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Juan Camilo Espejo-Serna John McDowell Singular ought and the Extent of the Inner Space I Russells Principle:

: Contents are object dependent; in the case where there is no object, there is no content (singular thought). II Russells Restriction: ere cannot be an illusion of understanding contents. III Freges Psychological Principle: At one time, a subject cannot rationally hold conicting attitudes to the same content. Russell held I and II but denied III. Frege held III and arguably denies I (and since I is denied, II is not needed). e view that McDowell is presenting accepts I and III and denies II. In order to understand McDowells view, I would like to compare it to Burges view on content. Very roughly, Burge holds a view in which content is determined by the standards of the community; while McDowell presents a view in which the content is (at least partially) individuated by its object (I) and psychological constraints of rationality (III). Burge McDowell Wide content (?) Object-dependent senses Anti-individualism Anti-individualism Anti-functionalism Anti-functionalism (?) Error about ones mind Error about ones mind Anti-solipsism ? Content determined by community Content determined by objects Objects gure in content Responsibility before the community Partial or expert understanding Seeming to understand or actually understanding Explanatory practices Intrinsic connection between mind and world

1. Is there a fundamental dierence between Burges and McDowells positions or are they holding fairly similar views but getting to them from through dierent paths? 2. Is the view presented by McDowell plausible? Does it seem a possible platform from where to launch an attempt to solve the puzzles we have seen? 3. Has McDowell presented sucient conditions for individualizing contents?

March 14, 2011

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