Main Report of The Shunglu Committee

HIGH LEVEL COMMITTEE
Organization and
Conduct of
Commonwealth
Games 2010
Main Report of HLC
2011
VIGYAN BHAWAN ANNEXE,NEW DELHI

Main Report of the HLC –Organization & Conduct of CWG 2010
Contents
Chapter Particulars Page No.
Acronyms 2
Executive Summary 3
1 Introduction 5
2. Governance Structure 10
3. Cost of the Games 17
4. Group of Ministers 26
5. Committee of Secretaries 36
6. Ministries of Government of India, Govt. of NCT of Delhi 43

and Connected Entities
7. Organizing Committee 52
8. Terms of Reference 72
Appendix – 1 List of Professional Staff of HLC
Appendix – 2 List of officers /persons interviewed by HLC
Page 1
Acronyms
AITA All India Tennis Association
CAG Comptroller and Auditor General
CBI Central Bureau of Investigation
CEO Chief Executive Officer
CGF Commonwealth Games Federation
CM Chief Minister
COS Committee of Secretaries
CPWD Central Public Works Department
CVC Central Vigilance Commission
CWG Commonwealth Games
DDA Delhi Development Authority
DGCA Director General Civil Aviation
EFC Expenditure Finance Committee
EIL Engineers India Limited
GNCTD Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi
GOI Government of India
GOM Group of Ministers
HLC High Level Committee
IOA Indian Olympic Association
ITPO India Trade Promotion Organization
LG Lieutenant Governor
MCD Municipal Corporation of Delhi
MHRD Ministry of Human Resource Development
MYAS Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports
NDMC New Delhi Municipal Council
OC Organising Committee
PM Prime Minister
PMO Prime Minister’s Office
SAI Sports Authority of India
Page 2
Executive Summary
1. Commonwealth Games were awarded to Government of India in 2003 and conducted at Delhi
in October 2010.
2. The Host City Contract, accepted without due consideration, committed Government to
underwrite the Games on the false promise of revenue neutrality. Several other obligations
compromised decision making in our best interests.
3. The role of President, CGF and its Chief Executive Officer was hardly what was expected from
this kind of agency and the kind of authority they enjoyed was not conducive to good management
besides being expensive.
4. A period of seven years was available to prepare for the Games. The first three years were
squandered in peripheral activity thereby compressing the time available to four years. In disregard
of time lost, activity picked up belatedly and reached a feverish pitch so near the Games that most
actions became ‘emergency’ decisions compromising cost and quality.
5. Lack of explicit Budgetary ceiling compounded increasing costs and it was not entirely clear
whether Ministry of Youth Affairs & Sports, assigned the function to coordinate, possessed the
authority to restrain entities. These (the entities) displayed no restraint; one and all overstated costs,
misled the approving authority and wrongdoing became commonplace.
6. The implicit decision to conduct the Games through a private non-profit society was an ‘error
of judgment’ compounded by the personality of its chairman for whom the difference between fact
and fiction was academic. His style and interests compromised proper preparation and efficient
conduct of Games. Emergency measures ameliorated the situation but at a very high cost.
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7. The Governance mechanism designed for oversight of what turned out to be a mammoth
undertaking proved unequal to the task and its facilitation function was often abused by entities it
was meant to assist.
8. Considerable legacy value has obtained from the very large sum expended on the Games and
in support of the Games. Measures to enhance value have been suggested both for infrastructure
projects and for sports.
9. Ownership of such a large enterprise has emerged as a key issue. For the future, ownership
must remain with Government while addressing several other connected issue including structure,
staffing, finance, accountability etc.
Page 4
Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 On 13th November, 2003 the Commonwealth Games Federation General Assembly voted to
award the XIX Commonwealth Games to the City of Delhi at Montego Bay, Jamaica. The
Commonwealth Games were conducted at Delhi from October 3 – 14th, 2010. On October 15th, 2010,
responding to the public perception that the conduct of the Games left much to be desired, the Prime
Minister announced the setting up of a High Level Committee comprising of Shri V.K. Shunglu
(Chairman) and Shri Shantanu Consul (Member) effective 1st November, 2010. The terms of
reference of the Committee are at Annexure – I. The Committee was required to submit its report
within 3 months. This was later extended to 31st March, 2011.
1.2 This Report has been prepared in response to the terms of reference. In preparing the
Report, entities concerned with the preparation for and the execution of the Games have been taken
into account viz. i) Government of India; ii) Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi
(GNCTD); iii) Delhi Development Authority (DDA); iv) New Delhi Municipal Council (NDMC); v)
Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD); vi) Organizing Committee (OC); vii) Prasar Bharati /
Doordarshan viii) Sports Authority of India (SAI); ix) All India Tennis Association (AITA); x) India Trade
Promotion Organization (ITPO); xi) CPWD. The Committee has not reviewed the conduct of
Commonwealth Youth Games, except to the extent of noting expenditure incurred by the Organizing
Committee.
1.3 The review is based on examination of files, reports, interviews with officials / persons
connected with the conduct of the Games. In certain cases information has been obtained by issue of
questionnaire and / or requests to relevant authorities, including Tax Authorities. The HLC also
undertook ‘digital imaging’ of computers and information obtained from the same has also been
used.
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1.4 The review was conducted by the HLC and professional staff employed by the HLC. The
professional staff conducted its enquiries on site, i.e., at the premises of the entity. A list of
professional staff is provided at Appendix – 1. Certain serving officials of Government of India were
also seconded to the HLC. Their names are also included in the list at Appendix – 1. The list is
displayed in alphabetical order.
1.5 Mobilizing over 70 persons, dependable and competent, could be accomplished only by
engagement of institutions. High Level Committee (HLC) engaged KPMG / BSR, Dinesh Mehta & Co.,
Grant Thornton and Red Flag. Besides human resources, these institutions were able to provide
specific skills needed for the inquiry viz. professional accountancy, forensic audit, engineering,
taxation and compliance. HLC reports contain sufficient material of wrong-doing elucidated by
systematic application of these skills. Individuals, on temporary assignment from Government,
retired Government officials with professional skills contributed in equal measure. The success of our
enterprise emerged from the ability of people, without previous acquaintance or future expectation,
to work as a team. Multi-disciplinary approach enabled HLC to discover, in large measure, what went
wrong.
1.6 Keeping in view the vast scope of the Terms of Reference, the High Level Committee decided
to divide its work into distinct, identifiable sectors to enable submission of reports on the following:
i) Host Broadcasting
ii) Games Village
iii) City Infrastructure
iv) Games Venues
v) Organizing Committee
vi) Main Report – Organization and Conduct of CWG, 2010
1.7 The First Report on ‘Host Broadcasting’ was submitted to the Government on 29th January,
2011; the ‘Games Village’ Report on 7th March, 2011; Third Report on ‘City Infrastructure’ on 18th
March, 2011; ‘Games Venues’ Report and Fifth Report on ‘Organising Committee’ on 28th March,
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2011 and the Main Report on ‘Organization and Conduct of CWG 2010’ on 29th March, 2011. Each of
the five Reports discussed governance and its outcome in respect of the specific areas covered, while
all generic aspects of governance are discussed in this Main Report. Where the documentation
supporting the Reports was voluminous, it was provided in a CD format. These Reports, along with
Annexures and Relevant Documents, have also been uploaded on the web site and placed in the
public domain so as to ensure complete transparency.
1.8 A large number of officials met HLC from the entities which were under enquiry and provided
their version of events. These have been taken into account in reaching our findings. The list of
officials is at Appendix -2.
1.9 High Level Committee (HLC) was conscious that a number of institutions and agencies were
also enquiring into / investigating conduct of Commonwealth Games 2010 - in its broadest sense – in
particular, Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG), Central Vigilance Commission (CVC),
Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and the Tax authorities. Governance was our focus, transactions
and events directly elucidating outcome of governance were under the scanner. In that sense, this
Report is not a chronicle of all wrong doing even though HLC has strived to encompass as much as
was reported in the press and emerged during our enquiries.
1.10 The limited time available did not permit HLC to review all the expenditure on the
organization and conduct of Games. A different threshold emerged for each slice of expenditure
incurred in organization and conduct of the Games. In certain cases it was as high as 90% while in
others it was no more than 50%. In aggregate, expenditure vis a vis CWG – 2010 reviewed by HLC is
estimated at 57%.
Major Head Item Description Agenc Approved Reveiwed Remarks
y Expenditure in by HLC in
Rs. Crore Rs. Crore
Prasar Bharti
482.57 321.77
Production & Coverage of CWG
2010 246.00
ITPO
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75.77
Games Village Total Project Cost of CWG Village DDA 253.40 727.80 Rs. 253.4 Cr. was
sanctioned only for
Training venues
inside the games
Village. DDA had
sanctioned the
additional amount
for Developing
Games Village
City GoI grant to GNCTD
Infrastructure 7,156.00 3,031.33 was Rs. 2800 Crore.
Barapullah Elevated Road GNCTD The remaining
549.00 498.00 expenditure is by the
Ring Road Bye Pass GNCTD agencies, total
654.39 654.39 approval by GNCTD is
Bus Parking near JLN Stadium MCD approximately
324.00 303.00 29,000 crore
Ghazipur grade seprator GNCTD excluding the
245.56 245.56 expenditure on
Naraina T Point GNCTD DMRC, Power Plants,
119.76 119.76 Procurement of
Raja Ram Kohli Marg GNCTD Buses, etc. The
230.00 229.68 expenditure on City
Street Scaping GNCTD Infrastructure alone
, MCD 454.79 454.10 is of the order of Rs.
& 7156 crore. Out of
NDMC this projects worth
Signages GNCTD Rs. 3053.84 crore
, MCD 94.15 94.15 were reviewed by
& HLC
NDMC
Street Lighting GNCTD
, MCD 346.69 346.69
&
NDMC
Millenium Park Bus Parking DTC
60.00 60.00
Sewa Nagar RUB MCD
10.00 26.00
Games Venue
4,459.48 2,776.12
SAI
2,460.00 996.47
DU, JMI, AITA, CRPF CRPF was not
444.86 406.65 reviewed
Delhi University
304.00
Jamia Milia Islamia University
43.51
AITA
59.14
Page 8
DDA
574.45 741.00
GNCTD
416.76 297.00
NDMC Final Sanctioned
310.00 335.00 amount was Rs. 335
Cr.
Organisation
Committee 1,649.00 1,131.00
Total The total amount
14,000.45 7,988.02 calculated without
considering the
projects undertaken
by Ministry of Home
Affairs, Ministry of
Culture, Ministry of
Health and Pune
Games. It includes
additional
expenditure provided
by DDA on Games
Village and by GNCTD
on City
Infrastructure, etc.
57.1%
1.11 Except for initial problems in obtaining files and documents, the Committee faced no
hindrance in gaining access to files, papers and documents in the offices of the different
agencies involved with CWG 2010. The quality of the report was enhanced considerably by the
information supplied by the Customs and Income Tax Authorities. The experience shows that if
the will exists, ways can be found. Government should face no problem whatsoever in obtaining
data, documents, and facts required for any study or inquiry.
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Chapter 2: Governance Structure

“In his conversations with his friends, he frequently acknowledged that of all the
arts the most difficult was the art of reigning.”
- Diocletian Imperator 284-305 CE.
2.1 On 9th May, 2002, Shri Suresh Kalmadi, President of the Indian Olympic Association (IOA)
addressed a letter to the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports (MYA&S) seeking the support of the
Ministry for making India’s Bid for the Commonwealth Games at the forthcoming meeting of CGF at
Manchester. The then Minister of Sports Ms. Uma Bharati agreed to participate at the General
Assembly of CGF at Manchester (23.07.2002). However, the Ministry declined to provide any
financial commitment in the endeavour of President, IOA.
The Bid Saga

2.2 India’s interest in hosting Commonwealth Games was thus registered but the Ministry did not
pursue the matter for the remaining part of 2002. It seems that there was a discussion on this issue
between the then Prime Minister, Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the then Chief Minister of Andhra
Pradesh, Shri Chandrababu Naidu and Shri Suresh Kalmadi, President, IOA during the Closing
Ceremony of the National Games at Hyderabad on 23rd December, 2002. The then Prime Minister’s
reaction to hosting the Commonwealth Games was positive and accordingly, Shri Kalmadi addressed
a letter to the new Minister, MYA&S Shri Vikram Verma, requesting support for canvassing at the
forthcoming meeting of the Executive Board of CGF (February 7 – 10, 2003). Shri Verma recorded a
Note for consideration of the Prime Minister on 29 th January, 2003. This Note was approved by the
Prime Minister and Shri Verma provided the required letter of comfort to Shri Kalmadi to enable him
to register India’s seriousness in hosting CWG – 2010.
2.3 After the Cape Town meeting of the Executive Board of CGF, Shri Randhir Singh, Secretary
General, IOA informed Government that 30th May, 2003 was the last date for submission of Bids for
CWG XIX to be held in 2010. He went on to outline likely receipts from and payments for hosting the
Games and forecast a ‘modest surplus’ in case it was decided to bid for the Games. A request in
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April, 2003 for 1.61 crore was made to support IOA in meeting the expenditure involved in bidding
for the Games. Briefly, the issues described below needed immediate affirmation in order to enable
IOA to proceed to bid for the CWG XIX.
 To allow the Indian Olympic Association to bid for XIX Commonwealth Games, 2010.
 To approve, in principle, holding of the XIX Commonwealth Games, 2010 in case the IOA is
successful in its bid to host the Games at Delhi.
 To allow the Ministry of Finance and the MYA&S to settle between themselves the financial
arrangements for estimated expenditure of 1,61,53,600/- towards the bidding process for
the Games.
 To allow the MYAS to issue the following guarantees :-
i) Undertaking to support the bid of Delhi to host the Games;

ii) Guaranteeing free entry for all accredited athletes and delegations of all participating
countries; and
iii) Guaranteeing that the Games will be organized in accordance with the Constitution
and Protocols & Regulations of the Commonwealth Games Federation.
2.4 Since the Draft Cabinet Notes circulated by MYAS on 25th April, 2003 and 15th May, 2003 to
secure these assurances from Government of India had not been taken up by the Cabinet, the
sanction of Prime Minister, in anticipation of Cabinet approval, was sought and secured on
24.05.2003. (Annexure - 2)
2.5 The Bid Document was prepared by President IOA with inputs from Chief Minister,
Government of Delhi and the Lt. Governor, Delhi, who stated that a suitable site for the Games
Village had been identified by him and so on. These documents, issued after approval of Prime
Minister, formed a part of the Bid submitted by President, IOA on 30 th May, 2003 in the presence of
Minister, MYAS and Lt. Governor, Delhi at London.
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2.6 President, IOA petitioned Government that the amount of 1.61 crore sanctioned for bidding
for the CWG was inadequate and, in fact, he would require 3.33 crore. It would be pertinent to note
that expenses have been exceeded, inter-alia, because Shri Kalmadi had included in his retinue two
persons from Wizcraft to accompany him to London viz. Shri Virat Sarkari and Shri Ajay Rao. What is
interesting is that the Commonwealth Youth Games Opening and Closing Ceremonies were
conducted by Wizcraft in particular, Shri Virat Sarkari and the Commonwealth Games Ceremonies
were entrusted to Wizcraft with Shri Virat Sarkari being the prima-donna, including at GOM meetings.
2.7 This is also the time when the visit of the CGF Evaluation Commission was imminent. Shri
Kalmadi, not satisfied with the budget of 25 lakh approved for meeting expenditure related to
Evaluation Commission on 28th July, 2003, petitions Shri Vikram Verma and manages to extract
another 7 lakh on the same day from the Minister on the ground that publicity budget needed to be
hiked1. It is unclear what required to be publicised.
2.8 These modest additional demands for funds are being noted because it would become part of
Shri Kalmadi’s studied approach, whenever the issue of money to support CWG came up. Meanwhile,
CGF sent a team consisting of Mr. Dick McColgan, Vice Chairman, CGF (Chairman), Edgar Rogers,
Regional Vice President, Africa, Michael Hooper, CEO, CGF, Richard Palmer, Special Adviser, Perry
Crosswhite, CEO, ACGA to evaluate India’s bid for CWG. The team visited Delhi from August 3 – 8,
2003. A major issue raised by the team was regarding the financing of the Games. According to the
Evaluation Commission, Government of India was obligated to underwrite the difference between
receipts and payments vis-à-vis Commonwealth Games. In other words, the shortfall in financing the
Games would be met by Government of India. On the facilities for hosting the Games, the Evaluation
Commission seemed to be well satisfied with the caveat that modernization and up-gradation of
facilities at various stadia would be needed. The Commission was also comfortable with the
proposed location of the Games Village suggested by Lt. Governor, Delhi on the river bed next to
Akshardham Temple, where the Village was eventually constructed.
1
See Annexure 3
Page 12
‘Revenue Neutral’ Games

2.9 In order to provide the guarantee of Government of India described in the previous
paragraph, MYAS Cabinet Note dated 10th September, 2003 stated that even though the proposed
expenditure on the Games had increased to 400 crore, there would still be a surplus of 50 to 60
crore. Thus, Cabinet was approached on the premise that the Games would not only be ‘revenue
neutral’ but would also generate a small surplus. This premise was the basis on which between 2003
and 2010 nearly 30,000 crore was secured from the Government even though, after a point, it was
very clear that the Games would place considerable financial burden on the Government. In any
event, Cabinet approved the proposal to underwrite the Games, approved the location of Games
Village next to Akshardham Temple and deferred its decision on how the accommodation
constructed in the Village for the Games would be utilized /disposed off. (Annexure -4)
2.10 After receiving these assurances, the CGF regarded Delhi’s Bid to secure the Games complete
in all respects and Government knew that their Bid would be taken up around 10th November, 2003
at Montego Bay, Jamaica. There was one other Bid in contention, that of Hamilton, Canada. The
comparative analysis of these bids by the Evaluation Commission of CGF, which was forwarded to all
members in October 2003, showed that Delhi’s Bid was much stronger. (Annexure – 5).
2.11 A delegation consisting of Minister, MYAS, Secretary (YAS), Joint Secretary (Sports), Lt.
Governor, Delhi, President, IOA, other officials of IOA and a few eminent sports persons was deputed
to Jamaica to canvass for India’s bid. On 13 th November, 2003, CGF announced the assignment of
CWG XIX to Delhi since it had secured the majority of the votes.
2.12 There is no official record of the events at this meeting in Jamaica. The Ministry of Youth
Affairs and Sports did not prepare any Report on the foreign deputation, even though an important
decision had been made which required action to be taken expeditiously, inter-alia because the
agreement signed between IOA and CGF, after award of the Games required formation of the
Organizing Committee for conduct of the Games within six months. This agreement was not available
on the file of MYAS at that time. No other action was also taken. The Minister, YA&S did make some
attempt to set-up a meeting with President, IOA in February – March 2003, but was rebuffed on the
Page 13
grounds that Shri Kalmadi was not available. Things continued to drift in this manner till August –
September, 2004. The notable developments in the meanwhile were – Parliamentary Elections in
May, 2004 leading to swearing-in of the late Shri Sunil Dutt as the Minister and the retirement of Shri
Rajeeva Srivastava, Secretary, MYAS. The last is being noted because from June, 2004 he joined Shri
Kalmadi and continued with him till November, 2010. It is our understanding that he left his
association with the OC, the legal entity which employed him, soon after this Committee was formed
and around the time of our meeting with him.
Brief is exceeded
2.13 In September, 2004, Shri Rajkumar Sacheti, Director (Coordination), Indian Olympic
Association informed Government of an additional liability of US $ 7.2 million. This had arisen
because President, IOA had announced a training grant of US $ 100,000 to each of the 72
Commonwealth Games Associations at Montego Bay during the General Assembly in November,
2003. Although Ministry was aware of this announcement since it had answered a Parliament
Question on 2nd December, 2003 on this subject, it feigned complete ignorance and seemed
surprised. To this day, this has remained its stand. In our meeting with Shri R.K Mishra, the then
Joint Secretary in the Ministry of YA&S, he chose to remain silent on this matter. Our query to the
then Minister Shri Vikram Verma, shows that the announcement was made by Shri Kalmadi without
any authority or prior consultation2. On being asked, Shri Kalmadi stated that he had taken the prior
approval of the then Prime Minister telephonically3. According to the Prime Minister’s Office there is
no record of such approval. Our review and interaction with the concerned officials leads us to
believe that the announcement was made unilaterally by Shri Kalmadi, he had no authority to do so
and he is not being truthful in now making out that he had secured the approval of the then Prime
Minister telephonically. In any event, it became an additional commitment which MYAS decided to
honour. Shri Kalmadi’s assertions that there was intense lobbying in support of Hamilton, that they
were also offering monetary inducements etc. are all afterthoughts, neither validated by
contemporaneous records nor vouchsafed by others present at Montego Bay. HLC specifically asked
Shri Vikram Verma whether this matter was discussed with him. He has answered in the negative.
2
Refer Annexure 6
3
See Annexure 7
Page 14
The announcement was not a part of India’s bid, Shri Kalmadi had no authority to commit
Government and therefore Government could have very well maintained that they were not obliged
to honour the commitment.
Constitution of Organizing Committee

2.14 There was also the issue of making suitable administrative arrangements for the Games. The
Host City Contract required constitution of an Organizing Committee for conduct of the Games. From
November 2003 to September, 2004 (10 months) there was little progress on these. These issues are
discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.
2.15 In September, 2004, Shri Sunil Dutt, Minister, MYAS was informed by the Cabinet Secretariat
of Prime Minister’s Orders dated 3rd September, 2004 stating “it has been decided, with the approval
of the Prime Minister, to constitute a Core Group of Ministers (GOM) for coordinating the work
relating to the organization of the Games.” Cabinet Secretariat further stated that the First Meeting
of the GOM would be held on 25.10.2004 and would be chaired by the Prime Minister. At the first
meeting, it was decided to:
i) Set-up mile-stones for various activities;

ii) Authorize MYAS to review and monitor arrangements for CWG;
iii) Create sports and tourists infrastructure, including training facility;
iv) Strengthen MYAS by setting-up of International Sports Division (ISD) to be headed by Joint
Secretary;
v) Set-up an Empowered Committee under Lt. Governor, Delhi to monitor construction;
vi) Set-up Committee of Secretaries (COS) to implement decisions of GOM;
vii) Set-up a Coordination Committee under Chief Secretary, Delhi to mirror the functions of
COS.
2.16 These structures were set up by the concerned entities. The issue which remained was
incorporation of an Organizing Committee for conduct of the Commonwealth Games as required by
the Host City Contract.
Page 15
2.17 The Organizing Committee (OC) was set up in February, 2005 with an Executive Board of 15
Members. Its functioning is discussed in detail in a separate chapter.
Group of Ministers (GOM)

2.18 The GOM was to be serviced by MYAS. MYAS was designated the Nodal Ministry for OC plus
others who secure money from Government for the Games or in the name of the Games. In addition,
MYAS set up a web based Monitoring System by 2008 to capture and report progress vis-a-vis
preparation for Games. It is also the parent Ministry for the Sports Authority of India (SAI). In brief,
these are the main functions of MYAS.
2.19 The Sports Authority of India is a Registered Society and the field organization of the Ministry
for games and sports. It is also the custodian of sports stadia owned by GOI viz. Jawaharlal Nehru
Stadium, Major Dhyan Chand Stadium, SP Mukherjee Swimming Pool, Indira Gandhi Stadium and
Karni Singh Shooting Range. It also carries the responsibility of training Indian participants in sports
events and has been assigned the task of preparing the Indian contingent for CWG – 2010.
Committee of Secretaries
2.20 Committee of Secretaries (COS) is an established mechanism for coordination and resolution
of Inter-Ministerial issues. It is chaired by the Cabinet Secretary. Its functioning gained momentum
with the passage of time.
2.21 The governance mechanism was thus complete. It did not take into account Cabinet or its
Committees. Our review shows that their role in the governance structure was limited to financial
sanctions. This is examined in the Chapter on the Cost of the Games. In succeeding chapters the role
played by each arm of the governance structure has been examined.
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Chapter 3: Cost of the Games

3.1 In a pamphlet issued by the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports at the conclusion of the
Games, the cost of the Games in terms of approved expenditure is estimated as follows:
Approved expenditure of Govt. of India 11,687.25 crore
Approximate cost of projects of Govt. of Delhi 16,560.00 crore
3.2 In sum, a little over 28000 crore was spent on organizing the Games: a galactic jump from
300 – 400 crore estimated by Shri Randhir Singh (April – May 2003) and reiterated by Shri Kalmadi
(August 2003) prior to Cabinet approval underwriting the Games in September, 2003. This issue,
“cost of Games” was periodically placed before the Cabinet seeking enhancements in financial
outlays. These were provided by the Cabinet. At no stage was an overall budget prepared by MYAS
or required by any other entity e.g. Ministry of Finance and / or Cabinet. The closest the exercise
came to a budgetary overview was in April, 2007 when it considered the Note for the Cabinet of
MYAS dated 6th March, 2007. The background to this Note was a meeting taken by the Prime
Minister in August, 20064 where several decisions were taken including, finalization of requirement of
entities, completion of EFC procedures, computation of total financial outlays required for the Games
and sanctions. Ministries were also urged to set out timelines and to ensure that completion of
projects takes place in a timely manner.
3.3 After the allotment of CWG – 2010 to India on the basis of Cabinet approval of September,
2003, the Cabinet is next approached after 3-1/2 years in March, 2007. In the meanwhile,
incorporation of OC has taken 18 months, that committee has engaged EKS to outline the
requirements for the Games and all this has taken 3-1/2 years5. The Cabinet Note suggests that the
4
Minutes of the Meeting taken by PM are at Annexure 8
5
What is inexplicable is prolonged hiatus between one stage and the next. Thus, even though EKS report is
ready by August, 2005 OC takes four months and GOM finally approves proposals for Games Venues in
Page 17
earlier estimates have now been updated and the Games are now estimated to cost 3,566 crore ±
300 crore. The Cabinet approval is on the basis of consideration of these proposals by the
Expenditure Finance Committee (EFC) held in September, 2006. It is somewhat unfortunate that it
has taken six months for the preparation of Cabinet Note after approval of the EFC. It is also curious
that the Cabinet Note states “in view of the above, as per present estimates the total expenditure of
the Games would be around 3566 ± 300 crore …“. (Para 12.6) It is also the case that the estimates
appended with the EFC Minutes at Annexure – XI - describes the estimates as “Rough Cost” and to
arrive at a rough cost it has taken all this time. Estimates have gone up by ten times in 3-1/2 years
and all we have are rough costs. Two other points are noteworthy. First, let out value of CPWD
contracts is 1341 crore,6 but this is not highlighted in 2007. Also since the contracts have been
awarded for this price, it is inappropriate to describe these are rough costs. All this seems to have
been known, but is recorded two years later. Secondly, the EFC mechanism deliberates at length but
is unable to discern and therefore does not record this issue. In any event, Cabinet approval is
accorded to these requests.
Myth of ‘revenue neutral’ Games

3.4 The Cabinet sanction includes an amount of 767 crore for Conduct of the Games by OC. It
should be noted that these estimates have effectively destroyed the hypothesis of Organizing
Committee that the Games would be ‘revenue neutral’. In other words, the income from the Games
would be equal to the expenditure. The propaganda after the Melbourne Games of a revenue
surplus is being systematically used to this end. It is another matter that the Accounts of the State of
Victoria7 have been audited by the Auditor General of Australia and he has found a deficit of
Australian Dollars 265.53 million in the Accounts of the Commonwealth Games Corporation,
statutorily incorporated to conduct the Games. A grant from the State of Victoria has met the deficit.
Unfortunately, even though these facts are known, they are not placed before the Cabinet. The then
Minister, MYAS had pointed out the myth of revenue neutral Games (October – November, 2004).
January, 2006. The next stage, consideration by EFC is reached in September, 2006 (9 months) and Cabinet
another six months thereafter.
6
In this connection discussion summarized in the Minutes of EFC held on 20th & 25th February, 2009 is
illuminating.
7
Independent Audit Report of Auditor General of Victoria conducted for the period 15th July, 1999 to 31st
August, 2006.
Page 18
3.5 It is worth noting that the letter of Shri Randhir Singh, Secretary General, IOA to Department
of Sports (March, 2003) is fictional8. Likewise, the letter of Shri Kalmadi, President, IOA (August 2003)
is a marginal improvement on the fiction. These letters were only designed to obtain the approval of
the Government under pretext that the Games would be ‘revenue neutral’, that there would be
virtually no financial liability for Government to meet and therefore it would be quite safe to
underwrite the Games, a requirement of CGF. These letters are at Annexure -9.
Absence of Budgetary Ceiling

3.6 In relation to the estimates of the Organizing Committee, the MYAS is increasingly uneasy and
it is also clear that the machinery of the Government is not adequate to address the micro-issues
involving examination of the requirements of OC. Accordingly, MYAS appointed an Expert
Committee (June/July 2007) to scrutinize the periodic demands for increased amounts being made by
the Organizing Committee. By mid 2007, more than 100 crore has been released to OC leaving both
sides frustrated. There is now demand for funds for the forthcoming Commonwealth Youth Games in
2008 and all this requires detailed scrutiny. Expert Committee is expected to do it. The Expert
Committee looks at the Budget of OC for Commonwealth Youth Games (CWYG) and recommends an
amount of 66.50 crore, an amount wholly unacceptable to OC. The discussions, numerous, at
several levels and all levels are becoming acrimonious. Shri Kalmadi describes the Ministry of Youth
Affairs and Sports as ‘cartoons sitting in one room in Shastri Bhawan’9. Not surprisingly, the Ministry
reluctantly gives in and, for the year 2007-08, OC ends up collecting 95.00 crore from Government
vis a vis expenditure of 52.00 crore. Its cash balance increases to 76.00 crore at the end of March,
2008 from 33.00 crore at the end of March, 2007.
3.7 Around this time, it is decided to abolish the Expert Committee and submit the requirements
of OC as well as other entities seeking funds to the EFC procedure10. Between 2007 and 2010, right
upto the conduct of the Games, entities continue to revise costs and secure Cabinet / CCEA approval.
The idea that there is an overall Budget of 3566 crore or any other amount never enters the Agenda.
8
The letter was accompanied by asupporting letter from SMAM, the infamous company later engaged by OC
at the instance of President and CEO, CGF as the marketing agency for CWG 2010.
9
See letter of Minister, MYAS addressed to PM in October 2007 placed at Annexure 15
10
HLC believes that Expert Committee was much better equipped to examine the kind of requirements which
were put forth by OC. Its abolition was an instance of Shri Kalmadi’s influence.
Page 19
We note that in the Annexures with certain Cabinet papers i.e. CCEA (27.3.2008), Cabinet (3.10.2008)
and Cabinet (4.12.2008), information regarding the mounting costs of the Games is included.
However, there is no write-up during the period March 2007 and April 2009 regarding a budgetary
ceiling for the Games. Mere aggregation of financial sanctions does not constitute a Budget. What
was envisaged in Prime Minister’s meeting of August, 2006 was a budget for the Games and for the
Ministries / entities to work within that established Budget. This has not taken place. All that has
been done is that the cost of the Games to the exchequer is being periodically revised and reported
as the Budget for the Games. On the last such occasion at the 32nd meeting of the GOM held on
22.09.2010 the GOM is informed of the Budget having increased to 11687 crore with the sanction of
193.42 crore to Organizing Committee. What has increased is the financial outlay, not the Budget.
It is a misnomer to describe the periodic increases in sanctioned outlays as a Budget. These are
merely cost revisions. The absence of budgetary ceiling seems to be an important cause of ballooning
expenditure because entities seemed to feel that after “due process,” sanctions would follow and,
follow they did.
3.8 Government, or should we say the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports, was remiss in not
framing a Budget11 for the Games and not restricting entities to financial ceilings set by the Budget. It
should be noted that by this time an elaborate exercise for assessing what is required for the Games
has been conducted by EKS, has been considered by all stake holders, its outcome has been put
through Inter Departmental process and nothing further remains to be done. Despite this
considerable progress in the planning process, no Budgetary Ceiling is set. Ever increasing costs are a
direct outcome of failure to set a Budgetary Ceiling.
3.9 The next round-of sanctions commence in April, 2009 and continue till September, 2010. In
April 2009, Cabinet agrees to revise CPWD requirements to 2460 crore from 1000 crore in 2007.
On that date all contracting has been completed by CPWD. So called ‘cost estimates’ placed before
Cabinet are really an aggregation of price at which contracts have been let out. In other words, after
11
Minutes of Prime Minister’s meeting (August, 2006) are clear and required a Budget for the Games.
Page 20
the award of Games, it has taken 5-1/2 years for reliable estimates to emerge and, in a sense, they
are not estimates at all because they are the value of contracts awarded by CPWD.
No dearth of money
3.10 By 2009 there is certainly an impression that money is not a constraint for delivering the ‘best
ever Games’, for showcasing India. Call it what you may, there is a tinge of hubris. What is sauce for
the goose is sauce for the gander. All entities follow this precedent and their costs / sanctions are
revised. Table 3.1 below provides the relevant information.
Table 3.1: Cost Estimates of the Projects
( in crore)
Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates Sanctions in
Sl. Item of approved by presented presented presented before 2009- 2010
No. Expenditure Cabinet on before CCEA before Cabinet on
15.3.2007 on 27.3.2008 Cabinet on 4.12.2008
03.10.2008
1. Sports Authority of 1000 1450 2195 2195 Estimate
India for Sports (plus minus revised to
Infrastructure 10%) 2460 crore in
April 2009
2. Venue for Tennis 30.00 30.00 30.00 62.75 Estimates
(AITA) (plus minus approved by
Cabinet on
15%)
8.10.2009
65.65 crore
3. OC for conduct of 767 1518 1518 1518 Estimates
Games (plus minus 110 110 approved by
Cabinet on
15%)
5.11.2009
1620 crore
4. Sports
Infrastructure for 210.00 210.00 210.00 210.00
Commonwealth
Youth Games
Pune, 2008
5. Civic Infrastructure - 134.32 134.32 134.32
for Pune
6. Security - 7.16 7.16 7.16

arrangements for
CWYG
Infrastructure
7. DDA for 325 631.55 631.55 631.55 Estimates
International Zone, (plus minus presented
before Cabinet
etc of Games 25%
on 15.10.2009
Village and Sports recommended 827.85 crore
Infrastructure by EFC on
22.8.2006
8. GNCTD for civic 770 770 770 770
infrastructure
Page 21
9 Preparation of 678 802 678 678

Teams (approved by
CCEA on
12.6.2008)
10. Overlays 200 400 400 400 Estimates
approved by
the Cabinet on
19.3.2010
687.06 crore
11. Upgradation/creati 257.41 Estimates
on of Competition (approved by 257.41 339 339 approved by
the Cabinet
and Training CCEA on
8.10.2009
Venues- DU, JMI 27.3.2008) 306.41 crs. +
and DPS 42.57 crore
Estimates
12 Security through 172 264 264 277 approved by
MHA the Cabinet
Committee on
Infrastructure
on 19.10.2009
370 crore
13. Host Broadcaster 415 494 415 415
DD/AIR
International
Broadcasting
Centre
PIB for Publicity - 20 20 20
etc.
ITPO - 28 28 28
Total of 13 542 463 463
14. Archeological - 25.75 25.75 25.75

Survey of India for
refurbishment of
monuments
15. Construction of Big 15 15 15 15 Estimates
Bore Shooting approved by
Range at CRPF the Cabinet on
Centre 8.10.2009
28.50 crore
16. Construction & 70.72 - 70.72 70.72
Operationalization
of Sports medicine
and Injury Centre
at Safdarjang
Hospital
17 MTNL for incremental Telecom Infrastructure approved by Cabinet on 18.2.2010 for an amount of
182.00 crore
18 OC for Timing Scoring Result (TSR System) and Sports Equipment approved by Competent
Page 22
Authority on 87.25 crore
19 Ministry of Health and Family Welfare for construction and operationalization of Sports Medicine
and Injury Centre at Safdarjang Hospital for an amount of 70.72 crore[ approved by competent
authority]
20 Ministry of Home Affairs for Intelligent Traffic Management System approved by CCEA on
13.8.2009 for an amount of 200 crore
3.11 It is also the case that by September, 2010 all projects are complete, are handed over and the
Games have taken place in October, 2010. Nevertheless, none of the projects of any entity are
shown, on the files, as complete. A considerable amount of savings are available for meeting
liabilities. What these liabilities could be, is another matter. In the absence of any monitoring
procedure and in the absence of this kind of enquiry these matters would have remained opaque.
Table 3.2 below shows the amounts available with the entities in relation to sanctions as of
December, 2010 / January, 2011:
Table 3.2: Unspent Balance
( in crore)
# Project Items Sanctioned Expenditure Unspent
Amount upto January Amount
2011
1 Games Venues 4854.24 3972.82** 881.42

2 Infrastructure 6773.68 5778.18 995.50
3 Organizing Committee 2580.73 1785.97* 794.76
4 Games Village 538.84 416.72 122.12
5 Training of Indian Contingent for 678.00 283.00 395.00
Commonwealth Games
Grand Total 15425.4912 12236.69 3188.80
* Expenditure upto February 2011
** Expenditure of SAI included in the figures shown are
upto Feb.2011
3.12 We believe that this was the outcome of the decision made by GOM on 4.01.2006. The
manner in which that decision was made is described in the next chapter and the consequences are
12
Out of 11,687.75 crore of approved expenditure, the details are available for 8274 crore and expenditure
indicated corresponds to this sanctioned amount. Further, sanctioned cost of GNCTD projects is 7155.99
crore. (Refer HLC 3rd Report).
Page 23
detailed in all five Reports on various aspects of the Games. What it did was to empower OC and
executing agencies without over-sight, without a budgetary ceiling and at one stroke eliminate Sports
Authority of India from the decision making process. Department of Sports had failed; at some level
was complicit. We return to this theme at relevant points in the report.
3.13 Not all the blame lies with the above captioned decision because in relation to the Organising
Committee, the savings to date are nearly a third of estimates. Unsurprisingly, Shri Kalmadi wrote to
Secretary, Department of Sports on 30thJune, 2010 describing OC’s dire financial position and
requesting for a further sum of 900 crore13. Luckily, Government procedures prevented the fruition
of this unseemly proposal.
3.14 Cabinet was concerned with the scale of expenditure. While considering the Cabinet Note of
Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports dated 06.03.2007 it decided that a system of concurrent Audit
should be put in place effective April 2008. Nobody is very clear what this entailed e.g. what did
concurrent Audit mean, what entities were to be covered and by whom? Department of Sports
addressed OC and was informed by the latter that a comprehensive system of Internal Audit exists.
There is sufficient correspondence between Department of Sports and Controller General of
Accounts; on the ground nothing much happens. Department of Sports addresses Comptroller and
Auditor General also and an Audit party commences Inspection of OC in November 2008. In essence
Cabinet decision of April, 2008 was not implemented.
Cabinet – sanctioning authority

3.15 Cabinet has by and large acted as a sanctioning authority. The progress in relation to the
Games has not been reported to it probably because it was treated as the function of GOM. It is also
the case that in December, 2008 MYAS reports to Cabinet on the state of preparedness for the
Games, takes credit for setting up a web-based monitoring system and asserts “the updated progress
is reviewed by the monitoring agencies on-line and issues / bottlenecks are addressed appropriately”
(para 18 of Note dated 27th November, 2008). Cabinet is unimpressed and decides “…. directed full
13
See Annexure 10
Page 24
review by Ministers of Urban Development, Tourism & Culture, Science & Technology and Youth
Affairs & Sports and report within two weeks”. It is unfortunate and somewhat inexplicable that
these orders of the Cabinet are not acted upon. This Group of Ministers met on three occasions after
the Cabinet meeting, in terms of the Cabinet decision, but they deal with issues not germane to the
Cabinet decision. These three meetings are described in the Chapter on GOM.
3.16 From the records provided to us, it appears that there have been about 20 meetings of
Cabinet / CCEA on Commonwealth Games – 2010. These meetings have been held to secure Cabinet
/ CCEA approval for the ever increasing cost of the Games. We have therefore concluded that
Cabinet / CCEA by and large functioned as a sanctioning authority for the cost of the Games.
Page 25
Chapter 4: Group of Ministers (GOM)

4.1 It would be recalled that this body was set up by the Prime Minister in September, 2004 with
the object of coordinating all matters concerning the Commonwealth Games – 2010. A copy of the
Cabinet Secretariat Memo setting up the GOM, its membership, its functions etc. is appended 14. The
First meeting of the GOM was held on 25.10.2004 and chaired by the Prime Minister. Thereafter 13
meetings were held. These meetings were chaired by late Shri Arjun Singh, the then Minister, Human
Resource Development (HRD). Unfortunately, no meeting took place between January, 2006 and
November, 2006 and again between 9th April, 2008 and 2nd July, 2009. The latter was in fact the first
meeting of the reconstituted GOM after Parliamentary elections in May, 2009.
4.2 The recurring themes of meetings of the first GOM were:

 Organizing Committee (OC);
 Games Village; and
 Games Venues.
In fact, the first 4 GOM meetings were devoted to the Organizing Committee. In the succeeding
paragraphs these themes are discussed.
Organizing Committee
4.3 The First GOM met in October, 2004. Thereafter, there is a gap of over two months during
which the issue of chairmanship of OC is being discussed informally and remains to be resolved. The
second meeting of GOM is held on 14th January, 2005 and, even though Minutes did not issue, the
approved Minutes state as follows:
“It was observed that material changes in financial as well as structural aspects of the
Organizing Committee, as proposed in the original Bid Document (which formed the basis for
allotment of Games to India) were made by IOA unilaterally. This revised Bid Document was
sent to the Ministry only in September, 2004.”
14
See Annexure - 11
Page 26
4.4 Unfortunately, no further action / decision was taken and the matter was allowed to rest. On
29th January, 2005 certain decisions seem to have been taken by the GOM. These are circulated on
7th February, 2005 by the MYAS. From the record it seems that a formal meeting has perhaps not
taken place. The crucial decision relates to chairmanship of the Organizing Committee which goes to
Shri Suresh Kalmadi.
4.5 At the next meeting of the GOM (Fourth meeting) held on 17.03.2005, Chairman, Organizing
Committee, Shri Suresh Kalmadi informs GOM that OC has been registered and provides it with
Memorandum of OC. This document is heavily weighed in favour of the Chairman and the OC.
Unfortunately, no discussion takes place in the GOM on this issue.
4.6 On 10.05.2005 Chairman, GOM informs Minister, Youth Affairs and Sports of his having
approved membership of Organizing Committee15. While this decision belonged to GOM, fait
accompli is accepted by the Minister / Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports. Unfortunately the then
Minister Shri Sunil Dutt passed away on 25th May, 2005.
4.7 At the 9th meeting of the GOM held on 04.01.2006, Chairman, OC declared that the Executive
Board of the Organizing Committee has decided that the Commonwealth Youth Games cannot be
organized in Delhi and he would take up this issue with Commonwealth Games Federation and
finalize the location. At its next meeting held on 9 th November, 2006 (10th GOM meeting) Chairman,
OC states “the 3rd Commonwealth Youth Games will be held in Pune (Maharashtra) from 12 – 18th
October, 2008”.
4.8 At the 13th meeting of the GOM (held on 10.03.2008), Ministry of Youth Affairs & Sports
makes a powerful plea for restricting the absolute power of Organizing Committee by a suitable
amendment to the Memorandum of the Organizing Committee. This is circulated as Agenda Item
No.16 “Institutional Issues of the Organizing Committee CWG – 2010”. While the Minutes are silent,
it appears this item is deferred. It is placed at the Agenda of the next meeting. Unfortunately this
15
See Annexure 12
Page 27
item is once again not taken up (14th meeting of the GOM held on 9.04.2008) because Shri Kalmadi
does not attend. The GOM was unable to act on this important issue, concerned with coordination
with the Games. Its compulsions (GOM) have not been recorded; its consequences will continue to
be debated. Howsoever this matter is viewed, the conclusion that Shri Kalmadi gains, cannot be
avoided.
4.9 While the First GOM was set up to coordinate issues with regard to CWG – 2010 it has begun
to take substantive decisions which may / may not have belonged to GOM because the GOM was not
empowered in terms of the Notification issued by the Cabinet Secretariat on the subject. Thus OC is
able to secure GOM approval for the appointment of EKS for functions which are not entirely clear at
the 10th GOM. In the main, OC has been able to secure what it wants from the GOM while
Government has been unable to use the GOM for exercising control over OC.
4.10 It would be perhaps not wrong to conclude that GOM during the period 2005 – 2009 is largely
supportive of OC and, as a result, some functions which did not belong to OC became their preserve.
In fact having approved the appointment of Shri Kalmadi as the Chairman of OC it was all the more
necessary to decide what functions would be performed by it and the remaining would naturally
remain with Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports. The dysfunctionality of Sports Authority of India
was largely a result of OC encroaching on territory belonging to the latter. It may well be that MYAS
having lost every battle had given up the struggle.
Games Village
4.11 One important matter, which is periodically placed before the GOM, is the CWG – 2010
Games Village at Akshar Dham. In January, 2006 the GOM decides that the Village may be
constructed on a PPP model. A large number of social activists, including Shri Kuldip Nayyar are up in
arms. ‘Yamuna Jia Abhiyaan’, a Group led by Shri Mishra is particularly active in opposing the location
of the Games Village in the Yamuna Flood Plains to press GOM for hearing. Unfortunately, for a
considerable period of time these groups do not secure a hearing from the GOM. At last they are
heard in November, 2007. By then the hearing has become an academic exercise because tendering
Page 28
process is complete and DDA, the executing agency, has signed the project development agreement
with EMMAR-MGF Construction Company Limited for executing the project. It is perhaps not an
exaggeration to conclude that GOM had little interest in this cause.
4.12 It is also not clear why the manner of execution of the Games Village Project needed
consideration and approval by the GOM. Cabinet had decided location as well as execution of the
Commonwealth Games Village. The site fixed was next to Akshardham and Delhi Development
Authority (DDA) had been named the executing agency. In fact, DDA had also prepared estimates for
execution of the project. DDA is a fully empowered body and did not need endorsement / approval
from GOM or any consultation on the manner in which it wish to execute the project. Unfortunately,
GOM discussed this issue in several meetings (IV to IX meetings) and approved the Public Private
Partnership (PPP) mode; another instance of decision making by GOM.
Games Venues
4.13 The games venues were brought to the attention of the GOM at its 4th meeting held on
17.03.2005 and Chairman, OC was insistent that a supplementary reappraisal of venues by EKS was
required. This was authorized and DDA (through its Vice Chairman, who was present) agreed to bear
the cost. Even though EKS completed its work by September, 2005, GOM was unable to take up
venue development, as proposed by EKS in that meeting or the next meeting held on 7th November,
2005 (in its VIII meeting). Eventually, GOM takes this subject at the 9th Meeting (held on 04.01.2006)
and decides “Identification and Development of Venue Infrastructure for Commonwealth Games –
2010”: The OC made a detailed presentation related to venue infrastructure covering 15 approved
disciplines and 3 new disciplines of Archery, Billiards & Snooker and Tennis.
4.14 The GOM, on the basis of the presentation and in the light of the proposal submitted by the
members before it, decided to approve the 18 venues subject to the conditions that :
a) Respective Agencies should proceed with the process of concept plan and design on the basis
of global tendering.
Page 29
b) The Plan and design should be finalized in consultation with the OC to ensure that the
technical requirements for various disciplines are taken care of.
c) The infrastructure is completed in all respects and with required quality well in advance
before the Commonwealth Games, 2010.
4.15 This decision had far reaching consequences. First, it was superfluous vis a vis approval of
venues. These had been identified during evaluation (August 2003) and there was never much
dispute on that score. Second, it empowered OC without any Budgetary limitation and considerably
enhanced the discretion of executing agencies (CPWD, DDA and GNCTD, PWD). It retained no over-
sight for Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports or for that matter GOM and Sports Authority of India
was, at one stroke, eliminated from the process.
4.16 In the drafting of GOM Minutes, the phraseology added what the GOM did not intend. Shri
V.K. Gautam, Director, Department of Sports at that time, one time Collector of Pune, was doing the
needful for Shri Kalmadi. In a few months he would join the OC on completion of tenure.
4.17 It was also unfortunate that during 2005-2006, Ministerial arrangements for MYAS were ad-
hoc. The far reaching consequences of this decision are discussed in our Fourth Report on ‘Games
Venues’.
Meetings of Group Appointed by Cabinet

4.18 It is also surprising that despite the existence of the GOM, three meetings are chaired by
Minister of Urban Development on 16.12.2208, 16.1.2009 and 6.2.2009. These meetings are
primarily concerned with selecting a Director for the Opening and Closing Ceremonies of CWG –
D2010. To what extent it was the mandate of the GOM to select the Director is certainly an issue;
more important is the issue of answering the question as to how could this Group, with a different
mandate, agree to deal with this issue. HLC did not receive any clear answer from MYAS. What
seems to have triggered these meetings is the observation in the Cocom Report – “The creative
concept was to be developed by September, 2008 but the producers are yet to be appointed”
(Cocom Report November 10 -11, 2008 paragraph 3.2.5). In any event the last meeting of the Group
Page 30
on 6.2.2009 approved unanimously the selection of Shri Bharat Bala as the Director for the Opening
and Closing Ceremonies. That matter is discussed in Chapter 7 and Fifth Report of HLC on Organising
Committee.
4.19 In conclusion the first GOM was meant to coordinate activities in relation to the organization
and conduct of the CWG – 2010. In some cases it did not decide issues which belonged to it while in
other cases it took decisions on matters not within its ambit. For surveillance of preparation for the
Games the kind of periodicity which ought to have existed during this crucial period of 2004 – 2009
did not follow.
Second GOM June 2009 – October 2010

4.20 In June, 2009 the GOM was reconstituted16 under the chairmanship of Shri Jaipal Reddy,
Minister of Urban Development at that time. A copy of the Cabinet Secretariat Memorandum setting
up the GOM is appended. This GOM held 34 meetings between July, 2009 and 18th October, 2010
when the last meeting was held. In constituting the Group it is stated:
“It has been decided with the approval of the Prime Minister to constitute a Group of
Ministers (GOM) to review the progress and take decisions as required to facilitate smooth
implementation of all activities connected with the Commonwealth Games to be held in Delhi
in 2010”
4.21 By October, 2009 Government is seriously concerned about the tardy progress made for CWG
– 2010 and, in partial modification of the earlier Memo constituting the Group, provides: i) the Group
may meet every week and ii) the work of the Organizing Committee will be supervised regularly by
the Group of Ministers. For discharging these functions, Secretary (Sports) and Chairman, OC will
report weekly to GOM. Between October, 2009 and the conclusion of the Games (October, 2010), 20
meetings take place, about half of those envisaged.
4.22 In the succeeding paragraphs an attempt will be made to review the themes addressed by the
reconstituted GOM, the decisions taken and the efficacy of this mechanism. The main themes
16
See Annexure 13
Page 31
addressed were : i) preparedness for the Games, mainly physical infrastructure; ii) Opening and
Closing Ceremonies; iii) progress achieved by Organizing Committee vis a vis preparation for the
Games; and iv) certain connected miscellaneous issues.
Preparedness for the Games

4.23 Secretary (Sports) was obligated to report to the GOM at its meeting on completion of
physical infrastructure. These reports were dutifully made and occasionally supplemented through
field visits prior to the meeting. By this time it has become clear that the monitoring mechanism set
up by Department of Sports is not working. Hence reliance has to be placed on what CPWD and
other executing agencies report in relation to the progress made. These reports are unable to
forecast completion because the progress made is never accurately revealed. It is also the case that,
on certain occasions, progress is reported and promises made by DG, CPWD and yet dates of
completion continue to elude targets. HLC has been informed that in addition to the GOM, progress
of CPWD executed Games projects are being monitored very regularly by Secretary, Ministry of Urban
Development. It is not clear why he is not asked to report progress instead of Secretary (Sports)
whose information is second hand hearsay. It needs to be pointed out that in July, 2009 CAG submits
a report to Government “Preparedness for the XIX Commonwealth Games 2010”. This Report is not
discussed by the GOM. It has pointed out a number of projects as High / Medium Risk including key
Games complexes SPM Aquatics, JLN Stadium and Games Village. Projects are delayed and get
completed in their own time. The empowerment of GOM does not seem to have helped even though
its Chairman is Minister for Urban Development, in charge of CPWD and DDA.
Opening & Closing Ceremonies

4.24 With a few exceptions, Opening and Closing Ceremonies are discussed at nearly all the
meetings of GOM. Progress, provision of resources, form and content, physical aids all come up for
consideration / decision before the GOM. By and large, Organizing Committee, in-charge of the
Ceremonies uses GOM to secure decisions where it would be useful to assign responsibility to GOM.
Thus for example when OC wishes to appoint Mark Fisher for a consideration of half a million Dollars
it places the matter before GOM. When GOM decides that his services are no longer necessary
because it has been decided not to construct the Band Stand, which he has been hired to design, OC
Page 32
ignores the decision. Mark Fisher continues and is now in-charge of Aerostat. It is another matter
that GOM is virtually presented with a fait accompli on this issue. Likewise, Bharat Bala has been
hired, is in receipt of a very large sum of money, he is now seeking enhanced remuneration and the
matter is promptly placed before the GOM; happily it is approved. A much bigger contract, where
there are allegations of serious conflict of interest i.e. the appointment of Wizcraft has taken place
without the approval of GOM. By August, 2010 (28th meeting 26.08.2010) GOM has lost patience and
when it is asked to authorize payment for M/s. K Events, Chairman, GOM and Minister (YA&S)
expressed strong reservation on bringing this matter before the GOM. It was reiterated that “matter
such as this are internal to OC and should be approved at the appropriate level by OC. They should
not be brought before GOM” (Minutes of 28th Meeting of GOM Item No.4).
4.25 In so far as the theme and content of Opening and Closing Ceremonies are concerned, there
are periodic discussions about action since not much progress has been made during the Calendar
year 2009. During this time OC is assisted in this function by Shri Bharat Bala and other experts.
When this topic is raised in December, 2009, after nearly one year GOM is promptly informed that
the funds available are inadequate and that instead of 106.50 crore they would need much more.
GOM agrees to raise the money for Opening and Closing Ceremonies to 200.00 crore. By June, 2010
GOM is again very restive with regard to progress, the matter of financial resources is again agitated
by Chairman OC and Chairman GOM increases the ceiling for Ceremonies to 300.00 crore. It is
hoped that there will be no further increases. Nevertheless at the 24 th meeting (held on 14.0.7.2010)
OC requested for another 75.00 crore. Till date, very little has been reported on the progress.
Finally, at the 26th meeting (15.08.2010) partial progress is reported and it is stated that rehearsal will
start shortly. On the suggestion of GOM elements of Islamic and Buddhists culture have been
included in the Ceremonies. Unfortunately there is now the risk of rain affecting these Ceremonies
and GOM (29th meeting – 01.09.2010) agrees with Mr. Virat Sarkari “insistence now will be on
feasibility of the show and not on the grandeur”. GOM continues to express unhappiness at the poor
progress and has to satisfy itself by directing that Shri Bharat Bala will remain in Delhi till the
conclusion of the Closing Ceremony. The Ceremonies have not been fully budgeted and GOM
Page 33
enhances the budget of OC on 23.09.2010 to 1813.42 crore through an additional loan of 193.42
crore.
Progress made by OC vis a vis Preparation for the Games

4.26 It would be recalled that in October, 2009 GOM was obligated to meet every week and
Chairman, OC was required to report progress made by OC in relation to preparation for the Games.
Commencing with the 11th meeting (held on 29.12.2009) CEO, OC Shri Jarnail Singh was assigned the
duty of reporting progress to GOM. He is present in the meetings, he reports progress, but these
reports say very little. For example, at this very meeting GOM raises the issue of delay in
procurement of timing and scoring system. Nobody has any information on this. Likewise, the
catering contract has been held up, this fact is known but not reported to GOM. The file has been
lying with Chairman, OC for over two weeks by this date. In this manner progress reports are made
as a matter of form at meetings of GOM but these are low on content and it is anybody’s guess what
is going on. This is despite the fact that commencing October, 2009 Government has inducted Shri
Jarnail Singh as CEO of OC and there is team of specially selected officials to virtually run key
functions in OC. Our interaction with the officials assigned by Government to OC suggests that for a
considerable period of time they were not assigned any work / function; more on that in our Chapter
on OC.
4.27 There are some miscellaneous issues which are raised before the GOM. One such issue is Bus
ticketing during the Commonwealth Games, an euphemism for supply of free tickets. It is debated on
numerous occasion where after Government of Delhi agrees to provide a few crore of subsidy.
Likewise the lack of progress in relation to Commonwealth Games Village is agitated but does not
lead to any direction or decision. Security issues, accreditation, etc. are also mentioned from time to
time. It cannot be said that GOM decides / directs the course of events on these issues. Host
Broadcasting Agreement and delays in executing it are mentioned on a few occasions without any
outcome.
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4.28 To sum up, GOM was set up first to coordinate, second to decide and third to ensure the
delivery of the Games. It lacked a sense of ownership because the Games nominally seemed to
belong to the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports. That Ministry underwent several Ministerial
changes between May, 2004 and April, 2008. Dr. M.S. Gill, Minister for YAS at the time of the Games
had been in the Ministry from the second quarter of calendar 2008.
4.29 Cabinet responsibility for successful conduct of Games was delegated to GOM. Was GOM
effective as a customized instrument of Governance? Between 2004 and 2009 its role was, in the
main, to coordinate the work relating to the organization of the Games. It seems its efforts got
coupled to the indifferent health of then Chairman, GOM (late Shri Arjun Singh) with the result that
for 14 months, as preparations gathered steam, GOM was unable to meet, (April 2008 – July 2009).
Crucial decisions, i.e. membership of Organizing Committee, were taken by Chairman instead of
GOM. Even after it was empowered (June, 2009), it was faced with issues which did not belong to it.
4.30 There is also the vexed issue of Ministerial responsibility derived from Allocation of Business
and the oversight role presumably contemplated for the GOM and especially for the empowered
GOM. Perusal of GOM deliberations and decisions reveal that subjects which individual ministries /
Minister chose to bring before the GOM were discussed rather than those which ought to have been
discussed if any oversight role had to be discharged by GOM. Thus, even if an oversight role was
contemplated for GOM, in practice it was unable to assert that role.
4.31 HLC observations are more delineation of boundaries of GOM rather than critique of its
deliberations. Should then things be done differently? We attempt an answer to this question in
responding to the Terms of Reference.
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Chapter 5: Committee of Secretaries (COS)

5.1 In December, 2004 PMO communicated the institutional arrangements which would be put in
place to hold Commonwealth Games 2010 to the Group of Minister (GOM). Based on a Note of the
then Minister of Human Resources Development, the institutional arrangements were confirmed by
the PMO in February, 2005. These arrangements, inter alia, provided that “A Committee of
Secretaries headed by the Cabinet Secretary will be responsible for the implementation of the
decisions of the GOM regarding the Commonwealth Games. The Sports Department through its
Secretary will service this Committee”.
5.2 Constituted in 2005 January, the Committee of Secretaries (COS) met for the first time only in
May, 2006. By this time the GOM had held nine meetings. Between May, 2006 and October, 2010,
the COS met about 89 times with the following break-up- :
# Period No. of meetings
1 May, 2006 to December, 2006 8

2 2007 7
3 2008 10
4 2009 14
5 2010 Approximately 50
meetings (including
more than one on a
single day)
5.3 It would be observed that the COS got off to a late start, had a slow take off till 2010 when
there was feverish activity. In this review it is proposed to cover two important areas and see how
the COS dealt with the subject; take a look at some interesting issues which were raised and
discussed in this body and also examine a few cases where an attempt was made to use the COS or
where the intervention of COS was sought on matters which were not really within its ambit.
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5.4 The Cabinet Secretary in the very first meeting of the COS held on 5th May, 2006 pointed out
that it was important to identify and finalize the various activities and projects, taking an over view of
the requirements of all the Departments and fix milestones for their timely completion. In the
meeting held on 1st September, 2006 the Cabinet Secretary observed that the concerned agencies
should ensure that all construction activities pertaining to the Games should begin around April,
2007, before the onset of the monsoon, and should be completed by November, 2009. Towards this
end all EFCs were to be cleared by September, 2006 and detailed design estimates finalized by
October – November, 2006. Further an Empowered Committee was to be set up to facilitate
requests for clearances of various projects.
5.5 In the meeting held on 28th June, 2007 the timelines for various projects were presented.
Most of the Games projects were to start in late 2007 or early 2008. Interestingly, Secretary, MYAS
pointed out that parallel execution of works would create competing demands on skilled manpower
and machinery and therefore very tight monitoring would be required.
5.6 Thereafter, in subsequent meetings progress of Games Venues was reported as follows:
9th September, 2009 It was noted that work on all stadia was progressing on target for
completion by December, 2009
17th February, 2009 It was noted that outstanding problems have been overcome and
construction work is progressing satisfactorily with constant
monitoring at all levels.
21st May, 2009 It was reported that all stadia will be completed by December, 2009
except the Cycling Velodrome and the Games Village which will be
completed by March, 2010.
10th July, 2009 The COS discussed a Report prepared by CAG in which delays up to
18 months had been reported. Secretary (Sports), however, took
the stand that all delays had been made good. Fears expressed
about the timely completion of the Games Village were also set at
rest by the Vice Chairman, DDA. It was decided that documents
should be provided to the Audit Team to share the confidence that
the works will be completed on time.
4th December, 2009 Secretary (Sports) informed the COS that most of the Games venues
civil works were nearing completion. Secretary, UD reported that
all Games works will be completed by the target dates. It was also
stated that Training Venues will be completed by 31 st July, 2010.
12th March, 2010 Representative of OC observe that timelines given by CPWD do not
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appear to be realistic. Secretary (Sports) also felt that the

completion of Venues for Cycling, Weightlifting, Badminton and
Squash were likely to be delayed. She felt that high risk venues
should be identified and concentrated on intensively.
9th April, 2010 Secretary (Sports) reported that 9 Venues had been completed; 3
would be completed by end April, 2010 and 6 more between 31 st
May and 30th June, 2010.
11th July, 2010 Cabinet Secretary expressed his serious concern that in many areas
there are time overruns and slippages. It was reported that most of
the stadia and venues under construction give an impression of lack
of coordination.
5.7 From this review it is clear that in spite of all its efforts, even the COS was unable to get the
agencies to complete the works in time. It is observed that incorrect reporting and lack of
coordination at lower levels prevented the COS from taking corrective action at stages earlier than
they actually did. Early warnings were ignored by the implementing agencies.
5.8 The Second project selected for review is the construction of the Games Village and
deliberations connected to that project.
Date of CoS Meeting Details of deliberations
5th May, 2006 COS suggested that the DDA should use the best of suggestions to
make use of the Games Village within the laid down procedures.
23rd June, 2006 It was reported that the concept plan for the Games Village will be put
up to the GOM by September, 2006 and the Village would be ready by
December, 2009.
28th June, 2007 It was reported that the work on construction of the Village would
start by 31st August, 2007 and completed by 31st December, 2009.
17th February, 2009 A proposal for purchase of flats by DDA was brought before the COS,
which advised that approval of the appropriate authority should be
taken and proper valuation of the flats should be done through an
independent agency in a transparent manner.
10th July, 2009 It was reported that the work is going on in full swing and would be
completed by 31st March, 2010.
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11th May, 2010 It was reported that the Games Village work had been completed.
However, landscaping, provision of water and electric connections was
in progress. Furniture was being received and installed.
11th June, 2010 It was reported that handing over to OC will commence in the 3rd week
of June, 2010. External development work had not yet completed.
Kitchen design was not yet in place. DDA would complete the work
only by 15th September, 2010.
17th August, 2010 17 Towers had been completed and furnishing and cleaning teams had
moved in. Remaining towers were supposed to be handed over by 30 th
August, 2010. But this appeared difficult unless night shifts were
initiated.
26th August, 2010 Dates for installation of OC Overlays were not available. However, the
OC representative reported that this would be done by the 11 th
September, 2010. It was reported that two towers needed to be
erected for receiving telecom signals.
31st August, 2010 It was reported that the main kitchen was ready. Teams of DDA, ITDC
and the Developer were at work to remove the defects and for
furnishing the flats. External development works was under progress.
5.9 It is thus clear that while a major part of the civil work may have competed by 31 st March,
2010 many other works like provision of water and electricity, land leveling and landscaping, supply
and installation of furniture took much longer and work pertaining to catering and kitchen was
pushed dangerously close to the actual starting date of the Games. The role of the Officers appointed
by the Cabinet Secretary, in ensuring coordination, solving problems and in expediting the works is
praise worthy. The HLC is however of the view that this step of appointing Special Officers should
have been taken earlier perhaps in June, 2010.
5.10 It would be instructive to cite a few interesting and revealing issues which were brought forth
in the COS meetings and the decisions taken on these issues.
a) In the Meeting held on 11th May, 2010, Secretary, Urban Development mentioned that in
respect of a large number of items of procurement, single tender proposals were being
placed before the Finance Committee of the OC for approval. Additional Secretary
(Expenditure) stated that many works were being taken up on Single Tender basis at the
last minute, without any scope for retendering and the trend is very worrying. Secretary,
UD stated that works are being forced to be given at rates at much higher than their
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initially estimated value. Cabinet Secretary desired that this issue should be placed before
the GOM on CWG. The HLC is of the view that these statements bring out the brazen
manner in which the OC was pushing decisions without following the prescribed
procedures.
b) The OC had been constantly harping on the theme that the Games were going to be
‘revenue neutral’ because a huge amount in the range of 1700.00 crore would be raised
as revenue. Such a statement was made in the COS meeting of 4th June, 2010. A doubt
was raised by the COS whether the estimated revenue would be generated. In the same
meeting the Cabinet Secretary advised the OC that it should assess what is essential and
what is not and take a decision by 20th June, 2010. He explained that the COS could not
give permission for approving advances beyond available budget provisions. He further
observed that any case of act of omission / commission in procurement and financial
dealings should immediately be brought to the notice of the Chairman, OC, Cabinet
Secretary or the Finance Ministry. The HLC is of the view that this is a telling comment on
the manner in which the OC was mismanaging its financial matters.
c) In the meeting held on 24th August, 2010, the CEO of the OC stated that the artists and
those involved in arranging the Ceremony were increasing their costs and adding new
items, but were not willing to give anything in writing. The Cabinet Secretary stated the
Secretary, Coordination should review the issue and the needs may be frozen within the
approved budget. This frank statement of the CEO, OC is being cited because the Opening
/ Closing Ceremony story is about a never ending appetite for larger funds to be spent
without any responsibility to account for the expenditure.
5.11 A couple of instances were noticed where implementing agencies / departments brought
certain issues before the COS which did not merit consideration by that body.
a) In the meeting held 17th February, 2009, the Ministry of Urban Development brought a
subject before the COS regarding a proposal being considered by the DDA for purchasing
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flats from the project developer of the Games Village. This was under consideration to
given some relief to the project developer which was facing financial difficulties. The
Minutes record that the Lt. Governor had already given approval to the DDA to purchase
the flats. Cabinet Secretary advised that this option could be explored after getting
requisite approvals and exhorted that proper valuation of flats should be done through an
independent agency in a transparent manner. The HLC is of the view that the Lt.
Governor having already given approval to purchase the flats, there was no point in
bringing this subject to the COS. Apparently, the matter was brought before the COS to
try and get an endorsement and a validation for a decision already taken.
b) In the meeting held on 29th December, 2009, the Ministry of Tourism brought before the
COS the issues of DGCA giving height clearance for the Vasant Kunj Housing Complex that
fell within the revised flight path funnel of the airport. The representative of the Ministry
of Civil Aviation mentioned that the four additional stories constructed were apparently in
violation of the aviation norms. The Cabinet Secretary desired that since the structures
had come up, the Ministry of Civil Aviation may consider all factors and take a positive
view in the context of the requirements for the Commonwealth Games. The HLC is of the
view that this matter should not have been considered by the COS as it involved statutory
issues.
5.12 To summarize, the Committee of Secretaries, as a part of the governance set–up of the
Commonwealth Games, had an important role to play. Though officially the task envisaged for the
CoS was that it would ensure that the decisions of the GoM are implemented, in actual practice it
played a much bigger role. It became a forum for coordination, for problem solving and it also gave
advice and directions. In some ways it was more “driven” than being in the driver’s seat. Different
implementing agencies and departments brought to the CoS issues / problems on which they wanted
advice / decisions /solutions and the CoS readily obliged. In spite of the large number of meetings
held and decisions taken, the CoS could not ensure completion of the Game’s related infrastructure
Page 41
in time. Ultimately in August 2010, special officers had to be appointed to supervise and coordinate
work at different venues and their contribution has been acknowledged and admired.
Page 42
Chapter 6: Ministries of Government of

India, Government of National Capital
Territory of Delhi (GNCTD) and
connected entities
Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports (MYAS)
6.1 The first brush of the Ministry with CWG was, it would be recalled in July, 2002 when
President, Indian Olympic Association (IOA) addressed it and sought its support to bid for
International events in particular Commonwealth Games, 2010. Its position on the games remained
reactive. In other words, Ministry reacted to initiatives taken by others in relation to CWG – 2010.
The decision to bid for the Commonwealth Games was taken by the Prime Minister. In fact the Note
submitted by the then Sports Minister, Shri Vikram Verma17 seems to be in response to do so from
the Prime Minister’s Office. While Minister, Youth Affairs and Sports was expected to attend the
Executive Board meeting at Cape Town (February 7 – 10, 2003), he was unable to do so. In any event
after the Executive Board meeting IOA requested the Ministry to take steps to enable it to submit
India’s bid within the time frame, 30th May, 2003. The events leading to the submission of the bid,
bid evaluation and its success have been noted in Chapter 2. It is also been noted that no action
seem to have occurred between November, 2003 and September, 2004.
6.2 The Ministry, more particularly then Minister Shri Verma sought to engage Shri Kalmadi in
March, 2004. However, he is informed that Shri Kalmadi is busy with forthcoming Lok Sabha
Elections and will be available thereafter. What is particularly surprising is that the Ministry does not
seem to have a file on the subject, even though the Host City Contract has been signed at Montego
Bay in November, 2003, the signed document is with the Ministry but no file is opened on this
subject. Our repeated attempts to trace a file with regard to what takes place / ought to have taken
place have met with no success. HLC concludes that Ministry was remiss in not opening a file, not
initiating action and in delaying action by at least 10 months. Action in the Ministry commences in
17
See Annexure 14
Page 43
September, 2004 when IOA sends India’s “revised bid document” to the Ministry. By October, 2004
the GOM has been constituted and Ministry is assigned the function of servicing GOM. It does so
from January, 2005 through October, 2010. We have reviewed the discharge of this function by the
Ministry in Chapter – 4 (Group of Ministers).
6.3 It should be noted that the first GOM chaired by the Prime Minister in October, 2004 also
decided to strengthen MYAS. This was accomplished by creation of International Sports Division (ISD)
headed by a Joint Secretary and assisted by a staff of 20, including one Director, two Under
Secretaries and two full Sections. It is somewhat surprising that after GOM decision of 25 th October,
2004 which was presided by the Prime Minister it took two years to activate the decision. For over
ten months the Department of Sports did not take any action. Thereafter Ministry of Finance took its
own time and the selected Joint Secretary took charge towards the end of 2006. This kind of delay in
setting up the governance structure in the Department which was supposed to discharge the key
function in relation to the Games is puzzling.
6.4 It is this set up which is expected to perform the role of coordination in relation to CWG –
2010. We use the word ‘coordination’ because that is the real function assigned to it. It is not
responsible for venues because that responsibility is with venue owners; it is not responsible for
infrastructure because that has been assigned to DDA / GNCTD; the Games will be conducted by
Organizing Committee and, hence, MYAS becomes the focal point for coordinating / assist in
coordinating all activities necessary for successful preparation and delivery of CWG - 2010.
6.5 The decisions of GOM are to be given effect to by the Committee of Secretaries (COS) headed
by the Cabinet Secretary. This forum is also to be serviced by ISD of MYAS.
6.6 In order to perform this function, MYAS undertakes to create web based monitoring system.
This system is designed by TCS and operated by NIC. All entities connected with CWG 2010 are
expected to provide periodic inputs so that the system remains updated on the progress made and
the tedium of calling reports and so on is obviated. It is not clear when the system becomes fully
Page 44
functional but certainly by late 2007 / early 2008, Cabinet is being informed that the system is fully
operational. The limitation of this system is that the inputs provided by entities, the basis of output,
cannot be cross checked. In consequence, when time lines become strained and frequent reviews
commence, referred to in Chapter 4 (GOM), the web based monitoring system is not very useful. JS
(ISD) is obligated to undertake field visits to stadia to report progress. Our review of the web based
output show that it was unable to serve its purpose despite an investment of more than 3.25 crore
in its implementation.
6.7 The Organizing Committee (OC) was expected to deal with Government through MYAS. It’s
budgetary requirements were to be evaluated by ISD and overlapping functions in relation to CWG –
2010 were to be jointly performed by both. It would be no exaggeration to state that the situation
was ripe for a tug of war. The intensity of the contest varied from time to time but the rope always
remained taut. In short, OC was ready for more while MYAS was trying to press the brakes. By and
large, OC succeeded in obtaining what it wished as would be clear from the succeeding paragraphs:
a) The Budget of OC was a constant point of debate. When the Games were conceived in 2003,
it was estimated that the conduct of the Games would cost 295.50 crore. By the time the
Games concluded the Budget of OC had increased to over 2,500 crore. This was true of
every transaction. For instance for CWYG, the Expert Group appointed by MYAS limited the
requirement of OC to 66.50 crore. However, OC secured an increase to 110.00 crore, not
far short of 123.00 crore it had originally demanded. The approved budget (October, 2009)
for Opening and Closing Ceremonies by the Cabinet was fixed at 106.00 crore. By December,
2009, OC had managed an increase of 93.00 crore with a ceiling of 200.00 crore. In June,
2010 another 100.00 crore was added to make a total of 300.00 crore. It is another matter
that despite liberal outlays to showcase India the actual expenditure is estimated at about
250.00 crore.
b) When the first sanction of funds to OC was issued in July, 2005, the sanction Memo of the
Ministry clearly stated “all expenditure on establishment has to be against posts sanctioned /
filled up as per approved process and procedures laid down by Government of India” and
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further “the salary perquisites and other facilities to staff / officers of the Organizing
Committee has to be in conformity with the guidelines, rules prescribed by Government of
India”. OC did not follow these conditions, which became part of all sanctions by GOI to OC,
at any point. Officials were appointed without due process, in many instances in disregard of
qualifications / suitability, at whims and fancies of OC. Similarly their pay and perquisites
were fixed in an arbitrary manner which had no connection with uniformity, merit or any
other principle. In both these matters the Ministry was unable to enforce the conditions it
had laid down.
c) In 2007 Cabinet decided that in view of the large sum of money being expended on CWG –
2010 it would be proper to introduce a system of concurrent Audit vis a vis OC. Ministry
attempted to introduce internal audit in OC unsuccessfully. OC stated that they had a proper
system of internal audit, no outside intervention was required and, hence, there was no need
for any action. This matter was allowed to rest by the Ministry.
d) The Ministry, through its Secretary was a Member of the Executive Board of OC. As the
activity of OC picked up, it became apparent that this representation was at best inadequate
and generally ineffective. Firstly, Chairman OC had full powers under the Rules of OC to take
decisions in anticipation of the Executive Board and secondly, Government representatives on
the Board of OC were in a minority. Even if they wished to assert themselves, they could not
overcome the brute majority commanded by Chairman, OC. Their participation in Executive
Board meetings produced the first symptoms of frustration and strain.
e) Their increasingly strained relationship engendered a situation where the Ministry sought a
redefinition by appealing to the Prime Minister’s Office and placing the matter before GOM.
As has been mentioned in an earlier Chapter, this matter was not taken up by GOM for
consideration either at its 13th meeting (March, 2008) or its 14th meeting (April, 2008).
Thereafter the matter was not pressed by the Ministry. It may be noted that in April, 2008,
Page 46
Dr. M.S. Gill replaced Shri Mani Shankar Aiyar as Minister for Youth Affairs and Sports.
Further the late Shri Sudhir Nath replaced the late Shri S.K. Arora as Secretary, Department of
Sports in May 2008. The crisis in management was fast approaching though it seems to have
become dormant for a variety of reasons examined later on in this Report.
6.8 We may conclude that the Department of Sports was unable to rein in OC and that whatever
power of oversight it commanded, in particular because of holding the purse strings, appeared
impressive in theory, ineffective in practice.
6.9 It would be recalled that PMO and GOM had directed / decided that MYAS would constitute
an Apex Committee: i) which will have overriding powers and responsibilities for overseeing and
coordinating CWG – 2010. It seems that this Committee existed for a short period of time during
2006; was by and large ineffective and, thereafter not reconstituted because “This has happened
despite my personal decision not to operationalise the Apex Committee authorized by GOM after
Kalmadi’s vociferous opposition to the Apex Committee at the meeting in August, 2006 convened at
your level” (DO letter of Minister, Panchayati Raj, Youth Affairs and Sports to PM dated 25 th October,
200718). It is idle to speculate what may have been had this oversight mechanism continued.
6.10 Ministry of Youth Affairs & Sports is supported by a field organization namely Sports Authority
of India (SAI). That authority is the custodian of four large stadia: i) J.L.N. Stadium, ii) Major
Dhyanchand Stadium, iii) I.G. Stadium and iv) SP Mukherjee Swimming Pool plus v) Dr. Karni Singh
Shooting Range. By 2009 Cabinet had sanctioned 2460.00 crore for the upgradation of these venues
for CWG – 2010. The upgradation was based on the base line survey conducted by EKS in terms of
CGF contractual obligation plus a reappraisal at the behest of Organizing Committee and at the cost
of DDA was also carried out by EKS. By 2005 (September), this exercise was largely complete and was
to remain the basis for action with regard to all the venues for the Games including those mentioned
above. We notice that in this exercise, which ought to have been conducted with the full
participation of SAI, it did not play any role. In the run up to the Games, at the time of planning,
18
See Annexure 15
Page 47
during implementation, at times of crisis and so on SAI played a peripheral role. The reasons for this
are far from clear. MYAS is happy to deal with executing agencies such as CPWD directly and SAI is
unfazed at its diminished role. Even in the matter of monitoring of project execution, SAI does not
play any noticeable role. In other words, at venues of which SAI is the custodian, far reaching
changes are being made at the say so of the Ministry, of Organizing Committee, of the GOM and so
on and SAI seems to have nothing to say.
6.11 A probable explanation for the limited involvement of SAI in CWG – 2010 seems to be the
constant encroachment by OC. For example, many matters relating to the field of play were never
assigned to OC. These belonged to the National Games Federations / their international
organizations. If issues relating to surface for Games Venues etc. were to be debated / decided, that
function belonged to SAI and the National Games Federation. Unfortunately, OC usurped this
function to the consternation of SAI and confusion at Games Venues. Some examples on this are
provided in our Report on the Games Venues. In the end, SAI is left with preparations of Indian
participants at the Commonwealth Games after OC has made an unsuccessful attempt to secure that
too.
Ministry of Urban Development (MoUD)

6.12 With the exception of Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports the most important Ministry in
relation to the Games was Ministry of Urban Development.
6.13 All the stadia under the management of Sports Authority of India were to be upgraded by
CPWD for which the MoUD was the administrative Ministry. DDA was assigned construction of
Games Village, up-gradation of its stadia and addition of tourist infrastructure. DDA reports to
Ministry of Urban Development. Thus, the Ministry of Urban Development had a crucial role to play
in the preparation for CWG – 2010. In our interaction with Secretary, Ministry of Urban
Development, we were given the impression that the Ministry has no role to play in relation to what
CPWD executes. The concerned entities make budgetary provisions, place the funds at the disposal
of CPWD and the project, its scope, its progress, etc. are matters between the client (entity Ministry
etc.) and CPWD. In other words, all the construction activity undertaken by the CPWD was neither
Page 48
the responsibility of the Ministry nor did it exercise any oversight function. This extreme position of
washing their hands off the whole mess can hardly be accepted considering that the Minister for
Urban Development was a Member of the GOM for the entire preparatory period leading to the
Commonwealth Games. From 2009, the Minister of Urban Development was the Chairman of the
GOM. It was certainly the responsibility of GOM to ensure that preparations are properly made and
in due time. Furthermore, when projects executed by the CPWD faced delays, the Committee of
Secretaries directed Secretary, Urban Development to review at short intervals of time the progress
of CPWD works. Unfortunately, he did not carry out this decision of the COS and made no effort to
do so. Given this background, it became the duty of Ministry of Urban Development to have tracked
the progress of works vis a vis CWG – 2010. Even if it is ordinarily not its function, the circumstances
during 2009 – 2010, were extraordinary and it could not remain an indifferent onlooker.
6.14 Besides CPWD projects, the Ministry is administratively responsible for DDA: in that sense
accountable for a proper site for the location of the Games Village. It was better placed to make that
judgment because while DDA is aware of land parcels owned by it the Ministry, being also in-charge
of L&DO, is aware of possibilities in relation to L&DO owned land. During the controversy on the
location of the Games Village and even at the commencement of the preparations for choosing a
separate site (April – May, 2003), the Ministry played no role to explore options and was pleased to
leave this important matter entirely to the DDA; in practice, Lt. Governor, restricted to DDA owned
parcels of land, made a choice which was sub-optimal.
6.15 While in these two matters, the Ministry of Urban Development played a passive role, when it
came to problems faced by Emaar/MGF (2008 – 2009) it played an active role. This was a matter
entirely within the competence of the DDA and yet the Ministry played a pro-active role, Secretary
(UD) attended crucial meetings and, as we have brought out in our Report on the ‘Games Village’,
was party to the decision making group chaired by Lt. Governor which conceived and approved the
bailout package.
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6.16 It would be seen from the above that the stand of the Ministry in relation to its role has been
inconsistent. It discharged its functions selectively. The basis for this inconsistency is unclear. Suffice
it to say, it was not conducive to efficiency; in particular, timely construction of CWG projects.
6.17 There were a number of other Ministries concerned, in part, with CWG – 2010. For example,
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting through Prasar Bharati was responsible for the Host
Broadcasting Agreement. Ministry of Home Affairs was responsible for security, traffic management,
etc. In relation to other Ministries the Department of Sports played a peripheral role. Sometimes
their estimates were consolidated by the Department of Sports. With the passage of time these
Ministries followed their own time table, secured their approvals and at best kept Department of
Sports informed. It seems that no particular role was played by the Ministry in this behalf. We have
reviewed the role of Information & Broadcasting Ministry in the First Report.
Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi (GNCTD)

6.18 The Host City Agreement was signed inter-alia by Lt. Governor of Delhi on behalf of GNCTD.
Chief Minister of Delhi stated (in 2003) that it was committed to provide upgraded infrastructure for
CWG – 2010. According to Chief Minister, about 74 infrastructure projects were in the pipeline. At
the 1st meeting of the GOM (25.10.2004) chaired by Prime Minister, it was decided that GNCTD will
set up a Committee headed by the Chief Secretary. This Committee would coordinate all Games
related activities under its charge. In fact, our Report on ‘City Infrastructure’ points out that this
Committee, it was termed as the Empowered Committee was constituted in 2006. In other words in
nearly 3 years, very little activity took place in relation to development of city infrastructure for CWG
– 2010.
6.19 Once the activity commenced, it was taken forward at a feverish pitch reaching a crescendo
during 2010 when it emerged that the governance structure had not been able to deliver. More
detailed discussion on these issues forms part of HLC’s Report on the ‘City Infrastructure’. At this
point, it is only necessary to note that the governance structure does not seem to have particularly
helped matters.
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Connected entities
6.20 A number of public sector undertakings including ITDC, TCIL, MTNL, EIL, RITES also played a
role in the preparation for the Games. It has been the practice during the preparatory phase of the
Games to assign projects / components to Public Sector undertaking because due process was
considered unnecessary. The outcome has been poor, as would be clear from the following
examples:
a) Project Management, euphemism for project implementation, for construction of stadium for
Rugby 7 and development of practice venues at Delhi University was assigned to Engineers
India Limited. EIL, in turn, without following any principle of procurement, contracted works
to various contractors / suppliers. As a result efficiency and economy were the twin victims.
Details are provided in HLC Report on the Games Venues.
b) ITDC was requested to furnish Games Village flats. HLC report on Games Village shows that
there are many failures in discharge of this function.
c) ITDC was requested to furnish Vasant Kunj flats in order to upgrade them to 3-Star facilities.
‘HLC Report on City Infrastructure’ elicits the confusion which prevailed between DDA and
ITDC in the discharge of this function.
d) MTNL was tasked with providing inter-connectivity between Games venues and the
broadcasting centre at ITPO. Its costs were so high that a Working Group had to be
constituted and costs were reduced to less than half of what had been propsed.
e) TCIL: Several acts of omission and commission in the procurement of equipment on behalf of
the OC have been pointed out in the Fifth Report.
6.21 The strategy of assigning work to Public Sector Undertakings on the ground that they
are Public Sector Undertaking was neither successful nor transparent and certainly not cost
effective. HLC believes that when goods and services have to be procured by Government
Departments, Public Sector Undertakings ought to be used as any other provider after due
process.
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Chapter 7: Organizing Committee

“I am made for the exception and not for the rule.”
- Oscar Wilde
7.1 In the Bid Document, as submitted by IOA in May 2003, it was mentioned that Chairman of
the Organizing Committee would be appointed by the Government. However, by the time these
discussions on the incorporation of the Organizing Committee commenced, a document (at Annexure
– III) had been received from IOA which purported to be the Revised Bid Document. The origin of this
document is in contention because Sports Ministry disowns it. Mr. R.K. Mishra, Joint Secretary during
2003 does not recall any amendment having taken place to the Bid Document (Shri Mishra met HLC
on3rd January, 2011). In any case, according to the case made out by IOA on behalf of Shri Kalmadi,
the amended Bid Document was put together in December, 2003, i.e. nearly one month after the
award of the Games to India / Delhi. An amended bid document created after the award of the
Games in November, 2003 has no validity whatsoever. We have therefore no hesitation in coming to
the conclusion that this Document was created by Shri Kalmadi or at his behest in IOA for being
specifically used to secure his ends, i.e. Chairmanship of OC and justification for the commitments
made by him at Montego Bay without any authority. It would be also pertinent to mention that all
attempts made by Ministry of Sports to open a dialogue with Shri Kalmadi between November, 2003
and September, 2004 on the action to be taken for CWG 2010 were unsuccessful because Shri
Kalmadi was unwilling to open negotiation till he was assured of the Chairmanship of the Organizing
Committee. In March, 2004 the then Minister Shri Vikram Verma requests Shri Kalmadi for a
discussion. Brig. Singh replies that Shri Kalmadi is busy with the elections. In August, 2004 Secretary
(MYAS) attempts to arrange a meeting and is unsuccessful.
7.2 According to the Host City Contract the Organizing Committee was to be constituted within six
months of the signing of the contract by May, 2004. CGF periodically reminds Shri Kalmadi to do so,
but to no avail. In August, 2004 Shri Kalmadi promises Mr. Fennell that there would be no further
delay and OC would be constituted by December, 2004. This does not happen. Precious time is thus
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lost because Shri Kalmadi was unwilling to accept anything less than the chairmanship of OC. He
addressed the Prime Minister and sought his intervention and the debate continued beyond the
meeting of 25.10.2004 chaired by the Prime Minister.
7.3 During the months of November and December, 2004 Shri Kalmadi kept insisting on past
precedents, including the Asian Games, 1982 that he ought to be the Chairman, while the then Sports
Minister stated that on the precedent of 1982 he ought to chair the Organising Committee. The late
Shri Sunil Dutt is extremely agitated by these developments, tries to point out that Shri Kalmadi is
factually wrong and appeals to the Prime Minister.19
7.4 On 06.12.2004 a Note was sent by the Prime Minister’s Office20 on the organizational
structure for the conduct of the Games. This Note suggested:
(a) GOM headed by Shri Arjun Singh, Minister, HRD to oversee the conduct of the Games;
(b) An Empowered Committee for construction of stadia etc headed by MYAS; and
(c) An Organizing Committee headed by Shri Suresh Kalmadi.
The Note went on to state “PM has directed that institutional arrangements mentioned above may
be sent to Shri Arjun Singh who heads GOM for consideration in the next meeting of GOM”.
7.5 This Note was placed before the Second Meeting of GOM held on 14.01.2005 21. Even though
Minutes of the GOM were not issued, the recorded Minutes stated inter-alia:
“It was observed that material changes in financial as well as structural aspects of the
Organizing Committee, as proposed in the original Bid Document, were made by IOA
unilaterally. This revised Bid Document was sent to the Ministry only in September, 2004”.
After detailed deliberations, the GOM authorized the Chairman to hold the discussions with Shri Sunil
Dutt, Minister (MYAS) and Shri Suresh Kalmadi, President, IOA on various aspects of conducting of the
Commonwealth Games 2010.
19
See Annexure 16
20
See Annexure 17
21
See Annexure 18
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7.6 It would be clear from the above that the Chairmanship of OC was holding up further
progress. These Minutes were approved by then HRM, even though there is no date to the approval.
The next date for GOM was set for 28th January, 2005 at 4.00 pm at the same venue.
7.7 A meeting seemed to have been held on 29th January, 2005 in the chamber of Chairman, GOM
(Minister of HRD) and the decisions were circulated by Joint Secretary (ISD), Ministry of Youth Affairs
and Sports stating “A copy of the Note indicating decisions taken in the above meeting approved by
the Chairman, GOM (Human Resourced Development Minister) is enclosed for kind information and
necessary action”. There is no supporting material such as list of persons who attended, reasons for
change of date from 28th to 29th January to show that a GOM was held. All that can be concluded is
the assertion of the then Minister, HRD that a meeting had taken place and at the meeting the
following decisions were taken:
“An Apex Committee headed by Minister of Sports, Shri Sunil Dutt shall be constituted, which
will have the over-riding power and responsibility for over-seeing and coordinating the
Commonwealth Games. The Minutes of all other Committees related to the conduct of the
Games shall be submitted to the Apex Committee periodically for its information. The
Chairman of the Apex Committee can also call for information ….”
 The Organizing Committee shall be headed by the Chairman, Indian Olympic Association, Shri
Suresh Kalmadi and this Committee will conduct the Commonwealth Games, 2010. The
Executive Board of the Organizing Committee will have 15 members, including the Chairman
and the Vice Chairman. The Members of the Committee will be appointed by the Chairman in
consultation with GOM.
 A 3-Member Sub-Committee of the GOM headed by the Finance Minister, Shri P.
Chidambaram will supervise and deal with all financial matters.
 The Lt. Governor of Delhi will have an over-all responsibility regarding the games with specific
reference to security law and order and matters coming under DDA.
 There will be a Sub-Committee headed by Chief Minister of Delhi which will look after all
other issues that come under the jurisdiction of the Govt. of NCT of Delhi, as per the
Constitution.
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 A Committee of Secretaries (COS) headed by the Cabinet Secretary will be responsible for the
implementation of the decisions of the GOM regarding the Commonwealth Games. The
Sports Department through its Secretary will service this Committee.
 All the arrangements worked out above shall apply only to the Common Wealth Games –
2010.
7.8 It bears repetition that the process for making these decisions is opaque and further some
items are repetitions of the administrative arrangements outlined by Prime Minister. The key issue
validated is the Chairmanship of OC.
7.9 On 10th February, 2005 Shri Kalmadi got a Society named Organizing Committee registered
under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. This Society, its Memorandum, its Rules, its Executive
Board, its membership etc. ought to have been approved by the GOM. However, no such approval
was taken. Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports was also not informed or consulted. At the next
meeting of GOM held on 17th March, 2005, the Memorandum of the Organizing Committee was
circulated by Shri Suresh Kalmadi, now Chairman of Organizing Committee by virtue of the
Memorandum.
7.10 It may be pointed out that the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports had framed a
Memorandum of Association a few months back and a copy of same is available on the files of the
Ministry. The file does not show this document having been available to Shri Kalmadi. To the
contrary the note of the then Secretary, YA&S states that this be not provided to Shri Kalmadi.
However, it seems that this document was made available to Shri Kalmadi from the Ministry.
7.11 A comparison of the document available on the file of the Ministry with the one Registered by
Shri Kalmadi on 10th February, 2005 shows a number of material changes made by him with the
object of concentrating all powers in his hands. The table below illustratively provides some of the
key issues:
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Memorandum and Rules & Regulations of Organising Committee
Clause Provisions in the draft prepared by Provisions in the MOA prepared and adopted
Ministry of Youth Affairs & Sports by the Organising Committee
4. Objects
(a) to prepare for, organise and conduct in NCR
(a) to prepare for and hold the of Delhi the CWG-2010 allotted to Indian
Commonwealth Games, 2010 in Delhi Olympic Association by CWG Federation......
allotted by the Commonwealth Games
Federation in its meeting on 13th The Games shall belong to Indian Olympic
November, 2003 in Montego Bay, Jamaica Association, an autonomous body, who has
been assured by the Government of India and
Govt of NCT of Delhi their full support in the
successful completion of the CWG and have
undertaken to abide and follow the principles
as laid down by constitution of the CWG
Federation.
Objects incidental to the Main Objects
(c) On winding up or dissolution of the (c) to wind up or dissolve the Society after
society, after clearing of its debts and conducting the CWG-2010 and to transfer any
liabilities, any property or surplus property (moveable or immoveable) remaining
remaining with the Society will be with the Society after clearing of its debts and
transferred to Central Government of the liabilities, to the Indian Olympics Association.
extent of its contribution towards conduct
of the Games. The balance, if any will be
distributed between Government and IOA,
as determined by the Organising
Committee
Rules & Regulations
4. The Executive Board shall consist of not The Executive Board shall consist of fifteen
more than 13 and not less than 8 members.
members including the office bearers who
shall be nominated by the Chairman in
consultation with the Vice Chairman. The
Chairman in consultation with the Vice
Chairman shall assign work to the
members of the Executive Board.
The Chairman in consultation with the The Chairman may make such additions or
Vice Chairman may make such additions alterations in the composition of the Executive
or alternations in the composition of the Board from time to time as deemed necessary
Executive Board from time to time as in the interest of the Society's aim and
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deemed necessary in the interest of the objective

Society's aims and objectives.
If the office of any office bearer in the If the office of any office bearer in the
Executive Board is vacated, the resultant Executive Board is vacated, the Chairman may
vacancy may be filled by the Chairman in fill the resultant casual vacancy.
consultation with the Vice Chairman
The Chairman or the Vice Chairman in the The Chairman shall have full authority to
absence of Chairman shall have full conduct the meeting including the authority to
authority to conduct the meeting decide on the admissibility of any question,
including the authority to decide in the expunging any remarks, directing the
admissibility of any question, expunging conclusion of debate and putting any motion
any remarks, directing the conclusion of to vote. The Chairman's decision on the
debate and putting any motion to vote. conduct of a meeting shall be final.
The Chairman's or the Working Chairman's
(in the absence of Chairman), decision on
the conduct of the meeting shall be final.
6 Committee and Sub Committee
The Chairman in consultation with the The Chairman may form one or more
Vice Chairman may form one or more Committees, Sub Committees or Advisory
Committees or Sub Committees and bodies and aid and advise him in the
bodies for the preparation of staging the preparation of and staging of the CWG-2010
CWG-2010
The Chairman in consultation with the The Chairman may appoint such persons to
Vice Chairman may appoint such persons those committees who are prominent in their
to those committees who are prominent respective fields such as academics, specialized
in their respective fields such as sports, professions, higher learning, industry,
higher learning, academics, specialized commerce, trade, sports as well as other
professions, industry, commerce, trade, as realms of public life.
well as other realms of public life.
The Chairman in consultation with the The Chairman may appoint suitable persons,
Vice Chairman may appoint any suitable not more than twelve each, being Deputy
person as Chairman of such committees. Chairmen and Joint Secretaries to assist him in
These committees shall meet at such time coordinating with various committees / sub-
and place and conduct their business in committees.
such directions as may be issued by the
Chairman/Vice Chairman.
Duties & Responsibilities

Clause 8
7 Chairman shall preside over the meetings He shall be executive head and chief
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of the Organizing Committee and the administrator responsible for the due discharge
Executive Board and exercise general of function and policies as laid down by the
supervision over its office bearers, subject, Executive Board and will exercise general
however, to the control of the Executive supervision over the affairs of the Society,
Board. preside over the meetings of the Executive
Board and General Body Meetings.
In case of emergency, the Chairman shall take

decisions in the interest of the society and
shall inform the Executive Board in its next
meeting which shall be ratified by the
Executive Board.
Clause 12 (a)
Any dispute between the members relating to

this Memorandum of Association and Rules
and Regulations shall be decided by the
Chairman and the decision so given shall be
binding and conclusive, without any further
appeal before any court.
7.12 Thus, officials of the Ministry have assisted Shri Kalmadi. He has made radical changes and
after doing so, got it registered. It is also the case that the Draft Memorandum prepared by the
Ministry was on the crucial assumption that Chairman of OC would be a Government nominee. It
was not envisaged, in framing the draft Memorandum that Shri Kalmadi would be the Chairman in
perpetuity. Hence this draft was inappropriate for the purpose for which it was used. Moreover,
instead of making changes relevant to the changed circumstances Shri Kalmadi made changes for his
personal advantage as would be amply clear from the above table. Unfortunately despite all this the
Memorandum registered by Shri Kalmadi remained unchanged.
7.13 This document at Article - 6 states “the names, addresses, occupations and designations of the
present Members of the Executive Board to whom the Management and Affairs of the Society are
entrusted as required under Section 2 of the Societies Registration Act 1860 …. are as follows : Shri
Suresh Kalmadi is designated as Chairman”. To set at rest any further debate the Rules and
Regulations of Organizing Committee, Commonwealth Games – 2010 provides in Rule 4 (IV) “Shri
Suresh Kalmadi shall be the Chairman …”. In other words taking advantage of the GOM decision, Shri
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Kalmadi had appointed himself as Chairman in perpetuity without any consultation / approval. GOM
did approve his (Shri Kalmadi) chairmanship but the decision of the GOM cannot be construed by any
stretch of imagination to mean that he would be Chairman in perpetuity without there being any
power to change him.
7.14 The Organizing Committee is at the present time without any members, other than the 9
Members shown as members of the Executive Board in the Memorandum. The Rules and
Regulations of Organizing Committee provide: i) The Society shall consist of not more than 500
persons, who shall be invited to become members by the Chairman. v) A Membership Register shall
be maintained by the Secretary General which shall be signed by such member in token of his
Membership. Both these are Sub Rules of Rule 3 of Rules and Regulations. A list of about 471
Members was drawn-up by Shri Suresh Kalmadi, in consultation with the then Minister of HRD, Shri
Arjun Singh. This list was enclosed with Shri Arjun Singh’s letter22 which stated, “I approve the
names of persons mentioned in the list.” This list underwent periodic changes depending on the
whims and fancies of Shri Kalmadi; but, in our opinion, these lists have little value in as much as the
OC has not maintained any Register of Members. There being no register, the question of any
Member having signed the Register in token of his acceptance has therefore remained academic.
HLC repeatedly pressed OC to provide all documentation in relation to Membership of OC in terms of
Rules and Regulations of OC. OC was unable to provide any documentation with regard to: a) issue of
invitation to join OC by the Chairman, Shri Kalmadi; b) existence of Register of Members duly signed
by Members in token of acceptance of Membership; and c) any other documentation, supportive of
the fact that the process envisaged under Rule 3 have been followed. In brief, approval by the then
Minister, HRD of a list of persons suitable for membership of OC did not per se confer membership on
those persons, unless the requirements of Rule 3 had been followed. The HLC has therefore
concluded that none of the persons displayed in typed lists maintained by OC and periodically
amended are / became members of OC. Most of them did not attend the Annual General Meeting of
OC. Interestingly, a sizeable number of persons who attended the OC meetings were not on that
date Members of OC.
22
See Annexure 12
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7.15 The decision to appoint Shri Kalmadi was to cost dear. Was a different decision possible? At
the time (2004-2005) Government had three options:
(a) To organize the Games on the precedent of 1982 Asian Games;
(b) To appointment Minister of Youth Affairs and Sports Chairman of Organizing
Committee;
(c) To appointment Shri Kalmadi or some other person Chairman of OC;
7.16 It is generally recognized that Asian Games 1982 were de facto organized by PMO,
irrespective of the de jure arrangements. While the precedent of 1982 was neither suggested nor
considered, it ought to be acknowledged that there was not much in common between PMO (1980–
82) and PMO (2004-05). For that matter it would be no exaggeration to conclude that PMOs’ post
1984 were a different cup of tea; some less, some more, very different nevertheless. In 2004 the
clock could not be put back by two decades and hence 1982 precedent was not an option.
7.17 It was certainly possible to appoint Minister, Youth Affairs and Sports Chairman of Organizing
Committee. But that Ministry scarcely commanded the authority to direct preparation for the Games
i.e. Games Venues, City Infrastructure, Games Village, etc. Minister, Youth Affairs and Sports could
scarcely neglect ministerial responsibility / duty and therefore unlikely to find time to manage OC.
The scale of CWG – 2010 was larger, grander. India was to be “showcased” and all that required a
high degree of empowerment. This much is clear that from an organizational point of view for CWG –
2010 whole time attention would be required. In other words, in case Minister (YA&S) was to chair
the Organizing Committee, there would have to be a Chief Executive Officer, executing the
multifarious functions which would be in its domain sooner or later. At the time it was not possible to
appoint Minister (YAS) as Chairperson and Shri Kalmadi as the Chief Executive Officer because this
would have been wholly unacceptable to President of IOA. Whether such a structure was
appropriate in case of a non-profit society is another matter.
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7.18 The remaining option was to appoint Shri Kalmadi or some other person. There does not
seem to have been any other candidate besides Shri Kalmadi. He also ‘claimed’ to possess
impeccable credentials, Member of Parliament, as President of Indian Olympic Association he had
succeeded in winning CWG – 2010 for India and had been Minister of State for Railways. It is still
possible to criticize this selection; but with the benefit of hindsight. What is in question are not his
credentials but his conduct of the Games. HLC has reviewed the latter in the Fifth Report on
‘Organisation Committee’.
7.19 In essence what was decided was for OC to be a non-profit Society and for Shri Kalmadi to be
its Chairman. In the previous CWG Games when the Government of Australia / State of Victoria faced
this issue they answered it by creating a Corporation. This kind of option does not seem to have
entered Government’s consideration at that stage.
7.20 Howsoever the arrangements are viewed, including with the benefit of hindsight, in one
respect they were flawed. It was possible for Government, in particular Ministry of Youth Affairs and
Sports (MYAS) to have ensured the resignation of Shri Kalmadi from the Presidentship of IOA.
Protocol 2(1.1) of the Games Management Protocols of the Commonwealth Games Federation
states: “The Federation shall entrust the CGA of the host country with organization of the Games.
The CGA shall establish an OC which shall have legal status and shall delegate the organization of the
Games to OC, which shall work in conjunction with the CGA and shall jointly and severally responsible
with the CGA for all commitments including financial commitments in regard to the organization and
staging of the Games”.
7.21 The CGA, meaning the Commonwealth Games Association in case of India was the Indian
Olympic Association. This may well have strengthened Shri Kalmadi’s claim to Chairmanship of
Organizing Committee, but the above captioned Protocol clearly called for complete independence of
Organizing Committee in the conduct of the Games. By leaving this issue unaddressed, Organizing
Committee remained an adjunct of Indian Olympic Association.
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7.22 His continuance in both offices was not conducive to the efficient conduct of CWG – D2010.
More importantly there were areas of conflict of interests between the two entities. These conflicts
and their outcome are described in the Fifth Report of HLC on Organising Committee including the
fiduciary dealings between OC and IOA. Shri Kalmadi for his part, was ready to receive more, never to
restrict his empire.
7.23 In this background, we would have expected action from the MYAS, but that was not to be
because the relationship between the Ministry and Shri Kalmadi was, in the main, warm and became
cozy. One need only recall the manner in which the Ministry dealt with the bid for the Games and its
aftermath. That Shri Kalmadi had, unauthorisedly announced Training Grants for all participating
entities was known to the then Minister, YA&S and then Secretary (YA&S) in November, 2003. The
Ministry got to know about it in the end of November, 2003, when that information officially become
part of records and a Parliament Question was answered. Nothing was done about it expect that this
co-operative attitude secured the then Secretary, Shri Rajeeva Srivastava about six years of post
retirement employment with Shri Kalmadi. He engages him in OC as a part of its formation in 2005,
where he continued to facilitate matters. Some important episodes of co-operation are mentioned in
the Fifth Report. It is also the case that this attitude continued, in the Ministry of YA&S after his
departure.
7.24 While the then Minister Shri Vikram Verma has denied having authorised the Training Grant
announced by Shri Kalmadi at Montego Bay, it is also the case that the events are within his
knowledge. It is he who has answered the Parliament question in December 2003 and yet he decides
to remain silent. It is our impression that when a Minister leads a delegation abroad, it is his
responsibility to submit a Report on his visit. Even though the events at Montego Bay have been both
momentous and beyond the remit of the delegation, no report is prepared by Shri Verma or at his
behest. We therefore must conclude that commencing February 2003 to the end of that year, Shri
Kalmadi and Shri Verma shared a warm relationship.
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7.25 It is a sad reflection of our times that Shri V.K. Gautam (IAS : MH:1987), under a cloud in the
Ministry of Power while functioning as PS to then Minister, Power, is selected by the CSB for being
posted to the Department of Sports. His suspect integrity is discussed but is not considered sufficient
ground to deny him a Directorship in MoYA&S. He is assigned to the MYAS with the specific direction
that he should not be assigned a sensitive desk. But surprisingly, soon after joining he is assigned, by
a singular coincidence to look-after SP-II Section, which at that time was naturally dealing with Shri
Kalmadi’s area of interest. Shri Gautam is an erstwhile Collector Pune, knows Shri Kalmadi very well
and is inducted as Chief Operating Officer in Organizing Committee, another very sensitive post, after
finishing his tenure.
7.26 He is more than equal to what is expected of him as would be clear from the following:
a) There is some evidence to suggest that the Minutes of the First GOM – 25.10.2004 were
materially different to what was discussed;
b) The Minutes of the Second GOM approved by the Chairman are not issued;
c) The Third GOM does not seem to have taken place in any formal sense and it records the key
decision of appointing Shri Kalmadi as the Chairman;
d) On the additional commitment made by Shri Kalmadi regarding training grant ($ 7.5 million)
the GOM (17.03.2005) decided that the matter be placed before the Cabinet with full
justification. This does not take place and instead this obligation is merged with the overall
requirement of OC and EFC / Cabinet approval obtained.
e) We have mentioned in Chapter – 3 what was accomplished by clever drafting in relation to
depriving Department of Sports / Sports Authority of India (SAI) of their functions and
assigning the same to OC.
f) When Shri Gautam decides that he is no longer in sync with the likes of Shri Lalit Bhanot and
Shri V.K.Verma, Shri Kalmadi is accommodative and sanctions him over a year’s leave, ex post
facto in November, 2010.
7.27 The other outcome of this cooperative / compliant attitude was that extraordinary provisions
in the Memorandum and Rules of OC remained unchallenged till the second half of 2007. We may
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take note of the absolute control of the Executive Board enjoyed by the Chairman, the fact that
decisions taken by him in anticipation of the Board had to be ratified by the Board; in essence
unbridled power on all matters within the purview of OC. If it meant hiring accommodation at
outrageous rates for Mr. Hooper, he could do so; if it meant showering favors on cohorts he was free
to do so and so on. In short, “the Society was constituted by the President and a few members of the
IOA, to retain absolute and unhindered control on the Commonwealth Games, 2010 through a sham
society with much lesser accountability and transparency even in comparison to the IOA”. 23
7.28 These facts were common knowledge. In the First Report of CGF Coordination Commission
(CoCom) (November 20 – 23, 2006) lack of progress due to a complex governance framework was
mentioned. It was also observed that the structure had undergone a change within a few days of its
presentation to CGF and further that the decision making was highly centralized. In other words, 21
months after Registration, 3 years after allotment of the Games to India, OC was unable to finalize its
governance structure. In the next Report (May 14 – 16, 2007) it was stated “OC significantly behind
in developing its planning and organization capacity” and “OC’s development requires immediate
acceleration with the recruitment and productive development of staff” (Para 3.1). It was noted that
there was no general organizational plan, that Games planning was 12 months (plus) behind schedule
and that Sub-Committees formed were doing very little. The next Report of Cocom (January 14 – 18,
2008) states “Little practical progress has been made by OC since the last Cocom review in May,
2007” and “although many commitments were made during Cocom in May 2007, few have been
delivered ….” The next Cocom Report (November 10 -11, 2008) notes some progress though not
enough because only 28 of the 34 functional areas have been activated, there is a shortage of
experienced personnel and the procurement list is not yet ready. It looks as if OC is not particularly
concerned about these observations because the next meeting of Cocom (May 11 – 13, 2009)
observes “OC ignored advice on Consultants ….” and further “the centralist approach leads to the
conclusion that the OC management is largely dysfunctional”.
23
See Annexure 19
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7.29 These setbacks in progress were handled by Shri Kalmadi by concealment and denial. The
Cocom Reports were not placed before the Executive Board. After the May 2007 meeting of Cocom
and before the next Report of Cocom (January 14 – 18, 2008) Shri Kalmadi volunteered “Chairman,
OC stated that in the recently concluded Commonwealth Games Federation (CGF) General Assembly
meeting in Colombo, the CGF had appreciated that the preparations for the Commonwealth Youth
Games Pune, 2008 were ahead of schedule and preparations for the Commonwealth Games Delhi
were on schedule”. Clearly Chairman, OC was in no mood to inform GOM the true state of affairs;
(refer Minutes of 12th Meeting of GOM held on 12.11.2007) every assertion made by the Shri Kalmadi
in the above quotation was designed to contradict the Cocom reports without any connection with
truth.
7.30 Observations made by Cocom initially came to the attention of then Secretary Sports. Shri
S.K. Arora, then Secretary, Department of Sports had analyzed the Memorandum of OC including
Rules and pointed out the centralized power structure; he had suggested the need for change.
During 2007 – 2008 Government thinking seems to have been to reform OC by diluting the absolute
power exercised by its Chairman, Shri Suresh Kalmadi. Shri Kalmadi, tremendously well informed
about developments, writes a detailed letter to the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister and
promises to reform OC24. It is thus possible that the proposals put forward by Ministry of Sports are
not discussed in GOM meetings (held on 13th Meeting on 10.03.2008 and 14th Meeting on
09.04.2008). The debates, the promises not withstanding Shri Kalmadi decides to do nothing and his
centralized power emerging from Memorandum and Rules remains intact.
7.31 Around this time (April, 2008) Dr. M.S. Gill replaced Shri Mani Shankar Aiyar as Sports
Minister. Late Shri Sudhir Nath is the new Sports Secretary (May, 2008). Government policy
remained “let sleeping dogs lie”. The Games were now 16 months away and progress had to take
place irrespective of organizational constrains, personal whims and misinformation. Crisis was
inevitable, not distant and, if we may say so, inherent in the personality of Shri Kalmadi.
24
See Annexure 20
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Crisis Management
7.32 The year 2008 – 2009 ought to be viewed as a period of transition. First round of sanctions
have taken place / contracting is complete. OC has secured all it wants for the CWYG at Pune.
Elections in May 2009 complete the transition. After reconstitution of GOM (June, 2009) CWG – 2010
is back on the agenda. On the commitments made to Government on reform of OC, Shri Kalmadi has
done nothing.
7.33 During September, 2009 the Commonwealth Games Federation (CGF), in particular its
Chairman, Michael Fennell, concluded that the time for private remonstration and public support was
past. It was now necessary to debate, in public the inadequate preparedness for the Games in so far
as Organizing Committee and its Chairman were concerned. This was accomplished through a letter
dated 13th September, 2009 addressed to the Executive Board and copied to its Members as well as
to Members of the Executive Board of Commonwealth Games Federation. Mr. Fennell went public
during September, 2009, sought appointments with Minister, Youth Affairs and Sports and Prime
Minister during his planned visit to Delhi (first week of October, 2009) and generally publicized the
issue. His letter dated 13th September, 2009 is at Annexure 21.
7.34 The then Minister for Youth Affairs and Sports reviewed the situation and noted that there
was considerable progress in so far as Government and preparation for the Games was concerned.
“But the question raised by Fennell is, about the ability and the capability of the Organizing
Committee and its higher staff to deliver the Games to the quality expected. They are
expected to look after 17000 sportspersons and officials from the time they leave they (sic)
country, their travel costs, unfortunately being our burden, to the 16 th of October, when they
depart. Every aspect of their living in Delhi, and their competitions are to be organized with
clockwork precision. The OC have 23 Sub-Committees, which have rarely met, or performed
in the situation described above. Yesterday 25th September, 2009, the Chairman of all these
Committees were called by the OC Chairman, I suppose in view of the current controversy and
given an exhortation, in the hope that they will buckle down to the job. The competence of
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the Committees and the decentralization, necessary for them, to function effectively is yet to
be seen”.
Dr. M.S. Gill then MYAS went on to state:

“In this background, I have had intensive meetings with Shri Kalmadi and Shri Randhir Singh
the Secretary General, and with Delhi Chief Minister, the Cabinet Secretary, and Shri T.K. Nair.
We have devised a line of action, to strengthen the management, inside the Organizing
Committee, immediately. The structure cannot be changed, but this is the essential
minimum now, with no time to lose” – letter of Dr. M.S. Gill to Prime Minister dated 26th
September, 2009.25
7.35 Government concluded that the professional capability of OC required to be supplemented by

induction of experienced Government officials. It was immediately decided to appoint Shri Jarnail
Singh to OC. After some wrangling, Chairman, OC accepted him as the Chief Executive Officer (CEO).
By a suitable adjustment he was also appointed to the Executive Board of OC. He alone could hardly
be expected to deliver. Hence a set of Officers were inducted by Government. It was expected that
they would be assigned or secure responsibility for some of the key functional areas. Shri Jiji
Thomson was one such officer and he became responsible for catering (Games Village), Transport and
Press Operations. Shri Sanjeev Mittal was another such officer and he was assigned the responsibility
of Ticketing, Catering (Venues) and procurement. Shri Sudhir Mittal was assigned Games Village,
Media & Environment. Shri G.C. Chaturvedi was assigned Finance. In the succeeding paragraphs we
have tried to recapitulate events through the eyes of these officials. They were individually
interviewed by HLC, they provided written briefs of events and some of them interacted with us on
more than one occasion.
7.36 Shri Jarnail Singh was appointed as CEO in October, 2009. According to him the most
important task facing OC was to award contracts for goods and services required for the conduct of
the Games. Of the 400 or more contracts to be awarded by the time he joined, only 50 or 60
25
See Annexure 22
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contracts had been awarded. All the contracts were awarded thereafter. He functioned as a
facilitator and a bridge between Chairman, OC and the functional heads, in particular where such
functional heads were not the trusted lieutenants of Chairman. While many things were thus
facilitated, his ability to either speed up contracting or introduce transparency were unsuccessful.
Chairman listened to him politely and did as he pleased. Given the crisis situation GOM had been
mandated to meet more frequently, for OC to report to it on progress made and these reports were
made by the CEO. From the Minutes of the GOM it is clear that CEO was either lacking any
information or unable to obtain information of what was going on. In other words, Chairman, OC was
unwilling to share information which would in any way compromise him. And this went on right to
the conclusion of the Games. Power remained with the Chairman.
7.37 This was the experience of Shri Jiji Thomson as well, in-charge of Catering, contracts
pertaining to which were on the critical path. By December, 2009 it was clear that there was only one
corporate entity capable of executing the catering contract, that its credentials were strong. In fact
there was little choice. However, the catering contract file remained with the Chairman for nearly a
month between December, 2009 and January, 2010 where after it was returned to Shri Thomson on
the specious pretext that the only bidder qualified to do the job had failed to deposit earnest money.
The relevant committee had, after due consideration, recommended relaxation but to no avail. These
matters are examined in greater detail in the Fifth Report.
7.38 Shri G.C. Chaturvedi joined the Organizing Committee in May, 2010 as Additional Director
General with the function of Finance. Whatever may have been the power and functions assigned to
him and how so ever diligently he may have applied himself, the fact remains that between May,
2010 and till Shri Kalmadi left, Chairman, OC exercised complete power over the finances of OC. In
other words, Shri Chaturvedi was unable to rein in Shri Kalmadi. His functions were more to do with
accounting than finance.
7.39 The experience of Shri Sanjeev Mittal was more problematic. Relations between him and
Chairman, OC deteriorated to a point where he was peremptorily reverted to his Parent Ministry
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under the orders of the Chairman. Government asserted its authority and prevented implementation
of these orders after a period of dies non. On his return to OC nothing changed, he remained as
ineffective / effective as before. Clearly Chairman grudgingly accepted the medicine but refused to
drink it. Public interest in CWG – 2010 peaked during the first week of October, witness demand for
tickets. Shri Mittal, attempting to put more tickets in public hands, was divested of this function on
7th October, 2010. The real shots through E-mails, secret and otherwise, were being called by Ms
Monica Jolly, who was in direct touch with Shri Kalmadi26.
7.40 What else could Government have done? This question, it was apparent to HLC, required an
answer. In September, 2009 when it was clear that Government confidence in Chairman, OC (from
February, 2005) was misplaced, that he had not delivered, that things were unlikely to change any
time soon and that come what may India was responsible for the successful delivery of the Games,
Plan - B required to be taken up.
7.41 Plan – B turned out to be what Government did, described by HLC in the previous paragraphs.
It was largely unsuccessful in reforming Shri Kalmadi. Instead of medication, surgery was called for,
i.e. removal of Shri Kalmadi as Chairman of the Organizing Committee. The question then is was it
not obvious to Government, at the time, that nothing short of removal of Shri Kalmadi would resolve
the issue. Confrontation (2006-2008) had failed, co-operation had led to no improvement (2008-
2009) and therefore there was no choice but to sack Shri Kalmadi from the post of Chairman, OC.
Our enquiries have not clarified matters. Dr. M.S. Gill’s letter to Prime Minister (26.09.2009) states
“The structure cannot be changed, but this is the essential minimum now with no time to lose”.
Nobody, including Fennel, had asked for a change in the structure. Host City Contract had assigned
conduct of Games to Organizing Committee and there was no need to change that. The problem was
Chairman OC. The time was ripe for sacking the Chairman. This issue, which should have been
obvious to Government having had enough experience, was not even aired let alone addressed.
Twelve months from the CWG 2010 was not the time for “essential minimum”. Situation obtaining
post Fennel’s letter 13th September, 2009 is discussed and the decision taken implicitly is to rein in
26
Ticketing is examined in detail in the Fifth Report of HLC on the ‘Organizing Committee’
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Shri Kalmadi, support OC by induction of experienced official and successfully deliver CWG – 2010.
Given what transpired, described earlier in this Chapter, HLC concludes that measures taken proved
inadequate.
7.42 By March, 2010 not only OC but all other entities except Major Dhyan Chand National Stadium
have missed their deadlines. Games Venues are repeatedly seeking extensions for completion, City
Development Projects are way beyond schedule and it is doubtful whether such projects i.e.
Barapulla Nallah, would be complete before the Games. Need one add that not much work has taken
place, under the supervision of the Organizing Committee, on the Opening and Closing Ceremonies
even though all the decisions required of the Government have long since been taken. Besides more
frequent GOMs and COS took place. In 26th meeting of GOM (held on 15.08.2010) CEO-OC requested
GOM as follows:
“Special Officers be designated for the Venues who would make intensive visits to the Venues
and ensure close coordination between stakeholder and the OC Teams for Games Readiness.
This assignment will be in addition to their present duties.”
Accordingly, Cabinet Secretary selects and assigns 16 Officers (at Joint Secretary and Additional
Secretary level) from the Government of India.
7.43 HLC met 10 of the 16 Officers deputed by Cabinet Secretary. Some of them besides discussing
issues with HLC, also provided written briefs of their experience. It was generally recognized that
most of the functions in relation to coordination related to the OC and further that body was
indifferent to what was taking place or expected. Hence inter-agency coordination at the Venues, as
also at the Games Village was totally missing. These officials, it was hoped, would be able to
discharge these functions and accelerate progress. Arrangements were operationalized by August,
2010 and continued till the conclusion of the Games. Their contribution to the success of the Games
cannot be underestimated because without them it is doubtful whether issues which arose such as
that between suppliers and Delhi Police could have been resolved in time. Despite them, many issues
remained and on many occasions intervention from the level of Cabinet Secretary himself was
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required. However, without them that would not have taken place. In short, emergency mechanism
of positioning officers, of addressing problems based on their feedback was effective and successful
in ensuring the success of the Games.
7.44 The important point which emerges from the above discussion is that Government
intervention was the main panacea for crisis management. Government officials were part of OC
from its inception, during 2006 – 2009 more were added by OC and in October 2009 five officials
were inducted in consultation with Shri Kalmadi. On the request of OC for management of games
venues Cabinet Secretary deputed 16 officials in August 2010. All this was necessary because
Government had underwritten the Games and thus owned the Games. The idea of a ‘revenue
neutral’games, was a myth propounded in 2003 by Members of Indian Olympic Association including
Shri Kalmadi, Shri Randhir Singh etc. to secure control of CWG – 2010. The dichotomy between
ownership and control portended ill for all that was to follow. It would be worth recalling that CWG
Melbourne was conducted by a Corporation incorporated by Government and eventually the finances
were subsidized by Government. With clear and efficient management, the subsidy was nearly half
of the cost of the Games.
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Chapter 8: Terms of Reference

8.1 In this Chapter we answer the terms of reference. The first term of reference is:
“The role and responsibilities of the signatories to the Host City Contract and the overall
implications of the obligations entered into through the Host City Contract”
The signatories on behalf of India to the Host City Contract were Shri Suresh Kalmadi, President, IOA,
Shri Rajeeva Srivastava, then Secretary, Sports and Youth Affairs and Shri Vijay Kapoor, then Lt.
Governor, New Delhi. On behalf of Commonwealth Games Federation the contract was signed by
Mr. Mike Fennel and Michael Hooper.
8.2 The IOA and Organizing Committee (not incorporated on the date of signing) were jointly and
severally responsible for organizing the Games. The relevance of IOA was that India did not have a
separate Commonwealth Games Association; IOA also functioned as the Commonwealth Games
Association. In pursuit of this objective they were to draw up plans and programmes and in pursuit of
plans and programmes to accomplish certain milestones described in Section 6 of the Contract. This
Section also required IOA / OC to provide CGF periodic progress reports. A number of other
responsibilities connected with conduct of the Games such as ticketing, hospitality, accreditation,
accommodation, travel, Games Village and transport were also the responsibility of OC. IOA / OC
were also assigned Ceremonies including medals and arrangements for the Queens Baton’s Relay.
For its part CGF assigned to OC all commercial rights including marketing, sponsorship, broadcasting
and other rights, Games Web Site.
8.3 The then Secretary (Sports) signing on behalf of Government of India committed Government
to:
i) be responsible for all commitments including without limitation financial
commitments relating to organization and staging of the Games;
ii) support, facilitate and finance the organization of the Games;
iii) ensure free access to the host country, minimize the imposition of taxes; and
iv) ensure appropriate and necessary security.
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8.4 Shri Vijay Kapoor, then Lt. Governor signing on behalf of Host City was committed to all the
very same things described as the function of the GOI. Given are constitutional arrangements the
City of Delhi was dependent on the GOI to help it successfully deliver the games. In addition, during
Bid evaluation certain observations were made by the Evaluation Commission with regard to traffic
congestion etc., which were interpreted by GNCTD to mean an obligation to undertake infrastructure
projects within GNCTD territory. The Host City Contract does not have any Clause requiring GNCTD to
improve street lights (the lux was enhanced to over 50 vis a vis requirement of 30 – 35 lux) or street
scaping.
8.5 The crucial obligations under the Host City Contract have been captured in what has been
stated above. What is significant on a full reading of the contract is that all the authority and benefits
belonged to OC, while all the responsibility was of GOI and GNCTD. In practice the responsibility
became of GOI. This dichotomy between authority and responsibility engendered many a situation to
the detriment of GOI. For example the Host City Contract provided “the IOA and OC will ensure that
a village reserved for competitors and team officials is provided in accordance with the Games
Documents including Protocol 10 & Regulation 3”. This responsibility was discharged by DDA and it
was assumed by Government at all stages (from May 2003 onwards) that it would be its
responsibility. Likewise according to the Host City Contract all rights were assigned by CGF to OC.
The provision for Broadcast rights was “the OC will have exclusive rights to negotiate the potential
host broadcaster and other potential holders of television broadcasting rights” (Clause 28). The
expenditure on Host Broadcasting Service Provider was entirely of GOI. Thus while OC was the holder
of rights Government of India was saddled with the responsibility of planning and execution for this
service. Grudgingly OC agreed to share a part of the revenue with Prasar Bharati. It would not be
profitable to go on multiplying examples of this dichotomy between authority and responsibility.
Suffice it to say that it placed OC, or should one say Shri Kalmadi, in the driver’s seat.
8.6 The Second Term of Reference states:

“The planning and execution of development projects related to the Games, and,
contracts for service delivery, with reference to time, cost and quality”
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8.7 GOI and GNCTD were responsible for games venues, accommodation and city infrastructure
projects. The planning and execution of these projects have been examined in detail by HLC under
the following headings:
i) Games Venues;
ii) City Infrastructure – including accommodation;
iii) Games Village – accommodation for participants / players; and
iv) Host Broadcast Arrangements.
8.8 On each of the above captioned headings there is a separate Report capturing the work
undertaken by HLC, mainly its teams deployed for examination at site. These Reports spell out
emergence of plans, execution, costs and time. The impact of cost and time overruns, ubiquitous in
CWG 2010, is examined in great detail. The main conclusions are:
i) After allotment of CWG to India in November 2003 and up to October 2010 a period of
seven years was available.
ii) Authority disproportionate to their role in relation to games venues and to some
extent in case of Games Village devolved on OC and its recommendations were
without regard to financial ceilings.
iii) OC took over four years to finalize venue briefs for games venues thereby directly
contributing to delays.
iv) The first three years were frittered by all agencies without any meaningful activity.
This delay later became the bane of most projects, the cause of cost overruns, quality
issues and frequently of time over runs.
v) Planning was the first casuality and many projects faced problems because of
inadequate planning. Alternatives such as lump-sum contracts were not explored.
vi) Far too many City Civic infrastructure projects were taken up beyond the capacity of
implementing agencies, including expansion of metro network.
vii) The work undertaken was, in a large number of cases, either over-designed or
superfluous.
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viii) Not much attention was paid to costs. This was a consequence of there being no
budgetary ceiling. Even though Prime Minister’s meeting (August 2006) clearly
envisaged a budget for the Games no such budget ever emerged.
ix) OC’s own procurement process for the conduct of games was delayed beyond all
estimates and severely compromised in the process. This was a consequence of its
management style.
8.9 The next Term of Reference is:

“The issues relating to the effectiveness of the organizational structure and
governance for organization, preparation and conduct of the Games at all levels,
including the Organizing Committee and its Key Functional Areas”.
8.10 The governance structure devised in 2004 – 2005 remained, by and large unchanged to the
end. What the structure lacked was a sense of ownership. According to the Host City Contract the
Games were assigned to OC and in that narrow sense owned by OC. But it was common ground that
this ownership was legal, no more, and that the real responsibility for ensuring the delivery of the
Games was with Government. In that sense, ownership was of Government. In the vast ocean of
Government where did ownership lie? Did it lie with the Prime Minister’s Office or did it belong to
Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports whose subject it was? And what about the Ministry of Urban
Development, owner of Games Venues as well as responsible for DDA. Where in all this did GNCTD
fit in? While the governance structure had described a role for each of these entities what it was not
able to do was to decide ownership, because clearly ownership could not belong to OC. This lack of
ownership affected the planning and conduct of games.
8.11 GOM was a key element of the governance structure, it was strengthened during 2009 and
functioned till the conclusion of the Games. HLC has discussed in some detail its deliberations /
decisions between 2004 and 2010. The problems faced by it have been highlighted. What was
required for the successful delivery of CWG – 2010 was an effective management instrument, an
authority as it were who could ensure that the relevant entities had prepared a plan, possessed the
means to execute it and implementation was proceeding in accordance with the plan. It was perhaps
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too much to expect GOM to perform this function even though that is what was expected. For such a
function to be performed by a group of individuals, the requirements are leadership, cohesion and
continuity. As has been mentioned in Chapter 4 the functioning of GOM (2004 – 2009) was
compromised by the declining health of the late Shri Arjun Singh. There were frequent changes in the
Ministry of Youth and Sports portfolio and there were long gaps between meetings. Consequently,
none of the elements conducive to effective leadership and direction obtained during these crucial
years. Whether the kind of leadership required to drive a mega event can at all be engendered by
GOM is moot. HLC concludes that GOM is perhaps not suited to perform a managerial function
because such a function depends on a sense of ownership and it was too much to hope that such a
sense of ownership would at some point emerge. If it did not, it is no surprise.
8.12 Committee of Secretaries (COS) was mandated to ensure that decisions of GOM were
implemented. In fact it became a decision making body with the approach of the games, given the
time constraints which had emerged. The functioning of COS was cohesive, there was a sense of
continuity (2007 onwards because of Shri K.M. Chandrasekhar continuing as Cabinet Secretary) and
leadership was certainly not lacking. The events from September 2009 to the conclusion of the
Games were effectively addressed by COS. In the process it made itself vulnerable to becoming a
party to many decisions which it was not empowered to take and in certain specific instances the
process of this forum was abused to secure decisions validating wrong doing. These “decisions” are
discussed in our Reports on ‘Games Village’, ‘Host Broadcasting’, etc. HLC concludes that prolonged
use of COS on a single subject (Games in this case) has the potential to shift decision making from
line Ministries to the Cabinet Secretariat; from a forum to which decision making belongs to one
which ought not take decisions and thus to underwrite unwittingly potential wrong doing.
Organizing Committee:
8.13 OC was mandated to organize and conduct the Commonwealth Games 2010 and the
Commonwealth Youth Games 2008. Its mandate has been described in some detail while responding
to Item I of the Terms of Reference. Its organization structure has been discussed in our Report on
the ‘Conduct of the Games’ and its functioning has been discussed both in this Report and the former
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Report. Unfortunately a discussion of OC cannot be separated from the personality of Shri Kalmadi.
It would be recalled that in 2005 he created a monocracy, which remained unchanged and therefore
the effectiveness of OC or lack of it depends on how the actions of Shri Kalmadi are viewed.
8.14 Shri Kalmadi met HLC, at his request on March 18, 2011 at 16.15 hrs. His stance was that
decisions, now in contention, were taken by the appropriate committee, were reviewed by CEO Shri
Jarnail Singh and endorsed by the relevant Secretaries, Government of India. Some document seems
to have been forged by Shri Mahindroo vis a vis Queen’s Baton Relay – London episode. HLC Report
on Organising Committee examines most issues in public contention. From the point of view of
Governance, the question is who appointed Mahindroo, who sent him to London, who empowered
him to incur expenditure. It is now common ground that OC was ruled by Shri Kalmadi and his cabal.
He called the shots or authorized certain henchmen to do so. The numerous drawbacks in the
organization of the Games the excessive cost et al are attributable to his flawed decisions.
8.15 Hence while it is all very well to evaluate the Governance structure, the crucial issue will
always remain the individual(s) making the decisions, implementing it and so on. Outcome cannot be
hung on the peg of governance. Structures help those who wish to be helped. If Shri Kalmadi acts in
self interest, as he did, it would be futile to blame the structure of OC. If the option of removing him
remained dormant in September 2009 it was not due to any structural constraint. If engineers
insisted on creating wasteful assets, there is hardly any point in blaming GOM. HLC reports are
replete with instances of incorrect and / or motivated decisions. In aggregate these seriously
compromised the Games, engendered the vast chasm between expectations and outcome and in the
result dented “Showcase India”.
8.16 The Fourth Term of Reference is:

“Examination of weaknesses in management, alleged misappropriation,
irregularities, wasteful expenditure and wrongdoing in the conduct of the Games,
and recommending action on the same”.
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8.17 HLC has examined (i) weakness in Management (ii) alleged misappropriation irregularities and
wrongdoing (iii) wasteful expenditure and has recommended action in respect of all the entities
examined by it in particular OC CPWD, DDA, GNCTD, NDMC, MCD and Prasar Bharti. These are
detailed in the relevant Reports of HLC. This report has described the constitution and functioning of
Governance structure set up for Games in 2004-05. It has also provided its opinion on the efficacy of
each limb of Governance. At the same time it was not possible to address Governance in one place
and one report alone. Thus OC is addressed in this report and exhaustively in our Report on
‘Organising Committee’. Likewise, Ministry of Urban Development is commented upon in this report
as well as our Report on the ‘Games Village. Thus weaknesses in management are covered in more
than one report.
8.18 Specific reports cover (ii) and (iii) i.e. reports on Conduct of Games, Games Venues, City
Infrastructure, Games Village and Host Broadcasting. Wrongdoing in its broadest sense and wasteful
expenditure are specifically covered and wherever possible the latter estimated. Officials responsible
have been identified in many cases.
8.19 The Fifth Term of Reference is:

“The issues relating to financing the Games, including estimates of revenue and
expenditure”
8.20 Commencing from April 2003 relevant files are full of estimates of revenue and expenditure.
Between April 2003 and September 2003 the position taken by Shri Kalmadi was that composite
expenditure on the Games would be less than revenue. The April 2003 estimates were forwarded by
Shri Randhir Singh, Secretary General, Indian Olympic Association and those of August 2003 by Shri
Kalmadi. This letter clearly shows that what Shri Kalmadi is stating at the time is that the expenditure
on the games, estimated at 400.00 crore, would be well within the revenue estimate of 450.00
crore or more. This argument is successfully placed before the Cabinet at its meeting 10 th September,
2003 and provides a kind of reassurance because even though the process for bidding for the CWG
2010 has been ongoing since May 2003 this is the first time that Cabinet is considering the matter.
For the next two years nothing much happens with regard to the budget. When discussions
reopened in 2005 a clear distinction is being made between the requirements of OC and of other
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entities. What Shri Kalmadi is now stating is that the revenue of OC will be higher than the
expenditure of OC. All the costs relating to venue upgradation etc. are no longer part of the Games
budget according to him. In other words by 2005 a revenue neutral budget is a myth. It is
propagated by Shri Kalmadi periodically to assert the independence of OC in relation to Department
of Sports and no more. Since expenditure is going up because nobody in OC understands budgeting
an exercise is mounted to increase estimates of revenue. Ernst &Young are contracted by OC to
validate its budget and the budget goes up to 1800.00 crore by 2009. Cabinet approves 1620.00
crore in November, 2009. Revenue estimates have also increased to over 1800.00 crore. But there
is no basis whatsoever for the increase. While what has been stated above is a broad discussion of
what took place between 2003 and 2010 the issue is considered in great detail in HLC Report on the
‘Organising Committee’. Our conclusion is that most of the Budgetary exercise undertaken by Shri
Kalmadi and OC was hypothetical, designed to secure Budgetary support from Government and no
more and was packaged as revenue neutral.
8.21 The Sixth Term of Reference is:
“The issues concerning coordination between various agencies involved in the

development of infrastructure and conduct of the Games”.
8.22 The agencies involved development of infrastructure for the Games were Government of
National Capital Territory of Delhi (GNCTD), Delhi Development Authority (DDA), Municipal
Corporation of Delhi (MCD) and New Delhi Municipal Council (NDMC).
8.23 GNCTD was required by GOM decision of 2004 to set up an Empowered Committee for
coordination of all Games related projects including infrastructure projects. This Committee was set
up in 2006 because till that time GNCTD had not taken up any infrastructure projects. It was also
found that the Empowered Committee undertook to review a number of projects which did not
belong to its mandate. Further some projects were pursued for some time and thereafter abandoned
by the Empowered Committee. By and large, this Committee was unable to speed up project
implementation because that subject was with line agencies, they followed their own systems and
could not be hurried up.
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8.24 A specific issue faced in some infrastructure projects related to clearances by DUAC. These
clearances were extremely protracted, Government did not seem to have any leverage with DUAC
and while there was the option of appealing to Lt. Governor to overrule DUAC this was exercised so
belatedly that it was unable to obviate delays. While it is not clear how this issue ought to be
addressed it may be possible to consider the matter being posed to the Lt. Governor ipso facto after a
certain period of time. In other words after all information has been provided by the executing
agency to DUAC and should no decision be forthcoming within three months the matter should
automatically reach Lt. Governor for his decision.
8.25 DDA was responsible for its stadia, for the Games Village and for DDA flats in Vasant Kunj. The
issue of coordination with other agencies was relevant in case of the Games Village and it seems that
the Games Village did not face delays due to lack of coordination with other agencies. It is another
matter that DDA ought to have also approached Yamuna Standing Committee which it did not do.
With regard to the construction of flats at Vasant Kunj, the issue was more of delayed
commencement of the project, non-adherence to height restrictions set by Airport Authority and so
on, rather than one of delays. There is a fuller discussion of these issues in HLC Report on ‘City
Infrastructure’.
8.26 NDMC and MCD do not seem to have faced issues of inter agency conflict in the three
infrastructure projects implemented by these agencies i.e. Street Lighting, Street-scaping and Street
Signage.
8.27 The Seventh Term of Reference is:
“The role of international / national advisors / consultants / officials of Organizing

Committee in the conduct of the Games”
8.28 The terms Advisor and Consultant are being used synonymously. No particular distinction is
made between Indian consultant and foreign consultant. The role of consultants in individual
projects is examined in detail in the relevant reports. There is separate Chapter on consultants in the
Fifth Report of HLC.
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8.29 It is common ground that for a project of this complexity and size, consultants are a
prerequisite. Whether they are foreign or Indian would depend on the expertise required. Over the
years national expertise has increased significantly. Design of Barapullah Nala, a complex engineering
project, is a case in point. It was designed by Indian Consultants who were given insufficient time to
do so. On the other hand we had no expertise to install membrane roofing over JLN Stadium and
foreign consultants were engaged. The delineation was not always that obvious or clear.
8.30 A discussion of foreign consultants and their role would be incomplete without commenting
on the four contracts given by OC to EKS and the marketing contract for sponsorship entered with
SMAM. These organizations with poor credentials, interconnected ownership, complete backing of
CGF in particular of Mike Fennell and Hooper, derived undue gain from OC and rendered little service.
Their contracts / performance have been examined in detail in the Fifth Report on ‘Organizing
Committee’. It was most inappropriate for Mr. Hooper, a member of the Executive Board of OC to
actively canvass for a particular entity knowing full well that EKS did not possess the qualification to
provide services required by OC. It is a different matter that EKS registered a new company with
head quarter in Mauritius and has still to find Income Tax Returns.
8.31 Foreign consultants at exorbitant costs were Shri Kalmadi’s preference. While GOM
continued to emphasize ‘Indianness’ of Opening and Closing Ceremonies, Shri Kalmadi insisted that
he was obligated by the Host-City Contract to hire a foreign consultant. He promised to provide legal
opinion to support his opinion; needless to say never did. In the event consultants were hired at
enormous cost, they suggested expensive solutions requiring imports and additional foreign expertise
and all that to no great purpose; witness Aerostat suggested by Mark Fisher because he had nothing
left to do.
8.32 In many cases, consultants were hired to provide the advice the client wanted. This was
obvious in case of valuation for the purchase of additional flats from Emaar / MGF by DDA. Even
though COS had stressed the need for proper valuation, the consultant being the tax advisor of DDA
was able to justify the price it had been decided to pay. Street scaping Consultants are another
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example of this phenomena. When it did not suit the entity, the consultant was ignored. Prasar
Bharti / Doordarshan ignored the sensible advice of Mark Furlough. As with Governance, so with
consultants; need and outcome depend on the user. He / she can take rational decisions conducive
to economy and efficiency or use the device to achieve his objective. Perhaps the latter was more
the case. OC followed a simple principle in engaging officials viz. “Apnacha Manus”. The inefficiency,
mismanagement and wrong doing of OC are largely attributable to this simple principle. CoCom
reports repeatedly emphasized this aspect and when Mr. Fennel could not prevail, he foisted Mr.
Hooper at enormous cost on OC, an unnecessary irritant as Shri Kalmadi’s missive27 graphically
pointed out. Passage of time made it worse because the triumvirate were struggling for power – Shri
Kalmadi’s men, Hooper etc. and Government appointees. To the last, this confusion enabled Shri
Kalmadi to call the shots assisted by man Friday – Shri Shekhar Deorukhkar, Railway Guard - Western
Railway, personal assistant to Shri Kalmadi, at present under arrest.
8.33 The Eight Term of Reference is:
“The overall impact of the Games including legacy for city infrastructure, sports
infrastructure and sports development”.
8.34 A publication on the Melbourne Games 2006 entitled “United by the Moment” refers to the
legacy value of those Games in the following words:
“Sporting facilities would be developed or upgraded, training and educational opportunities

through Games programmes would be promoted, relationships and understanding between
the many cultures of Victoria and the Commonwealth Nations would be strengthened. An
appreciation of arts and culture would be ignited specially among our youth and the
importance of protecting the environment for future generations would be reinforced.
Tourists would be drawn to Victoria in record numbers, and trade and commerce
opportunities across many industries and interest would be created.”
27
See Annexure 23
Page 82
8.35 In preparation for the Commonwealth Games 2010 thousands of crore of rupees were spent
in Delhi for developing new stadia and a Games Village, beautifying the City, improving the road
infrastructure, constructing the flyovers and elevated roads, inducting a large fleet of new buses,
extending metro connectivity and augmenting the tourist infrastructure. This massive investment
needs to be preserved, protected, nurtured and built upon. The legacy value must be maximized. In
this background, the HLC makes the following observations and recommendations for the legacy of
City Infrastructure:
a) GNCTD welcomed the opportunity posed by the Commonwealth Games to take up a number
of new infrastructure projects and to expedite those in the pipeline. In almost all cases the
works were taken up and completed in a compressed time frame. There is a need for follow
up action to take all projects to their logical conclusion;
b) The Barapullah elevated road should be ‘completed’ by constructing the two links viz. from
JLN Stadium to Aurobindo Marg and from Star City Mall on the eastern side of the Yamuna,
across the river, to Sarai Kale Khan. This is necessary to make optimum use of the elevated
road already constructed;
c) The RWAs should be involved in the task of supervising the maintenance of street lighting,
street scaping and related horticulture works in their neighbourhood. Legacy value of this
investment will only be achieved when the works taken up are sustained by the concerted
action of all stake holders;
d) The Sunehari Nala and Kushak Nala parking areas should be utilized to the maximum.
Hundreds of private buses are parked for the night in the lanes and bye- lanes in New Delhi.
They must be made to park at the above parking areas. This would also generate revenue
which could be ploughed back for the maintenance of these facilities.
8.36 As far as the legacy for sports infrastructure and sports development is concerned, the
views and suggestions of the HLC are as follows:
i) The ‘state- of- the- art’ sports infra-structure which has come up in Delhi, should be put to
optimum use and the Venue Owners should be made responsible for its upkeep so that
the infrastructure created does not go to seed.
Page 83
ii) All Venue Owners should be asked to prepare an annual budget for maintaining the
infrastructure under the superintendence of SAI and the Venue Owners (DDA /NDMC/
GNCTD/ DU /JMI / AITA etc.) must be made responsible for providing the same without
any delay.
iii) Buildings, structures and spaces which can be used for generating revenue without
adversely affecting the sports facility should be carefully identified and aggressively
marketed. The revenue should be credited into a dedicated fund for maintaining the
sports infrastructure created.
iv) Ministry of Youth Affairs & Sports through SAI should set up a system for regular
inspection and monitoring of the Games and Training venues constructed for CWG 2010
and timely implementation of their recommendations should be binding on the concerned
agencies.
v) All sports facilities should be opened for use by athletes and sports persons. All such
athletes who have represented District, State, College, University and the country at
recognized District, State, National or International level meets / tournaments should be
allowed free access to these facilities.
vi) Schools and colleges should be encouraged to utilize the sports facilities created. A fixed
schedule should be drawn up and communicated to these institutions to enable them to
plan their logistics. SAI coaches could impart training and use these sessions to spot talent.
vii) Sports Federations should be encouraged to hold at least one national and international
meet / tournament in these venues every year.
viii) It must be ensured that the Sports Authority of India should develop the requisite
expertise so that in future it is able to conduct baseline survey of available Games facilities
and assess the work that needs to be undertaken to bring them on par with latest
international standards necessary for hosting an international meet. SAI must also be
charged with the duty of keeping a track of the latest and best equipment for various
games and its price and should be able to give expert advice on this subject.
Page 84
ix) It should be ensured that a qualified Venue Manager and requisite staff is appointed by
the Venue Owners for each Games and Training Venue.
x) Equipment purchased for CWG 2010 should be properly accounted for and deployed in a
manner which would ensure its full utilization.
xi) India is a vast country with a huge population and it would be very difficult for the Central
Government or the State Governments alone to nurture and promote sports. It is
necessary and desirable to involve the private and the public sector in this task. Leading
PSUs and private sector companies should be invited to select a game of their choice and
they should be given the responsibility of promoting the game, spotting talent and training
the promising sports persons. This could be a part of their corporate social responsibility.
xii) An important legacy of CWG 2010 should have been availability of a large number of
professionals with specialization in sports administration. Unfortunately, the manner in
which recruitment was done by the Organizing Committee was so shoddy that the number
of such professionals would be limited. However small the number, these persons should
be identified, kept in the sports sector, trained further and given exposure by visits abroad
to see other international Games, so that by the time India is ready to organize another
major international sports event, there is a nucleus of professional sports administrators
available.
xiii) While the HLC did not deal with Sports Federations directly during the time it was studying
issues related to the CWG 2010, it came across ample evidence to show the degeneration
in these Federations and to demonstrate how they are controlled by a few persons. The
intricate networking through which these persons support each other also came to light.
In the larger interest of sportsmen and the sports sector, the Government must intervene
and rescue the Federations from the clutches of these persons. In this context, attention is
drawn to an appeal from sportsmen regarding the need to clean-up the sports
administration. A copy of the appeal is at Annexure - 24. The HLC acknowledges and
supports the action taken by the Government to introduce a bill to restrict the tenures and
specify age limit of office holders in sports bodies.
Page 85
8.37 The Ninth Term of Reference is:
“The lessons learnt for the future, on each of the above, including establishment of a
mechanism for laying down timeframes and effective monitoring, creation of a
legally sustainable framework for hosting similar international sporting events,
appropriate financial management and internal audit, media interaction and
communication”.
8.38 At the time of consideration and evaluation of India’s bid for the Commonwealth Games 2010,
the draft Bid document was sprung on Government at the last minute. Up to the end of August 2003,
the files of Department of Sports do not show the need to consider any such document because no
such document is on file. The document is appended with the Cabinet Note dated 10 th September,
2003. It is described as a ‘standard’ document from which Government has nothing much to fear,
except the commitment to underwrite the Games which Government ought to do because it does not
entail any financial commitment for Government, the Games being revenue neutral. While, the
present report has pointed out in some detail the myth of revenue neutral Games, it has not
commented on the multifarious obligation foisted on Government by the Host City Contract. It would
be pertinent to mention that Canadian Government showed greater perceptiveness in questioning
several aspects of the Contract, declining to accept others in particular the obligation to underwrite
the Games, irrespective of their desire to host the Games28. Shri Randhir Singh, in his letter dated 9th
September, 2003 (2 days before the Cabinet meeting) maintained that the Canadian Government had
furnished to the CGF a guarantee to underwrite the shortfall if any in the capital and revenue
expenditure of the Games29. This was patently false, at best, Shri Randhir Singh did not know; at
worst, he informed otherwise. This would reinforce the belief of the HLC that the relevant officials, in
particular, Shri Rajeeva Srivastava were remiss in not verifying the facts, in not informing Cabinet of
alternatives and thereby committing Government to obligations which were frequently quoted by
CGF and frequently misquoted by Shri Kalmadi to our detriment. The responsibility also lies with the
then Minister Shri Vikram Verma because the Cabinet Note dated 10 th September, 2003 was of his
Ministry and had been approved by him.
28
See Annexure 5 for details.
29
See Annexure 25
Page 86
8.39 One obvious lesson to be learnt from this is that due diligence study of documents like the
Host City Contract for all future Games should be carried out well in advance. Cases where other
countries have successfully managed amendments in the so called ‘boiler plate agreement’ should be
taken note of so that we can act in our national interest and not succumb to the pressures of the
office bearers of these international sports federations.
8.40 A discussion on lessons for the future would be incomplete without describing the role of
Commonwealth Games Federation (CGF), in particular its President, Mr. Mike Fennell and Chief
Executive Officer, Mr. Michael Hooper. Both these office bearers acted in unison, not always to
facilitate the organization and conduct of the Games. Some examples of what took place are given in
the following paras.
8.41 Soon after the award of the Games to India, there was an insistence on hiring Event
Knowledge Services (EKS) by CGF. There was also an impression that the ‘Base Line Survey’ of Games
Venues would be conducted by EKS, as would be clear from the following:
“However, Minister of Youth Affairs and Sports observed that as per the Host City
Contract, payment of license fees includes the cost of Base Line Survey to be
undertaken by CGF and any work beyond the preparation for Commonwealth Games
2010 was not mandated by the Cabinet for OC”.
In this background on the request of Chairman, OC Shri Suresh Kalmadi

“it was decided that the work of venue reappraisal beyond the Host City Contracts
mandatory Base Line Survey as proposed by OC shall be undertaken and DDA agreed
to bear the entire exercise.30
8.42 Mr. Hooper now states, after being a party to the decision of venue appraisal, as follows:
“first of all let me clarify that there is no such thing as a “Base Line Survey” performed by EKS
in relation to the 2010 Commonwealth Games31”.
30
Both these quotes are from the Minutes of the 4th GOM meeting held on 17th March, 2005, item No.7(3).
31
See Annexure 26
Page 87
While acknowledging the close relationship between CGF and EKS including a contract between the
two (2003), he refused to disclose either the contents of the contract or the amount paid for any
services performed and went on to state “There was no overlap between the services EKS was
commissioned to perform by the CGF under the CGKMP and any other services EKS was contracted to
perform for the OC”.
8.43 Our detailed review (Fifth Report of HLC – Organising Committee) of the several contracts
between EKS and OC shows a significant duplication and overlapping plus insistent pressure exerted
by Michael Hooper, with the backing of Mike Fennell, to continue to provide contracts to EKS. It was
unseemly for Mr. Hooper to intervene in procurement matters being a Member of the Executive
Board of OC and not being part of the relevant functional area. His statement that the relationship
between CGF and EKS had been ‘fully disclosed’ ought to have restrained him from playing any role
rather than enabling him to back EKS now that he had made a full confession.
8.44 It is quite clear that there are certain companies, no doubt with relevant experience, which
are being assiduously supported by the office bearers of international sports bodies. EKS was
vociferously backed by the CGF nominees on the Executive Board. It was claimed that EKS was an arm
of the CGF. Now it transpires that SMAM and EKS are interlinked. McLatchey, CEO of EKS, owns 26%
of SMAM Australia through two other companies namely Ithaca and ERIS32. That there is considerable
understanding and accommodation while making recommendations about companies to be awarded
contracts would be established by the fact that when the subject of allocating the contract for
International Broadcasting Rights came up before the EB, one of the CGF representatives advised that
SMAM, the lowest bidder, should not be selected because ‘all eggs should not be kept in the same
basket” and the other bidder M/S Fast Track should be given the contract. Whether M/s Fast Track is
also linked in some way or the other to SMAM or EKS has not been investigated.
8.45 At the instance of Mike Fennell, contrary to the Host City Contract, Michael Hooper was
stationed in Delhi at a cost of over 3.45 crore, an issue examined in detail in our Report on the
32
See Annexure 27
Page 88
‘Organizing Committee’. Mr. Suresh Kalmadi constitutionally relying on the ‘scripture’ (Host City
Contract) to further his own agenda, yielded to this pressure and Michael Hooper took full advantage
of his vulnerable position.
8.46 While the instances cited above created problems, if we were asked to choose a single factor
which dramatically increased the risk and virtually jeopardized CWG – 2010, we would without
hesitation point to lack of ownership, bordering on absence.
(a) IOA / OC had successfully secured the Games, signed the Host City Contract, were
responsible for conduct of Games and had been empowered by Government to do so.
Were they the owners? Not really; OC would be dissolved after the Games and IOA
was merely discharging the functions of OC while it subsisted. The top management
of OC was on secondment from IOA, no more. The assets created for the Games
would not be IOA’s legacy and it had little to do with infrastructure.
(b) CWG – 2010 had been entrusted by the Host City Contract to GNCTD. Lt. Governor
attended the conference at Montego Bay (2003) and had signed the agreement. Did
they own the Games at least in some classical sense? They were not responsible for
organization of the Games. Most of the venues did not belong to them and they did
not possess the resources to do so. Their role was limited to certain city
infrastructure projects, two stadia and Security.
(c) Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports was the nodal Ministry for the Games. It had
participated in the bidding process, its Secretary had signed the Host City Contract
obligating Government to underwrite the Games and the Organizing Committee was
expected to deal with Government through MYAS. GOM (25.10.2004) had also
approved the creation of International Sports Division (ISD) to enable the Ministry to
discharge its function. But as our Report shows, over the period 2004-2010 MYAS
continued to lose what it possessed rather than the other way round. Hence it is
clear that ownership of the Games did not lie with MYAS.
(d) Other than these three there was no other focal point or entity which could in any
way be construed to be the owner of the Games. Certain Ministries, in particular
Page 89
Ministry of Urban Development were expected to play a crucial role, though they
could not be understood to performing the role of the owner. No doubt Prime
Minister’s Office selectively intervened; in 2004 to set up the governance mechanism,
in 2006 to review progress and so on. But it never assumed ownership. Our
observation is a statement of fact.
8.48 It would clear from the above discussion that there was lack of ownership vis a vis CWG –
2010. The first consequence of this was a kind of anarchy with reference to the development of
venues for the Games. This exercise commenced after a gap of 16 months from allocation of Games
to India in March 2005 and in some sense continued right to the end. GOM discussions during 2010
show that nearly all the venues are incomplete, specifications are being added upto March – April
2010 for the Opening / Closing Ceremonies and as a consequence everything is delayed. Test Events
which ought to have commenced no later than January 2010 actually take place in a superficial
manner from June 2010. And this kind of delay takes place across the board, the catering contract for
the Games Village being a case in point.
8.49 The second consequence of lack of ownership was unchecked expenditure described in great
detail in our Reports and discussed in Chapter 3 (Cost of the Games). Entities identified for creation
of infrastructure for the Games (including venues) expended funds without any regard to economy,
budgetary ceiling or felt needs. Details of excess expenditure, wrongful expenditure, etc. are
furnished in our Reports. Suffice it to say, to a great extent, lack of ownership facilitated wrong
doing. It is worth noting that a budgetary ceiling for the Games would have acted as an appropriate
check to ever burgeoning costs. Hence it is essential that for an event of this type Government must
decide a budget and the expenditures be limited to the budgetary ceiling. There must not be an open
ended commitment, the desire to show case India notwithstanding.
8.50 We can conclude that in future for conduct of a mega-event such as CWG – 2010 it would be
essential to identify ownership. When CWG were held in Kuala Lumpur during 1998, a High Level
Committee chaired by the Prime Minister of Malaysia (at that time Dr. Mahatir Mohammad) directed
Page 90
planning, execution and conduct of the Games. The 2002 Games were held in Manchester and the
British precedent may not be very helpful because the majority of the Commonwealth Games are
held in that country. CWG 2006 was hosted by Melbourne (Australia). The State of Victoria
incorporated a Crown Corporation which was responsible for organizing the Games. While there was
much criticism, especially with regard to expenditure, the fact remains that the total Audited
expenses on CWG – 2006 (Melbourne) was A$523 million only, roughly 2000 crore. Our situation is
in a sense somewhere in between Malaysia and Australia. We are not in a position to go back to the
1982 Asian Games precedent and that is essentially what Malaysia did. On the other hand what
Australia decided to do through a Corporation we think of accomplishing through a Society.
8.51 Perhaps in our situation a non-profit Government Society for conduct of Games looks
appropriate. Learning from what took place the Chairperson of the Society should be the Prime
Minister. This alone would instill ownership of the kind needed for efficient conduct of the Games.
Recognizing the extreme pressure on the Prime Minister’s time the Society need meet only once
every quarter. The functioning of the Society should be entrusted to a Vice Chairperson and for a
sports event it should be the Minister, Department of Sports.
8.52 There would be a Chief Executive Officer appointed by Government and accountable to
Government. In other words, he would be on deputation from the Government. Adequate
representation would be provided to Sports Bodies at all the three levels. Inevitably a number of
Ministries (Ministry of Urban Development, Ministry of Tourism, etc.) may be concerned with the
organization of the Games and they should be represented on the management of the Society
through the Minister, in charge of the Ministry.
8.53 As far as practicable, applicable frameworks drawing reference to standards and rules for
conduct of Government controlled bodies and compliance with Government rules for procurement
should be considered, with premium on dynamism and innovation.
Page 91
8.54 Besides the key positions which may well be from Government , the remaining staff should be
recruited by the Society taking into account the skill sets required, the expertise needed, in particular
for sport (s) which it is proposed to host. A balance between full time staff and consultants should be
planned before commencement of recruitment
8.55 The Society should operate on an overall budget disaggregated to annual outlays. The total
being an aggregate of all that is required to be done properly estimated with no scope for change. In
other words, with increasing costs there should be a set of priorities which should enable certain
parts to be excluded to preserve the overall budgetary ceiling.
8.56 In case of Government stadia being used the upgradation costs should be identified properly,
approved by the Society and Ministry of Urban Development should be accountable for outcome
including observance of budgetary ceilings. The EFC mechanism does not seem to have been
effective in containing costs or restricting outlays. It may be necessary to set up a separate
mechanism for cost estimation.
8.57 It is important that independent and professionally equipped Audit and Vigilance mechanisms
are mandated. Results of oversight should be available in a time bound manner to facilitate remedial
action.
8.58 Revenue generation from sponsorship, from ticketing etc. is generally significant even in
events which prove to be non-self financing. Government organizations tend to be less efficient than
the private sector in maximizing revenue. Even if one were to ignore the sad experience of OC in
raising revenue, one could conclude that much more could have accomplished had this function been
performed in a bonafide manner by the private sector. For example if after ear marking seats for
accredited persons and VIPs the rest of the ticketing had been assigned to the private sector the
stadia would not have remained empty. There is thus a strong case for assigning this function to the
private sector.
Page 92
8.59 Capacity building and skill enhancement are important from the point of view of legacy and
should be given due attention.
8.60 To sum up, the role of Government would be crucial for organizing a similar event and should
be recognized upfront. Later interventions are both expensive and inefficient.
Page 93

Appendix 1: List of officials / persons engaged by High Level
Committee

1 Aakash Bassi
2 Abhijit Ghosh
3 Abhishek Paliwal
4 Adarsh Kumar Aggarwal
5 Ajay Singh
6 Amit Pathania
7 Anil Roy
8 Ankit Dewan
9 Ankita Sikka
10 Ankush Sachdeva
11 Anshul Ujlayan
12 Arindam Ghosh
13 Asawari Kapur
14 Ashutosh kapoor
15 Ashwani Kumar
16 Bhan SK
17 C.S. Murty
18 Charanpreet Singh
19 Deepak Malhotra
20 Deepankar Sanwalka
21 Deepti Singal
22 Dhritimaan Shukla
23 Dogra TK
24 Doodhnath
25 Gahlot SS
26 Ganganpreet Singh Puri
27 Gopal Krishna Shukla
28 Gupta PK
29 Gupta. S.C.
30 Harsh Mehta
31 Hiran Mehta
32 Induvant S Tomar
33 Jai Paul Rattan
34 Kannan K.
35 Kaushik HC
36 Kavita Nathaniel
37 Khandelwal, KN
38 Koteswaran TK
Page 94


39 Koul. P.N.
40 Kujur, SKF
41 Kunal Gulati
42 Mahesh Chandra
43 Manav Walia
44 Mishri Lal Gupta
45 Monika Malhotra
46 Mukesh Arya
47 Mukhopadhyay, PK
48 Murali Talasila
49 Nasreen Chanana
50 Neogy. SK
51 Nidhi Vashisht
52 Nishith Seth
53 Parasher H.
54 Prasun Singh
55 Rahul Puniya
56 Ranjan Rajourya
57 Rao VS
58 Saguna Sodhi
59 Sanjeev Kwatra
60 Sanyukt Kharbanda
61 Sharma RD
62 Sasikumar S
63 Shiban Ji Sultan
64 Shuchi Gupta
65 Shuchi Rewal
66 Shyam Kishore
67 Singh, IP
68 Sinha, AV
69 Sunil Kumar
70 Thakur, AK
71 Varun Mowar
72 Vasudevan.S
73 Venugopal V
74 Vijay Batra

Page 95

2. Shri C.S. Prasad, DG
3. Sh.Shyam Kishore, Chief Engineer
4. Shri V.K. Gupta, Addl. DG (CWG)
5. Shri A.K. Jain, Addl. DG (CWG)
6. Shri Nikhilesh Jha, CVO
7. All SE’s and EE’s dealing with CWG works
8. Shri Nagarajan, CE (Electrical), (Retd.)
Prasar Bharati & Doordarshan
1 Shri B.S. Lalli, CEO, Prasar Bharti
2 Shri A.K.Jain, Member (Finance), Prasar Bharti
3 Ms.Leena Nandan, Director, DD
Delhi Development Authority

# Name & Designation
1. Shri Ashok Kumar, Vice Chairman
2. Sh.Dinesh Rai, Ex-Vice Chairman, DDA
3. Shri Nand Lal, Member (Finance)
4. Ms.Veena Ish, Principal Commissioner
Sports Authority of India
1. Shri Sayan Chatterjee, DG
2. Shri Gopal Krishna, Secretary
3. Smt.Jhanja Tripathi, former Director
4. Shri H.S. Kinga, JS/OSD
Page 98
5. Shri Pravin Krishan, JS/OSD
6. Mrs. Rachna Govil, Director
Government of National Capital Terriotory of Delhi
1. Shri R.Narayanaswami, Retired Chief Secretary
2. Shri Rakesh Mehta, Chief Secretary
3. Shri K.K. Sharma, Pr. Secretary, PWD
4. Shri S. Prasad, Secretary, IT
5. Shri Deepak Virmani, Addl. Secretary, IT
6. Shri Vashisht, Controller of Accounts
7. Shri S. Bhattacharya, Director of Health Services
8. Shri Rajesh Kumar, Nodal Officer
9. Shri S.K. Das, Dy, Labour Commissioner
10. Shri Sunil Sharma, Executive Engineer, Ring Road Bye-pass
11. Shri Raj Pal Singh, EE, Ring Road Bye-pass
12. Shri S.C. Chauhan, EE, Gazipur Flyover
13. Shri PC Channa, EE, Raja Ram Kohlimarg Intersection
14. Shri S.C. Gupta, EE, Naraina T Point Flyover
15. Shri Pandit, Programme Manager
16. Shri Amit Kumar, EE, Tyagraj Stadium
17. Shri Sajal Mitra, EE, Millennium Park Bus Parking
18. Shri Priyanka Mittal, EE, Barapulla Road
Page 99
Municipal Corporation of Delhi

1. Shri K.S. Mehra, Commissioner
2. Shri Anshul Prakash, Additional Commissioner
3. Shri V.K. Malhotra, Nodal Officer
4. Shri Ravi Das, Addl. Nodal Officer
5. Shri Ajay Agarwal, EE, Barapulla Bus Parking
New Delhi Municipal Council
1. Shri Parimal Rai, Chairman
2. Shri P.K. Puri, AE, Shivaji Stadium
3. Shri R.K. Sharma, Manager, Talkatora Stadium
4. Shri V.K. Katiyal, AE, Talkatora Stadium
5. Shri Feroz Ahmed, CE, Talkatora Stadium
Delhi Transport Corporation
1. Shri Uday Kumar, Chairman, DTC (Upgradation of Bus-shelter)
2. Shri A.K. Chawla, Dy, CGM, DTC
Delhi University
1. Shri
1 G.S. Gupta, EE, Delhi University
Jamia Millia Islamia
1. Prof. Zubair Meenai Dean, Students welfare
2. Prof. Noor Mohammad Director, Physical Education
RITES
1. Mr. Alok Garg, Group General Manager [ CP ]
2. Mr. J.S. Yadav, Addl. General Manager [ Finance ]
Page 100
3. Mr. Shariq Zulfikar, Addl. General Manager [ CP ]
4. Mr. R.K. Jindal, Dy. General Manager [ C ]
Siri Fort Sports Complex – DDA officials
1 Mr. Alok Swarup, Director Sports (D.D.A.)
2 Mr. Rajiv Pandey, Chief Accounts Officers (D.D.A.)
3 Mr. N.L. Singh, Chief Engineer ( CWG)
4 Mr. Vinod Sawhney, S.E.(CGD 3)
5 Mr. M.S. Gill, E.E. ( CGD 9)
6 Mr. N.K. Mittal, E.E. (CWG) C3
7 Mr. A.K. Jain, A.E. (CGD 5)
8 Mr. S.K.Satija, E.E.(CWG)T3E.E.(CWG)T3
9 Mr. R.K. Gupta, E.E.( CDG 5)
All India Tennis Association

1 Col Amarbir Singh, Executive Director, AITA
2 Col Ranbir Chauhan, Executive Director, AITA
3 V.K. Batra, Executive Director, AITA
4 S.G. Lakhanpal, Consultant
5 Rajiv Khanna,Consultant
Yamuna Sports Complex – DDA officials

# Name & Designation
1 Mr.P.K. Bhandari, SE (Electrical)
2 Mr. S. K. Sethi, SE (Civil CGD-IV)
3 Mr. Anil Kumar, SE (Civil CGD-VI)
Page 101
4 Mr. S.C. Gupta, EE (Electrical)
5 Mr. D.K. Jha, EE (Electrical)
6 Mr. Nahar Singh, EE (Civil – CGD-IV)
7 Mr. S.K. Doomra, EE (Civil – CGD-VI)
8 Mr. V.K. Arora, AE (Electrical)
9 Mr. R.K. Nagpal, AE (Electrical)
10 Mr. Lal Singh, AE (Civil CGD-IV)
11 Mr. Arvind Chadha, AE (Civil CGD-IV)
12 Mr. I. H. Naqvi , AE (Civil CGD-VI)
13 Mr. D.S. Malik, AE (Civil CGD-VI)
14 Mr. Hari Singh, AE (Civil CGD-VI)
15 Mr. Mr. K.D. Sharma, AE (Civil CGD-VI)
16 Mr. R.P.S Chauhan, JE (Electrical)
17 Mr. Gain Prakash, JE (Electrical)
18 Mr. B.L. Verma, JE (Electrical)
19 Mr.Viond Sharma, JE (Electrical)
20 Mr. S.C. Mittal, JE (Civil CGD-IV)
21 Mr. Rafiqu Ahmed, JE (Civil CGD-IV)
22 Mr. D.K. Sharma, JE (Civil CGD-IV)
23 Mr.S.R. Ansari, JE (Civil CGD-IV)
24 Mr.S.C. Sharma, JE (Civil CGD-IV)
25 Mr.Sandeep Kushwaha, JE (Civil CGD-VI)
Page 102
26 Mr. A.K. Khanna, JE (Civil CGD-VI)
27 Mr. T.R. Sharma, JE (Civil CGD-VI)
28 Mr. Mohd. Akhtar, JE (Civil CGD-VI)
29 Mr.Dharmender Singh, JE (Civil CGD-VI)
30 Mr. V.K. Sharma, JE (Civil CGD-VI)
VIPs
1 Shri M.S. Gill, former Minister of Youth Affairs & Sports
2 Shri Jaipal Reddy, Minister of Urban Development.
3 Shri Vijay Kapoor, former Lt. Governor of Delhi.
4 Delegation led by Shri Virender Gupta, President, Delhi Unit BJP and Sh Madan
Lal Khurana, former Chief Minister of Delhi
Page 103

Main Report of The Shunglu Committee

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Main Report of The Shunglu Committee

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HIGH LEVEL COMMITTEE

VIGYAN BHAWAN ANNEXE,NEW DELHI

3. Cost of the Games 17

6. Ministries of Government of India, Govt. of NCT of Delhi 43

Appendix – 1 List of Professional Staff of HLC

Appendix – 2 List of officers /persons interviewed by HLC

Chapter 2: Governance Structure

The Bid Saga

 To allow the MYAS to issue the following guarantees :-

i) Undertaking to support the bid of Delhi to host the Games;

‘Revenue Neutral’ Games

Constitution of Organizing Committee

i) Set-up mile-stones for various activities;

Group of Ministers (GOM)

Chapter 3: Cost of the Games

Approved expenditure of Govt. of India 11,687.25 crore

Approximate cost of projects of Govt. of Delhi 16,560.00 crore

Myth of ‘revenue neutral’ Games

Absence of Budgetary Ceiling

6. Security - 7.16 7.16 7.16

9 Preparation of 678 802 678 678

Total of 13 542 463 463

14. Archeological - 25.75 25.75 25.75

Authority on 87.25 crore

1 Games Venues 4854.24 3972.82** 881.42

Cabinet – sanctioning authority

Chapter 4: Group of Ministers (GOM)

4.2 The recurring themes of meetings of the first GOM were:

Meetings of Group Appointed by Cabinet

Second GOM June 2009 – October 2010

Preparedness for the Games

Opening & Closing Ceremonies

Progress made by OC vis a vis Preparation for the Games

Chapter 5: Committee of Secretaries (COS)

# Period No. of meetings

1 May, 2006 to December, 2006 8

appear to be realistic. Secretary (Sports) also felt that the

Date of CoS Meeting Details of deliberations

Chapter 6: Ministries of Government of

Ministry of Urban Development (MoUD)

Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi (GNCTD)

Chapter 7: Organizing Committee

Memorandum and Rules & Regulations of Organising Committee

Objects incidental to the Main Objects

Rules & Regulations

deemed necessary in the interest of the objective

6 Committee and Sub Committee

Duties & Responsibilities

In case of emergency, the Chairman shall take

Any dispute between the members relating to

Dr. M.S. Gill then MYAS went on to state:

7.35 Government concluded that the professional capability of OC required to be supplemented by

Chapter 8: Terms of Reference

8.6 The Second Term of Reference states:

8.9 The next Term of Reference is:

8.16 The Fourth Term of Reference is:

8.19 The Fifth Term of Reference is:

8.21 The Sixth Term of Reference is:

“The issues concerning coordination between various agencies involved in the

8.27 The Seventh Term of Reference is:

“The role of international / national advisors / consultants / officials of Organizing

8.33 The Eight Term of Reference is: