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II. ,

79

List of Questions for the General Population

115

SUMMARY

118


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109012, , . , 17. .: (095) 229 5545
E-mail: direct@levada.ru
()
119571, , . , 82. .: (095) 564 8582

,
77981 10 2003 .
-, , 2004

Analytic Center
Yuri Levada
(Levada-Center)
The Interdisciplinary
Academic Centre for
Social Sciences
(InterCentre)

CONTENTS

PRINCIPAL TRENDS

ANALYSIS & INTERPRETATION


"Homo Sovieticus" 1989-2003. Reflections
on "the majority" and "the minority" (Yury LEVADA)

Members of
the Editorial Council
Tatyana Zaslavskaya
(Chair)
Abel Aganbeghian
Anatoly Vishnevsky
Boris Grushin
Leokadia Drobizheva
Otto Latsis
Yuri Levada
Natalia Rimashevskaya
Teodor Shanin
Vladimir Yadov
Yevgenii Yassin
Editorial Board
Yuri Levada
(Editor-in-Chief)
Boris Dubin
Alexei Grazhdankin
Lev Gudkov
(Deputy Editor-in-Chief)
Ludmila Khakhulina
(Deputy Editor-in-Chief)
Marina Krasilnikova
Galina Sterlikova
Natalia Zorkaya
(Executive Secretary)

Serving the Russian State: Prospects and Constraints for


Young Civil Servants' Careers
(Vladimir GIMPELSON, Vladimir MAGUN)

10

Social Dynamics in Transitional Societies


(Marina KRASILNIKOVA)

37

Of Those Who Call Themselves the 'Middle Class'


(Alexey LEVINSON, Olga STOUCHEVSKAYA, Yakov SHCHUKIN)

48

Russia and Eastern Europe: Mutual Alienation and Indifference


(Lev GUDKOV)
Authors of the issue

63
75

INFORMATION: SURVEYS' FINDINGS

76

I. Technical Notes

77

II. Attitudes, Opinions and Evaluations of the Population

79

List of Questions for the General Population

115

SUMMARY

118

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<http://www.isras.ru/files/extra/Molodue_spetsialistu.pdf>; .. : // . 2002. 11; Brym R., Gimpelson V, The Size,
Composition, and Dynamics of the Russian State Bureaucracy in the 1990s//Slavic Review. 2004. Vol. 63. N 1; .. : , :
, <http://www.pareform.ru/bulletin>; ..
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2004. . 7; . // . 2004.
3. . 61-70; Jakobson L. Administrative Reform in Russia's Economic Development // Administrative Reform and National Economic
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Weber M. Op. cit. P. 975.


Evans P., Rauch J. Bureaucracy and Growth: A Cross-National
Analysis of the Effects of "Weberian" State Structures on Economic
Growth //American Sociological Review. 1999. Vol. 64. N 5. Oct.;
Rauch J., Evans P. Bureaucratic Structure and Bureaucratic Performance in Less Developed Countries // Journal of Public Economics. 2000. Vol. 75. P. 49-71.
2

1
KochanowiczJ. Reforming Weak States and Deficient Bureaucracies // Intricate Links: Democratization and Market Reforms in
Latin America and Eastern Europe. Wash. (DC); ODC, 1994. P. 202.
2
Weber M. Economy and Society/Ed. G.Roth, C.Wittich. University of California Press, 1978. Vol. 2.

20

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Analysis. Lexington Books, 1971; Internal Labor Markets / Ed.
P.Osterman. MIT Press, 1984.
., : DiPrete T. The Professionalization of Administration and Equal
Employment Opportunity in the U.S. Federal Government // American Journal of Sociology. 1987. Vol. 93. N 1. July. P. 119-140;
Idem. The Bureaucratic Labor Market: The Case of the Federal Civil
Service. N.Y.: Plenum Press, 1989.
3
.: Williamson 0. Markets and Hierarchies. Analysis and Antitrust Implications. N.Y.: The Free Press, 1975. Ch. 4.

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.. : ; Brym R., Gimpelson V. The Size, Composition, and Dynamics of the Russian State Bureaucracy.

5 (73) - 2004

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Evans P. The State as Problem and Solution: Predation, Embedded Autonomy, and Structural Change // The Politics of Economic
Adjustment / Ed. S.Haggard, R.Kaufman. Princeton, 1992; Idem.
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Hirschman A. Exit, Voice and Loyalty. Responses to Decline in
Firms, Organizations, and States. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 1970.

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5 (73) - 2004

:

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, . 65 75%
( ;
,
. )
. ,
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, 24, 8,
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" ".
, , , , , , 2 .

,
2004 . XIV (),
" : ". . . " "
. " : ,
1990- ".
2
.: . : // :
. 2002. 1 (57). . 20-24.

(CBOS Centrum Badania Opinii Spolecznej)
, , , , , ,
(, , , ). ,

.


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.
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5 (73) - 2004

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1

Gudkov L, Levinson A. Abschied vom Imperium: Die baltische


Frage als Problem der Russen die russische Frage als Problem
der Balten // Die Neue Gesellschaft. Frankfurter Hefte. 1991. N 7.
Juli.S. 604-610.

64

, " " .

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,
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1953 . , 1956 . )
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,
. , " "
, 40% : (
) 19%, 6%, "
" 18%.
( 2001 ., N=1600 ). , ("
, ...")
(6+19%).

5 (73) - 2004

1
. ?
. ?
( % )

(, , .)

(, , .)


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(, )
(, , .)



1968 .,
1980- ,
"" , (,
! ). ,
, .

.
, ()

. 1991 . (N=4849 , )
0,50,7%. 1993 .
: ""

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, ,
, -

(. 1).

1999.
22
6
20
4

2001 .

17
12
1
2
3
6

64
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41
40
32
25
22
18
10
10
8
7
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5
2

2000

1600

? ( %
, 1998., N=1600 ):

%

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14

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( )
1
, ,
1

1

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19

, ,
, ? ( %
, 2002 ., N=1600 ):



(, , .)


( )

5 (73) - 2004

%
48
39
36
30
29
27
65

" "

( , )

20

15

9
8
6
6
4
2

2000 .
(N=1600 ),
.
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: "
,
, " (63%), "
(,
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("- ") 3%'.
(67%) ,
. "" "" 1:3.
, ,

? ( % , 2000 ., N=2003 ):

" " " "


" "
'

27
41
32

, ,

( ),
. , , ,
1

: 2004 .
: (,
) 34%,
(, ) 25, 13, 9,
1%.
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2004 .), , ,
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3%.
16-17%,
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,
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.

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5 (73) - 2004

67

2
15 , 1989 . ( , .)
, .
, , :

1 - , ;
2 - , ;
3 - (., .);
4 - .
( % , 2004 ., N=1600 )


:
18-24
25-39
40-54
55
:



, :


1
29

2
24

3
28

4
19

38
36
27
22

18
21
26
28

16
26
33
30

28
18
14
19

36
31
23

26
23
25

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28
29

14
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29
33
30
35
38
34
21
21
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17
28
28
27
22
21
28
18
16

44
27
27
30
18
30
30
29
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10
12
15
8
22
15
21
31
26

,
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, , ,

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5 (73) - 2004

( % )

, "

, ,

. 1994 2002 .

( 1995 .
72%). , , 1
" . 1994 .
(48%; 20 .,
2001 .), ,

(. 4).

: 1
Polish Public Opinion // Public Opinion Research Center.
Warszawa, 2004. N 2. P. 2-3.


- ,
, ,
, ,
,
, : 1995 .
22 . (. . 4). 35%

.
,
.

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5 (73) - 2004

69

? ( , % , N=1005 )

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2001 .
68
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0

2002 .
55
28

2004 .

17

37

48
25

5
:

? ( , % , N=1057 )



1995.
13
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25


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18
43
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2004.
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40
35

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1


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. 24% ,
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"" (
31%).

5 (73) - 2004

. -
" "
. , : " ,
, ,
? ( % , 2001 ., N=1600 ):

%

37

37

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25


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1920 .,
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.
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, 2003 . 54%

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).

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5 (73) - 2004

71

6

,

?
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46
31

30
34
36

53
36
11

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8

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72

7

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/
/.

?
( % )

1998. 1999. 2000. 2000 .

9
10
10
23
28
34
32
17

63
2407

55
2385

58
2407

60
2407

8

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( % )

/
/

2000 . 2001 .
___
30
33
64
38
32
3
1600
2000

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,
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N=1600 ). , ,
(
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9
. ,
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1. ,
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, ()
.

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1997., N=1600 ):

44

19
11
26

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, (
1996 ., N=1600 ).

,
, 15 ,
1989 .
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2001 . 55%, 37%),
, -
( 1997 . 55%,
, , .. 2004 . 46%). ,
,
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;
1995 ., 75%,
2001 . 56-57%)'.
( , )
77-80%
1994-1996 . 64% ( 2001 .
;
2004 . 71%).
7-8% 1994 .
30% ( 2001 . 2003 .,
),
20%. ,
,
, , ,
,
, (. 11).

Polish Public Opinion. 2004. N 6. P. 2-3.

5 (73) - 2004

73

10
, , ,
? ( % )



,


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,
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- , (49%).


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(65-68%).


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,
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,
, 79% , ,

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, ,
, (
,
, ..),
.
Polish Public Opinion. 2004. N 5. P. 4.

74

1998.

21
16
13
50

2407

2000 .

30
15
18
37
2407

2001 .

31
14
18
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2400

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,
( % ,
2004 ., N=1006 )

,
,

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60
53
11
7
11
19
8
10
9

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51
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13
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) 15% ( ), 1%, 2 7%.

5 (73) - 2004

12

( % )
- 1997.


63

24
9

2
2

2004 .

56
23
17
14
2
4

2001 .

58
23
16
14
2
1

: Polish Public Opinion. 2004. N 6. P. 4.

13
( % )


1994 .
1997 .
2001 .
2004 .

49
56
61
61

51
44
39
39

: Polish Public Opinion. 2004. N 6. P. 3.

, ,
,

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5 (73) - 2004

75

:
I. ""
I. ,
A. ( 1994 . 2004 .)
. , , ( 2004 .)
B. -
( 2004 .)
. ,
, ( 2004 .)
.
( 2004 .)
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5 (73) - 2004

77

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).
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, ,
0,8573 (2107/2407).

, .
, , , , ,
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, 2407 . ,
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429 .
. 100%,
. , ,
0,5% .

1,2,3

2004 .

5 (73) - 2004

, .'

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1. ,

2.

3. ,

4.

5.
6.

7.

8. ,
-

9. ,

10. ,


1 1 .

12.
13.

69

44

71

89

67

87

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75

34

59

57

53

79

69

13

15

14

10

12

19

12

10

12

15

12

14

29

13

31

40

25

46

45

19

11

29

19

18

36

29

15
21

13
18

13
20

19
27

15
11

14
28

14
19

16
22

17
15

13
21

13
19

16
22

14
22

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17

15

18

15

20

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17

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15

20

22

17

18

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12

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3

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1

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3

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1

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1

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1

7
3

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3

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1

19

15

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15

12

42. , ?

1.
2. ,

3.
4.

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43

26

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26

11

22

32

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24

25

39

23

19

30
26

36
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25

16
47

31
16

19
47

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21

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7

38
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1.
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3.
4.

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21

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25
48

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26

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64

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44

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18

31
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31

32
36

20
58

27
40

19

21

18

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17

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17

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32

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83
3
7
3

62
10
15
11

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4
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3.
4 . ,
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4
6
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4

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4
5
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3
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1
0
0

84
1
4
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11

13

15

10

10

I List of Questions (or the General Population


I (Page numbers in brackets indicate where opinions and characteristics of various groups of population are presented!

9. What could you say about your mood in the recent days? 1) Excellent mood; 2) Normal, calm condition;
3) I experience strain, irritation; 4) I feel fear, distress; 5) Difficult to answer. (79, 86, 91, 96,101,107)
9a. Speaking in general to what extent are you satisfied with the life you are leading now? 1) Quite satisfied;
2) Mainly satisfied; 3) Partly satisfied, partly not; 4) Mainly not satisfied; 5) Not satisfied at all; 6) Difficult
to answer. (86, 91,96,101,107)
10. How would you evaluate the financial position of your family at present? 1 )Very good; 2) Good; 3) Average;
4) Bad; 5) Very bad; 6) Difficult to answer. (79, 86, 91, 96,101,107)
11. How would you evaluate the economic situation in your town, rural district? 1) Good; 2) Average; 3) Bad;
4) Very bad; 5) Difficult to answer. (80, 86, 91, 96,101,108)
12. How would you evaluate the economic situation in Russia? 1) Good; 2) Average; 3) Bad; 4) Very bad;
5) Difficult to answer. (80, 87, 91, 96,102,108)
13. What do you think, which of the statements given below describes better the situation having been developed?
1) Everything is not so bad and it's possible to live; 2) Life is difficult but it's possible to bear it; 3) It's impossible
to bear our disastrous situation any longer; 4) Difficult to answer. (80, 87, 92, 97,102,108)
13A. What do you think, will you (your family) live better or worse then now in a year? 1) Better to a great extent;
2) Somewhat better; 3) The same matter as now; 4) Somewhat worse; 5) Worse to a great extent;
6) Difficult to answer. (80, 87, 92, 97,102,108)
13B. Which of the following statements most exactly describes your attitude to the present life? 1) "I simply
can't adapt to the present life"; 2) "I've got accustomed to the fact that I had to refuse from customary way
of life, to live, limiting myself in great and small"; 3) I have to "spin", seize upon any opportunity to earn only
to provide a tolerable life for my family and me"; 4) "I succeeded in using new opportunities to achieve
more in life"; 5) "I live in the same way as before: nothing has particularly changed for me in the recent
years"; 6) Difficult to answer. (81, 87, 92, 97,102,109)
14. What do you think, market reforms should be continued now or ceased? 1) Market reforms should be continued;
2) Market reforms should be ceased; 3) I don't know, it's difficult to answer. (81, 87, 92, 97,103,109)
19. How would you evaluate the political situation in Russia in general? 1) Safe, good; 2) Calm; 3) Strained;
4) Critical, explosive; 5) Difficult to answer. (81, 87, 92, 97,103,109)
20. Generally speaking, how much are you now satisfied with your life? 1) Quite satisfied; 2) Rather satisfied;
3) Partly satisfied, partly not; 4) Rather unsatisfied; 5) Not satisfied at all; 6) Don't know. (79)
22. What do you think, will our life improve more or less during the coming year or there will be no improvement?
1) Will improve; 2) There will be no improvement; 3) Difficult to answer. (82, 87, 92, 97,103,109)
26. How would you evaluate from 1 to 10 the activity of V.Putin as the President of Russia? (87, 93, 97,103,109)
26*. How would you rate on a scale from 1 to 10 the performance of Boris Yeltsin as Russia's president/Vladimir Putin as acting president/Vladimir Putin as Russia's president? Average on the scale. (82)
27. How would you evaluate from 1 to 10 the activity of M.Kasyanov, the first deputy chairman of the minister
cabinet? (82, 87, 93, 97,103,109)
28. What do you think, what awaits Russia in the nearest months in the political life? 1) Considerable improvement of the situation; 2) Some improvement of the situation; 3) Some change of the situation to the worse;
4) Considerable change of the situation to the worse; 5) Difficult to answer. (83, 88, 93, 97,103,110)

29. What do you think, what awaits Russia in the nearest months in the economic life? 1) Considerable improvement
of the situation; 2) Some improvement of the situation; 3) Some change of the situation to the worse;
4) Considerable change of the situation to the worse; 5) Difficult to answer. (83, 88, 93, 98,103,110)
31 a. Which of the following issues are you concerned with most of all and consider them the most urgent?
1) Corruption, taking of bribes; 2) Unemployment growth; 3) AIDS rate increase; 4) Nationalism growth,
deterioration interethnic relations; 5) Poverty, pauperization of the majority of population; 6) Increasing
environment pollution; 7) Threaten of explosions and other terrorist actions in the place I live; 8) Increasing number of crimes; 9) unavailability of many types of health services; 10) Drug use growth; 11) Rudeness, cruelty of militia men; 12) Economics crisis, production decline in industry and agriculture; 13) Crisis
of ethics, culture, morals; 14) Dramatic stratification into the rich and the poor, inequitable distribution of
incomes; 15) Growth of paid education, its non-availability; 16) Limitation of civil rights, democratic
freedom (freedom of speech, press, movements); 17) Prices increase; 18) Weakness, helplessness of
governmental power; 19) Conflicts in the country's leadership; 20) Delays in paying salaries, pensions,
benefits, etc.; 21) Warfare in Chechnya; 22) Lack of life perspectives for children; 23) Lack of attention to
the elderly people problems; 24) Other; 25) Difficult to answer. (88, 93, 98,104,111)
32. What do you think, to what extent mass violence of the population against the decrease of the living
standard and for the defense of their rights is possible now in your town/rural district? 1) Quite possible;
2) Hardly possible; 3) I don't know, difficult to answer. (89, 93, 99,105,111)
32*. How possible are now in your town/rural area mass actions of people against the price increase and
decline in standards of living? 1) Quite possible; 2) Little probable; 3) Don't know. (83)
33. If such rallies and protest demonstrations happen, will you personally take part in them? 1) Most probably
yes; 2) Most probably no; 3) Don't know. (83, 89, 94, 99,105,112)
33c. Is the protest movement with political demands possible in your town/rural district? 1) Quite possible;
2) Hardly possible; 3) I don't know, difficult to answer. (83, 89, 94, 99,105,112)
33c*. How probable are in your town/rural area protest actions (demonstrations, rallies, strikes) with political
claims of the President or the Federal government resignation? 1) Quite probable; 2) Hardly probable;
3) Don't know. (83)
35. How much money does your family need now per capita month to lead a normal, to your idea, life? (85,
90,95,100,106,114)
37. The income that would provide in respondent's opinion the "the minimum living standard"? (85,90,95,
100,106,114)
42. To speak of the major purchases for the family (such as furniture, refrigerator, household electronics, TV
set) do you think this is on the whole a good or a bad time now for such purchases? 1) Good; 2) Neither
good nor bad; 3) Bad; 4) Difficult to answer. (84, 89, 94, 99,105,113)
43. To speak in general, do you think this is a bad or a good time now to save up money? 1) Good; 2) Neither
good nor bad; 3) Bad; 4) Difficult to answer. (84, 89, 95, 99,105,113)
L15. How has the financial situation of your family changed during the last year? 1) Rather improved; 2) Remained the same; 3) Rather got worse; 4) Difficult to answer. (84)
L16. How do you think the financial situation of your family will change in the nearest year? 1) Rather will
improve; 2) Will remain the same; 3) Rather will get worse; 4) Difficult to answer. (84)
L17. Will you please tell us what makes the life of your family most difficult at present? 1) Low incomes, lack of
money; 2) Fear of losing a job; 3) Poor health, problems with medical treatment; 4) Bad dwelling; 5) Every-day
life difficulties; 6) Impossibility of giving good education to children; 7) Bad relations within the family;
8) Drinking or drug addiction of a family member; 9) Fatigue and exhaustion; 10) Hopelessness and absence of
prospects in life; 11) Lack of free time; 12) Something else;13) Difficult to answer. (89, 94, 99,105,113)
L33. Which of the following population groups would you rather ascribe yourself to? 1) We hardly make both ends
meet, there is not enough money even forfood; 2) There is enough moneyforfood but clothes buying causes serious
difficulties; 3) There is enough money for food and clothes but buying the durable goods (TV-set, refrigerator, etc.) is
difficult for us; 4) We can easily buy durable goods. To buy really expensive things is difficult for us; 5) We can afford
rather expensive purchases apartments, dacha and many others. (82, 89, 94, 99,105,112)
L88. To speak of the economical situation of the country on the whole, do you think the following 12 months will be
a good or a bad time for the country economy? 1) Good; 2) Good, but not in everything; 3) Neither good, nor
bad; 4) Bad, but not in everything; 5) Bad; 6) Difficult to answer. (84)

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LL10. What do you think, since what average monthly money income per capita a family may be considered a
rich one? (85, 90,95,100,106,114)
LL11. What do you think, with what average monthly money income at the rate for one person a family may be
considered poor one? (85, 90, 95,100,106,114)
01f. What stratum of the society would you rather ascribe yourself to? 1) To the lowest one; 2) To the workers;
3) To the lowest part of the middle stratum; 4) To the middle part of the middle strata; 5) To the higher
stratum; 6) Difficult to answer. (79, 86, 91, 96,101,107)
06+010. General respondent's earnings during the last month. (85, 90, 95,100,106,114)
010. How much money did you personally earn for extra work during the last month? (85, 90, 95,100,106,114)
015b:5. Average income per capita during the last month: (90, 95,100,106,114)
025:5. Average per capita income: (85)
026c. Does anyone of your family, including you, have access to Internet? If so, is it at home or at the office?
1) No access to Internet; 2) Yes, only at home; 3) Yes, only at the office; 4) Yes, both at home and at the
office; 5) I don't know anything of the existence of Internet. (90, 95,100,106,113)

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SUMMARY
1. "Homo Sovieticus" 1989-2003. Reflections
on "the majority" and "the minority" (by Yury Levada). In interpreting the data of public opinion
polls comparing the attitudes of "the majority" and
"the minority" seems most simple and commonplace:
the majority supports, disagrees, trusts, disapprove,
etc.; the minority is naturally of the opposite opinion.
Meanwhile the experience proves these constructions
to be artificial and even dangerous, able to mislead
both the researchers and practical data users.
In socio-practical aspect the notions "the majority" and "the minority" rarely acquire actual meaning
for the society on the whole, only in general elections or referendum with dichotomy choice. In any
case the acting force is not "the majority" or "the
minority" but a structure, organization, institution,
united group. Mass functions in any societal structures and processes are support, approval, agreement with the given pattern or direction. Only the
structures and groups comprising quantitative "minority" may be diverse, heterogeneous, inwardly organized.
During "perestroika" (transition) period "the Soviet" pattern of interaction between social structure
components was still working: quasi-united political
elite and obedient, sometimes ecstatically obedient
"majority". In the following period of disappointments and confrontations (19931999) in the absence of socio-political field the state power remained the main "player".
The side-effect of the series of bargains and confrontations .was keeping up the atmosphere of social
rights and freedoms during the 90s. But that was also
the source of weakness and unreliability of such
rights. That was proved not once by the following
events. By 1999 social preferences looked like expectations of "strong power" which would rely on the
army and security service. However lack of conspicuous outward competitor to non-alternative
power structures doesn't lead to "unanimous approval". But this may be considered a significant
difference between the present imitation pattern of
mass support of the leader and the totalitarian one.
Where there is no significant minority in social
life, where the voice of an individual is not heard,
there is no "majority" either. All types of tyrannies
and dictatorships in the remote and recent past could
get the support of the crowd (though they relied not
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upon the crowd but on the organized layer of praetorians, opritchniks, etc.). There can be neither minority, nor majority in a crowd, enraged, exalted or
scared. One may either behave like "all the others"
or be crushed by them.
2. Serving the Russian State: Prospects and
Constraints for Young Civil Servants' Careers (by
Vladimir Gimpelson, Vladimir Magun). The paper
explores relationships between recruitment and promotion procedures in the Russian civil service, on
the one hand, and the Weberian ideal bureaucracy,
on the other. It uses microdata from a survey of
young civil servants at federal, regional and municipal levels conducted in 2001-2002.
The paper argues that recruitment of young bureaucrats for the Russian c i v i l service does not use
competence-based criteria; search and hiring of
candidates for office are usually based on use of
personal informal networks. Moving up intra-organizational job ladders (promotion) is often meritbased, as it is argued by surveyed bureaucrats,
though the civil servants themselves have not been
hired on a competitive merit-based system. Loyaltybased criteria governing promotion are also frequently mentioned.
Regression analysis strongly suggests that bureaucrats' estimate of the promotion system as
merit-based is negatively associated with their propensity to quit the organization. On the contrary,
their belief that actual bureaucratic career is loyaltydriven amplifies quitting behavior. More the promotion system is considered merit-oriented, higher
earnings in bureaucratic organizations are likely to
be, thus keeping negative selection processes at bay.
3. Social Dynamics in Transitional Societies (by
Marina Krasilnikova). The article analyses the dynamics of social structure of various societies for a
long period (20 years) using the data of international
research carried out in several countries not all of
which were transitional. Social groups are singled
out that differ in dynamics type of subjective evaluations of their own position in the society. The article examines the special features of value orientations of various population groups in transitional
society and their differing attitudes to social
changes.

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The analysis of the data leads to the conclusion


that social dynamics in transitional societies is characterized not only by the general deterioration of
social well-being but by differently directed changes
in subjective notions of various social groups about
their positions in the society. This is common for all
post-Socialist countries. However the character of
the previous historical development and peculiarities of carrying out the transformational processes
indifferent countries are manifested in the correlation between the numbers of winners and loosers.
The analysis of the social groups attitudes to the
changes occurring in the country allows to make a
conclusion that the degree of society support for the
processes of transitional period may be judged most
adequately by the evaluations of a middle group, i.e.
those people who refer themselves to the middle of
social ladder.
The comparison of value orientations of post-Socialist countries population shows that they do not
differ much from the patterns of West European
culture. The existing differences reflect the transitional character of Eastern European countries, the
value structure of Russian society having the greatest differences.
4. Of Those Who Call Themselves the 'Middle
Class' (by Alexey Levinson, Olga Stouchevskaya,
Yakov Shchukin).The authors do not claim to give
their own definition of the middle class, the much
disputed issue in contemporary Russia. They rather
describe the two cases of the 'middle class' selfdefinition: the broad one (when over 80% of Russian
population place themselves in this category), and
the narrow one. Here, entrepreneurs and employees
in the new private sector of economy are singled out.
This group view themselves as the only social class
who have managed to achieve what the authors see
as norms and expectations rooted in the consump-

tion and ethical ideals of the Soviet period. This


make them different from either the 'low class' who
have failed to find means to do this, and the 'upper
class' who have failed to find the adequate social
ideal. This would-be middle class is in the process of
acquiring its own identity and discourse that is reflected in ideology, as well as in the consumption
behavior.
The authors do not share the view that the present
political regime has an interest in these people as in
law-abiding citizens, but think that they definitely
have an interest in a regime that would implement
the proper execution of the law.
5. Russia and Eastern Europe: Mutual Alienation and Indifference (by Lev Gudkov). The attitude
of Russians to Eastern European countries is examined on the data of research carried out for many
years. The author's main thesis is that mass ideas of
significance/importance of actual relations with
neighboring countries is defined not by pragmatic
interests, but is a projection of key aspects of mass
national identity. After the collapse of the USSR
Eastern Europe lost its functional role of "close
West" in mass identity structure of the closed totalitarian society, and Russia's interest in these countries has gone, though outward relations are still
described as calm and mutually favorable. But under
the cover of these formally favorable attitudes there
is a thick layer of offences and mistrust reflecting
the experience of the times of forced integration and
imperial consciousness. Comparison with Polish
surveys data shows that attitudes of Eastern Europeans and Russians are going apart.
6. Information: Surveys' Findings
I. Technical Notes
II. Attitudes, Opinions and Evaluations of the
Population (July, 2004)

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