his in the U.P. College of Law (t. t.s.n. July 6, 1989,
pp. 22, 29, 39).

(c) ATTY. RAMON NISCE.

Atty. Nisce, through his brother-in-law, Ricardo Paras, entered into a contract with the Hyatt Hotel for
a total of 29 rooms plus one (1) seventh-floor room. He made a downpayment of P20,000 (t.s.n.
June 28, 1989, p. 58) on April 20, 1989, and P37,632.45 on May 10, or a total of P57,632.45.
Ms. Cecile Flores, Ms. Milagros Ocampo, and Mr. Ramon Jacinto, the sales department manager,
credit manager, and reservation manager, respectively of the Hyatt, testified that Atty. Nisce's bill
amounted to P216,127.74 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 57-58; Exhibits E-Flores, F-Jacinto G-Ocampo).

As earlier mentioned, Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms for those who committed
themselves to his candidacy.

The hotel guests of Atty. Nisce were: Gloria Agunos Dennis Habanel B. Batula, John E. Asuncion,
Reynaldo Cortes, Lourdes Santos, Elmer Datuin, Romualdo Din, Antonio Nalapo, Israel Damasco,
Candido Balbin, Serrano Balot, Ibarra, Joel Llosa, Eltanal, Ruperto, Asuncion, Q. Pilotin Reymundo
P. Guzman, Zoilo Aguinaldo, Clarin, R. Ronquillo, Dominador Carillo, Filomeno Balinas, Ernesto
Sabulan, Yusop Pangadapun, A. Viray, Icampo, Abelardo Fermin, C. Quiaoit, Augurio Pamintuan,
Daniel Macaraeg, Onofre Tejada.

(6) Campaigning by labor officials for Atty. Violeta Drilon

In violation of the prohibition against "campaigning for or against a candidate while holding an
elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government' (Sec. 14[c], Art. I, IBP By-
Laws), Mariano E. Benedicto II, Assistant Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment, testified
that he took a leave of absence from his office to attend the IBP convention. He stayed at the
Philippine Plaza with the Drilon group admittedly to give "some moral assistance" to Atty. Violeta
Drilon. He did so because he is a member of the Sigma Rho Fraternity. When asked about the
significance of Sigma Rho, Secretary Benedicto explained: "More than the husband of Mrs. Drilon
being my boss, the significance there is that the husband is my brother in the Sigma Rho."

He cheered up Mrs., Drilon when her spirits were low. He talked to her immediate circle which
included Art Tiu, Tony Carpio, Nilo Pena, Amy Wong, Atty. Grapilon, Victor Lazatin, and Boy Reyno.
They assessed the progress of the campaign, and measured the strengths and weaknesses of the
other groups The group had sessions as early as the later part of May.

Room 114, the suite listed in the name of Assistant Secretary Benedicto toted up a bill of P23,110
during the 2-day IBP convention/election. A total of 113 phone calls (amounting to Pl,356) were
recorded as emanating from his room.

Opposite Room 114, was Room 112, also a suite, listed in the names of Mrs. Drilon, Gladys Tiongco
(candidate for Governor, Eastern Mindanao) and Amy Wong (candidate for Governor, Metro Manila).
These two rooms served as the "action center' or "war room" where campaign strategies were
discussed before and during the convention. It was in these rooms where the supporters of the
Drilon group, like Attys. Carpio, Callanta, Benedicto, the Quasha and the ACCRA lawyers met to plot
their moves.

(7) Paying the dues or other indebtedness of any number (Sec. 14[e], IBP BY-Laws).

Atty. Teresita C. Sison, IBP Treasurer, testified that she has heard of candidates paying the IBP
dues of lawyers who promised to vote for or support them, but she has no way of ascertaining
whether it was a candidate who paid the delinquent dues of another, because the receipts are
issued in the name of the member for whom payment is made (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 24-28).

She has noticed, though, that there is an upsurge of payments in March, April, May during any
election year. This year, the collections increased by P100,000 over that of last year (a non-election
year from Pl,413,425 to Pl,524,875 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, p. 25).
(8) Distribution of materials other than bio-data of not more than one page of legal size sheet of
paper (Sec. 14[a], IBP By-Laws).

On the convention floor on the day of the election, Atty. Paculdo caused to be distributed his bio-
data and copies of a leaflet entitled "My Quest," as wen as, the lists of his slate. Attys. Drilon and
Nisce similarly distributed their tickets and bio-data.

The campaign materials of Atty. Paculdo cost from P15,000 to P20,000. They were printed by his
own printing shop.

(9) Causing distribution of such statement to be done by persons other than those authorized by the
officer presiding at the election (Sec. 14[b], IBP By-Laws).

Atty. Paculdo employed uniformed girls to distribute his campaign materials on the convention floor.
Atty. Carpio noted that there were more campaign materials distributed at the convention site this
year than in previous years. The election was more heated and expensive (t.s.n. July 6,1989, p. 39).

Atty. Benjamin Bernardino, the incumbent President of the IBP Rizal Chapter, and a candidate for
chairman of the House of Delegates on Nisce's ticket, testified that campaign materials were
distributed during the convention by girls and by lawyers. He saw members of the ACCRA law firm
campaigning for Atty. Drilon (t.s.n. July 3,1989, pp. 142-145).

(10) Inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or to vote for or against a candidate (Sec.
14[e], IBP BY-Laws).

Atty. Bernardino disclosed that his cousin, Atty. Romeo Capulong, urged him to withdraw his
candidacy for chairman of the House of Delegates and to run as vice-chairman in Violy Drilon's slate,
but he declined (t.s.n. July 3,1989, pp. 137, 149).

Atty. Gloria Agunos personnel director of the Hyatt Terraces Hotel in Baguio and president of the
Baguio-Benguet IBP Chapter, recalled that in the third week of May 1989, after the Tripartite meet of
the Department of Labor & Employment at the Green Valley Country Club in Baguio City, she met
Atty. Drilon, together with two labor officers of Region 1, Attys. Filomeno Balbin and Atty. Mansala
Atty. Drilon solicited her (Atty. Agunos') vote and invited her to stay at the Philippine Plaza where a
room would be available for her. Atty. Paculdo also tried to enlist her support during the chapter
presidents' meeting to choose their nominee for governor for the Northern Luzon region (t.s.n. July
13,1989, pp. 43-54).

Atty. Nisce testified that a Manila Chapter 4 delegate, Marcial Magsino, who had earlier committed
his vote to Nisce changed his mind when he was offered a judgeship (This statement, however, is
admittedly hearsay). When Nisce confronted Magsino about the alleged offer, the latter denied that
there was such an offer. Nisce's informant was Antonio G. Nalapo an IBP candidate who also
withdrew.

Another Nisce candidate, Cesar Viola, withdrew from the race and refused to be nominated (t.s.n.
June 29, 1989, p. 104). Vicente P. Tordilla who was Nisce's candidate for Governor became
Paculdo's candidate instead (t.s.n. June 29, 1989, p. 104).

Nisce recalled that during the Bench and Bar Dialogue in Cotabato City, Court Administrator Tiro
went around saying, "I am not campaigning, but my wife is a candidate." Nisce said that the
presidents of several IBP chapters informed him that labor officials were campaigning for Mrs. Drilon
(t.s.n. June 29,1989, pp. 109-110). He mentioned Ciony de la Cerna, who allegedly campaigned in
La Union (t.s.n. June 29,1989,p.111)

Atty. Joel A. Llosa, Nisce's supporter and candidate for governor of the Western Visayas, expressed
his disappointment over the IBP elections because some delegates flip-flopped from one camp to
another. He testified that when he arrived at the Manila Domestic Airport he was met by an assistant
regional director of the DOLE who offered to bring him to the Philippine Plaza, but he declined the
offer. During the legal aid seminar, Atty. Drilon invited him to transfer to the Philippine Plaza where a
room had been reserved for him. He declined the invitation (t.s.n. July 4,1989, pp. 102-106).

Atty. Llosa said that while he was still in Dumaguete City, he already knew that the three candidates
had their headquarters in separate hotels: Paculdo, at the Holiday Inn; Drilon, at the Philippine
Plaza; and Nisce, at the Hyatt. He knew about this because a week before the elections,
representatives of Atty. Drilon went to Dumaguete City to campaign. He mentioned Atty. Rodil
Montebon of the ACCRA Law Office, accompanied by Atty. Julve the Assistant Regional Director of
the Department of Labor in Dumaguete City. These two, he said, offered to give him two PAL tickets
and accommodations at the Philippine Plaza (t.s.n. July 4,1989, pp. 101-104). But he declined the
offer because he was already committed to Atty. Nisce.

Atty. Llosa also revealed that before he left for Manila on May 31, 1989, a businessman, Henry Dy,
approached him to convince him to vote for Atty. Paculdo. But Llosa told Dy that he was already
committed to Nisce.

He did not receive any plane tickets from Atty. Nisce because he and his two companions (Atty.
Eltanal and Atty. Ruperto) had earlier bought their own tickets for Manila (t.s.n. July 4, 1989, p. 101).

SUMMARY OF CAMPAIGN EXPENSES INCURRED

BY THE CANDIDATES

Atty. Paculdo admitted having spent some P250,000 during his three weeks of campaigning. Of this
amount, the Capitol Bar Association (of which he was the chapter president) contributed about
P150,000. The Capitol Bar Association is a voluntary bar association composed of Quezon City
lawyers.

He spent about P100,000 to defray the expenses of his trips to the provinces (Bicol provinces,
Pampanga, Abra, Mountain Province and Bulacan) (t.s.n. June 29,1989, pp. 9-14).

Atty. Nisce's hotel bills at the Hyatt amounted to P216,127.74. This does not include the expenses
for his campaign which began several months before the June 3rd election, and his purchases of
airplane tickets for some delegates.

The records of the Philippine Plaza Hotel, headquarters of Atty. Drilon's camp, showed that her
campaign rang up over P600,000 in hotel bills. Atty. Callanta paid P316,411.53 for the rooms, food,
and beverage consumed by Atty. Drilon's supporters, but still left an unpaid bill of P302,197.30 at
convention's end.

FINDINGS.

From all the foregoing, it is evident that the manner in which the principal candidates for the national
positions in the Integrated Bar conducted their campaign preparatory to the elections on June 3,
1989, violated Section 14 of the IBP By-Laws and made a travesty of the idea of a "strictly non-
political" Integrated Bar enshrined in Section 4 of the By-Laws.

The setting up of campaign headquarters by the three principal candidates (Drilon, Nisce and
Paculdo) in five-star hotels: The Philippine Plaza, the Holiday Inn and The Hyatt the better for them
to corral and entertain the delegates billeted therein; the island hopping to solicit the votes of the
chapter presidents who comprise the 120-member House of Delegates that elects the national
officers and regional governors; the formation of tickets, slates, or line-ups of candidates for the
other elective positions aligned with, or supporting, either Drilon, Paculdo or Nisce; the procurement
of written commitments and the distribution of nomination forms to be filled up by the delegates; the
reservation of rooms for delegates in three big hotels, at the expense of the presidential candidates;
the use of a PNB plane by Drilon and some members of her ticket to enable them to "assess their
chances" among the chapter presidents in the Bicol provinces; the printing and distribution of tickets
and bio-data of the candidates which in the case of Paculdo admittedly cost him some P15,000 to
P20,000; the employment of uniformed girls (by Paculdo) and lawyers (by Drilon) to distribute their
campaign materials on the convention floor on the day of the election; the giving of assistance by the
Undersecretary of Labor to Mrs. Drilon and her group; the use of labor arbiters to meet delegates at
the airport and escort them to the Philippine Plaza Hotel; the giving of pre-paid plane tickets and
hotel accommodations to delegates (and some families who accompanied them) in exchange for
their support; the pirating of some candidates by inducing them to "hop" or "flipflop" from one ticket
to another for some rumored consideration; all these practices made a political circus of the
proceedings and tainted the whole election process.

The candidates and many of the participants in that election not only violated the By-Laws of the IBP
but also the ethics of the legal profession which imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of their
obligation to obey and uphold the constitution and the laws, the duty to "promote respect for law and
legal processes" and to abstain from 'activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system" (Rule 1.02, Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility). Respect
for law is gravely eroded when lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be millions of the law,
engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside the very rules that the IBP formulated for
their observance.

The unseemly ardor with which the candidates pursued the presidency of the association detracted
from the dignity of the legal profession. The spectacle of lawyers bribing or being bribed to vote one
way or another, certainly did not uphold the honor of the profession nor elevate it in the public's
esteem.

The Court notes with grave concern what appear to be the evasions, denials and outright
prevarications that tainted the statements of the witnesses, including tome of the candidates, during
the initial hearing conducted by it before its fact-finding committee was created. The subsequent
investigation conducted by this Committee has revealed that those parties had been less than
candid with the Court and seem to have conspired among themselves to deceive it or at least
withhold vital information from it to conceal the irregularities committed during the campaign.

CONCLUSIONS.

It has been mentioned with no little insistence that the provision in the 1987 Constitution (See. 8, Art.
VIII) providing for a Judicial and Bar Council composed of seven (7) members among whom is "a
representative of the Integrated Bar," tasked to participate in the selection of nominees for
appointment to vacant positions in the judiciary, may be the reason why the position of IBP president
has attracted so much interest among the lawyers. The much coveted "power" erroneously
perceived to be inherent in that office might have caused the corruption of the IBP elections. To
impress upon the participants in that electoral exercise the seriousness of the misconduct which
attended it and the stern disapproval with which it is viewed by this Court, and to restore the non-
political character of the IBP and reduce, if not entirely eliminate, expensive electioneering for the
top positions in the organization which, as the recently concluded elections revealed, spawned
unethical practices which seriously diminished the stature of the IBP as an association of the
practitioners of a noble and honored profession, the Court hereby ORDERS:

1. The IBP elections held on June3,1989 should be as they are hereby annulled.

2. The provisions of the IBP By-Laws for the direct election by the House of Delegates (approved by
this Court in its resolution of July 9, 1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) of the following national officers:

(a) the officers of the House of Delegates;

(b) the IBP president; and

(c) the executive vice-president,

be repealed, this Court being empowered to amend, modify or repeal the By-Laws of the IBP under
Section 77, Art. XI of said By-Laws.

3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-President elected by the
Board of Governors (composed of the governors of the nine [91 IBP regions) from among
themselves (as provided in Sec. 47, Art. VII, Original IBP By-Laws) should be restored. The right of
automatic succession by the Executive Vice-President to the presidency upon the expiration of their
two-year term (which was abolished by this Court's resolution dated July 9,1985 in Bar Matter No.
287) should be as it is hereby restored.

4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-President shall automatically
succeed to the office of president. The incoming board of governors shall then elect an Executive
Vice-President from among themselves. The position of Executive Vice-President shall be rotated
among the nine (9) IBP regions. One who has served as president may not run for election as
Executive Vice-President in a succeeding election until after the rotation of the presidency among
the nine (9) regions shall have been completed; whereupon, the rotation shall begin anew.

5. Section 47 of Article VII is hereby amended to read as follows:

Section 47. National Officers. — The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a
President and Executive Vice-President to be chosen by the Board of Governors
from among nine (9) regional governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis.
The governors shall be ex oficio Vice-President for their respective regions. There
shall also be a Secretary and Treasurer of the Board of Governors to be appointed
by the President with the consent of the Board.

6. Section 33(b), Art. V, IBP By-Laws, is hereby amended as follows:

(b) The President and Executive Vice President of the IBP shall be the Chairman and
Vice-Chairman, respectively, of the House of Delegates. The Secretary, Treasurer,
and Sergeant-at-Arms shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the
House of Delegates.'
7. Section 33(g) of Article V providing for the positions of Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Secretary-
Treasurer and Sergeant-at- Arms of the House of Delegates is hereby repealed

8. Section 37, Article VI is hereby amended to read as follows:

Section 37. Composition of the Board. — The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall
be governed by a Board of Governors consisting of nine (9) Governors from the nine
(9) regions as delineated in Section 3 of the Integration Rule, on the representation
basis of one (1) Governor for each region to be elected by the members of the House
of Delegates from that region only. The position of Governor should be rotated
among the different Chapters in the region.

9. Section 39, Article V is hereby amended as follows:

Section 39. Nomination and election of the Governors at least one (1) month before
the national convention the delegates from each region shall elect the governor for
their region, the choice of which shall as much as possible be rotated among the
chapters in the region.

10. Section33(a), Article V hereby is amended by addingthe following provision as part of the first
paragraph:

No convention of the House of Delegates nor of the general membership shall be

held prior to any election in an election year.

11. Section 39, (a), (b), (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7) of Article VI should be as they are hereby
deleted.

All other provisions of the By-Laws including its amendment by the Resolution en banc of this Court
of July 9, 1985 (Bar Matter No. 287) that are inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified.

12. Special elections for the Board of Governors shall be held in the nine (9) IBP regions within three
(3) months, after the promulgation of the Court's resolution in this case. Within thirty (30) days
thereafter, the Board of Governors shall meet at the IBP Central Office in Manila to elect from among
themselves the IBP national president and executive vice-president. In these special elections, the
candidates in the election of the national officers held on June 3,1989, particularly identified in Sub-
Head 3 of this Resolution entitled "Formation of Tickets and Single Slates," as well as those
identified in this Resolution as connected with any of the irregularities attendant upon that election,
are ineligible and may not present themselves as candidate for any position.

13. Pending such special elections, a caretaker board shall be appointed by the Court to administer
the affairs of the IBP. The Court makes clear that the dispositions here made are without prejudice to
its adoption in due time of such further and other measures as are warranted in the premises.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla. Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes,
Griño-Aquino and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Fernan, C.J. and Medialdea, J., took no part.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.

March 23, 1929

In re LUIS B. TAGORDA,

Duran & Lim for respondent.

Attorney-General Jaranilla and Provincial Fiscal Jose for the Government.

MALCOLM, J.:

The respondent, Luis B. Tagorda, a practising attorney and a member of the provincial board of
Isabela, admits that previous to the last general elections he made use of a card written in Spanish
and Ilocano, which, in translation, reads as follows:

LUIS B. TAGORDA
Attorney
Notary Public
CANDIDATE FOR THIRD MEMBER
Province of Isabela

(NOTE. — As notary public, he can execute for you a deed of sale for the purchase of land
as required by the cadastral office; can renew lost documents of your animals; can make
your application and final requisites for your homestead; and can execute any kind of
affidavit. As a lawyer, he can help you collect your loans although long overdue, as well as
any complaint for or against you. Come or write to him in his town, Echague, Isabela. He
offers free consultation, and is willing to help and serve the poor.)

The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter addressed to a lieutenant of barrio in
his home municipality written in Ilocano, which letter, in translation, reads as follows:

ECHAGUE, ISABELA, September 18, 1928

MY DEAR LIEUTENANT: I would like to inform you of the approaching date for our induction
into office as member of the Provincial Board, that is on the 16th of next month. Before my
induction into office I should be very glad to hear your suggestions or recommendations for
the good of the province in general and for your barrio in particular. You can come to my
house at any time here in Echague, to submit to me any kind of suggestion or
recommendation as you may desire.

I also inform you that despite my membership in the Board I will have my residence here in
Echague. I will attend the session of the Board of Ilagan, but will come back home on the
following day here in Echague to live and serve with you as a lawyer and notary public.
Despite my election as member of the Provincial Board, I will exercise my legal profession as
a lawyer and notary public. In case you cannot see me at home on any week day, I assure
you that you can always find me there on every Sunday. I also inform you that I will receive
 any work regarding preparations of documents of contract of sales and affidavits to be sworn
to before me as notary public even on Sundays.

I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the reason that some people are in the
belief that my residence as member of the Board will be in Ilagan and that I would then be
disqualified to exercise my profession as lawyer and as notary public. Such is not the case
and I would make it clear that I am free to exercise my profession as formerly and that I will
have my residence here in Echague.

I would request you kind favor to transmit this information to your barrio people in any of your
meetings or social gatherings so that they may be informed of my desire to live and to serve
with you in my capacity as lawyer and notary public. If the people in your locality have not as
yet contracted the services of other lawyers in connection with the registration of their land
titles, I would be willing to handle the work in court and would charge only three pesos for
every registration.

Yours respectfully,

(Sgd.) LUIS TAGORDA

Attorney
Notary Public.

The facts being conceded, it is next in order to write down the applicable legal provisions. Section 21
of the Code of Civil Procedure as originally conceived related to disbarments of members of the bar.
In 1919 at the instigation of the Philippine Bar Association, said codal section was amended by Act
No. 2828 by adding at the end thereof the following: "The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice."

The statute as amended conforms in principle to the Canons of Professionals Ethics adopted by the
American Bar Association in 1908 and by the Philippine Bar Association in 1917. Canons 27 and 28
of the Code of Ethics provide:

27. ADVERTISING, DIRECT OR INDIRECT. — The most worthy and effective

advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, and especially with his brother lawyers, is
the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust.
This cannot be forced, but must be the outcome of character and conduct. The publication or
circulation of ordinary simple business cards, being a matter of personal taste or local
custom, and sometimes of convenience, is not per se improper. But solicitation of business
by circulars or advertisements, or by personal communications or interview not warranted by
personal relations, is unprofessional. It is equally unprofessional to procure business by
indirection through touters of any kind, whether allied real estate firms or trust companies
advertising to secure the drawing of deeds or wills or offering retainers in exchange for
executorships or trusteeships to be influenced by the lawyer. Indirect advertisement for
business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments concerning the manner of their
conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and
all other like self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower the tone of our high calling, and are
intolerable.

28. STIRRING UP LITIGATION, DIRECTLY OR THROUGH AGENTS. — It is unprofessional

for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of blood,
relationship or trust make it his duty to do so. Stirring up strife and litigation is not only
unprofessional, but it is indictable at common law. It is disreputable to hunt up defects in
 titles or other causes of action and inform thereof in order to the employed to bring suit, or to
breed litigation by seeking out those with claims for personal injuries or those having any
other grounds of action in order to secure them as clients, or to employ agents or runners for
like purposes, or to pay or reward directly or indirectly, those who bring or influence the
bringing of such cases to his office, or to remunerate policemen, court or prison officials,
physicians, hospital attaches or others who may succeed, under the guise of giving
disinterested friendly advice, in influencing the criminal, the sick and the injured, the ignorant
or others, to seek his professional services. A duty to the public and to the profession
devolves upon every member of the bar having knowledge of such practices upon the part of
any practitioner immediately to inform thereof to the end that the offender may be disbarred.

Common barratry consisting of frequently stirring up suits and quarrels between individuals was a
crime at the common law, and one of the penalties for this offense when committed by an attorney
was disbarment. Statutes intended to reach the same evil have been provided in a number of
jurisdictions usually at the instance of the bar itself, and have been upheld as constitutional. The
reason behind statutes of this type is not difficult to discover. The law is a profession and not a
business. The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through others for to do so
would be unprofessional. (State vs. Rossman [1909], 53 Wash., 1; 17 Ann. Cas., 625;
Peoplevs. Mac Cabe [1893], 19 L. R. A., 231; 2 R. C. L., 1097.)

It becomes our duty to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly practice of solicitation of cases by
lawyers. It is destructive of the honor of a great profession. It lowers the standards of that profession.
It works against the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar. It results
in needless litigation and in incenting to strife otherwise peacefully inclined citizens.

The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or suspension. That should
be distinctly understood.

Giving application of the law and the Canons of Ethics to the admitted facts, the respondent stands
convicted of having solicited cases in defiance of the law and those canons. Accordingly, the only
remaining duty of the court is to fix upon the action which should here be taken. The provincial fiscal
of Isabela, with whom joined the representative of the Attorney-General in the oral presentation of
the case, suggests that the respondent be only reprimanded. We think that our action should go
further than this if only to reflect our attitude toward cases of this character of which unfortunately the
respondent's is only one. The commission of offenses of this nature would amply justify permanent
elimination from the bar. But as mitigating, circumstances working in favor of the respondent there
are, first, his intimation that he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts, second, his youth and
inexperience at the bar, and, third, his promise not to commit a similar mistake in the future. A
modest period of suspension would seem to fit the case of the erring attorney. But it should be
distinctly understood that this result is reached in view of the considerations which have influenced
the court to the relatively lenient in this particular instance and should, therefore, not be taken as
indicating that future convictions of practice of this kind will not be dealt with by disbarment.

In view of all the circumstances of this case, the judgment of the court is that the respondent Luis B.
Tagorda be and is hereby suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law for the period of one
month from April 1, 1929,

Street, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

Johnson, J., reserves his vote.
.C. No. 5281 February 12, 2008

MANUEL L. LEE, petitioner,

vs.
ATTY. REGINO B. TAMBAGO, respondent.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

In a letter-complaint dated April 10, 2000, complainant Manuel L. Lee charged respondent Atty.
Regino B. Tambago with violation of the Notarial Law and the ethics of the legal profession for
notarizing a spurious last will and testament.

In his complaint, complainant averred that his father, the decedent Vicente Lee, Sr., never executed
the contested will. Furthermore, the spurious will contained the forged signatures of Cayetano
Noynay and Loreto Grajo, the purported witnesses to its execution.

In the said will, the decedent supposedly bequeathed his entire estate to his wife Lim Hock Lee,
save for a parcel of land which he devised to Vicente Lee, Jr. and Elena Lee, half-siblings of
complainant.

The will was purportedly executed and acknowledged before respondent on June 30,
1965.1 Complainant, however, pointed out that the residence certificate2 of the testator noted in the
acknowledgment of the will was dated January 5, 1962.3 Furthermore, the signature of the testator
was not the same as his signature as donor in a deed of donation4 (containing his purported genuine
signature). Complainant averred that the signatures of his deceased father in the will and in the deed
of donation were "in any way (sic) entirely and diametrically opposed from (sic) one another in all
angle[s]."5

Complainant also questioned the absence of notation of the residence certificates of the purported
witnesses Noynay and Grajo. He alleged that their signatures had likewise been forged and merely
copied from their respective voters’ affidavits.

Complainant further asserted that no copy of such purported will was on file in the archives division
of the Records Management and Archives Office of the National Commission for Culture and the
Arts (NCCA). In this connection, the certification of the chief of the archives division dated
September 19, 1999 stated:

Doc. 14, Page No. 4, Book No. 1, Series of 1965 refers to an AFFIDAVIT executed by
BARTOLOME RAMIREZ on June 30, 1965 and is available in this Office[’s] files.6

Respondent in his comment dated July 6, 2001 claimed that the complaint against him contained
false allegations: (1) that complainant was a son of the decedent Vicente Lee, Sr. and (2) that the
will in question was fake and spurious. He alleged that complainant was "not a legitimate son of
Vicente Lee, Sr. and the last will and testament was validly executed and actually notarized by
respondent per affidavit7 of Gloria Nebato, common-law wife of Vicente Lee, Sr. and corroborated by
the joint affidavit8 of the children of Vicente Lee, Sr., namely Elena N. Lee and Vicente N. Lee, Jr.
xxx."9
Respondent further stated that the complaint was filed simply to harass him because the criminal
case filed by complainant against him in the Office of the Ombudsman "did not prosper."

Respondent did not dispute complainant’s contention that no copy of the will was on file in the
archives division of the NCCA. He claimed that no copy of the contested will could be found there
because none was filed.

Lastly, respondent pointed out that complainant had no valid cause of action against him as he
(complainant) did not first file an action for the declaration of nullity of the will and demand his share
in the inheritance.

In a resolution dated October 17, 2001, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.10

In his report, the investigating commissioner found respondent guilty of violation of pertinent
provisions of the old Notarial Law as found in the Revised Administrative Code. The violation
constituted an infringement of legal ethics, particularly Canon 111 and Rule 1.0112 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR).13 Thus, the investigating commissioner of the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline recommended the suspension of respondent for a period of three months.

The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XVII-2006-285 dated May 26, 2006, resolved:

[T]o ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with

modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, and considering Respondent’s failure to comply with the laws in the discharge of his
function as a notary public, Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby suspended from the practice
of law for one year and Respondent’s notarial commission is Revoked and
Disqualified from reappointment as Notary Public for two (2) years.14

We affirm with modification.

A will is an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a
certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take effect after his death.15 A will may either be
notarial or holographic.

The law provides for certain formalities that must be followed in the execution of wills. The object of
solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door on bad faith and fraud, to avoid
substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity.16

A notarial will, as the contested will in this case, is required by law to be subscribed at the end
thereof by the testator himself. In addition, it should be attested and subscribed by three or more
credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.17

The will in question was attested by only two witnesses, Noynay and Grajo. On this circumstance
alone, the will must be considered void.18 This is in consonance with the rule that acts executed
against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself
authorizes their validity.
The Civil Code likewise requires that a will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witnesses.19 The importance of this requirement is highlighted by the fact that it was
segregated from the other requirements under Article 805 and embodied in a distinct and separate
provision.20

An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent
officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an extra step undertaken whereby
the signatory actually declares to the notary public that the same is his or her own free act and
deed.21 The acknowledgment in a notarial will has a two-fold purpose: (1) to safeguard the testator’s
wishes long after his demise and (2) to assure that his estate is administered in the manner that he
intends it to be done.

A cursory examination of the acknowledgment of the will in question shows that this particular
requirement was neither strictly nor substantially complied with. For one, there was the conspicuous
absence of a notation of the residence certificates of the notarial witnesses Noynay and Grajo in the
acknowledgment. Similarly, the notation of the testator’s old residence certificate in the same
acknowledgment was a clear breach of the law. These omissions by respondent invalidated the will.

As the acknowledging officer of the contested will, respondent was required to faithfully observe the
formalities of a will and those of notarization. As we held in Santiago v. Rafanan:22

The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public. They are
required to certify that the party to every document acknowledged before him had presented
the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence tax); and to enter its
number, place of issue and date as part of such certification.

These formalities are mandatory and cannot be disregarded, considering the degree of importance
and evidentiary weight attached to notarized documents.23 A notary public, especially a lawyer,24 is
bound to strictly observe these elementary requirements.

The Notarial Law then in force required the exhibition of the residence certificate upon notarization of
a document or instrument:

Section 251. Requirement as to notation of payment of [cedula] residence tax. – Every

contract, deed, or other document acknowledged before a notary public shall have certified
thereon that the parties thereto have presented their proper [cedula] residence certificate or
are exempt from the [cedula] residence tax, and there shall be entered by the notary public
as a part of such certificate the number, place of issue, and date of each [cedula] residence
certificate as aforesaid.25

The importance of such act was further reiterated by Section 6 of the Residence Tax Act26 which
stated:

When a person liable to the taxes prescribed in this Act acknowledges any document before
a notary public xxx it shall be the duty of such person xxx with whom such transaction is had
or business done, to require the exhibition of the residence certificate showing payment of
the residence taxes by such person xxx.

In the issuance of a residence certificate, the law seeks to establish the true and correct identity of
the person to whom it is issued, as well as the payment of residence taxes for the current year. By
having allowed decedent to exhibit an expired residence certificate, respondent failed to comply with
the requirements of both the old Notarial Law and the Residence Tax Act. As much could be said of
his failure to demand the exhibition of the residence certificates of Noynay and Grajo.

On the issue of whether respondent was under the legal obligation to furnish a copy of the notarized
will to the archives division, Article 806 provides:

Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witness. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file
another with the office of the Clerk of Court. (emphasis supplied)

Respondent’s failure, inadvertent or not, to file in the archives division a copy of the notarized will
was therefore not a cause for disciplinary action.

Nevertheless, respondent should be faulted for having failed to make the necessary entries
pertaining to the will in his notarial register. The old Notarial Law required the entry of the following
matters in the notarial register, in chronological order:

1. nature of each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him;

2. person executing, swearing to, or acknowledging the instrument;

3. witnesses, if any, to the signature;

4. date of execution, oath, or acknowledgment of the instrument;

5. fees collected by him for his services as notary;

6. give each entry a consecutive number; and

7. if the instrument is a contract, a brief description of the substance of the instrument.27

In an effort to prove that he had complied with the abovementioned rule, respondent contended that
he had crossed out a prior entry and entered instead the will of the decedent. As proof, he presented
a photocopy of his notarial register. To reinforce his claim, he presented a photocopy of a
certification28 stating that the archives division had no copy of the affidavit of Bartolome Ramirez.

A photocopy is a mere secondary evidence. It is not admissible unless it is shown that the original is
unavailable. The proponent must first prove the existence and cause of the unavailability of the
original,29 otherwise, the evidence presented will not be admitted. Thus, the photocopy of
respondent’s notarial register was not admissible as evidence of the entry of the execution of the will
because it failed to comply with the requirements for the admissibility of secondary evidence.

In the same vein, respondent’s attempt to controvert the certification dated September 21,
199930 must fail. Not only did he present a mere photocopy of the certification dated March 15,
2000;31 its contents did not squarely prove the fact of entry of the contested will in his notarial
register.

Notaries public must observe with utmost care32 and utmost fidelity the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties, otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of notarized deeds
will be undermined.33
Defects in the observance of the solemnities prescribed by law render the entire will invalid. This
carelessness cannot be taken lightly in view of the importance and delicate nature of a will,
considering that the testator and the witnesses, as in this case, are no longer alive to identify the
instrument and to confirm its contents.34 Accordingly, respondent must be held accountable for his
acts. The validity of the will was seriously compromised as a consequence of his breach of duty.35

In this connection, Section 249 of the old Notarial Law provided:

Grounds for revocation of commission. — The following derelictions of duty on the part of a
notary public shall, in the discretion of the proper judge of first instance, be sufficient ground
for the revocation of his commission:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) The failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register
touching his notarial acts in the manner required by law.

xxx xxx xxx

(f) The failure of the notary to make the proper notation regarding cedula certificates.36

These gross violations of the law also made respondent liable for violation of his oath as a lawyer
and constituted transgressions of Section 20 (a), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court37 and Canon 138 and
Rule 1.0139 of the CPR.

The first and foremost duty of a lawyer is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land.40 For a lawyer is the servant of the law and
belongs to a profession to which society has entrusted the administration of law and the
dispensation of justice.41

While the duty to uphold the Constitution and obey the law is an obligation imposed on every citizen,
a lawyer assumes responsibilities well beyond the basic requirements of good citizenship. As a
servant of the law, a lawyer should moreover make himself an example for others to
emulate.42 Being a lawyer, he is supposed to be a model in the community in so far as respect for the
law is concerned.43

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.44 A breach of these conditions justifies
disciplinary action against the erring lawyer. A disciplinary sanction is imposed on a lawyer upon a
finding or acknowledgment that he has engaged in professional misconduct.45 These sanctions
meted out to errant lawyers include disbarment, suspension and reprimand.

Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction.46 We have held in a number of cases
that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution47 and should not be decreed if any
punishment less severe – such as reprimand, suspension, or fine – will accomplish the end
desired.48 The rule then is that disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that
seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court.49

Respondent, as notary public, evidently failed in the performance of the elementary duties of his
office. Contrary to his claims that he "exercised his duties as Notary Public with due care and with
due regard to the provision of existing law and had complied with the elementary formalities in the
performance of his duties xxx," we find that he acted very irresponsibly in notarizing the will in
question. Such recklessness warrants the less severe punishment of suspension from the practice of
law. It is, as well, a sufficient basis for the revocation of his commission50 and his perpetual
disqualification to be commissioned as a notary public.51

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby found guilty of professional

misconduct. He violated (1) the Lawyer’s Oath; (2) Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; (3) Canon 1 and
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; (4) Art. 806 of the Civil Code and (5) the
provisions of the old Notarial Law.

Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year and his
notarial commissionREVOKED. Because he has not lived up to the trustworthiness expected of him
as a notary public and as an officer of the court, he is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from
reappointment as a notary public.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to all the courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant, as well as made part of the personal records of
respondent.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005]

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), Petitioner,

vs.SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division), LUCIO C. TAN, CARMEN KHAO
TAN, FLORENCIO T. SANTOS, NATIVIDAD P. SANTOS, DOMINGO
CHUA, TAN HUI NEE, MARIANO TAN ENG LIAN, ESTATE OF BENITO
TAN KEE HIONG (represented by TARCIANA C. TAN), FLORENCIO N.
SANTOS, JR., HARRY C. TAN, TAN ENG CHAN, CHUNG POE KEE,
MARIANO KHOO, MANUEL KHOO, MIGUEL KHOO, JAIME KHOO,
ELIZABETH KHOO, CELSO RANOLA, WILLIAM T. WONG, ERNESTO B.
LIM, BENJAMIN T. ALBACITA, WILLY CO, ALLIED BANKING CORP.,
ALLIED LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION, ASIA BREWERY,
INC., BASIC HOLDINGS CORP., FOREMOST FARMS, INC., FORTUNE
TOBACCO CORP., GRANDSPAN DEVELOPMENT CORP., HIMMEL
INDUSTRIES, IRIS HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., JEWEL
HOLDINGS, INC., MANUFACTURING SERVICES AND TRADE CORP.,
MARANAW HOTELS AND RESORT CORP., NORTHERN TOBACCO
REDRYING PLANT, PROGRESSIVE FARMS, INC., SHAREHOLDINGS,
INC., SIPALAY TRADING CORP., VIRGO HOLDINGS & DEVELOPMENT
CORP., and ATTY. ESTELITO P. MENDOZA,Respondents.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This case is prima impressiones and it is weighted with significance for it concerns
on one hand, the efforts of the Bar to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in government
service and on the other, its effect on the right of government to recruit competent
counsel to defend its interests.
In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial
difficulties. GENBANK had extended considerable financial support to Filcapital
Development Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current
account with the Central Bank.[1] It was later found by the Central Bank that
GENBANK had approved various loans to directors, officers, stockholders and
related interests totaling P172.3 million, of which 59% was classified as doubtful
and P0.505 million as uncollectible.[2] As a bailout, the Central Bank extended
emergency loans to GENBANK which reached a total of P310 million.
[3] Despite the mega loans, GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. On
March 25, 1977, the Central Bank issued a resolution declaring
GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to its depositors,
creditors and the general public, and ordering its liquidation.[4] A public
bidding of GENBANK's assets was held from March 26 to 28, 1977, wherein the
Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid.[5] Subsequently, former Solicitor
General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the then Court of First
Instance praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK's
liquidation as mandated by Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265.
In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos government. One of
the first acts of President Corazon C. Aquino was to establish the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth
of former President Ferdinand Marcos, his family and his cronies. Pursuant to this
mandate, the PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with theSandiganbayan a complaint
for 'reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages against
respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad P. Santos,
Domingo Chua, Tan Hui Nee, Mariano Tan Eng Lian, Estate of Benito Tan Kee
Hiong, Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Harry C. Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung Poe Kee,
Mariano Khoo, Manuel Khoo, Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth Khoo, Celso
Ranola, William T. Wong, Ernesto B. Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy Co, Allied
Banking Corporation (Allied Bank), Allied Leasing and Finance Corporation, Asia
Brewery, Inc., Basic Holdings Corp., Foremost Farms, Inc., Fortune Tobacco
Corporation, Grandspan Development Corp., Himmel Industries, Iris Holdings and
Development Corp., Jewel Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing Services and Trade Corp.,
Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp., Northern Tobacco Redrying Plant, Progressive
Farms, Inc., Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay Trading Corp., Virgo Holdings &
Development Corp., (collectively referred to herein as respondents Tan, et al.),
then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Panfilo O. Domingo, Cesar
Zalamea, Don Ferry and Gregorio Licaros. The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. 0005 of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.[6] In connection
therewith, the PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly
acquired by the above-named persons by taking advantage of their close
relationship and influence with former President Marcos.
Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this Court and filed petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and injunction to nullify, among others, the writs of sequestration issued
by the PCGG.[7] After the filing of the parties' comments, this Court referred the
cases to the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition. These cases were docketed
as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099. In all these cases, respondents Tan, et al. were
represented by their counsel, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, who has
then resumed his private practice of law.
On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza
as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. with the Second Division of
the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0005[8] and 0096-0099.[9] The motions
alleged that respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor General[10] and counsel to
Central Bank, 'actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK, which was
subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking
Corporation. Respondent Mendoza allegedly 'intervened in the acquisition of
GENBANK by respondents Tan, et al. when, in his capacity as then Solicitor
General, he advised the Central Bank's officials on the procedure to bring about
GENBANK's liquidation and appeared as counsel for the Central Bank in connection
with its petition for assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK which he filed with the
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of and was docketed as Special
Proceeding No. 107812. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits former government
lawyers from accepting 'engagement or employment in connection with any matter
in which he had intervened while in said service.
On April 22, 1991 the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution denyingPCGG's motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza in Civil Case
No. 0005.[11] It found that the PCGG failed to prove the existence of an
inconsistency between respondent Mendoza's former function as Solicitor General
and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. It noted that
respondent Mendoza did not take a position adverse to that taken on behalf of the
Central Bank during his term as Solicitor General.[12] It further ruled that
respondent Mendoza's appearance as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. was
beyond the one-year prohibited period under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713
since he ceased to be Solicitor General in the year 1986. The said section prohibits
a former public official or employee from practicing his profession in connection
with any matter before the office he used to be with within one year from his
resignation, retirement or separation from public office.[13] The PCGG did not seek
any reconsideration of the ruling.[14]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It appears that Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 were transferred from
the Sandiganbayan'sSecond Division to the Fifth Division.[15] In its resolution
dated July 11, 2001, the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan denied the other
PCGG's motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza.[16] Itadopted the resolution of
its Second Division dated April 22, 1991, and observed that the arguments were
the same in substance as the motion to disqualify filed in Civil Case No. 0005. The
PCGG sought reconsideration of the ruling but its motion was denied in its
resolution dated December 5, 2001.[17]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG assailing the resolutions dated July
11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan via
a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.[18] The PCGG alleged that theFifth Division acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed
resolutions contending that: 1) Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
prohibits a former government lawyer from accepting employment in connection
with any matter in which he intervened; 2) the prohibition in the Rule is not time-
bound; 3) that Central Bank could not waive the objection to respondent Mendoza's
appearance on behalf of the PCGG; and 4) the resolution in Civil Case No. 0005 was
interlocutory, thus res judicata does not apply.[19]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The petition at bar raises procedural and substantive issues of law. In view,
however, of the import and impact of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility to the legal profession and the government, we shall cut our way and
forthwith resolve the substantive issue.

Substantive Issue

The key issue is whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
applies to respondent Mendoza. Again, the prohibition states: 'A lawyer shall not,
after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection
with any matter in which he hadintervened while in the said service.

I.A. The history of Rule 6.03

A proper resolution of this case necessitates that we trace the historical

lineage of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ethical standards for lawyers
were pervasive in England and other parts of Europe. The early statements of
standards did not resemble modern codes of conduct. They were not detailed or
collected in one source but surprisingly were comprehensive for their time. The
principal thrust of the standards was directed towards the litigation conduct of
lawyers. It underscored the central duty of truth and fairness in litigation as
superior to any obligation to the client. The formulations of the litigation duties
were at times intricate, including specific pleading standards, an obligation to
inform the court of falsehoods and a duty to explore settlement alternatives. Most
of the lawyer's other basic duties -- competency, diligence, loyalty, confidentiality,
reasonable fees and service to the poor -- originated in the litigation context, but
ultimately had broader application to all aspects of a lawyer's practice.
The forms of lawyer regulation in colonial and early post-revolutionary
America did not differ markedly from those in England. The colonies and early
states used oaths, statutes, judicial oversight, and procedural rules to govern
attorney behavior. The difference from England was in the pervasiveness and
continuity of such regulation. The standards set in England varied over time, but
the variation in early America was far greater. The American regulation fluctuated
within a single colony and differed from colony to colony. Many regulations had the
effect of setting some standards of conduct, but the regulation was sporadic,
leaving gaps in the substantive standards. Only three of the traditional core duties
can be fairly characterized as pervasive in the formal, positive law of the colonial
and post-revolutionary period: the duties of litigation fairness, competency and
reasonable fees.[20]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The nineteenth century has been termed the 'dark ages' of legal ethics in the
United States. By mid-century, American legal reformers were filling the void in two
ways. First, David Dudley Field, the drafter of the highly influential New York 'Field
Code, introduced a new set of uniform standards of conduct for lawyers. This
concise statement of eight statutory duties became law in several states in the
second half of the nineteenth century. At the same time, legal educators, such as
David Hoffman and George Sharswood, and many other lawyers were working to
flesh out the broad outline of a lawyer's duties. These reformers wrote about legal
ethics in unprecedented detail and thus brought a new level of understanding to a
lawyer's duties. A number of mid-nineteenth century laws and statutes, other than
the Field Code, governed lawyer behavior. A few forms of colonial regulations ' e.g.,
the 'do no falsehood oath and the deceit prohibitions -- persisted in some states.
Procedural law continued to directly, or indirectly, limit an attorney's litigation
behavior. The developing law of agency recognized basic duties of competence,
loyalty and safeguarding of client property. Evidence law started to recognize with
less equivocation the attorney-client privilege and its underlying theory of
confidentiality. Thus, all of the core duties, with the likely exception of service to
the poor, had some basis in formal law. Yet, as in the colonial and early post-
revolutionary periods, these standards were isolated and did not provide a
comprehensive statement of a lawyer's duties. The reformers, by contrast, were
more comprehensive in their discussion of a lawyer's duties, and they actually
ushered a new era in American legal ethics.[21]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a new form of ethical standards
began to guide lawyers in their practice ' the bar association code of legal ethics.
The bar codes were detailed ethical standards formulated by lawyers for lawyers.
They combined the two primary sources of ethical guidance from the nineteenth
century. Like the academic discourses, the bar association codes gave detail to the
statutory statements of duty and the oaths of office. Unlike the academic lectures,
however, the bar association codes retained some of the official imprimatur of the
statutes and oaths. Over time, the bar association codes became extremely popular
that states adopted them as binding rules of law. Critical to the development of the
new codes was the re-emergence of bar associations themselves. Local bar
associations formed sporadically during the colonial period, but they disbanded by
the early nineteenth century. In the late nineteenth century, bar associations began
to form again, picking up where their colonial predecessors had left off. Many of the
new bar associations, most notably the Alabama State Bar Association and the
American Bar Association, assumed on the task of drafting substantive standards of
conduct for their members.[22]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In 1887, Alabama became the first state with a comprehensive bar association
code of ethics. The 1887 Alabama Code of Ethics was the model for several states'
codes, and it was the foundation for the American Bar Association's (ABA) 1908
Canons of Ethics.[23]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In 1917, the Philippine Bar found that the oath and duties of a lawyer were
insufficient to attain the full measure of public respect to which the legal profession
was entitled. In that year, the Philippine Bar Association adopted as its own,
Canons 1 to 32 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.[24]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
As early as 1924, some ABA members have questioned the form and function of
the canons. Among their concerns was the 'revolving door or 'the process by
which lawyers and others temporarily enter government service from private life
and then leave it for large fees in private practice, where they can exploit
information, contacts, and influence garnered in government service.[25] These
concerns were classified as adverse-interest conflicts' and 'congruent-interest
conflicts. 'Adverse-interest conflicts' exist where the matter in which the
former government lawyer represents a client in private practice is substantially
related to a matter that the lawyer dealt with while employed by the government
and the interests of the current and former are adverse. [26] On the other hand,
'congruent-interest representation conflicts'are unique to government lawyers
and apply primarily to former government lawyers. [27] For several years, the ABA
attempted to correct and update the canons through new canons, individual
amendments and interpretative opinions. In 1928, the ABA amended one canon
and added thirteen new canons.[28] To deal with problems peculiar to former
government lawyers,Canon 36 was minted which disqualified them both for
'adverse-interest conflicts' and 'congruent-interest representation conflicts.[29] The
rationale for disqualification is rooted in a concern that the government lawyer's
largely discretionary actions would be influenced by the temptation to take action
on behalf of the government client that later could be to the advantage of parties
who might later become private practice clients.[30] Canon 36 provides, viz.:

36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment

A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of which he has
previously acted in a judicial capacity.

A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ should not,
after his retirement, accept employment in connection with any matter he has investigated
or passed upon while in such office or employ.

Over the next thirty years, the ABA continued to amend many of the canons and
added Canons 46 and 47 in 1933 and 1937, respectively.[31]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In 1946, the Philippine Bar Association again adopted as its own Canons 33 to
47 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.[32]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
By the middle of the twentieth century, there was growing consensus that the
ABA Canons needed more meaningful revision. In 1964, the ABA President-elect
Lewis Powell asked for the creation of a committee to study the 'adequacy and
effectiveness' of the ABA Canons. The committee recommended that the canons
needed substantial revision, in part because the ABA Canons failed to distinguish
between 'the inspirational and the proscriptive and were thus unsuccessful in
enforcement. The legal profession in the United States likewise observed
thatCanon 36 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics resulted in unnecessary
disqualification of lawyers for negligible participation in matters during their
employment with the government.
The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA to replace it in the 1969 ABA
Model Code of Professional Responsibility.[33] The basic ethical principles in
the Code of Professional Responsibility were supplemented by Disciplinary Rules
that defined minimum rules of conduct to which the lawyer must adhere. [34] In the
case of Canon 9, DR 9-101(b)[35] became the applicable supplementary norm.
The drafting committee reformulated the canons into the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility, and, in August of 1969, the ABA House of Delegates
approved the Model Code.[36]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Despite these amendments, legal practitioners remained unsatisfied with the results
and indefinite standards set forth by DR 9-101(b) and the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility as a whole. Thus, in August 1983, the ABA adopted
new Model Rules of Professional Responsibility. The Model Rules used the
'restatement format, where the conduct standards were set-out in rules, with
comments following each rule. The new format was intended to give better
guidance and clarity for enforcement 'because the only enforceable standards were
the black letter Rules. The Model Rules eliminated the broad canons altogether and
reduced the emphasis on narrative discussion, by placing comments after the rules
and limiting comment discussion to the content of the black letter rules. The Model
Rules made a number of substantive improvements particularly with regard to
conflicts of interests.[37] In particular, the ABA did away with Canon 9, citing
the hopeless dependence of the concept of impropriety on the subjective
views of anxious clients as well as the norm's indefinite nature.
[38]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In cadence with these changes, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
adopted a proposed Code of Professional Responsibility in 1980 which it
submitted to this Court for approval. The Code was drafted to reflect the local
customs, traditions, and practices of the bar and to conform with new realities. On
June 21, 1988, this Court promulgated the Code of Professional
Responsibility.[39] Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility deals
particularly with former government lawyers, and provides, viz.:

Rule 6.03 ' A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with anymatter in which he had intervened while in said service.

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility retained the general structure
of paragraph 2, Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics but replaced the
expansive phrase 'investigated and passed upon with the word 'intervened. It
is, therefore, properly applicable to both 'adverse-interest conflicts' and
'congruent-interest conflicts.
The case at bar does not involve the 'adverse interest aspect of Rule 6.03.
Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he
acted as Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 and later as counsel of
respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0005 and Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099
before the Sandiganbayan. Nonetheless, there remains the issueof whether
there exists a 'congruent-interest conflict sufficient to disqualify respondent
Mendoza from representing respondents Tan, et al.

I.B. The 'congruent interest aspect of Rule 6.03

The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning of
'matter referred to in the rule and, second, the metes and bounds of the
'intervention made by the former government lawyer on the 'matter. The
American Bar Association in its Formal Opinion 342, defined 'matter as any
discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or conduct involving a
particular situation and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing
or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing
abstract principles of law.
Firstly, it is critical that we pinpoint the 'matter which was the subject of
intervention by respondent Mendoza while he was the Solicitor General. The PCGG
relates the following acts of respondent Mendoza as constituting the 'matter where
he intervened as a Solicitor General,viz:[40]

The PCGG's Case for Atty. Mendoza's Disqualification

The PCGG imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) in
issuing the assailed Resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 denying the motion to
disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. The PCGG insists that Atty. Mendoza,
as then Solicitor General, actively intervened in the closure of GENBANK by advising the Central Bank
on how to proceed with the said bank's liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with
the CFI of .

As proof thereof, the PCGG cites the Memorandum dated March 29, 1977 prepared by certain key
officials of the Central Bank, namely, then Senior Deputy Governor Amado R. Brinas, then Deputy
Governor Jaime C. Laya, then Deputy Governor and General Counsel Gabriel C. Singson, then Special
Assistant to the Governor Carlota P. Valenzuela, then Asistant to the Governor Arnulfo B. Aurellano
and then Director of Department of Commercial and Savings Bank Antonio T. Castro, Jr., where they
averred that on March 28, 1977, they had a conference with the Solicitor General (Atty. Mendoza),
who advised them on how to proceed with the liquidation of GENBANK. The pertinent portion of the
said memorandum states:

Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor General and he advised that
the following procedure should be taken:

1. Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board reporting that studies
and evaluation had been made since the last examination of the bank as of August 31,
1976 and it is believed that the bank can not be reorganized or placed in a condition so
that it may be permitted to resume business with safety to its depositors and creditors
and the general public.
 2. If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall order the liquidation of the
bank and indicate the manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan.

3. The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of Genbank of the foregoing
decision to liquidate the bank and the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board.

4. The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the
proceedings which had been taken and praying the assistance of the Court in the
liquidation of Genbank.

The PCGG further cites the Minutes No. 13 dated March 29, 1977 of the Monetary Board where it was
shown that Atty. Mendoza was furnished copies of pertinent documents relating to GENBANK in order
to aid him in filing with the court the petition for assistance in the bank's liquidation. The pertinent
portion of the said minutes reads:

The Board decided as follows:

...

E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor General with a copy of the subject
memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank dated
March 29, 1977, together with copies of:

1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision and Examination Sector, to

the Monetary Board, dated March 25, 1977, containing a report on the current
situation of Genbank;

2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General Bank and Trust Co., dated
March 23, 1977;

3. Memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank, to

the Monetary Board, dated March 24, 1977, submitting, pursuant to Section
29 of R.A. No. 265, as amended by P.D. No. 1007, a repot on the state of
insolvency of Genbank, together with its attachments; and

4. Such other documents as may be necessary or needed by the Solicitor General

for his use in then CFI-praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of
Genbank.

Beyond doubt, therefore, the 'matter or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor
General involved in the case at bar is 'advising the Central Bank, on how to
proceed with the said bank's liquidation and even filing the petition for its
liquidation with the CFI of . In fine, the Court should resolve whether his act of
advising the Central Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK is
included within the concept of 'matter under Rule 6.03. The procedure of
liquidation is given in black and white in Republic Act No. 265, section 29, viz:

The provision reads in part:

SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. ' Whenever, upon examination by the head of
the appropriate supervising or examining department or his examiners or agents into the
condition of any bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions, it shall be disclosed that the condition of the same is one of insolvency, or that its
continuance in business would involve probable loss to its depositors or creditors, it shall be
the duty of the department head concerned forthwith, in writing, to inform the Monetary
Board of the facts, and the Board may, upon finding the statements of the department head
to be true, forbid the institution to do business in the Philippines and shall designate an
official of the Central Bank or a person of recognized competence in banking or finance, as
receiver to immediately take charge of its assets and liabilities, as expeditiously as possible
collect and gather all the assets and administer the same for the benefit of its creditors,
exercising all the powers necessary for these purposes including, but not limited to, bringing
suits and foreclosing mortgages in the name of the bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions.

...

If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm within the said period that the bank
or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions is insolvent or cannot
resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, it shall, if the
public interest requires, order its liquidation, indicate the manner of its liquidation and
approve a liquidation plan. The Central Bank shall, by the Solicitor General, file a petition in
the Court of First Instance reciting the proceedings which have been taken and praying the
assistance of the court in the liquidation of such institution. The court shall have jurisdiction
in the same proceedings to adjudicate disputed claims against the bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions and enforce individual liabilities of the
stockholders and do all that is necessary to preserve the assets of such institution and to
implement the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board. The Monetary Board shall
designate an official of the Central Bank, or a person of recognized competence in banking or
finance, as liquidator who shall take over the functions of the receiver previously appointed
by the Monetary Board under this Section. The liquidator shall, with all convenient speed,
convert the assets of the banking institution or non-bank financial intermediary performing
quasi-banking functions to money or sell, assign or otherwise dispose of the same to
creditors and other parties for the purpose of paying the debts of such institution and he
may, in the name of the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions, institute such actions as may be necessary in the appropriate court to collect and
recover accounts and assets of such institution.

The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the actions of the Monetary
Board under this Section and the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act shall be final
and executory, and can be set aside by the court only if there is convincing proof that the
action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith. No restraining order or injunction shall be
issued by the court enjoining the Central Bank from implementing its actions under this
Section and the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act, unless there is convincing proof
that the action of the Monetary Board is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith and the
petitioner or plaintiff files with the clerk or judge of the court in which the action is pending a
bond executed in favor of the Central Bank, in an amount to be fixed by the court. The
restraining order or injunction shall be refused or, if granted, shall be dissolved upon filing by
the Central Bank of a bond, which shall be in the form of cash or Central Bank cashier(s)
check, in an amount twice the amount of the bond of the petitioner or plaintiff conditioned
that it will pay the damages which the petitioner or plaintiff may suffer by the refusal or the
dissolution of the injunction. The provisions of Rule 58 of the New Rules of Court insofar as
they are applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this Section shall govern the
issuance and dissolution of the restraining order or injunction contemplated in this Section.

Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to mean the inability of a bank or non-
bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to pay its liabilities as they
fall due in the usual and ordinary course of business. Provided, however, That this shall not
include the inability to pay of an otherwise non-insolvent bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions caused by extraordinary demands induced
by financial panic commonly evidenced by a run on the bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions in the banking or financial community.
 The appointment of a conservator under Section 28-A of this Act or the appointment of
a receiver under this Section shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary Board, the
provision of any law, general or special, to the contrary notwithstanding. (As amended by PD
Nos. 72, 1007, 1771 & 1827, Jan. 16, 1981)

We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to

liquidate GENBANK isnot the 'matter contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear as daylight in
stressing that the 'drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency
procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law are acts
which do not fall within the scope of the term 'matter and cannot disqualify.
Secondly, it can even be conceded for the sake of argument that the above act of
respondent Mendoza falls within the definition of matter per ABA Formal Opinion
No. 342. Be that as it may, the said act of respondent Mendoza which is the
'matter involved in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 isentirely different from the
'matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096. Again, the plain facts speak for
themselves. It is given that respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the
decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. It is also given that he did not
participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The 'matter where he got
himself involved was in informing Central Bank on the procedure provided by
law to liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the necessary petition in Sp.
Proc. No. 107812 in the then Court of First Instance. The subject 'matter of Sp.
Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not the same nor is related to but is
different from the subject 'matter in Civil Case No. 0096. Civil Case No. 0096
involves the sequestration of the stocks owned by respondents Tan, et al., in
Allied Bank on the alleged ground that they are ill-gotten. The case does not involve
the liquidation of GENBANK. Nor does it involve the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank.
Whether the shares of stock of the reorganized Allied Bank are ill-gotten is far
removed from the issue of the dissolution and liquidation of GENBANK. GENBANK
was liquidated by the Central Bank due, among others, to the alleged banking
malpractices of its owners and officers. In other words, the legality of the
liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the
jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. It
goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged
intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an
intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case
No. 0096.
Thirdly, we now slide to the metes and bounds of the 'intervention contemplated
by Rule 6.03. 'Intervene means, viz.:

1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or circumstance . . . 2: to occur, fall, or

come in between points of time or events . . . 3: to come in or between by way of hindrance or
modification: INTERPOSE . . . 4: to occur or lie between two things (Paris, where the same city lay on
both sides of an intervening river . . .)[41]

On the other hand, 'intervention is defined as:

 1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION; 2: interference that may affect the
interests of others.[42]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

There are, therefore, two possible interpretations of the word 'intervene. Under
the first interpretation, 'intervene includes participation in a proceeding even if
the intervention is irrelevant or has no effect or little influence.[43] Under
the second interpretation, 'intervene only includes an act of a person who has
the power to influence the subject proceedings.[44] We hold that this second
meaning is more appropriate to give to the word 'intervention under Rule 6.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility in light of its history. The evils sought to be
remedied by the Rule do not exist where the government lawyer does an act which
can be considered as innocuous such as 'x x x drafting, enforcing or interpreting
government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract
principles of law.
In fine, the intervention cannot be insubstantial and insignificant. Originally,
Canon 36 provided that a former government lawyer 'should not, after his
retirement, accept employment in connection with any matter which he has
investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ. As aforediscussed,
the broad sweep of the phrase 'which he has investigated or passed upon resulted
in unjust disqualification of former government lawyers. The 1969 Code restricted
its latitude, hence, in DR 9-101(b), the prohibition extended only to a matter in
which the lawyer, while in the government service, had 'substantial
responsibility. The 1983 Model Rules further constricted the reach of the rule. MR
1.11(a) provides that 'a lawyer shall not represent a private client in connection
with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as
a public officer or employee.
It is, however, alleged that the intervention of respondent Mendoza in Sp. Proc. No.
107812 is significant and substantial. We disagree. For one, the petition in the
special proceedings is aninitiatory pleading, hence, it has to be signed by
respondent Mendoza as the then sitting Solicitor General. For another, the record
is arid as to the actual participation of respondent Mendoza in the subsequent
proceedings. Indeed, the case was in slumberville for a long number of years. None
of the parties pushed for its early termination. Moreover, we note that the petition
filed merely seeks the assistance of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The
principal role of the court in this type of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in
determiningclaims of creditors against the GENBANK. The role of the court is not
strictly as a court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in
determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding, the participation of the
Office of the Solicitor General is not that of the usual court litigator protecting the
interest of government.

II

Balancing Policy Considerations

To be sure, Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility represents a

commendable effort on the part of the IBP to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in the
government service. As aforestressed, it is a take-off from similar efforts especially
by the ABA which have not been without difficulties. To date, the legal profession in
the United States is still fine tuning its DR 9-101(b) rule.
In fathoming the depth and breadth of Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional
Responsibility, theCourt took account of various policy considerations to
assure that its interpretation and application to the case at bar will achieve its end
without necessarily prejudicing other values of equal importance. Thus, the rule
was not interpreted to cause a chilling effect on government recruitment of
able legal talent. At present, it is already difficult for government to match
compensation offered by the private sector and it is unlikely that government will
be able to reverse that situation. The observation is not inaccurate that the only
card that the government may play to recruit lawyers is have them defer present
income in return for the experience and contacts that can later be exchanged for
higher income in private practice.[45] Rightly, Judge Kaufman warned that the
sacrifice of entering government service would be too great for most men to endure
should ethical rules prevent them from engaging in the practice of a technical
specialty which they devoted years in acquiring and cause the firm with which they
become associated to be disqualified.[46] Indeed, 'to make government service
more difficult to exit can only make it less appealing to enter.[47]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh eye on its use as a litigation
tactic to harass opposing counsel as well as deprive his client of competent
legal representation. The danger that the rule will be misused to bludgeon an
opposing counsel is not a mere guesswork. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia has noted 'the tactical use of motions to disqualify counsel in order to
delay proceedings, deprive the opposing party of counsel of its choice, and harass
and embarrass the opponent, and observed that the tactic was 'so prevalent in
large civil cases in recent years as to prompt frequent judicial and academic
commentary.[48]Even the United States Supreme Court found no quarrel with the
Court of Appeals' description of disqualification motions as 'a dangerous game.
[49] In the case at bar, the new attempt to disqualify respondent Mendoza is
difficult to divine. The disqualification of respondent Mendoza has long been a dead
issue. It was resuscitated after the lapse of many years and only after PCGG has
lost many legal incidents in the hands of respondent Mendoza. For a fact, the
recycled motion for disqualification in the case at bar was filed more than four
years after the filing of the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with
the Supreme Court which were subsequently remanded to the Sandiganbayan and
docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099.[50]At the very least, the circumstances
under which the motion to disqualify in the case at bar were refiled put petitioner's
motive as highly suspect.
Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the
prejudice to the client which will be caused by its misapplication. It cannot be
doubted that granting a disqualification motion causes the client to lose not only the
law firm of choice, but probably an individual lawyer in whom the client has
confidence.[51] The client with a disqualified lawyer must start again often without
the benefit of the work done by the latter. [52] The effects of this prejudice to the
right to choose an effective counsel cannot be overstated for it can result in denial
of due process.
The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a truncated
reading of the rule on the official independence of lawyers in the
government service. According to Prof. Morgan: 'An individual who has the
security of knowing he or she can find private employment upon leaving the
government is free to work vigorously, challenge official positions when he or she
believes them to be in error, and resist illegal demands by superiors. An employee
who lacks this assurance of private employment does not enjoy such freedom.
[53] He adds: 'Any system that affects the right to take a new job affects the ability
to quit the old job and any limit on the ability to quit inhibits official independence.
[54] The case at bar involves the position of Solicitor General, the office once
occupied by respondent Mendoza. It cannot be overly stressed that the position of
Solicitor General should be endowed with a great degree of independence.
It is this independence that allows the Solicitor General to recommend acquittal of
the innocent; it is this independence that gives him the right to refuse to defend
officials who violate the trust of their office. Any undue dimunition of the
independence of the Solicitor General will have a corrosive effect on the rule of law.
No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the former
government lawyer of the freedom to exercise his profession. Given the
current state of our law, the disqualification of a former government lawyer may
extend to all members of his law firm.[55]Former government lawyers stand in
danger of becoming the lepers of the legal profession.
It is, however, proffered that the mischief sought to be remedied by Rule 6.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility is the possible appearance of
impropriety and loss of public confidence in government. But as well observed,
the accuracy of gauging public perceptions is a highly speculative exercise at
best[56] which can lead to untoward results.[57] No less than Judge Kaufman
doubts that the lessening of restrictions as to former government attorneys will
have any detrimental effect on that free flow of information between the
government-client and its attorneys which the canons seek to protect. [58] Notably,
the appearance of impropriety theory has been rejected in the 1983 ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct[59] and some courts have
abandoned per se disqualification based on Canons 4 and 9 when an actual conflict
of interest exists, and demand an evaluation of the interests of the defendant,
government, the witnesses in the case, and the public.[60]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for it
correctly disfavors lawyers who 'switch sides. It is claimed that 'switching sides'
carries the danger that former government employee may compromise
confidential official information in the process. But this concern does not cast a
shadow in the case at bar. As afore-discussed, the act of respondent Mendoza in
informing the Central Bank on the procedure how to liquidate GENBANK is
a different matter from the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0005 which is about
the sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank.
Consequently, the danger that confidential official information might be divulged is
nil, if not inexistent. To be sure, there are no inconsistent 'sides' to be bothered
about in the case at bar. For there is no question that in lawyering for respondents
Tan, et al., respondent Mendoza is not working against the interest of Central Bank.
On the contrary, he is indirectly defending the validity of the action of Central Bank
in liquidating GENBANK and selling it later to Allied Bank. Their interests coincide
instead of colliding. It is for this reason that Central Bank offered no objection to
the lawyering of respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005 in defense of
respondents Tan, et al. There is no switching of sides for no two sides are
involved.
It is also urged that the Court should consider that Rule 6.03 is intended to
avoid conflict of loyalties, i.e., that a government employee might be subject to a
conflict of loyalties while still in government service.[61] The example given by the
proponents of this argument is that a lawyer who plans to work for the company
that he or she is currently charged with prosecuting might be tempted to prosecute
less vigorously.[62] In the cautionary words of the Association of the Bar
Committee in 1960: 'The greatest public risks arising from post employment
conduct may well occur during the period of employment through the dampening
of aggressive administration of government policies.[63] Prof. Morgan, however,
considers this concern as 'probably excessive.[64] He opines 'x x x it is hard to
imagine that a private firm would feel secure hiding someone who had just been
disloyal to his or her last client ' the government. Interviews with lawyers
consistently confirm that law firms want the 'best government lawyers ' the ones
who were hardest to beat ' not the least qualified or least vigorous advocates.
[65] But again, this particular concern is a non factor in the case at bar.
There is no charge against respondent Mendoza that he advised Central Bank on
how to liquidate GENBANK with an eye in later defending respondents Tan, et al. of
Allied Bank. Indeed, he continues defending both the interests of Central Bank and
respondents Tan, et al. in the above cases.
Likewise, the Court is nudged to consider the need to curtail what is perceived as
the 'excessive influence of former officials' or their 'clout.[66] Prof. Morgan
again warns against extending this concern too far. He explains the rationale for his
warning, viz: 'Much of what appears to be an employee's influence may actually be
the power or authority of his or her position, power that evaporates quickly upon
departure from government x x x.[67] More, he contends that the concern can
be demeaning to those sitting in government. To quote him further: 'x x x The
idea that, present officials make significant decisions based on friendship rather
than on the merit says more about the present officials than about their former co-
worker friends. It implies a lack of will or talent, or both, in federal officials that
does not seem justified or intended, and it ignores the possibility that the officials
will tend to disfavor their friends in order to avoid even the appearance of
favoritism.[68]

III

The question of fairness

Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among others, that the
congruent interest prong of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
should be subject to a prescriptive period. Mr. Justice Tinga opines that the rule
cannot apply retroactively to respondent Mendoza. Obviously, and rightly so, they
are disquieted by the fact that (1) when respondent Mendoza was the Solicitor
General, Rule 6.03 has not yet adopted by the IBP and approved by this Court, and
(2) the bid to disqualify respondent Mendoza was made after the lapse of time
whose length cannot, by any standard, qualify as reasonable. At bottom, the point
they make relates to the unfairness of the rule if applied without any prescriptive
period and retroactively, at that. Their concern is legitimate and deserves to be
initially addressed by the IBP and our Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and
December 5, 2001 of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos.
0096-0099 is denied.
No cost.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 70332-43 November 13, 1986

GENEROSO TRIESTE, SR., Petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION), Respondent.

ALAMPAY, J.: chanrobles virtual law library

The present case relates to an appeal by way of a Petition for Review of the decision promulgated on
November 6, 1984, by the Sandiganbayan convicting the herein petitioner, Generoso Trieste, Sr., of
twelve (12) separate violations of Section 3 paragraph (h) of Republic Act 3019, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices - Act, which petitioner were accused of in Criminal Cases Nos.
6856-6867 of said Court. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was denied by the
respondent Sandiganbayan under its Resolution of March 11, 1985. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law library

The twelve (12) separate Informations filed by the Tanodbayan against the herein petitioner for
violation of Section 3 (h) of the Anti-Graft Law are all similarly worded as the information presented in
Criminal Case No. 6856 which is hereunder quoted:

That on or about the month of July, 1980 and some time subsequent thereto, in the municipality of
Numancia, Aklan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed
accused, being then the Municipal Mayor and member of the Committee on Award of the Municipality
of Numancia, Aklan and as such, had administrative control of the funds of the municipality and whose
approval is required in the disbursements of municipal funds, did then and there wilfully and
unlawfully have financial or pecuniary interest in a business, contract or transaction in connection with
which said accused intervened or took part in his official capacity and in which he is prohibited by law
from having any interest, to wit the purchases of construction materials by the Municipality of
Numancia, Aklan from Trigen Agro-Industrial Development Corporation, of which the accused is the
president, incorporator, director and major stockholder paid under Municipal Voucher No. 211-90-10-
174 in the amount of P558.80 by then and there awarding the supply and delivery of said materials to
Trigen Agro-Industrial Development Corporation and approving payment thereof to said corporation in
violation of the Anti-Graft and corrupt Practices Act.

except only as to the dates of the commission of the offense, voucher numbers, and amounts
involved.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Criminal Cases Nos. 6856, 6857, 6858, 6859, 6860. 6861, and 6862 were allegedly committed in July,
1980; Criminal Cases Nos. 6863 and 6864, in August, 1980; and Criminal Cases Nos. C-865, 6866
and 6867 in October, 1980. The separate vouchers involved in the twelve (12) cases are said to be
the following:

Crim. Case #6856, Vchr #211-90-10-174 at P558.80 chanrobles virtual law library

Crim. Case #6857, Vchr #211-80-10-187 at 943.60 chanrobles virtual law library

Crim. Case #6858, Vchr #211-80-10-189 at 144.00 chanrobles virtual law library

Crim. Case #6859, Vchr #211-80-10-190 at 071.30 chanrobles virtual law library

Crim. Case #6860, Vchr #211-80-10-191 at 270.00 chanrobles virtual law library

Crim. Case #6861, Vchr #211-80-10-232 at 1,820.00 chanrobles virtual law library

Crim. Case #6862, Vchr #211-80-10-239 at 1,085.80 chanrobles virtual law library

Crim. Case #6863, Vchr #211-80-10-407 at 150.00 chanrobles virtual law library

Crim. Case #6864, Vchr #211-80-12-494 at 500.00 chanrobles virtual law library

Crim. Case #6865, Vchr #211-81-04-61 at 840.00 chanrobles virtual law library

Crim. Case #6866, Vchr #211-81-04-62 at 787.00 chanrobles virtual law library

Crim. Case #6867, Vchr #211-81-04-63 at 560.00

T o t a l - - - -P7,730.50

(Consolidated Comment, pg. 4; Rollo, 325)

After trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered the challenged decision dated November 6, 1984, convicting
the petitioner in all the twelve (12) criminal cases, (Rollo, pp. 324-325) and in each case he was
sentenced,"...to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from THREE (3) YEARS and
ONE (1) DAY as the minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as the maximum, to further suffer
perpetual disqualification from the public office, and to pay the cost of the action." (pp. 37-40,
Decision; Rollo, 322). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

After the petition for review was filed in this case and pending the submission by respondent of its
comment to the petition, herein petitioner presented to this Court on June 7, 1985, an urgent petition
to lift the order of the Sandiganbayan dated September 12, 1983, suspending him from Office as the
elected Municipal Mayor of Numancia, Aklan. His term was to expire in 1986. No objection to the
petition for the lifting of the suspension order was interposed by the Solicitor General. Accordingly,
and pursuant to the resolution of this Court dated October 1, 1985, petitioner's preventive suspension
was lifted and his reinstatement as Municipal Mayor of Numancia, Aklan was ordered to take effect
immediately. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

A supplemental petition, dated October 10, 1985, was later filed by petitioner's new counsel in
collaboration with the original counsel on record of petitioner. In this supplemental pleading, it was
vigorously stressed that the petitioner did not, in any way, intervene in making the awards and
payment of the purchases in question as he signed the voucher only after all the purchases had
already been made, delivered and paid for by the Municipal Treasurer. It was further pointed out that
there was no bidding at all as erroneously adverted to in the twelve informations filed against herein
petitioner because the transactions involved were emergency direct purchases by personal
canvass. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Upon leave of the Court given, the former Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment dated
November 4, 1984, to the original petition filed in this case dated April 30, 1985 as well as on the
supplemental petition dated October 10, 1985. He argued the dismissal of the petition on the ground
that the same raise factual issues which are, therefore, non-reviewable (Consolidated Comment, pg.
20; Rollo, 341). The submission made by the Office of the Solicitor General in the Consolidated
Comment dated November 4, 1986, are hereunder quoted:

xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library

The impugned decision convicted petitioner for violation of Section 3 (h), paragraph (h) of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which reads as follows: chanrobles virtual law library

SEC. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing laws, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful: chanrobles virtual law library

xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library

(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction
in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited
by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The elements essential in the commission of the crime are: chanrobles virtual law library

a) The public officer has financial or pecuniary interest in a business, contract or transaction; chanrobles virtual law library

b) In connection with which he intervenes in his official capacity. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law library

Concurrence of both elements is necessary as the absence of one will not warrant conviction. (Rollo,
pp. 338-339).

The earlier view taken by the Solicitor General's Office was that petitioner's evidence of divestment of
interest in Trigen 'Corporation, which is said to have been effected on February 25, 1980, before the
petitioner assumed the Mayorship, should have been presented at the earliest opportunity before the
Tanodbayan and because this was not done by him the resolution of the Tanodbayan finding a prima
facie case against petitioner should be sustained. Furthermore, petitioner was faulted because the
transfer of his interest in the corporate stock of Trigen Corporation should have been recorded in the
Securities and Exchange Commission but no evidence of this sort, was presented. The consolidated
comment also played up the advertisement of Trigen Corporation in the program of the Rotary Club of
Kalibo, Aklan, showing the printed name of petitioner as the President-Manager of the said
corporation. (Consolidated Comment; Rollo, pp. 340-341) chanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner filed a Reply controverting the allegations and arguments recited in the aforestated
Consolidated Comment of the Solicitor General. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law library

After considering the pleadings filed and deliberating on the issues raised in the petition and
supplemental petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Sandiganbayan, as well as the
consolidated comment and the reply thereto filed by petitioner's counsel, the Court in its resolution of
January 16, 1986, gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file their respective
briefs.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner's exhaustive and well-reasoned out Brief which was filed with the Court on April 14, 1986,
raised the following legal questions.

xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library

From the foregoing recital of facts, the following legal questions arise: chanrobles virtual law library

1. Does the mere signing by a Municipal Mayor of municipal vouchers and other supporting papers
covering purchases of materials previously ordered by the Municipal Treasurer without the knowledge
and consent of the former, subsequently delivered by the supplier, and, thereafter paid by the same
Municipal Treasurer also without the knowledge and consent of the Municipal Mayor, constitute a
violation of the provisions of Section 3 (h) of Rep. Act No. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act? chanrobles virtual law library

2. Does the mere signing of the mere documents above constitute the kind of intervention of taking
part in (his) official capacity within the context of the above-mentioned law? chanrobles virtual law library

3. Was damage or prejudice, as an element of the offense under Section 3 (h) of the said law, caused
to the Government or the Municipality of Numancia as a result of the contracts in question and as a
corollary thereto, was undue advantage and gained by the transacting corporation? chanrobles virtual law library

4. Was there divestment on the part of the herein petitioner of his shares in Trigen Agro-Industrial
Development Corporation long before the questioned transactions? (Appellant's Brief, page 15)

It was then discus and argued by the petitioner that the prosecution failed to establish the presence of
all the elements of the offense, and more particularly to adduce proof that petitioner has, directly or
indirectly, a financial or pecuniary interest in the imputed business contracts or transactions. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law library

Discussion of petitioner's arguments in this regard will not however, be recited anymore as this was
obviated when a new Solicitor General, after seeking and obtaining several extensions of time to file
its Brief in this case at bar, filed on October 7, 1986, a "Manifestation For Acquittal" (in lieu of the
People's Brief). Rollo, 293). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The new Solicitor General's Office after adopting the statement of facts recited in the consolidated
comment of the former Solicitor General's Office moved for the acquittal of the petitioner, upon
acknowledging and concluding that:

xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner has divested his interest with Trigen chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner sought to establish that before he assumed office as mayor on March 3, 1980, he had
already sold his shares with Trigen to his sister Mrs. Rosene Trieste-Tuason. The sale was made by
corresponding indorsements to her stock certificate which was duly recorded in the stock and transfer
book of the corporation. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Respondent Sandiganbayan however doubts the sale because the same was not reported to the SEC.
SEC records, as the prosecution evidence show, do not reflect the sale and petitioner still appears as
the firm's President. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The prosecution's evidence to establish non-divestment of petitioner's interest with Trigen is weak.
Anyway, Trigen has not updated its reports to the SEC since 1976. It have not even submitted its
financial annual report ever since. Absence of the sales report in the SEC does not mean that the sale
did not take place. Reporting the sale is not a mandatory requirement.

Sales of stocks need not be reported to SEC

In any event, the law only requires submission of annual financial reports, not sales or disposal of
stocks (Section 141, Corporation Code of the Philippines). chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law library

Upholding the evidence of petitioner's divestment of his interest with Trigen would necessarily allow
him to act freely in his official capacity in the municipality's dealings or transactions with Trigen. That
in itself is sufficient to acquit him of the crimes charged. (Rollo, pp. 299-300).

In the matter of the alleged intervention of petitioner, the Office of the Solicitor General itself
subscribes to and on its own volition place on record the following observations: chanrobles virtual law library

Prosecution failed to prove charges; evidence discloses absence of bidding and award

The prosecution's lone witness, Treasurer Aniceto Vega, testified that there never was a public bidding
conducted because all the transactions were made by direct purchases from Trigen.

Q. In other words, in all these transactions there never really was any public bidding? chanrobles virtual law library

A. Yes, Sir. There was no public bidding. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. And these purchases were made by direct purchases from the establishment of Trigen? chanrobles virtual law library

A. Yes, Sir. (pp. 36-37, Tsn., Oct. 26, 1983)

In the absence of a public bidding and as emphatically declared by the prosecution's sole witness Vega
that all the transactions were on direct purchases from Trigen, how can one ever imagine that
petitioner has awarded the supply and delivery of construction materials to Trigen as specifically
charged in the twelve (12) informations? The charges are of course baseless and even contradict the
evidence of the prosecution itself. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Even the respondent Court finally found that petitioner did not intervene during the bidding and
award, which of course is a false assumption because of Vega's testimony that there was no public
bidding at all. Respondent Court said: chanrobles virtual law library

. . . . In short, accused's intervention may not be present during the bidding and award, but his
liability may also come in when he took part in said transactions such as signing the vouchers under
certifications 1, 2 and 3 thereof, to make it appear that the transactions were regular and proper.
(Resolution dated March 11, 1985 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration/new trial, page
7).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

No evidence to prove petitioner approved payment chanrobles virtual law library

Now, did petitioner intervene by approving payments to Trigen as also charged in the information?
Can there be intervention after payment. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Vega testified that petitioner signed the twelve (12) municipal vouchers (Exhibits A to L) for the
purchase and payment of construction materials. It was sometime after delivery of the construction
materials that he (Vega) signed and paid the twelve (12) -municipal vouchers (pages 5 to 7), decision
of respondent Sandiganbayan dated November 2, 1984). The prosecution has not presented evidence
to show as to when petitioner signed the twelve (12) municipal vouchers. But it can safely be assumed
as a matter of procedure that petitioner had signed the voucher after Treasurer Vega signed and paid
them., (Rello, pp. 301-303) chanrobles virtual law library

xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library

Testimonial and documentary evidence confirms that petitioner signed vouchers after payment chanrobles virtual law library

Additional facts which respondent Court failed to consider and which could have altered the outcome
of the case in the following uncontroverted testimony of Josue Maravilla:

Q. When these municipal vouchers were prepared by the municipal treasurer, as you said, and then
presented to Mayor Trieste for his signature, were the purchases in question already paid? chanrobles virtual law library

A. They had already been paid for, sir. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. Previously, prior to the signature of Mayor Trieste? chanrobles virtual law library

A. Yes, sir. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

A.J. ESCAREAL: chanrobles virtual law library

Q. Under what authority were they paid? chanrobles virtual law library

A. Under official receipt issued by Trigen. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law library

Q. Who authorized the payment? chanrobles virtual law library

A. The municipal treasurer who paid the materials.

ATTY. CONSULTA: chanrobles virtual law library

Q. You said they had already been paid for. Do you know of any receipts issued by Trigen to indicate
that at the time these municipal vouchers were signed by Mayor Trieste, the materials had already
been delivered and paid by the municipality to Trigen?

xxx xxx xxx

A. Yes, sir chanrobles virtual law library

Q. Now, what exhibits particularly do you know were issued

by Trigen to indicate that payments were made prior to the signing of the municipal vouchers by
Mayor Trieste? chanrobles virtual law library

A. Exhibits A, G, B, F, C, D, Exhibit I and Exhibit H.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Now, Mr. Maravilla, aside from these prosecution's exhibits which are Trigen receipts showing
payments long before the municipal vouchers were prepared, what can you say about the other
municipal vouchers in this case in reference to payments made by Trigen to the municipality? chanrobles virtual law library

ESCAREAL: chanrobles virtual law library

Payment made by Trigen? chanrobles virtual law library

ATTY. CONSULTA: chanrobles virtual law library

I am sorry, Your Honor, made to Trigen by the municipality? chanrobles virtual law library

A. Official receipts issued by Trigen also indicate that when municipal vouchers marked Exhibits E, B,
C, D, F, G, H, I were prepared, they had already been delivered and the amounts indicated therein
were already prepared by the municipal treasurer. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law library

Q. Did you say already made by the municipal treasurer-the amounts were already paid by the
municipal treasurer? chanrobles virtual law library

A. Already paid. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. Who disbursed the funds evidenced by the Trigen official receipts? chanrobles virtual law library

A. The municipal treasurer, then Mr. Vega. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law library

Q. Now, do you know why Mr. Vega asked that those municipal vouchers be nevertheless signed in
spite of the fact that he knew that the amounts had already been disbursed and paid by him to
Trigen?chanrobles virtual law library

A. He said that the municipal vouchers for record purposes is necessary to be signed by the mayor.
(Tsn., Mar. 5, 1984, pp. 19-49).

Inasmuch as Treasurer Vega signed and paid the vouchers after the materials were delivered,
petitioner's signature on the vouchers after payment is not, we submit the kind of intervention
contemplated under Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law library

xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library

What is contemplated in Section 3(h) of the anti-graft law is the actual intervention in the transaction
in which one has financial or pecuniary interest in order that liability may attach. (Opinion No. 306,
Series 1961 and Opinion No. 94, Series 1972 of the Secretary of Justice). The official need not dispose
his shares in the corporation as long as he does not do anything for the firm in its contract with the
office. For the law aims to prevent the don-tenant use of influence, authority and power (Deliberation
on Senate Bill 293, May 6, 1959, Congressional Record, Vol. 11, page 603). chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law library

There is absolutely no evidence that petitioner had, in his capacity as Mayor, used his influence,
power, and authority in having the transactions given to Trigen. He didn't ask anyone-neither
Treasurer Vega nor Secretary Maravilla for that matter, to get the construction materials from Trigen.

Trigen did not gain any undue advantage in the transaction

Petitioner should not be faulted for Trigen's transaction with the municipality, which by the way, has
been dealing with it even before petitioner had assumed the mayorship on March 3, 1980. Personal
canvasses conducted found that Trigen's offer was the lowest, most reasonable, and advantageous to
the municipality. . . . (Rollo, pp. 307-308; Emphasis supplied).

It is also an acknowledged fact that there was no complaint for non-delivery, underdelivery or
overpricing regarding any of the transactions. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law library

Considering the correct facts now brought to the attention of this Court by the Solicitor General and in
view of the reassessment made by that Office of the issues and the evidence and the law involved, the
Court takes a similar view that the affirmance of the decision appealed from cannot be rightfully
sustained. The conscientious study and thorough analysis made by the Office of the Solicitor General
in this case truly reflects its consciousness of its role as the People's Advocate in the administration of
justice to the end that the innocent be equally defended and set free just as it has the task of having
the guilty punished. This Court will do no less and, therefore, accepts the submitted recommendation
that the decision and resolution in question of the respondent Sandiganbayan be reversed and that as
a matter of justice, the herein petitioner be entitled to a judgment of acquittal. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the decision rendered by the Sandiganbayan, dated November 2, 1984, in Criminal
Cases Nos. 6856 to 6867, finding the herein petitioner, Generoso Trieste, Sr. guilty of the violations of
Section 3 paragraph (h) of Republic Act 3019, as amended, is hereby set aside and reversing the
appealed judgment, a new judgment is now rendered ACQUITTING Generoso Trieste, Sr., of said
offenses charged against him with costs de oficio. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law library

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 3360 January 30, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant, vs. ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, Respondent. chanrobles virtual law library

PER CURIAM:

In a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension dated 12 July 1989, respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of
the Philippine Bar, asks this Court to lift the suspension from the practice of law imposed upon her by
a decision of the Court of Appeals dated 17 October 1988 in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093. chanrobles virtual law library

On 17 December 1983, respondent received from one Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of jewelry,
with a total stated value of P36,000.00, for sale on a commission basis, with the condition that the
respondent would turn over the sales proceeds and return the unsold items to Ms. Marquez on or
before 14 February 1984. Sometime in February 1984, respondent, instead of returning the unsold
pieces of jewelry which then amounted to approximately P26,250.00, issued three checks: (a) a check
dated 16 February 1984 for the amount of P5,400.00; (b) a check dated 23 February 1984 also for the
amount of P5,400.00; and (c) a check dated 25 February 1984 for the amount of P15,450.00. Upon
presentment for payment within ninety (90) days after their issuance, all three (3) checks were
dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding
receipt of the notice of dishonor, respondent made no arrangements with the bank concerning the
honoring of checks which had bounced and made no effort to settle her obligations to Ms. Marquez. chanrobles virtual law library

Consequently, four (4) informations were filed against respondent with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila: (a) one for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 85-38358; and (b) three (3) for violation of
B.P. Blg. 22, docketed respectively as Criminal Cases Nos. 85-38359, 85-38360 and 85-38361. In due
time, after trial, the trial court rendered a decision dated 25 August 1987 which:
(a) acquitted respondent of the charge of estafa; and

(b) convicted respondent of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in all three (3) cases, and sentenced respondent
to pay a fine of P6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify the
complainant in the amount of P5,400.00 in Criminal Case No. 8538359;

to pay a fine of P 6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify the
complainant in the amount of P5,400.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-38360; and

to pay a fine of P16,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to indemnify the
complainant in the amount of P15,450.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-38361, and to pay the costs in all
three (3) cases.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093 affirmed in toto the decision of the trial
court but, in addition, suspended respondent Tuanda from the practice of law. The pertinent portion of
the decision read as follows:

For reasons above stated and finding the evidence sufficient to sustain the conviction, the judgment is
hereby AFFIRMED subject to this modification.

A.C. No. 2387. September 10, 1998

CLETO DOCENA, complainant, v. ATTY. DOMINADOR Q. LIMON, respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM

On April 15, 1982, a complaint for disbarment was filed by Cleto Docena against Atty.
Dominador Q. Limon, Sr., on grounds of malpractice, gross misconduct, and violation of
attorney's oath.

It appears that respondent Atty. Limon was complainant's lawyers on appeal in Civil Case
No. 425 for Forcible Entry. While the appeal was pending before the then Court of First
Instance of Eartern Samar, Branch I, respondent required therein defendants-appellants
Docena spouses to post a supersedeas bond in the amount ofP10,000.00 allegedly to stay
the execution of the appealed decision.

To raise the required, complainant Cleto Docena obtained a loan of P3,000.00 from the
Borongan, Eastern Samar Branch of the Development Bank of the Philippines;
borrowed P2,140.00 from a private individual; and applied for an agricultural loan
of P4,860.00 from the Borongan, Samar Branch of the Philippine National Bank, wherein
respondent himself acted as guarantor (tsn, Session of July 8, 1983, pp. 33-34). The
amount of P4,860.00 was produced by complainant in response to respondent's letter dated
September 2, 1979 (Exh. "C", tsn, p. 26, ibid.) demanding delivery of the aforesaid amount,
thus:

Dear Mr. and Mrs. Docena:

I wish to remind you that today is the last day for the deposit of the balance of P4,860.00.
Atty. Batica was in court yesterday verifying whether you have deposited the said balance
and the Honorable Judge informed him that you have until today to deposit the said
amount.

I wish to inform you that the Honorable Judge will be in Sta. Fe tomorrow for rural service.

We will be waiting for you tomorrow September 22, 1979, at Sta. Fe as you promised.

Very truly yours,

(Signed)

On November 14, 1980, the Court of First Instance of Eastern Samar rendered a decision on
the appealed case in favor of the Docena spouses.

After receipt of said decision, complainant went to the CFI to withdraw the supersedeas
bond of P10,000.00 but he thereupon discovered that no such bond was ever posted by
respondent.

When confronted, respondent promised to restitute the amount, but he never complied with
such undertaking despite repeated demands from the Docena spouses.

In his answer the herein complaint, respondent claimed that the P10,000.00 was his
attorney's fees for representing the Docena spouses in their appeal. But this self-serving
allegation is belied by the letter (quoted above) of respondent himself demanding from the
Docena spouses the balance of P4,860.00 supposedly to be deposited in court to stay the
execution of the appealed decision of the MTC. Moreover, the fact that he had promised to
return the P10,000.00 to the Docena spouses is also an admission that the money was
never his, and that it was only entrusted to him for deposit.

After due investigation and hearing, the Intergrated Bar of the Philippines recommended
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year and ordered to return
the amount of P8,500.00 (he had earlier paid complainant P1,500.00, but nothing more)
within 1 month from notice, and should he fail to do so, he shall be suspended indefinitely.

The Court finds the recommended penalty too light. Truly, the amount involved may be
small, but the nature of the transgression calls for a heavier sanction. The Code of
Professional Responsibility mandates that:

Canon 1. x x x

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 16. x x x

Canon 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received from
the client.

Respondent infringed and breached these rules. Verily, good moral character is not a
condition precedent to admission to the legal profession, but it must also be possessed at
all times in order to maintain one's good standing in the exclusive and honored fraternity
(Villanueva vs. Atty. Teresita Sta. Ana, 245 SCRA 707 [1995]).
It has been said time and again, and this cannot overemphasize, that the law is not a trade
nor a craft but a profession (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1983, p. 1). Its basic ideal is to render
public service and to secure justice for those who seek its aid. [Mayer vs. State Bar, 2
Call2d 71, 39 P2d 206 (1934), cited in Agpalo, id.] If it has to remain an honorable
profession and attain its basic ideal, those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its
tenets and principles but should also, by their live, accord continuing fidelity to them.
(Agpalo, id) By extorting money from his client through deceit and misrepresentation,
respondent Limon has reduced the law profession to a level so base, so low and
dishonorable, and most contemptible. He has sullied the integrity of his brethren in the law
and has, indirectly, eroded the peoples' confidence in the judicial system. By his
reprehensible conduct, which is reflective of his depraved character, respondent has made
himself unworthy to remain in the Roll of Attorneys. He should be disbarred.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Dominador Q. Limon, Sr. is hereby DISBARRED. The Office of
the Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys. Respondent
is likewise ordered to return the amount of P8,500.00, the balance of the money entrusted
to him by complainant Docena, within one (1) month from the finality of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Panganiban, Martinez, Quisumbing and Purisima, JJ., concur.

Regalado, J., on official leave.

[A.C. No. 4500. April 30, 1999]

BAN HUA U. FLORES, complainant, vs. ATTY. ENRIQUE S. CHUA, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

In its Resolution No. XIII-98-288 in this Administrative Case, the Board of Governors of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines RESOLVED as follows:

to ADOPT and APPROVE the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex A, and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
respondent Atty. Enrique S. Chua is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years.

We quote the 21-page report of the Investigating Commissioner, Atty. Jaime M. Vibar:

THE FACTS AND THE CASE

Complainant Ban Hua U. Flores seeks the disbarment of respondent Atty. Enrique S. Chua, a
practicing lawyer in the City of Bacolod (Complaint dated October 11, 1995) for various offenses
amounting to malpractice, gross misconduct, violation of his lawyers oath, the Code of Professional
Conduct and Responsibility, as well as the provisions of the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, to
wit:
I.FRAUD AGAINST A DEFENSELESS WIDOW BY THE DEATHBED OF HER DECEASED SPOUSE THROUGH
FALSIFICATION AND FORGERY OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT.

II.FOISTING FALSEHOOD AND FABRICATED PUBLIC DOCUMENT TO MOLEST AND HARASS PARTIES
CONCERNED AND DEPRIVED THEM OF THEIR PROPERTY RIGHTS TO THEIR PREJUDICE AND
DETRIMENT.

III.LIBEL, MISPRESENTATION AND UNLAWFUL ADVERTISEMENT THROUGH THE PREMATURE

PUBLICATION OF PORTION OF A QUESTIONABLE DECISION WHICH IS PENDING APPEAL.

IV.BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION AND BLACKMAIL OF THE JUDICIARY AMOUNTING TO MALPRACTICE.

V.ILLEGAL TAPPING OF CONVERSATIONS IN VIOLATION OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 4200.

VI.COMMISSION OF PERJURY, FORUM SHOPPING, MISPRESENTATION, FILLING A FALSE SUIT AND

MISLEADING THE CLERK OF COURT TO EVADE PAYMENT OF DOCKET FEES.

Respondent filed his comment on the complaint with a countercharge against complainant and
counsel, dated January 24, 1996. Respondent denies the charges and alleges that:

1. Grounds I and II, referring to the forgery of the signature on a Deed of Sale notarized by
respondent Chua, are presently the subject of an on-going litigation (Crim. Case No. 12036 or Annex
A Complaint and SEC Case No. 3328 or Annex F or Sec Case No. 520 or Annex P, Complaint) whose
termination or conclusion is far from over, thus it would be premature to impose now any sanction
upon the respondent xxxx

2. Grounds III, III-A and III-B are presently litigated in the Libel Complaint docketed as BC-I.S. No.
93-2801 filed by complainant against the respondent and her (Complainants) brother xxx and is still
awaiting resolution. Said grounds are also intertwined with other pending cases.

3. Grounds IV, IV-A. IV-B and IV-C are absolutely baseless and false.

4. Other grounds mentioned are not valid and sufficient basis for respondents disbarment for the
issues raised therein are still the subject of pending cases. Such grounds are flimsy and frivolous.

Respondent claims that the cases he is handling and subject of the complaint involve disputes
between family members. As he represents the brother of complainant, the present administrative
complaint has apparently been filed by complainant to vent her ire for failing to attain what she sought
in the pending litigations against respondents client.

In the trial of the case, complainant presented testimonial and documentary evidence, including
decisions of courts and pleadings filed therein while respondent opted to submit the case for decision
only on the basis of documents. He submitted resolutions, pleadings and orders issued in other
pending cases adverted to in the complaint, to prove that the issues raised in the disbarment case are
still the subject of pending actions, or that the complaint has no legal and factual basis.

Let us examine the facts as established by the evidence adduced by the parties.

GROUND I. On the charge that respondent Chua was guilty of falsification and criminal activities in
connection with his office as lawyer and notary public.

Complainant presented evidence on the notarization by respondent Chua of a Deed of Sale allegedly
executed on December 5, 1989 (Exhibit E), or one (1) day before the death of Chua Beng, one of the
owners of the property. In the transcript of stenographic notes taken in Criminal Case Nos. 12037 and
12036, a proceeding against respondent Chua for falsification and notarization of a falsified document,
RTC-Bacolod City, Branch 53, it is revealed that during the wake of Chua Beng, Silvina Chua, the wife
of the deceased, asked to sign a document by Yu Seng, her husbands helper or assistant, who
represented to her that said document she signed was a deed of sale which conveyed a property of
her husband located in Nandalagan, Bacolod City, containing 344 square meters and evidenced by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 151706. She also found out that her husbands signature was forged.
The deed of sale purportedly transferred their property to Yu Seng and Benjamin Laudio.

Silvina Chua gave testimony that her husband Chua Beng could not have signed the deed of sale as
they were together all the time prior to his death and she did not see him sign any document (Exhibit
G at pages 39, et seg.) The forgery of the signature of her husband was reported to authorities
(Exhibit G at page 55) and a fingerprint expert in the person of Police Superintendent Rodolfo Castillo
attested to such forgery (Exhibit F at page 48 et. seq.) The forgery and notarization of the document
containing the said forged signature of Chua Beng became the basis of a criminal prosecution for
falsification of notarial document against Atty. Chua, the above-mentioned Criminal Case Nos. 12037
and 12036.

Respondent Chua has not rebutted evidence presented on his role in notarizing a deed of sale where
the signatory did not appear before him as, in fact, the signature was a forgery. The Acknowledgment
in the deed of sale states that Chua Beng appeared and signed the deed personally before respondent.
In his defense, respondent claims that there is a criminal case still pending against him for his
participation in the notarization and alleged falsification of the document so the administrative case
cannot proceed until the decision is rendered in the criminal case.

GROUND II. On the charge that respondent foisted falsehood and falsification to molest and harass
parties concerned to their prejudice and detriment.

The charge relates to the filing of a notice of lis pendens in connection with a case filed before the
Securitie [sic] and Exchange Commission (SEC). It appears that a petition, dated April 6, 1988, was
filed by the lawyers Ramon Encarnacion and Alberto de Joya in behalf of UBS Marketing Corporation
and Johnny K.H. Uy. Complainant herein and other family members were the respondents. The action
was for the turn over of Books of Accounts, Sums of Money and Damages with Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction. Subsequently, or on April 26, 1995, a notice of lis pendens was sent to the
Register of Deed of Bacolod City, informing of the filing of a SEC petition, docketed as Case No. 3328.
The first page of the petition was altered by obliterating the entry pertaining to the nature of the suit
appearing at the upper right hand portion of the caption of the case just below the case number. The
complainant testified that the erasure was made to conceal the true nature of the suit and lack of
basis of the notice so as to mislead the Register of Deeds into annotating the notice of lis pendens.
The notice sent to the Register of Deeds, Exhibit J, Annex F, Disbarment Complaint, was signed for
Ramon Encarnacion and Associates.

It is further charged that the notice was unlawful and baseless as the owner (SK Realty, Inc.) of the
properties subject thereof was not even a party to the SEC petition.

The application for the annotation of the notice of lis pendens was denied by the Register of Deeds in
a letter dated May 5, 1995, addressed to UBS Marketing Corp. and Johnny KH Uy c/o Atty. Enrique
Chua on the ground that the ownership of the titles was never an issue in the case and the registered
owner was not a party thereto. Respondent Chua, this time acting for the applicants, appealed the
denial to the Land Registration Commission (LRC) en consulta. However, the LRC Administrator, in a
Resolution dated September 21, 1995, denied the appeal, sustaining the ground stated by the
Register of Deeds that the notice was not registrable as the registered owner of the affected
properties was not a party to the SEC case.

No contrary evidence was presented by respondent.

GROUND III. On the third charge that respondent was guilty of libel, misrepresentation and unlawful
conduct by causing the publication and advertisement of a portion of the SEC decision in a newspaper
of general and wide circulation in the province, evidence is not disputed that indeed an
advertisement/notice and news report came out in the Visayan Daily Star, in its issues of June 6, 1995
ad June 9, 1995 (Exhibits Q and R, Annexes L and M) respectively, relating to the decision of the
hearing officer in the SEC Case No. 3328 holding complainant and other liable for P68 million. The
decision as published included, among others, the cancellation of titles of SK Realty, Inc. and New
Challenge Resources, Inc.

In these publications, respondent was always in the forefront, claiming to be the lawyer of the winning
parties and paying for the advertisement/notice of the SEC decision. (Annexes N and O).

Complainant testified (TSN February 19, 1997 at page 54 et seq.) before this Commission and
affirmed tat the decision of the hearing officer in SEC Case No. 3328 declared her and others in
default and held liable for P68 million. Thereafter, Atty. Chua, who was not the counsel of petitioners
in the proceedings, caused damage and embarrassment to the [sic] them when said respondent
instigated and initiated the publication in a newspaper of general and wide circulation in the Visayas,
the Visayan Daily Star issue of June 6, 1995, the issuance of the decision with the caption
BUSINESSMEN ORDERED TO PAYP68 MILLION PESOS BY THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION. The publication reported that Atty. Chua was the counsel of the petitioners. Not content
with the news report, respondent Chua himself caused and paid for the publication of a two (2) page
notice/advertisement in the Visayan Daily Star in its issue of June 9, 1995, informing the public about
the decision of the SEC finding the complainant and others liable for P68 million.

Even non-parties, SK Realty, Inc. and New Challenge Resources were mentioned in the publication
(Exhibit Q, Annex L, Complaint).

The SEC decision adverted to in the publications had been appealed to the Commission en banc. A
copy of the notice of appeal was sent by mail to the counsel of record on June 9, 1995. (Exhibit V,
Annex P).

While the SEC case was pending appeal, respondent Chua filed a case against SK Realty, complainant
herein and others with the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Case No. 95-9051 for Reconveyance of
Property and Cancellation of Titles and/or Recovery of Ownership and Possession of Real Estate with
Damages and Accounting. (Annex Q).

In defense, respondent Chua submitted evidence to show that a complaint for libel filed by Ban Hua
Flores against respondent, arising from the publication/advertisement of the decision in SEC No. 3328,
was dismissed by the prosecutors office of Bacolod (Annex 1, Respondents Manifestation and
Submission of Evidence dated February 15, 1997). He further alleged that while complainant filed an
administrative complaint against the prosecutors, the said complaint was likewise dismissed for the
acts complained of amounted merely to errors of judgment correctible by appeal or a petition for
review and not by an administrative proceedings (Annex 3, Ibid). Respondent maintains that the
complaint on the publication is, therefore, baseless.

GROUND IV. On the charge that respondent was guilty of bribery, corruption and blackmail of the
judiciary, as well as harassment of the prosecution arm through the filing of administrative and
criminal cases against them, complainant presented evidence that respondent testified in
Administrative Matter No. RTJ-92-863 and Administrative Matter No. RTJ No. 92-880, involving Judge
Renato Abastillas and Judge Bethel Moscardon, respectively, whereat respondent Chua allegedly
admitted having bribed and/or conspired to bribe then RTC Judge Abastillas in order to obtain a
favorable ruling for his clients in Crim. Case Nos. 10009 and 10010. Failing to get a favorable action,
respondent Chua squealed/fabricated Administrative Matter No. RTJ-92-863 against ex-Judge
Abastillas.

Complainant further charges respondent of having conspired to bribe Judge Moscardon, which illegal
act he admitted in A.M. RTJ-92-880. Complainant also makes the sweeping accusation that
respondent Chua has the propensity to either bribe or sue the judges and prosecutors. He is charged
of having harassed Provincial Prosecutor Bartolome Facual.

Respondent denies the accusation but admits that he has already been proceeded against and, in fact
sternly warned for his misconduct in giving Judge Abastillas P20,000.00 for a case he was handling
and for which acts he has already expressed rancor (A.M. No. RTJ-92-863). He emphasizes that the
charges he acted irresponsibly by indiscriminately suing of harassing judges and others, while serious,
are false and untrue. His actions, in fact, resulted in the dismissal of judges.

Evidence adduced indeed prove that respondent Chua was previously found guilty for misconduct as a
lawyer in Administrative Matter No. RTJ-92-863/Administrative Case No. 3815, and where Judge
Renato Abastillas was ordered dismissed (Annex C, Complaint for Disbarment). Respondent was found
to have bribed Judge Abastillas and sternly warned that a repetition of similar act or acts or violation
committed by him in the future will be dealt with more severely. In Administrative Matter RTJ-92-880
(In re: Judge Bethel Moscardon), the Honorable Supreme Court directed the Bar Confidant to
investigate Atty. Chuas conduct in negotiating with a judge for an increase in rent for his client and
further noted that:

Thus is not the first time that Atty. Chua was involved in a similar incident. In A.C. No. 3815 Atty.
Chua admitted giving P20,000.00 bribe to another judge who was ordered dismissed. Atty. Chua was
spared from prosecution but he was sternly warned that a repetition of a similar acts or acts or
violation committed by him in the future would be dealt with more severely.

The Honorable Supreme Court furnished the Department of Justice with a copy of the decision in A.M.
RTJ-92-880 for investigation and possible criminal prosecution of persons concerned including
respondent herein. A copy of said decision was also endorsed to the Bar Confidant for possible
investigation and disciplinary action against respondent.

Complainant further alleges that there is a pattern of conduct on the part of respondent that tends
towards the frustration of justice. While not specifically alleged in the complaint, evidence was
adduced that respondent resorted to dilatory tactics in the handling of his cases. The attempts to
delay and impeded the natural course of justice has not remained unnoticed. In a Comment of the
Office of the Solicitor General (Exhibit Z) filed in CA-G.R. No. 41329, a petition to question an order of
the trial court which denied the accused petitioners Motion to Suspend Further Proceedings in a
criminal case for Estafa filed in 1988, the Solicitor General revealed that the petitioner therein, who
was assisted by Atty. Chua, filed (6) Motions to Disqualify Private Prosecutor/law firm, three (3)
Motion for Reinvestigation, five (5) Motions to Quash/Dismiss/Suspend Proceedings, four (4) Motions
to Recall Warrant of Arrest and several motions to inhibit the judges. These motions were all denied or
dismissed. Aside from the motions, the accused succeeded in seeking the postponement of the
arraignment twenty three (23) times. The filling of the petition in the Court of Appeals was part of the
ploy to further delay the proceedings.

The dilatory tactics of respondent Chua has not escaped the attention of the Court of Appeals in a
petition for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. No. 38798 (Exhibit A). This petition was filed by respondent
Chua to seek the annulment of an Order of the trial court dated August 21, 1995 setting the case for
further proceedings on various dates and the annulment of the April 27, 1998 Order which directs
Atty. Reyanaldo Depasucat, counsel for the plaintiff, to put in writing his oral manifestation that
respondent Chuas client has not honored a subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena duces
tecumpreviously issued by the court. Petitioner likewise seeks to compel the trial court to dismiss
and/or suspend the proceedings in Civil Case No. 7675. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition
but noted that:

The petition is utterly without merit and is obviously intended to delay proceedings in the aforesaid
civil case.
The court looks with disfavor at the clear dilatory tactics employed by herein petitioner in delaying the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 7635 by bringing the instant petition before this court when private
respondent is merely being required to put in writing his oral manifestation that Sy Seng Cho refused
to honor the subpoena duces tecum requiring him to produce the original of the minutes of the
reconciliation meeting of the feuding Uy family of which he is the custodian. Quite obvious is the fact
that herein petitioner is merely employing this petition to delay the case and thus delay likewise the
motion to cite him for contempt.

We will not be a part to the unreasonable and unnecessary delay of the proceedings in Civil Case No.
7635 which has dragged on since 1993 to the detriment of the proper administration of justice and
has prolonged the long standing feud of the Uy family.

We see that there is no valid issues that could arise from the order of the public respondent since the
order merely directs counsel for the plaintiff (private respondent) to put in writing his oral
manifestation as to the reason for the dishonor by the petitioner of the subpoena xxxx.

Respondent claims that he has not caused a delay in the proceedings much less in Case No. 95-9597
or in Criminal Case Nos. 12037 and 12036.

V. On the charge that respondent admitted in the administrative cases as aforesaid that he and his
client tapped private conversations and that said acts allegedly violated the Anti-Wiretapping Act. RA
No. 4200, no evidence was adduced, independent of what has been stated in the administrative cases,
had been adduced by the complainant.

VI. Respondent is further charged of forum shopping for his role as counsel for certain parties in
instituting various actions in different judicial and quasi-judicial fora. These case have the same or
similar causes of action and were allegedly instituted to defeat the ends of justice.

The decision of the Regional Trial Court on a motion to dismiss the case entitled Johnny K.H. Uy & UBS
vs. Sk Realty, et al. Civil Case No. 95-9051, RTC-Bacolod City, Branch 43 gives a summary of the
cases instituted by respondent Chua in behalf of his clients and finds that there was forum shopping
committed, thus:

xxx defendants alleged that there are three pending case involving practically the same parties,
subject matter and issues. The first is SEC AC Case No. 520 entitled UBS Marketing Corporation and
Johnny K.H. Uy vs. Ban Hua U Flores, et al. which is an appeal from the decision of the Hearing Officer
of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC Case No. 3528) to the SEC En Banc. The dispositive
portion of the appealed decision ordered, among others, the cancellation and annulment of all
Certificates of Title in the name of herein defendant S.K. Realty Inc. The present case, likewise, asks
for the annulment and cancellation of transfer certificates of title in the name of defendant S.K.
Realty, Inc. which properties are the very same properties covered by SEC AC No. 520.

The second case, entitled S.K. Realty, Inc. et al. vs. Securities and Exchange Commission, UBS
Marketing Corporation and Johnny K.H. Uy is CA-G.R. No. 37451 pending in the Court of Appeals. The
issue raised thereto refers to the nullity of the decision rendered in SEC Case No. 3328 which awarded
the real properties of S.K. Realty, Inc., to the herein plaintiffs. These properties are the very same
subject matter of the present action between the same parties.

The third case, Civil Case No. 95-8978 entitled SK Realty, Inc. vs. Johnny K.H. Uy and UBS Marketing
Corporation pending in Branch 41 of this Court, is an action for damages due to the Notices of Lis
Pendens effected by the herein plaintiffs on the real properties of the defendant SK Realty, Inc.

xxx
Finally it is the contention of plaintiffs that there is no forum shopping in the present case as the
defendants even vehemently declared that defendant SK Realty is not and has never been a party to
SEC Case Nos. 3318, 520 and 3328, therefore, is a total stranger to the said case. Neither can there
be a similarity of causes in the petition with the Court of Appeals and Civil Case No. 95-8975, for the
causes of action in these cases are distinct and the reliefs prayed for are different from the present
case.

The denial of defendants motion to dismiss is what plaintiffs seek for.

A judicious scrutiny of the evidence on record led this Court to hold that defendants' position, as a
whole, is impressed with merit.

A perusal of the plaintiffs complaint in the instant case and SEC Case No. 5328 xxx which is now the
subject of appeal docketed as SEC Case No. 520, disclosed that the plaintiffs in both instances assert
rights founded on substantially the same set of facts giving to the same basic issues breach, on the
defendants part, of the Family Agreement reached during the Family Reconciliation Meeting held on
February 10, 11 and 12, 1987; and the validity of nullity of the Deed of Sale involving several parcels
of land, executed by and between the defendants, to the prejudice of the rights and interest of the
plaintiffs.

While the case at bar is for the recovery of ownership and possession of real properties and on the
other hand SEC Case No. 3328 (now pending appeal) involves, inter alia, an action for accounting and
damages, ostensibly the cause of action in one is different from the other but in the final analysis the
same aforementioned basic issues confront these cases.

One must bear in mind that a party cannot, by varying the form of action or adopting a different
method of presenting this case, escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of
action shall not be twice litigated. (Aldez Realty, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 623)

It is evident that the aforementioned cases hinges on the same essential facts and circumstances.
Though the parties impleaded in one are not entirely the same to that (sic) in the other, nevertheless,
the same parties represent the same interest in both actions.

What we have before us is a clear case of forum shopping.

Respondent is thus accused of perjury in falsely certifying in his Complaint, Civil Case No. 95-9051
(Annex Q), that there are no pending cases with the same subject matter and cause of action.
Likewise, it is charged that respondent, in not specifying the value of the real properties involved in
the suit, misled the clerk of court in accepting the complaint without the correct filing fee being paid.

FINDING AND RECOMMENDATION

I. On the first charge (GROUND I) that respondent was guilty of fraud against a person in his
deathbed by falsification and forgery of a deed of sale, there is no evidence that he actively conspired
with any party, or actively participated, in the forgery of the signature of one Chua Beng, a purported
party to the contract. However, complainants evidence supports the conclusion that the signature of
Chua Beng on a Deed of Sale (Exhibit E) was forged. While the wife, Silvina Chua, admits that she
signed a document during the wake of her husband, she denies that her husband signed a Deed of
Sale (ANNEX E) on 5 December 1989, or one (1) day before her husbands death, concerning a
property covered by TCT No. T-151706.

We find the testimony of the wife on the forgery, which is supported by a handwriting expert, as
truthful and credible. We cannot ignore the circumstances of the execution of the said deed of sale
which purports to have been signed by Chua Beng before a Notary Public one day before his death.
We find the statement in the Acknowledgment appearing on the second page of the deed stating that
Chua Beng personally appeared before the Notary Public is an untruthful statement that amounts to
falsification. While we note that there is a criminal case of falsification pending against respondent
(Criminal Case No. 12036), the lack of a decision from the trial court on the matter should not
dissuade us from making a finding of liability in this administrative proceedings against respondent,
as, in fact, we find respondent Chua failed to exercise the required diligence and fealty to his office by
attending to the fact that the alleged party, Chua Beng, appeared before him and signed the deed
when in truth and in fact said person did not so participate in the execution thereof. Emphatically, this
finding does not in any way preempt the trial court on whatever decision it will issue on the criminal
cases against respondent Chua.

II. We shall jointly discuss the second ground (Ground II) together with Ground VI, VI-A, VI-B, and
VI-C, as said charges emanate from, or is related to, the filing of a case with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC Case No. 3328), involving the Uy family members and another case with
the civil court (Case No. 95-9051) involving their properties.

Complainant charges respondent Chua, under the second ground of her complaint, of foisting
falsehood and falsified a document to obtain a notice of lis pendens. We find documentary evidence to
sustain the conclusion that indeed a Notice of Lis Pendens was filed in relation to SEC Case No. 3328
(Exhibit J, Annex F, Complaint), to which was attached a copy of the Petition with page one thereof
containing an apparent erasure to omit the statement that it is For: Turn over of Books of Account,
Sums of Money and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. However, the Petition
and the Notice of Lis Pendens have been prepared and executed by Ramon Encarnacion or his law
firm. It does not appear from the documents, neither is there credible testimonial evidence, that
respondent Chua directly participated in the unlawful acts complained of. The fact that respondent
Chua was not the lawyer for the petitioners in the said SEC case is even admitted by complainant in
her complaint (Complaint, paragraph 15, page 11).

However, there is evidence that respondent Chua subsequently took action to appeal the denial by the
Registry of Deeds of the application for the registration of the Notice of Lis Pendens to the Land
Registration Commission, which eventually sustained the decision of the former, in a Resolution dated
September 21, 1995, which denied the application on the ground that the real party in interest in the
SEC case, the registered property owner SK Realty, Inc., was not impleaded in the suit.

It also appears that respondent Chua filed a similar action in the civil court while the SEC case was
pending adjudication, an action claimed to amount to forum shopping, intended to enable respondents
clients to annotate a notice of lis pendens on the titles of the properties which were the same subject
of an earlier SEC petition and application for a notice of lis pendens. Respondent Chua cannot deny
the institution of the civil complaint (Annex Q, Complaint for Disbarment). The civil complaint, Civil
Case No. 95-9051, shows that SK Realty, Inc., which was not a party in the SEC case, was impleaded
this time as partly plaintiff. The causes of action and the reliefs sought therein seem to differ from
those stated in the SEC case. In the civil case, the plaintiffs seek judgment specifically as follows:

1. Declaring null and void the Deed of Absolute Sale (Annex A) and annulling and cancelling Transfer
Certificates of Titles Nos. T-141057; 141059; 141060; 141061; 141062; 141063; 141064, standing in
the name of defendant SK and reverting their ownership and possession to either of the plaintiffs; 2)
Directing the defendants to render full and accurate account of income and revenues on the eight (8)
parcels of land; 3) finding defendants, jointly and severally, liable for a) attorneys fees x x x x b)
Moral Damages x x x c) Exemplary Damages x x x d) Nominal Damages x x x x x and e) Moderate
Damages x x x.

The controversy over the sale of, or the titles to, the real properties of the Uy family was, to
respondent Chuas thinking, cognizable by the civil court and on the face of the SEC petition filed by
another lawyer, it is not indicated that a relief for the annulment of titles was being sought. As
admitted by complainant herself, SK Realty, Inc. was not a party litigant in the SEC case, while she is
now a party in the civil case and perhaps rightly so considering that an owner of property is an
indispensable party.
We cannot, however, ignore the resolution of the trial court in Civil Case No. 95-9051, dated
November 9, 1995, which found that while ostensibly the causes of action in the civil action is different
from the SEC Case, it held that in the final analysis the same x x x issues confront these cases.
(Exhibit P at page 5) and it, therefore, concluded that respondents clients were guilty of forum
shopping.

Indeed, while it would appear that respondent Chua was not the counsel of the petitioners in SEC
CASE No. 3328, his action to have a notice of lis pendens annotated at the Register of Deeds and his
appeal to the LRC indicate his clear knowledge of the pending action. Clearly, while there is no
sufficient basis to hold respondent liable for the charge of committing fraud in the filing of notice of lis
pendens in relation to the SEC case, or for falsification of page one of the SEC petition as attached to
the notice, respondent not being privy thereto, we are not prepared, however, to say that he is off the
hook on the forum shopping charge. As we have earlier pointed out, the pleadings in the SEC case and
in Civil Case No. 95-9051, may appear to have different causes of action and parties. But here is the
catch. The SEC rendered a decision, dated May 3, 1995, which directed, among others, the
cancellation and annulment of the transfer certificate of titles in the name of Soon Kee Commercial,
Inc. if any, the certificate of titles in the name of SK Realty, Inc., if any, and the certificate of titles in
the name of New Challenge Resources, if still there is, and all the properties formerly belonging to and
in the name of UBS, presently totalling eight (8) lots TCT No. 141057, TCT No. 141058. TCT No.
141059, TCT No. 141060, TCT No. 141061, TCT No. 141062, TCT No. 141063, TCT No. 14106 and
reverting them back to UBS Marketing Corporation. The Decision was published and even quoted in
the Visayan daily Star, the issue of June 6, 1995, at respondent Chuas behest and expense. The
decision was later appealed to the SEC Commission en banc. Respondent Chua was undoubtedly
aware that while the SEC petition did not make any references to the real properties, the decision of
the SEC gave reliefs in relation thereto. Therefore, when respondent filed a complaint, Civil Case No.
95-9051 (Annex Q, Disbarment complaint), on September 18, 1995, he was aware that the forum
shopping prohibition could be violated and yet he submitted a Verification in his civil complaint, which
was for reconveyance and cancellation of titles, that there is no prior action or proceedings involving
the same issues, as herein raised, has been filed with the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court or any
other tribunal or agency. He knew that the controversy on the properties was pending with the SEC,
or was pending appeal, initiated by SK Realty and New Challenge Resources, Inc., with the Court of
Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 37541) and SEC Case No. 520). The fact that the relief granted by the SEC
gearing officer has not yet been set aside when respondent instituted the civil case and that he was
aware of this fact should be enough reason for him to be made answerable for making false
representation and forum shopping. It is also worth noting the fact that when the civil complaint was
filed on September 18, 1995, the appeal in Consulta No. 2334, with respect to the Notice of Lis
Pendens, was still unresolved. The decision of the LRC Administrator came only on September 21,
1995 (Annex K, Disbarment Case). Ignorance of a pending action on the properties subject of the SEC
case cannot, therefore, be invoked by respondent. Respondent is answerable for misconduct under
Canon 12.02.

III. On the third ground (Ground III, III-A and III-B) that respondent Chua caused the publication of
new reports and paid advertisement/notice about the issuance of a decision by the Securities ad
Exchange Commission, there is sufficient evidence to sustain complainant's charges.

Undeniably, respondent Chua did not act as counsel for any of the parties in the SEC case, although it
is safe to say that he represented some of the protagonist in other matters or cases. It is likewise
undenied that the decision of the SEC hearing officer in Case No. 3328 was favorable to respondent
Chuas clients. Respondent Chua, being a lawyer, should have known that the said decision was
appealable. When he published the decision, he courted a possible sanction for contempt. Here, we
cannot excuse him from such misconduct for it behooves him to even exert earnest efforts towards
the settlement of family disputes and certainly he should be the last to exacerbate and complicate the
controversial situation in which family members are embroiled. By his publication, respondents has
violated the canons of professional ethics and professional responsibility, particularly Canon 19, 27,
3.01, 13.02, 1.03 and 1.04.

IV. The charges alleged in Ground IV, IV-A IV-B and IV-C, which imputes to respondent acts of
blackmail, harassment of the judiciary, arbitrary filing of administrative and criminal cases, and the
charges alleged in Ground V, which attributes to represent the crime of wire tapping private
conversations in violation of RA No. 4200 should be dismissed for lack of evidence and for being
without basis. Besides, the acts complained of were the subject of Administrative Case No. 92-863 and
A.M. No. RTJ 92-880. The decision in said administrative matters will have a bearing on the imposition
of the penalty on respondent who has been warned of a stiffer penalty in case another misconduct is
committed.

V. The charge alleged in Ground VI-D which assails the allegation of respondent in the civil complaint,
paragraph 4 of Annex Q, Complaint for Disbarment, as a brazen lie should be dismissed for lack of
merit. A reading of paragraph 4 of the Complaint shows that when respondent made a statement that
these facts are within the judicial notice of the Court being a settled litigation passed upon with finality
by the Supreme Court, he made a reference to a case docketed as Securities and Exchange
Commission vs. Court of Appeals and JBS vs. Court of Appeals reported in 201 SCRA 124. The term
these facts should not, therefore, be interpreted by complainant as referring to the facts alleged in the
complainant or that there was an intention to mislead the trial court by invoking judicial notice of a
court decision.

VI. The charge against respondent, stated under Ground VI-E of the complaint, of allegedly misleading
the Clerk of Court into accepting the filing of a civil complaint without the proper filing fee being paid
should be dismissed for lack of merit. The insufficiency in the payment of filing should be better be
threshed in the civil case rather than before the Commission. The intent to mislead the Clerk of Court
cannot be deduced from the mere fact of filing, although real properties are involved in the case. We
think that the charge lacks factual and legal basis.

Finally, the Commission does not wish to see lawyers deeply involving themselves in a fractious and
divisive family feud, nay aggravating a controversy by reckless resort to unnecessary legal actions
that only tend to frustrate the ends of justice. Instead of working for the amicable settlement or a
friendly end to the dispute, lawyers file pleadings, perhaps with the clients cheers and approval, that
only cause delay and impede the normal course of justice until the solution to the family imbroglio has
become unreachable. Under Rule 1.04, it is mandated that lawyers shall encourage (their) clients to
avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement. It appears that in the family
conflicts in which the lawyers involved herein are also active participants, no earnest efforts have been
exerted by said lawyers towards that end. It is pathetic that years have been wasted without any end
in sight.

While a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his clients rights and is expected to display the utmost
zeal in defense of a clients cause, the conduct must never be at the expense of truth. (People v.
Susano Blancas, 45 SCRA 405; Caballero vs. Deiparine , 60 SCRA 136; Muoz v. People, 53 SCRA 190)
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct when he is wanting in moral character, in
honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. (Nadayag vs.
Grageda, 237 SCRA 202).

In view of our observation and finding that the charges against respondent for forum shopping,
committing falsehood, injurious, willful and unprofessional conduct of publishing, or causing the
publication, in a newspaper of general circulation, of a pending case, causing undue delay in the court
proceedings and for notarizing a document without the party being present, to be supported by
evidence and meritorious, it is hereby recommended that respondent be suspended for a total of three
(3) years for all his acts of misconduct. Respondent Chua has, by his unprofessional conduct, violated
Rule 10.01, 12.02, 12.04 (foisting or commission of false hood, forum shopping and causing delay in
court proceedings), Canon 19 (failing to resort to lawful means in representing client), 27, 3.01, 13.02
(causing undue publication of pending action). Having been previously found guilty of misconduct by
the Hon. Supreme Court and warned of a more stern penalty should he commit another breach of the
Canons of Professional Responsibility, respondents penalty would even seem light.

While the counsel for the complainant is not recommended for any disciplinary action, he is, however,
advised to take note of the Rules of Professional Conduct (Rule 1.01) which requires him to take the
necessary steps aimed at encouraging a fair amicable settlement of the long-running family disputes,
brought to light in this administrative proceedings, where he is actively and deeply involved.

We fully agree with the Investigating Commissioner in his findings of facts and conclusion of
culpability, and even in his own lament that the recommended penalty would even seem light. Indeed,
the misconduct of respondent, which this case has unfolded, is grave and serious that brings dishonor
to the legal profession. Committed in succession and within a short time, the misconduct exposes a
habit, attitude, and mindset not only to abuse ones legal knowledge or training, but also to
deliberately defy or ignore known virtues and values which the legal profession demands from its
members.

In respondents notarization of a forged deed of sale, we see not just an act of generosity lavishly
extended. We see his active role to perpetuate a fraud, a deceitful act to prejudice a party. He did not
deny knowing the supposed vendor. As a matter of fact, he certified in the acknowledgment that he
knew the vendor and knew him to be the same person who executed the document. When he then
solemnly declared that such vendor appeared before him and acknowledged to him that the document
was the vendors free act and deed despite the fact that the vendor did not do so as his signature was
forged, respondent deliberately made false representations.

It must be stressed that under Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103,[1 a notary public, like herein
respondent, shall certify that the person acknowledging or document is known to him and that he is
the same person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The
purpose of the requirement of personal appearance by the acknowledging party before the notary
public is to enable the latter to verify the genuineness of the signature of the former.[2 It may be
added, too, that only by such personal appearance may the notary public be able to ascertain from the
acknowledging party himself that the instrument or document is his own free act and deed. Needless
to state, the personal appearances and acknowledgement by the party to the document are the core
of the ritual that effectively convert a private document into a public document, making it admissible
in court without further proof of its authenticity.[3

The role then of the notary public in this ritual cannot be taken lightly. Where the notary public is a
lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed upon his shoulder by reason of his solemn oath to obey the
laws and to do no falsehood or consent tot he doing of any. The Code of Professional Responsibility
also commands him not to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and to uphold
at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. In Maligsa v. Cabanting, we emphatically
pronounced:

As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, respondent is mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties
appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public policy impressed with public interest.
Faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment or
jurat is sacrosanct. Simply put, such responsibility is incumbent upon and failing therein, he must now
accept the commensurate consequences of his professional indiscretion. By his effrontery of notarizing
a fictitious or spurious document, he has made a mockery of the legal solemnity of the oath in
anAcknowledgment.[4

In said case, respondent Cabanting notarized a forged deed of quitclaim. Considering also his previous
misconduct for which he was suspended from the practice of law for six months, we ordered him
disbarred from the practice of law.

In the instant case, respondent Enrique S. Chua also notarized a forged deed of sale. it must be
recalled that in Lee v. Abastillas and Abastillas v. Chua,[5 we held respondent Enrique Chua
administratively liable for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for allegedly
bribing Judge Abastillas; and, accordingly, we STERNLY WARNED [him] that a repetition of similar act
or acts or violation committed by him in the future [would] be dealt with more severely. Respondent
Chua should, on this score alone, deserve a similar deal with Cabanting. But, considering the other
items of his misconduct enumerated in the Report of the Investigating Commissioner, which in their
totality brought dishonor to the legal profession, for more reasons must we visit upon respondent the
most severe permissible penalty. What we said inMaligsa v. Cabanting bears repeating:

A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The bar should
maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor
to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his
clients. To this end a member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might
lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and
integrity of the legal profession.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent ENRIQUE S. CHUA guilty of grave
misconduct rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession. He is thus
ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken off of the Roll of Attorneys,
effective immediately.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, which shall forthwith record
it in the personal filed of respondent; all the Courts of the Philippines; the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, which shall disseminate copies thereof to all its Chapters; and all administrative and quasi-
judicial agencies of the republic of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Santiago, JJ., concur

[A.C. No. 4680. August 29, 2000]

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., complainant, vs. ATTYS. ANTONIO M. LLORENTE and LIGAYA
P. SALAYON,Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.: chanrobles virtual law library

This is a complaint for disbarment against respondents Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya P. Salayon for
gross misconduct, serious breach of trust, and violation of the lawyers oath in connection with the
discharge of their duties as members of the Pasig City Board of Canvassers in the May 8, 1995
elections. Salayon, then election officer of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), was designated
chairman of said Board, while Llorente, who was then City Prosecutor of Pasig City, served as its ex
oficio vice-chairman as provided by law.1 Complainant, now a senator, was also a candidate for the
Senate in that election. chanrobles virtual law library

Complainant alleges that, in violation of R.A. No. 6646, 27(b),2respondents tampered with the votes
received by him, with the result that, as shown in the Statements of Votes (SoVs) and Certificate of
Canvass (CoC) pertaining to 1,263 precincts of Pasig City, (1) senatorial candidates Juan Ponce Enrile,
Anna Dominique Coseteng, Gregorio Honasan, Marcelo Fernan, Ramon Mitra, and Rodolfo Biazon were
credited with votes which were above the number of votes they actually received while, on the other
hand, petitioners votes were reduced; (2) in 101 precincts, Enriles votes were in excess of the total
number of voters who actually voted therein; and (3) the votes from 22 precincts were twice recorded
in 18 SoVs. Complainant maintains that, by signing the SoVs and CoC despite respondents knowledge
that some of the entries therein were false, the latter committed a serious breach of public trust and
of their lawyers oath. chanrobles virtual law library

Respondents denied the allegations against them. They alleged that the preparation of the SoVs was
made by the 12 canvassing committees which the Board had constituted to assist in the canvassing.
They claimed that the errors pointed out by complainant could be attributed to honest mistake,
oversight, and/or fatigue. chanrobles virtual law library

In his Consolidated Reply, complainant counters that respondents should be held responsible for the
illegal padding of the votes considering the nature and extent of the irregularities and the fact that the
canvassing of the election returns was done under their control and supervision. chanrobles virtual law library

On December 4, 1998, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, to which this matter had been referred
pursuant to Rule 139-B, 13, in relation to 20 of the Rules of Court, recommended the dismissal of the
complaint for lack of merit.3 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on March 11, 1999, but his
motion was denied in a resolution of the IBP Board of Governors dated April 22, 1999. On June 4,
1999, he filed this petition pursuant to Rule 139-B, 12(c). chanrobles virtual law library

It appears that complainant likewise filed criminal charges against respondents before the COMELEC
(E.O. Case No. 96-1132) for violation of R.A. No. 6646, 27(b). In its resolution dated January 8, 1998,
the COMELEC dismissed complainants charges for insufficiency of evidence. However, on a petition
for certiorari filed by complainant,4 this Court set aside the resolution and directed the COMELEC to file
appropriate criminal charges against respondents. Reconsideration was denied on August 15, 2000.
library
chanrobles virtual law

Considering the foregoing facts, we hold that respondents are guilty of misconduct. chanrobles virtual law library

First. Respondent Llorente seeks the dismissal of the present petition on the ground that it was filed
late. He contends that a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under Rule 139-B,
12(c)5 and, therefore, the filing of such motion before the IBP Board of Governors did not toll the
running of the period of appeal. Respondent further contends that, assuming such motion can be filed,
petitioner nevertheless failed to indicate the date of his receipt of the April 22, 1999 resolution of the
IBP denying his motion for reconsideration so that it cannot be ascertained whether his petition was
filed within the 15-day period under Rule 139-B, 12(c). chanrobles virtual law library

The contention has no merit. The question of whether a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited
pleading or not under Rule 139-B, 12(c) has been settled in Halimao v. Villanueva,6 in which this Court
held: chanrobles virtual law library

Although Rule 139-B, 12(c) makes no mention of a motion for reconsideration, nothing in its text or in
its history suggests that such motion is prohibited. It may therefore be filed within 15 days from
notice to a party. Indeed, the filing of such motion should be encouraged before resort is made to this
Court as a matter of exhaustion of administrative remedies, to afford the agency rendering the
judgment an opportunity to correct any error it may have committed through a misapprehension of
facts or misappreciation of the evidence.[7 chanrobles virtual law library

On the question whether petitioners present petition was filed within the 15-day period provided under
Rule 139-B, 12(c), although the records show that it was filed on June 4, 1999, respondent has not
shown when petitioner received a copy of the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors denying his
motion for reconsideration. It would appear, however, that the petition was filed on time because a
copy of the resolution personally served on the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court was received
by it on May 18, 1999. Since copies of IBP resolutions are sent to the parties by mail, it is possible
that the copy sent to petitioner was received by him later than May 18, 1999. Hence, it may be
assumed that his present petition was filed within 15 days from his receipt of the IBP resolution. In
any event, the burden was on respondent, as the moving party, to show that the petition in this case
was filed beyond the 15-day period for filing it. chanrobles virtual law library
Even assuming that petitioner received the IBP resolution in question on May 18, 1999, i.e., on the
same date a copy of the same was received by the Office of the Bar Confidant, the delay would only
be two days.8 The delay may be overlooked, considering the merit of this case. Disbarment
proceedings are undertaken solely for public welfare. The sole question for determination is whether a
member of the bar is fit to be allowed the privileges as such or not. The complainant or the person
who called the attention of the Court to the attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and
generally has no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper
administration of justice.9 For this reason, laws dealing with double jeopardy10 or prescription11 or with
procedure like verification of pleadings12 and prejudicial questions13 have no application to disbarment
proceedings. chanrobles virtual law library

Even in ordinary civil actions, the period for perfecting appeals is relaxed in the interest of justice and
equity where the appealed case is clearly meritorious. Thus, we have given due course to appeals
even though filed six,14 four,15 and three16days late. In this case, the petition is clearly meritorious. chanrobles virtual law library

Second. The IBP recommends the dismissal of petitioners complaint on the basis of the following: (1)
respondents had no involvement in the tabulation of the election returns, because when the
Statements of Votes (SoVs) were given to them, such had already been accomplished and only
needed their respective signatures; (2) the canvassing was done in the presence of watchers,
representatives of the political parties, the media, and the general public so that respondents would
not have risked the commission of any irregularity; and (3) the acts dealt with in R.A. No. 6646, 27(b)
are mala in se and not mala prohibita, and petitioner failed to establish criminal intent on the part of
respondents.17 chanrobles virtual law library

The recommendation is unacceptable. In disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar, only
clear preponderance of evidence is required to establish liability.18 As long as the evidence presented
by complainant or that taken judicial notice of by the Court19 is more convincing and worthy of belief
than that which is offered in opposition thereto,20 the imposition of disciplinary sanction is justified. chanrobles virtual law library

In this case, respondents do not dispute the fact that massive irregularities attended the canvassing of
the Pasig City election returns. The only explanation they could offer for such irregularities is that the
same could be due to honest mistake, human error, and/or fatigue on the part of the members of the
canvassing committees who prepared the SoVs. chanrobles virtual law library

This is the same allegation made in Pimentel v. Commission on Elections.21 In rejecting this allegation
and ordering respondents prosecuted for violation of R.A. No. 6646, 27(b), this Court said: chanrobles virtual law library

There is a limit, We believe, to what can be construed as an honest mistake or oversight due to
fatigue, in the performance of official duty. The sheer magnitude of the error, not only in the total
number of votes garnered by the aforementioned candidates as reflected in the CoC and the SoVs,
which did not tally with that reflected in the election returns, but also in the total number of votes
credited for senatorial candidate Enrile which exceeded the total number of voters who actually voted
in those precincts during the May 8, 1995 elections, renders the defense of honest mistake or
oversight due to fatigue, as incredible and simply unacceptable.[22 chanrobles virtual law library

Indeed, what is involved here is not just a case of mathematical error in the tabulation of votes per
precinct as reflected in the election returns and the subsequent entry of the erroneous figures in one
or two SoVs23 but a systematic scheme to pad the votes of certain senatorial candidates at the
expense of petitioner in complete disregard of the tabulation in the election returns. A cursory look at
the evidence submitted by petitioner reveals that, in at least 24 SoVs involving 101 precincts, the
votes for candidate Enrile exceeded the number of voters who actually voted in the said precincts and,
in 18 SoVs, returns from 22 precincts were tabulated twice. In addition, as the Court noted
in Pimentel, the total number of votes credited to each of the seven senatorial candidates in question,
as reflected in the CoC, markedly differ from those indicated in the SoVs.24Despite the fact that these
discrepancies, especially the double recording of the returns from 22 precincts and the variation in the
tabulation of votes as reflected in the SoVs and CoC, were apparent on the face of these documents
and that the variation involves substantial number of votes, respondents nevertheless certified the
SoVs as true and correct. Their acts constitute misconduct. chanrobles virtual law library

Respondent Llorentes contention that he merely certified the genuineness and due execution of the
SoVs but not their correctness is belied by the certification which reads: chanrobles virtual law library

WE HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing Statement of Votes by . . . [p]recinct is true and correct.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we sign these presents at the City/Municipality of ___________ Province
of ____________ this _______ day of May, 1995. (Emphasis added) chanrobles virtual law library

Nor does the fact that the canvassing was open to the public and observed by numerous individuals
preclude the commission of acts for which respondents are liable. The fact is that only they had access
to the SoVs and CoC and thus had the opportunity to compare them and detect the discrepancies
therein.chanrobles virtual law library

Now, a lawyer who holds a government position may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for
misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official.25 However, if the misconduct also
constitutes a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility or the lawyers oath or is of such
character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or shows moral delinquency on his part, such
individual may be disciplined as a member of the bar for such misconduct.26 chanrobles virtual law library

Here, by certifying as true and correct the SoVs in question, respondents committed a breach of Rule
1.01 of the Code which stipulates that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. By express provision of Canon 6, this is made applicable to lawyers in the
government service. In addition, they likewise violated their oath of office as lawyers to do no
falsehood. chanrobles virtual law library

Nowhere is the need for lawyers to observe honesty both in their private and in their public dealings
better expressed inSabayle v. Tandayag27 in which this Court said: chanrobles virtual law library

There is a strong public interest involved in requiring lawyers . . . to behave at all times in a manner
consistent with truth and honor. It is important that the common caricature that lawyers by and large
do not feel compelled to speak the truth and to act honestly, should not become a common
reality. . . .[28 chanrobles virtual law library

It may be added that, as lawyers in the government service, respondents were under greater
obligation to observe this basic tenet of the profession because a public office is a public trust. chanrobles virtual law library

Third. Respondents participation in the irregularities herein reflects on the legal profession, in
general, and on lawyers in government, in particular. Such conduct in the performance of their official
duties, involving no less than the ascertainment of the popular will as expressed through the ballot,
would have merited for them suspension were it not for the fact that this is their first administrative
transgression and, in the case of Salayon, after a long public service.29 Under the circumstances, a
penalty of fine in the amount of P10,000.00 for each of the respondents should be sufficient. chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondents Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya P. Salayon GUILTY of
misconduct and imposes on each of them a FINE in the amount of P10,000.00 with a WARNING that
commission of similar acts will be dealt with more severely. chanrobles virtual law library

SO ORDERED. chanrobles virtual law library

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

A.C. No. 2841 - July 3, 2002

RE: ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 44 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH IV,
TAGBILARAN CITY, AGAINST ATTY. SAMUEL C. OCCEÑA.

PER CURIAM:

"Membership in the bar is in the category of a mandate to public service of the highest order. A lawyer
is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law
and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest for truth and justice, for which
he has sworn to be a fearless crusader."1 These were the eloquent words of the late Chief Justice Fred
Ruiz Castro in exalting the sacred and honorable legal profession. But he laments the pathetic and
deplorable fact that, "many a law practitioner, forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant
and his exalted position as an officer of the court, has allowed himself to become an instigator of
controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for
compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the
primacy of truth and moral justice, a mercenary purveying the benefits of his enlightened advocacy in
direct proportion to a litigant's financial posture instead of a faithful friend of the courts in the
dispensation of equal justice to rich and poor alike."2 Here, Atty. Samuel C. Occeña, as later shown by
his disgraceful and outrageous conduct, is one such lawyer who has become an apostate to his exalted
position as an officer of the court. He thus deserves to be weeded out from the legal profession to
protect its sanctity and nobility.

This administrative case stemmed from the settlement of the estate of testator William C. Ogan which
has since been pending in the Court of First Instance (CFI), now Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4,
Tagbilaran City, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 423. In 1976, Judge Fernando S. Ruiz took over
the case from Judge Paulino S. Marquez who, in turn, inherited it from Judge Antonio Beldia. Noting
that the proceedings have been pending for thirteen (13) years, Judge Ruiz then inquired into the
principal causes of the delay. He found out, as will be shown later in detail, that Atty. Samuel C.
Occeña caused the delay by disobeying lawful court orders and by willfully prolonging the litigation
through his various maneuvers, in gross violation of his oath as a lawyer that he will not willingly sue
any groundless, false, or unlawful suit, or delay any man's cause for money or malice.

Going back to Special Proceedings No. 423, under the terms of the Last Will and Testament of the late
William C. Ogan, his residuary estate was divided among his seven children. One of them, Necitas
Ogan-Occeña, was named in the will as executrix of the estate. As such, she retained her husband,
Atty. Samuel C. Occeña, as her lawyer.

The estate consists of bank deposits, securities (both here and in the United States of America), and
real estate in Cebu City and in Ohio, U.S.A. The deceased left no debt. Thus, the settlement of the
estate should have been simple and speedy. However, since the death of the testator on February 1,
1963, the settlement of his estate has not yet been terminated owing largely to the dilatory tactics of
Atty. Occeña.

Looking into the causes of the delay, Judge Ruiz learned that the executrix, Necitas Ogan-Occeña,
filed a project of partition on August 4, 1967. On September 22, 1967, the probate court approved the
project except certain portions. The executrix then interposed an appeal. In view of the delay caused
by the pendency of the appeal, the other heirs filed several motions praying that the estate's
remaining P250,000.00 cash as well as its shares of stocks in the Philippines and in the United States
be distributed among all the heirs. The executrix, through her husband Atty. Occeña, vehemently
opposed the motions, asserting that the P250,000.00 cash had already been earmarked for her
husband's attorney's fee and other expenses, and that the shares of stocks could not be distributed
among the heirs because the stock certificates were not in her possession. The dispute between the
executrix, on the one hand, and the other heirs, on the other, which delayed the proceedings,
centered mainly on the P250,000.00 cash and the shares of stocks.

Records also show that the executrix, through Atty. Occeña, interposed numerous appeals from the
orders of the probate court. For their part, the heirs repeatedly prayed in their motions for the release
of the shares of stocks and the remaining cash. But the executrix and Atty. Occeña opposed the same,
thus prolonging the proceedings. In CA-GR No. 48716-R (December, 1974), the Court of Appeals, in
remanding the case to the probate court, had this to say:

"It is, however, earnestly hoped, and the parties are urged, to settle their differences with the
view to closing the estate which has been pending since 1963. The executrix, the heirs, and
the lawyers, are reminded that the prolongation of administrative proceedings can only benefit
the executor or administrator or the counsels for the contending parties. It always results in
the diminution of the share of each of the heirs because the estate is burdened with the
expenses of the administration proceedings, the heir must have to pay attorney's fee and the
longer the proceedings the bigger the attorney's fee."3

Obviously, the main causes of the delay in the probate proceedings were Atty. Occeña's claim for
attorney's fee in the amount of P250,000.00 and the executrix's refusal, through her husband, to
account for the shares of stocks belonging to the estate which, according to her, were not in her
possession. The other heirs could not accept that explanation because as executrix, she was charged
with the responsibility of collecting all the assets of the estate.

Thus, on August 8, 1977, Judge Ruiz issued an order directing the executrix to comment why the
securities were not in her possession. She filed her comment, through her husband, that some
Philippine and American securities were not in her possession. To determine which securities were in
her possession, Judge Ruiz on October 22, 1977, issued an order requiring her to submit within 30
days the latest inventory of all the securities of the estate. However, she failed to comply with the
order. Judge Ruiz then issued another order on February 6, 1978, "directing her to take possession of
all certificates of stocks or their replacements belonging to the estate and to make an up-to-date
inventory thereof with a statement of their nature and their value." Again, she did not comply with the
order.

Determined to block the release of the P250,000.00 to the heirs, the executrix, through Atty. Occeña,
appealed the numerous interlocutory orders of the probate court to the Court of Appeals, hence,
adding to the delay. Because of the propensity of the executrix, through Atty. Occeña, to elevate
interlocutory orders to the Court of Appeals, Judge Ruiz issued an order on June 16, 1978 directing
her to "refrain from instituting any action or proceeding without first informing the court." The
executrix and her husband disobeyed this order. In fact, he filed six cases with the Court of Appeals
and one with this Court.

On August 15, 1979, Judge Ruiz issued an order authorizing Nancy Ogan-Gibson, one of the heirs, to
go to Vinton County, Ohio, U.S.A., to take proper action on the five parcels of land owned by the
estate and to submit a report to the probate court. To provide money for the purpose, the court
ordered the executrix to release to Nancy Ogan-Gibson the sum of $1,000.00 from the estate fund,
the same to be liquidated with supporting receipts upon her submission of her report on or before
September 30, 1979. The executrix assailed the order before the Court of Appeals in a petition for
prohibition and certiorari, docketed therein as CA-G. R. No. SP-10326. Dismissing the petition on
January 13, 1981 for lack of merit, the Court of Appeals said:

"Indeed it is surprising why petitioner as executrix should oppose such an order of the court
which is and would be for the benefit of the estate and the heirs. All the other heirs completely
agreed with what the trial court did. xxx

"Thus, rather than accuse respondent judge of grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
questioned orders he should be complimented in finding ways and means of promptly and
 expeditiously determining the assets of the estate to be ultimately distributed among the
heirs."

On May 12, 1981, Judge Ruiz cited the executrix for contempt of court for her failure to obey the
orders of October 22, 1977, December 8, 1977, February 6, 1978 and October 16, 1979 and directed
her to report to the court which securities were and were not in her possession and to give the reason
therefor.

On February 11, 1982, the executrix and Atty. Occeña were held in contempt of court and fined
P250.00 each for disobeying the court order of August 15, 1979 requiring the executrix to release
$1,000.00 to Nancy Ogan-Gibson. Both were given the chance to explain their failure to comply with
the order, but they did not submit any explanation. On January 13, 1981, this order was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. SP-10326. It bears emphasis that this incident delayed the
proceedings for four (4) years.

On October 16, 1979, the probate court issued an order requiring the executrix to distribute
immediately among the heirs all the shares of stocks of the estate in the Batangas-Laguna
Transportation Co., the Masonic Hall, Inc. and the Motor Service Co.; to report her compliance within
10 days from notice; and within the same period, to file a written report to the court stating (a) what
other certificates of stocks belonging to the estate are in her possession; and (b) which certificates of
stocks are not with her, giving the reasons therefor. Again, the executrix and her husband, Atty.
Occeña, did not comply with the said order. The probate court thus ordered her to explain why she
should not be punished for contempt of court. After several postponements at her instance and that of
her husband, the incident was set for hearing on April 20, 1981. But neither of them appeared, thus
delaying the proceedings for about a year and a half. Finding the executrix unfaithful in the
performance of her duties, the probate court, on May 12, 1981, adjudged her in contempt of court.

Forthwith, Atty. Occeña and his wife, filed with the then CFI of Davao City, Civil Case No. 14456 for
damages (P200,000.00 as moral damages and expenses of litigation) against Judge Ruiz. But, on
October 13, 1981, the court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.

After the dismissal of Civil Case No. 14456, Atty. Occeña filed with the Tanodbayan a letter-complaint
against Judge Ruiz, charging him with knowingly rendering unjust interlocutory orders, in that without
prior notice and hearing, he punished the executrix for indirect contempt of court and censured her for
non-compliance with the probate court's order of October 16, 1979. For lack of merit, Atty. Occeña's
complaint was dismissed by then Tanodbayan Bernardo P. Fernandez in a Resolution dated November
19, 1984.

On November 13, 1979, Atty. Occeña filed with this Court Administrative Case No. 2345-CFI against
Judge Ruiz for gross inefficiency and dishonesty. In a Resolution dated October 11, 1982, this Court
dismissed the complaint for failure of Atty. Occeña to substantiate his charges during the
investigation.

Unhappy with what Judge Ruiz stated in his comment on the said administrative complaint, Atty.
Occeña and his wife filed with the CFI of Davao City Civil Case NO. 14957 for damages against the
former. The couple alleged that they suffered damages upon reading the judge's comment filed with
the Supreme Court. On June 11, 1982, the CFI dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action, the
comment being an absolutely privileged communication.

By filing the said civil actions, criminal charge, and administrative complaints, found to be groundless,
Atty. Occeña further delayed with malice the probate proceedings and inflicted hardship and pain upon
Judge Ruiz.

More telling is the fact that by deliberately delaying the proceedings, Atty. Occeña has inflicted greater
harm to the other heirs, with the executrix herself as his willing partner.
From the start of the testate proceedings in 1963, no less than 13 petitions were filed with this Court
and the Court of Appeals by Atty. Occeña, questioning the interlocutory orders of the probate court.
But most, if not all, were without merit.

Aside from Judge Ruiz, his predecessor, the late Judge Antonio Beldia, in the same probate
proceedings, was also harassed by Atty. Occeña with groundless administrative charges and suits,
both criminal and civil. These cases, while pending, were then utilized by Atty. Occeña in securing
restraining orders from the Court of Appeals or as grounds for the judge's inhibition.

Pursuant to Section 28, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court providing inter alia that the CFI may
suspend an attorney from the practice of law for cause, Judge Ruiz, on May 26, 1982, filed with the
same probate court Administrative Case No. 44 charging Atty. Occeña with gross misconduct, violation
of his oath as a lawyer and willful disobedience of lawful court orders. Instead of filing an answer, he
submitted a motion praying for the inhibition of Judge Ruiz. This motion was denied. Atty. Occeña was
then directed to file his answer within 15 days from notice which was extended to another 15 days
upon his motion. Still, he did not file an answer. What he submitted was a motion to dismiss the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction. But it was denied for lack of merit.

Administrative Case No. 44 was set for hearing on December 2 and 3, 1982, morning and afternoon.
Upon Atty. Occeña's motion, he was given an extension of 15 days from November 3, 1982 within
which to file his answer. However, he did not comply. Neither did he appear during the hearing.

Eventually, further hearing of the case was suspended when this Court issued a temporary restraining
order in G. R. No. 62453, "Samuel Occeña vs. District Judge Fernando S. Ruiz, CFI-4, Bohol" for
prohibition. However, on August 15, 1983, this Court dismissed Atty. Occeña's petition for lack of
merit. The hearing of the administrative case was set on January 30 and 31, 1984, but again, he did
not appear.

The hearing was reset but once more, Atty. Occeña failed to appear. Upon his telegraphic request, the
hearing was reset on December 13 and 14, 1984. On December 7, 1984, he filed his Answer and
Motion for Referral to the Solicitor General or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. His motion was
denied. The hearing was reset on May 8 and 9, 1985. Upon another telegraphic request of Atty.
Occeña, the hearing was postponed to August 14 and 15, 1985. Again, he did not appear. Thus, in its
order of August 15, 1985, the probate court considered his failure to appear as a waiver of his right to
present evidence.4

On November 14, 1985, based on the evidence presented ex parte, showing that Atty. Occeña has
"abused, misused and overused the judicial system,"5 Judge Ruiz rendered a decision suspending6 him
from the practice of law for three (3) years. The decision7 unfolded a long list of his administrative
offenses, thus:

Willful disobedience of lawful orders of the court; gross misconduct in office

During the probate proceedings, respondent Occeña, on behalf of his wife executrix, filed with
the Court of Appeals six (6) cases; and with the Supreme Court one (1) case, assailing the
order of the probate court directing the said executrix to provide Nancy Ogan, authorized to
determine the assets of the estate in the U.S., $1,000.00 to be taken from the estate; and the
order ordering the same executrix to report to the probate court the securities belonging to
the estate. Atty. Occeña's refusal to obey the said orders and elevating the same to the higher
courts unnecessarily delayed the probate proceedings.

II
 Wittingly or willingly promoted or sued groundless suits and gave aid or consent to
the same; delayed persons for money or malice

Respondent, together with his wife, filed against the judge of the probate court two actions for
damages which were both dismissed for lack of merit and lack of cause of action. Respondent
also filed with the Tanodbayan a letter-complaint charging the judge of the probate court with
knowingly rendering unjust interlocutory orders. The complaint was likewise dismissed for lack
of merit. Respondent also filed with this Court an administrative complaint which was again
dismissed for failure of respondent to substantiate the charge.

By filing the above-cited civil actions for damages, administrative complaint and criminal
charge which were found to be groundless and unsubstantiated, respondent unduly delayed
the settlement of the estate proceedings by harassing Judge Ruiz who had to spend time,
effort and money to defend himself against said frivolous and unmeritorious cases.

In fact, respondent's propensity to file groundless administrative charges, as well as civil and
criminal suits, harassed not only Judge Ruiz but also the previous judges who handled the
case. As a measure of self defense, these judges were compelled to prepare and file pleadings
or comments thereby using time which could have been devoted to expediting the closure of
the estate proceedings.

Finally, since the start of the testate proceedings in 1963, no less than 13 petitions were filed
with the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals questioning the interlocutory orders of the
probate court. Most, if not all of these petitions, were determined to be groundless and
without merit.

III

Disobeying the laws

Respondent violated his lawyer's oath of office by flagrantly disobeying the clear provision of
Rule 140, Section 6, Revised Rules of Court, entitled "Charges Against Judges of First
Instance," which reads as follows:

"Sec. 6. Confidential - Proceedings against judges of first instance shall be private and
confidential."

During the pendency of the administrative complaint (Adm. Matter No. 23345-CFI, Exh. "Z")
filed by respondent against Judge Ruiz in the Supreme Court, he violated the private and
confidential nature thereof three (3) times, to wit:

1. On April 1, 1980, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition and
certiorari, entitled "Estate of William C. Ogan, et al. vs. Hon. Fernando S. Ruiz, et al., CA-G.R.
No. SP-10604", questioning an interlocutory order of the probate court (No. 2, Exh. "V") to
which he attached as Annex "AW" a complete copy of his aforesaid administrative complaint
against Judge Ruiz albeit the same is completely immaterial to the issue raised in said petition.

2. In another petition for prohibition and certiorari, entitled "Estate of William C. Ogan, et al.
vs. Hon. Fernando S. Ruiz, et al., CA-G.R. No. SP-13162" (No. 4, Exh. "V"), impugning an
interlocutory order of the probate court, he attached as Annex "C" thereof a true and complete
copy of the said administrative complaint although not relevant to the question therein raised;
and

3. On March 29, 1982, when respondent filed a letter-criminal complaint with the Tanodbayan
(Exh. "Y"), he also attached as Annex "A" thereof a true and complete copy of said
administrative complaint against Judge Ruiz even if said administrative complaint is not
germane to the charge (Page 2, No. 1, Exh. "Y").

By repeatedly violating said provision of the Rules of Court, respondent, as an officer of the
court, put to naught one of the principal purposes thereof which is to protect the personal and
professional reputation of judges from the baseless charges of disgruntled, vindictive and
irresponsible clients, litigants and counsels (In re Abistado, 57 Phil. 668; Murillo vs. Superable,
Adm. Case No. 341, March 23, 1960; Moran, Rules of Court, 1963 Ed., Vol. VI, page 260).
Respondent committed gross misconduct in office and has not conducted himself as a lawyer
according to the best of his knowledge and discretion.

IV

Did falsehood and consented to the doing of same in court.

In his complaint for damages against Judge Ruiz (Civil Case No. 14456 (Exh. "W"), respondent
alleged in paragraph IV-7b thereof (Exh. "W-1") that his wife-executrix Necitas Ogan Occeña
was held in contempt and censured, "without any hearing," for not obeying the probate
court's order of October 16, 1979 (Exh. "N").

However, the records of the Ogan estate proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. 423) would show that in
the order of February 26, 1980, the probate court directed said executrix to explain within 5
days from notice why she should not be cited for contempt (Exh. "O"). In the order of April 8,
1980, the contempt charge was set for hearing on June 23, 1980, at 9:00 o'clock in the
morning (Exh. "P") but was reset to October 22, 1980 after the lifting of the restraining order
of the Court of Appeals (Exh. "Q"). This was again reset to April 20, 1981, subsequent to the
denial by the Supreme Court of the respondent's petition for review impugning the Court of
Appeals' decision. As stated in the order of May 12, 1981, page 2, paragraph 3 (Exh. "R"),
copies of the order setting the hearing of the contempt charge on said date (April 20, 1981)
were received by the respondent and his wife-executrix on March 24, 1981. On the date of the
hearing, neither the executrix nor respondent appeared. The following day (April 21, 1981),
the court received executrix's motion for postponement of the hearing, which was denied for
lack of merit. Subsequently, the order of May 12, 1981 (Exh. "R") was rendered holding the
executrix in contempt and penalized with censure.

In fine, there was hearing with notice but the executrix and her counsel did not attend.

Meanwhile, respondent once more, committed falsehood when he subsequently alleged under
oath in his letter-complaint to the Tanodbayan, dated March 29, 1982, against Judge Ruiz
(Exh. "Y") that "without prior notice and without any hearing," Judge Ruiz adjudged
executrix Necitas Ogan Occeña guilty of contempt and censuring her (page 2, paragraph 2,
Exh. "Y-2"; page 5, paragraph 9b, Exh. "Y-3").

Furthermore, in order to avoid complying with the probate court order of August 15, 1979
(Exh. "C"), directing said executrix to remit immediately the sum of $1,000.00 to her co-heir
Nancy Ogan-Gibson with which to meet whatever necessary expenses that she might incur in
inquiring into the status of the 5 parcels of land owned by the estate at Vinton County, Ohio,
U.S.A., respondent and his wife-executrix committed falsehood when they stated in their
petition filed with the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-10326 that the said order was issued
"without hearing" and thus a violation of procedural due process. The Court of Appeals, in its
decision which has become final (Exh. "E"), confirmed this falsehood when it held that the
petitioner-executrix "was not deprived of her right to be heard when the respondent
judge issued the two orders in question" (Page 6, Exh. "E").
In accordance with the provisions of Section 29, Rule 1388 and Section 9, Rule 1399 of the Revised
Rules of Court, Judge Ruiz, on November 26, 1985, transmitted to this Court a certified true copy of
the order of suspension and a full statement of facts.10

On February 11, 1986, this Court, upon Atty. Occeña's motion, restrained Judge Ruiz from enforcing
his decision of November 14, 1985. The case then has remained pending so that on May 30, 1989,
this Court issued an Order11 requiring "the parties to move in the premises, by informing the Court
about the status of the decision or order suspending Atty. Samuel C. Occeña from the practice of law,
Judge Ruiz particularly indicating if he still pursues the instant case, within ten (10) days from notice."

On June 2, 1989, Judge Ruiz filed a comment that he has been waiting for this Court's action on his
decision suspending Atty. Occeña.

On August 25, 1989, Atty. Occeña filed an Explanation and Motion praying that the case be referred to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation and recommendation. This Court denied the
motion and instead referred the case to Atty. Emilio Rebueno (now deceased), then Bar Confidant, for
evaluation, report and recommendation. After going over the records, he recommended "that the
temporary restraining order enjoining Judge Fernando S. Ruiz from enforcing the decision dated
November 14, 1985 suspending Atty. Samuel C. Occeña from the practice of law for a period of three
years be forthwith LIFTED, and that Atty. Samuel C. Occeña be DISBARRED from the practice of law
for grave violation of his oath of office as attorney; likewise, that his name be DROPPED from the roll
of attorneys."

We sustain the evaluation, report and recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant, the same
being supported by the facts on record.

Indeed, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in
his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.12 His guilt, however, cannot be
presumed.13 It must indicate the dubious character of the acts done, as well as the motivation thereof.
Furthermore, a disbarred lawyer must have been given full opportunity upon reasonable notice to
answer the charges against him, produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself and
counsel.14 All these requirements have been complied with in the case at hand.

In fact, it was Atty. Occeña who did not bother at all to appear in the hearing of the administrative
case against him which was postponed by Judge Ruiz so many times so that he could be accorded the
full measure of due process. The court a quo, therefore, appropriately proceeded to hear the case ex
parte as Atty. Occeña deliberately failed to appear and answer the accusations against him.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a member of the Bar may be
disbarred or suspended by this Court for any (1) deceit, (2) malpractice, (3) gross misconduct in
office, (4) grossly immoral conduct, (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, (6) violation of
the lawyer's oath, (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, and for (8) willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so. Not only did Atty. Occeña commit
deceit, malpractice, grossly immoral conduct and willful disobedience to a superior court. Beyond
these transgressions, he violated the lawyer's oath whereby he imposed upon himself the following
duties, thus:

"I, ________________________,of ________________________,do

- - - - - - - (place of birth)

solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support
its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not
wittingly or willing promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor
consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a
 lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to
the court as to my clients; and I impose upon myself these voluntary obligations without any
mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God."

As shown by the records, Atty. Occeña gravely violated his oath of office in his handling of Special
Proceedings No. 423. The facts of the case succinctly show that through his atrocious maneuvers, he
successfully delayed the disposition of the case for the last thirty-eight (38) years, causing untold hurt
and prejudice, not only to the heirs, but also to Judges Ruiz and Beldia who heard the case. For
respondent's part and that of his wife, such prolonged litigation obviously benefited them. As aptly
declared by the Court of Appeals, the delay "can only benefit the executor or administrator" and "the
longer the proceedings, the bigger the attorney's fees." But the more tragic reality is the fact that
Atty. Occeña has caused a mockery of the judicial proceedings and inflicted injury to the
administration of justice through his deceitful, dishonest, unlawful and grossly immoral conduct.
Indeed, he abused beyond measure his privilege to practice law.

This Court has held that a lawyer should not abuse his right of recourse to the courts for the purpose
of arguing a cause that had been repeatedly rebuffed. Neither should he use his knowledge of law as
an instrument to harass a party nor to misuse judicial processes, as the same constitutes serious
transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility. For while he owes fidelity to the cause of his
client, it should not be at the expense of truth and the administration of justice.15

The practice of law is a sacred and noble profession. It is a special privilege bestowed only upon those
who are competent intellectually, academically and morally.16 A lawyer must at all times conduct
himself, especially in his dealings with his clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in
a manner beyond reproach.17 He must faithfully perform his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts
and to his clients. A violation of the high standards of the legal profession subjects the lawyer to
administrative sanctions by this Court which includes suspension and disbarment.

Clearly, Atty. Occeña's conduct has made him unfit to remain in the legal profession even for a single
moment.

It is a time-honored rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to
the practice of law. Its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the legal
profession.18 Atty. Occeña has definitely fallen below the moral bar when he engaged in deceitful,
dishonest, unlawful and grossly immoral acts. This Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of
integrity and good moral character as part of a lawyer's equipment in the practice of his
profession,19because it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants for the profession is inexorably
diminished whenever a member of the Bar betrays their trust and confidence.20

Thus, for his serious administrative offenses, punishable under Section 27 of Rule 138, Atty. Occeña
deserves the ultimate penalty, that of expulsion from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers.

WHEREFORE, ATTY. SAMUEL C. OCCEÑA is DISBARRED from the practice of law. His name
is STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all
courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing*, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, and Corona, JJ., concur.
 G.R. No. 151081. September 11, 2003]

TOP RATE CONSTRUCTION & GENERAL SERVICES, INC.,, Petitioner, v. PAXTON

DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND BAIKAL REALTY CORPORATION, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

Forum shopping is committed by a party who institutes two or more suits in different courts, either
simultaneously or successively, in order to ask the courts to rule on the same or related causes or to
grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, on the supposition that one or the other court would
make a favorable disposition or increase a partys chances of obtaining a favorable decision or
action.1 It is an act of malpractice for it trifles with the courts, abuses their processes, degrades the
administration of justice and adds to the already congested court dockets.[2 What is critical is the
vexation brought upon the courts and the litigants by a party who asks different courts to rule on the
same or related causes and grant the same or substantially the same reliefs and in the process
creates the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same
issues, regardless of whether the court in which one of the suits was brought has no jurisdiction over
the action.[3

In the instant case, we probe what is perceived to be a blatant demonstration of forum shopping,
outrageous abuse of judicial process and gross disrespect for the authority of this Court.

For a flashback on the factual backdrop of this case: Five (5) civil actions involving the ownership of
Lots Nos. 5763 and 5765 -New situated in Salawag, Dasmarias, Cavite, were jointly tried by RTC-Br.
21, Imus, Cavite.[4 One of the complaints was filed by respondent Paxton Development Corporation
against petitioner Top Rate Construction and General Services, Inc., and against respondent Baikal
Realty Corporation and the Register of Deeds of Cavite, for declaration of nullity of the Torrens Title
for Lots Nos. 5763-A and 5763-B as part and parcel of Lot No. 5763, docketed as Civil Case No. 1124-
95, with prayer for damages. TOP RATE was represented in this civil case by the Gana Law Office
through Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and/or Elmer E. Manlangit.

On 13 March 1998 the trial court rendered a Joint Decision on the five (5) civil actions, which included
Civil Case No. 1124-95 -

x x x declaring Paxton Development Corporations TCT No. T-557274 which covers and describes Lot
No. 5763 (5763-A and 5763-B) and TCT No. T-559147 which covers and describes Lot No. 5765-New
as the lawful and valid certificates of title evidencing the lawful ownership of Paxton Development
Corporation over said lots and improvements thereon x x x x declaring Top Rate Construction and
General Services, Inc.s TCT No. T-147755 for Lot 5763-A and TCT No. T-147756 for Lot 5763-B as
null and void and of no force and effect x x x x directing Top Rate x x x to peacefully surrender
possession of these lots to Paxton, in the event that they are in possession of said lots x x x x
directing the Register of Deeds for the province of Cavite to cancel the aforementioned titles of Top
Rate x x x x[5

TOP RATE and the other parties in the five (5) civil cases, Baikal Realty Corporation and Hi-Tone
Marketing Corporation, filed their respective notices of appeal from the Joint Decision,6 docketed as
CA-G.R. No. CV-60656. TOP RATE was represented in the appeal by the Gana Law Office through
Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and/or Elmer E. Manlangit.

On 21 May 2001 the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision on the various appeals affirming in
toto the Joint Decisionof the trial court.7
On 28 June 2001 TOP RATE moved for reconsideration of the CA Decision where it was represented by
the Gana Law Office through Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer E. Manlangit.[8 In due
time, the other party-appellants followed suit.[9 Despite notice PAXTON did not file
its Comment,10 while Baikal as one of the appellants moved on 27 November 2001 for the early
resolution of the pending motions for reconsideration.[11

On 14 December 2001 the appellate court promulgated a Resolution denying all motions for
reconsideration.12

On 26 December 2001 TOP RATE through a Manifestation informed the Court of Appeals that it filed
on 21 December 2001 by registered mail a Manifestation and Motion of even date which was attached
as annex thereof.13 The Manifestation and Motion prayed -

x x x x 2. That due to compelling reasons, the Resolution dated December 14, 2001 be RECALLED and
SET ASIDE x x x x 4. That thereafter, this Honorable Court squarely resolve on the merits the issues
raised by Toprate, Baikal and Hi-Tone in their separate Motions for Reconsideration; and 5. That the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by Toprate and the reliefs prayed for therein be granted.

The Manifestation and Motion was signed and filed in behalf of TOP RATE by the same counsel of
record Gana & Manlangit Law Office through lawyers Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer E.
Manlangit.14 Incidentally, on 14 January 2002 the Court of Appeals received the Manifestation and
Motion from the postal service.15

On 7 January 2002, despite the Manifestation and Motion of 21 December 2001 pending with the
Court of Appeals, TOP RATE filed with this Court a motion for extension of time to file a petition for
review from the adverse CA Decision andResolution. The motion was signed by TOP RATEs counsel of
record Gana & Manlangit Law Office through Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer E.
Manlangit.16 Furthermore, the motion contained a Verification/Certification under oath executed by
one Alfredo S. Hocson, President of TOP RATE, that -

x x x x I have not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different Divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; to
the best of my knowledge no such action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if I should thereafter learn that
a similar action or proceeding has been filed or pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, I undertake to report this fact
to this Honorable Court within five days from notice thereof.

It may be observed that the Verification/Certification did not mention the pending Manifestation and
Motion dated 21 December 2001 filed with the Court of Appeals.

Earlier, the other appellants BAIKAL and Hi-Tone filed before this Court their respective motions for
extension of time to file a petition for review of the adverse CA Decision and Resolution.[17

On 30 January 2002 this Court denied TOP RATEs motion for extension of time to file petition for
review for lack of service of a copy of the motion on the Court of Appeals x x x.[18 Also in
separate Resolutions of even date, this Court denied the motions for extension of time to file petition
for review separately filed by BAIKAL and Hi-Tone on the identical ground - for lack of showing that
petitioner has not lost the fifteen (15) - day reglementary period to appeal x x x it appearing that the
date of filing of the motion for reconsideration of the assailed judgment is not stated in the motion.[19

On 4 February 2002, regardless of the denial of its motion for extension of time to file petition for
review, and theManifestation and Motion of 21 December 2001 still to be resolved by the Court of
Appeals, TOP RATE filed with this Court its Petition for Review assailing the CA Decision of 21 May
2001 and Resolution of 14 December 2001, and praying that
 x x x the Decision dated May 21, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 60656 be set aside
and a new one issued x x x confirming TOP RATEs lawful ownership of Lots 5763-A and 5763-B, Imus
Estate, as well as the validity and authenticity of its TCT Nos. T-147755 (Lot 5763-A) & T-147756 (Lot
5763-B), both issued by the Cavite Register of Deeds x x x x Declaring as absolutely null and void and
no force and effect Paxtons TCT No. 557274 (Lot 5763), Serapio Cuencas 1995 TCT 541994 (Lot
5763), and Baikals TCT 542566 (Lot 5763-B) x x x x Awarding TOP RATE the damages as prayed for
in the Answer.20

The Petition for Review dated 4 February 2002 was signed by the same law office of Gana &
Manlangit through Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer E. Manlangit.21 The petition included a
Secretarys Certificate executed by TOP RATE Corporate Secretary Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana stating thus -

RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, that the Corporation elevate to the Supreme Court the adverse
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 60656 entitled Paxton Development Corporation
v. Top Rate Const. & General Services, Inc., et al., and Hi-Tone Marketing Corp. v. The Estate and/or
Heirs of Serapio Cuenca, et al. and that its President, Arch. Alfredo S. Hocson be authorized to
represent the Corporation and sign the Petition for Review on Certiorari and all the pleadings to be
filed therein.22

The petition also contained a Verification/Certification signed under oath by TOP RATE President
Alfredo S. Hocson declaring in relevant parts

x x x x I have not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different Divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; to
the best of my knowledge no such action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if I should thereafter learn that
a similar action or proceeding has been filed or pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, I undertake to report this fact
to this Honorable Court within five days from notice thereof.23

For the second time, TOP RATEs Verification/Certification did not state that its Manifestation and
Motion dated 21 December 2001 was then still pending with the Court of Appeals.

On 18 February 2002 Baikal filed with this Court a Manifestation and Motion alleging that it opts to
wait for whatever decision the x x x Court of Appeals may render in the x x x Manifestation and Motion
filed [with the Court of Appeals] by Top Rate Construction and General Services, without prejudice,
however, to such remedies as may be available to [Baikal Realty Corporation] in case of an adverse
decision of the Court of Appeals.

On 6 March 2002 this Court resolved to deny TOP RATEs Petition for Review for petitioners failure to
take the appeal within the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days in accordance with Section 2, Rule
45 in relation to Section 5 (a), Rule 56, in view of the denial of petitioners motion for extension of
time to file petition in the resolution of 30 January 2002.[24

On 15 March 2002 TOP RATE moved for reconsideration of this Courts Resolution of 30 January 2002
by granting Top Rates timely filed motion for extension of time, and requiring the respondent PAXTON
to comment on the timely filed Petition for Review on Certiorari.[25 The motion, which was signed
again by the same Gana and Manlangit Law Office through Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and
Elmer E. Manlangit, did not mention the Manifestation and Motion of 21 December 2001 awaiting
decision in the Court of Appeals.26

Surprisingly, on 3 April 2002, TOP RATE filed a Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Petition for
Review on Certioraridated 2 April 2002 contending that the filing of its petition before this Court was
premature. For the first time, TOP RATE bared to this Court the existence of its Manifestation and
Motion dated 21 December 2001 pending in the Court of Appeals which had allegedly superseded
its Petition for Review filed with this Court as the Manifestation and Motion was taken up by a Division
of Five of the Court of Appeals composed of Associate Justices Portia Alio-Hormachuelos, Mercedes
Gozo-Dadole, Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr., with Associate Justices Teodoro P. Regino and Mariano C. del
Castillo as additional members.[27 TheManifestation and Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review on
Certiorari prayed for the withdrawal of TOP RATEs petition for review without prejudice to its refiling in
the future if warranted.

On 24 April 2002 this Court denied with finality TOP RATEs motion for reconsideration of
the Resolution dated 30 January 2002, and noted without action its Manifestation and Motion to
Withdraw Petition dated 2 April 2002. It also appears that the denial of the motions for extension of
time to file petition for review separately filed by Baikal and Hi-Tone had become final and
executory.28

Meanwhile, on 22 April 2002 the Division of Five of the Court of Appeals resolved to defer action on
the Manifestation and Motion dated 21 December 2001 until after the Supreme Court has acted on
[Top Rates] Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review on Certiorari.29

On 31 May 2002, apparently in response to the above-mentioned Resolution of the Court of Appeals,
TOP RATE filed with the appellate court a Manifestation informing the Division of Five that it may now
proceed to resolve TOP RATEsManifestation and Motion dated 21 December 2001 in light of
the Resolution of the Supreme Court dated 24 April 2002 which noted without action its Manifestation
and Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review on Certiorari of 2 April 2002.30The Manifestation was
signed by TOP RATEs lawyer of record Gana & Manlangit Law Office through the same lawyers
Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer E. Manlangit.31

On 3 May 2002 this Court made an entry of judgment for its Resolution of 6 March 2002 denying TOP
RATEs Petition for Review on Certiorari.32

On 2 August 2002, notwithstanding the previous denial with finality of TOP RATEs motion for
extension of time to file petition for review and its Petition for Review itself, the Division of Five of the
Court of Appeals promulgated an Amended Decision granting the appeal of TOP RATE and modifying
the Joint Decision of RTC-Br. 21 of Imus, Cavite, thus -

(1) TOPRATE is hereby declared to be the true and lawful owners (sic) of Lots 5763-A and 5763-B,
and the Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 147755 for Lot No. 5763-A, and 147756 for Lot No. 5763-B,
issued in the name of defendantappellant TOPRATE, are hereby proclaimed to be valid and lawfully
issued by the Register of Deeds of Cavite; and (2) The Cavite Register of Deeds is
hereby ORDERED to cancel PAXTONs Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-557274 for Lot 5763 of the
Imus Estate, and any and all titles issued covering the subject properties, for being spurious and
void, and of no force and effect (underscoring and emphasis in the original).33

Associate Justice Portia Alio-Hormachuelos penned a Dissenting Opinion averring that

the Manifestation and Motion dated 21 December 2001 of TOP RATE should have been dismissed since
it was a prohibited second motion for reconsideration under Sec. 2, Rule 52, of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.[34

On 23 August 2002 PAXTON filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Amended Decision.[35 This was
followed on 13 September 2002 by a Partial Motion for Reconsideration filed by BAIKAL.[36

On 22 October 2002 the Court of Appeals received a Letter of Transmittal from the Judicial Records
Office of this Court directing the Clerk of Court of the appellate court to return the records of [the
instant case] to the x x x court of origin and to submit to this Court proof of such remand, both within
five (5) days from notice hereof.[37

On 8 November 2002 TOP RATE filed with this Court an Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of
Judgment through the same Gana & Manlangit Law Office as represented by Attys. Luis Ma. Gil
L. Gana and Elmer E. Manlangit.38
On 9 December 2002 this Court denied TOP RATEs Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment and
required TOP RATE and its counsel to show cause why they should not be held liable for forum
shopping within five (5) days from notice.39

On 27 January 2003 TOP RATE represented by its President Alfredo S. Hocson and its lawyer Gana &
Manlangit Law Office through Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer E. Manlangit filed
their Compliance asserting that they had no intention to commit the abhorrent and detestable practice
of forum shopping; assuming that there was forum shopping, they did so neither willfully nor
deliberately but solely to protect the interest of TOP RATE as shown by the filing of theManifestation
and Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 2 April 2002 as soon it was certain that
theirPetition for Review on Certiorari was premature; the Manifestation and Motion dated 21
December 2001 filed with the Court of Appeals could have been denied as a prohibited second motion
for reconsideration, and with such denial TOP RATE would have also lost its period to file an appeal
by certiorari to this Court; and, finally, neither litis pendentia nor res judicatawould have arisen in the
instant case since the Supreme Court may still review the pertinent decision or resolution of the Court
of Appeals on their Manifestation and Motion dated 21 December 2001.[40

On 4 February 2003 TOP RATE filed a Motion for Reconsideration of our Resolution dated 9 December
2002, praying that its motion to recall entry of judgment be granted.

In the meantime, on 27 March 2003, the Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution directing its Clerk
of Court to return the records of this case to the court of origin, without however making any ruling on
what the court of origin would be executing as the final and executory decision, nor any statement on
the status of PAXTONs Motion for Reconsideration of the Amended Decision.41 This Resolution seems
to be a belated response to the Letter of Transmittal coming from the Judicial Records Office of this
Court directing the Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals to return the records of the instant case to
the trial court.

On 3 April 2003 PAXTON filed a Manifestation informing this Court of the 27 March 2003 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals purportedly setting aside its Amended Decision of 2 August 2002, although
nothing in that Resolution validated PAXTONs submission.

On 6 May 2003 PAXTON filed another Manifestation with this Court alleging that TOP RATE moved for
the issuance of a writ of execution with RTC-Br. 21 of Imus, Cavite, which was signed this time by a
certain Atty. Carmelo M. Mendoza in behalf of TOP RATE.

On 16 June 2003 this Court issued a Resolution denying with finality TOP RATEs motion for
reconsideration of theResolution of 9 December 2002 which in turn denied petitioners urgent motion
to recall entry of judgment, and further requiring TOP RATE to comment on the twin Manifestations of
PAXTON.

In its Comment dated 18 July 2003, TOP RATE asserted that nowhere was it stated in the 27 March
2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals that the appellate court was invalidating its Amended
Decision of 2 August 2002, and that since the filing of its Petition for Review with this Court was
premature, the subsequent dismissal thereof did not set aside the Amended Decision, which allegedly
stands as the decision to be executed by the trial court.

The issues to be resolved herein are: (a) whether Top Rate Construction and General Services, Inc.,
and its counsel Gana & Manlangit Law Office through Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer E.
Manlangit are guilty of forum shopping, and whether such transgression is willful and deliberate; (b)
whether Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer E. Manlangit are administratively liable for
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and, (c) whether the Amended Decision of 2
August 2002 may be reversed and set aside in the instant proceedings for being void on its face.

We have no doubt that Top Rate Construction and General Services, Inc. and its lawyer Gana &
Manlangit Law Office through Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer E. Manlangit are guilty of
forum shopping. Although TOP RATE as principal party executed the several certifications of non-
forum shopping, Attys. Gana and Manlangit cannot deny responsibility therefor since Atty.
Manlangit notarized the certifications and both of them definitely knew the relevant case status after
having invariably acted as counsel of TOP RATE before the trial court, the Court of Appeals and this
Court.

Clearly, in seeking to reverse the 13 March 1998 Joint Decision of the trial court and the 21 May
2001 Decision of the appellate court and to perfect ownership of Lots 5763-A and 5763-B upon similar
causes and the same reliefs, TOP RATE and its lawyers committed forum shopping when they resorted
simultaneously to both this Court by means of their Petition for Review on Certiorari and the Court of
Appeals through their Manifestation and Motion dated 21 December 2001. This misdeed amounts to a
wagering on the result of their twin devious strategies, and shows not only their lack of faith in this
Court in its evenhanded administration of law but also their expression of disrespect if not ridicule for
our judicial process and orderly procedure.

Furthermore, while TOP RATE and its counsel moved to withdraw their Petition for Review for
whatever such maneuver was worth, they did so only after they had been rebuffed in this Court. In
doing so, they themselves proved that their coordinated actions were carried out purposely to increase
their chances of securing a favorable decision. As has been held, a party is said to have sought to
improve his odds of obtaining a sympathetic decision or action where after an unfavorable decision
has been rendered against him in any of the cases he has brought before the courts, he seeks to
abandon the adverse proceeding and concentrate his attention on the remaining case.42

The instant case is similar to E. Razon, Inc. v. Philippine Ports Authority.43 In E. Razon,
Inc., petitioners after filing a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order in the Supreme Court filed an hour later a similar petition before the Regional Trial
Court and, having been assured of a favorable action by the latter court, then sought the withdrawal
of the petition in this Court. Petitioners were found guilty of forum-shopping, the Court holding that
(t)he acts of petitioners constitute a clear case of forum-shopping, an act of malpractice that is
proscribed and condemned as trifling with the courts and abusing their processes.44

What aggravates the transgression perpetrated by TOP RATE and its lawyers is that they deceived the
highest court of the land. In all the certificates of non-forum shopping they presented to this Court,
they did not reveal the existence of theirManifestation and Motion dated 21 December 2001 which
they claimed was still pending before the Court of Appeals. They divulged this secret only after their
motion for extension of time to file a petition for review and their Petition for Review on
Certiorari were denied by this Court, and only after they had filed their motion for reconsideration of
such denials.

If TOP RATE and its counsel genuinely believed that their recourse to this Court was premature, why
then did they still ask for a reconsideration of the Resolutions denying their motion for extension
and Petition for Review? Evidently they were venturing on two (2) fronts, and presumably simply
awaiting auspicious word or two on their Manifestation and Motion of 21 December 2001 before finally
disclosing their real intent.

Worse, in their attempt to extricate themselves from the prejudicial Resolutions of this Court, TOP
RATE and its counsel had the temerity to ask for the withdrawal of their Petition for Review, again on
the insolent assertion that their resort to this Court was premature. For the record, it took them four
(4) months from 21 December 2001 when they filed theirManifestation and Motion up to 3 April 2002
when they submitted their Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review on Certiorari, to
concoct the theory of prematurity!

To be sure, there is no merit in the claim that the Petition for Review initiated by TOP RATE and its
lawyers was premature. TOP RATE and its lawyers are estopped from claiming that this initiatory
pleading was premature for it was their unwavering representation before this Court that the Court of
Appeals had already rendered a final and appealable decision when they filed their motion for
extension of time and ultimately their Petition for Review. The filing of such petition presupposes the
finality of the judgment subject of appeal.

In any event, Sec. 15 of the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (which is a restatement of
Sec. 8, Rule 9, of the old Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals) explicitly provides that (n)o
motion for reconsideration or rehearing shall be acted upon if the movant has previously filed in the
Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari or a motion for extension of time to file such petition.
If such petition or motion is subsequently filed, the motion for reconsideration pending in this Court
shall be deemed abandoned. Verily, although a motion for reconsideration is still before the Court of
Appeals, the motion is deemed vacated once the jurisdiction of this Court is invoked.

The lawyers of TOP RATE are not excused from engaging in forum shopping for the reason that their
clients interests were then paramount. On the contrary, this assertion coming as it does from
their Compliance of 25 January 2003 in reply to our show cause order, very well confirms the identical
causes and their reliefs of their Petition for Review on Certiorari andManifestation and Motion dated 21
December 2001 as both were calculated to quash the adverse decisions of the Court of Appeals.

It bears stressing that a lawyer truly worth his oath pledges allegiance not only to his clients but also
to society, the legal profession and the courts, for the clients cause is not all encompassing nor
perpetually overriding. Moreover, if their purpose in filing the Petition for Review even while
the Manifestation and Motion was pending with the Court of Appeals is to protect some entitlements of
TOP RATE, are they implying that the Supreme Court is incapable of defending such asserted right?
But the court a quo can? We certainly cannot unfold our compassionate mantle in this instance, and
instead, we must lay our disciplinary hand to strike down the reprehensible ploy employed by TOP
RATE and Attys. Gana and Manlangit.

TOP RATE and its lawyers cannot rectify their forum shopping by arguing that litis pendentia and res
judicata would not have arisen in the instant case since the Supreme Court may still review the
pertinent decision or resolution of the Court of Appeals on their Manifestation and Motion dated 21
December 2001.

This argument is patently misplaced. For precisely, the concurrent pleadings of TOP RATE and its
lawyers exhibit the element of litis pendentia and res judicata alleged by them to be absent, i.e., the
result of the first action is determinative of the second action in any event and regardless of which
party is successful, since the action of this Court on the Petition for Review will surely bind the other
pending action on the same cause in the court a quo. Moreover, how can this Court still resolve on
appeal such subsequent decision when it has already decided with finality the same cause upon which
the later decision was supposedly based? The purported review by this Court of the ensuing decision
would have been barred by res judicata. Incidentally, in Crisostomo v. Securities and Exchange
Commission45 where forum shopping was detected, the infringing cases were filed with the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court.

We also rule that the forum shopping pulled off by TOP RATE and its lawyers is willful and deliberate.
As reflected in the Secretarys Certificate authorizing the President of TOP RATE to file the necessary
pleadings in court to question the adverse decisions of the Court of Appeals, Atty. Luis Ma. Gil L.
Gana as TOP RATE Corporate Secretary attested to the collective desire to file the Petition for
Review even while the Manifestation and Motion of 21 December 2001 was still pending with the Court
of Appeals.

In addition, the Manifestation and Motion filed with the Court of Appeals which prayed for the same
reliefs as the Petition for Review before this Court was deemed filed as early as 21 December 2001,
yet its existence was disclosed to this Court only on 3 April 2002 when TOP RATE and its lawyers
submitted their Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review on Certiorari. What is more,
this underhanded sense of honesty was triggered only after the adverse Resolutions of this Court were
promulgated. Prior to this confession, TOP RATE as abetted by its lawyers executed certificates of non-
forum shopping in its motion for extension of time to file petition for review and its Petition for
Review itself, which contained no reference to the filing or pendency of the Manifestation and
Motion filed with the Court of Appeals. In fact, even as TOP RATE moved to reconsider the denial of its
motion for time and Petition for Review, there was no mention whatsoever of its existence.

We also keenly observe how Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer E. Manlangit instigated the
Court of Appeals to rule on their Manifestation and Motion of 21 December 2001, thereby consummate
and realize the fruits of their forum shopping, when they nonchalantly alleged in one of
their Manifestations before the Court of Appeals that the appellate court may already proceed to
resolve TOP RATEs Manifestation and Motion despite their knowledge that their Petition for Reviewhad
been denied with finality and that their motion to withdraw such petition was not granted.

Obviously, under the foregoing state of facts, forum shopping was crafted willfully and deliberately
with the sole objective of endorsing whichever proceeding would yield favorable consequences to TOP
RATEs interests.

On the second issue, we hold that Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer E. Manlangit of the
Gana and Manlangit Law Office, counsel of record of TOP RATE, are administratively liable for
grotesque violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In arriving at this conclusion, we
strongly note how Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer E. Manlangitprompted the Court of
Appeals to rule on their Manifestation and Motion of 21 December 2001 and thereby complete the
process of forum shopping, despite their knowledge that their Petition for Review had been denied
with finality and that their motion to withdraw such petition was not granted.

Under Sec. 5, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, willful and deliberate forum shopping
constitutes direct contempt of court and a cause for administrative sanctions, which may both be
resolved and imposed in the same case where the forum shopping is found.46

The lawyers of record of TOP RATE, as all other lawyers, should be reminded that their primary duty is
to assist the courts in the administration of justice. Any conduct which tends to delay, impede or
obstruct the administration thereof contravenes their oath of office.

A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, promote respect for law and legal
processes;47 shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening the
confidence in the legal system;[48 shall observe the rules of procedure and not misuse them to defeat
the ends of justice;49 shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause;50 shall impress upon
his client compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness;51 shall represent his client with zeal
within the bounds of the law;52 and, shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful
objectives of his client x x x x[53

This Court has time and again warned counsel of litigants not to abuse court processes, especially not
to resort to forum shopping for this practice clogs the court dockets. Regrettably, TOP RATEs counsel
of record failed to internalize and observe with due regard the honorable tenets of the legal profession
and the noble mission of our courts of justice.

In previous cases[54 the penalties imposed upon erring lawyers who engaged in forum shopping
ranged from severe censure to suspension from the practice of law. In the instant case, the
suspension of Attys. Gana and Manlangit from the practice of law for six (6) months from finality of
this Resolution should make them realize the seriousness of the consequences and implications of
their abuse of judicial process and disrespect for judicial authority.

Finally, on the third issue, this Court has no choice but to reverse and set aside the Amended
Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 2 August 2002 for being void on its face. To be sure,
the instant proceeding is a collateral attack on such decision since the issue of its validity is involved in
this action only as a mere incident.55 Of course, this attack is proper only when the assailed judgment
is null on its face, as where it is patent that the court which rendered the judgment in question has no
jurisdiction.[56 Parenthetically, forum shopping is consummated although the court in which one of
the suits was brought has no jurisdiction over the action.57
In Macabingkil v. Peoples Homesite and Development Corporation[58 we held that a collateral attack
is proper against a challenged judgment which is void upon its face or where the nullity of the
judgment is apparent by virtue of its own recitals. The nullity must be shown from the averments of
the questioned decision or the documents in the record itself, and not upon mere errors of judgment
but on the ground that the court had no power or authority to grant the relief or no jurisdiction over
the subject matter or the parties or both.[59 A proceeding for contempt of court is an appropriate
collateral vehicle for declaring a judgment void, provided that the aforementioned requisites for such
action are present.[60

When the Division of Five of the Court of Appeals promulgated the Amended Decision of 2 August
2002, TOP RATE had already filed with this Court its motion for extension of time to file petition for
review and thereafter its Petition for Review. What is worse, even before the Amended Decision was
handed down, this Court had already denied TOP RATEs motion for extension of time to file petition for
review for lack of service of a copy of the motion on the Court of Appeals x x x x; thereafter denied
its Petition for Review for petitioners failure to take the appeal within the reglementary period of
fifteen (15) days in accordance with Section 2, Rule 45 in relation to Section 5 (a), Rule 56, in view of
the denial of petitioners motion for extension of time to file petition in the resolution of 30 January
2002; and, denied with finality TOP RATEs motion for reconsideration of the adverse Resolutions, as
well as noted without action its Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Petition dated 2 April 2002.

Under the foregoing circumstances, the Court of Appeals has lost jurisdiction to rule on
the Manifestation and Motion of 21 December 2001. As earlier mentioned, Sec. 15 of the 2002
Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals bluntly affirms that no motion for reconsideration or rehearing
shall be acted upon if the movant has previously filed in the Supreme Court a petition for review on
certiorari or a motion for extension of time to file such petition. If such petition or motion is
subsequently filed, the motion for reconsideration pending in this Court shall be deemed abandoned.
As the jurisdiction of this Court had been summoned, it was too late in the day for the appellate court
to act upon the Manifestation and Motionand enter a new decision on the merits.

Our ruling in Joy Mart Consolidated Corp. v. Court of Appeals[61 is instructive. In that case, the trial
court granted plaintiff a writ of preliminary injunction against defendants, which the latter challenged
before the Court of Appeals on petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the immediate
lifting thereof. While the certiorari petition to review the writ was still pending in the appellate court,
defendants filed in the trial court a joint petition to dissolve the writ, offering to post a counterbond for
that purpose. As prayed for, the trial court dissolved the writ and denied plaintiffs motion for
reconsideration. Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals upon being apprised of the trial courts action
dismissed the petition for certiorari for having become moot and academic.

The issue in Joy Mart Consolidated Corp. was whether the trial court continued to have control of the
writ of preliminary injunction even after the same had been raised to the Court of Appeals for review.
This Court ineluctably ruled

The answer is no. After the LRTA and Phoenix had elevated the writ of preliminary injunction to the
Court of Appeals for determination of the propriety of its issuance x x x the trial court
(notwithstanding the absence of a temporary restraining order from the appellate court) could not
interfere with or preempt the action or decision of the Court of Appeals on the writ x x x whose
annulment was sought therein by Phoenix and the LRTA. In petitioning the trial court to lift the writ x
x x Phoenix and the LRTA engaged in forum-shopping. After the question of whether the writ x x x
should be annulled or continued had been elevated to the Court of Appeals for determination, the trial
court lost jurisdiction or authority to act on the same matter x x x x They improperly tried to moot
their own petition in the Court of Appeals - a clear case of trifling with the proceedings in the appellate
court or of disrespect for said court x x x x Judicial courtesy behooved the trial court to keep its hands
off the writ x x x and defer to the better judgment of the Court of Appeals the determination of
whether the writ should be continued or discontinued x x x x The private respondents application to
the trial court for the dissolution of the writ x x x that was pending review in the Court of Appeals was
a form of forum shopping which this Court views with extreme disapproval. The lower courts
proceeding being void for lack of jurisdiction, the writ of preliminary injunction should be reinstated,
and the petition to annul the writ x x x should be dismissed on the ground of forum shopping x x x x62

The absence of jurisdiction on the part of the court a quo is manifest not only from the
voluminous rollo compiled by the Court of Appeals but also from the four corners of the Amended
Decision. From the case record, we will find copies of TOP RATEs motion for extension of time to file
petition for review, its Petition for Review, the adverse Resolutions of this Court denying the motion
for extension of time to file petition for review and the Petition for Review itself. The case record also
informs us of the denial with finality of TOP RATEs motion for reconsideration of the
unfavorable Resolutions of this Court as well as the noting without action of its Manifestation and
Motion to Withdraw Petition dated 2 April 2002. From these circumstances alone, we can clearly infer
lack of jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to promulgate the Amended Decision.

Moreover, in the 22 April 2002 Resolution of the Division of Five, action on the Manifestation and
Motion dated 21 December 2001 was deferred until after the Supreme Court has acted on [Top Rates]
Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review on Certiorari.63 This implies that the
appellate court was well-aware that TOP RATE had summoned the authority of this Court. Finally, in
the Dissenting Opinion which forms an integral part of the Amended Decision, there are unmistakable
references to the Petition for Review which was filed with this Court while the Manifestation and
Motion was still pending in the Court of Appeals

On April 24, 2002 this Court deferred action on appellant TOP RATEs Manifestation and Motion dated
December 21, 2001 x x x due to the pendency in the Supreme Court of TOP RATEs Motion to
Withdraw the Petition for Review on Certiorari it earlier filed therein x x x x On June 7, 2002 this
Division received a copy of the Supreme Courts Resolution dismissing with finality TOP RATEs Motion
for Reconsideration of its Resolution dismissing TOP RATEs Petition for Review x x x x

Undoubtedly, we can nullify the Amended Decision in the instant case since the dearth of jurisdiction
of the Court of Appeals to rule upon the Manifestation and Motion can be plainly discerned not only
from the case record but also from the text of the assailed decision itself.

WHEREFORE, we Resolve to (a) REVERSEand SETASIDE the Amended Decision of 2 August 2002 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV-60656 and REINSTATE its Decision of 21 May 2001
(affirming in toto the Joint Decision of 13 March 1998 of the RTC-Br. 21, Imus, Cavite); (b)
DECLARE Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer E. Manlangit of the Gana and Manlangit Law
Office as well as its client Top Rate Construction and General Services, Inc., in CONTEMPT of this
Court and DIRECT Atty. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana, Atty. Elmer E. Manlangit and Top Rate Construction
and General Services, Inc., to each pay a fine of P10,000.00 within five (5) days from finality of
this Resolution; and, (c) SUSPENDfrom the practice of law Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer E.
Manlangit for six (6) months effective from finality of this Resolution, with warning that any future
violation of their duties as lawyers will be dealt with more severely.

Top Rate Construction and General Services, Inc. shall PAY double costs in this instance.

Let copies of this Resolution be attached to the Bar records of Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and
Elmer E. Manlangit, and served upon the Court of Appeals, the RTC-Br. 21, Imus, Cavite, the Office
of the Bar Confidant of this Court, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, for proper dissemination
among its chapters all over the country, and for whatever appropriate action they may deem proper to
take under the premises.

SO ORDERED.

Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur

 [A.C. No. 4256. February 13, 2004

JOVITA BUSTAMANTE-ALEJANDRO, complainant, v. ATTYS. WARFREDO TOMAS ALEJANDRO

and MARICRIS A. VILLARIN, Respondents.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This is an administrative case filed in 1994 by Jovita Bustamante-Alejandro charging

respondents Atty. Warfredo Tomas Alejandro and Atty. Maricris A. Villarin with bigamy and
concubinage.

Complainant alleged that respondent, Atty. Warfredo Tomas Alejandro, is her husband; that
they were married on March 3, 1971 at Alicia, Isabela, as evidenced by their Marriage
Contract;1 that she bore him three (3) sons, namely, Dino, Eric, and Carlo, born in 1971,
1973, and 1978, respectively, as evidenced by their respective Certificates of Live
Birth;2 that respondent abandoned her and their children in 1990 to live with his mistress,
respondent Atty. Ma. Cristina Arrieta Villarin,3 at 27-C Masbate St., Quezon City; that
respondents have since then been publicly representing themselves as husband and wife;
that respondent Atty. Villarin gave birth to Paolo Villarin Alejandro on January 17, 1992 as
a result of her immoral and scandalous relationship with complainants husband whom she
named as the father of her son in the latters Certificate of Live Birth;4 and, that in said
Certificate of Live Birth, respondent Atty. Villarin identified herself as Ma. Cristina V.
Alejandro having been married to Atty. Alejandro on May 1, 1990 at Isabela Province.
Complainant alleged that she filed this administrative complaint when she learned that her
husband has been nominated as a regional trial court judge. She insists that he is not fit to
be a judge considering that he, and co-respondent Atty. Villarin, do not even possess the
basic integrity to remain as members of the Philippine Bar.

We required respondent to comment on the administrative complaint in our Resolution

dated July 4, 1994. When copies of our resolution and of the complaint and its annexes
addressed to respondent Atty. Alejandro at 27-C Masbate St., Quezon City were returned
unserved with notation moved, we required complainant to submit the correct and present
address of her husband.5 No similar return of service with respect to respondent Atty.
Villarin appears on the record.

In an Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion dated December 5, 1994, complainant insisted that
her husbands correct address remains to be 27-C Masbate St., Quezon City; that it was him
who told the postman that he had already moved; and, that any subsequent service by mail
will result in the same failure as respondent will either refuse service or misrepresent a
change of address again. Complainant therefore asked that copies of the complaint and
Court resolution requiring comment be served personally upon her husband by the Courts
process servers. We noted and granted the prayer.6 However, when the Courts process
server attempted to effect personal service on February 16, 1995, respondent Atty.
Alejandro was allegedly out of the house and his house helper refused to accept service.
Consequently we considered the copies as having been served upon respondent Atty.
Alejandro in our Resolution of July 31, 1996,7 and required him to show cause why he
should not be disciplinary dealt with or held in contempt for his continued failure to file
comment, and to file such comment, considering the considerable length of time that has
lapsed since he has been first required to do so. Respondent Atty. Alejandro failed to
comply.Hence, we fined him P1,000.00 and directed that he file the required explanation
and comment on the administrative complaint.8
When copies of both resolutions were again returned unserved with postal
notations moved, we required complainant anew to submit the correct and present address
of respondents, within ten (10) days from notice, under pain of dismissal of her
administrative complaint.9 In a handwritten letter dated September 10, 1998, complainant
disclosed respondents present address as 12403 Dunlop Drive, Houston, Texas.10

We referred this case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation, within ninety (90) days from notice, in our Resolution of March 17,
2003.

In a Report dated August 26, 2003, IBP Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan recommended
that both respondents be disbarred on the following rationalization:

In its Resolution dated 31 July 1996, the Supreme Court (Second Division) ruled that
respondent Atty. Alejandro was deemed served a copy of the instant administrative
complaint and of the Courts Resolution dated 4 July 1994, by substituted service pursuant
to Rule 1, Section 6 of the Rules of Court.

In the earlier Resolution of the Supreme Court dated 4 July 1994, respondents Atty.
Alejandro and Atty. Villarin were directed to file their Comment on the instant Complaint
within ten (10) days from notice of said Resolution. To date, no Comment has been filed by
either respondent Atty. Alejandro or Atty. Villarin. x x x

Complainant submitted a photocopy of the Marriage Contract (Annex A of the letter-

complaint) between herself and respondent Atty. Alejandro executed on 3 March 1971.
Complainant also submitted photocopies of the Birth Certificates (Annexes B to D of the
letter-complaint) of the children born out of her marriage to respondent Atty. Alejandro.
These documentary evidence submitted by complainant clearly show that there was and is
a valid and subsisting marriage between herself and respondent Atty. Alejandro at the time
she filed the instant administrative complaint against said respondent, her husband.

In support of her charge of bigamy and concubinage against respondents Alejandro and
Villarin, complainant submitted a photocopy of the Birth Certificate (Annex E of the letter-
complaint) of one Paolo Villarin Alejandro. The said Birth Certificates states that the mother
of said Paolo Villarin Alejandro is Ma. Cristina Arrieta Villarin, while his father is one
Warfredo Tomas Alejandro. Said Birth Certificate also states that the parents of Paolo
Villarin Alejandro were married on May 1, 1990 in Isabela Province.

Given the Birth Certificate of Paolo Villarin Alejandro (Annex E of the letter-complaint), and
considering the failure of respondents Atty. Alejandro and Atty. Villarin to deny the charges
of complainant, it is submitted that there is sufficient evidence on record which establishes
the immoral/illicit relationship between respondents Atty. Alejandro and Atty. Villarin.
However, there is no evidence on record which would establish beyond doubt that
respondent Atty. Alejandro indeed contracted a second marriage with Atty. Villarin while
his marriage to herein complainant was subsisting. Thus, it is recommended that as prayed
for by complainant, respondents Atty. Alejandro and Atty. Villarin be disbarred for willful
violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline adopted and approved the above report and
recommendation in its Resolution No. XVI-2003-169 dated September 27, 2003.

We agree with the IBP recommendation with respect to respondent Atty. Alejandro.

Indeed Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides

A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Thus we have in a number of cases11 disciplined members of the Bar whom we found guilty
of misconduct which demonstrated a lack of that good moral character required of them not
only as a condition precedent for their admission to the Bar but, likewise, for their
continued membership therein. No distinction has been made as to whether the misconduct
was committed in the lawyers professional capacity or in his private life. This is because a
lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen
at another.12 He is expected to be competent, honorable and reliable at all times since he
who cannot apply and abide by the laws in his private affairs, can hardly be expected to do
so in his professional dealings nor lead others in doing so. Professional honesty and honor
are not to be expected as the accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in other
relations.13 The administration of justice, in which the lawyer plays an important role being
an officer of the court, demands a high degree of intellectual and moral competency on his
part so that the courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in him.14

In the instant case, sufficient evidence was presented to show that respondent Atty.
Alejandro, while being lawfully married to complainant, carried on an illicit relationship
with another woman, co-respondent Atty. Villarin. Although the evidence presented was not
sufficient to prove that he contracted a subsequent bigamous marriage with her, the fact
remains that respondent Atty. Alejandro exhibited by his conduct a deplorable lack of that
degree of morality required of him as a member of the Bar. We have already held that
disbarment proceedings is warranted against a lawyer who abandons his lawful wife and
maintains an illicit relationship with another woman15 who had borne him a child.16 We can
do no less in the instant case where respondent Atty. Alejandro made himself unavailable to
this Court and even fled to another country to escape the consequences of his misconduct.

The same penalty however cannot be imposed on respondent Atty. Villarin. I is noted that
our Resolution dated July 4, 1994 requiring comment on the administrative complaint was
never deemed served upon her, in the same way that it was upon Atty. Alejandro. In fact, it
does not appear that copies of the administrative complaint, its annexes, and of our
resolution requiring comment were even sent to her. Although sent at the address she
allegedly shared with co-respondent Atty. Alejandro, the envelope bearing the copies was
addressed to the latter only.17 That was why when both service by registered mail and
personal service failed, the copies were deemed served solely upon Atty. Alejandro.18

The IBP for its part attempted to serve copy of the complaint upon Atty. Villarin with
directive for her to file answer. It is noted however that the same was sent to respondents
old address at 27-C Masbate St., Quezon City, not 12403 Dunlop Drive, Houston, Texas,
which was respondents new address on record supplied by the complainant. The return of
service therefore showed the postal notation moved. Considering the serious consequences
of disbarment proceedings, full opportunity upon reasonable notice must have been given
respondent to answer the charge and present evidence in her behalf. It is only in clear
cases of waiver that an administrative case be resolved sans respondents answer.

WHEREFORE, for Gross Immorality, respondent Atty. Warfredo Tomas Alejandro is

DISBARRED from the practice of law, to take effect immediately upon his receipt of this
Decision. Let copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Alejandros personal record in the
Office of the Bar Confidant and a copy thereof be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.

The complaint against respondent Atty. Maricris A. Villarin is REFERRED BACK to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for further appropriate proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-

Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna,
andTinga, JJ., concur.
 [A.C. No. 4947. February 14, 2005]

ROSA YAP-PARAS, Petitioner, vs. ATTY. JUSTO PARAS, respondent.

RESOLUTION
GARCIA, J.:

Before us is this verified Petition[1] filed by Rosa Yap-Paras praying for the
disbarment of her estranged husband Atty. Justo Paras on alleged acts of deceit,
malpractice, grave misconduct, grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as
a lawyer.
On 18 January 1989, respondent filed his comment[2] to the Petition.
In a Resolution dated 10 February 1999,[3] the Court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The background facts are summarized in a Report and Recommendation dated 13
January 2004[4] of Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline, which Report reads in part, as follows:

Complainant alleged that on February 9, 1965 the children of Ledesma de Jesus Paras-Sumabong
namely Conegunda, Justo, Corazon, Carmen and Cataluna all surnamed Paras executed a Special
Power of Attorney prepared by the respondent to sell parcels of land located in Matobato, Bindoy,
Negros Oriental giving authority to their mother to sell the subject real properties previously
registered in the name of the heirs of Vicente Paras wherein respondent was one of the signatories
therein.

Complainant alleged that on May 4, 1966 on the basis of said Special Power of Attorney, Ledesma J.
Paras-Sumabang executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Aurora Dy-Yap over the subject real
property located in Matobato, Bindoy, Negros Oriental which was with the respondent's full knowledge
since he was residing at the house of Soledad Dy-Yap at that time and from that time, the Yap family
had been in possession of the subject real property up to the present.

Complainant alleged that sometime in June 1998 her attention was called to the fact that a free patent
title to the aforesaid property was issued in respondent's name and upon verification with the DENR,
Bureau of Lands, Dumaguete City, complainant was able to get copies of the documents for lot Nos.
660, 490 and 585 pertaining to the Notice of Application for Free Patent dated April 2, 1985 signed by
the respondent; over the aforesaid lots previously sold by Ledesma de Jesus to Aurora D. Yap;
Quitclaim/Renunciation of Property Rights and Interest Over Real Property executed by Ledesma de
Jesus dated May 28, 1985; Letter of Application dated April 2, 1985 signed by respondent under oath
before Apolonio Tan authorized officer to administer oath; Letter of Certification signed by Apolonio
Tan dated June 4, 1985 and Order of Approval dated August 19, 1985 signed by District Land Officer
Teopisto L. Gallozo with a Free Patent No. 328 in the name of respondent Justo J. Paras.
Complainant alleged that the aforementioned application was made by the respondent without her
knowledge and consent and those acts of deceit, machinations and falsification of documents were
deliberately willfully, and maliciously committed by the respondent in violation of Art. 172 in relation
to Art. 171 of the RPC; in betrayal of his oath as a lawyer and a transgression of the Canons of
Professional Responsibility.

Complainant alleged that respondent surreptitiously obtained a free patent title over real properties
which had been previously sold by his own mother to Aurora D. Yap and now still under the control
and possession of complainant's natural family, a fact respondent allegedly withheld from the Bureau
of Lands which he had full knowledge in successfully causing the release of a free patent in his name
and unjustly and unlawfully deprived the rightful owners of their legitimate title to the said property in
betrayal of the court to pervert the administration of justice in gross violation of his oath of office.

xxx xxx xxx

In his Comment, respondent alleged that complainant was obviously not the owner of the properties
and considering that the properties were applied for free patent titling during their marital union prior
to its breakage, complainant was likewise a communal owner thereof and as such was also
complaining against herself.

Respondent alleged that later on, a great portion of the public lands classified as forested zone in
Matobato were declared and reclassified into public agricultural lands, then publicly surveyed and
parcelized by lots identified in the survey map based on actual or known occupants; then the Bureau
of Lands allegedly made a public announcement that the lands were available for private ownership
thru Free Patent Application available only to native settlers or natural born Filipinos.

Respondent alleged that none of the Yaps including complainant being native or natural born Filipinos
muchless Aurora D. Yap who in 1985 was said to be already an American citizen; complainant and her
family; the Yaps prevailed upon him to apply for free patent over said questioned properties for the
reason that respondent had already occupied the properties; introduced improvements thereon; acted
as owner thereof; and could easily align his right to the property which had been identified in the
public survey as 'Heirs of Vicente Paras' , otherwise the questioned properties allegedly according to
the Yaps will be applied for and awarded to other qualified natural born Filipinos.

Respondent alleged that Free Patent Application was filed by him over the communal property of him
and the complainant as well as those purchased by him including the portion whose occupancy of a
public land was purchased by Aurora D. Yap from Ledesma Vda de Paras upon the prodding of the
Yaps for all of them were not qualified to apply for ownership of an agricultural public land via free
patent; none of them being a natural born Filipino or native settler and were disqualified from a
gratuitous grant of public land from the government.

Respondent alleged that the whole idea of giving to him and the complainant the properties was
hatched and executed by the Yaps, most particularly Atty. Francisco D. Yap to circumvent the law and
prevent the properties from being given by the government to some other qualified persons. He
allegedly applied for issuance of free patent in good faith and thereafter took dominion and control of
the properties in the concept of a legitimate owner under authority of a gratuitous grant of the
government.

Respondent alleged that complainant or any member of her family much less American citizen Aurora
Dy Yap had not made any prior demand for the return of the questioned properties; nor filed a
complaint under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law; nor filed an administrative remedy before the
DENR for the cancellation and reversion/transfer of the Free Patent and Title to them; nor brought any
action in any civil court for either quieting of title, or cancellation of free patent title or recovery of
ownership or whatever.
Respondent alleged that even without such civil court determination on whether or not complainant or
her family were qualified to become grantee of a government gratuitous grant of public agricultural
land, if the Honorable Supreme Court will decide that complainant, her mother, brothers and sisters
were within the ambit of the term natural born citizen or native citizens under the 1946 Constitution
and to them rightfully belong the ownership of the questioned titled public agricultural lands; and that
he can never be guilty of the Anti-Dummy Law consequent to such cession, respondent alleged that he
will gladly deliver and transfer title to them.

Respondent alleged that he sought and prayed for recovery of possession of all conjugal/communal
properties including the herein questioned properties for after he left the conjugal home in 1988
possession of all these properties, real and personal were until now with the complainant and her
biological family.

Respondent prayed for the outright dismissal of the petition for lack of merit.

Complainant subsequently filed a Reply[5] to respondent's Comment, therein

refuting respondent's claims that he was used as a 'dummy since complainant and
her siblings had previously acquired Free Patents in their names. Complainant
further alleged that respondent is morally unfit to continue to be an officer of the
court because of his falsely declaring under oath that he had been occupying the
subject real property since 1985 when in fact he did not and was never in
occupation/possession thereof.
On 27 August 1999, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued an
Order[6] noting the filing of the last pleading and setting the instant case for
hearing. Several hearings[7] were conducted wherein complainant presented all her
witnesses together with their respective affidavits and supporting documents[8],
which were all subjected to cross-examination by the respondent. Likewise,
respondent presented his Counter-Affidavit[9] and supporting documents.
Based on the foregoing, the Investigating Commissioner concluded her Report and
made a recommendation, as follows:

From the facts obtaining respondent committed deceit and falsehood in having applied for free patent
over lands owned by another over which he had no actual physical possession being aware of the fact
that the same was previously transferred in the name of Aurora Yap; an act which adversely reflected
on his fitness to practice law in violation of Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

It is immaterial as to who instituted the complaint for as long as there was a violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which partakes the nature of proper disciplinary action pursuant to Section
1, Rule 139-B of the Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys.

Wherefore in view of the foregoing, the Undersigned respectfully recommends for the suspension of
Atty. Justo Paras from the practice of his law profession for a period of three (3) months from receipt
hereof.

It is also hereby recommended that the IBP Chapter wherein respondent Paras is a registered member
be furnished a copy of the Order and notified of the said suspension for proper enforcement.

Via Resolution No. XVI-2004-120 dated 27 February 2004,[10] the IBP Board of
Governors adopted the Report of the Investigating Commissioner but modified the
latter's recommended penalty by recommending that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for six (6) months for violation of Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
The case is now before us for confirmation.
We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be sanctioned.
We find, however, that the recommended penalty is not commensurate to the
gravity of the wrong perpetrated.
The Court has always reminded that a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession[11] as' the bar should always maintain a high
standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing among its
members. By and large, a lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully
performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients.[12] To
this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might
tend to lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the
fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession.[13]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In Marcelo v. Javier[14], we held:

It bears stressing that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the
privilege and right to practice law during good behavior and can only be deprived of it for misconduct
ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded
him. Without invading any constitutional privilege or right, an attorney's right to practice law may be
resolved by a proceeding to suspend or disbar him, based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a
license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. It must be understood that the
purpose of suspending or disbarring an attorney is to remove from the profession a person whose
misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the
office of an attorney, and thus to protect the public and those charged with the administration of
justice, rather than to punish the attorney.

An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney
and counsellor which include the statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court. These statutory grounds are so broad as to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer in his
professional or private capacity. It is a settled rule that the enumeration of the statutory grounds for
disciplinary action is not exclusive and a lawyer may be disciplined on grounds other than those
specifically provided in the law. Generally a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any
misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral
character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court,
or an unfit or unsafe person to enjoy the privileges and to manage the business of others in the
capacity of an attorney, or for conduct which tends to bring reproach on the legal profession or to
injure it in the favorable opinion of the public.

Indeed, the practice of law is not a right but merely a privilege bestowed by the
State upon those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the
qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege.[15] One of those
requirements is the observance of honesty and candor.
And in the recent case of Bergonia v. Merrera[16], we ruled:

Candor in all their dealings is the very essence of a practitioner's honorable membership in the legal
profession. Lawyers are required to act with the highest standard of truthfulness, fair play and nobility
in the conduct of litigation and in their relations with their clients, the opposing parties, the other
counsels and the courts. They are bound by their oath to speak the truth and to conduct themselves
according to the best of their knowledge and discretion, and with fidelity to the courts and their
clients. x x x

In the instant case, it is clear to the Court that respondent violated his lawyer's
oath as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates upon each
lawyer, as his duty to society and to the courts, the obligation to obey the laws of
the land and to do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court.
Respondent has been deplorably lacking in the candor required of him as a member
of the Bar and an officer of the court in his acts of applying for the issuance of a
free patent over the properties in issue despite his knowledge that the same had
already been sold by his mother to complainant's sister. This fact, respondent even
admitted in the comment that he filed before this Court when he alleged that the
said properties were public land under the Forestal Zone 'when the mother of the
respondent ceded to Aurora Yap some portions of entire occupancy of the
Parases' [17]. Moreover, respondent committed deceit and falsehood in his
application for free patent over the said properties when he manifested under oath
that he had been in the actual possession and occupation of the said lands despite
the fact that these were continuously in the possession and occupation of
complainant's family, as evidenced no less by respondent's own statements in the
pleadings filed before the IBP.
Anent his argument questioning the status of complainant and her family as
'natural born citizens' , this Court holds that the instant case is not the proper
forum to address such issue. Furthermore, as correctly held by the Investigating
Commissioner, '[i]t is immaterial as to who instituted the complaint for as long as
there was a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Likewise, any other
action which the parties may make against each other has no material bearing in
this case. For, it must be remembered that administrative cases against lawyers
belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and may proceed
independently of civil and criminal cases.
In line herewith, this Court in In re Almacen,[18] held:

Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither
purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not ' and does not involve ' a trial of an action or a
suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. Not being intended to
inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor
a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary
objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to
be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely
calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in
view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of
justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no
longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an
attorney. xxx

The facts and evidence obtaining in the instant case indubitably reveal respondent's
failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the strictures of the
lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, thereby occasioning
sanction from this Court.
At this juncture, we take note that on 18 October 2000, in our Decision in A.C. No.
5333 formerly A.C. No. CBD-371, entitled Rosa Yap Paras v. Atty. Justo de Jesus
Paras, respondent was previously meted with suspension from the practice of law
for six (6) months on the charge of falsifying his wife's signature in bank documents
and other related loan instruments, and for one (1) year from the practice of law on
the charges of immorality and abandonment of his own family.
Considering the serious nature of the instant offense and in light of respondent's
prior misdemeanors for which he was penalized with a six (6) month and one (1)
year suspension from the practice of law, his deplorable behavior in the present
case which grossly degrades the legal profession warrants the imposition of a much
graver penalty.
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Justo J. Paras guilty of committing a
falsehood in violation of his lawyer's oath and of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law
for a period of one (1) year, with a WARNING that commission of the same or
similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the IBP, as well as the Office of the Bar
Confidant and the Court Administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their
information and guidance and likewise be entered in the record of respondent as
attorney.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales,
JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 114732. August 1, 2000]

ESTRELLA TIONGCO YARED (now deceased) substituted by one of her heirs, CARMEN
MATILDE M. TIONGCOPetitioner, v. HON. RICARDO M. ILARDE, Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo, Br. 26, JOSE B. TIONGCO and ANTONIO G. DORONILA, JR.,
Respondents.

DECISION

DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the Order dated March 17,
1994[1 of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 26, which reinstated an earlier
order cancelling the notice of lis pendensannotated on the back of Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. T-92383 and T-5050, of the Registry of Deeds of Iloilo City covering Lots 3244
and 3246, respectively, located in Iloilo City.

The relevant facts are summarized as follows:

On October 17, 1990, petitioner Estrella Tiongco Yaredfiled an amended complaint[2 before
the Regional Trial Court, 6th Judicial Region, Branch XXVI, against private respondents Jose
B. Tiongco and Antonio Doronila, Jr. Docketed as Civil Case No. 19408, the action was one
for "annulment of affidavit of adjudication, sales, transfer certificates of title, reconveyance
and damages.

In brief, the amended complaint alleged that respondent Tiongco, on the basis of an
affidavit of adjudication dated April 17, 1974 alleging that he is the sole surviving heir of
the previous owner, Maria Luis de Tiongco, succeeded in having the subject properties
registered in his name, to the prejudice of the other surviving heir of the previous owner,
petitioner among them. Petitioner and respondent Tiongco's father were siblings, and both
were among several heirs of Maria Luis de Tiongco. The aforesaid affidavit of adjudication
was registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo City on May 10, 1974.
Petitioner prayed that the properties be reconveyed to the original registered owners,
subject to partition among the lawful heirs, and that respondent Tiongco be ordered to pay
damages and costs.

To protect her interest in the properties during the pendency of the case, petitioner caused
to be annotated on Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-52547, T-4666 and T-52546,[3 which
covered Lot Nos. 3244, 3246 and 1404,respectively. TCT Nos. T-92383 and T-5050 were
derived or transferred from TCT Nos. T-52547 and T-4666 respectively and registered in the
name of Tiongco.

After respondent Jose B. Tiongco filed his answer, trial ensued during which, on three
separate occasions, he filed motions seeking the cancellation of the notices of lis pendens.
[4 All these motions were denied.[5

On December 14, 1993, the respondent judge issued a Decision[6 dismissing petitioner's
complaint and private respondent's counterclaim. The trial court found that petitioner's
cause of action had already prescribed.

Petitioner filed a notice of appeal[7on December 17, 1993. As before, respondent Tiongco
filed a motion for cancellation of the notices of lis pendens[8 dated December 21,
1993; this was denied in an Order dated January 10, 1994.[9 He filed a
"Second Motion for Reconsideration"[10which was also denied in an Order
dated January 26, 1994.[11 Displaying remarkable tenacity, respondent
Tiongco filed a "Third Motion for Reconsideration."[12 This time, however,
his arguments proved persuasive. In an Order[13dated February 14,
1994,the respondent judge ruled to wit:

In the light of the ruling laid down in Magdalena Homeowners Association Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, 184 SCRA 325; 330 (1990), cited in Vda. De Kilayko vs. Tengco, 207 SCRA 600;
614-615 (1992), that "the continuance or removal of a notice of lis pendens is not
contingent on the existence of a final judgment in the action and ordinarily has no effect on
the merits thereof so that the notices of lis pendens in the case at bar may, on proper
grounds, be cancelled notwithstanding the non-finality of the judgment of this Court
brought about by plaintiff's appeal and considering the finding of this Court that plaintiff's
action had already prescribed, which finding is based on the admitted fact that the
questioned deed of adjudication was registered way back of May 10, 1974 so that the
possibility of this finding being reversed is quite remote if not totally nil and, considering
further, the circumstances obtaining in this case, among which are: (1) that the criminal
complaint for perjury filed by plaintiff against defendant Jose B. Tiongco based on the same
deed of adjudication had already been dismissed with finality also on the ground of
prescription; (2) that the occupants of the property who were alleged as formerly paying
rentals to herein plaintiff, Estrella Tiongco Yared, had already recognized defendant's
ownership and had long stopped paying rentals to plaintiff without the latter intervening,
much less, contesting the decision in Civil Case No. 15421 where defendant Jose B. Tiongco
was declared with finality as the true and lawful owner of Lots Nos. 3244 and 3246; and (3)
that, if at all, the present claim of plaintiff covers but a very small portion of subject lots
consisting only a total of about 64 square meters hence, it would be unfair to the defendant
who has torrens title covering the parcels of lands solely in his name to have the same
subjected to the harsh effect of such a encumbrance; the Court, in view of all the foregoing
considerations and upon further review of the records, hereby reconsiders its stand on the
subject matter of lis pendens and so holds that the continued annotation of subject notices
of lis pendens is intended to molest the defendant, Jose B. Tiongco, and is not necessary to
protect the rights of plaintiff as such rights, if any, are now foreclosed by prescription.

This time, it was petitioner's turn to seek reconsideration.[14 On March 4, 1994, the public
respondent issued an Order[15 reversing himself on the ground that (1) it had already lost
jurisdiction over the case due to the expiration of the last day to appeal of both parties, (2)
the notice of appeal has been approved, and (3) the records had been ordered elevated to
the Court of Appeals.

Private respondent Tiongco filed another motion for reconsideration[16 against the Order
dated March 4, 1994. On March 17, 1994, the respondent judge issued the order, subject of
this petition, which is quoted hereunder:

Considering that under Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, although appeal had
already been perfected, the Court, prior to the transmittal of the records to the appellate
court, may issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties
which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal and considering that in the case at
bar, lis pendens is not a matter litigated in the appeal and the records have not as yet been
transmitted to the appellate court so that this Court still has jurisdiction to issue the Order
of February 14, 1994 cancelling the notices of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. T-92383
covering Lot 3244 and on TCT No. T-5050 covering lot 3246 and considering further, that
the said Order does not direct cancellation of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. T-89483
covering Lot no. 1404 which contains a total area of 1,587 square meters where the area of
64 square meters claimed by plaintiff can very well be taken; as prayed for by the
defendant Jose B. Tiongco, the Order of March 4, 1994 is hereby reconsidered and set aside
and the Order of February 14, 1994 is hereby reconsidered and set aside and the Order of
February 14, 1994 cancelling the notices of lis pendens on TCT No. T-92383 covering lot
3244 andon TCT No. T-5050 covering lot 3246 is hereby reinstated.

On April 5, 1994, the Register of Deeds cancelled the annotation of notices of lis pendens.
[17

Feeling that a motion for reconsideration would be fruitless, petitioner filed the instant
special civil action forcertiorari, alleging that:

THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED CAPRICIOUSLY, WHIMSICALLY AND

WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ORDERING THE CANCELLATION OF THE
NOTICES OF LIS PENDENS ANNOTATED AT THE BACK OF THE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE
THAT ARE THE SUBJECT OF THE CIVIL CASE NO. 19408, AS THESE ARE AMONG THE
DOCUMENTS THAT ARE SOUGHT TO BE DECLARED NULL AND VOID BY THE HEREIN
PETITIONER.

The doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon reasons of public policy and necessity, the
purpose of which is to make known to the whole world that properties in litigation are still
within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated and to prevent the defeat of
the judgment or decree by subsequent alienation.[18 The notice of lis pendens is an
announcement to the whole world that a particular real property is in litigation, and serves
as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk,
or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said property.[19

Rule 13, Section 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure[20 and Section 76 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529,[21otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree provide the
statutory bases for notice of lis pendens. From these provisions, it is clear that such a
notice is proper only in:

a) An action to recover possession of real estate;

b) An action to quiet title thereto;

c) An action to remove clouds thereon;

d) An action for partition; and

e) Any other proceedings of any kind in Court directly affecting title to the land or the use
or occupation thereof or the building thereon.[22

Thus, all petitioner has to do is to assert a claim of possession or title over the subject
property to put the property under the coverage of the rule.[23 It is not necessary for her
to prove ownership or interest over the property sought to be affected by lis pendens.

Whether as a matter, of procedure[24 or substance,[25 the rule is that a notice

of lis pendens may be cancelled only on two (2) grounds, namely (1) if the annotation was
for the purpose of molesting the title of the adverse party, or (2) when the annotation is
not necessary to protect the title of the party who caused it to be recorded.[26

The petition should be dismissed, there being a clear violation of the doctrine of judicial
hierarchy that we have taken pains to emphasize in past jurisprudence.

Thus, we ruled in Vergara v. Suelto[27 that:

[t]he Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if its is to
satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by fundamental charter and
immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be burdened with the task of dealing
with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the so-called
extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or where
serious and important reasons exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction should generally
be exercised relative to actions or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before
constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for some reason or
another, are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of an
extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional
Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific action for the writ's
procurement must be presented. This is and should continue to be the policy in this
regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly observe.

We reaffirmed this policy in People v. Cuaresma,[28 thus:

xxx A last word. This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writ of certiorari (as well as
prohibition,mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive.
It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance),
which may issue the writ, enforceable in any part of their respective regions. It is also
shared by this Court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the Court of Appeals
(formerly Intermediate Appellate Court), although prior to the effectivity of Batas
 Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981, the latter's competence to issue the
extraordinary writs was restricted to those "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction." This
concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking
any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which
application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That
hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general
determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A
becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for
the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed
with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A
direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs
should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly
and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy that is
necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which
are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent
further over-crowding of the Court's docket. Indeed, the removal of the restriction on
the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in this regard, supra-resulting from the deletion
of the qualifying phrase, "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction"-was evidently intended
precisely to relieve this Court pro tanto of the burden of dealing with applications for
the extraordinary writs which, but for the expansion of the Appellate Court's
corresponding jurisdiction, would have had to be filed with it.

The Court feels the need to reaffirm that policy at this time, and to enjoin strict adherence
thereto in the light of what it perceives to be a growing tendency on the part of litigants
and lawyers to have their applications for the so-called extraordinary writs, and sometimes
even their appeals, passed upon and adjudicated directly and, immediately by the highest
tribunal of the land. The proceeding at bar is a case in point. The application for the writ
of certiorari sought against a City Court was brought directly to this Court although there is
no discernible special and important reason for not presenting it to the Regional Trial Court.

The Court therefore closes this decision with the declaration, for the information and
guidance of all concerned, that it will not only continue to enforce the policy, but will
require a more strict observance thereof. (emphasis supplied)

Notwithstanding these pronouncements, parties persisted in disregarding the judicial

hierarchy. As we noted inSantiago v. Vasquez,[29

One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the part of
petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may be said of a number of litigants who initiate
recourses before us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking
relief directly from this Court despite the fact that the same is available in the lower courts
in the exercise of their original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be
sought therein. This practice must be stopped, not only because of the imposition upon the
precious time of this Court but also because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended
or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or referred to
the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to
resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial
policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot
be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstance
justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.

This policy found further application in People v. Court of Appeals,[30 Aleria v.

Velez, [31 and Tano v. Socrates.[32 Only the presence of exceptional and compelling
reasons justified a disregard of the rule.[33

Petitioner has failed to advance a satisfactory explanation as to her failure to comply with
or non-observance of the principle of judicial hierarchy. There is no reason why the instant
petition could not have been brought before the Court of Appeals, considering all the more
that the appeal of the main case was already before it. InMagdalena, Homeowners
Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[34 we ruled, to wit:

The notice of lis pendens-i.e., that real property is involved in an action-is ordinarily
recorded without the intervention of the court where the action is pending. The notice is but
an incident in an action, an extrajudicial one, to be sure. It does not affect the merits
thereof. It is intended merely to constructively advise, or warn, all people who deal with the
property that they so deal with it at their own risk, and whatever rights they may acquire in
the property in any voluntary transaction are subject to the results of the action, and may
well be inferior and subordinate to those which may be finally determined and laid down
therein. The cancellation of such a precautionary notice is therefore also a mere incident in
the action, and may be ordered by the Court having jurisdiction of it at any given time. And
its continuance or removal-like the continuance or removal or removal of a preliminary
attachment of injunction-is not contingent on the existence of a final judgment in the
action, and ordinarily has no effect on the merits thereof.

In the case at bar, the case had properly come within the appellate jurisdiction of the Court
of Appeals in virtue of the perfection of the plaintiff's appeal. It therefore had power to deal
with and resolve any incident in connection with the action subject of the appeal, even
before final judgment. The rule that no questions may be raised for the first time on appeal
have reference only to those affecting the merits of the action, and not to mere incidents
thereof, e.g., cancellation of notices of lis pendens, or, to repeat, the grant or dissolution of
provisional remedies. [emphasis supplied]

Had petitioner brought the instant petition before the Court of Appeals, the same could, and
would, have been consolidated with the appeal, thereby bringing under the competence of
the said court all matters relative to the action, including the incidents thereof.

Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, the disposition of the instant case will be
incomplete without a reference to the improper and unethical language employed by
respondent Jose B. Tiongco, who is also counsel for private respondents, in his pleadings
and motions filed both before us and the court a quo. It is his belief that counsel for
petitioner, Atty. Marciana Deguma, "a rambunctious wrestler-type female of 52 who does
not wear a dress which is not red, and who stampedes into the courtroom like a mad fury
and who speaks slang English to conceal her faulty grammar,"[35 is impelled by less than
less than noble reasons in serving as counsel for petitioner. Her ulterior motive? "[T]o
please and tenderize and sweeten towards her own self the readily available Carmelo M.
Tiongco,"[36 a retired police major described by respondent Tiongco as Atty. Deguma's "nio
bonito,"[37 an unmarried mestizo with curly hair who lives with plaintiff for being
houseless[38 who rents a place on the subject property sought to be recovered by
petitioner. Atty. Deguma, apparently are unmarried maiden of a certain age, is variously
described by respondent Tiongco as "a love-crazed female Apache [who] is now ready to
skin defendant alive for not being a bastard,"[39 and a "horned spinster and man-hungry
virago and female bull of an Amazon who would stop at nothing to molest, harrass (sic) and
injure defendant - if only to please and attract police-major Carmelo Tiongco Junior - the
deeply desired object of her unreciprocated affections - who happens not to miss every
chance to laugh at her behind her back."[40 He claims that Atty. Deguma, a lawyer with the
Public Attorney's Office, is engaged in a game of one-upmanship with a fellow employee, in
that "she happens to be ambitious enough to secretly (that what she thought) plot to put
one over her office-mate who simply netted a corporal (if not a private) by aiming at no lest
than an IMDC major - hoping to catch him by sheer brass and audacity.[41 In so doing,
Atty. Deguma is using the PAO as a "marriage bureau for her own benefit.[42 Respondent
Tiongco predicts that nothing good will come out of opposing counsel's scheme since,
quoting Voltaire, "outside of virtue, ther's (sic) no happiness."[43
Respondent Tiongco has achieved a remarkable feat of character assassination. His verbal
darts, albeit entertaining in a fleeting way, are cast with little regard for truth. However, he
does nothing more than to obscure the issues, and his reliance on the fool's gold of gossip
betrays only a shocking absence of discernment. To this end, it will be wise to give him an
object lesson in the elementary rules of courtesy by which we expect members of the bar to
comport themselves. These provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility are
pertinent:

CANON 8-A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND
CANDOR TOWARD HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID
HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL.

Rule 8.01-A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use languages which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

xxx xxx xxx xxx

Rule 11.03-A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language before
the courts.

we stated that a lawyer's actuations, "[a]lthough

In Romero v. Valle,[44
allowed some latitude of remarks or comment in the furtherance of the
cause he upholds, his arguments, both written or oral, should be gracious
to both court and opposing counsel and be of such words as may be
properly addressed by one gentleman to another." Otherwise, his use of
intemperate language invites the disciplinary authority of the court.[45 We
are aghast at the facility with which respondent Atty. Jose B. Tiongco
concocts accusations against the opposing party and her counsel, although
it is of public record that in Tiongco v. Deguma, et a1.,[46 we dismissed as
totally unfounded his charge of fraudulent conspiracy and public scandal
against petitioner, Major Tiongco, Atty. Deguma and even the latter's
superior at the Public Attorney's Office, Atty. Napoleon G. Pagtanac. His
lexicon of insults, though entertaining, do not find a ready audience in us,
and he should be, as he is hereby, warned accordingly: Homines qui
gestant, quiqui auscultant crimina, si meo arbitratu liceat, omnis pendeat,
gestores linguis, auditores auribus.[47

WHEREFORE, the petition fir certiorari is hereby DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to

costs.

SO ORDERED.

Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J., (Chairman), on leave.

[A.C. No. 5148. July 1, 2003]

 Atty. RAMON P. REYES, complainant, vs. Atty. VICTORIANO T. CHIONG JR., respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Lawyers should treat each other with courtesy, dignity and civility. The bickering and the hostility of
their clients should not affect their conduct and rapport with each other as professionals and members
of the bar.

The Case

Before us is a Sworn Complaint[1 filed by Atty. Ramon P. Reyes with the Office of the Bar Confidant of
this Court, seeking the disbarment of Atty. Victoriano T. Chiong Jr. for violation of his lawyers oath
and of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. After the Third Division of this Court
referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
resolved to suspend him as follows:

x x x [C]onsidering that respondent is bound by his oath which binds him to the obligation that he will
not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor
consent to the same. In addition, Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a
lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his professional colleagues,
and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. In impleading complainant and Prosecutor
Salanga in Civil Case No. 4884, when it was apparent that there was no legal ground to do so,
respondent violated his oath of office as well as the above-quoted Canon of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, [r]espondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years.[2

The Facts

In his Complaint, Atty. Reyes alleges that sometime in January 1998, his services were engaged by
one Zonggi Xu,[3 a Chinese-Taiwanese, in a business venture that went awry. Xu invested P300,000
on a Cebu-based fishball, tempura and seafood products factory being set up by a certain Chia Hsien
Pan, another Chinese-Taiwanese residing in Zamboanga City. Eventually, the former discovered that
the latter had not established a fishball factory. When Xu asked for his money back, Pan became
hostile, making it necessary for the former to seek legal assistance.

Xu, through herein complainant, filed a Complaint for estafa against Pan, who was represented by
respondent. The Complaint, docketed as IS 98J-51990, was assigned to Assistant Manila City
Prosecutor Pedro B. Salanga, who then issued a subpoena for Pan to appear for preliminary
investigation on October 27 and 29, 1998. The latter neither appeared on the two scheduled hearings
nor submitted his counter-affidavit. Hence, Prosecutor Salanga filed a Criminal Complaint[4 for estafa
against him before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.5 On April 8, 1999, the Manila RTC issued
a Warrant of Arrest6 against Pan.

Thereafter, respondent filed an Urgent Motion to Quash the Warrant of Arrest.7 He also filed with the
RTC of Zamboanga City a Civil Complaint for the collection of a sum of money and damages as well as
for the dissolution of a business venture against complainant, Xu and Prosecutor Salanga.

When confronted by complainant, respondent explained that it was Pan who had decided to institute
the civil action against Atty. Reyes. Respondent claimed he would suggest to his client to drop the civil
case, if complainant would move for the dismissal of the estafa case. However, the two lawyers failed
to reach a settlement.

In his Comment[8 dated January 27, 2000, respondent argued that he had shown no disrespect in
impleading Atty. Reyes as co-defendant in Civil Case No. 4884. He claimed that there was no basis to
conclude that the suit was groundless, and that it had been instituted only to exact vengeance. He
alleged that Prosecutor Salanga was impleaded as an additional defendant because of the irregularities
the latter had committed in conducting the criminal investigation. Specifically, Prosecutor Salanga had
resolved to file the estafa case despite the pendency of Pans Motion for an Opportunity to Submit
Counter-Affidavits and Evidence,9 of the appeal10 to the justice secretary, and of the Motion to
Defer/Suspend Proceedings.11

On the other hand, complainant was impleaded, because he allegedly connived with his client (Xu) in
filing the estafa case, which the former knew fully well was baseless. According to respondent, the
irregularities committed by Prosecutor Salanga in the criminal investigation and complainants
connivance therein were discovered only after the institution of the collection suit.

The Third Division of this Court referred the case to the IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation.[12 Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed its June 29, 2002
Resolution.13

Report and Recommendation of the IBP

In her Report and Recommendation,[14 Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, to whom the case was
assigned by the IBP for investigation and report, averred that complainant and Prosecutor Salanga
had been impleaded in Civil Case No. 4884 on the sole basis of the Criminal Complaint for estafa they
had filed against respondents client. In his Comment, respondent himself claimed that the reason x x
x was x x x the irregularities of the criminal investigation/connivance and consequent damages.

Commissioner San Juan maintained that the collection suit with damages had been filed purposely to
obtain leverage against the estafa case, in which respondents client was the defendant. There was no
need to implead complainant and Prosecutor Salanga, since they had never participated in the
business transactions between Pan and Xu. Improper and highly questionable was the inclusion of the
prosecutor and complainant in the civil case instituted by respondent on the alleged prodding of his
client. Verily, the suit was filed to harass complainant and Prosecutor Salanga.

Commissioner San Juan held that respondent had no ground to implead Prosecutor Salanga and
complainant in Civil Case No. 4884. In so doing, respondent violated his oath of office and Canon 8 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. The IBP adopted the investigating commissioners
recommendation for his suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years.

This Courts Ruling

We agree with the IBPs recommendation.

Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and defend; and
upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a
consequence.15 Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations. Mandated to maintain
the dignity of the legal profession, they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly. Moreover,
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that [a] lawyer shall conduct himself with
courtesy, fairness and candor towards his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics
against opposing counsel.

Respondents actions do not measure up to this Canon. Civil Case No. 4884 was for the collection of a
sum of money, damages and dissolution of an unregistered business venture. It had originally been
filed against Spouses Xu, but was later modified to include complainant and Prosecutor Salanga.

The Amended and Supplemental Complaints16 alleged the following:

27. The investigating prosecutor defendant Pedro Salanga knowingly and deliberately refused and
failed to perform his duty enjoined by the law and the Constitution to afford plaintiff Chia Hsien Pan
due process by violating his rights under the Rules on preliminary investigations; he also falsely made
a Certification under oath that preliminary investigation was duly conducted and plaintiff [was] duly
informed of the charges against him but did not answer; he maliciously and x x x partially ruled that
there was probable cause and filed a Criminal Information for estafa against plaintiff Chia Hsien Pan,
knowing fully [well] that the proceedings were fatally defective and null and void; x x x;

28. Said assistant prosecutor, knowing also that plaintiff Chia Hsien Pan filed said appeal and motion
to defer for the valid grounds stated therein deliberately refused to correct his errors and consented to
the arrest of said plaintiff under an invalid information and warrant of arrest.

29. Defendant Atty. Ramon Reyes, knowing that the suit of defendant Zongoi Xu is baseless connived
with the latter to harass and extort money from plaintiff Chia Hsien Pan by said criminal prosecution in
the manner contrary to law, morals and public policy, resulting to the arrest of said plaintiff and
causing plaintiffs grave irreparable damages[.][17

We concur with the IBP that the amendment of the Complaint and the failure to resort to the proper
remedies strengthen complainants allegation that the civil action was intended to gain leverage
against the estafa case. If respondent or his client did not agree with Prosecutor Salangas resolution,
they should have used the proper procedural and administrative remedies. Respondent could have
gone to the justice secretary and filed a Motion for Reconsideration or a Motion for Reinvestigation of
Prosecutor Salangas decision to file an information for estafa.

In the trial court, a Motion to Dismiss was available to him if he could show that the estafa case was
filed without basis. Moreover, he could have instituted disbarment proceedings against complainant
and Prosecutor Salanga, if he believed that the two had conspired to act illegally. As a lawyer,
respondent should have advised his client of the availability of these remedies. Thus, the filing of the
civil case had no justification.

The lack of involvement of complainant and Prosecutor Salanga in the business transaction subject of
the collection suit shows that there was no reason for their inclusion in that case. It appears that
respondent took the estafa case as a personal affront and used the civil case as a tool to return the
inconvenience suffered by his client. His actions demonstrate a misuse of the legal process. The aim of
every lawsuit should be to render justice to the parties according to law, not to harass them.18

Lawyers should treat their opposing counsels and other lawyers with courtesy, dignity and civility. A
great part of their comfort, as well as of their success at the bar, depends upon their relations with
their professional brethren. Since they deal constantly with each other, they must treat one another
with trust and respect. Any undue ill feeling between clients should not influence counsels in their
conduct and demeanor toward each other. Mutual bickering, unjustified recriminations and offensive
behavior among lawyers not only detract from the dignity of the legal profession,[19 but also
constitute highly unprofessional conduct subject to disciplinary action.

Furthermore, the Lawyers Oath exhorts law practitioners not to wittingly or willingly promote or sue
any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same.

Respondent claims that it was his client who insisted in impleading complainant and Prosecutor
Salanga. Such excuse is flimsy and unacceptable. While lawyers owe entire devotion to the interests of
their clients, their office does not permit violation of the law or any manner of fraud or
chicanery.20 Their rendition of improper service invites stern and just condemnation. Correspondingly,
they advance the honor of their profession and the best interests of their clients when they render
service or give advice that meets the strictest principles of moral law.21

The highest reward that can be bestowed on lawyers is the esteem of their professional brethren. This
esteem cannot be purchased, perfunctorily created, or gained by artifice or contrivance. It is born of
sharp contests and thrives despite conflicting interests. It emanates solely from integrity, character,
brains and skill in the honorable performance of professional duty.[22

WHEREFORE, respondent is found guilty as charged and is hereby SUSPENDED for two (2) years
from the practice of law, effective immediately.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Austria-Martinez, J., on leave.

[A.C. No. 6298 : May 27, 2004

FEDERICO D. RICAFORT, complainant, vs. ATTY. EDDIE R. BANSIL, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

On March 17, 2003, Atty. Federico D. Ricafort filed with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP),a verified complaint against respondent Atty. Eddie R. Bansil for
misconduct and for violation of theConstitution on the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern and R.A. No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. The case, docketed as CBD Case No.
03-1071, was referred by the Commission on Bar Discipline to Investigating Commissioner
Rebecca Villanueva-Maala for investigation, report and recommendation.

The factual and procedural antecedents are summarized by the Investigating Commissioner
as follows:

Complainant alleged that respondent has been commissioned as a Notary Public for
Guagua, Pampanga, with the obligation to submit his notarial book and documents every
month and each time he applies for a re-commission to the Clerk of Court of the Regional
Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga.

According to the RTC Clerk of Court of Guagua, Atty. Jorge Bacani (Atty. Bacani),
respondent submitted his notarial book and documents but the same were returned to him
for safekeeping considering that there was no space in the Office of the Clerk of Court to
accommodate the notarial books and documents. However, they are required to bring them
to the Clerk of Court when needed for inspection/verification of documents upon request.

Complainant has requested the Clerk of Court, Atty. Bacani, to send word to respondent
that he wanted to verify some documents purportedly notarized by respondent particularly
the documents contained in Notarial Book No XV, Series of 2002 and to bring the same to
the Office of the Clerk of Court. The request was made to respondent on several occasions,
the last of which was on 20 May 2003. Atty. Bacani repeatedly called up respondent
regarding the request of complainant but respondent repeatedly failed and refused to heed
the request.
On 20 February 2003, complainant sent a formal letter reiterating his request to examine
respondents Notarial Book XV, Series of 2002 for verification purposes at the office of the
clerk of court on 28 February 2003. However, despite the fact that respondent received the
said letter on 3 March 2003, respondent still failed and refused the request without any
justifiable reason and did not even responded (sic) to the said letter. Hence, this complaint.

In his Answer, respondent states that there was no failure and refusal to heed the request,
and the reason of inability to bring for verification the said Notarial Book CXV, Series of
2002 is the fact of lost (sic) thereof attributable to heavy flooding from July 6 to 20, 2002.

The letter-request was lately shown to him by a member of his household, however,
complainant did not mention any particular document or he could have readily extended the
desired help for verification or certification. Respondent contends that he is ready and
willing to be of help to complainant if shown the particular document necessitating
verification and/or certification.

Complainant claims that how can respondent help verify the genuineness or veracity of the
documents notarized by him, if respondent alleged that the same were lost in a flood.
Complainant avers that the certification issued as to the existence of flood in Guagua,
Pampanga in 6 to 20 July 2002 deals only with the flood in the town proper and did not say
that the house of respondent in San Antonio, Guagua, was hit by the flood. The streets were
flooded but not the house of respondent which is situated on a higher ground.The town of
Guagua, Pampanga has been perennially flooded during rainy season for which reason
respondent who had to bring his notarial books at his house in San Antonio, Guagua, could
have guarded the same against such contingency. A Notary Public should always place his
books and documents in a safe place at his residence, otherwise this could aggravate the
suspicion that he was grossly negligent in keeping his books which are public documents
and destruction of public documents is punishable by law.

At the hearing held on 4 June 2003 only complainant appeared. Respondents notice for the
reason of his absence was belatedly received by the office. Parties were directed to submit
their Position Paper and thereafter the case was submitted for report and recommendation.

In her Report and Recommendation submitted to the IBP Board of Governors,

Commissioner Villanueva-Maala found the respondent administratively liable for his failure
to attend to the request of complainant to look into his notarial book and recommended
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.

In its resolution dated October 25, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the findings
of Commissioner Villanueva-Maala but reduced the recommended penalty to a mere
reprimand; and referred the same to this Court.

Except for the penalty recommended, the Court agrees with the findings of the IBP Board of
Governors that respondent should be held administratively liable for not attending to
complainants request to look into his notarial book.

Before delving into the main issue of the case, we deem it proper to discuss two preliminary
matters.

First, it is noted that at the hearing scheduled on June 4, 2003, only the complainant
appeared.1 As a matter of procedure, the Investigating Commissioner should have
proceeded with the investigation ex parte pursuant to the provisions of Section 8, Rule 139-
B of the Rules of Court.2 The Investigating Commissioner should have required the
complainant to present evidence to substantiate his allegations. However, instead of
proceeding with the hearing, the Investigating Commissioner issued an order requiring
both parties to submit their respective memoranda within 15 days from the date of issuance
of the order, with respect to the complainant, and within 15 days from notice with respect
to respondent. Despite due receipt of the said order on June 18, 2003, respondent failed to
submit the required memorandum. The Investigating Commissioners Report and
Recommendation was dated September 16, 2003 while the resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors adopting and approving said Report and Recommendation was passed on
October 25, 2003. The records of the case do not show that from June 18, 2003 until
October 25, 2003, respondent had taken any action or that he submitted the required
memorandum. Consequently, he is deemed to have waived not only his right to file said
memorandum but also the right to a hearing.

Second, the complaint against respondent is in connection with the discharge of his
functions as a notary public, and not as an elected barangay chairman. Thus, the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees invoked by complainant
will not apply to the present administrative complaint against respondent. Respondent, as a
lawyer and a notary public, is covered by the Code of Professional Responsibility and Code
of Professional Ethics.

Coming to the main issue in the instant case, despite absence of reception of evidence, as
required by Sec. 8, Rule 139-B, Rules of Court, we find the following admissions made by
the respondent in his Answer to the complaint, to wit:

(1)He has been commissioned as a Notary Public for Guagua, Pampanga with obligation
to submit his notarial book and documents every month and each time he applies
for a commission to the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga;3

(2)His notarial books covering 2001-2002 were presented before the Clerk of Court for
the renewal of his notarial commission for the succeeding year but was returned to
him after verification because of limited working space in the office of the Clerk of
Court which is shared by Branch 53, RTC, Guagua, Pampanga;4

(3)He was notified by Clerk of Court Bacani regarding the request of complainant to
examine some notarized documents in his notarial book;5

sufficient to hold him liable for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Respondent likewise admitted in his Answer that he received complainants letter-request

dated February 20, 2003. However, he claims that said letter-request was belatedly shown
to him by a member of his household. We find this a lame excuse. Granting that
complainants letter-request was belatedly shown to respondent, elementary rules of
courtesy still dictate that respondent should have, at the least, responded to complainants
request to look at his notarial book. This is expected from respondent especially when the
one requesting is a colleague in the same profession. Moreover, respondent admitted that
Clerk of Court Bacani had earlier notified him of the request of complainant. Respondent
simply ignored the requests of both complainant and Clerk of Court Bacani.

Even if the subject notarial book was, as claimed by him, indeed lost by reason of flooding
in his place of residence, although there is no evidence to prove this belated self-serving
assertion, respondent could have easily written a letter or called up Clerk of Court Bacani to
inform him of such loss so that the complainant may be informed thereof in due time.

Respondent further contends that he could have easily helped complainant had the latter
personally gone to see him and showed him the particular document that needed to be
verified.Respondents contention and inaction smacks of arrogance and dereliction of his
duty to bring the notarial books and documents to the Clerk of Court upon request of the
latter. Worse, it speaks of his failure to live up to the exacting standards of conduct
demanded from each and every member of the legal profession as mandated by the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Code of Professional Ethics.

Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall conduct
himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues and shall
avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. Canon 22 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics provides that the conduct of a lawyer before the court and with other lawyers should
be characterized by candor and fairness. Indeed, the obligations of a member of the bar
include the observance of honorable, candid and courteous dealing with other lawyers,
fidelity to known and recognized customs and practices of the profession, and performance
of duties to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.6

Thus, respondent is guilty of unprofessional conduct. Unprofessional conduct in an attorney

is that which violates the rules or ethical code of his profession or which is unbecoming a
member of that profession.7

Under the circumstances, a mere reprimand is not sufficient. We deem it proper to impose
on respondent a fine in the amount of P5,000.00 not only for his unprofessional conduct but
also because his unjustified failure to heed complainants request or to inform complainant
or the Clerk of Court that the subject notarial books were lost in the flood, forced the latter
to go to the extent of filing the instant administrative case thereby wasting the time and
resources not only of the complainant and the IBP, but also of the Court.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Eddie R. Bansil GUILTY OF UNPROFESSIONAL

CONDUCT and FINED in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), with a warning
that a commission of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Once again, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is admonished to see to it that Section 8,
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court is observed by its Investigating Commissioners.

SO ORDERED.

Quisumbing, (Acting Chairman), Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Puno, (Chairman), J., on official leave.

January 9, 1973

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar Integration 1 submitted its Report dated November
30, 1972, with the "earnest recommendation" — on the basis of the said Report and the proceedings
had in Administrative Case No. 526 2 of the Court, and "consistently with the views and counsel
received from its [the Commission's] Board of Consultants, as well as the overwhelming nationwide
sentiment of the Philippine Bench and Bar" — that "this Honorable Court ordain the integration of the
Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the adoption and promulgation of an appropriate Court
Rule."

The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration of the Philippine
Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as far as possible and practicable to existing provincial and
other local Bar associations. On August 16, 1962, arguments in favor of as well as in opposition to
the petition were orally expounded before the Court. Written oppositions were admitted, 3 and all
parties were thereafter granted leave to file written memoranda. 4

Since then, the Court has closely observed and followed significant developments relative to the
matter of the integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction.

In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that there had grown a strong nationwide sentiment in
favor of Bar integration, the Court created the Commission on Bar Integration for the purpose of
ascertaining the advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar.

In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277 entitled "An Act Providing for the
Integration of the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds Therefor." The measure was signed by
President Ferdinand E. Marcos on September 17, 1971 and took effect on the same day as Rep. Act
6397. This law provides as follows:

SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may
adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such
conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession,
improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility more effectively.

SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated, out of any
funds in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to carry out the purposes
of this Act. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the same purpose shall
be included in the annual appropriations for the Supreme Court.

SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

The Report of the Commission abounds with argument on the constitutionality of Bar integration and
contains all necessary factual data bearing on the advisability (practicability and necessity) of Bar
integration. Also embodied therein are the views, opinions, sentiments, comments and observations
of the rank and file of the Philippine lawyer population relative to Bar integration, as well as a
proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission and presented to them by that body in a
national Bar plebiscite. There is thus sufficient basis as well as ample material upon which the Court
may decide whether or not to integrate the Philippine Bar at this time.

The following are the pertinent issues:

(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar?

(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?

(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time?
A resolution of these issues requires, at the outset, a statement of the meaning of Bar integration. It
will suffice, for this purpose, to adopt the concept given by the Commission on Bar Integration on
pages 3 to 5 of its Report, thus:

Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer
population of the Philippines. This requires membership and financial support (in
reasonable amount) of every attorney as conditions sine qua non to the practice of
law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.

The term "Bar" refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the
Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or Unified Bar) perforce must include all
lawyers.

Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with power to do

so: the State. Bar integration, therefore, signifies the setting up by Government
authority of a national organization of the legal profession based on the recognition of
the lawyer as an officer of the court.

Designed to improve the position of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and the
Rule of Law, integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and ensures, through their
own organized action and participation, the promotion of the objectives of the legal
profession, pursuant to the principle of maximum Bar autonomy with minimum
supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court.

The purposes of an integrated Bar, in general, are:

(1) Assist in the administration of justice;

(2) Foster and maintain on the part of its members high ideals of integrity, learning,
professional competence, public service and conduct;

(3) Safeguard the professional interests of its members;

(4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and brotherhood;

(5) Provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence, law reform, pleading,
practice and procedure, and the relations of the Bar to the Bench and to the public,
and publish information relating thereto;

(6) Encourage and foster legal education;

(7) Promote a continuing program of legal research in substantive and adjective law,
and make reports and recommendations thereon; and

(8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility effectively.

Integration of the Bar will, among other things, make it possible for the legal
profession to:

(1) Render more effective assistance in maintaining the Rule of Law;

 (2) Protect lawyers and litigants against the abuse of tyrannical judges and
prosecuting officers;

(3) Discharge, fully and properly, its responsibility in the disciplining and/or removal
of incompetent and unworthy judges and prosecuting officers;

(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own
forum, from the assaults that politics and self-interest may level at it, and assist it to
maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence;

(5) Have an effective voice in the selection of judges and prosecuting officers;

(6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law, and break up any monopoly of local
practice maintained through influence or position;

(7) Establish welfare funds for families of disabled and deceased lawyers;

(8) Provide placement services, and establish legal aid offices and set up lawyer
reference services throughout the country so that the poor may not lack competent
legal service;

(9) Distribute educational and informational materials that are difficult to obtain in
many of our provinces;

(10) Devise and maintain a program of continuing legal education for practising
attorneys in order to elevate the standards of the profession throughout the country;

(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards, and promulgate minimum fees schedules;

(12) Create law centers and establish law libraries for legal research;

(13) Conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal rights and obligations,
on the importance of preventive legal advice, and on the functions and duties of the
Filipino lawyer; and

(14) Generate and maintain pervasive and meaningful country-wide involvement of

the lawyer population in the solution of the multifarious problems that afflict the
nation.

Anent the first issue, the Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of
its power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law." Indeed, the power to
integrate is an inherent part of the Court's constitutional authority over the Bar. In providing that "the
Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar," Republic Act
6397 neither confers a new power nor restricts the Court's inherent power, but is a mere legislative
declaration that the integration of the Bar will promote public interest or, more specifically, will "raise
the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively."
Resolution of the second issue — whether the unification of the Bar would be constitutional —
hinges on the effects of Bar integration on the lawyer's constitutional rights of freedom of association
and freedom of speech, and on the nature of the dues exacted from him.

The Court approvingly quotes the following pertinent discussion made by the Commission on Bar
Integration pages 44 to 49 of its Report:

Constitutionality of Bar Integration

Judicial Pronouncements.

In all cases where the validity of Bar integration measures has been put in issue, the
Courts have upheld their constitutionality.

The judicial pronouncements support this reasoning:

— Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the practice of law.

— The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege; a privilege, moreover,
clothed with public interest, because a lawyer owes duties not only to his client, but
also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation; and takes part
in one of the most important functions of the State, the administration of justice, as
an officer of the court.

— Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with public interest, it is far and
just that the exercise of that privilege be regulated to assure compliance with the
lawyer's public responsibilities.

— These public responsibilities can best be discharged through collective action; but
there can be no collective action without an organized body; no organized body can
operate effectively without incurring expenses; therefore, it is fair and just that all
attorneys be required to contribute to the support of such organized body; and, given
existing Bar conditions, the most efficient means of doing so is by integrating the Bar
through a rule of court that requires all lawyers to pay annual dues to the Integrated
Bar.

1. Freedom of Association.

To compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar is not violative of his

constitutional freedom to associate (or the corollary right not to associate).

Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not
already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar
examinations. All that integration actually does is to provide an official national
organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which
every lawyer is already a member.

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to
attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to
vote in its elections as he chooses. The body compulsion to which he is subjected is
the payment of annual dues.
Otherwise stated, membership in the Unified Bar imposes only the duty to pay dues
in reasonable amount. The issue therefore, is a question of compelled financial
support of group activities, not involuntary membership in any other aspect.

The greater part of Unified Bar activities serves the function of elevating the
educational and ethical standards of the Bar to the end of improving the quality of the
legal service available to the people. The Supreme Court, in order to further the
State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional services, may
require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the
subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers.

Assuming that Bar integration does compel a lawyer to be a member of the

Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the
State. The legal profession has long been regarded as a proper subject of legislative
regulation and control. Moreover, the inherent power of the Supreme Court to
regulate the Bar includes the authority to integrate the Bar.

2. Regulatory Fee.

For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the
Court levies a tax.

A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction for regulation, while the
purpose of a tax is revenue. If the Court has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it
follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that
purpose. It would not be possible to push through an Integrated Bar program without
means to defray the concomitant expenses. The doctrine of implied powers
necessarily includes the power to impose such an exaction.

The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the Bar is that the regulation
does not impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by the
integration of the Bar far outweighs the inconsequential inconvenience to a member
that might result from his required payment of annual dues.

3. Freedom of Speech.

A lawyer is free, as he has always been, to voice his views on any subject in any
manner he wishes, even though such views be opposed to positions taken by the
Unified Bar.

For the Integrated Bar to use a member's due to promote measures to which said
member is opposed, would not nullify or adversely affect his freedom of speech.

Since a State may constitutionally condition the right to practice law upon
membership in the Integrated Bar, it is difficult to understand why it should become
unconstitutional for the Bar to use the member's dues to fulfill the very purposes for
which it was established.

The objection would make every Governmental exaction the material of a "free
speech" issue. Even the income tax would be suspect. The objection would carry us
to lengths that have never been dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if his
 liberties were to be thus extended, might refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of
war or of any other end condemned by his conscience as irreligious or immoral. The
right of private judgment has never yet been exalted above the powers and the
compulsion of the agencies of Government.

4. Fair to All Lawyers.

Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already practising because although the
requirement to pay annual dues is a new regulation, it will give the members of the
Bar a new system which they hitherto have not had and through which, by proper
work, they will receive benefits they have not heretofore enjoyed, and discharge their
public responsibilities in a more effective manner than they have been able to do in
the past. Because the requirement to pay dues is a valid exercise of regulatory
power by the Court, because it will apply equally to all lawyers, young and old, at the
time Bar integration takes effect, and because it is a new regulation in exchange for
new benefits, it is not retroactive, it is not unequal, it is not unfair.

To resolve the third and final issue — whether the Court should ordain the integration of the Bar at
this time — requires a careful overview of the practicability and necessity as well as the advantages
and disadvantages of Bar integration.

In many other jurisdictions, notably in England, Canada and the United States, Bar integration has
yielded the following benefits: (1) improved discipline among the members of the Bar; (2) greater
influence and ascendancy of the Bar; (3) better and more meaningful participation of the individual
lawyer in the activities of the Integrated Bar; (4) greater Bar facilities and services; (5) elimination of
unauthorized practice; (6) avoidance of costly membership campaigns; (7) establishment of an
official status for the Bar; (8) more cohesive profession; and (9) better and more effective discharge
by the Bar of its obligations and responsibilities to its members, to the courts, and to the public. No
less than these salutary consequences are envisioned and in fact expected from the unification of
the Philippine Bar.

Upon the other hand, it has been variously argued that in the event of integration, Government
authority will dominate the Bar; local Bar associations will be weakened; cliquism will be the
inevitable result; effective lobbying will not be possible; the Bar will become an impersonal Bar; and
politics will intrude into its affairs.

It is noteworthy, however, that these and other evils prophesied by opponents of Bar integration
have failed to materialize in over fifty years of Bar integration experience in England, Canada and
the United States. In all the jurisdictions where the Integrated Bar has been tried, none of the abuses
or evils feared has arisen; on the other hand, it has restored public confidence in the Bar, enlarged
professional consciousness, energized the Bar's responsibilities to the public, and vastly improved
the administration of justice.

How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar integration? The official statistics compiled by the
Commission on Bar integration show that in the national poll recently conducted by the Commission
in the matter of the integration of the Philippine Bar, of a total of 15,090 lawyers from all over the
archipelago who have turned in their individual responses, 14,555 (or 96.45 per cent) voted in favor
of Bar integration, while only 378 (or 2.51 per cent) voted against it, and 157 (or 1.04 per cent) are
non-commital. In addition, a total of eighty (80) local Bar association and lawyers' groups all over the
Philippines have submitted resolutions and other expressions of unqualified endorsement and/or
support for Bar integration, while not a single local Bar association or lawyers' group has expressed
opposed position thereto. Finally, of the 13,802 individual lawyers who cast their plebiscite ballots on
the proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission, 12,855 (or 93.14 per cent) voted in
favor thereof, 662 (or 4.80 per cent) vote against it, and 285 (or 2.06 per cent) are non-
committal. 5 All these clearly indicate an overwhelming nationwide demand for Bar integration at this
time.

The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced
in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the
exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is
"perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable," within the context of contemporary conditions
in the Philippines, has become an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal profession,
improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully
and effectively.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII of the
Constitution, hereby ordains the integration of the Bar of the Philippines in accordance with the
attached COURT RULE, effective on January 16, 1973.

Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castillo, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio
and Esguerra, JJ., concur.