APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1999 CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM 18 SEPT AS TITLE: Principles Of Deep Cover an eR a a Summer YEAR:a | ee Acallection of articles on the historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects af intelligent All statements of fect, opinion or analysis expressed in Studies in Intelligence are those of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other US Goverment entity, past or present, Nothing in the ‘contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government endorsement of an article's faciual statements and interpretations.Cardinat considerations in plac- ; tng covert personnel abroad in. } (easi-permanent private citizen positions. i PRINCIPLES OF DEEP COVER 1 . D, Edbrook oO ARE oc unger ee The Mtinplest and eHerétredne anes Nae eo : gence service hag for gelting Its unwelcome officers covertly into other countries is to assign them to cover jobs in it8 gor i ernment’s diplomatic missions, consulates, and other official + representations there. The Soviet bloc services call this ! “Tegal” cover, most Western services simply “official” cover. Aside trom providing for communteations home, a secure place to work, and 2 measure of protection from prosecution for esplonage, it has the advantage that the cover duties’ can usually be made light enough to leave most of the officer's time free for intelligence activity. The official position also opens the way to many useful contacts, although it precludes others. It has the accompanying disadvantage that the dis- | guise is a pretty shabby one, It requires no Herculean coun- ferintelligence effort to determine which foreign officials Probably have intelligence connections; they can be kept de- hniable, but not really secret. Moreover, some kinds of intelli. gence activity cannot be carried out from an official position. Tt Is therefore necessary to supplement the “legals” with ‘allegals," the intelligence offcers under official cover with op- eratives under “deep” cover, living as legitimate private citi, zens with such authenticity that their intelligence sponsor- ship would not be disclosed even by an intensive and deter- mined investigation. These offers ate sometimes career stad! employees of the intelligence service and sometimes eftt- zens of either the sponsoring or another country with a con- tract or agent relatisnship to the service. For the sake of simplicity we shall speak of them all as “agents,” although they are in a diferent category from the indigenous agents recruited locally by a case officer. ‘They do have an agent Sener 1