Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
I. HISTORICAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSIDERATIONS
PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION
INC. v PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION
70 PHIL 221
LAUREL; June 26, 1940
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
- For the past 20 years, Pangasinan
Transport has been engaged in the
business of transporting in
Pangasinan, Tarlac and Nueva Ecija
through TPU buses in accordance
with the terms and conditions of the
certificates of public convenience
issued by the Public Utility
Commission (later called Public
Service Commission).
- August 26, 1939 – PTI applied for an
authorization to operate ten
additional Brockway trucks on the
ground that they were needed to
comply with the terms and conditions
of its existing certificates and as a
result of the application of the Eight
Hour Labor Law. This was granted by
the Public Service Commission with
the following conditions (which are
written in a beautiful language called
Spanish so you may refer to the
original text in the case if there is a
lack of confidence in my translation
^_^):
- That the certificates of
authorization issued to
Pangasinan Transport would be
valid only for a period of 25
years counted from the date of
promulgation
- That the company may be
acquired by the Philippine
Commonwealth with proper
payment of the cost price of its
equipment, taking into account
reasonable depreciation to be
fixed by the Commission at the
time of it acquisition.
- October 9, 1939 – PTI did not agree
with the conditions set by PSC so it
filed a motion for reconsideration
which was denied by the latter.
- November 20, 1939 - The present
petition for a writ of certiorari was
instituted in this court praying that:
- An order be issued directing
the secretary of the Public
Service Commission to certify
forthwith to this court the
records of all proceedings in
the case.
- After hearing, the Court
should render a decision
declaring section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 454
unconstitutional and void
- If this court should be of the
opinion that section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 454 is
constitutional, a decision
-1-
A2010
should be rendered declaring
that the provisions are not
applicable to valid and
subsisting certificates issued
prior to June 8, 1939.
- Section 15 of Commonwealth Act
No. 146, as amended by section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 454 states
that “no public service shall operate
in the Philippines without possessing
a valid and subsisting certificate from
the Public Service Commission” and
that “the Commission may prescribe
as a condition for the issuance of the
certificate provided in the preceding
paragraph that the service can be
acquired by the Commonwealth of
the Philippines or by any
instrumentality thereof upon payment
of the cost price of its useful
equipment, less reasonable
depreciation; and likewise, that the
certificate shall valid only for a
definite period of time; and that the
violation of any of these conditions
shall produce the immediate
cancellation of the certificate without
the necessity of any express action
on the part of the Commission.”
ISSUE
WON the conditions set by the
Public Service Commission were
valid (as mandated by
Commonwealth Act 146)
HELD
YES but a remand of the case was
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
ordered
Reasoning
- The condition that the Commission
can acquire PTI is a restatement of
the constitutional provision that the
“State may, in the interest of national
welfare and defense, establish and
operate industries and means of
transportation and communication,
and, upon payment of just
compensation, transfer to public
ownership utilities and other private
enterprises to be operated by the
Government.”
- PTI assails the condition that the
certificates will be valid only for a
period of time. This should be
construed with the mandate that the
Public Service Commission should
issue certifications with the public
interest in mind. Thus the period for
validity is established in relation to
promoting and safeguarding public
interest.
- Section 8 of Article XIII of the
Constitution provides, among
other things, that no franchise,
certificate, or any other form of
authorization for the operation
of a public utility shall be "for a
longer period than fifty years."
- When it was ordained, in
section 15 of Commonwealth
Act No. 146, as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 454,
that the Public Service
Commission may prescribe as
a condition for the issuance of
a certificate that it "shall be
valid only for a definite period
of time" and, in section 16 (a)
that "no such certificates shall
be issued for a period of more
than fifty years," the National
Assembly meant to give effect
to this constitutional mandate.
- All that has been delegated to
the Commission, therefore, is
the administrative function,
involving the use discretion, to
carry out the will of the
National Assembly having in
view, in addition, the
promotion of "public interests
in a proper and suitable
manner."
- The petitioner is mistaken in the
suggestion that, simply because its
existing certificates had been granted
before June 8, 1939, the date when
Commonwealth Act No. 454,
amendatory of section 15 of
Commonwealth Act No. 146, was
approved, it must be deemed to have
the right of holding them in
perpetuity. The Constitution of the
Philippines provided, in section 8 of
Article XIII, that "no franchise or right
shall be granted to any individual,
firm, or corporation, except under the
condition that it shall be subject to
amendment, alteration, or repeal by
the National Assembly when the
public interest so requires." This is in
accordance with all other previous
laws (such as the Jones Law and the
-2-
A2010
Philippine Bill) on the matter.
- Statutes enacted for the regulation
of public utilities, being a proper
exercise by the state of its police
power, are applicable not only to
those public utilities coming into
existence after its passage, but
likewise to those already established
and in operation.
- Commonwealth Acts Nos. 146 and
454 are not only the organic acts of
the Public Service Commission but
are "a part of the charter of every
utility company operating or seeking
to operate a franchise" in the
Philippines.
- However the Court ordered a
remand of the case.
- The petitioner's application
here was for an increase of its
equipment to enable it to
comply with the conditions of
its certificates of public
convenience.
- On the matter of limitation to
twenty five (25) years of the
life of its certificates of public
convenience, there had been
neither notice nor opportunity
given the petitioner to be
heard or present evidence.
Disposition The decision appealed
from is hereby reversed and the case
remanded to the Public Service
Commission for further proceedings
in accordance with law and this
decision, without any pronouncement
regarding costs.
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
MANILA ELECTRIC v PASAY
TRANSPO
57 PHIL 600
MALCOLM ; NOV 25, 1932
FACTS
-Act No. 1446 granted a franchise to
Charles M. Swift to “construct,
maintain, and operate an electric
railway, and to construct, maintain,
and operate an electric light, heat,
and power system from a point in the
City of Manila in an easterly direction
to the town in Pasig, in the Province
of Rizal."
-Section 11 of the Act provides:
"Whenever any franchise or right of
way is granted to any other person or
corporation, now or hereafter in
existence, over portions of the lines
and tracks of the grantee herein, the
terms on which said other person or
corporation shall use such right of
way, and the compensation to be
paid to the grantee herein by such
other person or corporation for said
use, shall be fixed by the members of
the Supreme Court, sitting as a board
of arbitrators, the decision of a
majority of whom shall be final."
- Manila Electric now asks the
members of the Supreme Court,
sitting as a board of arbitrators, to fix
the terms upon which certain
transportation companies shall be
permitted to use the Pasig bridge of
the Manila Electric Company and the
compensation to be paid to the
Manila Electric Company by such
transportation companies
ISSUE/S
WON the members of the SC has
legal right to act as board of
arbitrators
HELD
NO
- Section 11 of Act No. 1446
contravenes the maxims which guide
the operation of a democratic
government constitutionally
established, and that it would be
improper and illegal for the members
of the Supreme Court, sitting as a
board of arbitrators, the decision of a
majority of whom shall be final, to act
on the petition of the Manila Electric
Company.
-The Supreme Court of the Philippine
Islands represents one of the three
divisions of power in our government.
It is judicial power and judicial power
only which is exercised by the
Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme
Court, as the guardian of
constitutional rights, should not
sanction usurpations by any other
department of the government, so
should it as strictly confine its own
sphere of influence to the powers
expressly or by implication conferred
on it by the Organic Act. The
-3-
A2010
Supreme Court and its members
should not and cannot be required to
exercise any power or to perform any
trust or to assume any duty not
pertaining to or connected with the
administering of judicial functions.
-The Organic Act provides that the
Supreme Court of the Philippine
Islands shall possess and exercise
jurisdiction as heretofore provided
and such additional jurisdiction as
shall hereafter be prescribed by law.
When the Organic Act speaks of the
exercise of "jurisdiction" by the
Supreme Court, it could only mean
the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the
Supreme Court acting as a court, and
could hardly mean the exercise of
"jurisdiction" by the members of the
Supreme Court, sitting as a board of
arbitrators. There is an important
distinction between the Supreme
Court as an entity and the members
of the Supreme Court. A board of
arbitrators is not a "court" in any
proper sense of the term, and
possess none of the jurisdiction which
the Organic Act contemplates shall be
exercised by the Supreme Court.
Disposition The members of the
Supreme Court decline to proceed
further in the matter.
NOBLEJAS v TEEHANKEE
23 SCRA 405
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
REYES JBL; April 29, 1968
NATURE:
Petition for writ of prohibition with
preliminary injunction
FACTS:
- Antonio H. Noblejas is the duly
appointed, confirmed and qualified
Commissioner of Land Registration.
By the terms of section 2 of RA
1151, the said Commissioner is
declared "entitled to the same
compensation, emoluments and
privileges as those of a Judge of the
Court of First Instance."
- On March 7, 1968, Sec of Justice
Teehankee coursed to Noblejas a
letter requiring him to explain in
writing why no disciplinary action
should be taken against petitioner
for "approving or recommending
approval of subdivision,
consolidation and consolidated-
subdivision plans covering areas
greatly in excess of the areas
covered by the original titles."
Noblejas answered and apprised the
Secretary of Justice that, as he
enjoyed the rank, privileges,
emoluments and compensation of a
Judge of the Court of First Instance,
he could only be suspended and
investigated in the same manner as
a Judge of the Courts of First
Instance, and, therefore, the papers
relative to his case should be
submitted to the Supreme Court, for
action thereon conformably to
section 67 of the Judiciary Act (R. A.
No. 296) and Revised Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court.
- On March 17, 1968, Noblejas
received a communication signed
by the Executive Secretary, "by
authority of the President",
whereby, based on "finding that a
prima facie case exists against you
for gross negligence and conduct
prejudicial to the public interest",
petitioner was "hereby suspended,
upon receipt hereof, pending
investigation of the above charges."
- On March 18, 1968, petitioner
applied to this Court, reiterating the
contentions advanced in his letter
to the Secretary of Justice, claiming
lack of jurisdiction and abuse of
discretion, and praying for
restraining writs. In their answer
respondents admit the facts but
denied that petitioner, as Land
Registration Commissioner,
exercises judicial functions, or that
the petitioner may be considered a
Judge of First Instance within the
purview of the Judiciary Act and
Revised Rules of Court 140; that the
function of investigating charges
against public officers is
administrative or executive in
nature; that the Legislature may not
charge the judiciary with non-
judicial functions or duties except
when reasonably incidental to the
fulfillment of judicial duties, as it
-4-
A2010
would be in violation of the principle
of the separation of powers.
ISSUE:
WON the Commissioner of Land
Registration may only be investigated
by the Supreme Court, in view of the
conferment upon him by RA 1151 and
Appropriation Laws of the rank and
privileges of a Judge of the Court of
First Instance.
HELD:
NO
- section 67 of the Judiciary Act
providing for investigation,
suspension or removal of Judges,
specifically recites that "No District
Judge shall be separated or removed
from office by the President of the
Philippines unless sufficient cause
shall exist in the judgment of the
Supreme Court . . ." and it is nowhere
claimed, much less shown, that the
Commissioner of Land Registration is
a District Judge, or in fact a member
of the Judiciary.
- petitioner's theory that the grant of
"privileges of a Judge of First
Instance" includes by implication the
right to be investigated only by the
Supreme Court and to be suspended
or removed upon its
recommendation, would necessarily
result in the same right being
possessed by a variety of executive
officials upon whom the Legislature
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
had indiscriminately conferred the
same privileges.
- Incidentally, petitioner's stand would
also lead to the conclusion that the
Solicitor General, another appointee
of the President, could not be
removed by the latter, since the
Appropriation Acts confer upon the
Solicitor General the rank and
privileges of a Justice of the Court of
Appeals, and these Justices are only
removable by the Legislature,
through the process of impeachment
(Judiciary Act, sec. 24, par. 2).
- such unusual corollaries could not
have been intended by the
Legislature when it granted these
executive officials the rank and
privileges of Judges of First Instance.
Where the legislative design is to
make the suspension or removal
procedure prescribed for Judges of
First Instance applicable to other
officers, provision to that effect is
made in plain and unequivocal
language.
- if the Legislature had really intended
to include in the general grant of
"privileges" or "rank and privileges of
Judges of the Court of First Instance"
the right to be investigated by the
Supreme Court, and to be suspended
or removed only upon
recommendation of that Court, then
such grant of privileges would be
unconstitutional, since it would
violate the fundamental doctrine of
separation of powers, by charging
this court with the administrative
function of supervisory control over
executive officials, and
simultaneously reducing pro tanto the
control of the Chief Executive over
such officials.
Disposition Writs denied, petition
dismissed
GARCIA v MACARAIG
39 SCRA 106
BARREDO; MAY 31, 1971
NATURE
Administrative complaint
FACTS
-Respondent Judge Macaraig was
appointed to one of the newly created
CFI branches in Laguna, in 1970. At
the time of appointment, he was
Chief of the Technical Staff of the
DOJ, receiving salary therefrom.
- After confirmation of his
appointment by the COA, respondent
judge took his oath of office on June
1970. However, due to several delays
in securing the court sala
(unavailability of funds for office
equipment and supplies, trouble
securing the space for the courtroom
due to objections and disagreement
over price), he never had the chance
to actually perform the functions of a
district judge. After realizing that it
might take sometime before he could
-5-
A2010
actually begin hearing cases in his
court, he decided to apply for an
extended leave of absence. The Sec.
of Justice, however, asked him to
forego his leave and, instead,
requested him to assist him, without
being extended a formal detail, which
he accepted.
- Having taken his oath as District
Judge and, drawing salary as judge
but without performing his functions
as such, respondent was charged by
Paz Garcia for “dishonesty, violation
of his oath of office as judge.. .gross
incompetence, violation of RA 296,
particularly Secs 5, 55 and 58
thereof.
ISSUE
WON respondent is guilty of the
allegations
HELD
No.
Reasoning He has not yet started
performing any judicial functions.
None of these laws and circulars
apply to him, for all of them
contemplate judges who are actually
holding trials and hearings and
making decisions and others. That he
could not actually hold office in the
court to which he was appointed was
not of his making.
***While the SC dismissed the
complaint, it nevertheless expressed
the opinion that it did not look with
favor the long standing practice of
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
judges being detailed in the DOJ to
assist the Secretary even if it were
only in connection with his work of
exercising administrative authority
over the courts, stressing the
principle of separation of powers. The
Court was of the opinion that
respondent was not guilty of
dishonesty or violation of his oath of
office as district judge as it was not
altogether his fault that he could not
actually perform his functions as
presiding judge of the CFI of Laguna.
Under the circumstances he was
placed in, he made himself available
to the DOJ to assist the Secretary,
using his experience as technical
assistant in said office.
Disposition Administrative
complaint DISMISSED.
IN RE: DESIGNATION OF JUDGE
RODOLFO U. MANZANO AS
MEMBER OF THE ILOCOS NORTE
PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE ON
JUSTICE
166 SCRA 106
PADILLA; October 5, 1988
NATURE
Request for the issuance of a SC
Resolution on the appointment of
Judge Manzano as a member of the
Prov. Committee on Justice
FACTS
A2010
-On 4 July 1988, Judge Rodolfo U. particularly those involving the poor
Manzano, Executive Judge, RTC, and indigent ones, thus alleviating jail
Bangui, Ilocos Norte, Branch 19, sent congestion and improving local jail
this Court a letter which reads: conditions. Among the functions of
…I was designated as a member of the Committee are:
the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee -- Receive complaints against any
on Justice… apprehending officer, jail warden,
Before I may accept the appointment final or judge who may be found to
and enter in the discharge of the have committed abuses in the
powers and duties of the position as discharge of his duties and refer the
member of the Provincial Committee same to proper authority for
on Justice, may I have the honor to appropriate action;
request for the issuance by the -- Recommend revision of any law or
Honorable Supreme Court of a regulation which is believed
Resolution, as follows: prejudicial to the proper
(1) Authorizing me to accept the administration of criminal justice.
appointment and to as assume and - It is evident that such Provincial/City
discharge the powers and duties Committees on Justice perform
attached to the said position; administrative functions.
(2) Considering my membership in Administrative functions are those
the Committee as neither violative of which involve the regulation and
the Independence of the Judiciary nor control over the conduct and affairs
a violation of Section 12, Article VIII, of individuals for; their own welfare
or of the second paragraph of Section and the promulgation of rules and
.7, Article IX (B), both of the regulations to better carry out the
Constitution, and will not in any way policy of the legislature or such as are
amount to an abandonment of my devolved upon the administrative
present position as Executive Judge agency by the organic law of its
and as a member of the Judiciary; and existence.
(3) Consider my membership in the - Furthermore, it is provided that ”The
said Committee as part of the Provincial/City Committees on Justice
primary functions of an Executive shall be under the supervision of the
Judge. Secretary of justice Quarterly
- An examination of Executive Order accomplishment reports shall be
No. 856, as amended, reveals that submitted to the Office of the
Provincial/City Committees on Justice Secretary of Justice”.
are created to insure the speedy
disposition of cases of detainees, HELD
-6-
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
- Under the Constitution, the
members of the Supreme Court and
other courts established by law shall
not be designated to any agency
performing quasi- judicial or
administrative functions
- Considering that membership of
Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte
Provincial Committee on Justice,
which discharges a administrative
functions, will be in violation of the
Constitution, the Court is constrained
to deny his request.
- in Garcia vs. Macaraig: While the
doctrine of separation of powers is a
relative theory not to be enforced
with pedantic rigor, the practical
demands of government precluding
its doctrinaire application, it cannot
justify a member of the judiciary
being required to assume a position
or perform a duty non-judicial in
character. That is implicit in the
principle. Otherwise there is a plain
departure from its command. The
essence of the trust reposed in him is
to decide. Only a higher court can
pass on his actuation. He is not a
subordinate of an executive or
legislative official, however eminent.
It is indispensable that there be no
exception to the rigidity of such a
norm if he is, as expected, to be
confined to the task of adjudication.
Fidelity to his sworn responsibility no
less than the maintenance of respect
for the judiciary can be satisfied with
nothing less.
- This declaration does not mean that
RTC Judges should adopt an attitude
of monastic insensibility or
unbecoming indifference to
Province/City Committee on Justice.
As incumbent RTC Judges, they form
part of the structure of government.
Their integrity and performance in
the adjudication of cases contribute
to the solidity of such structure. As
public officials, they are trustees of
an orderly society. Even as non-
members of Provincial/City
Committees on Justice, RTC judges
should render assistance to said
Committees to help promote the
laudable purposes for which they
exist, but only when such assistance
may be reasonably incidental to the
fulfillment of their judicial duties.
Disposition The aforesaid request of
Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano is DENIED.
SEPARATE OPINIONS
GUTIERREZ, dissenting:
- The Constitution prohibits the
designation of members of the
judiciary to any agency performing
quasi-judicial or administrative
functions.
- Insofar as the term "quasi-judicial" is
concerned, it has a fairly clear
meaning and Judges can confidently
refrain from participating in the work
of any administrative agency which
adjudicates disputes and
-7-
A2010
controversies involving the rights of
parties within its jurisdiction. The
issue involved in this case is where to
draw the line insofar as
administrative functions are
concerned.
- "Administrative functions" as used
in Section 12 refers to the executive
machinery of government and the
performance by that machinery of
governmental acts. It refers to the
management actions, determinations,
and orders of executive officials as
they administer the laws and try to
make government effective. There is
an element of positive action, of
supervision or control.
- membership in the Provincial or
City Committee on Justice would
not involve any regulation or
control over the conduct and
affairs of individuals. Neither will
the Committee on Justice
promulgate rules and regulations
nor exercise any quasi-legislative
functions. Its work is purely
advisory. I do not see anything
wrong in a member of the judiciary
joining any study group which
concentrates on the administration of
justice as long as the group merely
deliberates on problems involving the
speedy disposition of cases
particularly those involving the poor
and needy litigants or detainees,
pools the expertise and experiences
of the members, and limits itself to
recommendations which may be
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
adopted or rejected by those who
have the power to legislate or
administer the particular function
involved in their implementation.
-The constitutional provision is
intended to shield Judges from
participating in activities which may
compromise their independence or
hamper their work.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, dissenting:
- What I believe is contemplated by
the Constitutional prohibition is
designation, for example, to such
quasi-judicial bodies as the SEC, or
administrative agencies like the BIR.
Those are full-time positions involving
running the affairs of government,
which will interfere with the discharge
of judicial functions or totally remove
a Judge/Justice from the performance
of his regular functions.
- The Committee on Justice cannot be
likened to such an administrative
agency of government. It is a study
group with recommendatory
functions.
PUYAT v DE GUZMAN JR.
113 SCRA 31
Melencio-Herrera; March 25 1982
NATURE
This suit for certiorari and
Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction is poised against the
Order of respondent Associate
A2010
Commissioner of the Securities 1973 Constitution, then in force,
and Exchange Commission (SEC) provided that no Assemblyman
granting Assemblyman Estanislao could "appear as counsel
A. Fernandez leave to intervene in before ... any administrative
SEC Case No. 1747 body", and SEC was an
administrative body. Incidentally,
FACTS the same prohibition was
On May 14,1979, an election for maintained by the April 7, 1981
the eleven Directors of the plebiscite. The cited
International Pipe Industries Constitutional prohibition being
Corporation (IPI) a private clear, Assemblyman Fernandez
corporation, was held. Some did not continue his appearance
named on the left list of elected for respondent Acero.
officials may be called the Puyat When the SEC Case was called, it
Group; those on the right, the turned out that:
Acero Group. Thus, the Puyat (i) On May 15, 1979,
Group would be in control of the Assemblyman Estanislao A.
Board and of the management of Fernandez had purchased from
IPI. The Acero Group instituted at Augusto A. Morales ten (10)
the Securities and Exchange shares of stock of IPI for P200.00
Commission (SEC) quo warranto upon request of respondent Acero
proceedings, docketed as Case to qualify him to run for election
No. 1747 (the SEC Case), as a Director.
questioning the election of May (ii) The deed of sale, however, was
14, 1979. The Acero Group notarized only on May 30, 1979
claimed that the stockholders' and was sought to be registered
votes were not properly counted. on said date.
The Puyat Group claims that at (iii) On May 31, 1979, the day
conferences of the parties with following the notarization of
respondent SEC Commissioner de Assemblyman Fernandez'
Guzman, Justice Estanislao A. purchase, the latter had filed an
Fernandez, then a member of the Urgent Motion for Intervention in
Interim Batasang Pambansa, the SEC Case as the owner of ten
orally entered his appearance as (10) IPI shares alleging legal
counsel for respondent Acero to interest in the matter in litigation.
which the Puyat Group objected The SEC granted leave to
on Constitutional grounds. intervene on the basis of Atty.
Section 11, Article VIII, of the Fernandez' ownership of the said
-8-
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
ten shares. It is this Order allowing
intervention that precipitated the
instant petition for certiorari and
Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Assemblyman
Fernandez, as a then stockholder
of IPI may intervene in the SEC
Case without violating Section 11,
Article VIII of the Constitution
HELD
1. NO.
Ratio
Section 11, Article VIII of the
Constitution, which, as amended,
reads: SEC. 11.
No Member of the Batasang
Pambansa shall appear as counsel
before any court without appellate
jurisdiction.
before any court in any civil case
wherein the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof is the adverse
party,
or in any criminal case wherein any
officer or employee of the
Government is accused of an offense
committed in relation to his office,
or before any administrative body.
Neither shall he, directly or indirectly
be interested financially in any
contract with, or in any franchise or
special privilege granted by the
Government, or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or
controlled corporation, during his
term of office.
He shall not accept employment to
intervene in any cause or matter
where he may be called to act on
account of his office. (Emphasis
supplied)
Reasoning
Certain salient circumstances
militate against the intervention of
Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC
Case. He had acquired a mere
P200.00 worth of stock in IPI,
representing ten shares out of
262,843 outstanding shares. He
acquired them "after the fact" that is,
on May 30, 1979, after the contested
election of Directors on May 14, 1979,
after the quo warranto suit had been
filed on May 25, 1979 before SEC and
one day before the scheduled hearing
of the case before the SEC on May
31, 1979. And what is more, before
he moved to intervene, he had
signified his intention to appear as
counsel for respondent Eustaquio T.
C. Acero, but which was objected to
by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the
validity of the objection, he decided,
instead, to "intervene" on the ground
of legal interest in the matter under
litigation. And it maybe noted that in
the case filed before the Rizal Court
of First Instance (L-51928), he
appeared as counsel for defendant
Excelsior, co-defendant of respondent
Acero therein.
-9-
A2010
Under those facts and circumstances,
we are constrained to find that there
has been an indirect "appearance as
counsel before ... an administrative
body" and, in our opinion, that is a
circumvention of the Constitutional
prohibition. The "intervention" was an
afterthought to enable him to appear
actively in the proceedings in some
other capacity. To believe the avowed
purpose, that is, to enable him
eventually to vote and to be elected
as Director in the event of an
unfavorable outcome of the SEC Case
would be pure naivete. He would still
appear as counsel indirectly. A ruling
upholding the "intervention" would
make the constitutional provision
ineffective. All an Assemblyman need
do, if he wants to influence an
administrative body is to acquire a
minimal participation in the "interest"
of the client and then "intervene" in
the proceedings. That which the
Constitution directly prohibits may
not be done by indirection or by a
general legislative act which is
intended to accomplish the objects
specifically or impliedly prohibited.
In brief, the intervention of
Assemblyman Fernandez in SEC. No.
1747 falls within the ambit of the
prohibition contained in Section 11,
Article VIII of the Constitution.
II. CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTION
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
A. ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES Elections, and the Commission on
AND THE EXECUTIVE POWER OF Audit.
THE PRESIDENT -He submits that the creation of the
Joint Congressional Oversight
ARTICLE VII, 1987 Constitution Committee with the power to review,
Section 1. The executive power shall revise, amend and approve the
be vested in the President of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
Philippines. promulgated by the COMELEC, R.A.
Section 17. The President shall have No. 9189 intrudes into the
control of all the executive independence of the COMELEC which,
departments, bureaus, and offices. as a constitutional body, is not under
He shall ensure that the laws be the control of either the executive or
faithfully executed. legislative departments of
government; that only the COMELEC
itself can promulgate rules and
regulations which may be changed or
revised only by the majority of its
B. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT members; and that should the rules
POWER promulgated by the COMELEC violate
any law, it is the Court that has the
MACALINTAL v COMMISSION ON power to review the same via the
ELECTIONS petition of any interested party,
405 SCRA 693 including the legislators.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J., July 10, -It is only on this question that
2003 respondent COMELEC submitted its
Comment. It agrees with the
NATURE petitioner that Sections 19 and 25 of
Petition for certiorari and prohibition R.A. No. 9189 are unconstitutional.
Like the petitioner, respondent
FACTS COMELEC anchors its claim of
-Macalintal as taxpayer avers that unconstitutionality of said Sections
Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 upon Section 1, Article IX-A of the
violate Article IX-A (Common Constitution providing for the
Provisions) of the Constitution, to wit: independence of the constitutional
Section 1. The Constitutional commissions such as the COMELEC.
Commissions, which shall be It asserts that its power to formulate
independent, are the Civil Service rules and regulations has been
Commission, the Commission on upheld in Gallardo vs. Tabamo, Jr.
- 10 -
A2010
[RELATIVE NI JAT?-hehe] where this
Court held that the power of the
COMELEC to formulate rules and
regulations is implicit in its power to
implement regulations under Section
2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution.
COMELEC joins the petitioner in
asserting that as an independent
constitutional body, it may not be
subject to interference by any
government instrumentality and that
only this Court may review COMELEC
rules and only in cases of grave
abuse of discretion.
- The COMELEC adds, however, that
another provision, vis-à-vis its rule-
making power, to wit:
SEC. 17. Voting by Mail. -
17.1. For the May, 2004 elections,
the Commission shall authorize
voting by mail in not more than three
(3) countries, subject to the approval
of the Congressional Oversight
Committee. Voting by mail may be
allowed in countries that satisfy the
following conditions:
a) Where the mailing system is
fairly well-developed and secure to
prevent occasion for fraud;
b) Where there exists a
technically established identification
system that would preclude multiple
or proxy voting; and
c) Where the system of reception
and custody of mailed ballots in the
embassies, consulates and other
foreign service establishments
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
concerned are adequate and well-
secured.
Thereafter, voting by mail in any
country shall be allowed only upon
review and approval of the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee.
... ... ...
is likewise unconstitutional as it
violates Section 1, Article IX-A
mandating the independence of
constitutional commissions.
-The Solicitor General takes exception
to his prefatory statement that the
constitutional challenge must fail and
agrees with the petitioner that
Sections 19 and 25 are invalid and
unconstitutional on the ground that
there is nothing in Article VI of the
Constitution on Legislative
Department that would as much as
imply that Congress has concurrent
power to enforce and administer
election laws with the COMELEC; and
by the principles of exclusio unius
est exclusio alterius and
expressum facit cessare tacitum,
the constitutionally enumerated
powers of Congress circumscribe its
authority to the exclusion of all
others.
ISSUE
Whether or not Congress, through
the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee created in Section 25
of Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise
the power to review, revise,
amend, and approve the
Implementing Rules and
Regulations that the Commission
on Elections shall promulgate
without violating the
independence of the COMELEC
under Section 1, Article IX-A of
the Constitution?
HELD
NO.
RATIO
Once a law is enacted and approved,
the legislative function is deemed
accomplished and complete. The
legislative function may spring back
to Congress relative to the same law
only if that body deems it proper to
review, amend and revise the law,
but certainly not to approve, review,
revise and amend the IRR of the
COMELEC.
-By vesting itself with the powers to
approve, review, amend, and revise
the IRR for The Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003, Congress went
beyond the scope of its constitutional
authority. Congress trampled upon
the constitutional mandate of
independence of the COMELEC.
Under such a situation, the Court is
left with no option but to withdraw
from its usual reticence in declaring a
provision of law unconstitutional.
REASONING Composed of Senators
and Members of the House of
Representatives, the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee
(JCOC) is a purely legislative body.
- 11 -
A2010
There is no question that the
authority of Congress to "monitor and
evaluate the implementation" of R.A.
No. 9189 is geared towards possible
amendments or revision of the law
itself and thus, may be performed in
aid of its legislation.
-However, aside from its monitoring
and evaluation functions, R.A. No.
9189 gives to the JCOC the following
functions: (a) to "review, revise,
amend and approve the
Implementing Rules and Regulations"
(IRR) promulgated by the COMELEC
[Sections 25 and 19]; and (b) subject
to the approval of the JCOC [Section
17.1], the voting by mail in not more
than three countries for the May 2004
elections and in any country
determined by COMELEC.
-The ambit of legislative power under
Article VI of the Constitution is
circumscribed by other constitutional
provisions. One such provision is
Section 1 of Article IX-A of the 1987
Constitution ordaining that
constitutional commissions such as
the COMELEC shall be "independent."
-Interpreting Section 1, Article X of
the 1935 Constitution providing that
there shall be an independent
COMELEC, the Court has held that
"[w]hatever may be the nature of the
functions of the Commission on
Elections, the fact is that the framers
of the Constitution wanted it to be
independent from the other
departments of the Government.
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
-The Court has no general powers of
supervision over COMELEC which is
an independent body "except those
specifically granted by the
Constitution," that is, to review its
decisions, orders and rulings. In the
same vein, it is not correct to hold
that because of its recognized
extensive legislative power to enact
election laws, Congress may intrude
into the independence of the
COMELEC by exercising supervisory
powers over its rule-making authority.
-By virtue of Section 19 of R.A. No.
9189, Congress has empowered the
COMELEC to "issue the necessary
rules and regulations to effectively
implement the provisions of this Act
within sixty days from the effectivity
of this Act." This provision of law
follows the usual procedure in
drafting rules and regulations to
implement a law - the legislature
grants an administrative agency the
authority to craft the rules and
regulations implementing the law it
has enacted, in recognition of the
administrative expertise of that
agency in its particular field of
operation.
-The second sentence of the first
paragraph of Section 19 stating that
"[t]he Implementing Rules and
Regulations shall be submitted to the
Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee created by virtue of this
Act for prior approval," and the
second sentence of the second
A2010
paragraph of Section 25 stating that into the independence of the
"[i]t shall review, revise, amend and COMELEC.
approve the Implementing Rules and -During the deliberations, all the
Regulations promulgated by the members of the Court agreed to
Commission," whereby Congress, in ADOPT THE SEPARATE OPINION
both provisions, arrogates unto itself OF JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO AS
a function not specifically vested by PART OF THE PONENCIA ON THE
the Constitution, should be stricken UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF
out of the subject statute for SECTIONS 17.1, 19 AND 25 OF
constitutional infirmity. Both R.A. NO. 9189 INSOFAR AS THEY
provisions brazenly violate the RELATE TO THE CREATION OF
mandate on the independence of the AND THE POWERS GIVEN TO THE
COMELEC. JOINT CONGRESSIONAL
-Similarly, the phrase, "subject to the OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE.
approval of the Congressional
Oversight Committee" in the first Disposition WHEREFORE, the
sentence of Section 17.1 which petition is partly GRANTED. The
empowers the Commission to following portions of R.A. No. 9189
authorize voting by mail in not more are declared VOID for being
than three countries for the May, UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
2004 elections; and the phrase, "only a) The phrase in the first sentence
upon review and approval of the Joint of the first paragraph of Section 17.1,
Congressional Oversight Committee" to wit: "subject to the approval of the
found in the second paragraph of the Joint Congressional Oversight
same section are unconstitutional as Committee;"
they require review and approval of b) The portion of the last
voting by mail in any country after paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit:
the 2004 elections. Congress may "only upon review and approval of
not confer upon itself the authority to the Joint Congressional Oversight
approve or disapprove the countries Committee;"
wherein voting by mail shall be c) The second sentence of the first
allowed, as determined by the paragraph of Section 19, to wit: "The
COMELEC pursuant to the conditions Implementing Rules and Regulations
provided for in Section 17.1 of R.A. shall be submitted to the Joint
No. 9189.[48] Otherwise, Congress Congressional Oversight Committee
would overstep the bounds of its created by virtue of this Act for prior
constitutional mandate and intrude approval;" and
- 12 -
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
d) The second sentence in the
second paragraph of Section 25, to
wit: "It shall review, revise, amend
and approve the Implementing Rules
and Regulations promulgated by the
Commission" of the same law;
for being repugnant to Section 1,
Article IX-A of the Constitution
mandating the independence of
constitutional commission, such as
COMELEC.
The constitutionality of Section 18.5
of R.A. No. 9189 is UPHELD with
respect only to the authority given to
the COMELEC to proclaim the winning
candidates for the Senators and
party-list representatives but not as
to the power to canvass the votes
and proclaim the winning candidates
for President and Vice-President
which is lodged with Congress under
Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution.
The constitutionality of Section 5(d) is
UPHELD.
Pursuant to Section 30 of R.A. No.
9189, the rest of the provisions of
said law continues to be in full force
and effect.
SEPARATE OPINION
PUNO, concurring and
1
dissenting: :
1
I dissent from the majority’s ruling
upholding the constitutionality of section 5(d)
of Rep. Act No. 9189, which allows an
immigrant or a permanent resident of a
foreign country to vote for President, Vice-
The resolution of the issue entails a
two-tiered discussion of the: (1)
whether Congress has oversight
functions over constitutional bodies
like the COMELEC; and (2) assuming
that it has, whether Congress
exceeded the permissible exercise of
its oversight functions.
Separation of powers and checks
and balances
The principle of separation of powers
prevents the concentration of
legislative, executive, and judicial
powers to a single branch of
government by deftly allocating their
exercise to the three branches of
government. This principle dates
back from the time of Aristotle but
the "modern" concept owes its origin
in the seventeenth and eighteenth
century writings of political
philosophers including Locke and
President, Senators and Party-List
Representatives after executing the required
affidavit. I concur, however, with the
majority’s ruling upholding the
constitutionality of section 18.5 of Rep. Act
No. 9189 with respect to the authority given
to the COMELEC to proclaim the winning
candidates for Senators and Party-List
Representatives but not as to the power to
canvass the votes and proclaim the winning
candidates for President and Vice-President. I
also concur with the majority with respect to
the unconstitutionality of sections 17.1, 19
and 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189 subjecting the
implementation of voting by mail, and the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Rep.
Act No. 9189 to be promulgated by COMELEC,
to prior review and approval by Congress.
- 13 -
A2010
Montesquieu. Their writings were
mainly reactions to the ruinous
struggle for power by the monarchs
and the parliaments in Western
Europe.
-The Constitution divided the powers
of our government into three
categories, legislative, executive, and
judicial. Although not "hermetically
sealed" from one another, the powers
of the three branches are functionally
identifiable. In this respect, legislative
power is generally exercised in the
enactment of the law; executive
power, in its execution; and judicial
power, in its interpretation. In the
absence of specific provision in the
Constitution, it is fundamental under
the principle of separation of powers
that one branch cannot exercise or
share the power of the other.
-Justce Puno locates the concept of
congressional oversight in the grand
scheme of checks and balances under
the doctrine of separation of power.
Concept and bases of
congressional oversight
-Broadly defined, the power of
oversight embraces all activities
undertaken by Congress to enhance
its understanding of and influence
over the implementation of legislation
it has enacted. Clearly, oversight
concerns post-enactment measures
undertaken by Congress: (a) to
monitor bureaucratic compliance with
program objectives, (b) to determine
whether agencies are properly
Administrative Law A2010
Dean Carlota
administered, (c) to eliminate Categories of congressional -The power of appropriation carries
executive waste and dishonesty, (d) oversight functions with it the power to specify the
to prevent executive usurpation of The acts done by Congress project or activity to be funded.
legislative authority, and (d) to assess purportedly in the exercise of its Hence, the holding of budget hearing
executive conformity with the oversight powers may be divided into has been the usual means of
congressional perception of public three categories, namely: scrutiny, reviewing policy and of auditing the
interest. investigation and supervision. use of previous appropriation to
-The power of oversight has been a. Scrutiny ascertain whether they have been
held to be intrinsic in the grant of Congressional scrutiny implies a disbursed for purposes authorized in
legislative power itself and lesser intensity and continuity of an appropriation act. The
integral to the checks and attention to administrative consideration of the budget is also an
balances inherent in a operations. Its primary purpose is to opportunity for the lawmakers to
democratic system of determine economy and efficiency of express their confidence in the
government. Among the most the operation of government performance of a Cabinet Secretary
quoted justifications for this power activities. In the exercise of or to manifest their disgust or
are the writings of John Stuart Mill legislative scrutiny, Congress may disfavor of the continuance in office
and Woodrow Wilson. In his request information and report from of a bureaucrat. Congress can even
Consideration of Representative the other branches of government. It curtail the activities of the
Government, Mill wrote that the duty can give recommendations or pass administrative agencies by denial of
of the legislature is "to watch and resolutions for consideration of the funds.
control the government; to throw the agency involved. -But legislative scrutiny does not end
light of publicity on its acts; to -Legislative scrutiny is based in budget hearings. Congress can ask
compel a full exposition and primarily on the power of the heads of departments to appear
justification of all of them which any appropriation of Congress. Under the before and be heard by either House
one considers objectionable; and to Constitution, the "power of the purse" of Congress on any matter pertaining
censure them if found condemnable." belongs to Congress. The President to their departments. Section 22,
Wilson went one step farther and may propose the budget, but still, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
opined that the legislature’s Congress has the final say on provides: The heads of departments
informing function should be appropriations. Consequently, may, upon their own initiative, with
preferred to its legislative function. administrative officials appear every the consent of the President, or upon
He emphasized that "[E]ven more year before the appropriation the request of either House, as the
important than legislation is the committees of Congress to report and rules of each House shall provide,
instruction and guidance in political submit a budget estimate and a appear before and be heard by such
affairs which the people might program of administration for the House on any matter pertaining to
receive from a body which kept all succeeding fiscal year. During budget their departments. Written questions
national concerns suffused in a broad hearings, administrative officials shall be submitted to the President of
daylight of discussion." defend their budget proposals. the Senate or the Speaker of the
House of Representatives at least

- 14 -
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
three days before their scheduled
appearance. Interpellations shall not
be limited to written questions, but
may cover matters related thereto.
When the security of the State or the
public interest so requires and the
President so states in writing, the
appearance shall be conducted in
executive session.
-This provision originated from the
Administrative Code and was later
elevated to the level of a necessary qualifications, integrity and
constitutional provision due to its
"great value in the work of the
legislature."
-Likewise, Congress exercises
legislative scrutiny thru its power
of confirmation. Section 18, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution provides
for the organization of a Commission
on Appointments consisting of the
President of the Senate as ex officio
Chairman, twelve Senators and
twelve members of the House of
Representatives, elected by each
House on the basis of proportional
representation from the political
parties or organizations registered
under the party-list system. Consent
of the Commission on Appointments
is needed for the nominees of the
President for the following positions:
(a) heads of executive departments,
(b) ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, (c) officers of
the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and (d)
other officers whose appointments
are vested with the President under
the Constitution.
-Through the power of confirmation,
Congress shares in the appointing
power of the executive. Theoretically,
it is intended to lessen political
considerations in the appointment of
officials in sensitive positions in the
government. It also provides
Congress an opportunity to find out
whether the nominee possesses the
probity required of all public servants.
b. Congressional investigation
While congressional scrutiny is
regarded as a passive process of
looking at the facts that are readily
available, congressional investigation
involves a more intense digging of
facts. The power of Congress to
conduct investigation is recognized
by the 1987 Constitution under
section 21, Article VI, viz: The
Senate or the House of
Representatives or any of its
respective committee may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure. The rights of
persons appearing in or affected by
such inquiries shall be respected.
-But even in the absence of an
express provision in the Constitution,
congressional investigation has been
held to be an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function.
- 15 -
A2010
-American jurisprudence upholding
the inherent power of Congress to
conduct investigation has been
adopted in our jurisdiction in Arnault
v. Nazareno, decided in 1950, when
no provision yet existed granting
Congress the power to conduct
investigation. Upholding the power of
the Senate to punish Arnault for
contempt, the Court ruled as follows:
-Although there is no provision in the
Constitution expressly investing
either House of Congress with power
to make investigations and exact
testimony to the end that it may
exercise its legislative functions
advisedly and effectively, such power
is so far incidental to the legislative
function as to be implied. In other
words, the power of inquiry — with
process to enforce it — is an essential
and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function. A legislative body
cannot legislate wisely or effectively
in the absence of information
respecting the conditions which
legislation is intended to affect or
change; and where the legislative
body does not itself possess the
requisite information — which is not
frequently true — recourse must be
had to others who do possess it.
Experience has shown that mere
requests for such information are
often unavailing, and also that
information which is volunteered is
not always accurate or complete; so
some means of compulsion is
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
essential to obtain what is needed. . .
The fact that the Constitution
expressly gives the Congress the
power to punish its Members for
disorderly behaviour, does not by
necessary implication exclude the
power to punish for contempt any
other person.
-The Court further ruled that the
power of the Senate to punish a
witness for contempt does not
terminate upon the adjournment of
the session.
-The Court further held that once an
inquiry is admitted or established to
be within the jurisdiction of a
legislative body to make, the
investigating committee has the
power to require a witness to answer
any question pertinent to that inquiry,
subject to his constitutional right
against self-incrimination. The inquiry
must be material or necessary to the
exercise of a power in it vested by
the Constitution. Hence, a witness
can not be coerced to answer a
question that obviously has no
relation to the subject of the inquiry.
But the Court explained that "the
materiality of the question must be
determined by its direct relation to
the subject of the inquiry and not by
its indirect relation to any proposed
or possible legislation." The reason is
that the necessity or lack of necessity
for legislative action and the form
and character of the action itself are
determined by the sum total of the
information to be gathered as a result
of the investigation, and not by a
fraction of such information elicited
from a single question.
-Finally, the Court ruled that the
ground on which Arnault invoked the
right against self-incrimination "is too
shaky, infirm, and slippery to afford
him safety." It noted that since
Arnault himself said that the
transaction was legal, and that he
gave the P440,000.00 to a appearing therein are afforded
representative of Burt in compliance
with the latter’s verbal instruction,
there is therefore no basis upon
which to sustain his claim that to
reveal the name of that person would
incriminate him. It held that it is not
enough for the witness to say that the
answer will incriminate him for he is
not the sole judge of his liability, thus:
. . .[T]he danger of self-incrimination
must appear reasonable and real to
the court, from all the circumstances
and from the whole case, as well as
from his general conception of the
relations of the witness. . . The fact
that the testimony of the witness
may tend to show that he has
violated the law is not sufficient to
entitle him to claim the protection of
the constitutional provision against
self-incrimination, unless he is at the
same time liable to prosecution and
punishment for such violation. The
witness cannot assert his privilege by
reason of some fanciful excuse, for
protection against an imaginary
- 16 -
A2010
danger, or to secure immunity to a
third person.[
-As now contained in the 1987
Constitution, the power of Congress
to investigate is circumscribed by
three limitations, namely: (a) it must
be in aid of its legislative
functions, (b) it must be
conducted in accordance with
duly published rules of
procedure, and (c) the persons
their constitutional rights.
-In Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee, this Court held that the
senate committee exceeded the
permissible exercise of legislative
investigation because there was
nothing in Senator Enrile’s speech
which indicate that it is in aid of
legislation.
-The conduct of legislative
investigation is also subject to the
rules of each House. In the House of
Representatives, an inquiry may be
initiated or conducted by a
committee motu proprio on any
matter within its jurisdiction upon a
majority vote of all its Members or
upon order of the House of
Representatives through:
(1) the referral of a privilege
speech containing or conveying a
request or demand for the conduct of
an inquiry, to the appropriate
committee, upon motion of the
Majority Leader or his deputies; or
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
(2) the adoption of a resolution
directing a committee to conduct an
inquiry reported out by the
Committee on Rules after making a
determination on the necessity and
propriety of the conduct of an inquiry
by such committee: Provided, That all
resolutions directing any committee
to conduct an inquiry shall be
referred to the Committee on Rules;
or
(3) the referral by the Committee
on Rules to the appropriate
committee, after making a any inquiry conducted to carry
determination on the necessity and
propriety of the conduct of inquiry by
such committee, of a petition filed or
information given by a Member of the
House requesting such inquiry and
endorsed by the Speaker: Provided,
That such petition or information shall
be given under oath, stating the facts
upon which it is based, and
accompanied by supporting
affidavits.
-The committee to which a privilege
speech, resolution, petition or
information requesting an inquiry is
referred may constitute and appoint
sub-committees composed of at least
one-third (1/3) of the committee for
the purpose of performing any and all
acts which the committee as a whole
is authorized to perform, except to
punish for contempt. In case a
privilege speech is referred to two or
more committees, a joint inquiry by
the said committees shall be
conducted. The inquiries are to be
held in public except when the
committee or sub-committee deems
that the examination of a witness in a
public hearing may endanger national
security. In which case, it shall
conduct the hearing in an executive
session.
-The Rules further provide that
"the filing or pendency of a case
before any court, tribunal or
quasi-judicial or administrative
bodies shall not stop or abate
out a specific legislative
purpose." In exercise of
congressional inquiry, the committee
has the power "to issue subpoena
and subpoena duces tecum to a
witness in any part of the country,
signed by the chairperson or acting
chairperson and the Speaker or
acting Speaker." Furthermore, the
committee may, by a vote of two-
thirds (2/3) of all its members
constituting a quorum, punish for
contempt any person who: (a)
refuses, after being duly summoned,
to obey such summons without legal
excuse; (b) refuses to be sworn or
placed under affirmation; (c) refuses
to answer any relevant inquiry; (d)
refuses to produce any books,
papers, documents or records that
are relevant to the inquiry and are in
his/her possession; (e) acts in a
disrespectful manner towards any
member of the Committee or
- 17 -
A2010
commits misbehavior in the presence
of the committee; or (f) unduly
interferes in the conduct of
proceedings during meetings.
-Nevertheless, any person called to
be a witness may be represented by
a counsel and is entitled to all rights
including the right against self-
incrimination.
c. Legislative supervision
The third and most encompassing
form by which Congress exercises its
oversight power is thru legislative
supervision. "Supervision" connotes a
continuing and informed awareness
on the part of a congressional
committee regarding executive
operations in a given administrative
area. While both congressional
scrutiny and investigation involve
inquiry into past executive branch
actions in order to influence future
executive branch performance,
congressional supervision allows
Congress to scrutinize the exercise of
delegated law-making authority, and
permits Congress to retain part of
that delegated authority.
-Congress exercises supervision over
the executive agencies through its
veto power. It typically utilizes veto
provisions when granting the
President or an executive agency the
power to promulgate regulations with
the force of law. These provisions
require the President or an
agency to present the proposed
regulations to Congress, which
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
retains a "right" to approve or
disapprove any regulation before
it takes effect. Such legislative veto
provisions usually provide that a
proposed regulation will become a
law after the expiration of a certain
period of time, only if Congress does
not affirmatively disapprove of the
regulation in the meantime. Less
frequently, the statute provides that
a proposed regulation will become
law if Congress affirmatively
approves it.
-The legislative veto was developed
initially in response to the problems
of reorganizing the U.S. Government
structure during the Great Depression
in early 20th century. When U.S.
President Hoover requested authority
to reorganize the government in
1929, he coupled his request with a
proposal for legislative review. He
proposed that the Executive "should
act upon approval of a joint
Committee of Congress or with the
reservation of power of revision by
Congress within some limited period
adequate for its consideration."
Congress followed President Hoover’s
suggestion and authorized
reorganization subject to legislative
review. Although the reorganization
authority reenacted in 1933 did not
contain a legislative veto provision,
the provision returned during the
Roosevelt administration and has
since been renewed several times.
Over the years, the provision was
A2010
used extensively. Various American may not have participated in or
Presidents submitted to Congress agreed with the development of
some 115 Reorganization Plans, 23 of those aims. Consequently, absent
which were disapproved pursuant to safeguards, in many instances the
legislative veto provisions. reverse of our constitutional scheme
-Supporters of legislative veto stress could be effected: Congress
that it is necessary to maintain the proposes, the Executive disposes.
balance of power between the One safeguard, of course, is the
legislative and the executive legislative power to enact new
branches of government as it offers legislation or to change existing law.
lawmakers a way to delegate vast But without some means of
power to the executive branch or to overseeing post enactment activities
independent agencies while retaining of the executive branch, Congress
the option to cancel particular would be unable to determine
exercise of such power without whether its policies have been
having to pass new legislation or to implemented in accordance with
repeal existing law. They contend legislative intent and thus whether
that this arrangement promotes legislative intervention is
democratic accountability as it appropriate.
provides legislative check on the -Its opponents, however, criticize the
activities of unelected administrative legislative veto as undue
agencies. One proponent thus encroachment upon the executive
explains: prerogatives. They urge that any
It is too late to debate the merits of post-enactment measures
this delegation policy: the policy is undertaken by the legislative branch
too deeply embedded in our law and should be limited to scrutiny and
practice. It suffices to say that the investigation; any measure beyond
complexities of modern government that would undermine the separation
have often led Congress-whether by of powers guaranteed by the
actual or perceived necessity- to Constitution.] They contend that
legislate by declaring broad legislative veto constitutes an
policy goals and general impermissible evasion of the
statutory standards, leaving the President’s veto authority and
choice of policy options to the intrusion into the powers vested in
discretion of an executive officer. the executive or judicial branches of
Congress articulates legislative aims, government. Proponents counter
but leaves their implementation to that legislative veto enhances
the judgment of parties who may or separation of powers as it prevents
- 18 -
Administrative Law A2010
Dean Carlota
the executive branch and of the Commission on Elections as of government. While the President
independent agencies from provided in the 1987 Constitution is appoints the Commissioners with the
accumulating too much power. They decisive to the issue. concurrence of the Commission on
submit that reporting requirements Congressional Oversight and Appointments, the Commissioners
and congressional committee COMELEC are not accountable to the President
investigations allow Congress to The Commission on Elections in the discharge of their functions.
scrutinize only the exercise of (COMELEC) is a constitutional body They have a fixed tenure and are
delegated law-making authority. They exclusively charged with the removable only by impeachment. To
do not allow Congress to review enforcement and administration of ensure that not all Commissioners are
executive proposals before they take "all laws and regulations relative to appointed by the same President at
effect and they do not afford the the conduct of an election, plebiscite, any one time, a staggered system of
opportunity for ongoing and binding initiative, referendum, and recall," appointment was devised. Thus, of
expressions of congressional intent. and is invested with the power to the Commissioners first appointed,
In contrast, legislative veto permits decide all questions affecting three shall hold office for seven
Congress to participate elections save those involving the years, three for five years, and the
prospectively in the approval or right to vote. last three for three years.
disapproval of "subordinate law" -Given its important role in preserving Reappointment and temporary
or those enacted by the the sanctity of the right of suffrage, designation or appointment is
executive branch pursuant to a the COMELEC was purposely prohibited. In case of vacancy, the
delegation of authority by constituted as a body separate from appointee shall only serve the
Congress. They further argue that the executive, legislative, and judicial unexpired term of the predecessor.
legislative veto "is a necessary branches of government. Originally, The COMELEC is likewise granted the
response by Congress to the the power to enforce our election power to promulgate its own rules of
accretion of policy control by forces laws was vested with the President procedure,] and to appoint its own
outside its chambers." In an era of and exercised through the officials and employees in accordance
delegated authority, they point out Department of the Interior. According with Civil Service laws.
that legislative veto "is the most to Dean Sinco, however, the view -The COMELEC exercises quasi-
efficient means Congress has yet ultimately emerged that an judicial powers but it is not part of the
devised to retain control over the independent body could better judiciary. This Court has no general
evolution and implementation of its protect the right of suffrage of our power of supervision over the
policy as declared by statute." people. Hence, the enforcement of Commission on Elections except
-Given the concept and configuration our election laws, while an those specifically granted by the
of the power of congressional executive power, was transferred Constitution. As such, the Rules of
oversight, the next level of inquiry is to the COMELEC. Court are not applicable to the
whether congress exceeded its -Several safeguards have been put in Commission on Elections. In addition,
permissible exercise in the case at place to protect the independence of the decisions of the COMELEC are
bar. But before proceeding, a the COMELEC from unwarranted reviewable only by petition for
discussion of the nature and powers encroachment by the other branches

- 19 -
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
certiorari on grounds of grave abuse
of discretion.
-The COMELEC is, however, subject to
congressional scrutiny especially
during budget hearings. But Congress
cannot abolish the COMELEC as it can
in case of other agencies under the
executive branch. The reason is
obvious. The COMELEC is not a mere
creature of the legislature; it owes its
origin from the Constitution.
-Be that as it may, I respectfully
submit that the legislative veto
power or congressional oversight
power over the authority of
COMELEC to issue rules and
regulations in order to enforce
election laws is unconstitutional.
The COMELEC occupies a distinct
place in our scheme of government.
As the constitutional body charged
with the administration of our
election laws, it is endowed with
independence in the exercise of some
of its powers and the discharge of its
responsibilities. The power to
promulgate rules and regulations in
order to administer our election laws
belongs to this category of powers as
this has been vested exclusively by
the 1987 Constitution to the
COMELEC. It cannot be trenched
upon by Congress in the exercise of
its oversight powers.
DOUBTLESS, IF ITS RULE-MAKING
POWER IS MADE TO DEPEND ON
STATUTES, CONGRESS MAY
WITHDRAW THE SAME AT ANY TIME.
INDEED, THE PRESENT
CONSTITUTION ENVISIONS A TRULY
INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS COMMITTED TO ENSURE
FREE, ORDERLY, HONEST, PEACEFUL
AND CREDIBLE ELECTIONS, AND TO
SERVE AS THE GUARDIAN OF THE
PEOPLE'S SACRED RIGHT OF
SUFFRAGE — THE CITIZENRY'S VITAL
WEAPON IN EFFECTING A PEACEFUL
CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT AND IN
ACHIEVING AND PROMOTING
POLITICAL STABILITY. [ BSJ: This
statement of Puno supports the
notion that in the Philippines, there is
such thing as a legislative veto albeit
there is no express constitutional
provision using the term LEGISLATIVE
VETO. He limits the notion of
legislative veto to powers conferred
by statute or delegated powers.
When a power is conferred by the
Constitution itself such as the
COMELEC’s rulemaking power, it is
already beyond the ambit of
legislative veto]
The elevation of the COMELEC’s
power to promulgate rules and
regulations in the 1987 Constitution is
suffused with significance.
Heretofore, it was Congress that
granted COMELEC the power to
promulgate rules and regulations,
and hence, Congress can withdraw or
restrict it by the exercise of its veto
or oversight power. Under the 1987
Constitution, the power to
promulgate rules and regulations has
- 20 -
A2010
been directly granted by the
Constitution and no longer by
Congress. Undoubtedly, the power
was granted to COMELEC to
strengthen its independence, hence,
its exercise is beyond invasion by
Congress. Under any lens, sections 19
and 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189
constitute undue restrictions on the
constitutional power of the COMELEC
to promulgate rules and regulations
for such rules are made subject to the
prior review and approval of
Congress. The impugned provisions
can result in the denial of this
constitutionally conferred power
because Congress can veto the rules
and regulations the COMELEC has
promulgated. Thus, I respectfully
submit that sections 19 and 25 of
Rep. Act No. 9189 granting Congress
the power to review, revise, amend
and approve the implementing rules
and regulations of the COMELEC,
otherwise known as subordinate
legislations in other countries, are
unconstitutional.
Since the legislative standards have
been defined, all that remains is their
enforcement. Our Constitution has
specifically given the COMELEC the
power to enforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election. The power is
exclusive and it ought to be self-
evident that it cannot be subject to
review and revision or veto by
Congress in the exercise of its
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
oversight power. Again, the reason
for the exclusivity is to insulate
COMELEC from the virus of partisan
politics. In the exercise of this
exclusive power, the Commission
must be accorded considerable
latitude. Unless the means and
methods adopted by COMELEC are
clearly illegal or constitute grave
abuse of discretion, they should not
be interfered with.
C. Legislative and Judicial Control
of Administrative Decision
Making; Salvador T. Carlota
Administrative agencies have
proliferated in recent years.
Administrative agencies are endowed
with significant rulemaking and
adjudicative powers and make
decisions that affect both public
interest and private rights. To confer
both rule making powers and
adjudicatory powers seem to run
counter the principle of separation of
powers. But recent developments and
the complexities of contemporary
society has left us with no choice but
to adopt a more hospitable
interpretation of the doctrine of
separation of powers that can
accommodate the existence of
administrative agencies within our
constitutional system.
-Their creation is directed towards the
regulation of sensitive areas in social
and economic relations but the
exercise of the powers vested upon
them is constantly attended by
arbitrariness or abuse of discretion,
thus the need and the development
of mechanisms of control over these
agencies.
LEGISLATIVE CONTROL OVER
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
Power of Creation, Appropriation, and
Investigation
Creation
- (In theory) Congress can create,
divide, merge modify and abolish
agencies.
- (In reality) Congress creates rather
than abolish (evidenced by the
multiplication of regulatory agencies)
as society becomes more complex.
-the state is compelled to create
admin agencies to deal with problems
brought by social and economic
change.
Appropriation
-have potential for checking
arbitrariness in the administrative
process but in reality these have no
appreciable effect in controlling
administrative discretionary power.
-Congress has the power to withhold
funds for these agencies but at the
end of the day it is reluctant in
wielding this power because it
recognizes that if it does, it will affect
public interest. So what happens is,
- 21 -
A2010
during budget hearings, these
agencies undergo strict scrutiny but
receive their appropriations just the
same.
Investigation
-has limited value as a tool to provide
as effective regular control of the
improper exercise of administrative
power
-effective only as an aid in legislation
The non-delegation doctrine and the
requirement of legislative standards
-traditional legal thinking places
considerable emphasis on the non-
delegation doctrine and the
prescription of legislative standards
to control administrative agencies in
the exercise of their powers
-the rule is for delegation of powers
to an administrative agency to be
valid, the legislature must not only
declare the policy to be executed but
it must likewise fix a standard to
guide the agency in the exercise of
its delegated power
-for this doctrine to be effective, the
legislature must be able to provide
sufficient or definite standards every
time it decides to delegate powers to
an administrative agency, the more
specific the standards the greater the
chances of confining administrative
discretion within its proper limits
If the standards are too broad or
vague, the administrator is allowed to
exercise uncontrolled discretion
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
-Non-delegation cases shows that in -this combination (inability of
many instances of delegation, the congress to provide sufficient
legislature is unable to provide for standards and reluctance of SC to
definite or specific standards because strike down the constitutionality of
there are numerous areas of such delegation) undermines the
regulation which are of different efficacy of the non-delegation
nature, subject to variable conditions doctrine. Thus, the administrator’s
and policy considerations with discretion is virtually unconfined and
varying degrees of susceptibility to the possibility of abuse in the
definite standards. Stone stresses exercise of such discretionary power
that in providing definite standards becomes a real problem
the following must be considered (a) -In the US this doctrine has long been
the number, vagueness and degree regarded as unsatisfactory
of potential conflicts among policy -Davis suggests that the non-
indications which the legislature delegation doctrine should be altered
wants to be accommodated, and (b) to turn it into an effective and useful
the rate of change and movement in judicial tool. The focus should no
the facts concerning such policies longer be exclusively on standards; it
-this inability has not caused the should be on the totality of
Supreme Court to shy away from protections against arbitrariness,
assuming a liberal posture I resolving Including both safeguards and
challenges regarding the sufficiency standards. The key should no longer
of standards, the Court is generally be statutory words; it should be
unwilling to strike down the validity of protections and the administrators in
the delegation for broadness or fact provide, irrespective of what the
vagueness of the standards. statutes say or fail to say. The focus
-Interest of law and order, public of judicial inquiries thus should shift
interest, justice and equity and from statutory standards to
substantial merits of the case have administrative safeguards and
been considered as sufficient standards.
standards to sustain the
constitutionality of the delegation of Administrative Procedure as a Mode
powers. of Control
-the SC recognizes that delegation to -the legislature can, although
administrative agencies is a indirectly exert control over the
compelling necessity on a modern activities of administrative agencies
complex society. through the prescription of rules or
principles of administrative procedure
A2010
-these rules of procedure serve to
maximize fairness in the
administrative process
-in prescribing rules of procedure the
following must be considered (a)
administrative agencies are not
bound by the technical rules of
procedure and evidence followed in
regular courts (b) administrative
agencies are designed to act with
dispatch and flexibility to enable
them to speedily accomplish their
objectives. This does not however
exempt them from the fundamental
requirements of procedural due
process (see Ang Tibay v CIR).
(c)Administrative agencies are
created to deal with specific
problems, with different objectives
and under varying conditions, thus a
uniform rule of procedure for all is out
of the question. There is a need to
grant them enough leeway to come
up with rules particularly suited to
their areas of concern. The ideal
situation is to provide them with
minimum procedural guidelines and
general principles to be observed in
the performance of their rulemaking
and adjudicative functions.
-for a long time there was no law that
prescribed common procedural
guidelines for all administrative
agencies, thus they adopted their
own rules of procedure which
resulted in a bewildering variety of
rules and regulations promulgated by
the agencies which in turn caused

- 22 -
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
confusion and was prejudicial to the
persons affected especially when the
rules were not made easily available
to them.
-The Administrative Code of 1987 was
a significant legislative measure that
answered this problem; it contains
provisions which are applicable to all
agencies. It provides for the minimum
procedural standards which in their
totality strike a harmonious balance
between the fundamental
requirements of procedural due
process and the demands of
administrative flexibility.
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION
MAKING
-Judicial review of agency decisions is
given special emphasis in
administrative law.
-that there should be judicial review
is not contested, the debate is on the
purpose of such review.
-A radical view would subject not only
the agency conclusion of law but its
determinations of fact policy as well.
-the controlling principles frown upon
a wide-ranging or freewheeling type
of judicial review.
-The courts, traditionally, have been
confined to the role of seeing to it
that administrative agencies stay
within the limits of their power as
defined in their enabling statutes and
protecting private rights by checking
arbitrariness in the administrative
process.
-Even if the enabling statutes of these
agencies are silent with regard to
judicial review, the Supreme Court
has consistently held that this does
not foreclose the possibility of such
review. In one case it held that it is
generally understood that as to
administrative agencies exercising
quasi-judicial or legislative power
there is an underlying power in the
courts to scrutinize the acts of such
agencies on the question of law ad
jurisdiction even though no right of
review is given by statute. The
purpose of judicial review is to keep
the administrative agency within its
jurisdiction and protects substantial
rights of parties affected by its
decisions. It is part of a system of
checks and balances which restricts
the separation of powers and
forestalls arbitrary and unjust
adjudications. Judicial review is
proper in case of lack of jurisdiction,
grave abuse of discretion, error of
law, fraud or collusion (San Miguel v
Sec of Labor).
-note that the Supreme Court made
no mention of judicial review of
agency determination of fact and
policy.
-The judiciary recognizes that its
traditional role is deeply rooted to the
idea of judicial deference to
administrative expertise and the now
- 23 -
A2010
well entrenched substantial evidence
rule in administrative law.
-Questions of law belong to the
domain of the judiciary, questions of
fact and policy on the other hand are
better resolved by administrative
agencies which posses expertise or
experience in their respective areas
of specialization.
-While deference to administrative
expertise is the rule the courts
nevertheless is not precluded from
reviewing agency determination of
fact and policy. When the
substantiality of the evidence
supporting the factual findings of the
agency is challenged, the issue
assumes a judicial character. And the
lack of substantial evidence to
support agency finding causes the
overturning of such by the courts.
-The courts generally avoid
intervention in cases involving policy
considerations, however there are
occasions when in the course of
resolving questions of law which are
intimately linked to policy matters,
the courts are unable to exclude the
consideration of such matters in the
review.
CONCLUSION
The rise of administrative power has
generated a host of problems
regarding controls over the exercise
of such power.
Legislative Controls
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
Appropriation – Power of the purse;
but is generally not wielded in
consideration of public interest
Fixing of Standards- Has been proven
to be of little value
Prescription of Rules-prescription of
minimum procedural guidelines and
general principles to be commonly
observed by agencies can help
maximize fairness in the
administrative process.
 Administrative Code of 1987
– strikes a harmonious balance
between the fundamental
requirements of fairness and
the need for administrative
flexibility
Judicial Review –important instrument
to control agency behavior through
the court’s actual policing of agency
behavior to ensure that it is confined
within the limits set by law
D. THE OMBUDSMAN: ITS
EFFECTIVITY AND VISIBILITY
AMIDST BUREAUCRATIC ABUSE
AND IRREGULARITY
E. CASES
CONCERNED OFFICALS OF MWSS
v VASQUEZ, PLDPPMA
240 SCRA 502
VITUG; January 25, 1995
A2010
NATURE Also, that the Ombudsman acted with
Petition for certiorari with prayer for grave abuse of discretion by
preliminary injunction arbitrarily and capriciously interfering
with the exercise of sound discretion
FACTS of the MWSS
- MWSS conducted bidding for two
projects concerning its water ISSUE
distribution system in Metro Manila. 1. WON the Ombudsman had
The Philippine Large Diameter jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
Pressure Pipes Manufacturers’ complaint filed by the PLDPPMA and
Association (PLDPPMA) then correspondingly issue the challenged
questioned the award of the projects orders
with the Office of the Ombudsman
(Vasquez), charging an “apparent
plan” on the part of the MWSS to HELD
favor certain suppliers (those offering 1. NO
fiberglass pipes over those offering Ratio The
steel pipes) through the technical Reasoning On the basis of all the
specifications, and urging the provisions regarding the Office of the
Ombudsman to conduct an Ombudsman, Solicitor-General insists
investigation thereon and hold in that the authority of the Ombudsman
abeyance the award of the contracts. is sufficiently broad enough to cloth it
The Ombudsman then issued the with sufficient power to look into the
assailed order, directing the MWSS alleged irregularities in the bidding
to: “set aside the recommendation of conducted by the MWSS
an MWSS committee to award the - “The reason for the creation of the
contact to a contractor offering Ombudsman in the 1987 Consti and
fiberglass pipes”, and “award the for the grant to it of broad
subject contract to a complying and investigative authority, is to insulate
responsive bidder” said office from the long tentacles of
- the officials of MWSS filed the officialdom that are able to penetrate
instant petition with the SC, judges' and fiscals' offices, and others
contending that the ombudsman involved in the prosecution of erring
acted beyond the competence of his public officials, and through the
office when he assumed jurisdiction exertion of official pressure and
over the complaint, when the same is influence, quash, delay, or dismiss
clearly among the excepted cases investigations into malfeasances and
enumerated in the Ombudsman Act. misfeasances committed by public
- 24 -
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
officers. It was deemed necessary,
therefore, to create a special office to
investigate all criminal complaints
against public officers regardless of
whether or not the acts or omissions
complained of are related to or arise
from the performance of the duties of
their office. The Ombudsman Act
makes perfectly clear that the
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
encompasses 'all kinds of
malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-
feasance that have been committed
by any officer or employee as
mentioned in Section 13 hereof,
during his tenure of office.”
- the powers, functions and duties of
the Ombudsman have generally been
categorized into: Investigatory Power;
Prosecutory Power; Public Assistance
Functions; Authority to Inquire and
Obtain Information; and Function to
Adopt, Institute and Implement. This
case concerns the investigatory
power and Public Assistance Duties of
the Ombudsman
- the Ombudsman, in resolving the
complaint, considered 3 issues: (1)
WON the technical specifications
prescribed by MWSS in the projects
have been so designed as to really
favor Fiberglass Pipes-Contractors/
Bidders; (2) WON the MWSS has the
technical knowledge and expertise
with fiberglass pipes; and (3) WON
the contractors and local
manufacturers of fiberglass pipes
have the experience and qualification
to undertake the projects. While the
broad authority of the Ombudsman to
investigate any act or omission which
"xxx appears illegal, unjust, improper,
or inefficient" may be yielded, it is
difficult to equally concede, however,
that the Constitution and the Law
have intended to likewise confer upon
it veto or revisory power over an
exercise of judgment or discretion by
an agency or officer upon whom that
judgment or discretion is lawfully
vested. It seems that the
Ombudsman, in issuing the
challenged orders, has not only
directly assumed jurisdiction over,
but likewise preempted the exercise
of discretion by, the Board of
Trustees of MWSS. Indeed, the
recommendation of the MWSS
Committee to award the contract
appears to be yet pending
consideration and action by the
MWSS Board of Trustees.
We can only view the assailed order
to be more of an undue interference
in the adjudicative responsibility of
the MWSS Board of Trustees rather
than a mere directive requiring the
proper observance of and compliance
with the law.
Disposition Petition is granted.
Order annulled and set aside.
LASTIMOSA v VASQUEZ
243 SCRA 497
- 25 -
A2010
MENDOZA; April 6, 1995
NATURE
Petition for certiorari and prohibition
filed by petitioner to set aside the
orders of the Ombudsman with
respect to the two proceedings:
complaint for grave misconduct,
insubordination, gross neglect of duty
and maliciously refraining from
prosecuting crime and a charge for
indirect contempt.
FACTS
- February 18, 1993 > Dayon, public
health nurse at Cebu, filed with the
Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas a
criminal complaint for frustrated rape
and an administrative complaint for
immoral acts, abuse of authority and
grave misconduct against the
Municipal Mayor of Santa Fe, Rogelio
Ilustrisimo. After an investigation,
the investigating officer found no
prima facie evidence and
recommended its dismissal. But the
Ombudsman, Vasquez, disapproved
the recommendation and directed
that Mayor Ilustrisimo be charged
with attempted rape. Deputy
Ombudsman for Visayas Mojica
referred the case to Cebu Provincial
Prosecutor Kintanar for the "filing of
appropriate information with the
Regional Trial Court of Danao City.”
The case eventually went to First
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Gloria
G. Lastimosa.
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
- Lastimosa conducted a PI and found
that only acts of lasciviousness had
been committed. With the approval of
Kintanar, she filed an information for
acts of lasciviousness. As no case for
attempted rape had been filed by the
Prosecutor's Office, Mojica ordered
Kintanar and Lastimosa to show
cause why they should not be
punished for contempt for "refusing
and failing to obey the lawful
directives" of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
- Mojica issued an order placing
Lastimosa and Kintanar under
preventive suspension for a period of
six (6) months as approved by
Ombudsman Vasquez
- September 6, 1994 > Lastimosa
filed the petition for certiorari and
prohibition to set aside the orders
directing them to file of the action
(for Attempted Rape) against the
Mayor; instructing Lastimosa and
Kintanar to explain in writing why
they should not be punished for
indirect Contempt of the Office of the
Ombudsman "for refusing and failing
to file the appropriate Information for
Attempted Rape against the Mayor;
stating that the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor to comply with
the directive of the Office of the
Ombudsman that a charge for
attempted rape be filed against the
Mayor in recognition of the authority
of said Office; approving of the
placement of Lastimosa and Kintanar
A2010
under preventive suspension for a
period of six (6) months, without pay; HELD
directing Assistant Regional State 1. YES
Prosecutor to implement preventive Ratio When a prosecutor is
suspension; and designating deputized, he comes under the
Assistant Regional State Prosecutor "supervision and control" of the
Concepcion as Acting Provincial Ombudsman which means that he is
Prosecutor of Cebu subject to the power of the
- Petitioner claims: Office of the Ombudsman to direct, review,
Ombudsman and the prosecutor's approve, reverse or modify his
office have concurrent authority to (prosecutor's) decision. Petitioner
investigate public officers or cannot legally act on her own and
employees and that when the former refuse to prepare and file the
first took cognizance of the case information as directed by the
against Mayor Ilustrisimo, it did so to Ombudsman.
the exclusion of the latter. In any Reasoning
event, the Office of the Ombudsman - Ombudsman is authorized to call on
has no jurisdiction over the case prosecutors for assistance. Sec 31 of
against the mayor because the crime the Ombudsman Act of 1989
involved (rape) was not committed in (RA6770) provides: Designation of
relation to a public office. Therefore Investigators and Prosecutors. The
the Office of the Ombudsman has no Ombudsman may utilize the
authority to place her and Provincial personnel of his office and/or
Prosecutor Kintanar under preventive designate of deputize any fiscal, state
suspension for refusing to follow his prosecutor or lawyer in the
orders and to cite them for indirect government service to act as special
contempt for such refusal. investigator or prosecutor to assist in
the investigation and prosecution of
ISSUES certain cases. Those designated or
1. WON the Office of the deputized to assist him as herein
Ombudsman has the power to call on provided shall be under his
the Provincial Prosecutor to assist it in supervision and control.
the prosecution of the case for Obiter
attempted rape against Mayor - The office of the Ombudsman has
Ilustrisimo the power to "investigate and
2. WON Office of the Ombudsman prosecute on its own or on complaint
has the power to punish for contempt by any person, any act or omission of
and impose preventive suspension any public officer or employee, office
- 26 -
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper
or inefficient." This power has been
held to include the investigation and
prosecution of any crime committed
by a public official regardless of
whether the acts or omissions
complained of are related to, or
connected with, or arise from, the
performance of his official duty. It is
enough that the act or omission was
committed by a public official. Hence,
the crime of rape, when committed
by a public official like a municipal
mayor, is within the power of the
Ombudsman to investigate and
prosecute.
2. YES
- Sec 15(g) of the Ombudsman Act
gives the Office of the Ombudsman
the power to "punish for contempt, in
accordance with the Rules of Court
and under the same procedure and
with the same penalties provided
therein."
- Suspension is not a punishment or
penalty for the acts of dishonesty and
misconduct in office, but only as a
preventive measure. Suspension is a
preliminary step in an administrative
investigation. If after such
investigation, the charges are
established and the person
investigated is found guilty of acts
warranting his removal, then he is
removed or dismissed. This is the
penalty. There is, therefore, nothing
improper in suspending an officer
pending his investigation and before
the opportunity to prove his
innocence.
Disposition Petition is DISMISSED
for lack of merit and the Motion to Lift
Order of Preventive Suspension is
DENIED
BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE v
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
380 SCRA 424
de Leon, Jr., J; April 11, 2002
NATURE
Special civil Action . Certiorari and
Prohibition
FACTS
- The Office of the Ombudsman
received information from an
informant for reward regarding the
anomalous grant of tax refunds to
Distillera Limtuaco and La Tondena
Distilleries. On the basis of this
information, the Ombudsman
directed via a subpoena duces tecum,
Atty. Mansequiao of the legal
department of the BIR to appear
before him together with the
complete case dockets of the two
companies.
- BIR resisted this summons on the
grounds that the grant of the tax
refund had already been decided by
the Sandiganbayan in People vs Larin,
that the BIR had exclusive authority
to grant a tax credit, that the proper
A2010
authority to review is with the Court
of Tax Appeal, that there must be a
pending action before the issuance of
a subpoena can be made, and that
the subpoena did not specifically
described the documents sought to
be produced.
- The Ombudsman denied the motion
of the BIR and reiterated it
instructions to the BIR to produce the
documents sought.
- The BIR filed this Petition for
certiorari, prohibition, and preliminary
injunction, and temporary restraining
order with the SC
ISSUE/S
1. WON the Ombudsman could validly
exercise its power to investigate only
when there exist an appropriate case
2. WON it violated due process in
issuing subpoena without first giving
BIR the summary of complaint and
requiring it to submit a written reply
HELD
1. No. The power to investigate and
to prosecute granted by law to the
Ombudsman is plenary and
unqualified. The 1987 Constitution
provides that the “Ombudsman and
his Deputies, as protectors of the
people, shall act promptly on
complaints filed in any form or
manner against public officials or
employees of the government, or any
subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including

- 27 -
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
government owned or controlled
corporations, and shall, in appropriate
cases, notify the complainants of the
action taken and the result thereof”.
The Ombudsman Act makes it
perfectly clear that the jurisdiction of
the Ombudsman encompasses all
kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance,
and nonfeasance that have been
committed by any officer or
employee…during his tenure.
2. Yes. The SC held that the
procedure of immediately issuing the
subpeona duces tecum was violative
of the right to due process and did no
comply with Section 26, paragraph 2
of the Ombudsman Act (RA 6770).
The law clearly provides that if there
is reasonable ground to investigate
further, the investigator shall first
furnish the respondent public official
or employee with a summary of the
complaint and require him to submit
a written answer within 72 hours from
receipt of said complaint. As noted,
the BIR was never given a copy of the
complaint but was summarily ordered
to appear before the Ombudsman
and to produce the case dockets of
the tax refunds granted to the two
companies. Clearly, the Ombudsman
failed to afford BIR with the basic due
process in conducting the
investigation.
Disposition
Petition is granted. Ombudsman is
prohibited from proceeding with the
case and its orders are annulled and
set aside.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v
ENOC
G.R. Nos. 145957-68
MENDOZA; January 25, 2002
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
- Respondents were employed at the
Office of the Southern Cultural
Communities (OSCC), Davao del Sur
with salaries below grade 27.
- They were charged with 11
counts of malversation through
falsification, based on alleged
purchases of medicine and food
assistance for cultural community
members, and one count of
violation of R.A. No. 3019, §3(e),
in connection with the purchases
of supplies for the OSCC without
bidding/canvass.
- Respondents moved to quash the
informations saying that the
Ombudsman has no authority to
prosecute graft cases falling within
the jurisdiction of regular courts. This
motion was granted by the RTC and
the cases were dismissed without
prejudice, however, to their refiling
by the appropriate officer.
- The Office of the Ombudsman filed
the instant petition.
- 28 -
A2010
ISSUE
WON the Ombudsman has jurisdiction
to investigate and prosecute cases
before the regular courts.
HELD
- YES. Ombudsman has powers to
prosecute not only graft cases within
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
but also those cognizable by the
regular courts. The power to
investigate and to prosecute granted
by law to the Ombudsman is plenary
and unqualified. It pertains to any
act or omission of any public
officer or employee when such
act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient. The law does not make
a distinction between cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and
those cognizable by regular courts. It
has been held that the clause “any
illegal act or omission of any public
official” is broad enough to embrace
any crime committed by a public
officer or employee.
- The jurisdiction of the Office of the
Ombudsman should not be equated
with the limited authority of the
Special Prosecutor under Section 11
of RA 6770. The Office of the Special
Prosecutor is merely a component of
the Office of the Ombudsman and
may only act under the supervision
and control and upon authority of the
Ombudsman. Its power to conduct
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
preliminary investigation and to
prosecute is limited to criminal
cases within the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan.
- The Ombudsman is mandated by
law to act on all complaints against
officers and employees of the
government and to enforce their
administrative, civil and criminal
liability in every case where the
evidence warrants. To carry out this
duty, the law allows him to utilize the
personnel of his office and/or
designate any fiscal, state prosecutor
or lawyer in the government service
to act as special investigator or
prosecutor to assist in the
investigation and prosecution of
certain cases. Those designated or
deputized to assist him work under
his supervision and control. The law
likewise allows him to direct the
Special prosecutor to prosecute cases
outside the Sandiganbayan’s
jurisdiction in accordance with
Section 11(4c) of RA 6770.
Disposition WHEREFORE, the order,
dated October 7, 2000, of the
Regional Trial Court, branch 19 of
Digos, Davao del Sur is SET ASIDE
and Criminal Case Nos. 374(97) to
385(97) are hereby REINSTATED and
the Regional Trial Court is ORDERED
to try and decide the same.
FUENTES v OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN
GR NO. 124295
PARDO; October 23, 2001
NATURE
Petition for certiorari
FACTS
- Pursuant to the government's plan
to construct its first fly-over in
Davao City, the RP represented by
the DPWH filed an expropriation
case against the owners of the
properties affected by the project
(namely, Tessie Amadeo, Reynaldo
Lao and Rev. Alfonso Galo). The
case was presided by Judge Renato
A. Fuentes.
- The gov’t won the expropriation
case.
- The properties subject of the levy as
described as all scrap iron/junks
found in the premises of the DPWH.
An auction was conducted wherein
Alex Bacquial emerged as the
highest bidder. However, Bacquial
together with Sheriff Norberto
Paralisan attempted to withdraw the
auctioned properties but they were
prevented from doing so because
many of these were still serviceable
and were due for repair and
rehabilitation. (as opposed to their
classification as scrap iron/junk)
- So Alex Baquial filed an ex-parte
urgent motion for the issuance of a
'break through' order to enable him
to effect the withdrawal of the
auctioned properties. The motion
- 29 -
A2010
was granted by Judge Fuentes that
same day. Thus, Bacquial
succeeded in hauling off the scrap
iron/junk equipment in the depot,
including the repairable equipment
within the DPWH depot. He hauled
equipment from the depot for five
successive days until the lower
court issued another order
temporarily suspending the writ of
execution it earlier issued in the
expropriation case and directing
Bacquial not to implement the writ.
The lower court issued another
order upholding the validity of the
writ of execution
- On the basis of letters from
Congressman Manuel M. Garcia of
the Second District of Davao City
and Engineer Ramon A. Alejo, the
Court Administrator, the SC directed
Judge Renato A. Fuentes and Sheriff
Norberto Paralisan to comment on
the report recommending the filing
of an administrative case against
the sheriff and other persons
responsible for the anomalous
implementation of the writ of
execution. Also, the DPWH filed an
administrative complaint against
Sheriff Norberto Paralisan for
conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, in violation
of Article IX, Section 36 (b) of P. D.
No. 807.
- After considering the facts, the SC
ordered the sheriff’s dismissal.
From this order, the office of the
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
Court Administrator was also
directed to conduct an investigation
on Judge Renato Fuentes and to
charge him if the result of the
investigation so warrants. The
Office of the Solicitor General is
likewise ordered to take appropriate
action to recover the value of the
serviceable or repairable equipment
which were unlawfully hauled by
Alex Bacquial.
- Thus, Director Antonio E.
Valenzuela of the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao
recommended that petitioner Judge
Renato A. Fuentes be charged
before the Sandiganbayan with
violation of Republic Act No. 3019,
Section 3 (e) and likewise be
administratively charged before the
Supreme Court with acts
unbecoming of a judge. Fuentes.
filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao a motion to
dismiss complaint and/or
manifestation to forward all records
to the Supreme Court. The motion
was dismissed hence this petition.
ISSUE
1. WON the Ombudsman may
conduct an investigation of acts of a
judge in the exercise of his official
functions alleged to be in violation
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, in the absence of an
administrative charge for the same
acts before the Supreme Court.
HELD
NO. The Ombudsman may not
initiate or investigate a criminal or
administrative complaint before his
office against petitioner judge,
pursuant to his power to investigate
public officers. The Ombudsman must
indorse the case to the Supreme
Court, for appropriate action. Article
VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution
exclusively vests in the Supreme
Court administrative supervision over
all courts and court personnel, from
the Presiding Justice of the Court of
Appeals to the lowest municipal trial
court clerk. Hence, it is the Supreme
Court that is tasked to oversee the
judges and court personnel and take
the proper administrative action
against them if they commit any
violation of the laws of the land. No
other branch of government may
intrude into this power, without
running afoul of the independence of
the judiciary and the doctrine of
separation of powers. No other entity
or official of the Government, not the
prosecution or investigation service
of any other branch, not any
functionary thereof, has competence
to review a judicial order or decision--
whether final and executory or not--
and pronounce it erroneous so as to
lay the basis for a criminal or
administrative complaint for
rendering an unjust judgment or
- 30 -
A2010
order. That prerogative belongs to
the courts alone.
Dispositive
WHEREFORE, the petition is
GRANTED. The Ombudsman is
directed to dismiss the case and refer
the complaint against petitioner
Judge Renato A. Fuentes to the
Supreme Court for appropriate action.
LEDESMA v CA (DESIERTO)
G.R. No. 161629
YNARES-SANTIAGO; July 29, 2005
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari to
reverese and set aside CA decision
FACTS
- Atty Ronaldo Ledesma is the
chaiman of the 1st division of the
Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) of the
Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID). Agusto Somalio
with the Fact Finding and Intelligence
Bureau (FIIB) of the Office of the
Ombudsman filed a complaint
requesting for an investigation on
alleged anomalies surrounding the
extension of the Temporary Resident
Visas (TRVs) of 2 foreigners. The FIIB
investigation revealed 7 other cases
of TRV extensions with similar
irregularities.
- The FIIB, as nominal complainant
filed with Adjudication Bureau (AAB)
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
of the Office of the Ombudsman a
formal complaint against the
petitioner. Atty. Artherl Caronongan
(board member) and Ma. Elena Ang
(exec asst) were also charged
administratively. The case against the
petitioner was treated as both
criminal and administative for 9
countsof violationof the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act for
falsification of public documents and
9 counts of Dishonesty, grave
Misconduct, Falsification of Public
Documents and Gross Neglect of
Duty.
- The complaint alleged the ff illegal
acts: (a) irregularily in granting TRVs
beyond the prescbed period and (b)
using photocopied applications for a
TRV extension wthout the applicants
fixing their signatures to validate the
correctness of the information.
Ladesma and Coarongan allegedly
signed the Memorandum of
Transmittal to the Board of
Commission (BOC) of the BID,
forwarding the applications for TRV
extension of several aliens whose
papers were questionable.
- Graft Investigation Officer Marlyn
Reyes resolved the administrative
cases in a resolution recommending
that Ledesma be suspended from the
service for 1 year for Conduct
Prejudicial to the Interest of the
Service, that Caronongan be
dismissed for being moot and
academic and the case against Ang
be dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence.
- Asst Ombudsman Abelardo
Aportadera reviewed the joint
resolution which was approved by
Ombudsman Desierto.
- Pending the approval by Desierto,
he approved the resolution of Graft
Investigation Officer Marilou Ancheta-
Mejica dismissing criminal charges for
insufficiency of evidence.
- Petitioner filed an MFR in the
administrative case alleging that the
BOC which reviewed the applications
for extension approved theTRVs in
question thereby effectively declared
the applicationd regular and in order
and waived any infurmity thereon.
- Graft Officer Reyes recommended
the denial of the MFR which was
approved by Desierto but reduced the
suspension from 1yr to 9mos without
pay.
- Petitionerfiled a petition for review
with the CA with a preliminary
prohobitory mandatory injunction
and/or temporary restraining order to
enjoin public respondents from the
implementation of the order of
suspension. CA issued the TRO.
- CA affirmed the suspension but
reduced it to 6mos and 1day without
pay. MFR was denied.
ISSUE/S
1. WON CA manifestly overlooked
relevant facts which would have
justified a conclusion in favor of the
- 31 -
A2010
petitioner
2. WON CA erred in finding that the
ombudsman is not merely advisory
on the Bureau of Immigration
3. WON CA failed to consider that the
Ombudsmand's resolution finding
Ledesma administratively liable
constitutes an indirect encroachment
intot he power of the Bureau of
Immigration over immigration
matters
HELD
1. NO
Reasoning Petitioner undermines his
position in the BID and his role in the
processing of the subject
applications. The BSI reviews the
applications and when it finds them in
order, executes a Memorandum of
Tranmittal to the BOC certifying to
the regularity of the application.
All heads of offices have to rely to a
reasonable extent on their
subordinated. He cannot feign good
faith when the irregularities of the
TRV extention application were
patently clear on its face. The
contention that the BOC's approval of
the defective application for TRV
extension cured any infirmaties
absolved petitioner's administrative
lapse.
The main thrust of the case is to
determine whether petitioner
committedany misconduct,
nonfeasance, misfeasance or mal
feasance in the performance of his
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
duties.
2and3. NO
Ratio The creation of the Office of
the Ombudsman is a unique feature
of the 1987 Constitution. The
Ombudsman and his deputies are
mandated to act promptly on
complaints filed in any form or
manner against officers or employeed
of the Government. Foremost among
its powers is the authority to
investigate and prosecute public
officers and employees.
Reasoning Ledesma argues that to
uphold CA's ruling expands authority
granted by the constitution to the
Office of the Ombudsman.
The authority of the Ombudsman to
conduct administrative investigations
as in the present case is settled.
Section 19 of RA 6770 providesa that
the Ombudsman shall act on all
complaints relating, but not limited to
acts or omissions which: (a) Are
contrary to law or regulation; (b) Are
unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or
discriminatory; (c) Are inconsistent
with the general course of an
agency’s functions, though in
accordance with law; (d) Proceed
from a mistake of law or an arbitrary
ascertainment of facts; (e) Are in the
exercise of discretionary powers but
for an improper purpose; or (f) Are
otherwise irregular, immoral or
devoid of justification.
Under Section 13, subparagraph (3),
of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution,
A2010
the Ombudsman can only
“recommend” the removal of the ISSUES
public official or employee found to 1. WON there is substantial
be at fault, to the public official evidence to hold petitioner liable for
concerned. The Solicitor General and dishonesty and grave misconduct
the Office of the Ombudsman argue 2. WON the power of the
that the word “recommend” must be Ombudsman to directly remove,
taken in conjunction with the phrase suspend, demote, fine or censure
“and ensure compliance therewith” erring officials is unconstitutional
and not its literal meaning. since the under the 1987
The Constitutional Commission left to Constitution, the Ombudsman’s
Congress to empower the administrative authority is merely
Ombudsman with prosecutorial recommendatory
functions which it did when RA 6770
was enacted. HELD
Disposition WHEREFORE, the 1. YES.
instant petition is DENIED. Reasoning:
a. Estarija was caught red-handed in
an entrapment operation. When
Estarija went to the office of Adrian
ESTARIJA v RANADA Cagata to pick up the money, his
492 SCRA 652 doing so was indicative of his
QUISUMBING; Jun 26, 2006 willingness to commit the crime.
b. In an administrative proceeding,
NATURE the quantum of proof required for a
Petition for review on certiorari finding of guilt is only substantial
evidence, that amount of relevant
FACTS evidence which a reasonable mind
Captain Edgardo V. Estarija, Harbor might accept as adequate to justify a
Master of the Philippine Ports conclusion.
Authority (PPA), was found guilty by
the Ombudsman of dishonesty and 2. NO.
grave misconduct for having been Rep. Act No. 6770 provides for the
demanding monies for the approval functional and structural organization
and issuance of berthing permits and of the Office of the Ombudsman. In
monthly contribution from the Davao passing Rep. Act No. 6770, Congress
Pilots Association, Inc. (DPAI). He was deliberately endowed the
dismissed from the service. Ombudsman with the power to
- 32 -
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
prosecute offenses committed by
public officers and employees to
make him a more active and effective
agent of the people in ensuring
accountability in public office.
Moreover, the legislature has vested
the Ombudsman with broad powers
to enable him to implement his own
actions.
Reasoning
a. Jurisprudence
- In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, we
held that Rep. Act No. 6770 is
consistent with the intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution.
They gave Congress the discretion to
give the Ombudsman powers that are
not merely persuasive in character.
Thus, in addition to the power of the
Ombudsman to prosecute and
conduct investigations, the
lawmakers intended to provide the
Ombudsman with the power to punish
for contempt and preventively
suspend any officer under his
authority pending an investigation
when the case so warrants. He was
likewise given disciplinary authority
over all elective and appointive
officials of the government and its
subdivisions, instrumentalities and
agencies except members of
Congress and the Judiciary.
b. intent of the framers of the
Constitution
- Based on the record of the
Constitutional Commission, they
clarified that the powers of the
Ombudsman are not exclusive. They
are not foreclosing the possibility that
in the future, the Assembly may have
to give additional powers to the
Ombudsman.
3. The Constitution does not restrict
the powers of the Ombudsman in
Section 13, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, but allows the
Legislature to enact a law that would
spell out the powers of the
Ombudsman. Through the enactment
of Rep. Act No. 6770, specifically
Section 15, par. 3, the lawmakers
gave the Ombudsman such powers to
sanction erring officials and
employees, except members of
Congress, and the Judiciary.
DISPOSITION The petition is
DENIED.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS
MASING
Puno
January 22, 2008
The principal and office clert of Davao
City Integrated Special School were
administratively charged before the
OMB for Mindanao for allegedly
collecting unauthorized fees, failing
to remit authorized fees and to
account for public funds.
Issue: WON the OMB may directly
discipline public school teachers and
employees.
- 33 -
A2010
Held: Yes.
The authority of the OMB to act on
complaints filed against public
officers and employees is explicit in
Article XI, Section 12 of the 1987
Constitution, Article XI, section 13,
which delineates the powers,
functions and duties of the OMB and
such enumeration is non-exclusive.
Then RA 6770 gave OMB such other
powers that it may need to efficiently
perform the task given by the Consti.
In fine, the manifest intent of the
lawmakers was to bestow on the
Office of the OMB full administrative
disciplinary authority in accord with
the constitutional deliberations. In
1973, it was limited only in cases of
failure of justice. In 1987, it was
intended to play a more active role in
the enforcement of laws on anti-graft
and corrupt practices and other
offenses committed by public officers
and employees. Not just a passive
one but an activist watchman. In
Office of the OMB vs Laja, it was
emphasized that the OMB’s order to
remove, suspend, demote, fine,
censure, or prosecute an officer or
employee is not merely advisory or
recommendatory but is actually
mandatory. Implementation of the
order imposing the penalty is,
however to coursed through the
proper officer.
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
The authority of the OMB to conduct
administrative investigations is
beyond cavil. As the principal and
primary complaints and action center
against erring public officers and
employees, it is mandated by no less
than Section 13(1), Article XI of the
Constitution. In conjunction therewith,
Section 19 of RA 6770 grants to the
OMB the authority to act on all
administrative complaints.
Fabella case, the procedure set there
was for administrative investigations
conducted by DECS. This is not also
applicable because they were filed
with violations of civil service laws by
the DECS secretary unlike in the
present case where they were
charged with violations of RA 6713 or
the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and
Employees.
III. POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
A. LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION
1. NON DELEGATION DOCTRINE
COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS
DE FILIPINAS v THE BOARD OF
PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISIONERS
G.R. NO. L-11216
Moreland, J.: March 6, 1916
NATURE
Petition for review of an order of the
Board of Public Utility Commissioners
(the Board)
FACTS
-petitioner is a foreign corporation
organized under the laws of Spain
and engaged in business in the Phils.
as a common carrier of passengers
and merchandise by water. The Board
dictated an order requiring petitioner
to present a detailed report of its
finances and operations of its vessels
in the Phils. in the form of annual
reports, upon hearing and service of
an order for petitioner to show cause
why such reports should not be
required of them.
-The Board relied on Sec. 16 of Act
No. 2307 for its authority which
states that:
“the board shall have power, after
hearing, upon notice, by order in
writing, to require every public utility
as herein defined –
(e) to furnish annually a detailed
report of finances and operations,
in such form and containing
such matters as the Boars may
from time to time by order
prescribe.
-petitioner questioned the Board’s
authority on the ground that Act No.
2307 was invalid as constituting an
- 34 -
A2010
unlawful attempt on the part of
Legislature to delegate legislative
power to the Board.
ISSUE
WON there was a delegation of
legislative power to the Board
HELD
YES. Act No. 2307 failed to lay down
the general rules of action under
which the Board was to proceed, and
did not prescribe in detail the
contents of the reports it required.
Everything was left to the judgment
and discretion of the Board rendering
the Act arbitrary, special legislation,
and violative of the constitution. It did
not indicate what specific information
the State required and instead
authorized the Board to require
whatever information it wanted. This
amounted to the Legislature’s
abdication of its powers and functions
to the Board—as held in Birdsall vs
Clark: if discretion and judgment are
to be exercised, either as to time or
manner, the body entrusted with the
duty must exercise it, and cannot
delegate it to another.
-As stated in Interstate Commerce
Commission vs Goodrich Transit, “The
Congress may not delegate its purely
legislative powers to a commission,
but, having laid down the general
rules of action under which a
commission shall proceed, it may
require of that commission the
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
application of such rules to particular
situations and the investigation of
facts, with a view to making orders in
a particular matter within the rules
laid down by the Congress”. Here, the
general rules had been laid down for
the guidance of the commission, the
latter only having to carry out the
details. This case illustrates the
conferring of authority as to the
execution of the law, which is
completely valid, as opposed to the
delegation of the power to make the
law. Dowling vs Lancashire Insurance
Co. furthers that the law must be
complete, in all its terms and
provisions, when it leaves the
legislature, so that, in form and
substance, it is a law in all its details,
in presenti, but which may be left to
take effect in futuro. As held in
Merchants Exchange vs Knott, in
essence, the delegation of legislative
power is pure and simple despotism.
The order appealed from is set
aside and the cause returned to
the Board with instruction to
dismiss
US v ANG TANG HO
43 Phil 1
Johns; February 27, 1922
FACTS
- In 1919, the Philippine Legislature
passed Act No. 2868. The Act 1)
makes unlawful the monopoly and
hoarding of palay, rice or corn and
provides penalty for such violations;
and 2) authorizes the GG to fix the
quantities of sais products that a
company or individual may acquire,
and the maximum sale price that the
industrial or merchant may demand.
- The GG thus issued a proclamation
fixing the price at which rice should
be sold.
- A complaint was filed against the
Ang Tang Ho, charging him with the
sale of rice at an excessive price.
Upon this charge, he was tried, found
guilty and sentenced to
imprisonment and to pay a fine.
Hence this appeal.
ISSUE
WON Act No. 2868, in so far as it
authorizes the GG to fix the price at
which rice should be sold, is
unconstitutional.
HELD.
YES
It will be noted that section 1
authorizes the GG, with the consent
of the Council of State, for any cause
resulting in an extraordinary rise in
the price of palay, rice or corn, to
issue and promulgated temporary
rules and emergency measures for
carrying out the purposes of the Act.
By its very terms, the promulgation of
temporary rules and emergency
measures is left to the discretion of
the GG. The Legislature does not
- 35 -
A2010
undertake reasons the Governor-
General shall issue the proclamation,
but says that it may be issued " for
any cause," and leaves the question
as to what is "any cause" to the
discretion of the GG. The Act also
says: "For any cause, conditions arise
resulting in an extraordinary rise in
the price of palay, rice or corn." The
Legislature does not specify or define
what is "an extraordinary rise." That
is also left to the discretion of the GG.
The Act also says that the Governor-
General, "with the consent of the
Council of State," is authorized to
issue and promulgate "temporary
rules and emergency measures for
carrying out the purposes of this Act."
It does not specify or define what is a
temporary rule or an emergency
measure, or how long such temporary
rules or emergency measures shall
remain in force and effect, or when
they shall take effect. That is to say
the Legislature itself has no in any
manner specified or defined any basis
for the order, but has left it to the
sole judgment and discretion of the
GG to say what is or what is not "a
cause," and what is or what is not "an
extraordinary rise in the price of rice,"
and as to what a temporary rule or an
emergency measure for the carrying
out the purpose of the Act. Under this
state of facts, if the law is valid and
the GG issues a proclamation fixing
the minimum price at which rice
should be sold, any dealer who, with
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
or without notice, sells rice at a
higher price, is a criminal. There may
not have been any cause, and the
price may not have been
extraordinary, and there may not
have been an emergency, but, if the
GG found the existence of such facts
and issued a proclamation, and rice is
sold at any higher price, the seller
commits a crime.
By the Organic Law, all legislative
power is vested in the Legislature,
and the power conferred upon the
Legislature to make laws cannot be
delegated to the GG, or any one else.
The Legislative cannot delegate the
Legislative power to enact any law. If
Act No. 2868 is a law unto itself and
within itself, and it does nothing more
than to authorize the GG to make
rules and regulations to carry the law
into effect, then the Legislature itself
created the law. There is no
delegation of power and it is valid. On
the other hand, if the Act within itself
does not define a crime, and is not a
law, and some legislative act remains
to be done to make it a law or a
crime, the doing of which is vested in
the GG, then the Act is a delegation
of legislative power, is
unconstitutional and void.
Supreme Court of Wisconsin:
"That no part of the legislative power
can be delegated by the legislature
to any other department of the
government, executive or judicial, is
a fundamental principle in
constitutional law, essential to the
integrity and maintenance of the
system of government established by
the constitution.
"Where an act is clothed with all the
forms of law, and is complete in and
of itself, it may be provided that it
shall become operative only upon
some certain act or event, or, in like
manner, that its operation shall be
suspended.
The legislature cannot delegate its
power to make a law, but it can make
a law to delegate a power to
determine some fact or state of
things upon which the law makes, or
intends to make, its own action to
depend."
It must conceded that, after the
passage of Act No. 2868, and before
any rules and regulations were
promulgated by the GG, a dealer in
rice could sell it at any price, and
that he would not commit a crime,
because there would be no law fixing
the price of rice, and the sale of it at
any price would not be a crime. That
is to say, in the absence of a
proclamation, it was not a crime to
sell rice at any price. Hence, it must
follow that, if the defendant
committed a crime, it was because
the Governor-General issued the
proclamation. There was no act of the
Legislature making it a crime to sell
rice at any price, and without the
proclamation, the sale of it at any
price was not crime.
- 36 -
A2010
When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is
the violation of the proclamation of
the GG which constitutes the crime.
Without that proclamation, it was no
crime to sell rice at any price. In other
words, the Legislature left it to the
sole discretion of the GG to say what
was and what was not "any cause" for
enforcing the act, and what was and
what was not "an extraordinary rise
in the price of palay, rice or corn,"
and under certain undefined
conditions to fix the price at which
rice should be sold, without regard to
grade or quality, also to say whether
a proclamation should be issued, if
so, when, and whether or not the law
should be enforced, how long it
should be enforced, and when the law
should be suspended. The Legislature
did not specify or define what was
"any cause," or what was "an
extraordinary rise in the price of rice,
palay or corn." Neither did it specify
or define the conditions upon which
the proclamation should be issued. In
the absence of the proclamation no
crime was committed. The alleged
sale was made a crime, if at all,
because the GG issued the
proclamation.
PEOPLE v VERA
65 Phil 56
LAUREL; November 16, 1937
FACTS
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
-1931: information for criminal case
against Mariano Cu Unjieng, et. al
was filed in CFI Manila. HSBC, the
offended party, intervened.
-1934: CFI convicted Cu Unjieng
-1935: SC upholds conviction of Cu
Unjieng, modified duration of
imprisonment. After MFR and motions
for new trial which were denied by
SC, final judgment was entered. Cu
Unjieng now sought to elevate case
to US SC. US SC denied petition for
certiorari.
-1936: RP SC denied Cu Unjieng’s
petition for leave to file MFR or new
trial, remanded the case to CFI Manila
for execution of judgment. Cu Unjieng
applied for provation under Act No.
4221, which was referred to the
Insular Probation Office (IPO)
-1937: IPO recommended denial of Cu
Unjieng’s application for probation.
Petition for probation heard before
Judge Vera’s court. HSBC attacked
constitutionality of Act No. 4221
based on the following: equal
protection of the laws (its
applicability is not uniform
throughout the Islands); undue
delegation of legislative power
(section 11 of the said Act endows
prov’l boards w/ power to make said
law effective or otherwise in their
respective provinces). Judge Vera
eventually promulgates resolution
finding Cu Unjieng innocent of the
crime of which he stands convicted
but denying the latter’s petition for
A2010
probation. Counsel for MCU files especially wherefrom its own
exception to the resolution denying admission reliance was merely had
probation & notice of intention to file on the printed briefs, averments, and
MFR. This was followed by a series of pleadings of the parties. If each and
alternative motions for new every Court of First Instance could
reconsideration or new trial. A motion enjoy the privilege of overruling
for leave to intervene in the case as decisions of the Supreme Court, there
amici curiae signed by 33 (34) would be no end to litigation, and
attorneys was also filed. (Attorney judicial chaos would result.
Eulalio Chaves, 1 of the 34, <emphasis on the hierarchy in
subsequently filed a petition for leave the Philippine judicial system>
to withdraw his appearance as
amicus curiae on the ground that the ISSUE
motion was circulated at a banquet NOTE: There were many issues in this
given by counsel for MCU & that he case regarding the constitutionality of
signed the same "without mature Act No. 4221 but for purposes of
deliberation & purely as a matter of Admininstative law, the focus of the
courtesy.”) HSBC filed opposition to digest is the non delegation doctrine
motion for intervention. The Fiscal of – WON section 11 of Act No. 4221
the City of Manila filed motion w/ TC constitute Undue Delegation of
for issuance of an order to execute Legislative Power, and is therefore
judgment of Phil SC in said case & to unconstitutional and void
commit MCU to jail in obedience to
said judgment. HELD
-19 August 1937: hearing on the YES. Section 11 constitutes an
various motions for CFI’s improper and unlawful delegation of
consideration. On this same date, this legislative authority to the provincial
instant case was field before Phil SC boards, therefore, unconstitutional
to put an end to what they alleged and void.
was an interminable proceeding in Reasoning. Under the Consti, gov’t
CFI Mnla. powers are distributed among 3
- Note Probation implies guilt by coordinate and substantially
final judgment. While a probation independent organs: legislative,
case may look into the circumstances executive and judicial. Each
attending the commission of the department derives its authority from
offense, this does not authorize it to the Constitution, the highest
reverse the findings and conclusive of expression of popular will. Each has
this court, either directly or indirectly, exclusive cognizance of the matters
- 37 -
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
within its jurisdiction, supreme within
its own sphere.
- The power to make laws (the
legislative power) is vested in a
bicameral Legislature by the Jones
Law (sec. 12) and in a unicameral
National Assembly by the
Constitution (A6,s1). The Philippine
Legislature or the National Assembly
may not escape its duties and
responsibilities by delegating that
power to any other body or authority.
Any attempt to abdicate the power is
unconstitutional and void, on the
principle that potestas delegata non
delegare potest, an accepted
corollary of the principle of separation
of powers.
- The rule, however, which forbids the
delegation of legislative power is not
absolute and inflexible. It admits of
exceptions like: (1) delegation of
legislative powers to local authorities;
(2) to such agencies in US territories
as Congress may select; (3) to the
people at large; and (4) to those
whom the Constitution itself
delegates such legislative powers
(e.g., the President). The case before
us does not fall under any of these
exceptions.
- Test of Undue Delegation: to
inquire whether the statute was
complete in all its terms and
provisions when it left the hands of
the legislature so that nothing was
left to the judgment of any other
appointee or delegate of the
legislature. BUT to a certain extent
matters of detail may be left to be
filled in by rules and regulations to be
adopted or promulgated by executive
officers and administrative boards. As
a rule, an act of the legislature is
incomplete and hence invalid if it
does not lay down any rule or definite
standard by which the administrative
officer or board may be guided in the
exercise of the discretionary powers
delegated to it.
- In the case at bar, the provincial
boards of the various provinces are to
determine for themselves, whether
the Probation Law shall apply to their
provinces or not at all. The
applicability and application of the
Probation Act are entirely placed in
the hands of the provincial boards. If
the provincial board does not wish to
have the Act applied in its province,
all that it has to do is to decline to
appropriate the needed amount for
the salary of a probation officer. The
plain language of the Act is not
susceptible of any other
interpretation.
- The true distinction is between the
delegation of power to make the law,
which necessarily involves a Probation Law in their respective
discretion as to what it shall be, and
conferring an authority or discretion
as to its execution, to be exercised
under and in pursuance of the law.
The first cannot be done; to the latter
no valid objection can be made.
- It is true that laws may be made
- 38 -
A2010
effective on certain contingencies, as
by proclamation of the executive or
the adoption by the people of a
particular community. The legislature
may delegate a power not legislative
which it may itself rightfully exercise.
The power to ascertain facts is such a
power which may be delegated.
There is nothing essentially
legislative in ascertaining the
existence of facts or conditions as the
basis of the taking into effect of a
law. That is a mental process
common to all branches of the
government.
- The efficiency of an Act as a
declaration of legislative will must, of
course, come from Congress, but the
ascertainment of the contingency
upon which the Act shall take effect
may be left to such agencies as it
may designate. The legislature, then
may provide that a contingencies
leaving to some other person or body
the power to determine when the
specified contingencies has arisen. In
the case at bar, the various provincial
boards are, in practical effect,
endowed with the power of
suspending the operation of the
provinces.
- While the legislature may suspend a
law, or the execution or operation of
a law, a law may not be suspended as
to certain individuals only, leaving the
law to be enjoyed by others. The
suspension must be general, and
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
cannot be made for individual cases
or for particular localities. Here the
sovereign and absolute power resides
in the people; and the legislature can
only exercise what is delegated to
them according to the constitution. It
is manifestly contrary to the first
principles of civil liberty and natural
justice, and to the spirit of our
constitution and laws, that any one
citizen should enjoy privileges and
advantages which are denied to all
others under like circumstances; or
that ant one should be subject to
losses, damages, suits, or actions
from which all others under like
circumstances are exempted.
- True, the legislature may enact laws
for a particular locality different from
those applicable to other localities.
But option laws thus sustained treat
of subjects purely local in character
which should receive different
treatment in different localities
placed under different circumstances.
While we do not deny the right of
local self-government and the
propriety of leaving matters of purely
local concern in the hands of local
authorities or for the people of small
communities to pass upon, we
believe that in matters of general of
general legislation like that which
treats of criminals in general, and as
regards the general subject of
probation, discretion may not be
vested in a manner so unqualified
and absolute as provided in Act No.
4221. The validity of a law is not
tested by what has been done but by
what may be done under its
provisions.
- A great deal of latitude should be
granted to the legislature not only in
the expression of what may be
termed legislative policy but in the
elaboration and execution thereof.
"Without this power, legislation would
become oppressive and yet imbecile."
The mass of powers of government is
vested in the representatives of the
people and that these
representatives are no further
restrained under our system than by
the express language of the
instrument imposing the restraint, or
by particular provisions which by
clear intendment, have that effect.
(Angara case)
Decision WHEREFORE, Act No. 4221
is hereby declared unconstitutional
and void and the writ of prohibition is,
accordingly, granted. Without any
pronouncement regarding costs. So
ordered.
PELAEZ v AUDITOR GENERAL
G.R. L-23285
CONCEPCION; December 24, 1965
NATURE
Special civil action (for a writ of
prohibition with preliminary
injunction) against the Auditor
General, to restrain him, as well as
A2010
his representatives and agents, from
passing in audit any expenditure of
public funds in implementation of
contested EOs
FACTS
- Emmanuel Pelaez, in his capacity as
Vice President and as a taxpayer
instituted this civil action alleging
validity of EO Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and
126 to 129. These executive orders
created 33 municipalities, and were
issued by the President in virtue of
Sec. 68 of the Revised Admin Code.
- Pelaez alleged that such are null
and void, since Sec. 68 has been
impliedly repealed by RA 2370 and
constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power.
Sec 3 of RA 2370 provides that
barrios may "not be created or their
boundaries altered nor their names
changed" except by Act of Congress
or of the corresponding provincial
board "upon petition of a majority of
the voters in the areas affected" and
the "recommendation of the council
of the municipality or municipalities
in which the proposed barrio is
situated."
- Petitioner argues, accordingly: "If
the President, under this new law,
cannot even create a barrio, can he
create a municipality which is
composed of several barrios, since
barrios are units of municipalities?"
- Auditor General answered that this
can be done, upon the theory that a

- 39 -
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
new municipality can be created
without creating new barrios, such as,
by placing old barrios under the
jurisdiction of the new municipality.
ISSUE/S
1. WON the power of the President to
create municipalities under Sec. 682
of the Revised Admin Code amounts
to an undue delegation of legislative
power
2. WON Sec. 68 is deemed repealed
2
The (Governor-General) President of the
Philippines may by executive order define the
boundary, or boundaries, of any province,
subprovince, municipality, [township]
municipal district, or other political
subdivision, and increase or diminish the
territory comprised therein, may divide any
province into one or more subprovinces,
separate any political division other than a
province, into such portions as may be
required, merge any of such subdivisions or
portions with another, name any new
subdivision so created, and may change the
seat of government within any subdivision to
such place therein as the public welfare may
require: Provided, That the authorization of
the (Philippine Legislature) Congress of the
Philippines shall first be obtained whenever
the boundary of any province or subprovince
is to be defined or any province is to be
divided into one or more subprovinces. When
action by the (Governor-General) President of
the Philippines in accordance herewith makes
necessary a change of the territory under the
jurisdiction of any administrative officer or any
judicial officer, the (Governor-General)
President of the Philippines, with the
recommendation and advice of the head of
the Department having executive control of
such officer, shall redistrict the territory of the
several officers affected and assign such
officers to the new districts so formed.
HELD
1.YES
Ratio The authority to create
municipal corporations is essentially
legislative in nature. In the language
of other courts, it is "strictly a
legislative function" or solely and
exclusively the exercise of legislative
power." Although Congress may
delegate to another branch of the
Government the power to fill in the
details in the execution, enforcement
or administration of a law, it is
essential, to forestall a violation of
the principle of separation of powers,
that said law: (a) be complete in
itself - it must set forth therein the
policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate and (b)
fix a standard - the limits of which
are sufficiently determinate or
determinable to which the delegate
must conform in the performance of
his functions.
Reasoning Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code does not meet
these well settled requirements for a
valid delegation of the power to fix
the details in the enforcement of a
law.
- "Public welfare" and "public
interest," are sufficient standards for
a valid delegation of the authority to
execute the law. But, the doctrine laid
down in Calalang v Williams must be
construed in relation to the specific
facts and issues involved - grants to
- 40 -
A2010
administrative officers of powers
related to the exercise of their
administrative functions, calling for
the determination of questions of
fact. Such is not the nature of the
powers dealt with in section 68. The
question of whether or not "public
interest" demands the exercise of
such power is not one of fact. it is
"purely a legislative question " or a
political question.
NON-DELEGATION DOCTRINE
- If the validity of the delegation of
powers made in Section 68 were
upheld, there would no longer be any
legal impediment to a statutory grant
of authority to the President to do
anything which, in his opinion, may
be required by public welfare or
public interest. Such grant of
authority would be a virtual
abdication of the powers of Congress
in favor of the Executive.
- Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our
fundamental law ordains: The
President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, or
offices, exercise general supervision
over all local governments as may be
provided by law, and take care that
the laws be faithfully executed. The
power of control under this provision
implies the right of the President to
interfere in the exercise of such
discretion BUT this power is denied
by the Constitution to the Executive,
insofar as local governments are
concerned. The President cannot
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
interfere with local governments, so
long as the same or its officers act
within the scope of their authority.
Manifestly, such control does not
include the authority either to abolish
an executive department or bureau,
or to create a new one.
2. YES
Reasoning Even if it did entail an
undue delegation of legislative
powers, as it certainly does, said Sec
68, as part of the Revised
Administrative Code, approved on
March 10, 1917, must be deemed
repealed by the subsequent adoption
of the Constitution, in 1935, which is
utterly incompatible and inconsistent
with said statutory enactment.
Disposition The Executive Orders in
question are hereby declared null and
void ab initio and the respondent
(Auditor General) permanently
restrained from passing in audit any
expenditure of public funds in
implementation of said Executive
Orders or any disbursement by the
municipalities above referred to.
BENGZON [concur & dissent]
- The issue is whether the legislature
can validly delegate to the Executive
such power. The power to create a
municipality is legislative in
character. American authorities have
therefore favored the view that it
cannot be delegated; that what is
delegable is not the power to create
municipalities but only the power to
determine the existence of facts
under which creation of a implementing such legislation be
municipality will result.
- The test is said to lie in whether the
statute allows any discretion on the
delegate as to whether the municipal
corporation should be created. If so,
there is an attempted delegation of
legislative power and the statute is
invalid. Now Section 68 no doubt
gives the President such discretion,
since it says that the President "may
by executive order" exercise the
powers therein granted.
EDU v ERICTA
35 SCRA 481
FERNANDO; October 24, 1970
NATURE
Petition for certiorari and prohibition
FACTS
-Galo, on his behalf and that of other
motorists, filed on May 20, 1970 a
suit for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction assailing the
validity of the Reflector Law as an
invalid exercise of the police power,
for being violative of the due process
clause.
-This he followed on May 28, 1970
with a manifestation wherein he
sought as an alternative remedy that,
in the event that respondent Judge
would hold said statute constitutional,
Administrative Order No. 2 of the
- 41 -
A2010
Land Transportation Commissioner,
nullified as an undue exercise of
legislative power.
-On May 28, 1970, respondent Judge
ordered the issuance of a preliminary
injunction directed against the
enforcement of such administrative
order.
-SolGen filed MFR
-On June 9, 1970, respondent Judge
denied the motion for reconsideration
of the order of injunction, hence this
petition for certiorari and prohibition
ISSUE
WON Admninstrative Order No. 2 is
invalid for being contrary to the
principle of non-delegation of
legislative power.
HELD
No.
-It is not to be lost sight of that under
Republic Act No. 4136, of which the
Reflector Law is an amendment,
petitioner, as the Land Transportation
Commissioner, may, with the
approval of the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, issue
rules and regulations for its
implementation as long as they do
not conflict with its provisions
-It is a fundamental principle
flowing from the doctrine of
separation of powers that
Congress may not delegate its
legislative power to the two
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
other branches of the
government, subject to the
exception that local governments
may over local affairs participate
in its exercise.
-What cannot be delegated is the
authority under the Constitution
to make laws and to alter and
repeal them; the test is the
completeness of the statute in all
its term and provisions when it
leaves the hands of the
legislature.
-To determine whether or not there is
an undue delegation of legislative
power the inquiry must be directed to
the scope and definiteness of the
measure enacted. The legislature
does not abdicate its functions when
it describes what job must be done,
who is to do it, and what is the scope
of his authority.
-A distinction has rightfully been
made between delegation of
power to make the laws which
necessarily involves a discretion
as to what it shall be, which
constitutionally may not be done,
and delegation of authority or
discretion as to its execution to
exercised under and in pursuance
of the law, to which no valid
objection call be made.
-The Constitution is thus not to be
regarded as denying the legislature
the necessary resources of flexibility
and practicability.
-To avoid the taint of unlawful
delegation, there must be a
standard, which implies at the very
least that the legislature itself
determines matters of principle and
lay down fundamental policy. A
standard thus defines legislative
policy, marks its limits, maps out
its boundaries and specifies the
public agency to apply it. It
indicates the circumstances
under which the legislative
command is to be effected. It is
the criterion by which legislative
purpose may be carried out.
Thereafter, the executive or
administrative office designated may
in pursuance of the above guidelines
promulgate supplemental rules and
regulations.
-The standard may be either
express or implied. If the former,
the non-delegation objection is easily
met. The standard though does not
have to be spelled out specifically. It
could be implied from the policy and
purpose of the act considered as a
whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly
the legislative objective is public
safety.
-Justice Laurel: The principle of
non-delegation "has been made
to adapt itself the complexities of
modern governments, giving rise
to the adoption, within certain
limits, of the principle of
"subordinate legislation" not only
in the United States and England but
in practically all modern
- 42 -
A2010
governments. Accordingly, with the
growing complexity of modern
life, the multiplication of the
subjects of governmental
regulation, and the increased
difficulty of administering the
laws, there is a constantly
growing tendency toward the
delegation of greater powers by
the legislature and toward the
approval of the practice by the
courts."
-Justice J. B. L. Reyes in People vs.
Exconde: "It is well establish in this
jurisdiction that, while the making
of laws is a non-delegable
activity that corresponds
exclusively to Congress,
nevertheless the latter may
constitutionally delegate
authority to promulgate rules
and regulations to implement a
given legislation and effectuate
its policies, for the reason that
the legislature often finds it
impracticable (if not impossible)
to anticipate and proved for the
multifarious and complex
situations that may be met in
carrying the law in effect. All that
is required is that the regulation
should germane to the objects
and purposes of the law; that the
regulation be not in contradiction
with it; but conform to the
standards that the law prescribes
... "
-Chief Justice, Concepcion: "It is one
Administrative Law A2010
Dean Carlota
thing is to delegate the power to and the validity of Administrative regulations prepared by respondent
determine what the law shall be, Order No. 2 issued in the Commission were approved for
and another thing to delegate implementation thereof are immediate implementation by
the authority to fix the details in sustained. respondent Minister of Public Works
the execution of enforcement of and Communication.
a policy set out in the law itself. -Petitioner came to court alleging that
Briefly stated, the rule is that the AGUSTIN v EDU Letter of Instruction 229, as
delegated powers fall under the 88 SCRA 195 amended, clearly violates the
second category, if the law FERNANDO; Feb. 2, 1979 provisions of the New Constitution on
authorizing the, delegation furnishes due process, equal protection and
a reasonable standard which NATURE delegation of police power. That it is
"sufficiently marks the field within Petition for prohibition oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary,
which the Administrator is to act so confiscatory and contrary to the
that it may be known whether he has FACTS precepts of our compassionate New
kept within it in compliance with the -Letter of Instruction No. 229 (1974) Society.
legislative will." as amended by Letter of Instruction -The respondents' Answer
-The Reflector Law, construed No. 479 (1976) required every motor demonstrated that the assailed Letter
together with the Land Transportation vehicle owner to procure and use one of Instruction was a valid exercise of
Code, Republic Act No. 4136, of which pair of a reflectorized triangular early the police power; that the
it is an amendment, leaves no doubt warning device whenever any vehicle implementing rules and regulations of
as to the stress and emphasis on is stalled or disabled or is parked for respondent Land Transportation
public safety which is the prime thirty (30) minutes or more on any Commissioner do not constitute
consideration in statutes of this street, or highway, including unlawful delegation of legislative
character. There is likewise a expressways or limited access roads. power and that the hazards posed by
categorical affirmation of the power -The implementing rules and such obstructions to traffic have been
of petitioner as Land Transportation regulations prepared by the recognized by international bodies
Commissioner to promulgate rules respondent Land Transportation concerned with traffic safety, the
and regulations to give life to and Commissioner on December 10, 1976 1968 Vienna Convention on Road
translate into actuality such were not enforced as President Signs and Signals of which Philippines
fundamental purpose. His power is Marcos, on January 25, 1977, ordered was a signatory and which was duly
clear. There has been no abuse. His a six-month period of suspension ratified and the United Nations
Administrative Order No. 2 can easily insofar as the installation of early Organization.
survive the attack, far-from- warning device (EWD) as a pre-
formidable, launched against it by registration requirement for motor ISSUE
respondent Galo. vehicles was concerned. Letter of 1. WON the implementing rules
Instruction No. 716, issued on June and regulations of respondent Land
Disposition Petition is granted. The 30, 1978 lifted such suspension and Transportation Commissioner
constitutionality of the Reflector Law in pursuance thereof, the rules and

- 43 -
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
constitute unlawful delegation of
legislative power
HELD
1. NO.
Reasoning The Court dismissed the
petition for prohibition ruling that the
Letter of Instruction in question was
issued in the exercise of the State's
police power intended to promote
public safety; that there has been no
undue delegation of legislative power
as a standard has been set; and that
the country cannot repudiate its
commitment to international bodies
and the accepted principles of
international law. The petition itself
quoted these two whereas clauses of
the assailed Letter of Instruction:
"[Whereas], the hazards posed by
such obstructions to traffic have been
recognized by international bodies
concerned with traffic safety, the
1968 Vienna Convention on Road
Signs and Signals and the United
Nations Organization (U.N.);
[Whereas], the said Vienna
Convention, which was ratified by the
Philippine Government under P.D. No.
207, recommended the enactment of
local legislation for the installation of
road safety signs and devices; . . ."
It cannot be disputed then that this
Declaration of Principle found in the
Constitution possesses relevance:
"The Philippines . . . adopts the
generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of
the land, . . ." The 1968 Vienna
Convention on Road Signs and
Signals is impressed with such a
character. It is not for this country to
repudiate a commitment to which it
had pledged its word. The concept of
Pacta sunt servanda stands in the
way of such an attitude, which is,
moreover, at war with the principle of
international morality.
Disposition Petition DISMISSED
FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS
UNION v MINISTER OF LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT
108 SCRA 757
FERNANDO; Feb. 2, 1979
NATURE
Petition for certiorari before the
Supreme Court
FACTS
-Petitioner filed with the Ministry of
Labor a notice of strike for unfair
labor practices allegedly committed
by private respondent company
inviolation of their existing collective
bargaining agreement, particularly
the unilateral and arbitrary
implementation of a Code of Conduct
to the detriment and interest of its
members.
-Several conciliation meetings called
by the Ministry followed. Thereafter,
the Ministry of Labor pursuant to law,
- 44 -
A2010
certified the labor dispute to the
NLRC for compulsory arbitration and
the holding of any strike at private
respondent establishment was
enjoined. Hearing was subsequently
conducted whereas private
respondent agreed to the indefinite
preventive suspension of the
provisions of the Code of Conduct,
the principal cause of the
controversy.
-In a petition for certiorari before the
Supreme Court, petitioner union
submits that Batas Pambansa Blg.
130 insofar as it amends Article 264
of the Labor Code delegating to the
Minister of Labor the power and
discretion to assume jurisdiction
and/or certify strikes for compulsory
arbitration to the NLRC, and in effect
make or unmake the law on free
collective bargaining, is an undue
delegation of legislative powers and
is contrary to the assurance of the
State to the workers' right to self
organization and collective
bargaining. Such power, according to
petitioner union, is within the
competence of the President who can
best determine national interests
when a strike is in progress.
ISSUE
2. WON Batas Pambansa Blg. 130
insofar as it amends Article 264 of
the Labor Code delegating to the
Minister of Labor the power and
discretion to assume jurisdiction
Administrative Law A2010
Dean Carlota
and/or certify strikes for compulsory judicial determination. It must be franchise, it was likewise granted the
arbitration to the NLRC, and in stressed anew, however, that the authority to "construct and operate
effect make or unmake the law on power of compulsory arbitration, such ground facilities as needed to
free collective bargaining, is an while allowable under the deliver telecommunications services
undue delegation of legislative Constitution and quite from the communications satellite
powers and hence unconstitutional understandable in labor disputes system and ground terminal or
affected with a national interest, to terminals."
HELD be free from the taint of Pursuant to said franchise, petitioner
2. NO. unconstitutionality, must be puts on record that it undertook the
Reasoning the unconstitutional of exercised in accordance with the certain activities and established the
the act has not been demonstrated constitutional mandate of protection various installations:
and that any ruling on the question of to labor. By designation of the Republic of the
unconstitutional application would be Disposition Petition DISMISSED Philippines, the petitioner is also the
premature in the absence of factual sole signatory for the Philippines in
determination by the Ministry of the Agreement and the Operating
Labor and the NLRC. Batas Pambansa PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS Agreement relating to the
Blg. 130 insofar as it empowers the SATELLITE CORPORATION v International Telecommunications
Minister of Labor to assume ALCUAZ Satellite Organization (INTELSAT) of
jurisdiction over labor disputes 180 SCRA 218 115 member nations, as well as in the
causing or likely to cause strikes or REGALADO; Dec 18, 1989 Convention and the Operating
lockouts adversely affecting the Agreement of the International
national interest and thereafter NATURE Maritime Satellite Organization
decide it or certify the same to the Petition to annul and set aside an (INMARSAT) of 53 member nations,
NLRC is not on its face Order issued by respondent which two global commercial
unconstitutional for being violative of Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of the telecommunications satellite
the doctrine of non-delegation of National Telecommunications corporations were collectively
legislative power. It stressed further Commission established by various states in line
that compulsory arbitration must be with the principles set forth in
exercised in accordance with the FACTS Resolution 1721 (XVI) of the General
constitutional mandate of protection By virtue of Republic Act No. 5514, Assembly of the United Nations.
to labor. To repeat, there is no ruling PHILCOMSAT was granted "a
on the question of whether or not it franchise to establish, construct, Since 1968, the petitioner has been
has been unconstitutionally applied in maintain and operate in the leasing its satellite circuits to:1.
this case, for being repugnant to the Philippines, at such places as the Philippine Long Distance Telephone
regime of self-organization and free grantee may select, station or Company; 2. Philippine Global
collective bargaining, as on the facts stations and associated equipment Communications, Inc.; 3. Eastern
alleged, disputed by private and facilities for international satellite Telecommunications Phils., Inc.; 4.
respondent, the matter is not ripe for communications." Under this

- 45 -
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp.
ITT; and 5. Capitol Wireless, Inc.
or their predecessors-in-interest. The
satellite services thus provided by
petitioner enable said international
carriers to serve the public with
indispensable communication
services, such as overseas telephone,
telex, facsimile, telegrams, high
speed data, live television in full
color, and television standard
conversion from European to
American or vice versa.
Under Section 5 of Republic Act No.
5514, petitioner was exempt from the
jurisdiction of the then Public Service
Commission, now respondent NTC.
However, pursuant to Executive
Order No. 196 issued on June 17,
1987, petitioner was placed under the
jurisdiction, control and regulation of
respondent NTC, including all its
facilities and services and the fixing
of rates. Implementing said Executive
Order No. 196, respondents required
petitioner to apply for the requisite
certificate of public convenience and
necessity covering its facilities and
the services it renders, as well as the
corresponding authority to charge
rates therefor.
Consequently, under date of
September 9, 1987, petitioner filed
with respondent NTC an application
for authority to continue operating
and maintaining the same facilities it
has been continuously operating and
maintaining since 1967, to continue
providing the international satellite
communications services it has
likewise been providing since 1967,
and to charge the current rates
applied for in rendering such services.
Pending hearing, it also applied for a
provisional authority so that it can
continue to operate and maintain the
above mentioned facilities, provide
the services and charge therefor the
aforesaid rates therein applied for.
On September 16, 1987, petitioner
was granted a provisional authority to
continue operating its existing
facilities, to render the services it was
then offering, and to charge the rates
it was then charging. This authority
was valid for six (6) months from the
date of said order. When said
provisional authority expired on
March 17, 1988, it was extended for
another six (6) months, or up to
September 16, 1988.
The NTC order now in controversy
had further extended the provisional
authority of the petitioner for another
six (6) months, counted from
September 16, 1988, but it directed
the petitioner to charge modified
reduced rates through a reduction of
fifteen percent (15%) on the present
authorized rates.
PHILCOMSAT argues that the enabling
act (Executive Order No. 546) of
respondent NTC empowering it to fix
rates for public service
- 46 -
A2010
communications does not provide the
necessary standards constitutionally
required, hence there is an undue
delegation of legislative power,
particularly the adjudicatory powers
of NTC.
ISSUE
WON Executive Orders Nos. 546 and
196 are unconstitutional on the
ground that the same do not fix a
standard for the exercise of the
power therein conferred.
HELD
NO. Fundamental is the rule that
delegation of legislative power may
be sustained only upon the ground
that some standard for its exercise is
provided and that the legislature in
making the delegation has prescribed
the manner of the exercise of the
delegated power. Therefore, when
the administrative agency concerned,
respondent NTC in this case,
establishes a rate, its act must both
be non- confiscatory and must have
been established in the manner
prescribed by the legislature;
otherwise, in the absence of a fixed
standard, the delegation of power
becomes unconstitutional. In case of
a delegation of rate-fixing power, the
only standard which the legislature is
required to prescribe for the guidance
of the administrative authority is that
the rate be reasonable and just.
However, it has been held that even
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
in the absence of an express
requirement as to reasonableness,
this standard may be implied.
It becomes important then to
ascertain the nature of the power
delegated to respondent NTC and the
manner required by the statute for
the lawful exercise thereof.
Pursuant to Executive Orders Nos.
546 and 196, respondent NTC is
empowered,among others, to
determine and prescribe rates
pertinent to the operation of public
service communications which
necessarily include the power to
promulgate rules and regulations in
connection therewith. And, under
Section 15(g) of Executive Order No.
546, respondent NTC should be
guided by the requirements of public
safety, public interest and reasonable
feasibility of maintaining effective
competition of private entities in
communications and broadcasting
facilities. Likewise, in Section 6(d)
thereof, which provides for the
creation of the Ministry of
Transportation and Communications
with control and supervision over
respondent NTC, it is specifically
provided that the national economic
viability of the entire network or
components of the communications
systems contemplated therein should
be maintained at reasonable rates.
We need not go into an in-depth
analysis of the pertinent provisions of
the law in order to conclude that
respondent NTC, in the exercise of its
rate-fixing power, is limited by the
requirements of public safety, public
interest, reasonable feasibility and
reasonable rates, which conjointly
more than satisfy the requirements of
a valid delegation of legislative
power.
Dispositive Petition granted
CHIONGBIAN v ORBOS
245 SCRA 253
MENDOZA; June 22, 1995
NATURE: PROHIBITION AND
CERTIORARI
Facts:
- These suits challenge the validity of
a provision of the Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (or R.A. No. 6734 which
was passed pursuant to Art. X, Sec 18
of the 1987 Constitution), authorizing
the President of the Philippines to
"merge" by administrative
determination the regions remaining
after the establishment of the AR,
and the EO No. 429 issued by the
President pursuant to such authority,
"Providing for the Reorganization of
Administrative Regions in Mindanao."
- Pursuant to Art. XIX, Sec 13 of R.A.
No. 6734(which provides for the
authority of merging upon
administrative determination the
- 47 -
A2010
other regions), Pres. Aquino issued
the questioned EO No. 429 joining
provinces from other regions to
another region (eg. Misamis
Occidental, wast part of Region X,
became part of Region IX etc.)
- Herein petitioners in the first case,
wrote then President Aquino
protesting E.O. No. 429.
- They contended that the transfer of
the provinces of Misamis Occidental
from Region X to Region IX etc are
alterations of the existing structures
of governmental units, in other
words, reorganization. And that her
authority necessarily includes the
authority to merge, the authority to
merge does not include the authority
to reorganize. Therefore, the
President's authority under RA 6734
to "merge existing regions" cannot be
construed to include the authority to
reorganize them.
- Jaldon, a resident of Zamboanga
City, who is suing in the capacity of
taxpayer also contends that Art. XIX,
Sec. 13 of R.A. No. 6734 is
unconstitutional because (1) it unduly
delegates legislative power to the
President by authorizing him to
"merge [by administrative
determination] the existing regions"
or at any rate provides no standard
for the exercise of the power
delegated and (2) the power granted
is not expressed in the title of the
law.
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
- SOLGEN: the exercise of a power
"traditionally lodged in the President,"
as held in Abbas v. Comelec, and as a
mere incident of his power of general
supervision over local governments
and control of executive
departments, bureaus and offices
under Art. X Sec 16 and Art. VII Sec
17 of the Constitution.
- He contends that there is no undue
delegation of legislative power but
only a grant of the power to "fill up"
or provide the details of legislation
because Congress did not have the
facility to provide for them.
- Also, he justifies the grant to the
President of the power "to merge the
existing regions" as something fairly
embraced in the title of R.A. No.
6734, to wit, "An Act Providing for an
Organic Act for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao," because
it is germane to it.
- He argues that the power is not
limited to the merger of those regions
in which the provinces and cities
which took part in the plebiscite are
located but that it extends to all
regions in Mindanao as necessitated
by the establishment of the
autonomous region.
Issues:
1. WON the merging of admin regions
is an administrative matter
2. WON Congress has provided a
sufficient standard by which the
President is to be guided in the
exercise of the power granted and
3. WON the grant of power to him is
included in the subject expressed in
the title of the law.
4. WON the power granted to the
President is limited to the
reorganization of administrative
regions in which some of the
provinces and cities which voted in
favor of regional autonomy are found
pursuant to Art. 13 Sec 13
HELD:
1. YES. The power conferred on
the President to MERGE Admin
Regions is similar to the power to
adjust municipal boundaries
which has been described in
Pelaez v. Auditor General or as
"administrative in nature." (while
the CREATION of municipalities is
purely a legislative matter.)
2. YES. The standard is to be found in
the same policy underlying the grant
to the President in R.A. No. 5435.
- A legislative standard need not be
expressed. It may simply be gathered
or implied. Nor need it be found in
the law challenged because it may be
embodied in other statutes on the
same subject as that of the
challenged legislation.
- Nature of administrative regions and
the basis and purpose for their
creation:
- 48 -
A2010
* Basis: R.A. No. 5435 granted
authority to the Pres, with the
help of a Commission on
Reorganization, to reorganize
the different executive
departments, bureaus, offices,
etc.
* The law provided that any
reorganization plan submitted
would become effective only
upon the approval of Congress.
* Purpose was to promote
"simplicity, economy and
efficiency in the government."
- The choice of the President as
delegate is logical because the
division of the country into regions is
intended to facilitate not only the
administration of local governments
but also the direction of executive
departments which the law requires
should have regional offices.
- Abbas v. COMELEC: "while the
power to merge administrative
regions is not expressly provided for
in the Constitution, it is a power
which has traditionally been lodged
with the President to facilitate the
exercise of the power of general
supervision over local governments
[see Art. X, Sec 4 of the
Constitution]." The regions
themselves are not territorial and
political divisions like provinces,
cities, municipalities and barangays
but are "mere groupings of
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
contiguous provinces for
administrative purposes."
- There is, therefore, no abdication by
Congress of its legislative power in
conferring on the President the power
to merge administrative regions.
3. YES. It is a sufficient compliance
with the constitutional requirement if
the title expresses the general
subject and all provisions of the
statute are germane to that subject.
Certainly the reorganization of the
remaining administrative regions is
germane to the general subject of
R.A. No. 6734, which is the
establishment of the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao.
4. YES. The questioned EO No. 429
distorted and, in fact, contravened
the clear intent of this provision by
moving out or transferring certain
political subdivisions
(provinces/cities) out of their legally
designated regions.
- Aggravating this unacceptable or
untenable situation is EO No. 429's
effecting certain movements on areas
which did not even participate in the
plebiscite.
- While Art. XIX, Sec 13 provides that
"The provinces and cities which do
not vote for inclusion in the
Autonomous Region shall remain in
the existing administrative regions,"
this provision is subject to the
qualification that "the President may
A2010
by administrative determination purposes, not for political
merge the existing regions." representation.
- This means that while non-assenting - To be fundamental reason Art. XIX,
provinces and cities are to remain in Sec 13 is not so limited. But the more
the regions as designated upon the fundamental reason is that the
creation of the Autonomous Region, President's power cannot be so
they may nevertheless be regrouped limited without neglecting the
with contiguous provinces forming necessities of administration.
other regions as the exigency of - E.O. No. 429 is based on relevant
administration may require. criteria, to wit: (1) contiguity and
- The regrouping is done only on geographical features; (2)
paper. It involves no more than are transportation and communication
definition or redrawing of the lines facilities; (3) cultural and language
separating administrative regions for groupings; (4) land area and
the purpose of facilitating the population; (5) existing regional
administrative supervision of local centers adopted by several agencies;
government units by the President (6) socio-economic development
and insuring the efficient delivery of programs in the regions and (7)
essential services. number of provinces and cities.
- There will be no "transfer" of local
governments from one region to Dispositive: The petitions for
another except as they may thus be certiorari and prohibition are
regrouped so that a province like DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Lanao del Norte, which is at present
part of Region XII, will become part of
Region IX. SANTIAGO v COMELEC
- The regrouping of contiguous
provinces is not even analogous to a
redistricting or to the division or PANAMA REFINING CO v RYAN
merger of local governments, which 293 U.S. 388
all have political consequences on the HUGHES; January 7, 1935
right of people residing in those
political units to vote and to be voted FACTS
for. It cannot be overemphasized - EO 6199, which prohibited the
that administrative regions are transportation in interstate and
mere groupings of contiguous foreign commerce of petroleum and
provinces for administrative the products produced or withdrawn
from storage in excess of the amount
- 49 -
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
permitted to be produced or
withdrawn from storage by any State
law or valid regulation or order
prescribed by any board, commission,
officer, or other duly authorized
agency of a State, was enacted,
pursuant to sec 9(c) of title 1 of the
National Industrial Recovery Act of
June 16, 193, which states that “'The
President is authorized to prohibit the
transportation in interstate and
foreign commerce of petroleum and
the products thereof produced or
withdrawn from storage in excess of
the amount permitted to be produced
or withdrawn from storage by any
State law or valid regulation or order
prescribed by any board, commission,
officer, or other duly authorized
agency of a State. Any violation of
any order of the Pres issued under
the provisions of this subsection shall
be punishable by fine of not to
exceed $1k, or imprisonment for not
to exceed 6 months, or both.”
- EO 6204, based on sec 10(a) of the
NIRA, authorizing the Pres 'to
prescribe such rules and regulations
as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes' of title 1 and providing that
'any violation of any such rule or
regulation shall be punishable by fine
of not to exceed $500, or
imprisonment for not to exceed 6
months, or both,' authorized the Sec
of the Interior to exercise all the
powers vested in the Pres for the
purpose of enforcing Sec 9(c),
including full authority to designate
and appoint such agents and to set
up such boards and agencies as he
may see fit, and to promulgate such
rules and regulations as he may
deem necessary.
- Sec of Interior issued the regulations
which included the requirement for
every producer, purchaser or shipper
of petroleum to file a monthly
statement under oath, giving
information re: their residence and
post office address, and other
information regarding the sale,
purchase, production of petroleum
(Regulations IV, V and VII)
- EO 6256 approved Code of Fair
Competition for the Petroleum
Industry.
- Thru EO of August 28, 1933, the
Pres designated the Sec of the
Interior as Administrator, and the
Dept of the Interior as the federal
agency, to exercise on his behalf all
the powers vested in him under that
act and code. Sec 3(f), title 1 of the
NIRA, provides that, when a code of
fair competition has been approved
or prescribed by the Pres under that
title, 'any violation of any provision in
any transaction in or affecting
interstate or foreign commerce shall
be a misdemeanor and upon
conviction thereof an offender shall
be fined not more than $500 for each
offense, and each day such violation
continues shall be deemed a separate
offense.'
- 50 -
A2010
- By EO No. 6284-a, the 2nd par of sec
4 of art III3 was eliminated. It was
reinstated by EO 6855.
- Panama Refining Company, as
owner of an oil refining plant in
Texas, and its coplaintiff, a producer
having oil and gas leases in Texas,
and Amazon Petroleum Corporation
and its coplaintiffs, all being oil
producers in Texas and owning
separate properties, sued to restrain
officials from enforcing the laws
promulgated by the Sec of Interior
and questioned the constitutionality
of the EOs.
ISSUE
WON the EOs are constitutional
HELD
NO, because of unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power
Ratio The Legislature, to prevent its
being a pure delegation of legislative
power, must enjoin upon the agent a
certain course of procedure and
certain rules of decision in the
performance of its function.
Reasoning
- The Constitution has never been
regarded as denying the Congress
the necessary resources of flexibility
3
'If any subdivision into quotas of production allocated to
any State shall be made within a State any production by
any person, as person is defined in Article I, Section 3 of
this code in excess of any such quota assigned to him,
shall be deemed an unfair trade practice and in violation
of this code.'
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
and practicality, which will enable it
to perform its function in laying down
policies and establishing standards,
while leaving to selected
instrumentalities the making of
subordinate rules within prescribed
limits and the determination of facts
to which the policy as declared by the
Legislature is to apply. But the
constant recognition of the necessity
and validity of such provisions and
the wide range of administrative
authority which has been developed
by means of them cannot be allowed
to obscure the limitations of the
authority to delegate, if our
constitutional system is to be
maintained.
- Authorizations given by Congress to
selected instrumentalities for the
purpose of ascertaining the existence
of facts to which legislation is
directed have constantly been
sustained. Moreover the Congress
may not only give such authorizations
to determine specific facts, but may
establish primary standards,
devolving upon others the duty to
carry out the declared legislative
policy.
- Thus, in every case in which the
question has been raised, the Court
has recognized that there are limits
of delegation which there is no
constitutional authority to transcend.
We think that section 9(c) goes
beyond those limits. As to the
transportation of oil production in
excess of state permission, the
Congress has declared no policy, has
established no standard, has laid
down no rule. There is no
requirement, no definition of
circumstances and conditions in
which the transportation is to be
allowed or prohibited.
- Section 9(c) is brief and
unambiguous. It leaves to the states
and to their constituted authorities
the determination of what production
shall be permitted. It does not qualify
the President's authority by reference
to the basis or extent of the state's
limitation of production. It does not
state whether or in what
circumstances or under what
conditions the President is to prohibit
the transportation of the amount of
petroleum or petroleum products
produced in excess of the state's
permission. It establishes no creterion
to govern the President's course. It
does not require any finding by the
President as a condition of his
action.The Congress in section 9(c)
thus declares no policy as to the
transportation of the excess
production. So far as this section is
concerned, it gives to the President
an unlimited authority to determine
the policy and to lay down the
prohibition, or not to lay it down, as
he may see fit. And disobedience to
his order is made a crime punishable
by fine and imprisonment.
- 51 -
A2010
- The Congress left the matter to the
President without standard or rule, to
be dealt with as he pleased. The
effort by ingenious and diligent
construction to supply a criterion still
permits such a breadth of authorized
action as essentially to commit to the
President the functions of a
Legislature rather than those of an
executive or administrative officer
executing a declared legislative
policy. We find nothing in section 1
which limits or controls the authority
conferred by section 9(c).
- When the President is invested with
legislative authority as the delegate
of Congress in carrying out a declared
policy, he necessarily acts under the
constitutional restriction applicable to
such a delegation.
Disposition EO Nos. 6199, 6204, and
the regulations issued by the Sec of
the Interior, are without constitutional
authority.
SEPARATE OPINION
CARDOZO [dissenting]
- To uphold the delegation there is
need to discover in the terms of the
act a standard reasonably clear
whereby discretion must be
governed. Such a standard is not
lacking in respect of the prohibitions
permitted by this section when the
act with all its reasonable
implications is considered as a whole.
What the standard is becomes the
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
pivotal inquiry.
- The Pres has choice, though within
limits, as to the occasion, but none
whatever as to the means. The
means have been prescribed by
Congress. There has been no grant to
the Executive of any roving
commission to inquire into evils and
then, upon discovering them, do
anything he pleases. If we look to the
whole structure of the statute, the
test is plainly this, that the President
is to forbid the transportation of the
oil when he believes, in the light of
the conditions of the industry as
disclosed from time to time, that the
prohibition will tend to effectuate the
declared policies of the act-not
merely his own conception of its
policies, undirected by any extrinsic
guide, but the policies announced by
section 1.
- The President has the privilege of
choice between one standard and
another. What he does is to inquire
into the industrial facts as they exist
from time to time. These being
ascertained, he is not to prefer one
standard to another in any subjective
attitude of mind, in any personal or
willful way. He is to study the facts
objectively, the violation of a
standard impelling him to action or
inaction according to its observed
effect upon industrial recovery-the
ultimate end, as appears by the very
heading of the title, to which all the
other ends are tributary and mediate.
- Congress was aware that for the
recovery of national well-being there
might be need of temp restriction
upon production in one industry or
another. When it clothed the Pres
with power to impose such a
restriction-to prohibit the flow of oil
illegally produced-it laid upon him a
mandate to inquire and determine
whether the conditions in that
particular industry were such at any
given time as to make restriction
helpful to the declared objectives of
the act and to the ultimate
attainment of industrial recovery.
- A reference, express or implied, to
the policy of Congress, is a sufficient
definition of a standard to make the
statute valid. Discretion is not
unconfined and vagrant. The
separation of powers between the
Executive and Congress is not a
doctrinaire concept to be made use of
with pedantic rigor. There must be
sensible approximation, there must
be elasticity of adjustment, in
response to the practical necessities
of government, which cannot foresee
to-day the developments of tomorrow
in their nearly infinite variety.
- The President was not required
either by the Constitution or by any
statute to state the reasons that had
induced him to exercise the granted
power. It is enough that the grant of
power had been made and that
pursuant to that grant he had
signified the will to act.
- 52 -
A2010
- The President, when acting in the
exercise of a delegated power, is not
a quasi judicial officer, whose rulings
are subject to review upon certiorari
or appeal, or an administrative
agency supervised in the same way.
Officers and bodies such as those
may be required by reviewing courts
to express their decision in formal
and explicit findings to the end that
review may be intelligent. Such is not
the position or duty of the President.
He is the Chief Executive of the
nation, exercising a power committed
to him by Congress, and subject, in
respect of the formal qualities of his
acts, to the restrictions, if any,
accompanying the grant, but not to
any others.
ABAKADA GURO v EXEC. SEC.
ERMITA
GR No. 168207
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; September 1,
2005
NATURE
Petitions for certiorari and prohibition
FACTS
- On May 24, 2005, the President
signed into law Republic Act 9337 or
the VAT Reform Act. Before the law
was to take effect on July 1, 2005, the
Court issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining government from
implementing the law in response to
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
a slew of petitions for certiorari and
prohibition questioning the
constitutionality of the new law.
- NON-DELEGATION ISSUE: The new
law in its Sections 4, 5 and 6 granted
the Secretary of Finance the authority
to ascertain whether by December
31, 2005, the VAT collection as a
percentage of GDP of the previous
year exceeds 2 and 4/5% or the
national government deficit as a
percentage of GDP of the previous
year exceeds 1 and 1/2%. If either of
these two instances has occurred, the
Secretary of Finance, must submit
such information to the President.
Then the 12% VAT rate must be
imposed by the President effective
January 1, 2006.
ISSUE
WON the RA 9337's stand-by
authority to the Executive to increase
the VAT rate, especially on account of
the recommendatory power granted
to the Secretary of Finance,
constitutes undue delegation of
legislative power
HELD
NO.
Ratio Congress does not abdicate its
functions or unduly delegate power
when it describes what job must be
done, who must do it, and what is the
scope of his authority; in our complex
economy that is frequently the only
way in which the legislative process
can go forward.
Reasoning The case before the
Court is not a delegation of legislative
power. It is simply a delegation of
ascertainment of facts upon which
enforcement and administration of
the increased rate under the law is
contingent. The legislature has made
the operation of the 12% rate
effective January 1, 2006, contingent
upon a specified fact or condition. It
leaves the entire operation or non-
operation of the 12% rate upon
factual matters outside of the control
of the executive. No discretion would
be exercised by the President.
Highlighting the absence of discretion
is the fact that the word shall is used
in the common proviso. The use of
the word shall connote a mandatory
order. Its use in a statute denotes an
imperative obligation and is
inconsistent with the idea of
discretion.
- Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the
President to immediately impose the
12% rate upon the existence of any
of the conditions specified by
Congress. This is a duty, which
cannot be evaded by the President. It
is a clear directive to impose the 12%
VAT rate when the specified
conditions are present.
- In making his recommendation to
the President on the existence of
either of the two conditions, the
Secretary of Finance is not acting as
- 53 -
A2010
the alter ego of the President or even
her subordinate. He is acting as the
agent of the legislative department,
to determine and declare the event
upon which its expressed will is to
take effect. The Secretary of Finance
becomes the means or tool by which
legislative policy is determined and
implemented, considering that he
possesses all the facilities to gather
data and information and has a much
broader perspective to properly
evaluate them. His function is to
gather and collate statistical data and
other pertinent information and verify
if any of the two conditions laid out
by Congress is present.
- There is no undue delegation of
legislative power but only of the
discretion as to the execution of a
law. This is constitutionally
permissible. Congress did not
delegate the power to tax but the
mere implementation of the law. The
intent and will to increase the VAT
rate to 12% came from Congress and
the task of the President is to simply
execute the legislative policy.
Disposition Petition is DENIED.
A. L. A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v United States
295 U.S. 495
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES ; May 27, 1935
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
FACTS
- Schechter was found to have
violated the “Live Poultry Code”
promulgated under NIRA (National
Industrial Recovery Act) but written
by industry groups then approved by
the President through the Ag Sec’y.
NIRA gave President the authority to
approve “codes of fair competition”
applied by a trade or industrial group.
- Section 3 of the National Industrial
Recovery Act provides that "codes of
fair competition," which shall be the "
standards of fair competition" for the
trades and industries to which they
relate, may be approved by the
President upon application of
representative associations of the
trades or industries to be affected, or
may be prescribed by him on his own
motion. Their provisions [p496] are to
be enforced by injunctions from the
federal courts, and "any violation of
any of their provisions in any
transaction in or affecting interstate
commerce" is to be deemed an unfair
method of competition within the
meaning of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, and is to be
punished as a crime against the
United States. Before approving, the
President is to make certain findings
as to the character of the association
presenting the code and absence of
design to promote monopoly or
oppress small enterprises, and must
find that it will "tend to effectuate the
policy of this title." Codes permitting
monopolies or monopolistic practices
are forbidden. The President may
"impose such conditions (including
requirements for the making of
reports and the keeping of accounts)
for the protection of consumers,
competitors, employees and others,
and in the furtherance of the public
interest, and may provide such
exceptions and exemptions from the
provisions of such code," as he, in his
discretion, deems necessary "to
effectuate the policy herein
declared." A code prescribed by him
is to have the same effect as one
approved on application.
ISSUE
WON the Live Poultry Code is
unconstitutional for being an undue
delegation of legislative powers.
(YES.)
HELD
RATIO: Congress is not permitted by
the Constitution to abdicate, or to
transfer to others, the essential
legislative functions with which it is
vested. Congress may leave to
selected instrumentalities the making
of subordinate rules within prescribed
limits, and the determination of facts
to which the policy, as declared by
Congress, is to apply; but it must
itself lay down the policies and
establish standards.
REASONING:
- The delegation of legislative power
sought to be made to the President
- 54 -
A2010
by § 3 of the National Industrial
Recovery Act of June 16, 1933, is
unconstitutional and the Act is also
unconstitutional, as applied in this
case, because it exceeds the power
of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce and invades the power
reserved exclusively to the States
- This code was found to be an
unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power because:
1) private groups were given
lawmaking function and
discretion to make the policies.
Authority wasn’t really delegated
to the President.
2) It covered every sector of the
economy (not like the FCC, which
just deals with communications). It
was an overbroad delegation of
authority. There was no
limitation on things that could be
subject to the “codes of fair
competition.”
3) no formal procedures
constraining the President
when he decides to
approve/disapprove the codes. No
deliberation was required in acting
to promulgate the codes.
- Furthermore, there were no
statutory standards or procedural
safeguards for promulgating the
codes.
+ Cardozo wrote a strong
concurrence saying that this was a
situation of “delegation run riot”, that
although Congress delegating power
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
to executive can sometimes be ok,
congress delegating power to
industrial or trade associations was
out of the question.
FEDERAL ENERGY
ADMINISTRATION v AL GONQUIN
SNG, INC.
WHITE V ROUGHTON
530 F.2d 750
PER CURIAM; February 27,1976
NATURE
Appeal from order denying
application for preliminary injunction
to prevent termination by defendant
of general assistance granted to
plaintiffs.
FACTS
- Roughton is supervisor of the town
of the City of Champaign Township. In
this capacity he administers the
general township assistance program
which provides locally collected taxes
for distribution as welfare to needy
township residents.
- Plaintiff White received assistance in
the form of food orders. Plaintiff
Walker was provided food order and
rent. Subsequently, assistance to
both were terminated and they
received neither notice, explanation
nor information as to the right of
appeal.
- Plaintiff Silagy aplied for assistance
at least thrice but was always denied
without informing her of the reasons
supporting her rejection or the right
to appeal.
- Defendant admitted that he and his
staff determine eligibility based upon
their own unwritten personal
standards.
ISSUE/S
1. WON the injunction must issue
HELD
1. YES
Ratio Welfare recipients must be
provided with adequate notice and an
evidentiary hearing before benefits
may be discontinued. (Goldberg v
Kelly)
Reasoning General assistance
welfare grants are clearly state action
under provisions of statute relating to
public aid and are therefore subject
to due process protection.
Defendant as administrator of the
general assistance program has the
responsibility to administer the
program to ensure the fair and
consistent application of eligibility
requirements. Fair and consistent
application of such requirements
requires that Roughton establish
written standards and regulations.
Disposition Reversed and remanded
with directions
- 55 -
A2010
2. PERMISSIBLE DELEGATION
a. ASCERTAINMENT OF FACT
PANAMA REFINING CO v RYAN
293 U.S. 388
HUGHES; January 7, 1935
FACTS:
-Based on section 9(c) of title 1 of the
National Industrial Recovery Act of
June 16, 1933 which states that: “The
President is authorized to prohibit the
transportation in interstate and
foreign commerce of petroleum and
the products thereof produced or
withdrawn from storage in excess of
the amount permitted to be produced
or withdrawn from storage by any
State law or valid regulation or order
prescribed thereunder, by any board,
commission, officer, or other duly
authorized agency of a State. Any
violation of any order of the President
issued under the provisions of this
subsection shall be punishable by fine
of not to exceed $1,000, or
imprisonment for not to exceed six
months, or both.”, the President by
Executive Order No. 6199, prohibited
'the transportation in interstate and
foreign commerce of petroleum and
the products thereof produced or
withdrawn from storage in excess of
the amount permitted to be produced
or withdrawn from storage by any
State law or valid regulation or order
prescribed thereunder, by any board,
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
commission, officer, or other duly
authorized agency of a State.'
-Under section 10(a) of the National
Industrial Recovery Act, authorizing
the President “to prescribe such rules
and regulations as may be necessary
to carry out the purposes' of title 1 of
the National Industrial Recovery Act
and providing that 'any violation of
any such rule or regulation shall be
punishable by fine of not to exceed
$500, or imprisonment for not to
exceed six months, or both.” the
President, by Executive Order No.
6204, authorized the Secretary of the
Interior to exercise all the powers
vested in the President 'for the
purpose of enforcing Section 9(c) of
said act and said order' of July 11,
1933, 'including full authority to
designate and appoint such agents
and to set up such boards and
agencies as he may see fit, and to
promulgate such rules and
regulations as he may deem
necessary.'
- On July 15, 1933, the Secretary of
the Interior issued regulations to
carry out the President's orders of
July 11 and 14, 1933. the regulations
and the orders of the President were
questioned by oil companies affected
by the Orders. They question the
basis of the power of the President to
make such orders as an undue
delegation of legislative powers.
ISSUE:
WON there was an undue delegation
of legislative powers when the
Legislature, through section 9(c) of
title 1 of the National Industrial
Recovery Act of June 16, 1933,
allowed the President to issue the
Orders complained of.
HELD: Yes the delegation of such
power was undue.
(AS TO PERMISSIBLE DELEGATIONS)
-The Constitution has never been
regarded as denying to the Congress
the necessary resources of flexibility
and practicality, which will enable it
to perform its function in laying down
policies and establishing standards,
while leaving to selected
instrumentalities the making of
subordinate rules within prescribed
limits and the determination of facts
to which the policy as declared by the
Legislature is to apply. Without
capacity to give authorizations of that
sort we should have the anomaly of a
legislative power which in many
circumstances calling for its exertion
would be but a futility
-the Court cited several cases
wherein the Congress delegated the
power of ascertaining facts for the
implementation of orders. First of
which was Aurora v US wherein the
Congress left the power to determine
whether Great Britain modified her
edicts so as not to violate the Neutral
Commerce Act of the US. It gave the
President the power to suspend trade
- 56 -
A2010
relations with Great Britain until such
determination by the President. The
Court ruled that it could see no
sufficient reason why the Legislature
should not exercise its discretion in
reviving the act of 1809, 'either
expressly or conditionally, as their
judgment should direct.'
-Field v Clark where the case was
about an Act which gave the
President the power to suspend the
introduction of products from
different countries which imposed
duties or other exactions on
agricultural produce of the US. The
Court found that the act before it was
not inconsistent with the principle of
delegation of powers; that it did not
'in any real sense, invest the
president with the power of
legislation.' As 'the suspension was
absolutely required when the
president ascertained the existence
of a particular fact,' it could not be
said 'that in ascertaining that fact,
and in issuing his proclamation, in
obedience to the legislative will, he
exercised the function of making
laws.' 'He was the mere agent of the
law-making department to ascertain
and declare the event upon which its
expressed will was to take effect.'
-authorizations given by Congress to
selected instrumentalities for the
purpose of ascertaining the existence
of facts to which legislation is
directed have constantly been
sustained. Moreover the Congress
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
may not only give such authorizations
to determine specific facts, but may
establish primary standards,
devolving upon others the duty to
carry out the declared legislative
policy
-examples for the allowing of the
Congress to authorize
instrumentalities to fix standards
were the Radio Act of 1927 and
Hampton Jr. & Co. v United States
-in the present case the Court ruled
that “section 9(c) goes beyond those
limits. As to the transportation of oil
production in excess of state
permission, the Congress has
declared no policy, has established
no standard, has laid down no rule.
There is no requirement, no definition
of circumstances and conditions in
which the transportation is to be
allowed or prohibited”
DISSENTING Cardozo supra
LOVINA v MORENO
b. FILLING IN OF DETAILS
ALEGRE v COLLECTOR OF
CUSTOMS
53 PHIL 394
JOHNS; August 27, 1929
NATURE
Appeal from the decision of CFI
FACTS
- The petitioner for a number of years
has been and is now engaged in the
production of abaca and its
exportation to foreign markets.
November 8, 1927, he applied to the
respondent for a permit to export one
hundred bales of abaca to England,
which was denied, and advised that
he would not be permitted to export
the abaca in question without a
certificate of the Fiber
Standardization Board. He then filed
in the Court of First Instance of Manila
a petition for a writ of mandamus,
alleging that the provisions of the
Administrative Code for the grading,
inspection and certification of fibers
and, in particular, sections 1772 and
1244 of that Code, are
unconstitutional and void.
Section 1244. A collector of customs
shall not permit abaca, maguey, or
sisal or other fibrous products for
which standard grades have been
established by the Director of
Agriculture to be laden aboard a
vessel clearing for a foreign port,
unless the shipment conforms to the
requirements of law relative to the
shipment of such fibers.
Section 1772. The Fiber
Standardization Board shall
determine the official standards for
the various commercial grades of
Philippine fibers that are or may
hereafter be produced on the
- 57 -
A2010
Philippine Islands for shipment
abroad. Each grade shall have its
proper name and designation which,
together with the basis upon which
the several grades are determined,
shall be defined by the said Board in
a general order. Such order shall
have the approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources;
and for the dissemination of
information, copies of the same shall
be supplied gratis to the foreign
markets, provincial governors,
municipal presidents, and to such
other persons and agencies as shall
make request therefor. If it is
considered expedient to change
these standards at any time, notice
shall be given in the local and foreign
markets for a period of at least six
months before the new standards
shall go into effect.
Section 1788. No fiber within the
purview of this law shall be exported
from the Philippine Islands in quantity
greater than the amount sufficient to
make one bale, without being graded,
baled, inspected, and certified as in
this law provided.
- CFI held that sections 1722 and
1783 of the Administrative Code, as
amended, are unconstitutional and
void. Hence, this appeal by defs.
ISSUE/S
1. WON the law in question delegates
to the Fiber Board legislative powers
or administrative functions to carry
Administrative Law A2010
Dean Carlota
out the purpose and intent (details) of enforcement. The criticism that there licensing functions;
the law for its more efficient is partiality or even fraud in the government corporations with
administration administration of the law is not an respect to functions regulating
argument against its constitutionality. private right, privileges,
HELD occupation or business; and
- The act in question, is not a Disposition The judgment of the officials in the exercise of
delegation of legislative power to the lower court is reversed and the disciplinary power as provided
Fiber Board, and that the powers petition is dismissed. by law.
given by the Legislature to the board (2) "Rule" means any agency
are for an administrative purposes, to statement of general
enforce and carry out the intent of c. ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING applicability that implements
the law. or interprets a law, fixes and
- The law provides in detail for the BOOK VII describes the procedures in, or
inspection, grading and bailing of ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE practice requirements of, an
hemp the Fiber Board with the power CHAPTER 1 agency, including its
and authority to devise ways and GENERAL PROVISIONS regulations. The term includes
means for its execution. In legal Section 1. Scope. - This Book shall memoranda or statements
effect, the Legislature has said that be applicable to all agencies as concerning the internal
before any hemp is exported from the defined in the next succeeding administration or management
Philippine Islands it must be section, except the Congress, the of an agency not affecting the
inspected, graded and baled, and has Judiciary, the Constitutional rights of, or procedure
created a board or that purpose and Commissions, military establishments available to, the public.
vested it with the power and in all matters relating exclusively to (3) "Rate" means any charge to
authority to do the actual work. That Armed Forces personnel, the Board of the public for a service open to
is not a delegation o legislative Pardons and Parole, and state all and upon the same terms,
power. It is nothing more than a universities and colleges. including individual or joint
delegation of administrative power in Section 2. Definitions. - As used in rates, tolls, classifications, or
the Fiber Board, to carry out the this Book: schedules thereof, as well as
purpose and intent of the law. In the (1) "Agency" includes any commutation, mileage,
very nature of things, the Legislature department, bureau, office, kilometerage and other special
could not inspect, grade and bale the commission, authority or rates which shall be imposed
hemp, and from necessity, the power officer of the National by law or regulation to be
to do that would have to be vested in Government authorized by law observed and followed by any
a board of commission. or executive order to make person.
- The petitioner's contention would rules, issue licenses, grant (4) "Rule making" means an
leave the law, which provides for the rights or privileges, and agency process for the
inspection, grading and baling of adjudicate cases; research formulation, amendment, or
hemp, without any means of its institutions with respect to repeal of a rule.

- 58 -
Administrative Law A2010
Dean Carlota
(5) "Contested case" means (10) "License" includes the immunity, privilege, exemption
any proceeding, including whole or any part of any or exception; or taking of any
licensing, in which the legal agency permit, certificate, action upon the application or
rights, duties or privileges passport, clearance, approval, petition of any person.
asserted by specific parties as registration, charter, (14) "Agency proceeding"
required by the Constitution or membership, statutory means any agency process
by law are to be determined exemption or other form of with respect to rule-making,
after hearing. permission, or regulation of the adjudication and licensing.
(6) "Person" includes an exercise of a right or privilege. 1. "Agency action" includes
individual, partnership, (11) "Licensing" includes the whole or part of
corporation, association, public agency process involving the every agency rule,
or private organization of any grant, renewal, denial, order, license, sanction,
character other than an revocation, suspension, relief or its equivalent or
agency. annulment, withdrawal, denial thereof.
(7) "Party" includes a person or limitation, amendment, CHAPTER 2
agency named or admitted as modification or conditioning of RULES AND REGULATIONS
a party, or properly seeking a license. Section 3. Filing. -
and entitled as of right to be (12) "Sanction" includes the (1) Every agency shall file with
admitted as a party, in any whole or part of a prohibition, the University of the
agency proceeding; but limitation or other condition Philippines Law Center three
nothing herein shall be affecting the liberty of any (3) certified copies of every
construed to prevent an person; the withholding of rule adopted by it. Rules in
agency from admitting any relief; the imposition of penalty force on the date of effectivity
person or agency as a party for or fine; the destruction, taking, of this Code which are not filed
limited purposes. seizure or withholding of within three (3) months from
(8) "Decision" means the whole property; the assessment of that date shall not thereafter
or any part of the final damages, reimbursement, be the basis of any sanction
disposition, not of an restitution, compensation, cost, against any party or persons.
interlocutory character, charges or fees; the revocation (2) The records officer of the
whether affirmative, negative, or suspension of license; or the agency, or his equivalent
or injunctive in form, of an taking of other compulsory or functionary, shall carry out the
agency in any matter, restrictive action. requirements of this section
including licensing, rate fixing (13) "Relief" includes the whole under pain of disciplinary
and granting of rights and or part of any grant of money, action.
privileges. assistance, license, authority, (3) A permanent register of all
(9) "Adjudication" means an privilege, exemption, rules shall be kept by the
agency process for the exception, or remedy; issuing agency and shall be
formulation of a final order. recognition of any claim, right, open to public inspection.

- 59 -
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
Section 4. Effectivity. - In addition to
other rule-making requirements
provided by law not inconsistent with
this Book, each rule shall become
effective fifteen (15) days from the
date of filing as above provided
unless a different date is fixed by law,
or specified in the rule in cases of
imminent danger to public health,
safety and welfare, the existence of
which must be expressed in a
statement accompanying the rule.
The agency shall take appropriate
measures to make emergency rules
known to persons who may be
affected by them.
Section 5. Publication and
Recording. - The University of the
Philippines Law Center shall:
(1) Publish a quarter bulletin
setting forth the text of rules
filed with it during the
preceding quarter; and
(2) Keep an up-to-date
codification of all rules thus
published and remaining in
effect, together with a sufficient to cover publication and
complete index and
appropriate tables.
Section 6. Omission of Some Rules. -
(1) The University of the
Philippines Law Center may
omit from the bulletin or the
codification any rule if its
publication would be unduly
cumbersome, expensive or
otherwise inexpedient, but
copies of that rule shall be
made available on application
to the agency which adopted it,
and the bulletin shall contain a
notice stating the general
subject matter of the omitted
rule and new copies thereof
may be obtained.
(2) Every rule establishing an
offense or defining an act
which, pursuant to law, is
punishable as a crime or
subject to a penalty shall in all
cases be published in full text.
Section 7. Distribution of Bulletin
and Codified Rules. - The University of
the Philippines Law Center shall
furnish one (1) free copy each of
every issue of the bulletin and of the
codified rules or supplements to the
Office of the President, Congress, all
appellate courts and the National
Library. The bulletin and the codified
rules shall be made available free of
charge to such public officers or
agencies as the Congress may select,
and to other persons at a price
mailing or distribution costs.
Section 8. Judicial Notice. - The court
shall take judicial notice of the
certified copy of each rule duly filed
or as published in the bulletin or the
codified rules.
Section 9. Public Participation. -
(1) If not otherwise required by
law, an agency shall, as far as
practicable, publish or circulate
notices of proposed rules and
- 60 -
A2010
afford interested parties the
opportunity to submit their
views prior to the adoption of
any rule.
(2) In the fixing of rates, no
rule or final order shall be valid
unless the proposed rates shall
have been published in a
newspaper of general
circulation at least two (2)
weeks before the first hearing
thereon.
(3) In case of opposition, the
rules on contested cases shall
be observed.
1. LIMITS ON RULE-MAKING
POWER
OLSEN v ALDENESE
43 Phil 259
JOHNS; March 29, 1922
NATURE
Petition for a peremptory writ of
mandamus
FACTS
- The Tariff Act of 1913, conferred
legal right on Olsen and Co. to export
from the Phil. Islands into the US
cigars which it manufactured from
tobacco grown in the Phil. Islands In
1916, Phil. Legislature enacted Act.
No. 2613 entitled "An Act to improve
the methods of production and the
quality of tobacco in the Philippine
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
and to develop the export trade
therein," The Collector of Internal
Revenue then promulgated
Administrative Order No. 35, known
as "Tobacco Inspection Regulations."
- Olsen applied to the Collector of
Internal Revenue (CIR) for such a
certificate re the 10,00 cigars
manufactured by it from tobacco
grown and produced in the Philippine
Islands.
- Olsen alleged that CIR wrongfully
and unlawfully refused to issue such
certificate of origin "on the ground
that said cigars were not
manufactured of long filler tobacco
produced exclusively in the provinces
of Cagayan, Isabela or Nueva
Vizcaya." Despite such refusal, Olsen
applied to the Insular Collector of
Customs for the certificate of origin,
and that officer wrongfully and
unlawfully refused to issue such
certificate "on the ground that the
petitioner had not obtained and
presented with the application the
certificate of the said respondent
Collector of Internal Revenue.
Preliminary Notes:
- The important question here
involved is the construction of Secs.
6, 7, and 11 of Act No. 2613 of the
Philippine Legislature, and Sec. 9 of
the "Tobacco Inspection Regulations,"
promulgated by Administrative Order
No. 35.
- Clause B of Sec 6 of Act No. 2613
empowers the Collector of Internal
Revenue to establish rules defining
the standard and the type of leaf and
manufactured tobacco which may be
exported into the United States.
Portion of Sec. 7 of said Act provides:
"No leaf tobacco or manufactured
tobacco shall be exported from the
Philippine Islands to the United States
until it shall have been in inspected
by the Collector of Internal Revenue,
etc." Portion of Sec. 11 of the Act
requires the certificate of origin of the
Collector of Internal Revenue to show
that the tobacco to be exported is
standard. And, portion of Sec. 9 of
Administrative Order No. 35 limits the
exportation into the U.S. of Philippine
cigars to those manufactured from
long filler tobacco exclusively the
product of the provinces of Cagayan,
Isabela, or Nueva Vizcaya.
ISSUE
WON the CIR exceeded his rule-
making powers as shown in Sec.9 of
the Adm. Order 35.
HELD
YES.
Ratio The authority of the Collector
of Internal Revenue to make any
rules and regulations must be
founded upon some legislative act,
and that they must follow and be
within the scope and purview of the
act.
Reasoning
- 61 -
A2010
- It will be noted that the power of the
Collector of Internal Revenue to make
rules and regulations is confined to
the making of rules and regulations
for the classification, making, and
packing of tobacco, and that such
power is further limited to the making
of such rules for the classification,
marking, and packing of tobacco as
may be necessary to secure leaf
tobacco of good quality and its
handling under sanitary conditions. It
is for such purpose only that the
Collector of Internal Revenue is
authorized to make any rules or
regulations.
- Analyzing the power conferred, it
will be found that the provisions of
the legislative act are NOT limited to
the provinces of Cagayan, Isabela, or
Nueva Vizcaya, or to any province,
and that there is no limitation as to
the place where the tobacco should
be grown in the Philippine Islands.
The only power conferred is to
establish general and local rules for
the classification, marking, and
packing of tobacco and the standard
and the type of tobacco which may
be exported to the United States. By
Sec. 9 of Admin Order 35, Cir went
beyond its authority of rule-making
power as limited by law. Limting the
exportation into the U.S. of Philippine
cigars to those manufactured from
long filler tobacco exclusively the
product of the provinces of Cagayan,
Isabela, or Nueva Vizcaya is invalid.
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
*There was a long discussion on the
inapplicability of and difference of
this case with Buttfield vs. Stranahan
(192 U. S., 525). See original.
Disposition.Petition GRANTED.
SYMAN v JACINTO
93 Phil 1093
Montemayor; 31 Oct 1953
Nature
Appeal against the decision of CFI
Facts
-Collector of Customs for the Port of
Manila ordered the seizure of two
shipments of textile and a number of
sewing machines, consigned to the
petitioner (Sy Man).
-Collector of Customs for the Port of
Manila, after due hearing, rendered a
decision that the articles covered are
delivered to the importer after
payment of the necessary customs
duty, sales tax and other charges
except the sewing machines which
are hereby declared forfeited to the
Government of the Republic of the
Philippines to be sold at public
auction in conformity with law if
found saleable, otherwise, to be
destroyed.
-Sy Man received a copy of the
decision of the Collector of Customs
for the Port of Manila. Asking for the
execution of the decision, in view of
the fact that it had become final and
could no longer be reviewed by the
Commissioner of Customs after the
lapse of fifteen days from the date of
notification thereof was given to the
herein petitioner who did not appeal
from said decision to the
Commissioner of Customs within the
aforesaid period of time.
-Counsel for the petitioner requested
that the goods be released because
of the decision.
-Collector of Customs for the Port of
Manila responded and said that such
was endorsed to the Commissioner of
Customs, requesting information
whether the merchandise may now
be delivered to the owner upon
showing that the decision has
become final and executory after
fifteen (15) days from the receipt of a
copy of the same by the claimant.
-Sy Man sought (1) to declare null
and void that portion of the
Memorandum Order promulgated by
the Insular Collector of Customs
dated August 18, 1947, which
provides that as in protest cases,
decisions of the Collector of Customs
in seizure cases, whether appealed or
not, are subject to review by the
Insular Collector (now commissioner);
that such decisions and their
supporting papers be submitted to his
office, and that pending action by him
on such decisions, final disposal of
the goods involved shall not be made;
and (2) to order the Collector to
deliver to the petitioner the
- 62 -
A2010
shipments of textiles claimed to be
final and executory.
-TC granted the petition.
Issue
WON this supposed power of revision
by the Commissioner of unappealed
decisions of the Collector in seizure
cases, is supported by law
Held
Yes.
-Let us now see if there is any law
giving authority to the Commissioner
of Customs to review and revise
unappealed decisions in seizure
cases. In cases involving assessment
of duties, even when the importer
fails to protest the decision of the
Collector of Customs, the
Commissioner may order a
reliquidation if he believes that the
decision of the Collector was
erroneous and unfavorable to the
Government; and the Department
Head in his turn if he believes that
the decision of the Commissioner in
any unprotested case of assessment
of duties is erroneous and
unfavorable to the Government, may
require the Commissioner to order a
reliquidation or he may direct the
Commissioner to certify the case to
the CFI.
"SEC. 1393. Supervisory authority of
Commissioner and of Department
Head in certain cases. - If in any case
involving the assessment of duties
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
the importer shall fail to protest the
decision of the collector of customs
and the Commissioner shall be of the
opinion that the decision was
erroneous and unfavorable to the
Government, the latter may order a
reliquidation; and if the decision of
the Commissioner in any unprotested
case should, in the opinion of the
Department Head, be erroneous and
unfavorable to the Government, the
Department Head may require the
Commissioner to order a reliquidation
or he may, if in his opinion the public
interest requires, direct the
Commissioner to certify the cause to
the Court of First Instance of Manila,
in the manner provided in section one
thousand three hundred and eighty-
six hereof, there to be reviewed by
the court as other customs cases
removed thereto.
"Except as in the preceding
paragraph provided, the supervisory
authority of the Department Head
over the Bureau of Customs shall not
extend to the administrative revisal
of the decisions of the Commissioner
in matters removable into court."
It will be noticed that the section is
entitled "supervisory authority of the
Commissioner and of the Department
Head in certain cases." We find no
similar legal provision in seizure
cases. The logical inference is
that the lawmakers did not deem
it necessary or advisable to
provide for this supervisory
authority or power of revision by
the Commissioner and the
Department Head on unappealed
seizure cases; and it is highly
possible that up to and until
1947, when the memorandum
order of August 18th of that year
was issued, it was not the
practice of the Bureau of
Customs to have unappealed
seizure cases sent up by
Collectors to the Commissioner's
office for review and revision.
This we may gather from the
memorandum order itself, where the
Commissioner observes that in
seizure cases some collectors of
customs merely submit to him their
reports of their seizure and the
subsequent final disposition thereof
without transmitting the records of
their proceedings, and he therein
asserts the right of the Commissioner
of Customs to review decisions of
Collector of Customs in seizure cases
though unappealed. If that right and
that practice had existed from the
beginning, it is not likely that
Collectors would disregard and ignore
it, to the extent that it was necessary
to remind them of it by means of a
memorandum order.
-It would seem that in a seizure case,
the Collector transmits all the papers
in the cause to the Commissioner
only when and after the importer
notifies him in writing signifying his
desire to have the matter reviewed
- 63 -
A2010
by the Commissioner. The section
does not say that without the notice
of appeal, the Collector is called upon
to transmit the papers of the case to
the Commissioner. If this be true,
then legally, a case of seizure
unappealed ends right in the office of
the Collector, without prejudice of
course to the Collector subsequently
making a report of his action to the
Commissioner. Furthermore, section
1388 of the Revised Administrative
Code provides thus:.
"SEC. 1388. Settlement of cause by
payment of fine or redemption of
forfeited property. - If, in any seizure
case, the owner or agent shall, while
the cause is yet before the collector
of the district of seizure, pay to such
collector the fine imposed by him or,
in case of forfeiture, shall pay the
appraised value of the property, or if,
after removal of the cause, he shall
pay to the Commissioner the amount
of the fine as finally determined by
him, or, in case of forfeiture, shall pay
the appraised value of the property,
such property shall be forthwith
surrendered, and all liability which
may or might attach to the property
by virtue of the offense which was the
occasion of the seizure and all liability
which might have been incurred
under any bond given by the owner
or agent in respect to such property
shall thereupon be deemed to be
discharged.
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
"Redemption of forfeited property
shall not be allowed in any case
where the importation is absolutely
prohibited or where the surrender of
the property to the person offering to
redeem the same would be contrary
to law."
If under the above provisions, in a
seizure case the owner or agent may,
while the cause is yet before the
collector, pay the fine imposed, or in
case of forfeiture, pay the appraised
value of the property, and thereafter
such properties shall be surrendered
and all liability which may attach to
said property by virtue of the offense
causing the seizure is to be deemed
discharged, the conclusion to be
drawn is that it is within the power
and right of an importer, owner or
agent to end the case in the office of
the Collector, thereby precluding any
intervention by the Commissioner in
the way of reviewing and revising the
decision of the Collector. Again, under
section 1389 immediately following
which reads -
"SEC. 1389. Right of protest in such
cases. - Where payment is made or
redemption effected as allowed under
the preceding section, the party
making payment or effecting the
redemption may, if he desires to test
the validity of the proceedings, make
formal protest at the time of making
such payment or affecting such
redemption, or within fifteen days
thereafter, and make claim for the
repayment of the whole or any part of
the sum so paid by him; whereupon
the proceedings shall take the same
course as in ordinary cases of protest
against customs duties and charges
generally."
The importer or owner of goods
seized, after payment is made or
redemption effected, is allowed if he
desires to test the validity or
correctness of the decision of the
Collector, to appeal the same to the
Commissioner of Customs
presumably, to decrease the amount
of his liability or annul the seizure
altogether and have all the amounts
paid by him refunded. The inference
follows that by making payment
and redeeming the property
seized under the decision of the
Collector of Customs, the owner
may terminate the case right
there, although notwithstanding
his payment he still has the right
to have the case elevated to the
Office of the Commissioner of
Customs. It would seem that the
elevation of the case and the
transmittal of the papers thereof to
the Commissioner lies within the
owner's exclusive power and
discretion. This argues against the
pretended power of the
Commissioner of automatic
review and revision of decisions
of Collectors in unappealed
seizure cases.
- 64 -
A2010
It is argued that if this power of
review and revision by the
Commissioner of unappealed seizure
cases is not conceded, then in cases
where the Collector in his decision
commits a blunder prejudicial to the
interests of the Government, or
renders a decision through fraud or in
collusion with the importer, the
Government cannot protect itself. The
argument is not without merit; but we
must bear in mind that the law is
promulgated to operate on ordinary,
common, routine cases. The rule is
and the law presumes that in
seizure cases Collectors of
Customs act honestly and
correctly and as Government
officials, always with an eye to
the protection of the interests of
the Government employing them.
If mistakes are committed at all
more often than not they are in
favor of the Government and not
against it, and that is the reason
why when the importer feels
aggrieved by their decision, he is
given every chance and facility to
protest the decision and appeal
to the Commissioner. Cases of
erroneous decisions against the
interest of the Government of
decisions rendered in collusion
and connivance with importers
are the exception. To protect the
Government in such exceptional
cases, we find that in every
seizure case, section 1378 of the
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
Revised Administrative Code
requires the Collector to
immediately notify the
Commissioner and the Auditor
General. It may be that this
requirement has for its main
purpose the recording of and
accounting for the articles seized
so that in case of confiscation the
Commissioner and the Auditor
General will know what articles
have become government
property. But the notice will also
inform the Commissioner and the
Auditor General of the seizure. If
the seizure is important or
unusual, the Commissioner may,
if he so desires, order the
Collector as his subordinate to
withhold action on the seizure, or
hold in abeyance, within a
reasonable time, the
promulgation of his decision until
after he had conferred with the
Commissioner or the latter had
studied the case and given
suggestions. At that stage of the
proceedings before definite
action is taken by the Collector,
and a decision rendered by him,
it would seem that any action by
him as a subordinate is still
subject to the supervisory
authority and control of the
Commissioner as his Chief, and
the latter may still influence and
direct the Collector's action if he
finds occasion for doing so.
A2010
approved by the Department Head
But if the Government deems it and duly published as required by
necessary to provide for review and section 551 of the Revised
revision by the Commissioner or even Administrative Code but also because
by the Department Head of the it is inconsistent with law.
decisions of the Collector of Customs
in unappealed seizure cases, the Disposition
Legislature may be requested to For the foregoing reasons, the
insert a section in the Revised decision appealed from is hereby
Administrative Code similar to affirmed. No pronouncement as to
Section 1393 which applies to costs.
unprotested cases of assessment
duties. The defect in said section
however is that it does not fix the PEOPLE v MACEREN
period within which the automatic 79 SCRA 450
review and revision or reliquidation to AQUINO; October 18, 1977
be ordered by the Commissioner and
the Secretary of Finance must be FACTS
effected. This defect should be - Section 11 of the Fisheries Law
remedied. prohibits "the use of any obnoxious or
poisonous substance" in fishing.
In conclusion, we find and hold that - The Secretary of Agriculture and
under the present law governing the Natural Resources, upon the
Bureau of Customs, the decision of recommendation of the
the Collector of Customs in a seizure Commissioner of Fisheries,
case if not protested and appealed by promulgated Fisheries Administrative
the importer to the Commissioner of Order No. 84 (62 O.G. 1224),
Customs on time, becomes final not prohibiting electro fishing in all
only as to him but against the Philippine waters.
Government as well, and neither the - Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo
Commissioner nor the Department Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario
Head has the power to review, revise Aquino and Carlito del Rosario were
or modify such unappealed decision. charged with having violated
We also find and hold that the Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-
memorandum order of the Insular 1. It was alleged that they engaged in
Collector of Customs of August 18, electro fishing.
1947, is void and of no effect, not - Upon motion of the accused, the
only because it has not been duly municipal court dismissed the case.
- 65 -
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
CFI affirmed. The lower court held
that electro fishing cannot be
penalized because electric current is
not an obnoxious or poisonous
substance as contemplated in section
II of the Fisheries Law. The lower
court further held that, since the law
does not clearly prohibit electro
fishing, the executive and judicial
departments cannot consider it
unlawful.
ISSUE/S
1. WON the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources exceeded his
authority in issuing Fisheries
Administrative Order No. 84
HELD
1. YES.
Ratio The rule-making power must
be confined to details for regulating
the mode or proceeding to carry into
effect the law as it his been enacted.
The power cannot be extended to
amending or expanding the statutory
requirements or to embrace matters
not covered by the statute
Reasoning The Fisheries Law does
not expressly prohibit electro fishing.
As electro fishing is not banned under
that law, the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries are
powerless to penalize it. Had the
lawmaking body intended to punish
electro fishing, a penal provision to
that effect could have been easily
embodied in the old Fisheries Law.
Nowhere in the said law is electro
fishing specifically punished.
Administrative agents are clothed
with rule-making powers because the
lawmaking body finds it
impracticable, if not impossible, to
anticipate and provide for the
multifarious and complex situations
that may be encountered in enforcing
the law. All that is required is that the
regulation should be germane to the
defects and purposes of the law and
that it should conform to the
standards that the law prescribes
Disposition Decision affirmed
TOLEDO v CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION (COMELEC)
202 SCRA 507
PARAS, J.; October 4, 1991
NATURE
Petition for certiorari from
Resolution of the CSC
FACTS
- Petitioner Atty. Augusto Toledo was
appointed by then Comelec Chairman
Ramon Felipe as Manager of the
Education and Information
Department of the Comelec. At the
time of his appointment, petitioner
was already more than 57 years old.
- 66 -
A2010
However, no prior request for
exemption from the provisions of Sec.
22, Rule III of the Civil Service Rules
on Personnel Action and Policies
(CSRPAP) was secured. Said provision
prohibits the appointment of persons
57 years old or above into the
government service without prior
approval by the Civil Service
Commission (CSC). Petitioner
officially reported for work and
assumed the functions of his office.
- Public respondent Comelec, upon
discovery of the lack of authority
required under the CSRPAP, issued
Resolution No. 2066, which declared
Toledo’s appointment void ab initio.
Petitioner appealed the foregoing
Resolution to public respondent CSC.
CSC promulgated Resolution No. 89-
468 which disposed of the appeal,
declaring the appointment merely
voidable and not void ab initio, and
declaring Toledo a de facto officer
from the time he assumed to office to
the issuance of Comelec Resolution
No. 2066.
a
ISSUE
WON Sec. 22, Rule III of the CSRPAP
is valid
HELD
NO
Ratio The provision on 57-year old
persons in the Revised Civil Service
Rules cannot be accorded validity. It
is entirely a creation of the CSC,
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
having no basis in the law which it
was meant to implement. It cannot be
related to or connected with any
specific provision of the law which it
is meant to carry into effect. It was
therefore an unauthorized act of
legislation on the part of the CSC.
Reasoning RA 2260, establishing the
CSC and authorizing it to prescribe
and enforce rules for carrying into
effect the provisions of the law,
contained no provision prohibiting
appointment or reinstatement in the
Government service of any person
who was already 57 years old, or
otherwise requiring that some
limitation as regards to age be placed
on employment in the Government
service. This prohibition was purely a
creation of the CSC. The power
vested in the CSC was to implement
the law or put it into effect, not to
add to it; to carry the law into effect
or execution, not to supply perceived
omissions in it.
Disposition
The petition is GRANTED
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE v CA (R.O.H. AUTO
PRODUCTS)
240 SCRA 368
VITUG; January 20, 1995
NATURE
Petition for review of a decision of the
CA.
FACTS
- August 22, 1986: EO 41 was
promulgated declaring a one-time tax
amnesty on unpaid income taxes,
later amended to include estate and
donor’s taxes and taxes on business,
for the taxable years 1981 to 1985.
- R.O.H. Auto Products availed of the
amnesty, and filed in October 1986
and November 1986 its Tax Amnesty
Return and paid the corresponding
amnesty taxes due.
- Prior to this, petitioner CIR assessed
R.O.H. deficiency income and
business taxes for its fiscal years
ended 30 Sept 1981 and 30 Sept
1982 in an aggregate amount of
P1.41 M. The taxpayer wrote back to
state that since it had been able to
avail itself of the tax amnesty, the
deficiency tax notice should forthwith
be cancelled and withdrawn. The
request was denied by the
Commissioner on the ground that
Revenue Memorandum Order 4-87
implementing EO 41 had construed
the amnesty coverage to include only
assessments issued by the BIR after
promulgation of the executive order
on 22 August 1986 and not to
assessments theretofore made.
1.02. A certification by the Tax
Amnesty Implementation Officer of
the fact of availment of the said tax
- 67 -
A2010
amnesty shall be a sufficient basis
for:
1.02.3. xxx the cancellation/
withdrawal of assessment
notices and letters of demand
issued after August 21, 1986
for the collection of income,
business, estate or donor’s
taxes due during the same
taxable years.
- Court of Tax Appeals ruled for the
taxpayer. It said that the
Commissioner failed to present any
case or law which proves that an
assessment can withstand or negate
the force and effects of a tax
amnesty. This burden of proof on
taxpayer was created by the clear
and express terms of the executive
order’s intention—qualified availers of
the amnesty may pay an amnesty tax
in lieu of said unpaid taxes which are
forgiven.
- CA affirmed the decision of CTA. It
said that a “tax amnesty, being a
general pardon or intention
overlooking by the State of its
authority to impose penalties on
persons otherwise guilty of evasion or
violation of a revenue or tax law,
partakes of an absolute forgiveness
or waiver by the Government of its
right to collect what otherwise would
be due it xxx”
ISSUES
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
1. WON the position taken by the
Commissioner coincides with the
meaning and intent of EO 41.
HELD
YES.
Ratio All issuances must not
override, but must remain consistent
and in harmony with the law they
seek to apply and implement. The
authority of the Minister of Finance
(Secretary of Finance) in conjunction
with the CIR to promulgate all needful
rules and regulations for the effective
enforcement of internal revenue laws
cannot be controverted. Neither can
it be disputed that such rules and
regulates, as well as administrative
opinions and rulings, ordinarily should
deserve weight and respect by the
courts.
Reasoning
- If EO 41 had not been intended to
include 1981-1985 tax liabilities
already assessed prior to 22 August
1986, the law could have simply so
provided in it exclusionary clauses. It
did not. The executive order has been
designed to be in the nature of a
general grant of tax amnesty subject
only to the cases specifically
excepted by it.
- There is no pretension that the tax
amnesty returns and due payments
made by the taxpayer did not
conform with the conditions
expressed in the amnesty order.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILS v CA
(Yap)
249 SCRA 149
FRANCISCO; October 6, 1995
NATURE
Consolidation of two separate
petitions for review filed by
Department of Agrarian Reform and
Land Bank of the Philippines,
assailing the CA decision, which
granted private respondents' petition
for Certiorari and Mandamus.
FACTS
-Private respondents (Pedro Yap,
Heirs of Emiliano Santiago,
AMADCOR) are landowners whose
landholdings were acquired by the
DAR and subjected to transfer
schemes to qualified beneficiaries
under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (RA 6657). Aggrieved by
the alleged lapses of the DAR and the
Landbank with respect to the
valuation and payment of
compensation for their land, private
respondents filed with this Court a
petition questioning the validity of
DAR Admin Order No. 6 (1992) and
DAR Admin Order No. 9 (1990), and
sought to compel the DAR to expedite
the pending summary administrative
proceedings to finally determine the
just compensation of their properties,
and the Landbank to deposit in cash
and bonds the amounts respectively
- 68 -
A2010
"earmarked", "reserved" and
"deposited in trust accounts" for
private respondents, and to allow
them to withdraw the same.
-SC referred the petition to CA for
proper determination and disposition.
CA found the following facts
undisputed.
Respondents’ Arguments:
-Admin Order No. 9 (1990) was issued
in GADALEJ because it permits the
opening of trust accounts by the
Landbank, in lieu of depositing in
cash or bonds in an accessible bank
designated by the DAR, the
compensation for the land before it is
taken and the titles are cancelled as
provided under Section 16(e) of RA
6657.
-
DAR and the Landbank merely
"earmarked", "deposited in trust" or
"reserved" the compensation in their
names as landowners despite the
clear mandate that before taking
possession of the property, the
compensation must be deposited in
cash or in bonds.
Petitioners’ Arguments:
-DAR: Admin Order No. 9 is a valid
exercise of its rule-making power
pursuant to Section 49 of RA 6657.
The issuance of the "Certificate of
Deposit" by the Landbank was a
substantial compliance with Section
16(e) of RA 6657.
-Landbank: the issuance of the
Certificates of Deposits is in
consonance with Circular Nos. 29, 29-
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
A and 54 of the Land Registration
Authority where the words
"reserved/deposited" were also used.
ISSUES
1. WON CA erred in declaring as null
and void DAR Admin Order No. 9
(1990) insofar as it provides for the
opening of trust accounts in lieu of
deposit in cash or in bonds
2. WON CA erred in holding that
private respondents are entitled as a
matter of right to the immediate and
provisional release of the amounts
deposited in trust pending the final
resolution of the cases it has filed for
just compensation.
HELD
1. NO.
-Section 16(e) of RA 6657: Procedure
for Acquisition of Private Lands. (e)
Upon receipt by the landowner of the
corresponding payment or, in case of
rejection or no response from the
landowner, upon the deposit with an
accessible bank designated by the
DAR of the compensation in cash or
in LBP bonds in accordance with this
Act, the DAR shall take immediate
possession of the land and shall
request the proper Register of Deeds
to issue a TCT in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines.
-It is very explicit that the deposit
must be made only in "cash" or in
"LBP bonds". Nowhere does it appear
nor can it be inferred that the deposit
can be made in any other form. There
is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA
6657 to warrant an expanded
construction of the term "deposit".
Ratio The conclusive effect of
administrative construction is not
absolute. Action of an administrative
agency may be disturbed or set aside
by the judicial department if there is
an error of law, a grave abuse of
power or lack of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion clearly conflicting
with either the letter or the spirit of a
legislative enactment. The function of
promulgating rules and regulations
may be legitimately exercised only
for the purpose of carrying the
provisions of the law into effect. The
power of administrative agencies is
thus confined to implementing the
law or putting it into effect. Corollary
to this is that administrative
regulations cannot extend the law
and amend a legislative enactment,
for settled is the rule that
administrative regulations must be in
harmony with the provisions of the
law. And in case there is a
discrepancy between the basic law
and an implementing rule or
regulation, it is the former that
prevails.
2. YES.
-The ruling in the case of Association
of Small Landowners in the Phil. Inc.
vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform
merely recognized the extraordinary
- 69 -
A2010
nature of the expropriation to be
undertaken under RA 6657 thereby
allowing a deviation from the
traditional mode of payment of
compensation and recognized
payment other than in cash. It did
not, however, dispense with the
settled rule that there must be full
payment of just compensation before
the title to the expropriated property
is transferred.
-To withhold the right of the
landowners to appropriate the
amounts already deposited in their
behalf as compensation for their
properties simply because they
rejected the DAR's valuation, and
notwithstanding that they have
already been deprived of the
possession and use of such
properties, is an oppressive exercise
of eminent domain.
-It is unnecessary to distinguish
between provisional compensation
under Section 16(e) and final
compensation under Section 18 for
purposes of exercising the
landowners' right to appropriate the
same. The immediate effect in both
situations is the same, the landowner
is deprived of the use and possession
of his property for which he should be
fairly and immediately compensated.
Disposition Petition denied for lack
of merit. Appealed decision affirmed.
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
GMCR, INC. v BELL Division of CCAD, conducted a
TELECOMMUNICATION financial evaluation of the project
PHILIPPINES, INC. proposal of private respondent
271 SCRA 790 BellTel. Mr. Suarez made the finding
HERMOSISIMA, JR.; April 30, 1997 that BellTel has the financial
capability to support its proposed
NATURE project at least for the initial two (2)
Consolidated petitions seeking the years.
review and reversal of the decision] - Agreeing with the findings and
of the respondent Court of Appeals recommendations of the CCAD, NTC
Deputy Commissioners Fidelo Dumlao
FACTS and Consuelo Perez adopted the
- Republic Act No. 7692 was enacted same and expressly signified their
granting private respondent BellTel a approval
congressional franchise -In view of these favorable
- BellTel filed with the NTC a second recommendations by the CCAD and
Application praying for the issuance two members of the NTC, the Legal
of a Certificate of Public Convenience Department thereof prepared a
and Necessity for the installation, working draft of the order granting
operation and maintenance of a provisional authority to private
combined nationwide local toll respondent BellTel. The said working
(domestic and international) and draft was initialed by Deputy
tandem telephone exchanges and Commissioners Fidelo Q. Dumlao and
facilities using wire, wireless, Consuelo Perez but was not signed by
microwave radio, satellites and fiber Commissioner Simeon Kintanar.
optic cable with Public Calling Offices - While ordinarily, a decision that is
(PCOs) and very small aperture concurred in by two of the three
antennas (VSATs) under an members composing a quasi-judicial
integrated system. body is entitled to promulgation,
- The CCAD submitted to Deputy petitioners claim that pursuant to the
Commissioner Fidelo Q. Dumlao, a prevailing policy and the
Memorandum manifesting his corresponding procedure and practice
findings and recommending that in the NTC, the exclusive authority to
“based on technical documents sign, validate and promulgate any
submitted, BellTel’s proposal is and all orders, resolutions and
technically feasible.” decisions of the NTC is lodged in the
- Subsequently, Mr. Raulito Suarez, Chairman, in this case, Commissioner
the chief of the Rates and Regulatory Simeon Kintanar, and, thus, since
- 70 -
A2010
only Commissioner Simeon Kintanar
is recognized by the NTC Secretariat
as the sole authority to sign any and
all orders, resolutions and decisions
of the NTC, only his vote counts;
Deputy Commissioners Dumlao and
Perez have allegedly no voting power
and both their concurrence which
actually constitutes the majority is
inutile without the assent of
Commissioner Kintanar.
- Anxious over the inaction of the NTC
in the matter of its petition praying
for the issuance of a provisional
authority, private respondent BellTel
an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Resolve
Application and for the Issuance of a
Provisional Authority.
- No action was taken by the NTC on
the aforecited motion. Thus, BellTel
filed a Second Urgent Ex-Parte
Motionreiterating its earlier prayer.
-In an Order signed solely by
Commissioner Simeon Kintanar, the
NTC, instead of resolving the two
pending motions of private
respondent BellTel, set the said
motions for a hearing however, no
hearing was conducted as the same
was reset.
- On the day of the hearing, BellTel
filed a motion, prayed for the
promulgation of the working draft of
the order granting a provisional
authority to private respondent
BellTel, on the ground that the said
working draft had already been
signed or initialed by Deputy
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
Commissioners Dumlao and Perez
who, together, constitute a majority
out of the three commissioners
composing the NTC.
- NTC denied the said motion in an
Order solely signed by Commissioner
Simeon Kintanar.
- BellTel filed with this court a Petition
for Certiorari, Mandamus and
Prohibition seeking the nullification of
the Order
- The SC issued a Resolution referring
said petition to the respondent Court
of Appeals for proper determination
and resolution
- The Court of Appeals promulgated
the assailed decision which set aside
NTC Memorandum Circular No. 1-1-
93, Annex ‘J’ of the Petition,
Memorandum Circular No. 3-1-93,
Annex ‘K’ of the Petition and the
Order of Kintanar, Annex ‘L’ of the
Petition and directed . NTC to meet
en banc and to consider and act on
the draft Order
- Petitioners filed with this court
separate petitions for review.
ISSUE
WON the CA’s act of nullifying NTC
Memorandum Circular No. 1-1-93
and NTC Memorandum Circular No. 3-
1-93 was a collateral attack against
the aforecited circulars and an
unnecessary and abusive exercise of
the court’s power to nullify
administrative regulations.
A2010
HELD Disposition Petitions DISMISSED
NO.
Ratio Administrative regulations
derive their validity from the statute
that they were, in the first place,
intended to implement.
Reasoning Memorandum Circulars 1-
1-93 and 3-1-93 are on their face null
and void ab initio for being
unabashedly contrary to law. They
were nullified by respondent Court of
Appeals because they are absolutely
illegal and, as such, are without any
force and effect. The fact that
implementation of these illegal
regulations has resulted in the
institutionalization of the one-man
rule in the NTC, is not and can never
be a ratification of such an illegal
practice. At the least, these illegal
regulations are an erroneous
interpretation of E.O. No. 546 and in
the context of and its predecessor
laws. At the most, these illegal
regulations are attempts to validate
the one-man rule in the NTC as
executed by persons with the selfish
interest of maintaining their illusory
hold of power.
Since the questioned memorandum
circulars are inherently and patently
null and void for being totally
violative of the spirit and letter of
E.O. No. 546 that constitutes the NTC
as a collegial body, no court may
shirk from its duty of striking down
such illegal regulations.
- 71 -
Administrative Law A2010
Dean Carlota

- 72 -