<-soiiiiibiln:arein Dr, Florian Bieber European Center of Minority issues Pluralism and Complex Power-Sharing in Post-Conflict Societie: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina When riots erupted over the reconstruction the Farkaclia mosque in Banja Luks in May 2001 anti at the same time Ine dominant Crnat pany, tho Croatian Demonratic Community (HOZ), continued its pslicy of boycetting Bosnian insitutions, it seemed as if the fragile intoratanie pear, ectahlichedl in Dayton, Qhia in Novernber 1395, might disintegrate. In ralty,chese crses mecely reflect the continuing dominence of ethniaity in post-war Bosma. These events can alsabe viewsd asa msporse of naionaist poltical parties (0 a recent Lerd away idom ethnic separation and suxprcion to a more iniegrated Bomie. A key decision by the Consitutional Court ard the establishment of new governments atthe level of entices and joint instvutiors withaue nationalist parties for the fist time since 1990 seem to point towards a more muluinationsl Bosnia. Tiroughuu, tie past decade Bosnia has experienced broad range of mterathmic relations, rom peace and co.meistence to war and cepstation. After the bref csnwuccessfol atempt of power sharing from 1990/1, the reminder of the fst half of the ‘iecade wat shaped by sttempis to dismantle power-sharing structures nd co-existence through mass murder, oxauislons and separation. The years following the Dayton Peace Accords ‘DPA: have brought peace, but only limited success in fundamentally improving interathnic relations anc establishing a Tenctioning system of joire dedslan making between the three predlerninant natioval groups of the cuuirty. The current institutional structure of Besria deaws from a vasiety of cifferent insitutions and systems. oi power-sharing Itinclides eroments fram preaivar institutions (such 26 the zoliecive Presidency), incorporates layere of governance that emarged during the wartsuch as the wo entties, and borrows rom other cases and theoratical models of Dower sharing. 5 a consequence, the argument can be rade that the system of power- sharing in Bosnia does net consttute any news type of arranging interethnic relations This paper will aque, however, thet the novehy af pox-Dayton Bosnia lies in the complenity of the existing ingitutional syactore regulating interethnic relations. The complesity és condikioned bots by the rauliple fayers of governance insteuced by We Dayton Peace Arcords and also the additional netwark of internatenal organizations Gitecty engaged—be it in an act hoc oF an institutionalized form—in the adminstiation ang decaicnemaking process in Bastia, Session 4: lucien mIlematiors! Pet. Cate Stig Plain and DemocracyThe Structure of Bosnian Power-Sharing Consideration of the insttuttonal infrastructure in Bosnia i frequently limited to the Dayton Peace Accords alone. This definition, however, would exclude other significant centers of power—and subsequentiy ako of (petentiait power-sharing, [AS the war in Bosnia was based on claim to sell-determination by the dominant politica! representatives 0! two ofthe three nations of Bosnia the settlement is preoccupied with leedconstructing political center, with limited) competences vested in it, The ‘constitution nf Bosnia and Herzegovina, annexe! to the DPA, thus mostly governs the joinc institutions of the stare ‘The constitution, just as most of the other annexes to the DPA, tres to combine three conceptions of statehood and peace-building: First, it is based on the outcome of the war, rellecting the unwillingness of the international community to significantly aller the miicary ard poltécal balance with the use of force.® Consequertiy, the se:tlement had to make concessions on the basis of ‘military might rather then legitimate demands of the representatives of the national communities. Second, the DPA sought to establish a t-national state, which grants Bosriacs, Croats and Serbs equal pretecton and ensures poical representation ard power on the basis ff the groups’ numerical sength, Winie a wienational state wth significant powers granted to the national groups does flow ftom the demands of the Serb and Croat leadership the early phases of the war, tis concept had to estabish a political balance which dic not equal to the military balance during the war ie. the largest nation in Bosnia, ene Bosnacs, was the weakest party in (in Face victim oP the war had to receive Stronger representation in te institutions than their actual military strength would have suggested Third, the peace agreement did, although in a limited scope, recognize some civic features of the state, The permeation of excksive group rapeesentaion through the insttutional system is extensive. In its references to Bosnian cizens (as opposes to just the three nations, and in is commitment to refugee retuin, there has been some attempt inthe Dayton Peace Accords to reverse some of the consequences of the war and the “ethnification” of all spheres of public lie. ‘The peace accords had soughe to strike a balance between competing demands, such a the demands of the secessionist movements among Cioats and Serbs (.e. the ‘cognition ofthe Republika Spska asa separate entity), demands ofthe all nauonalst partes, including the Bostiac SDA, and, at the some time, to allow space for the Sevelopment of new peitical elites who would demonstrate greater wilingness than the war-time parties to work with each ather and with the international commanity While there has been no formal change ofthe Dayton Agreement since te ratication it late 1995, the practice has developed and changed ofthe substance of power-sharing in Bosnia, Most significant, the role ofthe international actors. especialy the High Representativa, hs been enhanced in recent years. The Peace implementation Counc 80 tation and Be acracy te cami cali granted the High Representative the power to remove affcias tom office and to impose Jaws. This effected not only the decision-making process, but also the balance of power between the diferent political actors in Bosnia, mastly in the fox af open support for moderate poitical partes and a range of measures (eg. dimisal ef oficial, banning of parties taken against nationalist parties. The origins ofthe power-sharing arrangement in Bosnia places a burden on is success Despite the fact that it includes some e'ements that predate the peace accords and that draw on established insttutional mechanisms such as the presidency sistem, the current power-sharing in Bosnia is widely perceived as being “imported” rather than a result of the wilt ofthe polity, ce a leas ofthe political representatives of national groups Past practices in power-sharing arrangements do suggest that mechanisms, which are perceived as “indigenous” rather than externally imposed have a higher lkeihood of access ‘The two predominant features of the current institutional set-up are (a) a consociational arrangement at the level of the joint state institutions, mixed with, (b} an asymmetric ‘multinational federation Power-Sharing at the Center “The execut’ve body of Bosnia requires the panicipation ofall thee rational groups. The instttionat system attempts to ensure the representation of Bosnacs, Croats, and Serbs, a well as veto for all groups on questions of “vital interest." While a number of ‘consociationat arrangements in mukinatonal states (e.g. Switzetlanc. Lebanon) are at least in part informal and not an aspect of the constitutional setup, power sharing in Bosnia is prescribed by the Dayton constitution tothe last etalk Te highest state organ-the Presidancy, which combines repreventative functions with the foreign policy of Bosnia—embodies equal representation and the veta power for each group. Notonly is one Croat, Serb and Bosniac represented inthe Presidency, but the meinbers are also elected by the two entities separately. The Presidency is thus based on territorial and national representation.” ‘The concitionalty fr office holders in terms of national identity, slongsde with thelr territorial base, resulting in an etectorate that is not congruent with this ethnic division, és institutionaized not only on the level of the Presidency. but also in other joint insttsions (eg. House of Peoples, Governing Board of the Cental Bank) This double delimitation raises a number of questions. As the main cleavage cutting across Bosna is doubtlessly ethnicity, as opposed to regional identity, the Presidency members are arguably elected to represent primarily theie respective nation and only secondarily ete entity. While the war created largely homogeneous entities, some level of diversity eemained both in the Federation and in the Repubsika Spska (RS, which was enhanced by the smal number of refugee returns.” The electorate of the Presidency members is thus not inherently mono-ethnic. Theoreticians have argued! over the utility father groups participating in the vote for representatives ofthe other group. Some, as Plaisn and Demeictaey anLiphart, have argued that in'a power-sharing arrangement, the representative should represent their respective community and any dilution ofthis principle might undermine ther legitimacy and ability to negotiate with other groups’ cepresentative on behalf of their group. Others have eGlintered this angument with the observation that with the cco-paricipation of other groups, the elected leavers might be more moderate than representatives who are selected on a purely monc-ethnic basis The realty of the Presidency in Bosnia since 1995/6 suggests that neither of the two interpretations apply inthis case: the Presidency members have been generaly regarded as legitimate leaders af their respective nation, mostly because they did not moderate thei platform to garner minority support. This can be attributed, in part, tothe relately law number of other rations living in the two entities, Instead, the past elections to the Presidency have de jacto deprived a segment of the population from representation in the Presidency.* Serbs from the Federation and Bosniacs and Croats in the Republika Srpska have thus had ne representation of thei own in the Presidency. Rather, they have had to rely on the—frequently inadequate—representation by members oftheir nation irom the other entity, This not oaly raises questions about the inclusiveness. of democratic representation, but. it also stands in conflict.with the principle of refugee retum, which, if carried out, would transform both entities into multinational tecritories again, ‘The sigidity of the instcutions has been remarked upon by the Constitutional Court in regard to the Federation. ls’ ebservations do, however, also apply to the level af joint institutions: "there is at least on sviking difference i the electoral mechanisms of Belgium on the one hand, and the federation of BIH on the other, particular as far asthe right to tard as a candidate is concerned, The Belgian. system does not preclude per se the right to stand as a candidate salely on the ground of language, Every citizen can stand aé a candidate, but has— lupon his election—decide whether be will tke the oath in French of in Flemish. It is therefore the subjective choice of the individual candidate "whether to rake the oath in French or in Flemish and thereby to “represent” 4 specific language group, whereas provision of the Constitution of the Federation of BIH provide fora priow etinitaly defined Bosniac and Croat delegates, caucus and velo powers for them.” [Besides the rigidity of ethnicity in the Presidency, a number of problems can be identified with a presidential system as part of power-sharing in general A presidential system, even if exercised in the moderated form of a Presidency, personifies ethnicity ‘more than a cabinet-based system, and renders a distribution of power mare dificult. ‘The degree of mstitutionaliztion of power-sharing s not as strong in the joint government, although formal regulatory mechanisms to ensure broad representation exist. The Counc ! BR etraligm and Democracy rational group. AS the Chair of the Counc of Ministers must be nominated by.the== a Presidency, and helshe ard hisher goverament must be approved by the Howe-of Representatives, there are additional in-built mechanisms insuring the indusion ofthe «i cifferent navonal groups in government.** Like the Presidency, the competences of the sovernment are ined, reflected inthe smal sizeof the government... ‘The overall emphasis of ethnic belonging in the executive and legislature of Bosnia doBS =a cenjure a permanent grand coalition ofthe three national groups, AC the sare toe, te ‘over.insituionalizeton provides litle flexity in the executive power-sharing ‘Among 2 number af addtional dificulties associated with the particular institutional get- Up in Bosria isthe near total exclusion of “others® or “citizens.” from the power-sharing arrangement, The constitution recognizes “citizens” as a quasiseparate group ftom the three national groups, while the insttutional—jst as the political and social—reality 2 ignotes the exétence of other minorties, citizens of mixed mariages, and those not vwiling or able to identity with the national groups. This group—‘ctizens"—whose strength is near to impossibie to determine, isnot guaranteed representation ™.A legal. scholar recently posed! the rhetorical question: “Who defends the vital interests ofthe - Citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovinat"™ Until early 2001, the answer to this question ‘would have to be “nobody.” The High Representative did, however exiablsh two constitationai commissions for both entities in January 2001, which are charged with safeguarding the interested of the three constituent nations, and the “ethers.” * Both commissions contain four members ofall four groups and the rajoriy of each group can object t0 2 proposed regulation, law or decision of the entities fit discriminates against ther group. The commission is charged with resolving the claim, and, iit cannot agree, relers it to the High Representative, The commissions, a provisional institution, pending the incorporation of the Constitutional Court decision on the constituent people in the entities (see above). thus provide for protection of citizens who are not members ofthe three national groups. Bosnia as a Multinational Federation ct yn wage In Bosnia, power-sharing at the center accounts for only a small segment of the ‘actual "> power exercised by eleced officals. The high degree of decentralization towards the - entities has transformed the originally unitary state into a highly decenualized one=The cis constitution of Bosnia and the Daytan Peace Accords conspict vORTSE atiplriral Sea ascription of the nature of the sate. In fact, the previous atzibution ,Republiceawak = dropped, resulting inthe county's oficial name being only. "Bosnia and Herzegow The extent of power vested in the two entities would suggest thatthe country is atleast a federation. The term “federation,” however, is already reserved for the;tFede Bosnia and Herzegovina” that encompasses the predominantly Gasniac-and Croat $1 Praiom and Democracy =spercent ofthe country. Ths, whats Bosnia? The Constttional Cour has, for example, ‘compared Bosnia with federal states, suggesting that Bosnia iesefisa federation ™ Mos. “studies of federal systems distinguish between “federalizing states” (e.g Belgium) and {federations deriving irom an agreement between diferent ants (e.g. USA, Suitzerlanch This disincion not only bears historical importance, but algo determines tne ariginl (and frequently stil primary) devel of authority. Bosnia constitutes 2 curious mixture cot both sjstems. On one hand, the current state possesses same elements af continuity Ewith the prewar state and is the legal successor to the Republic of Bosnia and | Herzegovina’, suggesting a “ederaliting state,” On the other hand, none of the pre- war institutions as incorporated in the new sate, weakening the conection to pre. war and wartime Bosnia," While the degree of decentralization suggests that Bosnia is at feast a federation, itis ‘more dificult to determine whether Sosnia might be a confederation. Two factors in Particular would suggest that Rosnia isin facta confederation. Fist, Uwe (act that one of its constituent units cals tse, and by its stacture i, a federation. could be viewed as an indicator of the confederal nature of Bosnia’ More imgortanly, the lack of compentences of the joint state in the sphere of defense" and the existence of two ‘Separate armies of the ‘ntities séem to point to a confederal stale. A confederation Would, however, suggest that the constituting unis are in fact dominant and have Supremacy over the central authorities. The structure of Bosnia daes neverthelecs {establish the supremacy of the joint institutions over the entities» Ae a result, Bosnia could be considered a foose mutinational federation." In addition to being a highly decentralized federation, Bosnia & also an asymmetric federation from at least two Points of view. First, the fact thatthe sub-units are constituted very differently: one isa loose federation consisting of ter cantons and two predomninant nations, and the second 3 ilormaly) centralized republic of one dominant nation. Second, the existence of a thir unit, the distct oF Bra provides for asymmetry, Br?ko, officially thi separate Unit "condominium" since March 1999 has the same competences as the two other nities, however, only in coordination with them. As the district formally belongs to i both entities simultaneously, it aso lacks inclvidual representation in joint institutions = This asymmetry of Bosnia has meant that in realty, the types 6f governance in the country vary greatly in terms of power-sharing, but aso in other aspects. Ths posts Particular problems to Besnia that do not apply to other federations, be they based on ational orteritora! criteria, ~ In addition, tome general questions arise with regard to multinational federdtichs in eneml: numberof factors seem to puitinto question the adequacy ofa federal system {or « multinational setting, The existence of tertorialzed national groups in the form of federal unis frequently cates a fear of secession, In the regional Context the demand 4 for a republican status, ie. being a federal unit, by some Albanians in Kosovo within CRs _, Yesoslavia in the 1900s was widely perceived as a demand for gratia sccesvion ron: in.” the state Sirilany the cemands of some Albantan poltcians in Macedonia fer octal | autonomy andlor fedetaization of Maceduris have cause such fears among the inajority. This fear can be found equally in ater interethnic disputes around the rod, especially when the demand for faderalization i raised at times of high tensions Even ifthe possible danger of separation in Bosnia has been reduced by excluding any reference to self-determination of either the nations or the entities in the constitution, and politically by the international presence, the concept of 3 multinational federation does not fully address this fear, Decentialized territorial unis that are defined primarily in ethnic terms tend to accelerate the homogenization af these unites er, inthe case of Bosnia, aay the *re- mixing” of the population. The temitoralization of ethnic identity fellows the (awed) sssumption that “good fences make good neighbors’ The resulting segregation and minimal contact between the nations does reduce the coltical and emotional ‘nvestmort of the nations constituting the state ant preclude a reconstruction of trust through interaction om an every-day bass. It furthermore reinforces the division of the stale’ polty: Will Kymlcka has argued thet multinational federations encourage ‘centripetal tendencies, which zesult in a weaker institutional reality than intended in the constitution, ** AS result ofthis and other deficiencies, Kymlicka has challenged the desiabilty of multinational federations: “For all these reasons, it seems likely that ‘multinational federalism will be plagued with instability, and may eventually devolve into a confederation o simply break up." Problems of the Current System Few would argue that Bosnia has been governed effectively since the Dayton Peace ‘Accords. Not only has progress in some key areas of governance—such as economic reforms, effective institutions and reconstruction ean limited, but also the degree of successful decision-making between representatives of the different national communities bas been minimal. Thus the question is raised whether power-sharing actually did take place in the past five and half years. This development, combined with the objective need for sustained intemational intervention n the politcal proces, has lead 2 nurnber of observers to conclude that the power sharing sructue of Bosnia as insted inthe PA, is fundamentally awed. **" In fact the weaknesses oten atnbuted to DPA ae limited almost exclusively © the corstitution (Annex 4). Proponents of a “Dayton 2° generally point to flaws in the constitution, which could be adtessed without a change o te overall peace plan = Furthermore, one is to identify the weaknesses of the power-sharing system (or/and the absence thereof, it emerges that—the flaws of the constitutional arrangement not \withstanding—most of the difficulties in establishing successut governance in Bosnia ere ot associated with the power-sharing system embodiad in the constitution, but rather have to do with institutions and mechanisms which ether precede or have followed the Dayton Peace Accords 85 Pluralism and Oemocracyi ds alon ane has t© = Frstutional arrangement of the Dayton Peace Accords alone, Rather, one has examine two additional aspects: the functioning of the entities, and the role of the Jnternational community. The entities constitute the level of primary political power in Bosnia, The constitution of Bosnia explicitly grants them “all governmental functions and powers not exoressiy assigned in... (the] constitution to the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina.“ The ‘power ofthe entities thus covers most aspects of governance with the exception Timited areas, such as foreign policy, customs, and monetary policy." In adeitor. he power-sharing atthe level ofthe joint institutions has meant in practice that the nosocal ‘center is frequenty dominated by political representatives whose primary Kavaky ies with the entities, the national groups they represent, and—often most impoesarc-— With the nationalist) political party they represent. + —This power vested-in the joint institutions; however, ¥6 in no“way matches t+ the: competences allocated to, and real political power exercised by, the entities, “pesoige theie political weight in Bosnia, beth the Federation of Bosnia-Hemenira ax he Republika Srpska have been unable to exercise elfecive control over thes ~SseMe teritories, Both the Federation and the Republika Srpska have been interas ahwsed for most of the past five and a hail years. In the Federation, the areas in rer=asina controled by the HOZ as result of the war were never etfectively integras= imam the! structures of the Federation. The Croatian cantons and army units “paints institutional structures with each other and until the end of HDZ=raie = January 2000, also with Croatia. The situation was the same ducing the PEARS the offical disbanding of “Herceg-Bosna” with the establishment of the S=arcauam i 1994 and the establishment ofthe Croat self government in March 2002 In 1997, the OSCE observed in an internal study that the area “ia evers _Atiltary and security matters to business tes, s part of Croatia, "= Abou he ‘of government in Croatia eventually lead to 2 cessation of funding of Shas = instttions, formal and informal institutions remained separate from Se =: __ mostly due to the continuing dominance of the HOZ in the Croat omirant= the Herzegovina. Awhile there was a Visible decline in the institutions of “Herceg Bossa iw: 24 ‘both, on the weakening of the HDZ and the more assertive role of tee implementing agencies," non federation Croat institutions reer? ir. 2 ‘Ater the HOZ, under the leadership of the then-Crost wieraber a ae 3 Presidency, Ante Jelav?, declared a withdrawal from the joiat Festeamni in March 2601, both international and domestic observers neces an Sm between the newly-formed Croat sel goverment and oreaising bee aren” Croat sel-gavernmment censequently marks in part the acknowledgment of pre-existing stcuctures rather than creation of new cnes. The recent political crisis in the Federation thus has only brought to light and exacerbated a pre-existing. deficiency of the Federation Unlike in the Federation, where the weakness are closely internvined with its decentralization, the dystunctianality ofthe Repubiike Seas is caused by failed political centzalization and geographic disintegration, The aim of te Serbian wartime leadership, 5 evidenced in the name Republika Srpska, sought to establish a contiguous tertory, which would form a joint state with Serbia’Yugoslavia in the futur. The esabiishment of a ceniraized and unified “republic* had been one of the primary demands at all peace conferences by the Serbian Democratic Patty." The Dayron Peace Accords, however, only parly fulfilled this demand. The territory defined as Republika Srpska consists out of two tetris, linked only by the ety of Br2ko in Nosthera Bosnia, hich was governed by the Republika Saska pending intemational arbitration. With the decison of the snterational arbiters in March 1998, the city ard the surounding county has been transformed into a condominium, thus removing the only link berween the two separate pars ofthe RS. Not unlike the seif-deciared Croatian autonomy in March 2001, the arbitration decision revealed a weakness.otthe.entiyy rather than creating it. The aritation, which occurted atthe same time as the cemoval from office of the present of the RS, Nikola Poplagen, and shorty belote the NATO bombardment of Kosowo began, created considerable oppostion on the side of the polticalelte ofthe 85.0 Nevertheless, for a number of years before the BrIko decision, te Republika Sipsia had already been divided politically, and de facco geographically. The spit emerged in the course of the dispute between Biljana Pla8i? and Momtilo Krainik over the degree of cooperation withthe international agencies in the Bosnia in 1996/7. This confit effectively erded the control of the RS government over its eastern par. ven after the departure of both Krajérile and Plavi? fram the politcal scene in the . akermath of the 1996 elections, the government had only limited influence over al of the Republika Sepska; in many respects, geography played into the hands of political 5. divisions. In addition, neither the nationalist govemment, nor the more moderate one of Milorad Dodik, could claim significant economic, social or political progress in the ently 2° Two key factors contributing to the dysfunctionality of the Republika Srpska been the detrimental roe of Slobodan MiloSevi? and the continued economic and tial decline of Serbia in the second half ofthe 1990s. In addition, the division of the litical elite of the Republika Sypska over co-operation with the international mmunity rendered governance more difficult. Although the Republika Sepska itself snot provide Jor power-sharing at any level and emphasizes its “Serb” nature ed pany by the Constitutional Court ruling in 2000), the government of Milorad. and current of Mladen Wani?, has had to rely onthe support of Bosniac parties. form of power-sharing has been largely informal and has allowed for ony limited paticipation of non-Seeb partis in governance. Their suppor was mosty based the interest in avoiding the rete of an extreme nationals government. The onal electoral law which allowed refugees to vote in their original piace of © has mada the political representation of the Republika Srpcka more diverse it actual population latribution. For example. in the November 2000 elections for 8beyond the coalition between moderate Serb, Bossa and. Croat partes in the Repubika Spa, t wouk be maleadng to describe the tats qu ss bone sharing The Consttutional Court decision of July 2000 could be consilered as important step in improving power-sharing on the level of entities. The court declared as uneonstitutional under the consitution of fosnia-Herzegovina parts of the entity constitutions whieh declared the respective nations to be the constituent nations of the entities." As 4 result, the entities are forced to change their constitution 50 to include all tree nations 45 constituent rations. While the court decision dogs not directly affect the institutional Set-up of both entites, changes in the nature of governance in both are to be expected! ‘once the court decision is incorporated nto the entives’ constitutions. The provisional _ nal commissions, aS outlined above, art 2 dvect result ofthe court ruling ane pi Symbaize the most significant institutional change in Bosnia since the Dayton Peace ‘Accords, leaving the augmented rote of the High Representative aside Role of the International Community Next to the entities the role ofthe Intemational community provides for a particular é challenge to the power-sharing system in Bosnia. The participation of international agencies in the implementation ofthe peace process has been widely viewed as being crucial in the success of maintaining peace in Bosnia." The role of intemational organizations was orginally intended at facilitating the domestic decsion making process by insuring adequate security for citizens (SFOR, IPTH, creating the economic framework for success governance (EU, UN# and by promoting democratic and more {clerant insttutions and processes (OSCB. Even the High Representative as the most influential.iternational representative in Bosnia was originaliy dimited to faciltate ‘monitor. ‘and cepor on the cian aspects of the peace process. One of his prime Powers was the final authority of the interpretation of the DPA,“ in recognition that these powers did not sulfice to successfully implement the peace accords, after 1997 the ‘High Representative was equipped with addit‘onal powers, which transformed him from 1-2 facittator to.an integral instiuxion of curent system’ of government in Bosnia > vipped with both legsiative and executive powers, the High Representative (HR) has {emerged as the most influential institution in Bosnia—and the only one not formally teased on power-sharing, ‘ince this increase in power to the High Representative, the office has passed over 100 laws and decisions—ranging fi isions—ranging fiom the state symbols and cense plates to persion fonds—and dismissed over 60 public officials form office, including a president of the eB Pluralism and Democracy RS Assembly, predominantly Federation-based parties—such as the SDA, Stranka 2a Bill (Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina), SDP and the Croat parties—gained near'y 20 ‘Bércent ofthe vote.** While the share of non-Serb population on the tector of che RS ‘before the war amounted t8 nearly SO%, the representation of Gosniacs and Croats in sas Parliament exceeds the current) demographic distribution, Nevertheless in the absence of effective decenvalization which would empower more nen-Serb or mixed adminisuations in areas of refugee return), and without any power-sharing mechanisms Republika Sepska 2nd the Croat representative of the Bosnian Presidency * Resting form this development, Bosnia has gained some attributes ofa protectorate since 1997, ‘his followed suggestions of a number of Bosnian intellectuals, who advocated a pioiectorate to reduce the cole of the nationalist partes! Until the postelection alton building in the winter af 2000/1, concrete improvements in the system of power sharing as @ result of the increased powsrs ofthe High Representative were not visible. The tangible success of the High Representative’s increased role has been the passing of significant legislation which would have either been postponed indefinitely or been watered down * The dismissal of public officials could also be interpreted as a success. The case has been made, however, that the successfui outcomes natwithstanding, the process in fact hur the development af power sharing structures, As Marcus Cox deta, the High Representative’s decsions relieve the paticipants inthe power-sharing strectures from negations and compromises, effecively relieving them from their responsibilities, and allowing nationalist politicians to advocate uncompromising positions without the fear of being blamed if no compromise is found." As a result, “nationalist politicians have often welcomed the High Bepresentative’s interventions, which relieve them of the responsiblity for difcut politcal postions." The power-sharing instutions in Bosnia, in adction to thei orignal weaknesses, have been further weakened by the strengthening of international intervention. Its nevertheless important to note that the representatives of the three: nationalist paties Cemanstrate lite willingness to engage in serious negetiations even before the enhancement of the HR's roe. Within the layers of governance, international representation is more closely intrinked with Bosnisn institutions, The Constitutional Court, the Human Rights Chamber ard the Central Bank incorporate significant international participation. The international judges and Governor ofthe central bank are not representatives of international organizations, ‘but merely appointed by them Ite European Court of Human Rights the Council of Europe and the IMF respectveiy). As such they became “Bosnian” actor, with the primary advantage of not being a member of the three national grougs and thus resembling a neutral arbiter and mediator within these institutions." The inclusion of international members into domestic institutions brings the advantage of not having to bypass domestic institutions to take decisions. in addition, the process of inter-ethnic negations in only slightly impaired, 1 examining the nature of the power-sharing mechanisms in Bosnia, it has become clear that the dysfunctional natute of the entities with regard to power-sharing and decision making, as well soe aspects ofthe international powers exercised in Bosnia contribute signfcarly to some key problems of the compiex institutional sracture of the county. Most of the power in the country is curently exercised by the High Representative or by the entities, Both of which have no, or only inadequate, power- sharing mechanisms, At the same time, the nature of the problems prohibits “quick Fixes” to te problems of power-sharing in Bosnia, 89 Plaralem and Democracy;_Allernatives to Dayton Both international observers and domestic politicians and intellectuals h é ns and intellectuals have argued for achange ofthe cuore tem o governance n Bons Mumba ie rae community engaged in ifplementing the DPA accords have, however boos ann arguing against changes in the ways the coun is governed, Pe ee frre changes we popes by the Stranka za BiH, led by the tice Se pons get vhs iy. 2 pe tected Bors Fonts agen enh Sentara cg tse hc inate a nr ate emer aor src os a cha tr he Co ri npn wot ay sang Federation to the whole country® The cantonization of all of Bosnia, as first proposed in the Vance- I, While deeecea ian Peace plan in 1893), could provide fora degree of decentraleation ithe asjmmetry ofthe slate and increase the need for co-operation, The Change and ‘ts partners emerging in the post motes henner incense tng a eatshee OO To tie the function yer te unctoning of powersharng to the elect oficial holding positon in ths operation pan ewide wer forthe probems ofthe syst, as 2 Teun of leg os oles elites remains posible. also neglecs the basic premises of pence ; 90 a Prim art Derg sharing institutions, which are intended to provide an incentve structure for an inelusion oF those paltical actors whose main interest might not he co-operation The aforementioned decision of the Constitutional Court has rased some fundamental questions, not only regerding the entities, but also the joint state, Many ofthe arguments of the Congitutonal Court discussed not only the canstitutonality af the insttutanalization of ethnic dominance, but also their impact on the quaity of democracy in Bosnia. The crtiasm of the exclasion of “others” in the Federation by ‘the Constitutional Court, mentioned above, can Be applied sialy tothe joint state, where the only difference to the Federtion lies in the inclusion of Serbs. “Others”, be they minorities or persons from ethnically-ixed marriages, remain excluded from many layers of the power-sharing structure. Its not only the exclusion of segments of the population that needs to be addressed on a state-wide lavebsit is also the over- institutionalization of ethnic identities, as detailed by the Constitutional Court with regard to the Federation and the election of officals!" The HDZ-declared Croat self-government has overshadowed and, some argue, hijacked”, an errerging constitutional debate in Bosnia about new ways to promote power-sharing. The acknowledgment by the High Representative in May 2001 of the possibilty to engage in constitutional changes provided an further step towards a reform... ‘of the institutional set-up of Bosnia!" While the new governments, cominated by the Alisnce for Change, seem to work more effective than previous nationalist ones, the eed to strengthen existing institutions is widely recognized. Such a project remains highty contentious, ang places the three naoral groups, as well as the multinational parties, on diferent sides. Conclusion ‘More chan five years ater the end of the war, some progress has been made in creating sustainable institutions, There remain, however, inherent hurdles to establishment of true power sharin institutions in Bosnia, With both dysfunctional entities and the strong role of the international community in diminishing co-operation between the political representatives of the rational communities, any significant development towards pluralistic institutions of a sustainable mukinational democracy wil be limited. The ongoing presence of radical nationalism among members of the three national .. groups, as evidenced by the riots in Banja Lula and Teébinje, ae well as by the Croat self-government, can be in interpreted in two fundamentally diffrent way. I ante vs to take a pessimistic interpretation of events, these incidents show the lack of fundamental progress despite the changes on the level of government and insitutions. Amore benign ineerpretaion would rather view. the aforementioned events as an expression-of,a | nationalist backlash to some fundamental improvement to the political system in Bosnia in the course of the past year. Hoth the Croat self government and the Serb riots were rot spontaneous even's, but clearly organized by the nationalist parties wi have been marginalized by politcal events, Whether their attempts to undermine steps towards ‘more sustainable Bosnia-Herzegovina are merely a backlash of forces of the past or whether they reflect tie continuing pervasiveness of extreme nationalism jn Bosnia will only become in the months to come. o Pluralism and DemocracyReferences $s * Hoan Biter, Eropean Cie fr Minoety Se, Sa, Mosse vigs 3. 877000 Sale Emel rebetyahoccom,Thspper assem eh enmng ate aul fr Mod oy ¥ Exensive bombing of itary postions te Repu Sisk dl ke plac npn 198, Thee wane ‘mecca ater thane ein ne poly fh te Daa contotaonl powee te ~ ican Hatook, he cannes attng end evar mdeenavice umssingenctine soos secemert wih the use of ce se lor ample, ey daw kemrenn e I Shree cases the suo th actin ofthe search pane ne deface ech of xl tie bans in the DPA, “Fiede ur Somer ttassoniat Dey Yeaegeeh ae ease erase Europa. npn, Yak 19, Ns tad rp ‘+ Uh chneceney, “aking Power Sng rk Lemons fom Succes an Pikes ic Cente Regan” illvhbetopr N15, ED » Tis thio change wth be adopt of «permanent ne. The OSCE OR prope aw sh iow ‘Esitesaeceabiedeiiata, bs tm Bsnan Counc of oien has ced een te Sas fromeutce the Rand ows a rom outs dete Pedra oon acne Meee Epos byte OSCEOMR, ned one weorrentrs el tensaal nd dover, sane: chp do ostan ofsonmentivamnesonioregel ene eee ‘>The constutons of Bosnaerzegovina ar he OPA at age oo not ates ot eh the member inthe dierent nations communtice alow or 3 Crab Bora ot» candle ot (368 decset to run ay aselcedared Serb ie alecons lor -epresteaton os Rano in Tesgene or cepresenation othe Repti Spa ‘wit Mend Upar, “The Powe Shang Approach” in Coc and Peacemaking io Sethi Sogn, ‘died ty Joseph V. Montville, New York: Lexington Books. 1991 pp. 497-8. * ‘= Donald Hovowits, Ehnic Groups in Conti. Beal. University of Calera Press, 1985 «This ako apis to ether miseries, whic do ao helengo ary of ie toe ere 3 Coneittional Court of BesnasHerzegoma, Pata Dacor, Cate No, S98: (72660), Pas. 120 2% See phan, “The Power-sharg Approsc,” a9. ct ‘it-At 6), Coontttion of Boas and Hezegpvina (1995, NG Atmersrtaion iit ta achieve, suited by the st election Boel in 1980. vat in isis The eit ws homer won by = merber ae SOA eop Fin to St tine mores yadara BIH” ca Fae, Wl 1, Mo +4, 2000 pp 85-48. QU Pos Rene, “igh Keoesenatve saves Dacson exadlshirg mii proeors 2 ne ies Dac esalshing iti proces to protect wa Pree nee otsnt Peopies ard Other, including heecom from Dbesminatian 1.1 S00%, Obie Parana 7 Tih Reotetetatives names Member athe Coetioral Cannons of he See ‘Hy Seestutonl Cour 6f Bonnin Hereppin, Patel cio, Cae No, USE 29,90.1 2000, Pare, 7 Dat Herprepe, Csnbdon of Powers ac Functions in Fada Sytem Otewn: Goverment of STE Rey Cound Ont. 19m, Nanaia 198 103311 suacocanp peepee Nonapeweral. il Cacnstd 12 32000 see 7 9 aad Dems 7 “es At, Contain of Basia and Hee (298, vee Marcus Cox, "State Buing and Post. War Reconstr: Letons fom Bosra, The Rehsbitaton of \WarTor Socetes” Geneva CASIN, lanuary 2003.9 sa Schneier has compared Bosni with she Euopean Union eet te he German Covstitaonal Cau i Ste ltemationl Cri Group, "Republika Srpska -Poplaten, Bik sed Koson; Thee Css and ut" Sapjore. 6:4.1999, ‘ic Despite une dima stution a mos othe Federation, the econo sustion nthe 8S has en oi icantly wore. Sue for ramp Reporter Bana Lk, 2862000, 1 Foresanple the 8S constution ints preamble refered oth agi or eedorn and independence of ‘he Seb people so At. 1 dctned the ee tobe oF the “Ses pepe and fal series Xie Al eecoon resus tam Paras and Dermaere¢y <= gy{BE Caaincal Cae of tHe, Paral econ, Case No, USIEAN (.7.2000. Ti de ‘So ofthe Conon Cort ne psy nana been te nt aie Ami vt, Of “BSD ope the dee srl ager tna eto Bos ‘cand sh ‘owt rl eb ager-sted suet he Geciton wat welcomad byte Bowe pita tnd se lop lets coaderinel by mes Sepa ONOSA Sj), 3.7209, SRNA Bn 50.97 Stn, “Ther hav ts tse ico the tl of tentons apc anh soi, Se or nae "ple Omid Chandler, Bona, Paling Descracy Aer Oryon Landon sod Sting VA; Pte Pea, fs oat se poe 10, A, 198. svat the Cueence of he super Peace implemen Coun IO nonin in Oacember 1, {Fe Hewes geen he permesontovemove oes om cic mho wea te 2PA de tive bodies f Sona ar otal, fo pore la: Boon Pace inperenaionContence 0, “eas Sos Nezaporna 1990, Setnataing. Stace "Bone 1D ember 107, ele at “ha rt 2O8 si The deco arated at the webste fhe Of of the gh Represent “Chapihvwn ate detonchom> {Ni See fr example Oe Sotolow?, Soc Reconsructn and Mor! Revaraton” In Reconauntng ‘nation Soca Te Caf Bosna Herp, eed by Ocal SO aNd Pern BO wea abe 0015p 88108 ‘hi: The vce ae acy ange wre aint Bown eae pate proved Indrument i ean Zour eee. Thepopery lw aca by th gh Repti de acta my ue i eu Cox. "Sat ling ed Pom coral” ap pe 1218 bn, 14 Tein adden, nana fhe meratnal mem f hee bela cane rm Crate ad Vpn a WS the tar ure tne reveuey AM ARV Content Boi and Heep, 19D ‘Amen 6, BPA 1996 {i The manele slogan ofthe SBM was Bos ex eres Bona wot Eitan, Sa he EO ety Sgn Sood Bost Gunna, 30.7 299, i hus ages, 73.2008 1 Se Steer Bing and Pa. Shoup, The Wa nosis Meregovina op pp. 214249 te nacional age 2232001 : 1s Ti equ objetirwcontoitonldeocrcein ged ee ena anna. Med, “Theos of Power Sharngsnd Corer Managenent Conic and Paced MAREE Sects ee by Snap, rive New on Lengo Boas, 19.9. 36 Si See abo snd Consors Count of BonasHetseporna, “ara Dctan” Cae No, UMM 8300, tei neni! Ce Grp, “Tring Sie tw Advaiag” op. cit "ie Te remake re rigged by the agerion of he Ciokan Pie Miner Nice Ratan ha the Sah Rapti shuld be aelted” Peta sponded by doing We even te Rapa Spled le tthe ame Le erharng tne pony or change Bown Rewer, 1852004 Be Muka Poet, “Usame Rfomeu Boil erage" da P, Vo 1, NB 3 ~ FPB000, $7781 = ~ ee . ' 94 pluals and Democracy tien a