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Villavicencio vs Lukban L-14639

Facts:

Justo Lukban as Manila Mayor together with the police officer, took custody of 170 women at the night of October 25 beyond the
latter's consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Davao City where they were signed as laborers.
A writ of habeas corpus was filed against the mayor on behalf of those women. The court granted the writ, but the mayor was not
able to bring any of the women before the court on the stipulated date.

Issue:

Whether or not the act of mayor has a legal basis.


Held:

The supreme court said that the mayor's acts were not legal. His intent of exterminating vice was commendable, but there was no
law saying that he could force filipino women to change their domicile from manila to nother place. The women, said the court,
although in a sense "lepers of society" were still filipino citizens and such they were entitled to the constitutional enjoyed by all
other filipino citizens. The right to freedom of domicile was such a fundamental right that its suppression could considered
tantamount to slavery.

The supreme court upheld the right of filipino citizens to freedom of domicile or the Liberty of abode. "Ours is a government of laws
and not of men."
Co Kim Chan v Valdez Tan Keh
Facts of the case: Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese occupation, with the Court of First Instance of Manila.
After the Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a
proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the
Philippines and, without an enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in
the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines (the Philippine government under the Japanese).
The court resolved three issues:
1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation were valid and remained valid even after the
American occupation;
2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which he declared that all laws, regulations and processes of any
other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines
free of enemy occupation and control invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts;
3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthurs proclamation, those courts could continue hearing the cases pending
before them.
Ratio: Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government are good and valid. The Philippine
Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments,
supported by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war.
Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended or changed by the conqueror. Civil obedience is
expected even during war, for the existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil
government or the regular administration of the laws. And if they were not valid, then it would not have been necessary for MacArthur to
come out with a proclamation abrogating them.
The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of the phrase processes of any other government and whether or not he
intended it to annul all other judgments and judicial proceedings of courts during the Japanese military occupation.
IF, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial proceedings of de facto governments are valid and remain valid even
after the occupied territory has been liberated, then it could not have been MacArthurs intention to refer to judicial processes, which would
be in violation of international law.
A well-known rule of statutory construction is: A statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains.
Another is that where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great mischief done, such construction is to be
avoided, or the court ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and
unequivocal words.
Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation would clog the dockets and violate international law, therefore what
MacArthur said should not be construed to mean that judicial proceedings are included in the phrase processes of any other governments.
In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such laws and institutions are continued in use by the occupant, they become his and derive
their force from him. The laws and courts of the Philippines did not become, by being continued as required by the law of nations, laws and
courts of Japan.
It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, law once established continues until changed by some competent legislative power.
IT IS NOT CHANGED MERELY BY CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY. Until, of course, the new sovereign by legislative act creates a change.
Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, and the laws and courts of the Philippines had
become courts of Japan, as the said courts and laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until now, it
follows that the same courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending therein before the restoration of the
Commonwealth Government, until abolished or the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said government.
DECISION: Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him to take cognizance of and continue to
final judgment the proceedings in civil case no. 3012.
Summary of ratio:
1. International law says the acts of a de facto government are valid and civil laws continue even during occupation unless repealed.
2. MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments, but this cannot be applied on judicial proceedings because such a construction
would violate the law of nations.
3. Since the laws remain valid, the court must continue hearing the case pending before it.
***3 kinds of de facto government: one established through rebellion (govt gets possession and control through force or the voice of the
majority and maintains itself against the will of the rightful government)
through occupation (established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war;
denoted as a government of paramount force)
through insurrection (established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent
state)

AGUSTIN vs EDU
88 SCRA 195

FACTS: This was an original action in the Supreme Court for prohibition.Petitioner was an owner of a volkswagen beetle
car,model 13035 already properly equipped when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights which could serve as an
early warning device in case of the emergencies mentioned in Letter of Instructions No 229, as amended, as well as the
Implementing rules and regulations in Administrative Order No 1 issued by Land transportation Commission.Respondent Land
Transportation commissioner Romeo Edu issued memorandum circular no 32 pursuant to Letter of Instructions No.229,as
amended. It required the use of early Warning Devices (EWD) on motor vehicles. Petitioner alleged that the letter of
instructions, as well as the implementing rules and regulations were unlawful and unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Whether the Letter of Instruction were considered valid and constitutional?

HELD: YES, The court held that the letter of Instruction No.229,as amended as well as the implementing rules and regulations
were valid and constitutional as a valid measure of police power. The Vienna Convention on Road signs and signals and the
United Nations Organization was ratified by the Philippine local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices.It
cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses relevance,between the
International law and municipal law in applying the rule municipal law prevails.

Petition is DISMISSED.

Luo Ichong vs Julme Hernundez
22112010

7reutles Muy Be Superseded by MunlclpuI Luws ln the Exerclse oI FoIlce Fower
Luo Ichong ls u Chlnese buslnessmun who entered the country to tuke udvuntuge oI buslness opportunltles hereln ubound (then) purtlcuIurIy ln
the retulI buslness. For some tlme he und hls IeIIow Chlnese buslnessmen en|oyed u monopoIy ln the IocuI murket ln Fusuy. UntlI ln June 1954
when Congress pussed the RA 1180 or the RetulI 7rude NutlonuIlzutlon Act the purpose oI whlch ls to reserve to FlIlplnos the rlght to enguge ln the
retulI buslness. Ichong then petltloned Ior the nuIIlIlcutlon oI the suld Act on the ground thut lt contruvened severuI treutles concIuded by the RF
whlch, uccordlng to hlm, vloIutes the equuI protectlon cIuuse (puctu sund servundu). He suld thut us u Chlnese buslnessmun enguged ln the
buslness here ln the country who heIps ln the lncome generutlon oI the country he shouId be glven equuI opportunlty.
ISSUE: Whether or not u Iuw muy lnvuIldute or supersede treutles or generuIIy uccepted prlnclpIes.
HELD: Yes, u Iuw muy supersede u treuty or u generuIIy uccepted prlnclpIe. In thls cuse, there ls no conIIlct ut uII between the rulsed generuIIy
uccepted prlnclpIe und wlth RA 1180. The equuI protectlon oI the Iuw cIuuse does not demund ubsoIute equuIlty umongst resldents; lt mereIy
requlres thut uII persons shuII be treuted uIlke, under Ilke clrcumstunces und condltlons both us to prlvlIeges conIerred und IlublIltles enIorced; und,
thut the equuI protectlon cIuuse ls not lnIrlnged by IeglsIutlon whlch uppIles onIy to those persons IuIIlng wlthln u speclIled cIuss, lI lt uppIles uIlke
to uII persons wlthln such cIuss, und reusonubIe grounds exlst Ior muklng u dlstlnctlon between those who IuII wlthln such cIuss und those who do
not.
For the suke oI urgument, even lI lt wouId be ussumed thut u treuty wouId be ln conIIlct wlth u stutute then the stutute must be upheId becuuse lt
represented un exerclse oI the poIlce power whlch, belng lnherent couId not be burgulned uwuy or surrendered through the medlum oI u treuty.
Hence, Ichong cun no Ionger ussert hls rlght to operute hls murket stuIIs ln the Fusuy clty murket.
Gonzales vs. Hechanova 9 SCRA 230
Facts:

Respondent executive secretary authorized importation of 67,000 tons of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources. Ramon
A. Gonzales, a rice planter and president of ilo-ilo palay and corn planters asso., filed and averring that in making or attempting to
make importation of foreign rice are acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction because RA 2207, explicitly prohibits the
importation of rice and corn by Rice and Corn Administration or any government agency.

Issue:

Whether an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts.

Held:

The power of judicial review is vested with the supreme court in consonace to section 2 art. VIII of the constitution. the alleged
consummation of the contracts with vietnam and burma does not render this case academic. RA 2207, enjoins our government not
from entering contracts for the purchase of rice, but from entering rice, except under conditions prescribed in said act.

A judicial declaration of illegality of the proposed importation would not compel our government to default in the performance of
such obligations as it mat have contracted with the sellers of rice in question because aside from the fact that said obligations may
be complied without importing the said commodity into the phils., the proposed importation may still be legalized by complying with
the provisions of the aforementioned law.
In Re Garcia 2 SCRA 985
Facts:

Arturo E. Garcia,has applied for admission to the practice of law in the phils. without submitting to the required bar examinations.
In his verified petition, he avers among others that he is a filipino citizen born in bacolod city of filipino parentage. He finished
Bachillerato Superior in spain. He was allowed to practice law profession in spain under the provision of the treaty on academic
degrees and the exercise of profession between the republic of the phils.

Issue:

Whether treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the phil. bar.

Held:

The court resolved to deny the petition. The provision of the treaty on academic degrees between the republic of the phils. and
spanish state cannot be invoked by the applicant. said treaty was intende to govern filipino citizens desiring to practice their
profession in spain. The treaty could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission to the practice
of law in the phils., for the reason the executive may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the supreme court to
promulgate rules for admission to the practice of the law in the phils. The power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being
reserved only to the congress of the phils.
Secretary of Justice v. Judge Lantion 343 SCRA 377 (2000)
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. LANTION [322 SCRA 160 (2000)]

Nature: Petition for review of a decision of the Manila RTC

Facts: On June 18, 1999 the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs a request for
the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. The Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant for his
arrest, and other supporting documents for said extradition were attached along with the request. Charges
include:
1. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US
2. Attempt to evade or defeat tax
3. Fraud by wire, radio, or television
4. False statement or entries
5. Election contribution in name of another

The Department of Justice (DOJ), through a designated panel proceeded with the technical evaluation and
assessment of the extradition treaty which they found having matters needed to be addressed. Respondent, then
requested for copies of all the documents included in the extradition request and for him to be given ample time
to assess it.

The Secretary of Justice denied request on the ff. grounds:
1. He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the completion of the evaluation. At that point in time, the
DOJ is in the process of evaluating whether the procedures and requirements under the relevant law (PD 1069
Philippine Extradition Law) and treaty (RP-US Extradition Treaty) have been complied with by the Requesting
Government. Evaluation by the DOJ of the documents is not a preliminary investigation like in criminal cases
making the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in criminal prosecution inapplicable.
2. The U.S. requested for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of the information in the documents.
3. Finally, country is bound to Vienna convention on law of treaties such that every treaty in force is binding upon
the parties.

The respondent filed for petition of mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition. The RTC of NCR ruled in favor of the
respondent. Secretary of Justice was made to issue a copy of the requested papers, as well as conducting further
proceedings.

Issues:
1. WON private is respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing
Yes. 2(a) of PD 1086 defines extradition as the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of
placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in
connection with any criminal investigation directed against him in connection with any criminal investigation
directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the
requesting state or government. Although the inquisitorial power exercised by the DOJ as an administrative
agency due to the failure of the DFA to comply lacks any judicial discretion, it primarily sets the wheels for the
extradition process which may ultimately result in the deprivation of the liberty of the prospective extradite. This
deprivation can be effected at two stages: The provisional arrest of the prospective extradite pending the
submission of the request & the temporary arrest of the prospective extradite during the pendency of the
extradition petition in court. Clearly, theres an impending threat to a prospective extraditees liberty as early as
during the evaluation stage. Because of such consequences, the evaluation process is akin to an administrative
agency conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially criminal since such
technical assessment sets off or commences the procedure for & ultimately the deprivation of liberty of a
prospective extradite. In essence, therefore, the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal
investigation. There are certain constitutional rights that are ordinarily available only in criminal prosecution. But
the Court has ruled in other cases that where the investigation of an administrative proceeding may result in
forfeiture of life, liberty, or property, the administrative proceedings are deemed criminal or penal, & such
forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. In the case at bar, similar to a preliminary investigation, the
evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings which may result in the filing of an information against the
respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, & to the deprivation of his liberty. Thus, the extraditee must be
accorded due process rights of notice & hearing according to A3 14(1) & (2), as well as A3 7the right of the
people to information on matters of public concern & the corollary right to access to official records & documents

The court held that the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation, having consequences
which will result in deprivation of liberty of the prospective extradite. A favorable action in an extradition request
exposes a person to eventual extradition to a foreign country, thus exhibiting the penal aspect of the process. The
evaluation process itself is like a preliminary investigation since both procedures may have the same result the
arrest and imprisonment of the respondent.

The basic rights of notice & hearing are applicable in criminal, civil & administrative proceedings. Non-observance
of these rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting
their interests, & upon notice, may claim the right to appear therein & present their side.

Rights to notice and hearing: Dispensable in 3 cases:
a. When there is an urgent need for immediate action (preventive suspension in administrative charges, padlocking
filthy restaurants, cancellation of passport).
b. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, & the respondent isnt prevented from enjoying the right
to notice & hearing at a later time (summary distraint & levy of the property of a delinquent taxpayer,
replacement of an appointee)
c. Twin rights have been offered, but the right to exercise them had not been claimed.

2. WON this entitlement constitutes a breach of the legal commitments and obligation of the Philippine
Government under the RP-US Treaty?
No. The U.S. and the Philippines share mutual concern about the suppression and punishment of crime in their
respective jurisdictions. Both states accord common due process protection to their respective citizens. The
administrative investigation doesnt fall under the three exceptions to the due process of notice and hearing in the
Sec. 3 Rules 112 of the Rules of Court.

3. WON theres any conflict between private respondents basic due process rights & provisions of RP-US
Extradition treaty
No. Doctrine of incorporation under international law, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of
international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to national legislative acts. Treaty can repeal
statute and statute can repeal treaty. No conflict. Veil of secrecy is lifted during trial. Request should impose veil
at any stage.

Judgment: Petition dismissed for lack of merit.

Alih vs Castro - A case Digest
Alih vs Castro
GL. 69401

This case was in explaining Sec 3 of Art 2 of the 1987 Constitution regarding the supremacy of the civilians.


Facts;

Zona was conducted by the men of Maj. Gen Castro in a compoud where petioners reside and conducted illegal search and
thereafter seized guns from them. The order was carried on by his Castro's men with the contention that the petitioners are involved
in the latest killing of the town's mayor Cesar Climaco.

Issue;

Is the warrantless search and seizure legal?

Held;

The Supreme Court declared those seized in custodia legis and declared that the operation conducted by Maj. Gen. Castro was
ILLEGAL. The respondents have all the time to obtain a search warrant granted that they have about 10 trial courts. The SC also
held the protection of the petitioner's human rights as stated in Art IV Sec 3 and 4 of the 1973 Constitution regarding illegal search
and seizure. The presumption ofinnocence of the petitioners should be observed and that they cannot be subjected to self-
incriminating instances like paraffin tests, photographingand finger printing.

As penned by J. Cruz in this case, "The Constitution is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the
shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times and under all circumstances. No doctrine, involving more pernicious
consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great
exigencies of government."

People v manayao
Treason


Manayao is a member of the Makapili (a group of Filipino traitors aiding the Japanese cause). Manayao conspired together with his
Japanese comrade soldiers to inflict terror upon the barrio of Banaban in Bulacan where they killed 60 to 70 residents. The residents they
killed were alleged to be supporters, wives and relatives of guerillas fighting the Japanese forces. Manayao was positively identified by
credible witnesses and he was later convicted with the high crime of treason with multiple murder. He was sentenced to death and to pay the
damages. Manayaos counsel argued that his client cannot be tried with treason because Manayao has already lost his Filipino citizenship
due to his swearing of allegiance to support the Japanese cause. Hence, Manayao cannot be tried under Philippine courts for any war crimes
for only Japanese courts can do so.

ISSUE: Whether or not Manayao is guilty of treason.

HELD: Manayaos swearing of allegiance to Japan was not proven as a fact nor is it proven that he joined the Japanese Naval, Army or Air
Corps. What he joined is the Makapili, a group of Filipino traitors pure and simple. The Court also emphasized that in times of war when the
state invokes the Constitutional provision which state The defense of the state is a prime duty of the government, in the fulfillment of this
duty all citizens may be required to render personal, military or civil service no one can effectively cast off his duty to defend the state by
merely swearing allegiance to an enemy country, leaving and joining the opposite force, or by deserting the Philippine Armed Forces. Or
even if Manayao did lose his citizenship it is also indicated that no such person shall take up arms against his native country; he shall be held
guilty of a felony and treason, if he does not strictly observe this duty.

PD 1706: Aug 8, 1980. Requires personal civil service. This is an enabling law to compel persons to act pursuant to the defense of state
provision of the Constitution (now Sec 4, Art 2)

EO 264: (Pres. Cory Aquino). Repealed PD 1706.

Case Digest on Secretary of Justice v. Hon. Lantion and Mark Jimenez
G.R. No. 139465, October 17, 2000
November 10, 2010

overturning 322 SCRA 160 (Jan. 18, 2000)
By virtue of an extradition treaty between the US and the Philippines, the US requested for the extradition of Mark Jimenez for violations of
US tax and election laws. Pending evaluation of the extradition documents by the Philippine government, Jimenez requested for copies of
the US extradition request. The Secetary of Justice denied that request. ISSUE: During the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings,
is private respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing?
HELD:
Private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. Extradition is a
proceeding sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights. The process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be
adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited.
Dissent (original decision): Under the extradition treaty, the prospective extraditee may be provisionally arrested pending the submission of
the request. Because of this possible consequence, the evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conducting an investigative
proceeding, and partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. Thus, the basic due process rights of notice and hearing are
indispensable.
Assuming that the extradition treaty does not allow for such rights, the Constitutional right to procedural due process must override treaty
obligations. When there is a conflict between international law obligations and the Constitution, the Constitution must prevail.


Lim vs. Executive Secretary G.R. No. 151445 April 11, 2002
July 25, 2009 at 12:11 pm (1)
FACTS :
Beginning 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the United States started arriving
in Mindanao, to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in Balikatan
02-1. In theory, they are a simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the
Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippines
and the United States in 1951.
On Feb. 2002, Lim filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition, praying that
respondents be restrained from proceeding with the so-called Balikatan 02-1, and
that after due notice and hearing, judgment be rendered issuing a permanent writ of
injuction and/or prohibition against the deployment of US troops in Basilan and
Mindanao for being illegal and in violation of the Constitution.
Petitioners contend that the RP and the US signed the Mutual Defense Treaty to
provide mutual military assistance in accordance with the constitutional processes
of each country only in the case of a armed attack by an external aggressor, meaning a
third country, against one of them. They further argued that it cannot be said that the
Abu Sayyaf in Basilan constitutes an external aggressor to warrant US military
assistance in accordance with MDT of 1951. Another contention was that the VFA of
1999 does not authorize American soldiers to engage in combat operations in
Philippine territory.
ISSUE :
Whether or not the Balikatan 02-1 activities are covered by the VFA.
RULING :
Petition is dismissed. The VFA itself permits US personnel to engage on an
impermanent basis, in activities, the exact meaning of which is left undefined. The
sole encumbrance placed on its definition is couched in the negative, in that the US
personnel must abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this
agreement, and in particular, from any political activity.
Under these auspices, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. It
is only logical to assume that Balikatan 02-1 a mutual anti terrorism advising
assisting and training exercise falls under the umbrella of sanctioned or allowable
activities in the context of the agreement. Both the history and intent of the Mutual
Defense Treaty and the VFA support the conclusion that combat-related activities as
opposed to combat itself such as the one subject of the instant petition, are indeed
authorized.
Chavez vs. Romulo
G.R. No. 157036, June 9, 2004

y A mere license is always revocable

FACTS:

This case is about the ban on the carrying of firearms outside of residence in order to deter the rising crime rates. Petitioner
questions the ban as a violation of his right to property.

ISSUE:
y Whether or not the revocation of permit to carry firearms is unconstitutional
y Whether or not the right to carry firearms is a vested property right



HELD:

Petitioner cannot find solace to the above-quoted Constitutional provision.

In evaluating a due process claim, the first and foremost consideration must be whether life, liberty or property interest exists. The
bulk of jurisprudence is that a license authorizing a person to enjoy a certain privilege is neither a property nor property right. In
Tan vs. The Director of Forestry, we ruled that a license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful,
and is not a contract between the authority granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property
right, nor does it create a vested right. In a more emphatic pronouncement, we held in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr. that:

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right
protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.
xxx

In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted broad discretion in the issuance of PTCFOR. This is evident from the tenor of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866 which state that the Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as
determined by him and under such conditions as he may impose, authorize lawful holders of firearms to carry them outside of
residence. Following the American doctrine, it is indeed logical to say that a PTCFOR does not constitute a property right protected
under our Constitution.

Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, may be revoked any time. It does not confer an
absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be exercised under existing restrictions, and such as may thereafter be reasonably
imposed. A licensee takes his license subject to such conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the statutory
conditions of this license is that it might be revoked by the selectmen at their pleasure. Such a license is not a contract, and a
revocation of it does not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity, or privilege within the meaning of these words in the
Declaration of Rights. The US Supreme Court, in Doyle vs. Continental Ins. Co, held: The correlative power to revoke or recall a
permission is a necessary consequence of the main power. A mere license by the State is always revocable.

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