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Lamha man Face, rac. whee Pan tes thatthe pnt hi See eed frum mss ast incmphsssRegining wth The Man Faces of efi Inte ar se for exanpe 0.77 PHILOSOPHICAL TOPICS Wo 20 nL BME LOPE The Search for Logically Alien Thought: Descartes, Kant, Frege, and the Tractatus! James Conant University of Pittsburgh U}n order to draw a limit to thought we should have to beable to think both sides ofthis limit (ve should there {ore have 1 be able to think what cannot be thought) The limit ea, therefore. only be dram in language ‘and what lies on the other side of the limit willbe sin ply nonsense. Ludvig Wingenstene™ The only proper way to break an egg is from the inside. —Parva Gallina Rubra ‘This essay is about three things: Wittgenstein’ eas concerning the question ‘ofthe possibility of illogical thought, the sources of those ideas (especially in Kant and Frege), and Puinam’s recent interest in both of these matters, ‘Along the way, this paper briefly sketches the broad outlines of two almost parallel traditions oF thought about the laws of logic: one rather long and complicated tradition called the History of Moder Philosophy, and ‘one rather short and complicated one called Hilary Putnam. Here isa thumb- nail version of how these to traditions align: Descartes thought the laws of logic were only contingenily necessary; not so recent Putnam agreed. St. ‘Thomas Aquinas believed that they were necessarily necessary: relatively recent Putnam agreed (ths is only confusing if you think Aquinas should not 15 be a step alead of Descartes). Kant thought they were simply necessary Frege wanted (o agree—but his manner of doing so raised the worry that there was no way in which to express his agreement that made sense Wittgenstein agreed with the worry. He concluded that sense had not (yet) been made of the question to which our two traditions sought an answer: very recent Putnam agreed, HISTORICAL PREAMBLE: A DIFFERENT KIND OF CARTESIANISM What is the status of the laws of logic, the most basic laws of thought? Wherrin does their necessity lie? In what sense does the negation of a basic Jaw of logic represent an impossibility? ‘The Scholastics were forced to think hard about these questions since they believed in the existence of an omnipotent God for whom all things are possible. If God is omnipotent does that mean that He has the power to abrogate the laws of logic? The Scholastics, on the whole, were quite relue: {ant to draw this conclusion. But does that then mean that Godl is not all- powerful, that there is a limit to his power, that there is something he can ‘not do? That is a conclusion that the Scholastics were, on the whole, at least ‘equally as reluctant to draw. Posed here ina theological guise isa version of ‘a question that has continued to haunt philosophy up until the present: do the laws of logic impose a limit which we run up against in our thinking? If so, what kind ofa limit is this? Do their negations represent something that we ‘cannot do ot that cannot be’ If so, what sort of “cannot” is this? Here is Aquinas's attempt to reconcile the omnipotence of the Divine Being with the inexorability of the basie principles of Reason: All confess that God is omnipotent: but it seems difficult to explain in what His omnipotence precisely consists. For there ‘may be adoubt as to the precise meaning of the word “all” when ‘we say that God can do all things. If, however, we consider the ‘matter aight, since power is said in reference o possible things. this phrase. God ean do all shings is rightly understood to mean that God can do all things that re possible: and for this reason eis said to be omnipotent. Now .. 2 thing is said to be pos- sible in two ways. First, in relation to some power I, ho= ever, we were fo say that God is omnipotent because He ean do ll things that are possible to His power, there would bea vicious Circle in explaining the nature of His power. For this would be saying nothing else but thet God is omnipotent because He can «do all that He is abe to do, Ieremains, therefore, that Go is called omnipotent becasse He can do all things that are possible absolutely: which is the 116 sevond way of saying thing is possible. Fora thing i said to be possible or impossible absolutely, according 10 the relation in ‘which the very terms stand to one anther: possible, if the pred icate is not incompatible with the subject, as that Socrates sis And absolutely impossible when the predicate is altogether incompatible with he subject, as, for instance, that a man isan ‘Therefore, everything that does not imply a contradic tion in terms is numsered among those possibles in respect of ‘which God is called ermnipatent; whereas whatever implies con tradietion does not come within the scope of divine emnipo- rence, hecause it canvot have the aspect of possibility. Hence it is more appropriate 1 say tha such things cannot be done, than that God cannot do them. Nor is this contrary tothe word ofthe angel. saying: No word shall he impossible with God (Luke 1.37), For whatever implies 4 contradiction cannot he a word, because no intellect can possibly conceive such a thing.* Aquinas is caught here between the Charybdis of asserting a mere tau- tology (God ean do everything within His power) and the Scylla of implic- itly aseribing a substantive limit to God's power (by declaring God can do all those sorts of things which fall under a certain general description X. and hence apparently implicitly declaring: He cannot do those things which do not fall under X). One way out—a way out which, as we shall see, is prad- ually refined in the course ef these (wo traditions of thought about logic: ‘would be for this description (of those things which God cannot do) to turn fut not to be a genuine description at all. Aquinas, indeed, tries to argue that those things whieh fall under the (apparent) description things which God cannot do ate not, properly speaking, things which car be done at all. These 128 which “cannot have the aspect of possibility.” OF these, Aquinas says, “itis more appropriate to say that such things cannot be done, than that God cannot do them.” But the worry arises: hasn’t Aquinas just offered us aa redescription of what kind of a thing a logically impossible sort ofa thing is? It would seem that we stil have here to deal with a certain (albeit remark= able) kind ofa thing, Ifso, the question remains: what sort of a thing is this and is it something not even God can do? Even if we concede to Aquinas that perhaps, strictly speaking, we should not speak of it as if it were-a doable kind of a thing, nevertheless, there certainly still appears to be an “it” here that our words ate straining after and which has formed the subject of our ‘thought throughout the preceding paragraph. Aquinas appears to be on his strongest ground when he tries to make out that the “it” which falls uncer these descriptions—"that which is logically impossible,” “that which even God cannot do”—is not a kind of a thing at all, What we have here instead is an attempt to conceive of a kind of a thing which “no intellect [i¢., not just a human intellect] can possibly conceive: 17 itisam attempt to speak a word “which eannot be a word.” In order to set up, this way of dissolving the appearance of an “it” (sshich not even God can do), Aquinas invokes Aristotle's distinction between those things which are impossible in relation to some power and those things which are impossible absolutely. Itis not clear, however, that this distinction really helps. It threat- ens fo recreate the appearance that we have to do here with two different kinds of things, belonging to two distinet orders of impossibility: the merely impossible and the absolutely impossible. Just as itis natural to picture that which is possible for a finite being (such as man) as contained within the space of that which is possible for God, i can seen natural to take Aristo Aistinetion as marking an analogous boundary, only a higher level. One pictures the distinction in terms of two degrees of impossibility: things belonging to the second degree (the absolutely impossible) ate situated on the far side ofthe outer iit which encompasses things belonging tothe frst degree (the metely impossible). So now it seems that although God never chafes against anything which lies within the citeumnference of this exterior circle, nonetheless, Great as He is, that is as far as He can go—even He must remain within this circle. This picture ofa circle (circumscribing the limits ‘of that which is absolutely possible) Iying within a wider space (the space of the absolutely impossible) inevitably leaves us with the feeling that we have after all, sueceeded in describing a genuine limit to His powcr. The existence of this outer space of absolute impossibility seems o settle the question in precisely the contrary direction from the one in which Aquinas had hoped to Jead us. The apparently innocent step of picturing the space of absolute pos sibility as bounded by a limit seems to have led us to the opposite conclu ion about God's omnipotence. ‘What sort ofa thing ies beyond the limit of God's power? Answer: the sort which is absolutely impossible. And now it becomes iresistible to add even for Him Descartes concluded that Aquinas, along with most of the rest of ‘medieval theology, had wandered into blasphemy.*"If men really understood the sense oftheir words,” they would never speak as they do. For their made ‘of speech clearly implies a limit to God's power. The only way o avoid such blasphemy is to refrain from ascribing any limits to what the Divinity is able to bring about tum to the difficulty of conceiving how God would have ‘been acing ely and indifferent if he had made it fase. in general that conzadictories could not be te together, is ey {0 dispel his dtficlty by considering that the power of Ge can rot have any limits and that our mind is nite and so created as to be able to conceive as possible the things which Gov has ‘wished to bein fet possiie. but not be able to conceive as pesible things which God could have made possible, but which ug hie has nevertheless wished 19 make impossible. The Fist ‘eomsidration shows us that God cannot have been determined to make it true that comraictories cannot be tue together, and therefore that he could have done the oppenite. The second con siuation assures us that even if this be true, we should not try te comprehend i, since our nature is incapable of doing s0.* Descartes positively asserts here that God could have made contradi tories true together.” He further asserts that this means that God ean bring bout things which our minds are incapable of comprehending. If only that which is comprehensible to minds such as ours were possible for God—it undamental truths (such as that contradictories cannot be true together) were extemal and prior to God's will—then He would not be omnipotent. For His will would not be free with respect to such truths, but rather subject to their determination, But this would be (o deny the infinitude and incom prchensibility of God's power." The only way to avoid such an unworthy blasphemy is to acknowledge that such truths do depend upon the will of God and that it lies within His power to bring about the negations of such truths." The sense in which they are nonetheless necessary or eternal lies in the fact that God has decreed them to be true: hence they are necessary for 1s, But, from a Divine point of view, they are only contingently necessary. For we nust allow that there is some sense in which God could have done otherwise: [Even if God has willed that some truths should be neces. sary. this does not meen that He has willed them necessarily: for itis one thing to will that they be necessary. and quite another to will this necessarily, cr tobe necessitated to will i If God had not been free 10 choose such laws as he did, if He were by necessity constrained to wil the truth of the laws of logic, then there would bbe a necessity that binds even Him, God would be inexorably subject to those laws, ust as we are subject to His decrees, There would be a farum that bindls even the Divinity, making a mockery of his alleged omnipotence. So we ‘ust say that God freely willed the laws of logic to be true, Descartes is very careful, however, to insist that, although these laws do not bind God, this does not make them any less binding for us, The hubris lies in our thinking that because we cannot comprehend how the negations of such laws could be true—for example, how it could be true that "He could have made con: tradictories true together"—we are therefore in a position to conclude that it ‘cannot be done, even by Him It is hubris to think that the limits of our pow. crs of comprehension enable us to specify something He cannot do: In general we can asert that God can do everything that is within our grasp but rot that He eannot do what is beyond our grasp. It would be rash to think that cur imagination reaches as far as his power." 9 [Slince Go is a case whise power surpasses the owls ff human understanding, and since the necessity ofthese truths ‘does not exceed our knowlege, these truths are something less than, and subject to, the incomprehensible power of Gad. Descartes, nonetheless, wants to be able to say: we think rightly when we think in accordance with these laws, We perceive correctly when we clearly and distinctly perceive the truths of fogic to be in some sense “nec essary": they are necessary in our world, But Descartes will not follow Aquinas and say that their negations are absolutely impossible. They are not as it were, necessarily necessary: God could have created a very different sort ofa world, Of course, since our powers of conception are constrained by the principles of logie, Descartes must say that we eannot make any sense of the possibility of such a world—nonetheless, we should admit the mere possi bility ofits existence: {There is no need to ask how God! could! have brought it tout eon eteity that i was mo tue that sic Foor make tht, and soon; fr Fadmit this is uninteligible to us. Yet onthe tther hand ¥ do understand... that it would have been easy for God o ordain certain things such that we men cannot understand {he possibilty of thee being otherwise than they are.'* Descartes concedes that any attempt on our part to comprehend such a ‘world must meet with failure, This raises the worry: doesn’t Descartes’s position ultimately collapse into Aquinas's? What are we to make of his assertion that we should believe in the possibility of such a world even though he himself freely admits that we cannot hope to comprehend it? How does one undertake to believe in something one cannot understand? Deseartes himself feels at least some of the force of this problem. In an attempt to get around it, he helps himself to a fine distinction—a distinction between our being able to conceive of such a world and our being able to conceive that such an inconceivable world coutd be. The possibility of such a world is not something we can comprehend, but itis something we can apprehend. Descartes's own way of expressing this slippery distinction is to say that the ultimate contingency of these truths (which we take to be nec essary) is not something we can embrace in our thought, but we can touch iin our thought: 1 know that God isthe author of everything ad that these {eternal truths are something and consequently that He is thet author. say that [know this, not that I conceive itor grasp is because it is possible to know that God is infinite and all powerful although our mind, being finite, cannot grasp or con bined into the following teaching: breaking the (syntactical) rues of logic in the right way allows us to show the unsayable—by running up against the Jimits of language, we are able to “convey” what lies beyond these limits. “Running up against the limits of language? Language is, after all, not ‘acage.”"”" The standard reading of the Tractatus has the teaching of the work inside out. Throwing avsay the ladder means throwing away the idea that lan- cage and that the rules of logic form its bars, ‘guage is a THE METHOD OF THE 7RACTATUS In the Preface to the Tractatus, Wittgenstein writes: “ Dieses Buch . .. ist also kein Lehrbuch.” This book is not a catechism, a doctrinal text. It is not a work which propounds a doctrine. Later he says: “Philosophy is not a body 155 ‘of doctrine [Lehre] but an activity” ($4.112). He then immediately goes on to say what kind of an activity philosophy is: one of elucidation. Both carly and late, Wittgenstein will insist that the dificulty of his work is tied to the Fact that he is not putting forward theses." But if the work does not culm nate in a conclusion about the nature of logic, how then does it effect ill ‘mination? What are we supposed to do with the nonsense the Tractatus presents us with? Towards the end of “Rethinking Mathematical Necessity.” Putnam writes: Tt makes mo sense to say oF tink that we have discovered that Logic| i wrong, them it also makes no sense to Fler a rea son fr thinking tis not wrong. reason for thinking logic] isnot wrong is 2 reason which excludes nothing. Trying to ius tify... Tog} is like trying to say that whereof one caanot speak thereof one must be silent; in both eases, it only looks as HM something is being ruled out or avoided." Putnam here connects the topic of this paper with the question of how ‘one should interpret the closing line of the Tractatus. Putnam suggests that Tine shoutd not be read as debarring us from being able to say something, The contrapositive of that line is ‘whereof one may speak, thereof one can speak.” Putnam's reading of that line suggests that if we are faced with a silence at the end of the book, tis is simply because (although there has been 4 great deal of noise) nothing has been said.!® But proponents of the star dard reading of the Tractatus take this silence to be one that guards the inef- fable. They heat in this line (which speaks of silence) the declaration of a substantive thesis: there are certain things which cannot be said and con- ‘coming them we must remain silent. At one point in the Investigations — in the middle of another discussion about things which cannot be stated in anguage—Wittgenstein formulates the task of philosophy as follows: "The great difficulty here is not to represent the matter as if there were something ‘one couldn't do” ($374). Wittgenstein says in our epigraph that what we wind up with when we try to draw a limit to thought is not deep nonsense, but rather einfach Unsinn—simply nonsense. Frege’s word for a mock thought is a Scheingedanke. Both Frege's and Wittgenstein's word for a pseudo- Proposition is a Scheinsatz—a mock proposition. A mock proposition is not Just not “strictly speaking” a proposition; it is not a kind of a proposition, any ‘more than stage thunder is a kind of thunder."” A philosophical elucidation aims to show us that the “propositions” we come out with in philosophy are ‘not propositions: the nonsense we are attracted to is plain unvamished no sense—words that do not express thoughts. The significance for Wittgenstein of Frege's exercise in elucidation can 156 the put as Follows: it enables us to come to see, once we peel off all the lay crs ofthe onion, that there 's no “it” which has been proposed asthe content of the thought experiment. In a sense, we come to see that there is no thought experiment, All that we are left with i the realization that we were subject (o an illusion of thought. becomes the mark of a successful philosophical chicidation for Wittgenstein—as for Kant—that it bring is interlocutor to the point where he can recognize the illusion to which be is subject as an illu- sion. For Wittgenstein, however—unlike for Kant—this means that a philo- sophical work which is self-conscious about its method will have to abandon the form of the treatise." To say that a philosophical work consists of elucidations is to say that it must assume the structure of an onion. Frege’s thought experiment isan example of a philosophical meditation which exhibits this structure, What happens is not that we sueceed in conceiving of an extraordinary possibility (logically alien thought) and then judge “it” to be impossible. Rather, what happens is—if the elucidation succeeds in its aim—we are drawn into an lu sion of occupying a certain sort of a perspective: call it the Cartesian per spective. From this perspective, we take ourselves to be able to survey the possibilities which undergird how things are with us, holding our necessities in place." From this perspective, we contemplate the laws of logic as they ae, as well as the possibility of their being otherwise. We take out ‘be occupying a perspective from which we can view the laws of logic from sideways on." The only “insight” the work imparts therefore is one about the reader himself: that heis prone to such illusions. This illusion of perspective is engendered through an illusion of sen We imagine ourselves to be making sense of the words in which the thought experiment is couched, when no sense (as yet) has been made. Tractatus's way of putting this (in §5.4733) isto say that if a sentence “has no sense, that ean only be because we have failed to give ameaning to some ofits constituent parts. (Even if we believe that we have done so.)" The prob: lem is that we do believe that we have given a meaning to all of the sen tence’s constituent parts" We think nonsense is produced not by a failure ‘on our part, but by a failureon the sentence’s part, We think the problem lies (when we contemplate “the possibilty of logically alien thought") not with the absence of meaning (inour failing to mean anything with these words at all), but rather with the senses the words already have—senses which the words bring with them ino this flawed thought, We think the thought is flawed because the senses of its parts are incompatible (“llogicat” and thought,” “private” and “language”): they clash with one another, They fail to add up to a thought. So we feel our words are attempting to think a logi- cally impossible thought—and that this involves a kind of impossibility of a higher order than ordinary impossibility." But Wittgenstein’ teaching is Ist that the problem lies not in the words (we could find a use for hem) but in ‘our confused relation to the words: in our experiencing ourselves &s mean ing something definite by them, yet also feeling that what we take ourselves to be meaning with the words makes no sense. We are confused about what itis we want fo say and we project our confusion onto the Linguistic sting ‘Then we look atthe linguistic string and imagine we discover what iis try- ing to say, We want to say to the string: “We know what you mean, but ‘it" cannot be said.” The incoherence of our desires with respect to the sen tence—wishing to both mean and not mean something with it—is seen by us as an incoherence in what the words want to be saying (i only it were something sayable). We displace our desire onto the words and see thet as aspiring to say something they never quite sueceed in saying (because, we tell ourselves, “it” cannot be said). We account forthe confusion these words ‘engender in us by discovering in the words a hopelessly flawed sense. The heart of the Tractarian conception of logic is to be found in the remark that “Wwe cannot make mistakes in logie™ (§5.473), The burden of the J much of Wittgenstein’s later writing—is to try to show us, that the idea that we can violate the logical syntax of language rests upon a confused conception of “the logical structure of thought™**—that there is no distinction to be drawn between deep nonsense and mere nonsense.!™ Everything which is possible in logic is also permitted” (§5.473). Ita sen- tence is nonsense, ths is not because itis trying but failing to make sense (by breaking a rule of logic), but because we have failed to make sense with it" ‘The Tractatus puts it ike this: “The sentence is nonsensical because we have failed to make an arbitrary determination of sense, not because the symbol isinitself unpermissible” (85.473). The idea that there are illegitimately con- structed propositions" rests upon a misunderstanding of the logic of our lat- Buage.!" Indeed, one of the most important continuities between early and Tate Wittgenstein lies in his attack on the idea of a hopelessly flawed sense!®*—the idea which gives rise to the illusion that we can occupy the Cartesian perspective. In the Tractarus, Wittgenstein writes: “We cannot give a sign the wrong sense” (5.4732). In the Investigations: “When a sen- tence is called senseless, itis not as it were its sense that is senseless (#500). This does not mean that we cannot give these words a sense, but only that we have (as yet) failed to do so." Inthe end, however, the snake bites its own tail, Our guiding idea—the idea that “we cannot make mistakes in logie"—turns out itself to be a piece ‘of nonsense. For if the sentence “we can make mistakes in logic” turns out {o be nonsense, then so does its denial. But in order to make sense of either of these sentences we have to make sense of “the possibihty of illogical thought.” Each rung of the ladder depends on its predecessors for support. ‘The collapse of one nung triggers the collapse of the next. We are initiated into a structure of thought which is designed to undermine itself. The Tractatus—a 158 Practatus takes the (illusory) structure of the problematic of the lugical aliens to be paradigmatic of the "structure of philosophical confusion gen: erally, and takes its elueidatory burden to be illustrative of the burden of philosophical work generally. The aim is not to take us from a piece of deep nonsense to a deep insight into the nature of things, but rather from a piece of apparently deep nonserse to the dissolution of the appearance of depth This brings us to a second important continuity in Wittgenstein’s work—his, conception of the aim of philosophy. In the Javestigarions, he writes: “My aim is: to teach you to past from a piece of disguised nonsense to something My propositions serve ax elucidations in the following way anyene who undersiands me eventually recognies then as non ensicol when be has climbed oat theogh them, on them. vee them, (He must, soto speak, throw avsay the ladder afer he has clisbed up it. {My emphases] ($6.54) Witigenstein does not ask his reader here to “grasp” his “thoughts.” He does not call upon the reader to understand his sentences, but rather to understand hin, namely the autor and the kind of activity in which he is engaged—one of elucidation! He also tells us how these sentences serve as clucidations by enabling us to recognize them as nonsense. One does not reach the end by arriving at the last page, but by arriving at a certain point in an activity— the point when the elucidation has served its purpose: when the illusion of sense is exploded from within and one has arived at the center ofthe onion The Preface and the concluding sections of the Trrctatus form the frame ofthe text. Itis there that Wittgenstein provides us with instructions for how to read what we ind inthe body of the text. Inthe Preface, Wittgenstein tells us that the idea that we can form thoughts about the limits of thought is simply nonsense. The book starts with a warning to the effect that a certain kind of enterprise-one o” attempting to draw a limit to thought—leads to plain nonsense. Inthe body of the text, we are offered (what appears to be) 2 doctrine about “the limits of thought.” With the aid of this doctrine, we imagine ourselves to be able to both draw these limits and see beyond them, ‘At the conclusion of the book, we are told thatthe author's elucidations have succeeded only if we reccgnize what we find in the body of the text to be (simply) nonsense. The sign that we have understood the author (as opposed tothe body) of the work isthat we ean throw the ladder we have climbed up away. That isto say, we have finished the work, andthe work is finished with us, when we are able (0 simply throw the sentences in the body of the swotk—sentences about “the limits of language” and the unsayable things which lie beyond them—avay.! To read the work correctly we need to hold on to something and throw something away. What we hold on to is the frame of the text—the text's instructions for how to read it and when to throw it away. What we 159 eventually” throw away isthe body ofthe text—its mock doctrine, The pro- ponents of the standard interpretation opt for the opposite procedure: they cling firmly to what they find in the body of the text and throw away the warnings and instructions offered in the frame. They peel far enough down into the onion to see thatthe sentences they are attracted to are nonsense, but they still want fo hold onto what (hey imagine) the nonsense is trying to say. ‘They conclude that the Tractarian onion must have a pit in the middle: insight” into the rrurh of certain deep matters-—even though, strictly speak ing, this truth cannot be put into language. Witigenstein’s aim is to enable simply left with what one is left with after one has peeled away all the ers of an onion, A PARABLE Certain general features of the Tractatus’s mode of elucidation are reflected in the following Jewish tale which dates from the beginning of this cen- tury." The parable, like the Tracratus, has an ethical point, APole and a Jew are sitting ina train, facing each other. The Pole shifts nervously, watching the Jew all the time; something is irritating him, Finally ‘unable to restrain himself any longer, he addresses the Jew: “Tell me if you ‘would please si: how do you Jews carry it off? It’s not that I'm anti-Semitic; but, I must confess, I find you Jews teribly perplexing. mean, I simply can- not understand how you do it.I simply want to know: how do you succeed in extracting from people everything they have down to their last coin and thereby accumulating your vast wealth? What is your secret?” The Jew pauses for a moment and then responds: "Very well. I will tll you.” A see: ond pause. “But it would not be right for me to divulge such a secret for noth- ing. First, you must give me five zloty.” After receiving the required amount, the Jew begins: “First, you take a dead fish; you cut off its head and put its entrails in a glass of water. Then, around midnight, when the moon is full, you must bury the glass in a che interrupts the Pole, “if do all this will I become rich?” “Not so quickly.” replies the Jew, “this is, not all you must do; but, if you wish me to continue, you must first pay me another five zloty.” After receiving more money, the Jew continues in a sim- ilar vein, Soon afterwards, the Pole again interrupts, and before continuing, the Jew again demands more money. And so on, and so on; until all of a sud- den the Pole explodes in fury: “You rascal, I see what it is you are aiming a; there is no secret at the bottom of this at all.” “That,” replies the Jew. as hhe returns the Pole his money, “is the secret.” 160 A TRACTARIAN MIDRASH The Pole has a problem, He is perplexed about Jews. He desires to possess the Jew's secret. His perplexity will be relieved, he imagines, only ifthe Jew ‘will disclose his secret. The Pole has a clear picture of the form which the solution to his problem must assume: the Jew must provide him with know! ceaige. The Pole pictures thisknowledge as both precious and hidden. Beyond this, the Pole has no clear conception of what such knowledge is like, other than that it is something he does not understand. All he knows for sure about this knowledge is that he wants it. The Jew engages the Poie’s desire by entering into his picture of the form which he imagines his satisfaction ‘must assume. The Jew therefore begins by charging the Pole money and urg- {ing him to Jook in the direction he already wishes 10 attend. But the Jew's delivery on his promise to relieve the Pole of his craving for knowledge lies notin any of the hits of sectet doctrine which the Jew imparts to his listener. but rather shrongh the activity by which he succeeds in capturing the lis tcner's desire for such doctrine, The Pole is relieved of his craving (For the Jew's secret doctrine) when he recognizes that this doctrine (to which he is so powerfully attracted) cannot satisfy him, It cannot satisfy him because there is no such doctrine: the secret is that there is no secret. ‘The parable ends by recording the Jew’s final gesture and final words. Ye are told nothing conce-ning the Pole’s response to them. His perple? ties about Jews may persist and continue to kindle his craving for knowledge. The Pole will find relief from this craving only when he is lieved of the ill sion that he will be satisfied by (Jewish) knowledge. He will be relieved of his perplexity about Jews—and the lesson will be complete—when he rec~ ‘ognizes that the source of his attraction to Jewish doctrine has nothing to do with Jews and everything to do with himself. NoTes |. ‘This puperis indebted to the writings of Cora Dimond and Thomas Rickelis, to conver sations with Stanley Cavell Stephen Engsirom, John MeDowel, Hilary Putnam. and Jamie Tappenden to comments onan caer daft hy Cora Diamond, David Finkelstein ‘Richard Gale, Matin Sone, Michael Thompson, and Lisa Van Alstyne to lectres and seminars om Frege by Burton Dreben and Warren Golfar, and to John MeDowell and ‘VD. Woorly for teling me about Lite Red Hen 2. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Preface Lowe this quotation to Archibald R. Maclniyee, Curave ls Hisors, Nowe, and Clinical Use (Chicago: Universit of Chicago Pest, 947), 209, Macliye als employs itasan epigraph, though to make «rather different point (the only proper way’ 10 stimulate 2 161 sel sf the inside hy HS nerve) There no inition oe way othe her Tater Macinyt aware of the lossng sigsinicant clue a he ators parva Galina Bra” Latin for "Late Red Hen Suma Theologica, Q.28, 3 '. One could. oie july. charge hat the complain developed inthe preceding paragraph Saat Aquinas lt dtngush between Go's omniptence His absolute power an fs ssity ihe absolute independence of His existence) [have not distinguished these Inecane ny pes ere prepare the eader fora discussion of Descartes sti ftom with scholastic views. Descartes moves seamlessly between the question of Sshether theres something God cannot of His ose re wil vig about andthe question shat the modal sats ofthe propstinns of gi teed independent of Ged {henna Phage fe commited othe lan thatthe maces teh ofthe laws of opie JP independent of G's will Descartes wo View him as commited toa doctine ‘which acres Fini to God's power 6. esc key thn he ist instance, Descartes as esprnng to Suare7 not Agnes 8 viddcrses the quetion of wheter the eee ate pice 1 Goa aiwer Desires mst encerne 10 eject Suarer’s view is that the ete vers do mot derive thet th frm Gis hay Fnuchowen ho then- rather, they are Krewe by Hi Recase they re tie. hes th jt ito His knowledge of them andthe object ofthe feat ‘tate dependent on Go's wll then contrary to thei natre. they would be na more nee hary than ny ther created truth they would ot proceed necessarily hut voluntarily {See Diipuotenes Metaphysiea, Disp, XXXI, sec. 12, No, 40.) Inthe evar of si Ing tte eteral rath ae independent of G's wil Suate7 allows htnsel tay that the clerna ths would he ire even f Geel did not exist, This formation of the pro fem ferns the pint of departare fr many of Descartes discussions of the tats ofthe feral tthe, fo example inthe Sih Se of Rees: IW anyone atten othe inmnearabe greatness of Gs he wil find it manifestly clea that thete ean be nothing whatsoever thi does not depend ct him This apples no jt everything tha subsists, but al frde. every law, and etry reason for anything’ being tue or goed Ifsome reason fr something's being good had existed prior to his peor ination. this Would have determined God to prefer those things which i {eas bes ta do [ny emphasis, (The Philosophical Wrrings of Descartes, tans, Cottingham, Stoothf, nd Murdoch in 3 volumes (Cambridge: ‘Cambridge University Prese, 1984-1991}, vol 2, 293-94. Al subsequent references to Deseares will be to oe of these volumes) Descartes avoids Sue's concn tha thee ae tats which ont depend gon Gus eee ysjecing hs tochles conversa lam that here ae ahs echoed om lw Bsc sn nthe Thos tra” depens upon the wil ef God and ws reordane by Min. Descartes, fate Tats same ae gov noel the question of whee the eterna ths depend ton God wih he question of whtir He eri ave true hit negations about 60 “Ror ws no te hat wie four mite igh") Ths the question othe stats of be ttt Tune ths (ete ty wo etree Gd id ot ex esos nongled for Descaes (ot ever wuld for Aus), ith he question ofthe extent ST Gal's ommpcenc ether ies within his power bing abou the negation of fennel 1. ncotet th passage uns “As forthe eral hse are rex posible nly ‘cure God rows them as reo posi. Tey are ot known a ue by Godin ay sey th nally that they ae te independent Hin tf men aly undertone The tem ofthe worse oul eer say wiht phen that htt of ang ‘Snr the iwwtee nich Ge a The peg pes on make ite thtDecore'scocen hereto eps Susteren not sta Af God aid not extn neveneless hese rae woul be efor the existence of God is 162 hint aa st eterna fal posible tts adhe oe fom whic aon end" (v0h 2h (Op cit vo. 3.236, A peat many ingenious exegetial efforts to rescue Descartes’ doctrine of the eration ‘the tera tris seem tome fo depend upon a neglect, on the par of comments ‘Descartes’ unabashed wilingness to indulge in such positive assertions Descartes carefully distinguishes between the “infinite and the ‘indefinite’ reserving the former ter for God ‘Our reason for wing the ter inefiitecathec han ‘iit in hese esses [the dvisiii f boady the numer of stars) in the frst place “ato reserve the er "infnte’ for Ge lone, Fei he ease of Gad lone, motel owe ait recognize any Tits im any respect, but out lunderstading positively tells os tht there are none, Second in the ease ‘futher things, cur understanding does mot nthe same way pesitivel tell ‘otha hey lack ini in some respect, we merely acknowledge ina nes- ‘ive wa that any nas which hes may hae cannot be discovered by us (Goi 1.202) ‘Our idea of Got ist sinly ofa Being whose its exceed cur grasp, ut rather ‘of a boing wih positively wthont ints, UI isin he mature af scl being no Tobe {ally grasped by ws" vo. 1,19), So, for Deseaves, the Fact that Ged is intinite entails thar He i incomprehensible ‘We shuld never ene iat arguments about the infinite... Por since we are ft, it woutd be absird for so detemin anything concerning the Infinite for this would Be an attempt to vt it and grasp it. (xc. 1 201-02) “This insistence upon he infinite of God intoduces a peofound tense int the heart of Descartes pilesophy-a tension Between the foundational role played by an ‘nbegat idea of God and the iconprebensbiity of Godt oa rite minds. Om the ome han, the project of Fuenshig a secure foundation for u system of scientific knowledge ‘depends upon our knowledge of Gok “The certainty and th fal krowledge depends ‘uniquely on my narenese othe tre God to sich an extent that Iwas incapable ope fect knowledge about anything else unl became swe of Hin (vol 249)-On he oer hand the idea of Goi the lea of being seas true natures heyond the reach of ou Fie minds: "We cannot comprehend the greatness of Ged, eventhough we can know {vol 3023) This latter cai also gives ise to a free poate (which we wll Begin to ‘explore in mement: bow can we know what we cannot comprehend? ‘Such view of God's omiputence (hich takes even the most fundamental principles of Topical consistency tobe sitject tothe Divine wil leads to theological havoc I'm not {ing to explore bere any ofthe many absurdities sucha view may sem to imetly ‘tangle self in. Fora bie ot penetrating general scunsen ofthe pecs see Richard MGile, On the Narre and Eristence of Gnd Cambridge: Cambri University Press 1991), 18-29, Fora erp discussion of he problem with Deseares's view, in par fica, sce Peter T. Geach, Providence ond Fst! (Cambridge: Cambeidge University Press, 1972). Chapter 1 Among the moe helpful atemps to sot out Deseares's views ‘on the creatine the eiemal tus are A. Boyce Gibson, "The Eternal Vertis and the ‘Willof Goa inthe Philosophy of Descartes” Proceedings nf the Aviotelian Soe. 8 30, 1929-1950; F. Heche, The Creation ofthe eral Truth in Descartes’ System in Descartes: Collection of rica Essays ed: Dovey (South Bend: University of Notre Dane Press 1968): F- ML Cure, "Descartes andthe Creation of the Eternal Truths” The Philosophical Review XCHI(4) (Oct 1984): H, Frankfurt "Descartes and the Creation of the Etemal Truths” Phibsophical Review LXXVI Uan. 1977), A. Furkenstin “Theology and the Scientific imapnation (Princeton: Princeton University Pres, 1986), 179-92: HL. Ishiguro, "The Svs of Necessity and Impossibility in Descartes" in Essays ‘Descartes Mediations 2d. Rony (Berkeley. Univesity of California Pres, 1986) ‘Se also the discussions in Guérolt and Wilson cited below. thers ps 163 2 8 15, 16 0. 20, opie Op cit Op.cit Op cit owe this orm 0. Op cit sul 3,25 Bren where Descartes does ot expily invoke sch a dition (Gareecn what we can tach in hough and what we can gasp he acest have someting ofthe sr ind Fo expt, wen he as ur elsing wha we cn teas asin Preps 4281201) ‘Wein elev everything which God hs reves, even shah it ay tebeyondout pap Hence. Ge Rapens oes w ws something about Hs oes sighs beyond te natural each of ur ind we al not exe to ete dsp heft hte dont leary understand t And we wl not be al spied tat there mich inte unease tare SFGate we gs ee Mi enact Moe gency. one could formule the Cartesian Pricrent the fangeof pik sophia pole one alls into when on ans caneve of rss as nel fe cers having lit anil Gucci hs uauaied way of ting de pin and ara ha se ineligitiy ef he hypothe hee gs depend pn sn bare Kno ee Gat So thoughe hphese spe ecient heen ea edi os Stare she ose clay tha ih ecpton woul tb pes or Go. "Tha Gd tsi and ots deter inf nalts, on need uh Wea have rpc hive anche and conte ele of Gol moter op {Sie th The Sol andthe Bods (Anoeap:Unerstyof Mesa Press 1S) 23) The second paragraph ofthe Fourth Monon tenons ove: might ape beacctscharening Batik gueson wher wats eprted here tear Chao tha he medi lonng he alg of en) one on pa et conaictn) to "eogne™ 2 7)-or wheter sl repens (ws Goo foi abot const on C's power “This ined aes intertetve ses which ead well eyond the oe ofthis Pare wih ate ened ae tama em Be, Gacoltin the pacding eave fave thowgt hat allo at God cold are Shen to dece wos be poi fr Ge er alent do ang hie Seay os te ni pe he at et bees nt et et snare dcsives. A ring that couldcev us ud be ine one Sint nd Hence would not be Gr The teh of Go dessving us theories 1 aie conrad, Now Desc defiey ares hat such ato elves ceneaton Dt oe aks seo Deseares> iw enna we ca tot iy oo concep then ca ot what Ged mat dea ‘oallinete acon ort todo ert testes ocala in te Sowing dim: we perceive aconation when we ate ocnceivet ding sch ng. The pres fal in teen ne qcaon of he dec few ie on init od. Asin inthis endnte, ne vay att a ie appear eof ifleaty hr derves am ous cue ef Gd es sea rece Sede vantherwe come tose ley an stint tht Ged could never eso Iihieve Bat ner restos on he atte, we thine by ou a pow {of enon? The quent: doe sah conaton hoe oncepton of Gd (enna ma cn afr on ets et for aelng tat He ack orto sch ating ers aly par of ot Se alt esheets Fp icy. cw ne on ‘hu abotely iconic even oot ed concept of Got lately impostor Gd given tiie power)? Whe one comes ct on . inuepetive ise wll depends great deal upon how much weight one pats on a hes 0 “hpstenty unequivocal passages in Descartes (hich 3s tempting to fnne) aoa INE should pot are atin to Gas power tespecialy the bass of ee hme Jpovers of comcepiont—passapes uch ax Princes, 8825-27 (vo. 120-02). the phy ithe cilih ebjection inthe Sith Set of Replies. and sunnerous remarks 1m the CComesponence, such a the following For my prt, ko that my itellectis frite and Go's powers infinite fant sls listo.» - Ando oly assert that God can do evers= thing whieh {perceive tobe possible, bu Tam nots bold to assent the Converse namely hat He anot do what conics with my conception of Ahings -t mecly sry that i invalves centration, (vol 3.369) "This suggests that with respect the ide that God isa deceive, we shoul snetely sty hat nimvoive teen ¢Ad nother held ato asset that He anno do what conics with ovr ewoxeption of ke up hove she eae of a sacha passage might hear on the problem of the Cartesian Cirle tnd the related question of what sor of valiaton it shat eur clear ad distinct eas feceive withthe sane wf the editors) “Tis formulinn (and hat of he previous sentence) sestepsacenral problem: ou cleat {Rand mest tine idea, ievonding to Descartes, cour dea of Ga —itis"The one sew tcc lands out rom all he ethers” (eo, 1 197). But ifthe necessity of or lear and {istnee ideas merely dies fom he principles which have heen implanted i ou ite mand this opens up the possibilty of pap etween God's actual nature ad even the ost lear ad distinct dev which we ae able o form of His nate. Tis. rn, aes the following exceedingly corrosive wort (suppressed the previews note: ou clear and Ustinet perception of God's omniptence is merely a reflection of the fact thal acetin foncept of Ge as been implied incur minds. But now its mo Tonger cleat wht the bn for Descats's lam that we should never say that Ge cannot do something. Sort to lock sf al tha this means i that omnipotence ia necessary Feature of ou con Sopra Gidthas insofar x we wishto think of Go we cannot think of him in anyother Seay than as omnipotent. But why shouldnt we conclude that tenevolence isan equally “erential feature of our cancep of God and hence conclude that the idea that Gnd could ‘hee deceiver sone whichis szplyvnthikable fr us? In order to block this, 1ooks as It Deseantes hast say that ont the idea that Go could bea deceive) the tea that Ged Jacks emmipetence one that e cannot even appreher, Although ti sill God we touch tupon nour thought when we apprehend the incomprehensible) possibility of His deceiv- {pun it so longer in ary sense an idea of God that we form when we imagine a being {eho is ot supremely powerful, But his won't do. For the atemp io privilege omnipo- {ence and eal itasan gsc Featre of God'snatre or of ur concep of Gr) not ly sre afoul of the doctrine of Gods simpli atin the end, it deprives the ieathat Ged asa nature of sense, Descartes sys we should never say that God cannot do X even TE involves something whic we take tobe contary © God's rate, But one’s xp on the lea ofabeing’s having 9 naue—and hence one's concept of such a being ted ‘one's understanding ofthe modalities, To say that X is part of God's mature is to say thar He wouldn't be God without XT hold that God can do anything, even something Iwhich is contrary to His ature, to hold that He ean make anything compatible with His ‘ature which sto old tat God has no rare. Thus, t2sign omnipotence an absolute [prorty overall of Goal’ other athutes is to completely dain the concept of Goof al Fscontent by depriving us of any handle onthe nein tat God asa ature ‘One way to render what ce can perceive clearly and disney open to doubt is 0 have itoceu Toone that God could have piven one a awed nature (such that one i deceived {ven about that whieh seme most evident), When ones working within one's nature. as ‘tee, and one turns to fhe hing themselves, one i imply unable o wihold sent {othat whichis cear and distinct oto affirm a manifest contradiction, Se, for example, the Third Meditaion ‘Bot what aboat when Iwas considering something very simple and straightforward for example that two and thre added together make sa hat so 165 2 2s, 16 Hive. nd sy? Did Lt eat as these things ely enough aftr ‘het rth? Inded, the ly tease Hr my ler juste that they ete ‘pen to db wathat tected tht perp sone Ga cok have siven me a natmne such hat Iwas deceive even ienates which seme ‘most evden, And whenever my recenceived elie in the supreme ower ‘6f Goa comes to mind. cannot hat ant that it woul Be ofr he so desired to ig it shout hat I rong even in those mater whieh Uihink I see tery clerly with my mind's eye. Yet when I turmto the things hemteves which hink I perceive very cleaty am so convinced hy them tht I spontaneously dectare et whoever ean do se deceive hewillnever being itaborthattwosand three adled together are move ‘ress than five ran hing of hiskind in hich Use a manifest conta Aten. (0h 3.28) ‘The idea that God could have given one a fase nar remlers even car mest secure eles (those based om cleat and distinct perception! dubtelby vedi the ‘tpposiion that reason (one's faculty clear ae distin! percepein) Hell dlctve hie hdea hs the power 0 dslodge our confidence in even the mot base tit son—aconinence whichis oerwiseunshakable: Under ordinary eccumstances Wea unable to dt what we cestly and disney perceive. A clear and distinct perception sane which siestble. The conception of reason at work hee (as eompasing tse pt ‘pls in acordanee with which we cannot help ba think) i thoroughly pry asa a contradiction involves something which we are incapable of arming. acest and distinct perception, if we attend oi svolves something from which we are unable ‘o ithe assent—sometbing which itis psychology impossible to doubt Descartes ‘consi ofthe goal of rational argument i equally psychologist: ito attain a ate ‘of urshakable elit Foon of "conviction based cn arguient so tong that tean never bre shaken by any stronger argument” (vo. 3. 147). Descartes psychelopisn is eident ina pasage sucha the following ‘As soon as we think that we correctly perceive something, we are Spontaneously convinced that iis tue. Now i this conviction is fi that ts impossible for us ever to ave any reason for doing what we ate convinced of then here are further questions forest ask- we have everything that we could reasonably want = convcton so finn that its ‘quite incapable of being destroyed an such w conviction is clearly the sae asthe most perfect certainty, (vl. 2 103) ‘TheextentofDescats'spsychologisn and its implications forthe interpretation of his philosophy as « whole ate helpfully discussed by C. Larmore. ‘Descartes Paychologsie Theory of Assent” Histon of Philosophy Quarterly. 184: L Loeb. "The Cartesian Citle” in The Cambrilge Companion to Descartes, ed by J. Coingham (Cambridge: Cambridge University res, 1992); and R. Rubin, *Descaress Validation ‘of Clear and Distinct Apprehension” Phlosophical Review. 1977, Op.cit, vol 3,359. ‘This sept, for example, nthe passage fromm Descartes with which we began (vo. 3 235), Ths might appea to contradic bis remark nthe opening ofthe Sith Meditation ‘hat tha never julged hat something couldnt be made by Him except onthe rounds that there would bea contradition in my perceiving Ht distinctly” (vol 2. 0). But ‘Descartes no only says i the former passage that God could have made contradiction tee bot also that "we should not try to comprehend it, since ovr nature incapable of doings.” This suggest that whet i at sen the Sie Meditation isa judgment which flows from the naturally repugnant character ofa contradiction (our fine faculty of jcdement) and not a judgment whichis grounded ina clear ad dstint perception af the positive ints of Goa's power, ‘The crucial tenet of Cartesianism—hat reason imposes limits on the structure of our thoughe—therefore cts across any facile classification of philosophies in terms of the ‘sul pigeonhols, such as empiricism versus rationalism (or naturalism versus pine isin Viewed fom this perspective, Descartes an Mi ate staunch Caress: Labi an! Locke staunch ant Caestans {nis insrctvew conta! Lack one ofthe fouding Fathers of empiricism. ith Descartes in thisrepind Veke lke Descartes, wilarpue that an ali to eenceive bose Gea cull do someting does no. in general afeed a basis for conchng tha He end rtd To conclade tus would be to deny Goss omniptence ke nite eka Pe inthis connection is es ability to uperadd the power of though to mater: Teo fess as much as you please that we canpot conceive how a soli. sutstance thinks but this weakness of oar apprehensions reaches nal the power of God” Tle Works of Ja Locke [London 1823) 468, “To deny that Gel eo endow ete mater withthe power 1 think (9 the ‘round that we cannot cence of how thought could be produced hy mate) ist Wan ‘er into Blasphemy. But wha is tse here for Lace, oor inability to conceive bow i certain sot af ease cel pve rise toa certain st of effet We can eoncive bis Sch am efect cold he rice by sch a ease, but his Joes not mean that God eld rot ondsin to be so. Ye Locke—for al is homily about the fms of usa ka ‘eg and all his piety about God's omnipotence wil net hesitate to declare “that, ‘Onynipotency cane make a substance tobe solid and no solid atthe same tne 65). ‘Our peers of comprehension are weefally fnite and hence incencevabity ism gen fra. mot a measare of rpossihiity. But oe nab to grasp a conaiction fot om a Pur with our maby to conceive certain kinds of causal enanecton; the fone st 90 ‘ey a symptom ofthe Hite of our minds Locke steep the Catsian formula “that ‘ee canno! conceive something is nota reason to deay that Ged can do i only insofar as ‘hs comadiction involved in ou desenpion of what Gnd an do. That there no co {radiction involved in oar conception of something) is, fr Locke (as for Aqoints). the {est of whether something is possible and hence of whether (we can coherently 49) Gd can doit Hence, Locke writes: think it cans he denied that God, having 2 power to posace ideas nus cam give that power toanother: to express itetherse, make any ‘dea the elfect of any opceatinn om our besies. This has no contradiction Anal thereon spose [my emphasis) (253) 26, She writes: {tis clear enough in any case, that Descartes i ep the “neces ‘we perceive in athematicl propositions asim some sense an degree @ function ofthe constitution of our minds themselves finite “sreattes ‘And even this eave limited cain fs been found extreme by sone Dhilsaphere ath a Labi). would appear, Iwvever, thatthe hstry Of epistemology and philosophy of mathematics since Descartes has tended very clea to demonstrate that his poston was fr fom wil ot excessively ios cate. From Hunve an Kant enward it ss heen widely held tat alleped perceptions of necessity” cannot he ken fer ere) sin that we mstin some senee or her have recourse tthe suctre ‘workings of our oem minds to give an account of these “perepions Ia tion, there have been increasingly extensive doubts about the alleged inelctable neces or eternity ofthe tratonal necessary (oe eternal) truths, There is een 2 vey controversy among some Teading pilose pers ofthe preent century whether logical necessity might ot go the Same way a the waditional "necessity" of Eolidean geometry. Fro this Poin of view whats eally extraordinary isnot Descates's cretion dee {rine isl, ur the fact that he has not been given mee credit fr atving ‘i (Descartes London: Routledge Kepan Pal 1978), 125-26.) 27. Mind, Language and Realty (Cambeidge: Cambdge University Pres, 1975) 0 2k tid x 29. Op. cit, 235, Wilson immediacy goes onto observe, however: 167 w. 2 m 38 31 ». 0, 168 Aim deren cen Desa sn Pt hat Dost Act tk poston way thsi Came eel Sd. escent seat dctine sly ete th Nrown lance on cnc ten pido cena uk Tisiwcemeced a dicen wil octon na manent fy Deas he cont nec haan te De ti) Patna, ps sad es of amon Ewe Pann Te Aycan he ae in anne md ei ie. “To sa a Pon oa oof ew aN Hard University Press, 1983), Coleen Rat and Reason Cantg: Cambridge Universiy Pres 1980. 98-14, Puna spperie floc amt in which am wnt te pope wich ‘Putnam goes on to complicate nd to conte extent rect the view pul forward in the boy Pears nicely enigma aad mes ecu eons ce Eresoyinm enya oat eas Etat Pee ee ae Sane Tce ae Pi eee oo athe coe Ces i ee eee a ame ree er ima eacvanenperteseees eee See eect cpr ee ee cea ae eee Reece eee etme Uftedepyingron utr wns font oa re re ote eee cr aetna Sree anager ea Ti it opener aca nic ein ce ere nee sei artnet emt Tete earensen yeaa cretineees wirtararsoue Cae eee eee aad inl in The Principles Philoophs. Ato icantly. Deserts’ dotrin the eternal us wax well known to Leitz and tis nconee ah tat Ka Ws swith hs etcis of it 41. naneatir draft here is a this juncture an ext reference to Descartes 42. Philosophical Essay, trans. Roget Aview and Daniel Gather ¢ndianapols: Hacket, 1989) 3. 41, Kant's own full Bowded account of feeedom obsionsly requires great deal more fa fee gent thon that he merely sift capaci fr rational houpht. AI hat mates for ca present purpeses. never. that peactical reason, for Kam is species of reason Descartes confusion (aboot id's wil being constained bythe las of log) sted, for Kant not only toa confusion about the ceitons of etional agency. bl also fo an invotiien appreciation ofthe spontaneity of teason. Descartes’ account of rational ‘Tongan infeence tn tems ofthe clea an stint percetions the natural Tigh of ‘enon ford) findamentlly misconceses the chaaetr of our faculty of spontaneity Cinsitakng fora were a alleratve Torn ofreeptvit)—one tats affected By {easene rather ha intuions} fa deterinae sort. The Kanan break with Cartesian tries exonesing the ennory model of the mind as an organ which perceives reasons 444, The Leibizin outline of Kans conception of Feeder, and its eiance ona distinction ‘retcen the Real of Freed and the Real of Nature. evident ina passage such as he flog ‘Willisa kind of cavity Belonging to ving Beings fara hey are rational. Freedom would then Be the property this causality has of Being Ne to work independently of determination y alien cases... The con eptof enusality cares with that offs, Hence freedom ofthe wil “ifongh it sm the propery of conforming to laws of mare, sno Tor this eason lawless lust rather be 3 causality conforming fo nmable ‘thovgh ola seca kind: for otherwise fee will would be sell contradictory. (Groundwork ofthe Mevaphysie of Morals, tans. H. I Paton, Harper and Row, New York: 1964], 114.) 45. Theodice (Open Coun. LaSalle: 1985), 246-47. 46 The pont i summarized ir section 46 of the Monadefog However. we must not imagine, as some do, thatthe eternal ths, ting dependent on God, ace arbitrary and depend upon is will. 25 Descartes seems tofave hed...» That is te only of Contingent tas Teas the aseseary tats depen solely om Go's understating “and are is inermal object, (GW. Leite’s Manadology ed. Nicholas Rescher [Pitsburg University of Ptsburgh Press: 1991], 156.) 447. “Only rational being ha he power to actin accordance wth his ide of awstats inactordance with principles and oly so has he a wll” (Groundwork, RO. 8. “Asal acts of he understanding canbe reduced to jdpments, the understanding may be eine a the facul of judgment” (AGS/B94). 49, Thisis how eatvey ecem Putnam summarizes the same point “Tsay tha ur eith in the mest fundamental principles of deductive logic. our fait ne principle of conradiction iets imply an innate iepemsity i te obliterate totally the distinction between geason and Blind faith. (-Theels At Least One A Pie Truth" op. ct, 108) 50. Stephen Engstom argues compellingly (in “The Transcendental Dedcton and Skep- tits” forthcoming hat his passage (27 of the Transcendental Dedction) i nt—3x has ofien been assured be red as directed apanst the Cartesian skeptic (but rather boinst« Humean one) Bathe Cartesian skeet Engtrom is concered to rule out inthis Content i the mare familer Cartesian outer‘worid skeptic (who doubts the existence of “onporeal things outside the mind), Whereas the form of Cartesianism that preoccupies us hereand with which Letni contend nthe passages quoted above is ofa very dil ferent variety itis one which todches specifically om the question of the character ofthe 169 st 32 3s 4 5 necessity ofthe wns andaneta mksf ugh o Kan an acon rations strain ernsotpselilgical access icons the tao uth he so he andthe aeons ofthe understanding. this eget that Engst oul he night th {the unmanitied reference 0 "he shepic” notwithstanding fn of ease Cats {extemal wl) skepticism isin view i this page as ifr exapl, clea isin The Refutation of Melis without nor having to deny tht certain Cartesian dts ate nonetheless ming under re in §27 of he Transcendental Deitin, ned heals ot “skepicio’ Kans faved term of desripton for skepticism concerning water objects. What Kant calls skepicism” largely coieides with hat T have Been ealing “Cotesia My point snot that Kant necessarily has Descattes a mind in the Transcendental Deduction. but rater tha he concerned to respond tna Cartesian problematic which he ecmes to by way of Leib and Cratus (and which closely pales as Engin mle eas out—a problematic which Kant akesto have been ave hy Hume sel, Kan clare his point in the Lai ‘We cannot think oc use our understanding cthersie than acundin 0 conain lee Alles acording to which the understantingprceets ane ether ne suns or contingent. The Teter ne those without which mo ue of the ‘ndersing would be possible at al: theft ae hose without which 8 certain use of the understanding would not take place. The eninge rules which depend upon a certain objet of eupition ae as variegated these objets themselves. Emo, we se aside all cogaition tht we ust hoerow fe an teflec solely upon the use ofthe uadertanding in tet, we discover those of is niles which are recescary throughout, in every respect and regatdess of any special ebects. because without them we weld not ‘hink at all sigh in these miles can therefore he gained 9 prion and Independent of ane experience. eae they contain, without scrim ration benveen object, msetely the contions ofthe use of the unl standing itself be it pre or empirical. (Kant Logic, ans. R, Haran and W, Schwarz [Mineoa: Dover, 1978), 18) Ibid 5 Bid, 14-15. See leo the Fits Critique: “There are therefore two rules which logicians must always bear in ‘min in dealing with pure general ogc: 1. Asa general lope. it abstracts fom all content ofthe knowledge of | derstanding and rom ll diferences i its objects and deals with noth ing bt the mere form of thought 2. As pute fogic it has thing todo with empirical prin ohjets doesnot. as sometimes Been supose, bow anything ew chology. which therefore has ma ifluence whatever onthe canon ofthe Understanding (ASW7B7R) Weave odo ere witha wages sof the into thoughts. at were imposed the pipes of pre pene hg). tthe of he ins fhe gmat Erplyment the steps —the lt ht of thought pe a swe aoa hj, Pre ener loi deals th i conition of tong gener ascend tle the odo oft soa Tce in rR as 10 do with the possi of sessile Erol epne fo exp thought). Transcendental dialectic, as a prophylactic against transcendental Mason 54 bach tanec “Ths for Ka ie Witgenn he estons wich ies deta ion — those gest which ae preserbel bythe ey mu fea el ihe ae ‘able and et se ely ble to omer (A ih ae helen ls ie Tey are a thy re fy Wiese spy one, For Kan the pen ‘rei ies st ais fms tho arth las to es eres thar ty fih us th opis ab ees 1 ‘Thetiit Kan wishes seer nol be etd withthe ane Wiens crates etace The Kanan to lint bic ne wangress pip ec Minn) wo preven endnes temp 0 make clarcamt he equated wh the Cason mon at (which the lw gi pose eeu ho. AS we {false ean’can be seens noting redone tt loi sich ol ht the lowvot repeal ahi ae corsa fh peilty of ag sh Make mpeseiad imposing itn thot Te rts i concerned wih the Cres ino hw hae aac mh afte en cu fileA ppear ee fo proitng Kata ring of he Toots “pu pe ang onthe wo oto of it Metin the Kanan Sef inte of thew kere he Tatra atin of the its kei {helonnone) Ths nse the Kanan moment ofthe wr Tendon hd ad Snmentes ty sb te Tron tes of Kann (wel as Schopenavei Sean) eye he wk pecs ul undeine neo asin Hs 0 ik om fr comeing fates te onncenc of Cd te nga orc a: ‘phuttonthecter noel ing nant Roi eo he Rinse nih sommes the pt ths paper ha es he fee {helt lope apy nonsense” 50. The Baie Las of rahe tans. Monger Furth Bere Unversity of Cal tri ese. 1967, 1. : ‘6 This isconeced a point rege makes when compari his syste with ht Brot the Beefs nt ely caesar Bt lsat har teste eel ututcalel bu ss universal lng. The angus toss ean became ian exp cpesenaion f the (pie ame stn wbch allan ces reese gifs fers wt merely 93° Tete ue system f fp proves a erieoos reesettion 35 theaivereal media of tought This meen that he sitio between tc nti ierrettoneniely alien othe Bsr or Frege logic net Shout the mampetton of met sigs on pape: queens concerning ter dsmerpret ime cineca do ane, and gel th sot deine y way schema Forty thermo meget rom hich ner oases the syste, ‘The hauiaion ote poi of Sch standpit or Frege. depends pen 2 detain the eof he aw of tg the fundamenal ressppasitions of {Fong shou anything satoeven, For Frege, or Ral. tee feno posi of ‘hernav loge nthe contemporary sense—tere ao nos competng meres 0 Chats pal pee he opal ocean hugh On this we. feign jet} shoul, ase ght ino way abiay The stole esence ot el ew i tha there Ison) one gies (Lecnes on the Frnt of Marhemanes Cora Dona ihca: Corel 1976) 172) For futher iscnsion of ts and eited mater, ee Jean San Hjenoo, “Logic as Cant and opie a Langoge™ in Sete Essos Naples ising 1988), Waren Golan apc nthe Teen’ Journal of Sombie Lege 448) (S197): and “Potent ‘Ai te Logit in tones Stuer nthe Piso of Science I, W. ‘Ngee and F Richer finnepots: Univer of innesaa Press THER, ad he pave by Thoms Ricks, ited Delo 59, "When propositions cle» poster o antic in my seas tis smo judge tout coon pscholopyssogcl pyc. which have made po $i fo he coe the opt nr coneiouness nxn itajudement aboot {he'way in whch Some eer tan hes come. perhaps eoncouy 1 eleve Is re ‘Mice ie judomen aout he imate qd my emp] pon which et the Fisifeation fo Reding i to Be Ire” (The Foundations of Antimenc [Evanson Nontiwesern Universi Pres, 180), 4), (isan important difference between Kant and rege that rege sees logic tenon i m 6 a, 6 nm wna henge sce of kr edge Towing passage! ss exc, for example, he ‘What Lepr a a source of kno edge is what jot the reson ‘ion of teh the aren 1 isinish he following sources of knowledge 1, See perception 2. The logical soure of Knowledge 3, The geometrical and temporal sources of knowledge (Poshnonnus Wetngs, ed. H. Hermes. F- Kambartel, and F. Kaulbach [Chicag: University of Chicago Press. 1979). 128.267) A numberof commentators hase though that the fllssng fomlation should he veal snail nthe Kanton flat he cs ow these distinctions bewcen api and paseo artic amd analyte, concern a Tse it po the comfent ofthe jadent bat the jsieaton for making the japment. [Foundations of Aifimen. 3) “They have therefore wished wo asmis the fstowing foot, hich Frege appends ths passage, a dsngennons: By this Ido not, of course, mean to asign anew sere these terms, ton to sate acoralely whut euler writers. Kant pric, have meant by ther. Ib) Frege rematks ina number of places that he thinks Kans “re view was ae ifcalto discover (i. 37. jhecaute his ode of expression sometines obscures his agreement ith Frege abou the importance of sharply desing he distinction between the psychological andthe logical. Frege rakes it clear nhs discussions of Kans account ‘of arithmetic tha he understands Kan's view (hat the th of atelier symtic pros to amount to the claim that pure infution rst be invoked “te ultimate round of our knowledge of sch judgments” (bid. 18) rege takes Kat's concer here tobe, lke his ow, withthe jthcarion ofthe tus of arithmetic Pepe's meive in recasting the anaytictsyheti distnetion in terms of justification (ater than cane) 6 in part to make it lear tat the question a sve fs abt one that canbe lumina by 2 psychological investigation. (He views his conteperres is prone to confuse subective _sychologieal content with objective ogieal content) Hei leo concemed to hea off psychologist misconstrals of his (and Kans talk about racing ante ots imate round. He is out to daw the distinction (asthe fll context ofthe passage om page 3 na manner which marks of as erisply as possible the question of how we Proposition fom the question of where t dries is ution from, ‘So Frege’ intention i to rem thal to the spin. fmt the eter, of Kent's pilosophy. Nonetheless, his reonsteal ofthe analticlsatheis distinction marks more fash than Fege would have us believe, Kant defines an analytic judgment as one whose predicates contained in its subjet Kans definition of analytic permits one to inspect an individual adgment aken in oation and see wher it interal structure isof the appropriate composition Frege's defnition departs rom this conception in three significant respects. ist artention shifted fom the qetion ofthe nema legal tc ure ofan ivi judgment tothe question of the logical relation between aiid al jpment anda entire body of judgments om which it ay be derivable), Secondly, im detenmining whether a proposition is analytic. the rlevant hey of propositions the has avs of logic taken coletivey eather than, for Kant. simply the principle of po

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