"RAL THEORIES te face of the pattern of utilities, nor yet in the first instance of trying to under- cumstances are unlikely to make a ase at least, possible. Very often, we just result of the situation in which we are sery often an exceedingly good thing, in objections to consequentialism? Do nore to act utilitarianism than to rule ses that pose difficulties for the conse- th cases. Do you think George's refusal Could it be construed as right on utili- tean by “deeply held projects"? Why fore than utility? ‘illiams see between acting in ways that veing killed and acting directly by killing. he actual killing is worse. Bue why? Do ‘you? (What is so wonderful about hav- siding direct responsibility for a death the expense of twenty lives?) di have just read Williams’ essay. Write a Imperative Goo Will, Doty. an the Categorical Imperative Good Will, Duty, and the Categorical IMMANUEL KANT Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is considered to be one of the greatest philosophers of alltime. He lived in Konigs- berg, in East Prussia, and was a professor at the Univer~ sity there. Kant made significant and highly original ‘contributions to esthetics, jurisprudence, and the philos- ‘ophy of religion as well as 0 ethics and epistemology, His best known works ate the Critique of Pure Reason (1781) and the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785). Human beings have destes and appetites. They are aso rational, capable of knowing what i right and capable of willing vo doit. They can therefore exerie thei wills in the rational contol of dsie for the purpose of right ac- tion, Thisis what persons of moral worth do. According to Kan, to possess moral worth is more importa than to possess inelgence, humor, stength, or any oter talent ofthe mind or body. These talents ar valuable bat moral wort has able value, commanding not mere IMmiration but reverence and respect. Human beings weho do right merely because it pleases them are not yet intrinsically moral. For had it pleased them they would have done wrong. To act morally to at rem no ater coop wat, ou aNb mye carIGOmAL aRarMe From Fumes Pipl oe Mey ‘Phot by nana Rene Tae by =. ABROE 895) 13MORAL DOCTRINES AND MORAL THEORIES ‘motive than the motive of doing whats right. This kind of motive has nothing co do with anything 2s subjective 2s pleasure. To do right out of principle is o recognize an objective right that imposes an obligation on any cae tional being. Moral persons actin such a way that they could will that the principles of their actions should be "universal laws for everyone ese as well. This is one test of a moral act: Is it the kind of act that everyone should perform? Kant illustrates how this test can be applied to determine whether 2 given principle is moral and objec- tive of merely subjective. For example, 1 may wish to break a promise, but that cannot be moral since I cannot will that promise-breaking be a universal practice Universal principles impose catagorcal imperatives. An Imperative isa demand that I actin a certain fashion. For example, if | want 10 buy a house, it is imperative that 1 tearm something about houses. But “Learn about houses!” isa hypothetical imperative since it is conditional fon my wanting to buy ahouse, A categorical imperatives Unconditional. An example is “Keep your promises ‘Thus an imperative is nox preceded by any condition such as “i you want 2 good reputation." Hypothetical imper- atives are “prudential”: “If you want security, buy thee insurance.” Categorical imperatives are moral: “Do not lie!” Kant argues that the categorical imperative presup- Poses the absolute worth of all rational beings as ends in ‘themselves. Thus another formulation of the categorical imperative is, “So act as to teat humanity... as an end withal, never as a means only." Kant calls the domain of beings that are to be created in this way the “kingdom. offends.” Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, \ which can be called good, without qualification, except 2 Good Will Tntelligence, wit, judgment, and the other talents ofthe mind, how ever they may be named, or courage, resolution, perseverance, a5 qualities of temperament, are undoubtedly good and desirable in many respects; but these gifts of nature may also become extremely 124tAL THEORIES ve motive of doing what is right. This kind nothing to do with anything as subjective ’ do right out of principle is o recognize Sight that imposes an obligation on any r2- ‘Moral persons act in such a way that they at the principles of their actions should be for everyone else as well. This is one test of Is it she kind of act that everyone should wllustrates how this test can be applied to rether a given principle is moral and abjec- y subjective. For example, I may wish t0 ise, but that cannot be moral since I cannot nise-breaking be a universal practic, srineiples impose categorical imperatives. An 4 demand that I actin a certain fashion, For ‘want to buy a house, it is imperative that sthing about houses. But “Learn about hypothetical imperative since it is conditional 1g to buy ahouse. A categorical imperative is | An example is “Keep your promises.” xative is not preceded by any condition such ‘nt « good reputation.” Hypothetical imper- tudential”: “If you want security, buy theft “ategorical imperatives are morak: "Do not sues thatthe categorical imperative presup- lute worth of all rational beings as ends in hus another formulation of the categorical “So act as fo reat humanity... asan end 38.4 means only’ Kant calls the domain of re to be treated in this way the “kingdom aceived in the world, or even out of it, thout qualification, except a Good Will and the other talents of the mind, how= F courage, resolution, perseverance, as re undoubtedly good and desirable in ts of nature may also become extremely God Wall, Bary ad dhe Categorical Imperative bad and mischievous i the will which is to make use of them, and which, therefore, constitutes what is called character, is not good. Ie js the same with the giffs of fortune. Power, riches, honour, even health, and the general well-being and contentmient with one’s con= dition which is ealled happiness, inspire pride, and often presump- tion, if there is not a good wil to correct the influence of these on the mind, and with this also to reetufy the whole principle of acting, and dupe it to its end, The sight of a being who is not adorned with a Single feature of a pure and good will, enjoying unbroken prosperity. an never givespleasure 2 an impartial rational spectator, Thus a good ‘will appears to constitute the indispensable condition even of being | worthy of happiness. om “There are even some qualities which are of service to this good will self, and may facilitate ies action, yet which have no intrinsic tinconditional value, but always presuppose a good will, and this (qualifies the esteem that we justly have for them, and does not permit ts to regard chem as absolutely good. Moderation in the affections nd passions, self-control, and calm deliberation are not only good in many respects, but even seem to constitute part of the intrinsic ‘worth of the person; but they are far fom deserving t0 be called good without qualification, although they have been so uncondition- flip praised by the ancients. For without the principles of 1 good ‘will, they may become extremely bad and the coolness ofa villain hot only makes him far more dangerous, but also directly makes him ore abominable in our eyes than he would have been without i. ‘A.good willis good not because of what it performs or effects, sot by its aptness for the attainment of some proposed end, but simply by virtue of the volition, that is, it is good in itself, and considered by itself is to be esteemed much higher than al that can be brought about by it in favour of any inclination, nay, even of the sum-total of i inclinations. Even.if it should happen that, owing to special dis- favour of fortune, or the niggardly provision of a step-mnotherly na ture, this will should wholly lack power to accomplish its purpose, if with its greatest efforts it should yet achicve nothing, and there Should remain only the good will (no, to be sure, a mere wish, but the summoning of all means in our power), then, like a jewel. it ‘would stil shine by its own light, as a thing which has its whole Value in isele, Its usefulness oF fuitlessness can neither add t0 nor take away anything from this value 128EEE" MORAL DOCTRINES AND MORAL THEORIES PRsar gate ‘Thus the moral worth of an action does not lie in the effect ex- pected from it, nor in any principle of action which redjuires to borrow its motive from this expected effect, For all these ef- fects—agrecableness of one's condition, and even the promotion of the happiness of others—could have been also brought about by other causes, so that for this there would have been no nted of the will ofa rational being: whereas i is in this alone that the supreme ind unconditional good can be found. The(pre-eminent good which ‘we call moral can therefore consist in nothing cle than ht conceprion af law in itself, which certainly is only possible im «rational bing, 50 o> \ fais shis conception and not the cxpectd effec, decries the “will. This is a good which is already present in the person who acts accordingly, and we have not co wait for ito appear first inthe resule. ‘But what sort of law.can. that be, the conception of which must : determine the will, even without paying any regard to the effect o expected from it, in order that this will may be called good absolutely and without qualification? As I have deprived the will of every im= pulse which could arse to it from obedience to any law, there remains nothing but the universal conformity of its actions to law in general, which alone isto serve the wll as a principle, ic, Iam never to act otherwise than_so that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law. Here, nOW, Wis the iplé conformity torawin general wat assuming any particular law appliable fo Gertain actions that serves the will as its principle, and must so serve it, if duty isnot to be a vain delusion and a chimerical notion. The common reason of men in its practical judgments perfectly coincides with this and al- ways has in view the principle here suggested. Let the question be, for example: May I when in distress make a promise with the inten= tion not 1o keep it I readily distinguish here between the two signi- fications which the question may have: Whether it is prudent, ot whether it is right, to make a false promise? The former may un- ‘ doubtedly often be the case. I see clearly indeed tha it is not enough to extricate myself from a present difficulty by means of this subter- foge, but it must be well considered whether there may not hereafter spring from this lie much greater inconveniene than that from which Tnow free myself, and as, with all my supposed canning, the conse- quences cannot be so easily foreseen but that credit once lost may be much more injurious to me than any mischief which I seek to avoid at present, it should be considered whether it would not be more 126, i . ‘AAL THEORIES an action does not lie in the effect ex- principle of action which requires to is empeced fet. For all thse ef condition, and even the promotion of uld have been also brought about by there would have been no need of the reas it is in this alone that the supreme ve found. The pre-eminent good which onsist in nothing else than the conception is only possible in a rational being, in 50 wot the expected effect, determines the already present in the person who acts to wait for itto appear first in the result that be, the conception of which must thout paying any regard to the effect «this will may be called good absolutely S$ T have deprived the will of every im- om obedience to any law, there remains :formity ofits actions to law in general, ‘las a principle, Le, lam never vo at also will that my maxim should become a the Simple conformity (law in general, ular law applicable to certain actions, siple, and must so serve it, if duty is not imerical notion. The common reason of ts perfectly coincides with this and al- le here suggested. Let the question be, distress make a promise with the inten- Aistinguish here between the two signi= may have: Whether it is prudent, or a false promise? The former may un- {see clearly indeed that itis not enough sent difficulty by means of this subter- jdered whether there may not hereafter ater inconveniene than that from which ith all my supposed auming, the conse- reseen but that credit once lost may be han any mischief which I seek to avoid sidered whether it would not be more Good Wil, Puy, and the Categor Imperative prudent to act herein according to a universal maxim, and to make it P habit to promise nothing except with the intention of Keeping it But it pon clear to me that stich a maxim will still only be based. on the fear of consequences. Now itis a wholly diferent ching o be tothfal from duty, and to be so from apprehension of injurious Consequences. In the first case, the very notion of the action ales implies a law for me; in the second case, | must frst look about teewhere to see what results may be combined with it which would Sffect myself. For to deviate from the principle of duty s beyond al doubt wicked; but to be unfaithful to my maxim of prudence may soften be very advantageous to me, although to abide by iis certainly Safer The shortest way, however, and an unerring one, to discover the answer to this question whether a lying promise is consistent swith duty, isto ask myself, Should I be content that my maxim (o extricate myself from difficulty by a false promise) should hold good soa universal law, for myself as well as for others? and should I be Soleo say to myself, “Every one may make a deceitful promise when he finds himself in a difficulty from which he cannot otherwise ex: j inicatehirnself"2 Then I presently become aware that while [can will the lie, can by no means Il that lying should be a universal law: For with such a Taw there would be no promises 2 all, since it would te in vain to allege my intention in regard to my furure actions 10 those who would not believe this allegation, or if they over-hastily ddd so, would pay me back in my own coin, Hence my maxim, a8 Soon ne it should be made a universal law, would necessarily destroy itself, do not, therefore, need any far-reaching penetration to discern whae I have to do in order that my will be morally good. Inexperi_ Thad in the course of the world, incapable of being prepared forall its contingencies, | only ask myself: Canst thow also will that thy veaxim should be a universal law? If nt, then it must be rejected, sped thar not because of a disadvantage accruing from it to myself or ‘even to others, but because it cannot enter a5 3 ‘ible universal legislation, and reason extorts principle into a pos- from me immediate reapect for such legislation, I do not indeed as yet dscert om wha chit fespect is based (this the philosopher may inguite), but at east | dinderstand this, that itis an estimation of the worth which far out weighs all worth of what is recommended by inclination, and that the necessity of acing from pure respect forthe practical aw what 127mannan MORAL DOCTRINES AND MORAL THEORIES | ~eonstisuces duty, to which every other motive must give place, bee | cause itis the condition of a will being good in self, and the worth of such a will above everything, Everything in nature works according to laws. Rational \ beings Hlone-have-the faculty OF acting according 10 the conception of laws, that is according to principles, .e. have a will. Since the deduc- tion of actions from principles reyuires reason, the willis nothing but practical reason. If reason infalibly determines the will, then the actions of such a being which are recognized as objectively necessary ate subjectively necessary also, i.e. the will isa faculty to choose that only which reason independent on iticlination recognizes as practi- cally necessary, i.e. 25 good. Bui if Fason of itself does not suffi- ciently determine the will, if che later is subject also to subjective conditions (particular impulses) which do not always coincide with the objective conditions; in a word, ifthe will does not in itself com= pletely accord with reason (which is actually the case with men), then x the actions which objectively are recognized as necessary are stbjec- tively contingent, and the determination of such a will according to objective laws is, obligation, chat is to say, the relation of the objective laws toa will thatis-not thoroughly good is conceived as the deter~ . rmination of the will ofa rational being by principles of reason, but which the will from its nature does not of necessity follow. The conception of an objective principle, in so farasieis obligatory for'2 will, is called a command (of reason), and the formula of the command is called an Imperative ‘Now all imperatives command eitheg hypothetically ox categoria, ‘The former represent the practical necessity of a possible action as +S means to something else that is willed (or at least which one might possibly will). The categorical imperative would be that which rep- resented an action as necessary of itself without reference to another end, i.e. as objectively necessary. ince every practical law represents a possible action as good, and on this account, for a subject who is practically determinable by reason, necessary all imperatives are formulae determining an action which is necessary according to the principle of a will good in some i, respects. If now the action is good only as a means to something ese, then the imiperative is hypothetical; i€ i is conceived as good in itelf and consequently a8 bing necessarily the principle ofa will which of itself conforms to reason, then itis categorical ak BBAL THEORIES ty other motive e place ve must give place, be sill being good wn itself, and the worth works according to laws. Rational oF acting according to the conception of iples, ie. have a will, Since the deduc- requires rearon, the willis nothing but Eaibly determines the wil shen the are recognized as objectively necessary 1. 1. the wills a faculty to choose that xt on inclination recogni: ygnizes as practi- Bur if reason of itself does not suffi- the latter is subject also to subjective s) which do not always coincide with sword, if the will does not in itself com- sich is actually the case with men), then are recognized as necessary are subjec- ermination of such a will according to avis to say, the relation of the objective oughly good is conceived as the deter- onal being by principles of reason, but does not of necessity follow. ive principle, in so far as itis obligatory nad (of reason) and the formals ofthe ind either hypothetically or categorically. tetical necessity of a possible action as is willed (or atleast which one might «imperative would be that which rep- y of itself without reference to another ay. presents a possible action as good, and ct who is practically determinable by ves are formulae determining an action to the principle of a will good in some good only as a means fo something ese, tical; if i i conceived as good in itself cssarily the principle of a will which of nit is categorical ————— Ty \ | {Good Will, Dury, and she Categorical Imperative When I conceive a hypothetical imperative, in general 1 do noc know beforchand what it will contain until lam given the condition, But when I conceive a categorical imperative, I know at once what it vivesins, For as the imperative contains besides the law only the tpecessity that the maxims shall conform to this law, while the Ia vontaine no conditions restricting it, there remains noching but the general statement that che maxim of the action should conform '6 = eeyversal law, and it is this conformity alone that the imperative properly represents as necessary. . Theres, but one categorical imperative, namely, this: Act only ‘on that mascim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should Become a universal law ‘Now if all imperatives of duty can be deduced from this one im~ perative as from their principle, then, although it should seri rerjecided whether what is called duty is not merely a vain notion sar atleast we shall be able to show what we understand by it and ‘what this notion means Since the universality of the law according to which effects are produced constitutes what is properly called nature in the most >= eral sense (as to form), that is the exis nce of things $0 far a8 1 is Jeefernod by general laws, the imperative of dury may be expressed Qrocs dar ar ifthe maxim of thy action were to become by thy will swiveril law of nature. ‘Wie will now enumerate a few duties, adopting the usual division ‘of them into duties to ourselves and to others, and into perfect and imperfect duties Pe man reduced to despair by a series of misfortunes (eels wea- ried of life, but is still so far in possession of his reason that he can re Ginselt whether it would not be contrary to his duty to himself aaece his own life. Now he inquires whether the maxim of his we Jos could become a universal law of nature. His maxim is: From seiflowe | adopt it as a principle to shorten my life when its longer SJaration is likely to bring more evil than satisfaction. Its asked dhen Simply whether this principle founded on seflove can become 2 ary a law of nature, Now we see at once that a system of mature st which it should be-2 lawto destroy life by mieans-of the very feeling whose special nature it isto impel tothe improvement of Ie Tee remade ise, and therefore could not exist a8 a system of aane eee that maxim cannot possibly exist asa universal law of 29 &EO MORAL DOCTRINES AND MORAL THEORIES nature, and consequently would be wholly inconsistent with the su- preme principle of all duty. 2. Another finds himself forced by necessity to berrow money. He knows that he will not be able to repay it, but sees also that nothing will be leat to him, unless he promises stoutly to repay itina definite ‘ime, He desires to make this promise, but he has still so much Conscience as to ask himself Is it not unlawful and inconsistent with duty to get out of a difficulty in this way? Suppose, however, that he resolves to do so, then the maxim of his action would be expressed thus: When Lthink myself in want of money, I will borrow money ; and promise o repay it although I know that I never can do so. Now this principle of self-love or of ofe's own advantage may perhaps be consistent with my whole future welfate; but the question now is, Is itright? I change then the suggestion of self-love into a universal law, » and state the question thus: How would it be if my maxim were a tuniversal law? Then I see at once that it could never hold as universal law of nature, but would necessarily contradict itself. For supposing it to be a universal law that everyone when he thinks himself in a difficulty should be able to promise whatever he pleases, with the Purpose of not keeping his promise, the promise itself would become impossible, as well as the end that one might have in view in it, since no one would consider that anything was promised 0 him, but ‘would ridicule all such statements as vain pretences. 3. A third finds in himself a talent which with the help of some culture might make him a usefslmaf in many respects. But he finds himself in comfortable circumstances, and prefers to indulge in pleasure rather than to take pains in enlarging and improving his 4 happy natural capacities. He asks, however, whether his maxim of neglect of his natural gifts, besides agrecing with his inclination to indulgence, agrees also with what is called duty. He sees then that a system of nature could indeed subsist with such a universal law although men (like the South Sea islanders) should let their talents fest, and resolve to devote their lives merely to idleness, amusement, and propagation of their species—in a word, to enjoyment; but he Vee cannot possibly will that this should be a universal law of nature, or : be implanted in us as such by a natural instinct, For, as a rational being, he necessarily wills that his faculties be developed, since they serve him, and have been given him, for all sorts of possible purposes 130AAL THEORIES ald be wholly inconsistent with the su- reed by necessity to bor F row money. He eo repay, but sets alo that nthing promises stoutly to repay itn a definite nis promise, but he has still so. much 1s itnot unlawful and inconsistent with in this way? Suppose, however, that he axim of his action would be expressed ‘want of money, I will borrow money tugh I know that I never can do so. Now sfone’s own adv: fantage may perhaps be ve welfare; bo the question no iy {gestion of self-love into a universal la Alow would it be if my maxim were a se thatitcould never ld a nivel zssarily contradict itself. For supposin creryone when he thinks him in promise whatever he pleases, with the ‘omise, the promise itself would become that one might have in view init, since anything was promised to him, but sents as vain pretences. Fa talent which with the help of some aful man in many respects. But he finds tumstances, and prefers to indulge in pains in enlarging and improving his asks, however, whether his maxim of vesides agreeing with his inclination to ‘what is called duty. He sees then that a zed subsist with such a universal [aw h Sea islanders) should let their talents sir lives merely to idleness, amusement, cies—in a word, 0 ¢ |, 0 enjoyment; but he by a natural instinct. For, 35 2 rational that his faculties be developed, since en given him, for all sorts of possible ee dta#éa.H.44..g eee Good Will, Buty, an the Categoria Impera50e 4, Aourth, who isin prosperity, while he ses that others have © coh din peat wretchedness and that he could elp ther, inks aan weers is it of mine? Let everyone be as happy 28 Heaven Hewes or ashe can make himself will take noting 6m Nim Pleo ac only 1 do not wish co contribute anything css ence i assatance in distress! Now no doubt f such a mode ean ecg were a univers la, the human ace might ry Wel ceeninme, oubtless even berer than in 2 state in which everyone ae ampathy and good-will, or even takes care occasional 19 par on the other side, also cheats when he can, put it into pract ates them. But although etrays the rights of men, oF otherwise vie itis possible that a universal Taw of mature might exist” 26° swith chat maxima, 3 ble co will shat such a principle should dae pat Tniversal validity of 2 Jaw of nacre, Epe 2 will wich solved this would contradict itself inasmuch 25 many 0 ‘might solved ee ich one would have need of the love and sympathy of cerae ad in which, by such a law of nature, sprung from his own suit he would deprive himself ofall hope of the axl be desites We have thus established at Teast this much, that if dary is 627 ception which isco have any import and rea legslanys authority for ur actions, it can on! Fypathetea imperatives. We have also, whichis of great POTN eed clearly and definitely for every practical applicaoe the aan the categorical imperative, which muse contain the PPT Siac of all duty sf there is such a thing 2 all. We have To yeh ciple of avanced 0 far as 0 prove @ prior that there actually © oh am imperative, that there is @ practical law which ‘commands ayy pf itself, and without any other impulse, and hat the following of this law is duty. Now Peay: man and generally any rational being. exist. 3537 end in pina net merely as a means to, be arbitrarily wed by this that aaron all his actions, wheter they concern himself oF other veetal beings, must be always regarded atthe same time 280 end. ‘Al sbjects of the inclinations have only a conditions} worth; for if A drdlmations and the wants founded on chem did nor e=st then their abject would be without value, But che incinasions themselves aing sures of want are so far from having an absolne worth for vera they should be desired, that, on the contrary, i a0 be the A a of every rational being to be wholly fee Grom them, wt Iy be expressed in categorical, and not at alin. rordance 1! a2:lyMORAL DOCTRINES AND MORAL THEORIES Thus the worth of any object which is tbe acquired by our action is always conditional. Beings whose existence depends not on our will but on nature’, have nevertheless, if they are non-rational beings, only a relative value as means, and are therefore called things; rational beings, on the contrary, are called, persons, because their very nature points them out as ends in themselues, that is as something which ‘must not be useil ‘merely as means, and so far therefore restricts freedom of action (ind is an object of respect). These, therefore are not merely subjective ends whose existence has a worth for us 38 an effort of our action, but objective ends, that is things whose existence is an end in itself: an end moreover for which no other can be substi- tuted, which they should subserve merely as means, for otherwise nothing whatever would possess absolute worth; but ifall worth were conditioned and therefore contingent, then there would be no st- preme practical principle of reason whatever If then there is a supreme practical principle or in respect of the hhuman will, a categorical imperative, it must be one which, being drawn from the conception of that which is necessarily an end for everyone because it is an an end in itself, constitutes an objective prin- ple of will, and can therefore serve as a universal practical law. The foundation of this principle is: rational nature exists as an end in itself. Man necessarily conceives his own existence as being 50: so far then this is a subjective principle of human actions. But every other rational being regards its existence similarly, just on the same rational prin- ciple, that holds for me: so that it is at the same time an objective Principle, from which as a supreme practical law all laws of the will must be capable of being deduced. Accordingly the practical imper- ative will be as follows: So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine um person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only ‘The conception of every rational being as one which must consider itselfas giving all the maxims of its will universal laws, so a8 to judge itself and its actions from this point of view—this conception leads to another which depends on it and is very fruitful, namely, that of kingdom of ds By a kingdom I understand the union of different rational beings in a system by common laws, Now since itis by laws that ends are determined as regards their universal validity, hence, if we abstract from the personal differences of rational beings, and likewise from all the content of their private ends, we shall be able co conceive all 132ee [AL THEORIES which is tbe acquired by our action is hose existence depends not on our will reless, if they are non-rational beings, and are therefore called things; rational alled persons, because their very nature remselves, that is as something which tmeans, and so far therefore restricts abject of respect), These, therefore, are hose existence has a worth Jor us as an vive ends, that is things whose existence cover for which no other can be substi- bserve merely as means, for otherwise ss absolute worth; but ifall worth were tiingent, then there would be no su= vason whatever. practical principle or, in respect of the sperative, it must be one which, being af that which is necessarily an end for ‘ed in itself, constitutes an objective prin~ serve a8 a universal practical law. The 5: rational nature exists as an end in iself + own existence as being $0: so far then fnuman actions. But every other rational milarly, jst on the same rational prin- hat it is at the same time an objective preme practical law al laws of the will uced. Accordingly the practical imper- as to treat humanity, whether in thine own ‘every cae as an ond withal, never as means sional being as one which must consider ‘of its will universal laws, 50 as to judge ' point of view—this conception leads it and is very fruitful, namely, that of a the union of different rational beings in Now since it is by laws that ends are aniversal validity, hence, if we abstract, + of rational beings, and likewise from cc ends, we shall be able to conceive all eee Study Questions ends combined ina systematic whole (including both rational beings sactnde in themselves, and also the special ends which each may propose of himself), that isto say, we can conceive 2 Kingdom of ae, which on the preceding principles is possible For all rational beings come under the law that each of thers must tres itself and all others never merely as means, but in every case at he sre ine os ads in themselves. Hence results a systematic union of “objective laws, i.e, a kingdom which nds. rational beings by commo ‘may be called a kingdom of STUDY QUESTIONS 1. Why does Kant say that the good wills good without qualifi- cation? 2, What relationship docs duty have to appetite? Duty to reason? 5 What does Kane mean by saying that certain beings have ntrinsic value as ends in themselves? What obligations do such beings impose on moral agents? “4. Foe Keant, animals are not ends in themselves because they cannor reason. So, says Kant, they have no moral rights. Does this seem right to you? 5, How dows Kant distinguish between hypothetical and categoria} Jimperatives? What kind of imperatives do prudential” concerns 6 Ra wrt, he Brith deciphered the German aii \ intelligence code, thereby saving countless lives. Learning (60m Tnessages that certain intelligence officers were going to Be C2" eed and tortured, chey nevertheless sent chem back ro the Con- Ginont to preserve the secret that the code had been cracked Pealuate ths case from the standpoint of (2) a uilitarian, (b) 2 Kantian, (€) yourself. _! 133