REPORT

of a Commission of Inquiry into Disturbances in Zanzibar during June 1961

LONDON

HER MAJESTY'S STATIONER Y OFFICE 1961

PRICB 2s. 6d. NET

Colonial No. 353

Report:

Zanzibar Commission of Inquiry

SANCTUARY BUILDINGS, GREAT SMITH STREET, LONDON, S.W.I.

17th November, 1961.

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

We have the honour to present to you our Report on the disturbances which occurred in Zanzibar on the 1st June. 1961. and succeeding days, including our view as to their. causes and development and the steps taken to deal with them, in accordance with our Commission of the 8th September, 1961.

We are very conscious that you are at least as fully seized of the facts as we now are. and we regret having to restate them. but we have endeavoured to limit the recapitulation to such details as we consider necessary to make our report intelligible.

We have the honour to be.

Your Excellency's obedient servants,

S. FOSTER-SUTTON. VINCENT TEWSON. C. A. GROSSMITH.

HIS EXCELLENCY,

SIR GEORGE MOORING, K.C.M.O.

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CONTENTS

PART I.-INTRODUCTION .

Terms of Refcrcnce-· procedure-Counsel appearing.

PART n.-POLITICAL BACKGROUND . . . . .

Traditional harmony-1957-first election-political temperature risesboycotts, squatter trouble and dock dispute-Round Table Conference-Youth Movements-Amendments to Penal Code-Formation Zanzibar and Pemba Peoples' Party-Parties complain of rivals' speeches-" The Blood Report "-franchise extended-January 1961 Election-Caretaker Government-Election procedure-June ] 961 Election-Zanzibar Nationalist Party letter to Secretary of StatcVisits to Communist countries.

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PART IlL-THE DISTURBANCES OF JUNE, 196J . . . . . . .. 14-23

Day by day events June Ist-6th-Casualties June 1st-8th-number of arrests-Convictions prior to September 25th-" Plot" allegation, without foundation. June 1st, political leaders endeavour to persuade supporters to remain calm and disperse.

PART IV.-FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO TENSION

Aftermath of 1957 Election-growth of political party rivalry-Eviction of squatters-legal position of squatters clarified-1958 Dock disputeboycotts-use by Zanzibar Nationalist Party of national flag and Youth Band-loyalty to His Highness the Sultan-Afro-Shirazi Party disappointment-racialism and politics-the" bombardment of words". ---campaigning on racial grounds-Government decline to legislateresponsibility of leaders.

24-30

PART V.-THE POLICE FORCE, SECURITY AND MATTERS RELEVANT THERETO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31- 41

Police establishment June 1961-Reinforcements from mainland-meetings of Ministers May 4th-Meeting political party leaders May 19th-assurances sought on Security-agreed points of emphasis in broadcasts. Security Committee and Election Committee-assessment of election day risks-mainland reinforcements confirmed-Parties confident-no apparent reason for elections to be disturbed-police dispositions-efficiently deployed-new proposals for increase ill strength-availability of mainland reinforcements still necessarygeneral conduct of Police.

PART VI.-SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

APPENDICES

A-The Commission of Appointment

B-List of Witnesses

C-List of documents tendered in evidence

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42-48

49 50-51 52 56

PART I

Introduction

1. Thursday, Ist June, 1961, was the day on which voting was to take place in the third general election to be held in Zanzibar and Pemba for candidates for the Legislative Council. On the morning of that day, while voting was in progress; disturbances broke out in Zanzibar township, spread to the rural areas of Zanzibar on 2nd June, and continued, mainly in the central and northern areas of Zanzibar, until the security forces gained control of the situation on 6th June. As a result of these disorders 68 persons were killed and 381 injured. 'Many buildings were damaged, and there was a good deal of looting.

2. On the 8th September; 1961, His Excellency appointed a Commission of Inquiry, with the following terms of reference:

"To inquire into and report upon the civil disturbances which occurred in Zanzibar on the first day of June, 1961, and succeeding days, including their causes and development and the steps taken to deal with them."

The Commission of appointment, which is reproduced in Appendix A. was published in the Official Gazette on 9th September, 1961, and we caused a notice to be published in newspapers circulating in Zanzibar, drawing attention to the appointment of the Commission, its terms of reference, date of commencement and place of sittings. This notice was published on various dates between the 10th and 24th September, and invited any person interested in thesubject matter of the Inquiry to apply for permission to be represented before the Commission, or if they did not wish to be represented. but desired to give evidence before the Commission, to inform the Secretary of the Commission, in writing, to that effect.

3. The first session of the Commission opened in the Legislative Council Chamber, Zanzibar, on the morning of the 25th September, 1961, and Ne continued to sit daily. except for one day when we made a tour 01" dw main areas where the disturbances occurred, until the hearing was completed on 13th October.

4. Apart from the evidence of two witnesses and a portion of the evidence of one other, heard in camera, the evidence of the witnesses was heard in public.

5. The Government of Zanzibar, the Zanzibar Nationalist Party, and the Afro-Shirazi Party, were represented at the Inquiry.

6. Each of the parties represented called witnesses; one private individual gave evidence, and two others submitted written statements. One hundred and four documents were tendered in evidence. A list of the witnesses who gave evidence is to be found in Appendix B, and a description of the documentary evidence at Appendix C.

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7. Counsel who appeared before us were Mr. P. N. Dalton. AttorneyGeneral, Zanzibar, and Mr. W. Dourado, Crown Counsel. on behalf of the Government of Zanzibar, Mr. W. D. Fraser Murray and Mr. S. H. M. Kanji, on behalf of the Zanzibar Nationalist Party, and Mr. K. S. Talati and Mr. B. W. Kwaw-Swanzy, on behalf of the Afro-Shirazi Party.

PART II Political Background

8. Prior to the year 1957, apart from a few isolated incidents, such as the riot of Manga Arabs in February. 1936, Zanzibar was a country in which different races lived together in peace and harmony.

9. Early in the year 1957 provision was made, for the first time, for elections to be held throughout the Protectorate on a common roll.

10. Six of the twelve seats previously held by nominated unofficial members were to be filled by elected members. two were to be elected for Zanzibar Town. two for the rural districts of Zanzibar, and two for

Pemba. .

11. The franchise was then limited to males of not less than 25 years of age who were required to have certain other qualifications, the principal one being Zanzibar citizenship. The legislative sanction for this constitutional change is embodied in the Legislative Council (Elections) Decree, 1957.

12. At that time there were only two political parties in Zanzibar, the Zanzibar Nationalist Party, which was formed towards the end of 1955, and the Airo-Shirazi Party, which was formed in February, 1956.

13, The elections took place in July, 1957, and in the event. five seats were won by Afro-Shirazi candidates, and one by an Independent candidate who supported the Afro-Shirazi Party. The Zanzibar Nationalist Party was heavily defeated.

14. The leaders of the two parties, Sheikh Ali Muhsin, Zanzibar Nationalist Party, and Sheikh Abeid Amani Karume, Afro-Shirazi Party, opposed each other in the Ngambo constituency of Zanzibar, and the former was defeated by 3,328 votes to 918.

15. Considerable interest was shown in the elections; 87 per cent. of the registered electors voted. In the Annual Report of the Provincial Administration for the year 1957 it is recorded that the elections were later described" as having been probably the most peaceful in constitutional history".

16. Unhappily this peaceful state of affairs ·did not continue. Whether or not a planned and deliberate policy, the two rival parties succeeded in working up the political temperature which, by August, 1958, reached such heights, and bitterness, that it was considered by the Administration that a mere spark would produce a conflagration.

17. This resulted in the closure, through boycotting, of several hundred Arab-owned shops, in the eviction of a number of African squatters from

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Arab-owned plantations. in the boycotting of buses owned by members of the opposite political party, and the displacement of old established Afro-Shirazi dock labourers by " Nationalist Party labour" in the Zanzibar docks.

] 8. A previous appeal by the Civil Secretary. Mr. P. A. P. Robertson, C.M.G" to the leaders of both political parties, to use their influence in an attempt to reduce the existing political and racial tension, having failed to evoke any satisfactory response, in October, 1958, the Civil Secretary, with the approval of the British Resident, arranged a series of meetings between the leaders of the opposing political groups, which became known in Zanzibar as the" Round Table Conference",

19. As a result there was a 'lessening of tension, which had marked

the earlier months of the year .. anyway. 'on' the surface, but it is clear. from the evidence that, below the surface, frictiQncOlJ.~fUl,le4't"q. ~i~~, v,,';:i~}~~t .

20, In particular, the authorities were v'ety·c.oncerned ~Y the 'a~~iviti~t·'/ of the Youths' Own Union, the youth branch of the Zanzibar Nationalist Party, and the Afro-Shirazi Youth League, which had been forced as a counter-rrrove to the formation of the Youths' Own Union.

The Youths' Own Union were reported to be drilling and to be training in what can only be described as a militant manner. They wore uniforms, and on occasions were observed to be usurping the functions of the police,

The Afro-Shirazi Youth League were described in evidence as being " completely undisciplined" and as having been a constant source of trouble to the police.

21. In these oircumstances the Government considered it necessary to take additional legal powers with the object of preventing incidents calculated to exacerbate feelings.

22. Amendments were made to the Penal Code making the carrying of offensive weapons, besetting and intimidation, offences, and in April 1959, the Public Order Decree was passed, making it an offence, inter alia. to usurp the functions of the police, and to enable the Resident in Council,

by order, to prohibit the wearing of political uniforms.: j ,~. "

,;, ' ;", 'T

23. However, there was a substantial improvement in relations., and tension cased. The District Commissioner of the Rural District of Zanzibar, is on record as having expressed the view that the improvement was "reflected in the relations between landlords and squatters, between consumers and retail shopkeepers, and between the travelling public and bus-owners, "

24. This improvement in the situation continued until towards the end of 1959, when political activity increased, and three of the elected members broke away from the Afro-Shirazi Party and formed the Zanzibar and

Pemba Peoples' Party. '

25. Complaints began to be made to the Government by the two main political parties at the contents of speeches made by the other side at' public meetings.

26. The Zanzibar Nationalist Party claimed that the Afro-Shirazi Party speeches were racial in character and expressed disloyalty to His Highness the Sultan. The Afro-Shirazi Party complained that the speeches of the

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other side were abusive and insulting, and particularly expressed rcsen tment that it was being suggested that anyone who was not a member of the Zanzibar Nationalist Party must be assumed to be disloyal to his Highness the Sultan.

27. The present British Resident, Sir George Mooring, K.C.M.G., arrived in Zanzibar in January 1960, and immediately commenced discussing constitutional progress for the Protectorate with the leaders of the political parties, and this, for a time, had the effect of reducing the tension which again had commenced to rise.

28. A second election was scheduled to take place in 1960, but pressure for further political advance had culminated in a visit to Zanzibar in December 1959. by the Secretary of State. and it was then agreed that a Constitutional Commissioner should visit Zanzibar, review the constitutional position. and make recommendations for constitutional advance.

29. The election proposed for July, 1960, was accordingly postponed.

Sir Hilary Blood, G.RE., K.C.M.G., was appointed Constitutional Commissioner, arrived in Zanzibar in April, 1960, and proceeded to his task, reporting on the 28th May, 1960.

50. w'hat is now referred to as the "Blood Report" was generally accepted as the basis for constitutional advance by the Afro-Shirazi Party, h~lt ')V"S rejected, and publicly burnt. by the Zanzibar Na ti-mrlist Party.

31. By July 1960, the tone of the Press, and political speeches, was so deplorable that the British Resident decided it was necessary to call together the political leaders to discuss the situation and, after prolonged discussion, they all agreed to sign a joint declaration, calling upon their supporters to mend their ways and to behave with traditional good humour and politeness.

32. From then onwards the situation improved, partly because the appeals by their leaders' had .some effect, and partly because attention was being increasingly focussed on the next general election, which by then had been fixed to take place in January 1961.

33. It is here relevant to observe that Sir Hilary Blood recommended that there should be 21 single-member constituencies on the approximate basis of one member for every 15,000 units of the popula tion, but after (Ol'sHlc:r<tiilln of the various Tcpn':sclltations made to hun ill connection with the matter. the British Resident decided to recommend that the nurn hI of elected members should be increased to 22 by the addition of '.it',? scat to the Stone Town area of Zanzibar Town, which recommendation was accepted and implemented.

34. Several important changes, extending the franchise, were introduced before the general election in January 1961. The most important of these were the extension of the franchise to women and a reduction of the age limit from 25 years to 21 years. These innovations had the effect of considerably increasing the number of persons entitled to registration on the voters roll. In July, 1957, the number of registered electors was 39,833, and in January 1961,94,310.

35. The general election duly took place in January, 1961, with the result tha t the fortunes of ,the"·Z~ln7.ibar Nnt lona list Parry ch.i tlgl'd 1(),lhl' c x+c nt

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that lit won nine of the twenty-two seats, The Afro-Shirazi Party won ten seats and the remaining three seats went to the Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party.

36. The total votes cast was 84,962, out of a registered electorate 'of 94,310, divided as follows:

Afro-Shirazi Parity

Zanzibar Nationalist Party Zanzibar and Pemba Peoples' Party

Rejected

per cent. 40·2 35·8 17·0

7·0

37. Negotiations then took place between the two major parties and the ,three Zanzibar and Pemba Peoples' Party representatives, the evidence of which was given in camera, but it is permissible to say rhat after hard and prolonged bargaining two members of the Zanzibar and Pemba Peoples' Party undertook to support tlhe Zanzibar Nationalist Party and one undertook to support the Afro-Shirazi Parity.

38. The British Resident invited the leader of the Afro-Shirazi Party to form a government if he could command a majority of the elected members, and when it was apparent that he was unable to do so, a similar invitation wasextended to the leader of the Zanzibar Nationalist Party, with a like result.

39. T'his produced a position of stalemate, each of the major parties had the support ofeleven elected members, and neither side was able to form a Government.

40. Agreement was eventually reached between Ithe parties to form a coalition to act as a caretaker Government with Ithe Civil Secretary as Chid Minister, on the understanding that a further election would be held as early as possible.

41. There can be no, doubt that the success of the Zanzibar Nationalist Patty in the January, 1961, general election came as a considerable shock to the leaders of the Afro-Shirazi Patty and its supporters. This led to a genuinely held belief that there had been double voting, personation, and other election offences. lit was f.elt that this must be so otherwise the Zanzibar Nationalist 'Party could not possibly have increased its representation from nil ito nine elected members.

Being convinced of this they determined to watch the situation very carefully in the forthcoming June el ecti on , and make it their business to ensure that no" cheating" rt:ook place.

42. The procedure ito be followed at elections for members of the Legislative Council is Iaid down in the Legislative Council (Elections) Decree, and handbooks were published by the Supervisor of Elections. containing detailed instructions for Presiding Officers, Returning Officers. and candidates.

The procedur.e actually followed was explained in detail in the evidence of Mr. W. M. Hamilton who was Itlhe Returning Officer for the constituency of Raha Leo in both the January and June elections, and we are completely satisfied that every precaution was taken Ito prevent election offences.

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Having considered all 'of the evidence on this point with care we are in no doubt thaJt, if any personation and double voting did take place, in either election, the cases must have been So few as 10 make il q u it c unlikely that ithey affected any of the results.

We conclude that the belief of members of the Afro-Shirazi Party, already referred to, although honestly held, was due to disappointment and a failure to appreciate the effectiveness of the many precautions taken to prevent double voting and kindred offences.

43. In :tlhis connection we also think it relevant to observe that although a number of alleged election offences were carefully investigated by the police, no convictions were obtained because in no dnstance was a prima facie case made out.

44. An Election Petition was filed in respect of the election for the Chake Ohake constituency of Pemba, after the January, 1961, election, but was afterwards withdrawn, and no such petition has yet been filed in respect of the. June elections.

45. As a means of reducing the' posslbillty of the deadlock that occurred in January. the number of elected seats was increased to 23 by the division of ,the original two Southern Pemba constituencies of Kengeja and Mkoani into three. namely. Kengeja, Mkoani and Mtambile.

46. The election /took place on Ist June, 1961, and resulted in the winning by each of the major parties of ten seats and of three seats by the Zanzibar and Pemba Peoples' Party. which enabled the Zanzibar Nationalist Party, in coalition witJh the Zanzibar and Pemba Peoples' Party, to form a Government.

47. Voting was high, by any standards, despite the disturbances which occurred on polling day and which are described elsewhere in thiS." report, Of the 94,218 registered voters, 90,595 recorded their votes, representing a .poll of 96·15 per cent.

48. The voting was as follows :

Per cent.

For the Afro-Shirazi Party... 49'9

For the Zanzibar Nationalist Party 35'0

For the Zanzibar and Pemba Peoples' Party 13'7

Rejected 1'4

49. In considering the above, we think it is relevant to examine the position of the major parties in relation to the January, 1961, election.

50. If the recommendation of the Constitutional Commissioner, regarding the number of elected members had been accepted, it would have allowed three constituencies for Ngambo, one for Stone Town, eight for Zanzibar rural, and nine for Pemba. The Government of Zanzibar however decided, with the approval of the Secretary of State, that the Stone Town constituency should be divided into two single-member constituencies. On the basis of one member for 15,000 units of population, Stone Town with its population of over 18,000, would have been a large single-member constituency, larger in fact than any other constituency. In the circumstances we think the provision of two seats for Stone Town was justified.

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It is however possible to argue that without the addition of this extra seat, the Zanzibar Nationalist Party would have secured only a total of eight seats, and that accordingly the Afro-Shirazi Party would have been able to form a Government. But it is idle at this stage to speculate on these possibilities because at no time could an accurate prediction have been made regarding the question as to which side the successful candidates of the minority party (Zanzibar and Pemba Peoples' Party) would decide to give their allegiance.

5!. The increase in representation gained by the Zanzibar Nationalist Party in the June election was attributable to their winning the Pemba seat of Chake Chake which they lost by the narrow margin of one vote in the January election, and to their winning the new Mtambile constituency in Pemba which did not exist in the January election.

52. We think we should refer to an allegation made by the Zanzibar Nationalist Party in a letter addressed to the Secretary of State, dated June, 1961, which reads as follows:

"In this connection also, your attention must be drawn to remarks made earlier in this communication in connection with the manner in which ZNPjZPPP voters were forcibly prevented by Afro-Shirazi thugs from casting their votes. In our estimate of the situation, at least 3,000 of our members were for one reason or another prevented to vote and had they done so our figures would have been very considerably higher, and the final results would have been en tirely different."

This communication was no doubt written before feelings over the emergency had calmed down, but we think it as well to record thet an examination of the results in the constituencies where interference with electors has been complained of shows conclusively that any such interference did not in fact affect the final results.

53. In January, 1961, the candidates of the Zanzibar Nationalist Party won Stone Town North and Stone Town South with substantial majorities, and that Party's candidates won the same seats in the June elections, again with substantial majorities, and although the majority of the Zanzibar Nationalist Party candidate in the Darajani constituency was less in the June election than it was in the January election, their candidate again won that seat.

The Afro-Shirazi Party candidates won the Raha Leo and Jangombe constituencies for their party in January, 1961. and the results were substantially the same in the June election. Having regard to the size of the majority gained by the Afro-Shirazi Party candidates over their Zanzibar Nationalist Party opponents in these two constituencies, in both elections, it seems perfectly clear that the unsuccessful Party stood no chance of success in either of them.

Bearing these facts in mind i,t seems to us very wide of the mark for the Zanzibar Nationalist Party to suggest that" the final results wouJdhave been entirely different ", had it not been for the interference complained of.

54. During the course of the Inquiry we heard a good deal about visits by supporters of both the major political parties to Communist countries,

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Russia and China, but we do not think that any of the political parties in Zanzibar, as distinct from some individual members of such parties, are inspired by the ideology emanating from those countries, nor do we believe that Communism played any part in the disturbances.

PART III

The Disturbances of June, 1961

1st June

55. In the early hours of Thursday the Ist June, 1961, it could have seemed to all those concerned with the orderly conduct of the Election that the barometer was set fair for a reasonably tranquil polling day. No more than a repetition of the sporadic scuffles such as had happened at the: election of the 17th of January, 1961, was expected. Unhappily, the occurrences of the 1st June were very different.

56. As early as 7.45 a.m. trouble at Gulioni (Raha Leo constituency) was reported to the police. A member of the Nationalist Party was being held by Africans because, they alleged, he was not entitled to vote there. By 8.14 a.m. a disorderly crowd had gathered outside the polling station and extra constables bad to be sent. They were reinforced by a party of twenty-five other constables at 8.43 a.m. Within a very short time reports were received of disorders at the Civic Centre Polling Station at Raha Leo, at Kiswandui School in the Darajani constituency, and the Trade School and Holmwood School Polling Stations at Jangombe. In each of these cases the cause of the disorder was similar, namely, the seizure, assault, and removal from the voting queue of individual members of the Zanzibar Nationalist Party, by supporters of the Afro-Shirazi Party.

This behaviour derived from a suspicion, firmly held by members of the Afro-Shirazi Party, that the Zanzibar Nationalist Party had prepared a campaign of "vote stealing ", involving personation and double-voting.

51. Rumour circulated early that Arabs were being assaulted by Africans and it was stated in evidence that about 10 a.m. a party 'of Arabs armed with sticks was heading towards Darajan:i, and that a truck full of Manga Arabs, armed with sticks, had been stopped in Hollis Road. Meanwhile at Darajani it had become necessary for the police to resort to tear-smoke to disperse an unruly crowd, composed mainly of Afro-Shirazi Party supporters, from the precincts of the polling station.

58. The appearance 'Of motor cars containing members of the militant Youths' Own Union (the youth section of the Zanzibar Nationalist Party) in the vicinity 'Of the trouble spots heightened suspicion among AfroShirazi supporters even though. in some instances, they were merely bringing old and sick people It!o vote.

59. About 11 a.m. certain steps were taken by the Zanzibar Nationalist Party which, in 'Our view, had a p~'Ofound effect on the general situation.

The Party decided to withdraw from the election all Raha Leo and Jangombe, on the grounds that their supporters were being intimidated and prevented from voting. They accordingly instructed their supporters

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to rally to the Natlonalist Party Headquartersat Darajani with the object. so it was said. of giving moral support to their members wishing to vote

at the nearby Darajani Polling Stations. '

In this connection it lis relevant ,to observe that the Nationalist Party could not have entertained the smallest hope 'Of securing political victories in the Afro-Shirazi strongholds at Raha Leo and Jangombe, On the other hand they considered iit imperative that the Darajani seat, which they had won at the Ianuaryelection by a small majority, should not be lost to

them. I·

60. With the assembling of the crowd 'Of Nationalist Party supporters at their Party headquarters. some armed with sticks and some with knives or swords, the situation worsened.

The 'evidence shows 'that when these Nationalist Party members appeared on the scene, armed in this way, the Afro-Shirazis present rushed to piles of firewood which were unfortunately lying near rut, hand On the adjoining .' market) and armed themselves with these sticks (many of which could more properly be described as cudgels), and also gathered up stones from the piles 'Of coral which were lying nearby.

61. Stoning from both sides developed and the policetook up a position between them in anendeavour Ito restore order. At this time the number of police at the disposal of the Superintendent directing oporations at Darajani was fifty. At 12.34 p.m. the Superintendent considered the situation so serious that he decided to read the Riot Act, and the police eventually succeeded in dispersing the opposing crowds which numbered many hundreds.

The crowds moved away in the direction of Mtemdeni, Msufini and Mwembeladu, and there is evidence that at this time Afro-Shirazis were assaulted by Nationalist Party supporters from shops and offices, dragged 'Off their bicycles and beaten up, in some cases with swords.

Africans being attacked in this manner were heard to be saying "the Arabs are killing us". and it seems clear that this developed into a widespread rumour that Arabs were killing Africans, and was responsible for much of the subsequent violence.

62. During the early afternoon of the 1st June there were further disorders within the limits of Zanzibar T-own in which a number of persons were injured. There was also an incident at a polling station outside the town. Fighting was reported at Makonda 'and there was trouble at Kitwajuni where Afro-Shirazi supporters attempted to "an-est" the Presiding Officer because they thought he was destroying ballot papers (this, however, was quickly adjusted by the police).

63. By the evening, Iooting ot Arab houses and shops and rioting had become widespread in the areas surrounding the Ngambo police station ..

The extent to which this looting was directly attributable 11:'0 the criminal' . and .hoodigan velements of the distnict is impossible DO asses'S. We are, however. satisfied that here as elsewhere in the Island, the criminal and hooligan elements took full advantage of the situation, and we think it

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reasonable to oonclude that they were responsible for much of the looting, wounding and murder that took place. Some two to three hundred habitual criminals were housed in Ngambo.

64. The day resulted in the death from violence of one African, eight Arabs and 'One 'Other, a Comorian. Sixty-three Africans and seventy-nine Arabs were treated at hospital as oat-patients, and fifteen Africans and fifteen Arabs were admitted, seriously injured.

65. A curfew was imposed in the urban area from 7 p.m. on the Ist June to 6 a.m. 'On the following day. This, ooupled with the deployment of a General Service Company of police, approximately 'One hundred and twenty strong, which had arrived from Kenya at 6.15 p.m., had the desired effect and the night passed quietly.

During the late evening ,ilt was decided to ask for a second General Service Company IQf police from Kenya, which arrived in Zanzibar at 9.30 a.m. on Friday, the 2nd June.

2nd June

66. There is evidence that on the 2nd June a gang was operating in the Ndagaa area early in the morning, but the first information of serious trouble in the rural areas came in at about 4 p.m. It was reported that there were riots and looting by gangs in the Kitope Ndani area, and that three Arabs had been killed.

61. These gangs were reported to be composed of Africans of many tribes from the squatter labour on the surrounding farms. A total of seven incidents occurred during the day involving nine murders. Thirtyseven Africans and twenty-five Arabs were treated at hospital as outpatients and nine Africans and seventeen Arabs admitted seriously injured.

68. The night curfew in Zanzibar Town was continued. It was not extended beyond the Township area because it was considered that it could not then be enforced.

During the day arrangements were made for some three hundred Arabs living in the predominantly African or Afro-Shirazi areas to move out of Ngambo into Stone Town. Police escorts were provided.

69. The situation created by the extension of disorder to the rural areas was such that the British Resident arranged with the Chief of Staff, Nairobi, for the despatch of a Company of the King's African Rifles to arrive in Zanzibar first thing on Saturday morning, the 3rd of June.

3rd June

70. A Company of the 5th King's African Rifles duly arrived by air at 7,30 a.m. on the 3rd June. After a reconnaissance of the town area of Ngambo, the Officer Commanding asked for a second Company of King's African Rifles to be sent. In response to this request the second Company of the 5th King's African Rifles reached Zanzibar at 12.30 p.m.

71. Saturday, the 3rd June, was undoubtedly .the worst day of the emergency. Thirty-two persons were killed. Early in the day there was a report that Arabs were chasing Africans in the centre of Ngambo.

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72. In Stone Town at 10 a.m. members of the Youth's Own .Union were going round armed, and with red bands on their arms. Instructions were given that anyone wearing any form of political uniform was to be arrested.

73. Reports were received that gangs, described in evidence asoonsisting mainly of indigenous Africans, were operating in the areas of Chwaka and Bambi, attacking and looting Arab shops and assaulting the occupants.

The temper of these gangs was described as being completely hysterical, one witness expressed the opinion that by then they had become "blood mad ". Killings and lootings occurred at four different places.

While this was going on in the rural areas, there were a number of murders committed in the area of Zanzibar township.

74. It was on this day, 3rd June, that it was decided to impose a curfew in the Ngambo area from 2 p.m. to 7 p.m. The night curfew rin thewhole of the Township area was continued. I

75. During the 3rd June disquieting reports of some degree of tension in Pemba were received, and although the situation there was in no way comparable with that in Zanzibar Island, out of an abundance of caution it was decided to call for a Company of the 6th King's African Rifles to be sent to Pemba. This Company of the King's African Rifles reached Pemba late on the afternoon of the 4th June. Whether or not due to the presence of this Force, the situation in Pemba settled down, and thereafter there was no further cause for anxiety. It was in fact found possible to withdraw these troops from Pemba within a few days.

4th June

76. On the morning of the 4th June all was quiet in the town of Zanzibar. But looting of premises of evacuated persons at Ngambo occurred in the forenoon. At Mwembeladu a Superintendent of Police had to open fire on a group of looting Africans. Two were injured and taken to hospital. Also, before midday, houses of members of the Nationalist Party were broken into at Kizimkazi, in the south of the Island, and fighting was reported at Mwembetanga, nearer the Township of Zanzibar.

During the day nine Arabs were killed. Sixteen Africans and six Arabs . were treated at hospital as out-patients, and two Africans and five Arabs were admitted seriously injured.

77. As a result of a oonference held with the General Officer Commanding, East Africa Command, and the Commissioner of Police, Kenya, who had come to Zanzibar on the 4th June for the purpose, it was decided that if the whole of the rural area of Zanzibar was to be brought under control, more troops would be required. Pursuant to this decision:-

(a) a further Company of the 6th King's African Rifles was brought to Zanzibar, half arriving at 4 p.m. on the 4th June. and the other half at 8 a.m. on the morning of the 5th June; and

(b) another Oompany of the 5th King's African Rifles arrived from Kenya on the morning of the 5th June.

11

78. With the arrival of these further units it was considered that there were then sufficient troops in Zanzibar Island to regain control of the situation in the rural areas.

5th June

79. On the 5th June a band of armed Makonde, a somewhat primitive tribe of mainland Africans, originating from Portuguese East Africa and Tanganyika, was reported to be causing damage in the area of Tonguu. At Kazole a crowd of between 30 and 50 Africans (Makondc) armed with spears, pangas, knobkerries and various other instruments, was encountered by the Commissioner of Police. They were breaking into a shop. After shots had been fired by the Commissioner the crowd dispersed. Some were subsequently taken prisoner by a patrol of the 5th King's African Rifles. Murders were also committed in this area.

The number of killed and injured on the 5th June, throughout the Island. was given as one African and five Arabs killed, eleven Africans and five Arabs treated at hospital as out-patients, and two Africans and one Arab admitted. seriously injured.

6th June

80. By the 6th June the full benefit of the additions to the Security Forces began to be felt. They had by then been deployed in the rural areas of Zanzibar, and, for all practical purposes, the situation was under complete control, although a further number of isolated incidents occurred between the 6th and 8th June.

81. The following are the casualties between the 1st and 8th June:

Deaths ,.,

Casualties treated at hospital as out-patients Seriously injured and admitted to hospital, ..

Africans 3 144

39

Arabs 64 137 51

Others 1

9

1

82. By the 23rd June the total number of persons arrested in connection with the emergency had amounted to 1,272 Africans, 87 Arabs and 40 others, but some three to four hundred of these were later released, without any charges being preferred. It would seem that these releases can be accounted for by the fact that:

(i) a number of arrests were made by troops who were unaccustomed to police action and procedure; and

(ii) the two Kenya General Service Police units had returned to their own territory, and it was not considered practicable, or that the cases were serious enough. to press the charges.

When we first commenced our Inquiry there had been:

Convictions 28

27

78

50

Nature of charge Looting.

- Riot and Allied Offences.

Carrying offensive weapons. Curfew offences.

12

83. Anyone reading the figures -of .the number of persons who unfortunately lost their lives during the tragic events of June will, no doubt, be struck by the large number of Arabs killed as against Africans. But in considering these figures we think it important to draw attention to the fact that the evidence shows that most, if not all, of the Arabs who lost their lives in the rural areas of Zanzibar were Manga Arabs.

84. Manga Arabs have inherited the reputation gained by their race in events of which the riot in Zanzibar in the year 1936 is not the only instance, and have consequently come to be regarded (as was put to us quite objectively on several occasions) as the" bogymen" of Zanzibar.

In the main they are small traders, living in fairly densely populated squatter areas.

These circumstances tended, we think, to focus particular attention upon them when hysteria replaced reason. Moreover, the extent to which the element of, what may have been regarded as an opportunity for, "paying off old scores", should not be underestimated.

Bearing this in mind we conclude that the number of Manga Arabswho lost their lives should not be interpreted as necessarily indicating the extent of racial antagonism between" Africans" and" Arabs ".

85. We are perfectly satisfied that the disturbances were in no sense the result of any premeditated plot by any person, group of persons, or political party. An allegation that it was the result of a premeditated plot on the part of the Afro-Shirazi Party has repeatedly been made by the Zanzibar Nationalist Party, and we are satisfied beyond any doubt that the accusation is completely without foundation.

86. In concluding this part of our report we think it right to record that, after the disturbances had broken out on 1st June, and crowds had gathered. the leaders of the two major political parties, in response to a request made to them by the authorities, used their best endeavours to persuade their supporters to remain calm and disperse. We were told in evidence that Sheikh Abeid Karume was so active in his efforts that "he came in danger of his life."

PART IV

Factors Contributing to Tension

87. As we have already said. up to the year 1957 Zanzibar could fairly be described as a country with a multi-racial society whose people lived under the rule of His Highness, the Sultan, in harmony and peace. It is true that a social revolution had already commenced to take place, but no marked change in the atmosphere occurred until after the General Election in July, 1957. The fact that that election resulted in a resounding defeat of the Zanzibar Nationalist Party, with the resultant disappointment to its supporters', no doubt contributed to the rise in the political temperature which from then onwards began to gain momentum.

1.3

88. The report of the Provincial Administration for the year 1958 records that the year was notable for the extent to which politics in~~ted almost every_e of life in Zanzibar. It is there recorded that" traders, cultivators, labourers, fishermen, even housewives, were affected. Villagers in the rural areas argued among themselves. Funerals and religious ceremonies were

. boycotted by rival political parties! Women even pawned their clothing in order to raise the bus fare to political meetings. Such was the immediate result of the first common roll elections for these formerly peaceful islands."

89. Previously there had, from time to time, been disputes between landlords and their squatters, but these had been the ordinary type of dispute one would normally expect to occur under any squatter system.

90. It was in the year 1958 that an entirely new element of discord arose.

On the evidence before. US we think there can be no doubt that there were cases of Arab landlords.isupporters iof the Zanzibar Nationalist Party, bringing pressure to bear on 'their . squatters to support the political party theYi~flf6ured, and we are satisfied that there were cases of squatters being turned off their land, without compensation, because they declined to fall in with their landlords' wishes.

There were many other reasons for discord between landlords and their squatters at this time, triggered off, it would seem, by a speech made in or about March, 1958, claiming that the land did not belong to the landlords, that they only owned the trees. This also led to the eviction of a number of squatters, without compensation.

91. ~May, 1958, the position became so serious that the povernmcnl issued a communique setting out the legal position of squatters in relation to their landlords, numerous meetings in the rural areas were organised at which the position was explained, and arrangements for the assessment of compensation for evicted squatters were made.

The Afro-Shirazi Party organised a resettlement scheme with the object of helping someof its evicted supporters.

92. By the year 1960 the efforts to restore the good relations between landlords and squatters which had existed prior to 1958 had: achieved a substantial degree of success, but we think there can be no doubt that the disputes left a sense of grievance behind among the squatters.

93. Another incident which we are of the opinion had a political aspect was the Zanzibar dock dispute' which occurred in September, 1958. There was a conflict in the evidence given before us regarding the real nature of this dispute, but we are satisfied that there was an attempt to replace established Afro-Shirazi labour by labour favoured by the Zanzibar Nationalist Party, and we think it reasonable to conclude that this also left a sense of grievance.

94. T~ boycotting of shops -and of buses owned by persons who were, or who were thought to be, members of the opposite Party, already referred to, in our view also played a part in exacerba ting feelings'.

14

95. The use by the Zanzibar Nationalist Party of the National Flag at its meetings, and the fact that the band formed by its youth movement frequently arranged to be present at functions attended by His Highness the Sultan was, we think, intended to create the impression that it alone was the loyal party, and we have no doubt this added its quota to creating bitterness and tension.

In his evidence before us, Mr. M. V. Smithyman, O.B.E., expressed the view, which we accept, that the emotional support of Africans. particularly those in the rural areas, for His Highness the Sultan, is probably a stronger influence in Zanzibar than the appeal of" Africa for the Africans ", which is comparatively recent in origin. That this is so is, we think, underlined by the fact that some 70 per cent. of the votes cast in the June election for the Zanzibar Nationalist Party must have been African. The concept of loyalty to His Highness the Sultan is of long standing. and we feel that it is reasonable to suppose that the exploitation by the Zanzibar Nationalist Party of the idea that it was the loyal party did attract many African votes.

96. Evidence was given that shortly after the January election, when both the major parties were jockeying to obtain the support of the Zanzibar and Pemba Peoples' Party's elected representatives, meetings between prominent members' of the Zanzibar Nationalist Party and of the Zanzibar and Pemba Peoples' Party, took place in the house of Seyyid bin Hamoud bin Feisal, a son-in-law of His Highness the Sultan. This was greatly resented by supporters of the Afro-Shirazi Party. We are of the opinion that the locus chosen for these meetings was unfortunate, and did nothing to help in the lessening of tension.

97. Bitter disappointment on the part of the Afro-Shirazi Party at the success of its main opponent, the Zanzibar Nationalist Party, in the January elections, its inability to· command a majority of the elected members in the Legislative Council to enable it to form a Government, and the general feeling by its leaders and supporters that they had been cheated, had the effect of further adding fuel to the fire.

98. In his closing address to us, Mr. Fraser Murray submitted that the disturbances of June were" overwhelmingly racial in oharacter". but in our view the evidence establishes that what has been described as the" wind of change", and the impact of party politics played a substantial part.

99. We have given examples of factors which we conclude played some part in worsening the relations between the political parties and their supporters, Ibut. in our view the major cause of the rise in tension to a point that only required a spark, such as the events which occurred on the 1st June, to cause an explosion, was the "bombardment of words", both written and spoken. which the people of Zanzibar were subjected to, more or less continuously,

after the first General Election in July, 1957. .

100. In Zanzibar, with its population of approximately 300,000, there are no less than twenty-three newspapers in circulation. Two published under the aegis of the Government of Zanzibar, three described in evidence as being neutral, and the balance supporting one or other Otf the political parties. Examples of what might be described as the Party Press were tendered in

15

evidence, and although the violent language indulged in might not, in some countries, have had anyrealeffect, in the circumstances of Zanzibar we think it played a not inconsiderable part in fanning the flame.

101. In their evidence before us, Sheikh Ali Muhsin, leader of the Zanzibar Nationalist Party, ·and Sheikh Abeid Amani Karume, leader of the Afro-Shirazi Party, denied that anything was said or done at meetings of their respective Parties which could reasonably have added to the general atmospher-e of tension. Each placed all the blame for the general state of unrest on the other side, but we are unable to accept this version of the position.

In our view, the evidence conclusively shows that the Afro-Shirazi Party made its appeal to the electorate on a racial basis, and that the Zanzibar Nationalist Party introduced religion into the controversy, and whilst there is no evidence that the leader of either of the major political parties indulged in inflammable and violent language, there can be no doubt that other speakers at meetings of both political parties did so.

102. Again, much of what was said might well have had little or no effect in a country long accustomed to political aotivity, but in Zanzibar, where the degree of illiteracy is considerable, and whose first election on a common :w11 took place as recently as the year 1957, the" spoken word is Iiable to have an authority that can be dangerously used ".

103. Sheikh Ali Muhsin stress-ed the fact that he had repeatedly urged the Government of Zanzibar to make it an election offence to campaign on racial grounds, and he blamed the Government for having failed to do so. Counsel for the Zanzibar Nationalist Party also attached great importance to the point in his closing address to us.

The Government's reasons for declining to enact such legislation are explained by the British Resident in his despatch to the Secretary of State, dated IOth August, 1960, a copy of which is contained in Sessional Paper No. 14 of 1960. The relevant passages read as follows:-

"I consider that the suggestion that racial, tribal or communal groupings should be proscribed from contesting the elections is one that should not be adopted. The major communal groupings are the Arab Association. the Indian National Association. the Moslem Association and the Comorian. Shirazi and African Associations. As far as I know all but the Indian National Association and the Moslem Association now look to one of the 'existing political parties 'Lo protect their political interests. I do not consider there is any need to proscribe any of these Associations from contesting the elections, nor, I think. do the originators of the suggestion. The object of the proposal can only be directed against the Afro-Shirazi Party on the grounds that its name makes it a racial group. The Afro-Shirazi Party. however. as in the case of the other two parties, has a constitution which allows persons of any race to be members of the party. In my opinion, the acceptance of this suggestion would be a concession to the local party political struggle arid would intensify present racial animosities.

I hold similar views on the suggestion that campaigning on communal grounds should be an' electioneering offence. This does not

16

mean that I condone racialism in politics. But I am advised that if adequate evidence is produced there ought to be no difficulty insecuring convictions for inflammatory and abusive language ar political meetings. Most public meetings are now being .tape-recorded bY.tpe Police as well as being reported on by the Police and Provincial Administration. and I hope this methocl."wjJl be effective in che4kmg

undesirable speeches." ",

104. Having considered the matter with anxious care. we conclude that the Government's reasons for declining to adopt the suggestion would be

supported by any impartial observer. .

It seems to us that the Afro-Shirazi Party could. with equal justice. have asked that campaigning on religious grounds. Which •. as we have already said. was indulged in by some of the Zanzibar Nationalist Party's speakers, should be made an election offence.

The limitation of free speech is a slippery slope, and abuses of it should. in our opinion, be dealt with in the manner stated by the British Resident in the passage of the Sessional Paper quoted.

105. It is to be hoped that the leaders of the political parties in Zanzibar have by now realised the danger of countenancing the use of inflammatory and immoderate language at p.olitical meetings of their Parties.'

106. We suggest that what is required isa voluntary and determined effort on the part of the responsible leaders of all the political parties to ensure that the speakers at their party political meetings do not indulge in speeches or acts tending to arouse the type .of bitterness. which contributed so much to the tragic events of June, 1961.

107. We .have already referred to the Youths' Own Union (the youth branch of the Zanzibar Nationalist Party) and the Afro-Shirazi Youth League (the youth branch of the Afro-Shirazi Party).

Youth movements, in themselves, can undoubtedly play a valuable part in promoting political and social consciousness, but on the evidence we feel justified in expressing the view that up to date these two movements have been used for other and less commendable purposes, and it seems to us that the leaders of the political parties cannot escape responsibility for this.

108. There are other matters which no doubt caused irritation, .. such as the difference of opinion on immigration policy, but we have 1im~ted our observations to those matters which we think had a more direct impact on the events of June.

17

.J

PART V

L!'fhe Police Foree, Security, and matters relevant thereto

"';i)P9. ,9n 1st June. 1961. the establishment of the Police Force, including ,.ijisjHighness'S Band. was:-

I ,,'" 1 Commissioner

1 Deputy Commissioner 2 Senior Superintendents

,:.14 Superintendents. Deputy Superintendents and Assistant Superin" tendents

11 Inspectors

23 Assistant Inspectors (including one woman Assistant Inspector)

3 Sergeants-Major 13 Station Heads 36 Sergeants

75 Corporals

427 Constables 40 Recruits

I

646

---

1 Bandmaster ':3S13andsmen 18 Buglers

S4

110. This establishment is a slight increase on the establishment of 1958 when the present Commissioner of Police assumed command. In evidence, the Commissioner informed us that the 1958 establishment was not, in his opinion. fully adequate for the maintenance of law and. order in normal circumstances; that the small increases sanctioned for 1959 were however the best that could, be provided in the financial position obtaining in' Zanzibar. and that he was informed' by the Financial Secretary that the financial position .was such ,that no further increases could be sanctioned for the time being. In these circumstances the Commissioner otiPolice did not consider that any useful purpose would be served by attempting to obtain any further increase in the establishment in the Budgets for 1960 and. 1961.

'111. As part of the security arrangements before the 1st June. 1961, there was a long-standing agreement under which reinforcements could be made available to Zanzibar from the mainland Governments in the event , of: trouble.

In April, 1961, an estimate was made in Zanzibar of the assistance from Kenya that might be required to meet an emergency during the forthcoming election on the 1st June. It was placed at one Company of the Police General Service Unit. one Company of the King's African Rifles, 'plus' a second Company of the King's African Rifles if required.

-This estimate was subsequently confirmed and it was agreed that the General Service Police Unit should stand by at four hours' notice from 6 a.m. on the 1st June. '

18

112. On the subject of, securityv-the Civil Secretary informed usthat, in April. soon after his return from vacation leave, he decided in hls then capacity as Chief Minister in the Caretaker Government, to callameeting of Ministers to discuss a number of matters including, security a~dthe coming election. The meeting was held on the 4th May. At thai date it was reported that there was no indication that trouble need be expected on polling day. Sheikh Ali Muhsirrcomplained then of the dispositipnof the police at the January election, saying that too' many wer," k~pt in reserve, that there were too few at polling stations and that"when ',they were asked to take action they did nothing or took unnecessary' action. These complaints were duly communicated to the Commissioner of Poitce

for his consideration. '

113. About the middle of May a request was made' by the. various political parties for an assurance from Government that measures would be taken to ensure that adequate security arrangements were made ;;for election day. A meeting was held on the 19th -May, under the, i dili~f Minister's chairmanship. at which representatives of all the political p~rti~s. the Commissioner of Police and other Government officers, were present' Agreement was reached, inter alia, on points which should be dJ.:iyenl home to the people of Zanzibar, the political leaders agreeing to cooperate-In bringing them to the notice of the electorate. Summarised, these points were as follows:-

"(1) People should be persuaded to queue quietly and in an orderly manner.

(2) People should be specially asked not to take the law into their own hands but to leave matters to the election officials and the police. (3) As soon as people have voted they should go home or go back to work.

(4) They should be reminded that it is an' offence t()'C()ngregat~ within 100 yards of a polling station.

(5) Political parties should recognise that they are not responsible

for organising queues or for organising the voting.

(6) People should not order others about in the queue.

(7) People who are not voters should not go to the polling stations. (8) Children should be ordered not to go near polling stations on

polling day. "

(9) No patrols may be arranged by any political party or. by, other

people. ' "... i." ",'" ,

(10) People should not believe rumours but should listentlo 'the broadcasts."

A maximum publicity effort was made to bring these points ·toT;the notice of the public. and in broadcasts' made during th6."wee~egihtiing' .the 25th May, the Ministers of all political parties made helpful ~pee~li!s emphasizing them, and the need for good manners and orderly oohdu~t\ '

-: -', .1 .. ' :'"',~;.

114. Arrangements were made during May to keep open ,the~telep~on~

link with the mainland for twenty-four hours a day with effect"ftom $,,<~@..i on the 31st May, and for the broadcasting station to remain.,open;tor

twenty-four hours from 6 a.m. on Election Day. ' 1.,', '

19

1,15. During the latter half of May the political situation and security arrangements for polling day were under constant study by the Security S:opmittee which was composed of the Civil Secretary (Chairman), the A~prneYrGeneral. the Commissioner of Police. the officer in the Civil

Secretary's office in charge of security papers and the Senior District Commissioner. Certain security aspects were also kept under consideration bythe Election Committee, a Committee composed of senior officials experienced in the preparation of election arrangements in Zanzibar. The meetings of this Committee were attended by leaders of the political parties who were able to discuss any particular difficulties as well as matters affecting security.

··116. The essential points of the conclusions reached by the Security Committee and the Election Committee were the same, namely, that there were no indications that trouble need be expected on election day, the

·.lst June. though a repetition of the minor incidents which occurred during the election on 17th January was possible; that if serious trouble did arise it would not occur until after the announcement of the result of the election had been made public.

We were Informed that whenever the likelihood of trouble occurring on election day, Ist June, was discussed at Election Committee meetings, the representatives of the political Parties present would invariably say "We Zanzibaris are peaceful people, there won't be any trouble."

117. In his evidence, the Civil Secretary informed us that he telephoned to the East Africa Command Headquarters and the Ministry of Defence, in Nairobi. on the 30th May, to establish liaison with them and to confirm the detailed arrangements of the procedure which was to be followed if it became necessary to call for reinforcements of troops and police. He undertook to give a twenty-four hour situation report to the General Officer Commanding and also to the Ministry of Defence. At 2.30 p.m. on the 30th May he reported that the situation was calm and was expected to remain so for the next twenty-four hours. He telephoned again on the 31st May and gave an identical assessment.

The Civil Secretary also said that up to the morning of .the l st June, the situation had been calm and that there seemed to be no particular reason why any of the political parties should have wanted the elections to be disturbed, both of the major parties being confident of success; that the. emergency developed without any previous warning. He added that it had not been forecast, and that there appeared to be no reason why it should have broken out or taken the course it did.

-. 118. In considering the question whether the assessment of the security . position made by the Authorities was reasonable and justified it seems to

- us important to bear in mind, not only the intelligence information they had received, and the general consensus of opinion already referred to. but the fact that the two previous elections had passed off peacefully. the July. 1957, one entirely so, and the one in January, 1961, with only minor incidents. We were repeatedly told that it was considered that the tension had been greater before the January, 1961, election than it was in May, 1961.

". Unfortunately. in the event, the considered opinion of all concerned proved to be wrong.

20

....

119. It is. of course. easy to judge a matter of this kind in the light of what has been called" hindsight", but after most careful and anxious consideration we have reached the conclusion that, in the circumstances. the assessment of the security situation. made by those responsible. was reasonable and justified. In reaching this conclusion we have not .Iost to sight the submissions, in a contrary sense, made by Mr. Fraser Murray in his closing address to us.

120. It was against the background of the assessment of the security position that the Commissioner of Police made his police dispositions for polling day.' !hey were generally as follows:,;::;::::-:' .....

(1) In Zanzibar there were 69 NCOs and constables at the .police stations and on patrol duty. There were 30 engaged on transport duties, 30 employed as static guards at" His Highness's Palace;'the Residency and elsewhere, and 86 at polling stations in the town and rural areas. There was a reserve party of 100 men standing by 'at the police barracks at Ziwani. In addition, 48 nien wereeilgaged in C.LD. and Special Branch duties. and 40 recruits were also available.

(2) In Pemba there were 33 NCOs and constables at the police stations and on patrol duty. 4 on transport duty. 79 at the polling stations. and 50 in reserve at Chake Chake. A further 8 were engaged

in C.I.D. and Special Branch duties. '

These dispositions of police in Zanzibar and Pemba allowed for a small increase of constables at certain polling stations in Zanzibar Town beyond the number so engaged during the election of 17th January. 1961. At Darajani School the number in June was three, an increase 'Of one; at Kiswandui it was two'. as against 'One in January .at Kikwajuni it was also

. two as against one in January. At Gulioni School and at Raha Leo the number in June was four as against two in January. and at the' King George VI School. three instead 'Of two.

121. The June dispositions also provided for two mobile police stations, which were not used on polling day, the 17th January. They were described asomni-coaches fitted with radio, each with a team of one inspector and four constables. Initially. one was placed between Gulioni and the King George VI schools, and the other in the vicinity of Kiswandui, near jthe Fire Station.

122. A constable of the Zanzibar Police was also added to the Special Constable patrols. There were in fact three such patrols in the town' and three in the rural areas. At headquarters. Special Constables. male and female, were engaged on communication duties. Finally. thenl.lihber of other regular police patrols under the command of a senior 'Officer were more in June than in January.

123. The dispositions of the Police on Ist June were severely criticised, by Sheikh Ali Muhsin in his evidence, and by Counsel for the Zanzibar Nationalist Party in his closing address. The criticism was particularly directed to the number of Police provided at polling stations in Zanzibar, Town. ' " ,

In considering whether this cricicism is justified it is necessary to consider. firstly the number 'Of police available, secondly the number'S'£. tasks

21

I I

.1·' ,'c.

the'iforc6was required to perform. and thirdly, the purpose for which

constables were provided at polling stations.

). 1,'pe ~!lmber of polling stations in Zanzibar were numerous, and it was ·1i6s'$i'bl~tha.'t trouble might have broken out in any area. or a number of ateas aft/the same time. and it seems to us that the Commissioner of PoliCe was justified in his decision not to over dissipate his strength. but

tok:eeps"ufficie-llIt men in reserve to deal with any local situation that might

arls~.· ,~.$.;.

"'; The police stationed at a polling station were only intended to ensure orderly ,queuing. and to deal with minor incidents if they occurred. not

/witb. tbe;,ty'pe of disorder thar developed at Darajani.

. ,. Lt: wa:s~'becau8e he had a reasonable number of moo in reserve that it was. possfble to send fifty men to Darajani and gain control of the serious disturbance which arose there.

It seems to us important to bear in mind that the main police reserve was based on .the Police Lines at Ziwani, and was therefore within easy rea~ .of any potential trouble spot in Zanzibar Township.

Viewing the situation as a whole we think it can fairly be said that the police available were deployed as efficiently as possible .

. 124. The recourse to the use of the General Service Police Units from Kenya, and ,to the employment of troops 'Of the King's African Rifles, is described in Part III.of this report.

125. We recognise that the police establishment was considered as barely adequaee for the maintenance .of law and order in normal circumstances. As constituted, lit clearly could not be regarded as a force capable of dealing with widespread disorders. That this was appreciated is underlined by the, arrangements made for the employment .of reinforcements from the mainland territories.

126. lit: seems to have been accepted that pending the axri'val of reinforcements the forces actually available in the Protectorate could effectively cope with any dmmediate threat .of trouble on polling day. On the assessmotit of the political and security situations made immediately before the 1st June, this view is understand a ble.

127. Had serious trouble been anticipated, some reinforcements from the, mainland would no doubt have been brought into Zanziar before the morning of the 1st June. and this irrespective of any political considerations or of the financial cost eo Zanzibar.

In evidence before us the view was expressed that if forces from . the

I

mainland had been brought to Zanzibar before the election. in the climate

of opinion prevailing at the time, the Government would almost certainly have been accused of trying to dnfluenee the course of the election.

128. If even one of the Kenya Police General Service Units had been available in Zanzibar on the early morning of the 1st June. it might well have been possible to have prevented the situation developing as it did.

That being so the question arises whether. in spite of their assessment of the political aad security situation. the authorities ought to have arranged fori some reinforcement lof their security forces to be available in Zanzibar on the early morning of 1st June.

22

After weighing all the relevant considerations with care We have reached the conclusion that the decision not to do so. but to have a Kenya Police General Service Unit standing by to be flown in at four hours' notice from 6 a.m. on 1st June, for further Kenya Police and, if necessary, troops to be available at later call, was, in the circumstances, and at: .the

time it was made, justified. :11 '

129. That the Zanzibar Police Force was inadequate becauseIt.did] not possess a, reserve sufficient to provide a permanent striking force "is"""W~ were told, the key-note of a report made by the lnspector General of

Colonial Police since the June disturbances, . .

We were informed that he had made proposals for the creation ofa Police General Service Company in Zanzibar, that the Government has approved of the establishment of such a unit, and that it is now in the process of being formed.

Even when this extra Police unit of some 100 men is avai1abl~~ w~ rare ., of the opinion that forces from outside Zanzibar will still be necessary

in the event of serious emergency, and that the necessary arrangements

to have them available should be kept under review. .

130. During the course of the hearing it was suggested that in several instances some members of the police force had not displayed a sufficient degree of impartiality. and we questioned the Commissioner of Police

closely on this matter. i

The Police Force does consist of members of several different races. and there is, of course, always a possibility of racial bias, but we accept the assurance of the Commissioner of Police that he is fully alive to the possibilities, and that he keeps the matter under close review.

Having considered all the evidence, relevant to the point, we think-it right to record that, in our view, no case of partiality was established, and that we consider the restraint and general conduct of the Force throughout the disturbances is to be commended.

PART VI Summary of Conclusions .

131. The fact that the 1957 election resulted in defeat for the Zanzibar Nationalist Party, with the resultant disappointment' to its suppOrt~rs,

contributed to the rise in the political temperature. ' ,,'.

132. The differences between squatters and Arab landlords in 1958 produced a new element of discord. Though good relations were!>largely restored by 1960, a sense of grievance among the squatters remained.

133. The Zanzibar dock dispute of 1958. which had a political aspect.

also lef.t a sense of grievance. v •

134. The boycotting of shops and buses played a part in exaceibatibg feelings.'

135. The use by the Zanzibar Nationalist Party of the NationaLJlag:at. its meetings, and the fact that the band formed by its youth mQ\~m~nt frequently arranged to be present at functions attended by His HIghness

23

the! Sultan was intended to create the impression that it alone was the loy~l political party. This added its quota to creating bitterness and tension among members of the Afro-Shirazi Party who resent this claim.

136. Disappointment by the Afro-Shirazi Party over the gains made by tlhe Zanzi·bar Nationalist Party in the January. 1961, election, and a mistaken feeling that they had been "cheated", added fuel to the fire.

137. We do not accept the proposition that the disturbances were" overwhelmingly racial in character". The" wind of change" and the impact of party politics played a considerable part.

138. The major cause was the" bombardment of words ", both written and spoken, which the people of Zanzibar were subjected to more or less continuously after the first General Election of July, 1957.

139. The Afro-Shirazi Party made its appeal to the electorate on a racial basis, and the Zanzibar Nationalist Party introduced religion into the controversy.

There is no evidence that the leader of either of the major political parties indulged in inflammable and violent language, but there is no doubt that other speakers at meetings of both political parties did so,

The effect of the spoken word in Zanzibar. where the first election took place as recently as July, 1957, "is liable to have an authority that can be dangerously used."

J.40. The Government was right in declining to:-

(a) proscribe racial, tribal and communal groupings from contesting elections; and

(b) making election campaigning on communal grounds an election offence.

The political leaders should by now have realised the danger of countenancing the use of inflammatory and immoderate language at political meetings of their parties.

What is required is a voluntary and determined effort on the part of the political leaders to ensure that the speakers at their political meetings do not indulge in speeches or acts tending to arouse the type of bitterness which contributed so much to the tragic events of June. 1961.

141. The Youths' Own Union and the Afro-Shirazi Youth League have been a constant source of friction, and the leaders of the political parties to which they are affiliated cannot escape responsibility for this.

142. The belief 'Of supporters ,of the Afro-Shirazi Party that the Zanzibar Naeionalist Party had been gu~lotyof large scale" cheating ", double voting . and personation, in the January, 1961, election, although honestly held. was mistaken.

This belief was due to' disappointment and a failure to appreciate itlhe e1tectivenessof the many precautions taken by the Authorkies respcusible for the procedure and general arrangements at ithe election .

.

143. If any personation and double voting did occur at the January or June, 1961. elections, the cases must have been so few as to make it unlikely that they affected any of the results,

24

144. A number of alleged election offences were carefully investigated by the po.¥ce, but in no instance was a prima facie case made out.

145.1 Thestatement in Ithe letter addressed by the, Zanzibar Nationalist Party to the Secretary of State. "dated June. 1961. that some 3.000 of their supporters had been prevented by Afro-Shirazi supporters from voting. and that had they been able to vote the Zanzibar Nationalist Party's proportion of the total vote "would have been very considerably higher. and t1he final results would have been entirely different ", is not borne out by

the facts. . .

'IheJetter was no doubt wriuen before feelings over the emergency had calmed down.

Examination of ahe results in the constituencies where interference with voters has been complained of shows conclusively that any such interference did notin fact affect the final results.

146. We do not think that any of the political parties in Zanzibar. as distinct from some individual members of such parties, were inspired by Communist ideology or that Communism played any pant in the disturbances,

147. The cause of the disorders on the morning of the 1st June at the polling stations in ,the constituencies of Raha Leo, J angombe and Darajani was similar, namely, the seizure, assault and removal from the voting queues of dndividual members of the Zanzibar Nationalist Party by supporters 0If the Afro-Shirazi Panty. This behaviour derived from a suspicion firmly held by members of the Afro-Shirazi Parity, that the Zanzibar Nationalist Party 'had prepared a campaign of vote stealing involving personation and double voting.

148. The withdrawal of the Zanzibar Nationalist Party from the election at Raha Leo and Jangornbe because of alleged intimidation against their supporters there, and the subsequent assembling of a large crowd of Zanzibar Nationalist Party supporters alt panty headquarters at Darajani, had a profound effect on the situation,

The object of this assembly of Zanzibar Nationalist Party supporters was, so it was said. to give moral support to Nationalist Party members at Darajani, wishing to vote.

149. Some of the Zanzibar Nationalist Party's supporters who assembled at the Darajani headquarters were armed with sticks, and some with knives or swords.

]jt was when the Afro-Shirazis present saw these arms that they rushed to piles of wood and stones lying nearby and armed tbemselves.

Stoning by both sides and rioting ensued. It was thisthat necessitated the reading of the Riot Act.

150. In dispersing. Africans began to move away in <the direction of Mtemdesi, Maufini and Mwernbeladu. In S'O doing they were attacked by Arabs. some armed with swords.

It was a[,ter Itlhis that 'Africans were heard Ito be saying "the Arabs are killing us ". This gave rise to a.. widespread rumour which was responsible for much of Ithe subsequent violence.

25

rJSl. Much of the looting and many of the crimes of violence which .accompaniedrhe disturbances' were committed by criminal and hooligan elements.

152. When the kilHngs 'and looting spread Ito the rural areas, the victims wer~ mainly Manga Arabs. These p-eople have inherited the reputation g~iI1-ed by their race in events of which Ithe riot in Zanzibar in 1936 is not the I only instance, and have consequently come to be regarded as the ".bqgymen" of Zanzibar.

'Yhen hysteria replaced reason, the extent to which the element of, what may have been regarded as an opportunity for, "paying off old scores". should not be underestimated. Bearing this in mind, ,vhe number of Arabs who unfortunately lost their lives does ·not necessarily indicate

. the ex,tellJt, of racial antagonism between "AfIiicans" and "Arabs".

153. The disturbances were in no sense the result of any premedizated plot by any person, group of persons, or poliaical paety.

154. On ;vhe information then available, the assessment of the security situatlon made prior to tlhe June, 1961, election was reasonable.

155. The police establishment on the eve of the June, 1961, election was barely adequate for the maintenance of law and order in normal circumstances, It clearly was not capable olf dealing with anything more than minor disturbances.

That this was appreciated is underlined by the arrangements made for immediate reinforcements from Kenya if an emergency occurred. With this provision, and in the light of the appreciation of the situation made by all concerned immediately prior to 1st June, the authorities were justified in considering that the overall security forces at their disposal were adequate.

156. The experience gained as a result of the June disturbances demonstrates the necessity for increasing the strength of the security forces actually available in Zanzibar.

As 'a result of recommendations made. since June, 1961, by the Inspector General of Colonial Police, the Government has approved of the establishment of a Police General Service Company consisting of over 100 officers

and men. .

The formation of this new unit is now in process.

Even. when this addition to the Force is fully available. some reinforcements from outside Zanzibar will still be necessary in the event of serious emergency.

157. The policeavailable to the Commissioner of Police on the morning of election day, 1st June, were used to the best advantage.

'158. The restraint and general conduct of the police force throughout the disturbances is to be commended.

159. In conclusion we should like to thank the members of the Bar who appeared before us for their help_ throughout the Inquiry. We also thank Mr. Ahmed Idi who so ably acted as Interpreter; his patience and courtesy never failed. Our thanks also go to the verbatim reporters, Mrs. Baker. Mrs. Eggins, Miss Pass and Miss Whelan; they very willingly put in long hours

26

in order to make the recorded evidence available without delay, their work cannot be too highly praised and. in expressing our gratitude to them. we would include Mrs. Bhumgara and her staff forthe excellent work they did in producing copies of the record. We also thank Miss Palmley, our personal secretary, for the help she has so willingly given us, and for her patience 'throughout. and Mrs. Trace for all she so kindly did to ensure that our stay in Zanzibar was a comfortable one.

Finally we wish to .record our gratitude to Mr. A. L. Pennington, C.B.E .• who acted as Secretary to the Commission. His unfailing courtesy, efficiency and industry made a substantial contribution to the completion of the Inquiry.

Dated this 17th day of November. 1961.

S. FOSTER-SUTTON. VINCENT TEWSON. C. A. GROSSMITH.

27

APPENDIX A

The Commission of Inquiry Decree

A Commission

I, ARTHUR GEORGE RlXON MOORING, Knight Commander. of the Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, Knight Bachelor, British Resident for ' .. ' ' Zanzibar, do by virtue and in exercise of the powers vested in me by the Commission of Inquiry Decree, by this Commission under my hand appoint-

SIR STAFFORD FOSTER-SUTTON, Knight Commander of the Most Excellent Order of tJhe British Empire, Companion of the MoM Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and, Saint George, one of Her Majesty's Counsel learned in the Law, SIR VINCENT TEWSON. Knight Bachelor, Companion of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire upon whom has been conferred the Decoration of the Military Cross, CARYLL ARCHIBALD GROSSMITH, Esquire, Companion of the Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, Officer of the Most Excellent Order of the BI1it,:slh Empire, to be Commissioners-

To inquire into and report upon the civil disturbances which occurred in Zanzibar on the first day of June, 1961, and succeeding days, including their causes and development and the steps taken to deal wieh them:

And I do hereby direct that SIR STAFFORD FOSTER-SUTTON be Chairman of the said Commission :

And I do hereby direct that two Commissioners shal! form a quorurn :

And I do hereby direct that the said Inquiry shall be held at such time and at such place or places as the Chairman may from t.me to time deterrniue :

And I do hereby direct that the said Inquiry shall be held in public or in private; or parrly in public and partly in private as the Ohairrnan may from time to time determine:

And I do hereby direct tlha1 the Commission shaH be executed by the taking of oral evidence of witnesses or by the aoceptance of documentary evidence or by both:

And I do hereby appoint Mr. G. M. MAHON, Chief Justice, Zanzibar, to be the person before whom the said Commissioners shall make and subscribe the proper declaration as by the Commissions of Inquiry Decree required:

And I do hereby direct that the said Commissioners shall sit as soon as the Chairman may consider practicable and shall prosecute the said Inquiry with all due diligence and speed and make their report in writing without undue delay:

And I do hereby command all persons whom it may concern to take due notice hereof and to give their obedience accordingly.

Given under my hand and the Public Seal of the Protectorate at Zanzibar, this 8th day of September, 1%1.

A. G. R. MOORING, BRITISH RESIDENT.

28

APPENDIX B

List of Witnesses

Called by the Attorney-General M:r. P., A. P. Robertson, C.M.G., The Civil Secretary.

Mr. R. H. V. Biles. C.P.M .•

TJie Cernmrssioner of Police.

Mr. A. B. P. 1. Derham,

Assistant Superintendent of Police.

Sheikh Suleiman Said Kharusi, Superintendent of Police.

Mr. W. Widghrt:,

Senior Superintendent in charge of C.I.D.

Mr. M. V. Smithyman, O.B.E.,

Permanent Secretary to the Chief Minister.

Dr. W. L. Barton,

Assistant Director olf Medical Services.

Mr. W. M. Hamilton,

Town Planning Officer,

Returning Officer for Raha Leo constituency.

Called by Counsel for the Zanzibar Nationalist Party .Mr, Mzee bin Juma,

Laundry man.

Mr. Amarsi Hanaraj, Indian shop keeper.

Mr. Hussein bin Said, Trader,

Mr. ALi Dhihai.

Motor vehicle driver.

Mr. HHal Mohamed,

acted as Agent for the Zanzibar Nationa1ist Party at the Trade School Polling Station.

Mr. Mihijae Saleh, Cap maker.

Mr. Ali Raza Nathani, Merchant,

Mr. Mzee Thani,

Member of the Zanzibar Nationalist Party.

Mr. Vuwai Mmanga. Muana Juma Abdulla,

Woman member of the Zanzibar Nationalist Party.

Mr. Amur Mzee,

Agent for the Zanzibar Nationalist Party. Jarigombe constituency.

29

Mr. AbduLrahman .Mohamed (Babu),

General Secretary .of the Zanzibar Natl~bnalist Party.

Sheikh Ali M uhsin,

Leader of the Zanzibar Nat11ona,Iist Party,

Mr. Amani Thani Feruzi,

Agent for the Zanzibar Nationalist Party, Raha Leo constituency,

Mr. Hassan Amin,

Member of the Zanzibar Nationalist Party Executive Committee.

Called by Counsel for the Afro-Shirazi Party She.ikh Abeid Arnani Karume,

Leader of the Afro-Shirazi Party.

Mr. Thabit Kombo,

General Secretary of the Afro-Shirazi Party.

Mr. Idi bin B.akari,

Worker employed on Agriculture Department farm.

Applied personally to give evidence M~. Abdl1JilJla Hamoud Harfhy, Newspaperman,

Member of the Arab Asociation .

. Evidence in Camera

was 8iven by three persons.

3U

No.1

No. II No. III! No. IV No. V

No. VI No. VII No. VIn

No. IX No.IXA No. X No. XI

No. XII

No. XIIIA ... No. XllIB No. XIV

No. XV No. XVI

No. XVII '" No. XVIII No. XIX No. XX

No. XXI No. XXII ...

No. XXII!...

No. XXIV No. xxv ...

No. XXVIA No. XXVIB No: XXVII

No. XXVIII

No. XXIXA

No. XXIXB No. XXIXC No. XXIXD

80402

APPENDIX C

Documents Tendered in Evidence

Report of the Arbitrator to Enquire into a Trade Dispute at the Wharf

Area at Zanzibar.

Speech by the Chief Minister broadcast on 30th May. 1961. Extract from" Observer" of 11th June, 1961. . Quotation from" Sunday News" of 4th June, 1961.

Report by Medical Superintendent, H.J.K. Hospital, giving casualty figures by race for the period 1st to 8th June inclusive.

Pamphlet issued by Commissioner of Police "Duties and Responsibilities of Police during Elections."

Appendix No.3 to Force Orders, Riot Dril1, dated 1st April, 1957.

Note issued by Commissioner of Police, dated 23rd April, 1958,

detailing action to be taken in the event of any public disorder.

Police Diary (5 volumes) covering period 1st to 5th June, 1961, inclusive, ." . Cyclostyled copy of Exhibit IX. Murders-sequence of Reports. Letter from Commissioner of Police to leaders of 10 Zanzibar organisa-

tions.

Copy of Z.N.P. publication ., Dawn in Zanzibar" No.3 July-August,

1961, published in Cairo.

Photograph of 2 Z.N.P. youths in uniform. Photograph showing youths marching.

Pattern of material stamped with symbol of red cockerel and word "Uhuru ".

Report on Kano disturbances, May 1953, Nigeria.

Political Education Series Pamphlet No.2" Whither Zanzibar",

published in Cairo .

.. Land Tenure in Zanzibar "-John Middleton. Papers laid before the Legislative Council in 1959.

Photograph of semi-naked man being held by two constables. Report of the Committee on Immigration, 1959.

Disposition of Police at Polling Stations on Ist June.

Statement of casualties and arrests for the period lst to 12th June, inclusive.

Statement showing strength of Zanzibar Police Force during the period' 1951/1961-62.

Zanzibar Police-Distribution of Establishment-1961-1962. Confidential letter No. CPS/91 of 8th September, 1961, from Commissioner of Police to Civil Secretary, relating to increases in C.LD.

Photograph of locally manufactured swords, made in Pemba.

Photograph of locally manufactured swords, made in Pemba.

... Statement of Prisoners received at the C.l.D. Reception Centrelst-23rd June.

Statement of Lootings and Breakings, Riots and Allied Offences, Serious Assaults, Arson, Miscellaneous Emergency Offences, Offensive Weapons and Curfew Offences for the period 1st to 13th June, inclusive.

Plan showing Murder, Lootings, Assaults, Riots and Allied Offences

on l st June, 1961.

Same plan for 2nd June, 1961. Same plan for 3rd June, 1961.

Plan showing lootings of vacated houses from ] st June onwards.

'.

31

A6

'~o.'QOXE

:h':~ L: :~~t~; ~o.XXX ...

i

.i .. Y.YXT ....•.••

~r

• XXXIA

No. XXXII 110. XXXIIA No. XXXIII

'1

No. XXIV

;lio •. XXXV }Ito. }QQM

No.xxxvn No. XXXVIlI No. XXXIX No. XL No.XLA ••.

i. ' •

No. XLI .

No. XLII .

No.XLm

No. XLIV No. XLV ... No. XLVI No XLVII No. XLVllI

No. XLIX No. LA ~o.LB

No. LC No.LD No. LIA No. LIB No. LIC No. LID No.·Lm No. LII

No. LUI No. LlV No.~LV No. LVI No. LVII

No. LVIII No. LVIIIA

...

...

No. LVIIIB No.LVIIIC No. L1XA

Plan showing rural crime (murders, lootings, serious assaults, riot and

allied offences). '

Statement of Crimes in the Town area for the period 1st June to 4th

June, 1961, inclusive.

Press release giving results of January elections. Gazette Extraordinary of 20th December, 1961. Press release giving results of June elections.

, Gazette Extraordinary of.29th April, 1961.

Circular letter dated 7th January, 19.61, from the Supervisor of Elections'

to all Returning and Presiding Officers.

Letter No. E45/487 of 7th January, 1961, from the Senior Commissioner .. Legislative Council Elections-Instructions.

The Legislative Council (Elections) Decree, 1957 as amended by the

Legislative Council (Elections) (Amendment) Decree, 1960.

The Councils Decree, 1956.

General Notice No. 185 of 1961, in Gazette of 4th March, 1961. Broadcast by the Resident dated 25th July, 1960.

Broadcast New Year's Message by British Resident.

Press Release No. 5/1961 issued in January, 1961.

Broadcasts by Ministers in week beginning 26th May, 1961.

Police Notice calling on Electors to maintain good order at Polling

Stations.. .

Duplicate record of Press Releases, Broadcasts, etc., from 1st June,

1961 to 9th June, 1961.

Report of the Constitutional Commissioner, Zanzibar, 1960. List of Newspapers published in Zanzibar.

Extracts from African newspapers published in Zanzibar Press Release 112/61-Labour Relations.

" Cultivation by Squatters of Shambas owned by other people "-dated

23rd May, 1958.

Press Release--New Orders affect Landlords and Cultivators. Annual Report of Provincial Administration, 1957 .

.Annual Report of Provincial Administration, 1958.

Annual Report of Provincial Administration, 1959:

Annual Report of Provincial Administration, 1960. Press Release No. 11/61 of 18th January, 1961. Press Release No. 12/61 of 19th January, 1961. Press Release No. 13/61 of 21st January, 1961. Press Release No. 14/61 of 23rd January, 1961. Press Release No. 15/31 of 27th January, 1961. Issue of Daily Nation of 3rd June, 1961.

Tanganyika Standard of 29th September, 1961 (page 3).

Racial and Territorial Competition of the Zanzibar Police Force. Sessional Paper No. 14 of 196~Constitutional Reforms, 1960. Statement made by Aliz Raza Nathani, dated 12th June, 1961. Debates of the Legislative Council-Official Report-32nd Session,

1957 ... :1958 (page 126 et seq).

Chapter 89-Legislative Councils (Elections) Decree. Handbook for Presiding Officers, Zanzibar. Handbook for R~turning Officers, Zanzibar. Handbook for Candidates, Zanzibar.

Extract from" Umma .. of 2nd December, 1960, with English translation.

32

h~o.:LXliI No. LXIV No .. LXV '"

No. LXVI No. LXVII No. ,LXVIII No.!LXIXA

No.'LXIXB

No.LXIXC

No. LXIXD No. LXX '"

No. LXXI

No. LXXII

No. LXXIII

No. LXXIVA

No. LXXIVB

No. LXXV

I

No. LXXVI

No. LXXVII No. LXXVIII

Extract from" Umma" of 24th April, 1961, with English-translation. Extract from" Umma .. of 27th April, 1961, with English translation. Letter dated June, 1961, from tho General Secretary, Zanzibar Nationa-

list Party, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Letter dated 24th January, 1961 (with three enclosures) from the President, Afro-Shirazi Party, to His Excellency the British Resident.

Letter No. SH/VF/1629/NEG/890 of 3rd May, 1961, from the Cooper Motor Corporation, Ltd., to the Secretary, Afro-Shirazi Party, Zanzibar, with sales invoice VI/6/7881 of 20th April, 1961, enclosed.

Extract from .. Agozi " of 14th December, 1959, page 2. Extract from" Mwangaza " of 11 th November, 1959.

Zanzibar Nationalist Party. Suggestions of the Federation of Progressive Trade Unions, which is the Zanzibar Nationalist Party affiliate. Dated 9th June, 1961.

Press Release=-Afro-Shirazi Party statement on the recent disturbances. Police Permit to convene an assembly or to hold a public meeting. Speakers prohibited by Police orders from addressing public meetings. Extracts of speeches made at Zanzibar Nationalist Party and Youths'

Own Union meetings.

Extracts of speeches made at Afro-Shirazi Party and Afro-Shirazi Youth League meetings.

Extract of speeches made at Zanzibar and Pemba Peoples' Party meetings.·

Extracts of speeches made at Human Rights League meetings. Non-fatal casualties inflicted by security forces during the June emergency.

Series of letters exchanged between Commissioner of Police, Zanzibar, and the Chief Secretary (later the Civil Secretary), Zanzibar, beginning with a letter dated 18th December, 1959, and concluding with a letter dated 1st February, 1961.

Extract from demi-official letter S/31/CPS/258/62 dated 21st March, 1961, from the Commissioner of Police to the Office of the Civil Secretary on the subject "Zanzibarisation of the Police Force" (with three appendices).

Minutes of a meeting held in Elections Office at 9 a.m. on Monday, 24th April, 1961.

Copy of letter No. E45/569 of 25th March, 1961, from the Senior District Commissioner to a number of addressees.

Copy of letter No. PHQ/156/405 of 27th March, 1961, from the Commissioner of Police to the Senior District Commissioner.

Extract of leading article in "Tanganyika Standard" of Friday, 2nd June, 1961.

Reports of the Supervisors of Elections on the Registration of Voters and the Elections held in January, 1961.

Report of the Supervisor of Elections, June, 1961.

Report of the Commission of Inquiry concerning the Riot in Zanzibar on the 7th of February, 1936.

(80402) Wt. 2249-8330 K20 11/61 St.S.

33

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