Bello v. Court of Appeals Case No. 15 G. R.

L-38161 (March 29, 1974) FACTS: Petitioners falsely appealed a case to the Court of First Instance, which shouldhave been taken directly to Respondent Court. The Prosecutor filed a petition todismiss appeal. Petitioners invoked an analogous provision (Rule 50, Sec. 3) directingthe Court of Appeals in cases erroneously brought to it to certify the case to theproper court. The Court of First Instance still ordered the dismissal of the appeal.Petitioners then filed their petition for prohibition and mandamus to prohibit theexecution of judgment and elevate the appeal to Respondent Court. They dismissedthe petition. Although Respondent Court recognized that the Court of First Instancemay have exercised its inherent powers to direct appeal to Respondent Court, it heldthat Petitioners did not implead the Court of First Instance as principal partyrespondent and thus it could not grant any relief at all even on the assumption thatPetitioners can be said to deserve some equities .

Salaria v. Buenviaje Case No. 267 G.R. No. L-45642 (February 28, 1978) Chapter III, Page 115, Footnote No.193 FACTS: Petitioner has been staying on the land of Cailao when the latter sold the saidland to Private Respondent Mendiola. A formal letter of demand to vacate thepremises was sent by Respondent Mendiola to Petitioner. A complaint for unlawfuldetainer was filed by Mendiola against Petitioner Salaria. After the trial, the City Courtordered Petitioner to vacate the leased premises. On appeal, the CFI throughRespondent Judge Buenviaje affirmed the decision of the inferior court. Thus, apetition for review on Certiorari was filed with the Supreme Court. ISSUE: W/N Respondent can eject Petitioner from the lot. HELD: No. Memorandum Circular No. 970 was issued by the President stating that except for the causes for judicial ejectment of lessees bona fide tenants ofdwelling places covered by said decree are not subject to eviction, particularly if theonly cause of action thereon is personal use of the property by the owners or theirfamilies. Construction by Executive Branch of Government of a particular lawalthough not binding upon courts must be given weight as the construction comesfrom that branch called upon to implement the law. The ground relied upon by thelessor in this case, namely, personal use of property by the owner or lessors or theirfamilies is not one of the causes for judicial ejectment of lessees. People of the Philippines v. Moro Macarandang Case No. 211 G.R. No. L-12088 (December 23, 1959) Chapter II, Page 69, Footnote No.87 FACTS:Defendant was accused and convicted of illegal possession of firearms inLanao. Defendant, admitting the ownership and possession of the firearm andammunitions, invokes as his legal

ISSUE:W/N the case should be elevated to Respondent Court despite finality of judicial decision. HELD: Yes. The Court of First Instance acted with grave abuse of discretion. TheSupreme Court cautions against narrowly interpreting a statute, defeating its purposeand stressed that it is the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes as to avoidsuch a deplorable result of injustice or absurdity . The provision should also be takenwithin the context and spirit of Rule 50, Sec. 3 as an analogous provision. TheSupreme Court finds no reason as to why the court cannot act in all fairness andjustice to be bound by the same rule.

excuse the appointment issued to him by GovernorDimakuta as secret agent shown in the Governor s letter which he presented as andevidence. He was granted this appointment for having shown good faith bypreviously surrendering to the office of the Governor a firearm. He has then beenappointed as SECRET AGENT to assist on the maintenance of peace and ordercampaigns and is authorized to hold and carry in his possession 1 Riot shotgun. ISSUE: W/N a Secret Agent tasked to assist in the maintenance of peace and order falls among those authorized to possess firearms. HELD: Yes. It may be true that the Governor has no authority to issue any firearmlicense or permit but section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides the peace officers are exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance oflicense to possess firearms. The appointment sufficiently put him in the category of peace officer equivalent even to a Municipal Police expressly covered by section879. Wherefore the decision appealed from is reversed and the Defendant acquitted.

for secret agent therefore holding this position would notconstitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for a crime of illegal possession offirearm and ammunitions. Wherefore the conviction of the accused must stand. TheCourt s ruling overturned that of People v. Macarandang.

People v. Santayana Case No. 115 No. L-22291 (November 15, 1976) FACTS: Accused was found guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearms andsentenced to an indeterminate penalty from one year and one day to two years,and to pay the costs. ISSUE: W/N the appointment of the Appellant as a special agent of the CIS, whichapparently authorizes him to carry and possess firearms, exempts him from securing alicense or permit corresponding thereto. HELD: Yes. At the time of appellant s apprehension, the doctrine then prevailing wasenunciated in the case of People vs. Macarandang wherein it was held that theappointment of a civilian as secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace andorder campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within the category ofa peace officer equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expresslycovered by Section 879 .

People of the Philippines v. Mapa Case No. 213 G.R. No. L-22301 (August 30, 1967) Chapter II, Page 69, Footnote No.89 FACTS: Defendant was accused of illegal possession of firearms. He invokes in hisdefense that he was an appointed Secret Agent of the provincial Governor ofBatangas. He sought to be acquitted as the case of People v. Macarandang usedthe same defense providing evidences of his appointment. ISSUE: W/N a Secret Agent falls among those authorized to possess firearms. HELD: No. The court held that the law cannot be any clearer. The law does notcontain any exception