Avelino v.

Cuenco FACTS: The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto proceeding, asked the court to declare him the rightful Senate President and oust the respondent, Mariano Cuenco. In a session of the Senate, Tanadas request to deliver a speech in order to formulate charges against then Senate President Avelino was approved. With the leadership of the Senate President followed by his supporters, they deliberately tried to delay and prevent Tanada from delivering his speech. The SP with his supporters employed delaying tactics, the tried to adjourn the session then walked out. Only 12 Senators were left in the hall. The members of the senate left continued the session and Senator Cuenco was appointed as the Acting President of the Senate and was recognized the next day by the President of the Philippines. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction of the case. 2. Whether or not Resolutions 67 & 68 was validly approved. HELD: 1. The Court has no jurisdiction of the case because the subject matter is political in nature and in doing so, the court will be against the doctrine of separation of powers. To the first question, the answer is in the negative, in view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil. 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1) and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. We refused to take cognizance of the Vera case even if the rights of the electors of the suspended senators were alleged affected without any immediate remedy. A fortiori we should abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affect only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall not in the Supreme Court. 2. It was held that there is a quorum that 12 being the majority of 23. In fine, all the four justice agree that the Court being confronted with the practical situation that of the twenty three senators who may participate in the Senate deliberations in the days immediately after this decision, twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino, it would be most injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful President of the Senate, that office being essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body being amenable at any time by that majority. And at any session hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from the divergence of opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned,the said twelve senators who approved the resolutions herein involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow of a doubt. Arnault v Nazareno Petition for habeas corpus to relieve petitioner Jean Arnault from confinement in the New Bilibid prison. Denied Facts: In the latter part of October, 1949, the Philippine Government, through the Rural Progress Administration, bought two estates known as Buenavista and Tambobong for the sums of P4,500,000 and P500,000, respectively. P1,000,000 was paid for the first sum and P 500,000 to the second sum both to Ernest H. Burt, a nonresident American, thru his two attorneyin-fact in the Philippines, as represented by Jean L. Arnault, for both estates respectively. However, Ernest H. Burt was not the original owner of the estate. He bought the first from San Juan de Dios hospital and the second from the Philippine trust company. In both instances, Burt was not able to pay the necessary amount of money to complete his payments. As such, his contract with said owners were cancelled.

On September 4, 1947, the Philippine Trust Company sold, conveyed, and delivered the Tambobong Estate to the Rural Progress Administration by an abolute deed of sale in consideration of the sum of P750,000. The Philippine Government then, through the Secretary of Justice as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Rural Progress Administration and as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine National Bank, from which the money was borrowed, accomplished the purchase of the two estates in the latter part of October, 1949, as stated at the outset. On February 27, 1950, the Senate adopted its Resolution No. 8, which created a special committee to investigate the transactions surrounding the estates. The special committee created by the resolution called and examined various witnesses, among the most important of whom was Jean L. Arnault. An intriguing question which the committee sought to resolve was the apparent unnecessariness and irregularity of the Government's paying to Burt the total sum of P1,500,000 for his alleged interest of only P20,000 in the two estates, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before October, 1949. The committee sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the Government. Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000 were delivered to him on the afternoon of October 29, 1949; that on the same date he opened a new account in the name of Ernest H. Burt with the Philippine National Bank in which he deposited the two checks aggregating P1,500,000; and that on the same occasion he drew on said account two checks; one for P500,000, which he transferred to the account of the Associated Agencies, Inc., with the Philippine National Bank, and another for P440,000 payable to cash, which he himself cashed. It was the desire of the committee to determine the ultimate recipient of this sum of P440,000 that gave rise to the present case. As Arnault resisted to name the recipient of the money, the senate then approved a resolution that cited him for contempt. It is this resolution which brought him to jail and is being contested in this petition. Issue: 1. WON the Senate has the power to punish Arnault for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000. 2. WON the Senate lacks authority to commit him for contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session, which ended on May 18, 1950. 3. WON the privilege against self incrimination protects the petitioner from being questioned. HELD: 1. YES. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate, or to expel a Member; and every question which the investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to the subject of the inquiry or investigation. The materiality of the question must be determined by its direct relation to the subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation. The reason is, that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and the form and character of the action itself are determined by the sum total of the information to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such information elicited from a single question. 2. NO Senate is a continuing body and which does not cease to exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress or of the House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the

Senate's power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case. Senate will not be disposed to exert the power beyond its proper bounds, i.e. abuse their power and keep the witness in prison for life. If proper limitations are disregarded, Court isalways open to those whose rights might thus be transgressed. 3. NO Court is satisfied that those answers of the witness to the important question, which is the name of that person to whom witness gave the P440,000, were obviously false. His insistent claim before the bar of the Senate that if he should reveal the name he would incriminate himself, necessarily implied that he knew the name. Moreover, it is unbelievable that he gave P440,000 to a person to him unknown. "Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to a refusal to testify and is punishable as contempt, assuming that a refusal to testify would be so punishable." Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the P440,000 to a representative of Burt in compliance with the latter's verbal instruction, Court found no basis upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person might incriminate him. Casibang vs. Aquino 92 SCRA 642 Facts: Respondent Remigio P. Yu was proclaimed on November 9, 1971 as the elected Mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan in the 1971 local elections, his rival petitioner therein filed a protest against the election of the former with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, on the grounds of (1) anomalies and irregularities in the appreciation, counting and consideration of votes in specified electoral precincts; (2) terrorism; (3) rampant vote buying; (4) open voting or balloting; and (5) excessive campaign expenditures and other violations of the 1971 Election Code. This case was handled by Judge Aquino. On September 21, 1972, the incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines issued Proclamation No. 1081, placing the entire country under Martial Law; and two months thereafter, more or less, or specifically on November 29, 1972, the 1971 Constitutional Convention passed and approved a Constitution to replace the 1935 Constitution; and the same was thereafter overwhelmingly ratified by the sovereign people of the Republic of the Philippines on January 17, 1973. Respondent Yu moved to dismiss the election protest of petitioner on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution by reason of which Section 9 of Article XVII [Transitory Provisions] and Section 2 of Article XI a political question has intervened in the case. Yu pointed out that the Filipino people in the exercise of their free will and sovereign capacity approved a NEW CONSTITUTION, thus a NEW FORM OF GOVERNMENT-PARLIAMENTARY IN FORM was enforced. Under Section 9, Article XVII, of the new Constitution, only those officials and employees of the existing Government of the Republic of the Philippines like the protestee (respondent) herein, are given protection and are authorized to continue in office at the pleasure of the incumbent President of the Philippines, while under Section 2 of Article XI of the new Constitution, the intention of completely revamp the whole local government structure, providing for different qualifications, election and removal, term, salaries, powers, functions, and duties, is very clear. These present questions of policy, the necessity and expediency of which are outside the range of judicial review. On December 18, 1973, the trial court, presided by respondent Judge, sustained the political question theory of respondent Yu and ordered the dismissal of the electoral protest. Issue: Has the trial court lost its power to review official action in the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution? Ruling: No. RESPONDENT COURT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS

HEREBY SET ASIDE AND THE RESPONDENT COURT IS DIRECTED TO IMMEDIATELY PROCEED WITH THE TRIAL AND DETERMINATION OF THE ELECTION PROTEST BEFORE IT ON THE MERITS.

PABLITO V. SANIDAD - petitioner; newspaper columnist of the "OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, a weekly newspaper circulated in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras COMELEC - respondent; through its Solicitor- General Type of petition filed: PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ISSUE: Whether Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 is constitutional or not. FACTS: COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 was promulgated due to the enacted RA No. 6766 (An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region) last October 23, 1989, which paved for a call of a plebescite fo its ratification (original schedule was reset from December 27, 1989 to January 30, 1990. Allegations of Sanidad: 1.Unconsitutional as it it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press 2.Constitutes a prior restraint on his constitutionallyguaranteed freedom of the press bause of its penal provsions in case of violation Responses of COMELEC -Not violative of the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press but only a valid implementation of the power of the Comelec to supervise and regulate media during election or plebiscite periods as enunciated in Article IX-C, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of RA 6646 -Does Not absolutely bar petitioner from expressing his views and/or from campaigning for or against the Organic Act. He may still express his views or campaign for or against the act through the Comelec space and airtime (magazine/periodical in the province) HELD: Petiton is GRANTED- Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 is declared null and void and unconstitutional . TRO made permanent due to the follwing reasons: 1. It has no statutory basis 2. Form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction of petitioner's freedom of expression for no justifiable reason 3. affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be exercised. AYTONA vs. CASTILLO FACTS: On December 29, 1961, Carlos P. Garcia, who was still President that time, made last minute appointments while the Commission on Appointments was not in session. Said last minute appointment included Dominador R. Aytona, who was appointed as ad interim Governor of Central Bank. The latter took oath on the same day.

At noon on December 30, 1961, President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office. He issued Administrative Order No. 2 on December 31, 1961 recalling, withdrawing and canceling all ad interim appointments made by President Garcia after December 13, 1961, which was the date when Macapagal was proclaimed President by the Congress. He then appointed Andres V. Castillo as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank and the latter qualified immediately. On January 2, 1962, both exercised the powers of their office. However, Aytona was prevented from holding office the following day and thus instituted a quo warranto proceeding, challenging Castillos right to exercise the powers of the Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona claims that he was validly appointed and had qualified for the post, therefore making Castillos appointment void. Castillo then contended that Aytonas appointment had already been revoked by Administrative Order No. 2 issued by President Macapagal. ISSUE: Whether President Diosdado Macapagal had power to issue the order of cancellation of the ad interim appointments made by President Carlos P. Garcia even after the appointees had already qualified. RULING: Upon the ground of separation of powers, the court resolved that it must decline and refuse jurisdiction in disregarding the Presidential Administrative Order No. 2, canceling such midnight or last-minute appointments. Case dismissed. People vs. Vera [GR 45685, 16 November 1937] First Division, Laurel (J): 4 concur, 2 concur in result Facts: The People of the Philippine and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC), are respectively the plaintiff and the offended party, and Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants, in the criminal case entitled "The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al." (Criminal case 42649) of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila and GR 41200 of the Suprme Court. Hon. Jose O. Vera, is the Judge ad interim of the seventh branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, who heard the application of Cu Unjieng for probation in the aforesaid criminal case. The information in the said criminal case was filed with the CFI on 15 October 1931, HSBC intervening in the case as private prosecutor. After a protracted trial unparalleled in the annals of Philippine jurisprudence both in the length of time spent by the court as well as in the volume in the testimony and the bulk of the exhibits presented, the CFI, on 8 January 1934, rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing Cu Unjieng to indeterminate penalty ranging from 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional to 8 years of prision mayor, to pay the costs and with reservation of civil action to the offended party, HSBC. Upon appeal, the court, on 26 March 1935, modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty of from 5 years and 6 months of prision correccional to 7 years, 6 months and 27 days of prision mayor, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects. Cu Unjieng filed a motion for reconsideration and four successive motions for new trial which were denied on 17 December 1935, and final judgment was accordingly entered on 18 December 1935. Cu Unjieng thereupon sought to have the case elevated on certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States but the latter denied the petition for certiorari in November, 1936. The Supreme Court, on 24 November 1936, denied the petition subsequently filed by Cu Unjieng for leave to file a second alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial and thereafter remanded the case to the court of

origin for execution of the judgment. Cu Unjieng filed an application for probation on 27 November 1936, before the trial court, under the provisions of Act 4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature. Cu Unjieng states in his petition, inter alia, that he is innocent of the crime of which he was convicted, that he has no criminal record and that he would observe good conduct in the future. The CFI of Manila, Judge Pedro Tuason presiding, referred the application for probation of the Insular Probation Office which recommended denial of the same 18 June 1937. Thereafter, the CFI of Manila, seventh branch, Judge Jose O. Vera presiding, set the petition for hearing on 5 April 1937. On 2 April 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation to Cu Unjieng. The private prosecution also filed an opposition on 5 April 1937, alleging, among other things, that Act 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws for the reason that its applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands and because section 11 of the said Act endows the provincial boards with the power to make said law effective or otherwise in their respective or otherwise in their respective provinces. The private prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition on April 19, 1937, elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality on Act 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution). The City Fiscal concurred in the opposition of the private prosecution except with respect to the questions raised concerning the constitutionality of Act 4221. On 28 June 1937, Judge Jose O. Vera promulgated a resolution, concluding that Cu Unjieng "es inocente por duda racional" of the crime of which he stands convicted by the Supreme court in GR 41200, but denying the latter's petition for probation. On 3 July 1937, counsel for Cu Unjieng filed an exception to the resolution denying probation and a notice of intention to file a motion for reconsideration. An alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial was filed by counsel on 13 July 1937. This was supplemented by an additional motion for reconsideration submitted on 14 July 1937. The aforesaid motions were set for hearing on 31 July 1937, but said hearing was postponed at the petition of counsel for Cu Unjieng because a motion for leave to intervene in the case as amici curiae signed by 33 (34) attorneys had just been filed with the trial court. On 6 August 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed a motion with the trial court for the issuance of an order of execution of the judgment of this court in said case and forthwith to commit Cu Unjieng to jail in obedience to said judgment. On 10 August 1937, Judge Vera issued an order requiring all parties including the movants for intervention as amici curiae to appear before the court on 14 August 1937. On the last-mentioned date, the Fiscal of the City of Manila moved for the hearing of his motion for execution of judgment in preference to the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae but, upon objection of counsel for Cu Unjieng, he moved for the postponement of the hearing of both motions. The judge thereupon set the hearing of the motion for execution on 21 August 1937, but proceeded to consider the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae as in order. Evidence as to the circumstances under which said motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae was signed and submitted to court was to have been heard on 19 August 1937. But at this juncture, HSBC and the People came to the Supreme Court on extraordinary legal process to put an end to what they alleged was an interminable proceeding in the CFI of Manila which fostered "the campaign of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for delay in the execution of the sentence imposed by this Honorable Court on

him, exposing the courts to criticism and ridicule because of the apparent inability of the judicial machinery to make effective a final judgment of this court imposed on the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng." The scheduled hearing before the trial court was accordingly suspended upon the issuance of a temporary restraining order by the Supreme Court on 21 August 1937. Issue: Whether the People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General and Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in present case. Held: YES. The People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act 4221 really violates the constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws EMMANUEL PELAEZ, petitioner vs. THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent Original Action in the SC. Prohibition w/Preliminary Injunction [Dec. 24, 1965] Facts: Sept. 4 Oct. 29, 1964: Phil Pres purporting to act pursuant to Sec. 68 ofRevised Administrative Code (RAC), issued Exec Orders (EO) Nos. 93-121, 124,126-129, creating 33 municipalities (see footnote #1 in p.573 for complete list). Sec. 68 of RAC: 1.Gov Gen/Pres of Phil may by EO define boundary or boundaries of prov, subprov, municipality, municipal district or other pol subd & increase,divide, separate & merge territories, name new subd created & changeseat of govt w/in subd as pub welfare may require. 2.Provided that Phil Legislature/Congress of RPs authorization shall first beobtained when boundary of prov/subprov is to be defined or prov is to bedivided into 1/more subprov. 2 Except when authorized under LOI 43, in cases when stalled vehicles obstruct public streets. 3.Change of territory under jurisdiction of an administrative/judicial officer,recommendation & advice of head of dept having exec control over suchofficer shall be obtained. 4.Equitable distribution of funds & oblig of divisions affected shall be made as recommended by Auditor Gen & approved by Gov Gen/Pres. Nov. 10, 1964: Emmanuel Pelaez, as VP of the Phil & a taxpayer, institutedaction to restrain Auditor Gen & his reps & agents from passing in audit anyexpenditure of public funds in implementation of EOs and/or any disbursementby said municipalities. He claims that law invoked by Pres has been impliedlyrepealed by RA No. 2370 & constitutes undue delegation of legislative pow. Pertinent provisions of RA No. 2370 1.Sec. 3, Par. 1: All barrios at time of passage of this Act shall come under provisions hereof. 2.Sec. 3, Par. 2: New barrio may be created or name of existing one may bechanged by provl board of province upon petition of maj of voters in thoseareas & upon recommendation of council of municipality/municipalities inw/c proposed barrio is stipulated. Recommendation must be in a form ofresolution approved by at least 2/3 of councils

mems. To create a newbarrio, pop must be at least 500 persons. 3.Sec. 3, Par. 3: Barrios shall not be created/their boundaries altered northeir names changed except under provisions of this Act/by Act of Congress. Respondent: action is premature & not all proper parties (officials of newlycreated pol subd) have been impleaded. Mayors of municipalities from which the barrios w/c formed the new municipalities were taken intervened. Attys. Enrique Fernando & Emma Quisumbing-Fernando appeared as amici curiae. Issues & Ratio: 1.WON the Presidents act constituted an undue delegation of legislative pow. YES. Since Jan. 1, 1960, when RA 2370 took effect, barrios can only be created ortheir boundaries be altered or their names changed by Act of Congress or ofprovincial board (Par. 2 & 3 respectively). a.Petitioner claims if Pres is enjoined fr creating a barrio, all the more that heshould be prohibited fr creating a municipality w/c is composed of severalbarrios. b.Respondent: New municipality can be created w/o creating new barrios. You simply place old barrios under new municipality. (Tsktsk, logical!) But using logic & experience, we can deduce that the statutory denial of preslauthority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power tocreate new municipalities. Respondent cites Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binangonan inclaiming that Pres act is not an undue delegation of pow. But this is notapplicable because it did not involve the creation of a new municipality but amere transfer of territory (fr Cardona to Binangona). Both territories alreadyexisted prior to & during time of transfer. Remember that power tof ix common boundaries as in the cited case areadministrative in nature whereas authority tocrea te municipal corp. islegislative in nature. Strictly a legislative function (State ex rel. Higgins vs.Aicklen), solely & exclusively the exercise of legislative power (Udall vs. Severn). It has been held that municipal corp are purely the creatures of statutes (Territory ex rel. Kelly vs. Stewart). Congress can delegate such pow but it should provide the policy to beexecuted, carried out or implemented & fix the standard, w/ sufficientlydeterminate or determinable standards. Leaving the delegate (to whom pow isdelegated) only to fill in details in execution, enforcement or admin of law.Without the policy, delegate would be left to make/formulate the policy w/c isthe essence of every law & w/o the standard, we cannot determinew/reasonable certainty whether delegate acted w/in or beyond scope of hisauthority. Delegate might make or even unmake the law by adopting measuresinconsistent w/end sought to be attained by Act of Congress. This would nullifyprinciple of sep of pow & sys of checks & balances, & undermine foundation ofour Republican sys. Sec. 68 of RAC doesnt meet aforementioned standards indelegating pow since it does not provide w/ a policy & standard. Last clause of #1 Sec. 68, RAC using the term public welfare pertains only tochanging the seat of govt & not to all items in that sentence. This is inaccordance w/ orig provision, Sec. 1, Act No. 1748. Although SC ruled inCalalang vs. Wiliams and People vs. Rosenthal that pub welfare & pub interestare valid standards for valid delegation of authority to execute the law,

thesedoctrines are only applicable to specific facts & issues involved in said cases.They dont constitute precedents & are not binding. Besides, both casesinvolved grants to administrative officers of pows related to exercise ofadministrative functions, calling for determination of ques of fact whereas Sec.68 deals w/legislative functions. Ques of WON pub interest demands ex of suchpow is not one of fact, its purely a legislative ques (Carolina-Virginia CoastalHighway vs. Coastal Turnpike Authority), political ques (Udall vs. Severn) orques of public policy & statecraft (In Re Village of North Milwaukee). Examples of laws annulled by judiciary due to undue delegation of legislative pow: 1.law granting judicial dept pow to determine annexing of territories (Udall vs. Severn) 2.law vesting in a Commission rt to determine plan & frame of govt of proposed villages & functions to be exercised (In re Municipal Charters) 3.law allowing courts to incorporate towns/villages & determine metes &bounds upon petition of maj of taxable inhabitants setting forth areadesired to be included in the village (Territory ex rel Kelly vs. Stewart) 4.law w/c allowed courts & inhabitants of a town to incorporate a town (In re Villages of North Milwaukee) 5.creating Municipal Board of Control w/c determines if its w/in pub interestto construct/operate a toll road & allowing such board to create & namemunicipal corporations (CarolinaVirginia Coastal Hwy vs. Coastal TurnpikeAuthority) Schechter Poultry Corp vs US: involved constitutionality of a law w/c authorizedUS Pres to approve codes of fair competition submitted by trade/industrialcopr/assoc w/co inequitable restrictions on admission to membership as long ascodes are not designed to promote monopolies or eliminate/oppress smallenterprises & will not operate to discriminate against them. Court ruled thataside from providing w/gen aims of rehab, correction & expansion, the law doesnot provide any standards. Instead of prescribing rules of conduct, lawauthorizes making of codes to prescribe the rules. Pres discretion in approvingcodes is unregulated/unfettered. Thus, it is an unconstitutional delegation oflegislative pow. If Schechter case found term unfair competition broad & vesting pow on Pres would be a virtually unfettered discretion leading to unduedelegation of legislative pow, same should be applied to the term pub welfarew/c has a broader connotation. If we uphold validity of Sec. 68, then that wouldbe tantamount to allowing Pres to do anything w/c in his opinion may be forpub interest/welfare. It would be a virtual abdication of pows of Congress infavor of Exec & would bring about total collapse of democratic sys. Note that EOs were issued after legislative bills creating involved municipalities had failed to pass Congress. Sec. 10 (1), Art. VII of Consti only allows Pres to have gen supervision over locgovts. He can only check whether these governments & their officials areperforming duties as provided by law & he cant interfere as long as theyreacting w/in scope of their authority. He cant enact an ordinance w/ councilfailed/refused to pass even if such violated an imposed duty for its the role ofprovincial officials to do so. He cant vote, set aside or annul an ordinancepassed w/in councils jurisdiction even if such is unwise. He cant suspend anelective official or take disciplinary action except on appeal fr provincial boardsdecision. If Pres is allowed to create municipalities, then, he could compel locofficials to submit to his dictation, defying the constil provision w/c only grantshim gen supervision over loc officials. Also, Pres cant abolish or create a newexec dept or bureau. Allowing him to create a

municipal corp would give himgreater control over on loc govts than on exec depts., bureaus, or offices, whenhe should only exercise gen supervision over former. Thus, we can concludethat the 1935 Consti also repealed Sec. 68 of RAC since it is incompatible &inconsistent w/ the fundamental law. 2.Whether there are other proper parties to be impleaded. - NONE Records dont show & parties dont claim that officers of new municipalities havebeen appointed/elected & assumed office. Sol Gen is the officer authorized by law torepresent Phil Govt, its offices & agents in any proceeding requiring a lawyer(Sec.1661, RAC). Loc officials are mere agents or reps of natl govt. Presence of SolGen is sufficient. 3.WON present petition is premature. - NO Even if EOs in dispute have not yet been acted upon, Pres has previously issuedsimilar EOs which actually organized & operated new municipal corp & thus,expenditures incidental to such have been sanctioned, approved or passed by GenAuditing Officials. No reason that Auditor Gen wont be acting in the same manneron new EOs. Held: EOs are null & void ab initio. Respondent restraint from implementing Such De la Llana vs. Alba, 112 SCRA 294 (1982) The issue for resolution is whether or not respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in issuing a Writ of Execution to enforce the Decision in Civil Case No. 31725 of his Court for a sum of money entitled Aboitiz & Co Inc. v Violets Alday and Ernesto Yu, notwithstanding the fact that petitioners, as defendants aid the losing party below, had timely filed a Notice of Appeal and posted a cash appeal bond, but did not submit any Record on Appeal. There is no question that the Decision of the lower Court adverse to petitioners was rendered on August 13, 1981. Copy thereof was received by them on September 1, 1981. Within time, petitioners filed on September 4, 1981 a Notice of Appeal and a cash appeal bond, but without a Record on Appeal. On March 25, 1982, respondent Judge issued the questioned Order granting execution since petitioners had not perfected an appeal within the reglementary period for failure on their part to file a Record on Appeal within the prescribed period, Petitioners justify the non-filing of the Record on Appeal by invoking section 39 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (Batas Pambansa Blg. 129) providing that "no record on appeal shall, be required to take an appeal." They claim that the Act was approved on August 14, 1981 and Section 48 thereof specifically provides that it was to take effect immediately. Petitioners overlook, however, Section 44 of BP Blg. 129 specifically providing that its provisions were to be immediately carried out in accordance with an Executive Order to be issued by the President and that the old Courts would continue to function until the completion of the reorganization as declared by the President. Moreover, it will be recalled that on September 3, 1981, a Petition questioning the constitutionality of that law was instituted before this Court (De la Llana vs. Alba, G.R. No. L-57883). The constitutionality of that law was upheld in our Decision of March 12, 1982 (112 SCRA 294). Consequently, prior to that date, and before the issuance of Executive Order No. 864, dated January 17, 1983, declaring the completion of the reorganization of the Judiciary, BP Big. 129 could not be said to have been in force and effect. It was prematurely for petitioners to have invoked that law to justify their stand in not filing a Record on Appeal, and respondent Judge cannot be faulted with grave abuse of discretion for having authorized the issuance of the Writ of Execution since, for lack of compliance with the procedure for taking an appeal under the former Rules of Court, the lower Court Decision would have become final.

Nonetheless, in Executive Order No. 864, dated January 17, 1983, the President of the Philippines had declared that the former Courts were deemed automatically abolished as of 12:00 o'clock midnight of January 17, 1983. The reorganization having been declared to have been completed, BP Blg. 129 is now in full force and effect. A Record on Appeal is no longer necessary for taking an appeal. The same proviso appears in Section 18 of the Interim Rules aid Guidelines issued by this Court on January 11, 1983. Being procedural in nature, those provisions may be applied retroactively for the benefit of petitioners, as appellant. Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to action's pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent (People vs. Sumilang, 77 Phil. 764 [1946]). ACCORDINGLY, the Order of respondent Judge (now an Associate Justice of the Intermediate Appellate Court) granting the issuance of the Writ of Execution is hereby set aside and the branch of the Regional Trial Court to whom the case below has been assigned is hereby directed to give due course to petitioners' appeal even without a Record on Appeal. The temporary Restraining Order heretofore issued by this Tribunal enjoining the enforcement of the Writ of Execution issued by the lower Court is hereby made permanent. No costs. SO ORDERED. The issue in this case is whether or not B.P. 129, An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, is unconstitutional, considering that in the time-honored principle protected and safeguarded by the constitution the judiciary is supposed to be independent from legislative will. Does the reorganization violate the security of tenure of justices and judges as provided for underthe Constitution? HELD: Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. What is really involved in this case is not the removal or separation of the judges and justices from their services. What is important is the validity of the abolition of their offices. It is a well-known rule that valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents. Of course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold office. As well-settled as the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith. Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a nonexistent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. US vs. ANG TANG HO (February 17, 1922) Ponente: Johns, J. Facts: 1919: Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2686 O penalized the monopoly and hoarding of, as well as speculation in, palay, rice and corn under extraordinary circumstances o regulated the distribution and sale thereof o authorized the Governor-General to issue necessary rules and regulations pursuant therefor

see p. 3-4 with regard to pertinent sections being assailed August 1, 1919: Gov-Gen issued proclamation fixing price at which rice should be sold (EO #53) August 8: complaint was filed against defendant Ang Tang Ho, charging him with the sale of rice at an excessive price he was subsequently tried, found guilty, and sentenced to 5 months imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500 Present case is an appeal, with petitioner alleging that the lower court erred in: o Finding EO #53 to of any force and effect o Finding him guilty of the offense charged o Imposing the sentence Issue: WON Act No. 2868 delegates legislative power to the Governor-General (such delegation being violative of the Constitution) YES, therefore, it isunconstitutional and void; lower courts decision was reversed and petitioner wasdischarged Ratio: In the analysis and construction of Act No. 2868, insofar as it authorizes theGov-Gen to fix the price at which rice should be sold, it can be gathered thatlegislative power to enact law, which is constitutionally granted to theLegislature, is lodged in the Executive. o The promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures was left to the discretion of the Gov-Gen o The Legislature did not specify or define what conditions or for whatreasons the Gov-Gen shall issue the proclamation the Act states that itcan be issued for any cause o The Legislature did not specify or define what is an extraordinary rise inthe price of rice (wow, nag-rhyme), the causes of which shall supposedlybe prevented by such proclamation o The Act did not specify or define what is a temporary rule or an emergencymeasure, or how long such temporary rules or measures shall remain inforce and effect, or when they shall take effect o In the absence of the proclamation, it was not a crime to sell rice at any price. It follows that if the defendant committed a crime, it was because the Gov-Gen issued the proclamation. No act of the Legislature made it a crime to sell rice at any price, and without the proclamation, thesale of it at any price was not a crime. It is the violation of theproclamation, not of Act 2868, which constitutes the crime. The power conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated tothe Gov-Gen or anyone else. The Legislature cannot delegate the legislativepower to enact any law; it can only pass a law that does nothing more than toauthorize the Gov-Gen to make rules and regulations to carry the law into effect. Ponente states several US cases ie. State v. Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Ry. Co: The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves discretion as to what it shall be, and theconferring an authority or discretion to be exercised under and in pursuance ofthe law. Held: Act No. 2868, insofar as it undertakes to authorize the Gov-Gen in his

discretion to issue a proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the proclamation a crime, is unconstitutional and void Ynot vs IAC - A case Digest RESTITUTO YNOT -petitioner; an owner of carabaos Station Commander, Integrated National Police, Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo & the Regional Director, Bureau of Animal Industry, Region IV- respondents Type of petition filed: PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ISSUE: Whether Executive Order No. 626-A is constitutional or not. FACTS: Petitioner was charged of violation of EO 626 when he transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. 1 The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. Petitioner raised the issue of EOs constituitonality and filed case in the lower court. However, the court sustained the the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raised by the petitioner. Therefore, petitioner appealed the decsion to IAC with the following contentions: 1. EO is unconstitutional as confiscation is outright 2. Penalty is invalid as it is imposed without the owner's right to be heard before a competent and impartial court. 3. Measure should have not been presumed 4. Raises a challenge to the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former President. HELD: Petiton is GRANTED with the following justifications: 1. Right of the petitioner to question for constitutionality is valid as theres no exigency showing to justify the exercise of this extraordinary power of the President 2. Properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destrcution 3. Case involved roving commission and invalid delegation of powers and invalid exercise of police power 4. Due process is violated because the owner is denied the right to be heard in his defense and was immedeiately condemned and punish Gerochi v. DOEGR No. 15979617 July 2007 Nachura, J. RA 9136, otherwise known as t h e E l e c t r i c P o w e r I n d u s t r y Reform Act of 2001 ( E P I R A ) , w h i c h s o u g h t t o i m p o s e a univ ersal charge on all end-users o f e l e c t r i c i t y f o r t h e purpose of funding NAPOCORs projects, was enacted and took effect in

2001.P e t i t i o n e r s c o n t e s t t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y o f t h e E P I R A , stating that the imposition of the universal charge on all end-users i s o p p r e s s i v e a n d c o n f i s c a t o r y and amounts to taxation without representation for not giving the c o n s u m e r s a c h a n c e t o b e h e a r d and be represented. ISSUE: W / N t h e u n i v e r s a l c h a r g e i s a tax. HELD: NO. The assailed universal c h a r g e i s n o t a t a x , b u t a n e x a c t i o n i n t h e e x e r c i s e o f t h e States police power. That publicw e l f a r e i s p r o m o t e d m a y b e g l e a n e d f r o m S e c . 2 o f t h e EPIRA, which enumerates the policies of the State regarding e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n . M o r e o v e r , t h e Special Trust Fund feature of the u n i v e r s a l c h a r g e r e a s o n a b l y serves and assures the attainment a n d p e r p e t u i t y o f t h e p u r p o s e s for which the universal charge is i m p o s e d ( e . g . t o e n s u r e t h e viability of the countrys electric power industry), further boosting t h e position that the same is an exaction primarily in p u r s u i t o f the States police objectives .I f g e n e r a t i o n o f r e v e n u e i s t h e primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the imposition i s a t a x ; b u t i f r e g u l a t i o n i s the p r i m a r y p u r p o s e , t h e f a c t t h a t r e v e n u e i s i n c i d e n t a l l y r a i s e d does not make the i m p o s i t i o n a tax. The taxing power may be used as an implement of police power. The theory behind the exercise of t h e p o w e r t o t a x e m a n a t e s fromn e c e s s i t y ; w i t h o u t t a x e s , g o v e r nment cannot fulfill itsm a n d a t e o f p r o m o t i n g t h e general welfare and well-being of the people Defensor-Santiago vs. Guingona Facts: During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress, Senator Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the Senate by a vote of 20 to 2. Senator Tatad manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the majority, while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the minority. Senator Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCDUMDP Party numbering 7 and, thus, also a minority had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. Thereafter, the majority leader informed the body that he was in receipt of a letter signed by the 7 Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate. Senators Santiago and Tatad filed a petition for quo warranto, alleging that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad. Issues: (1) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition (2) Whether or not there is an actual violation of the Constitution Held: Regarding the first issue, jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined by the allegations of the complaint orpetition, regardless of whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief asserted. In light of the allegations of the petitioners, it is clear thatthe Court has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the

Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. However, the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the Upper House. The term majority, when referring to a certain number out of a total or aggregate, it simply means the number greater than half or more than half of any total. In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the minority, who could thereby elect the minority leader. No law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader. While the Constitution is explicit in the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says under Art. VI, Sec. 16(1) is that each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary. The method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the said constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by the Court.