CRIMINAL LAW, FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT, PRESCRIPTION People vs. Mizpah Reyes, GR No.

74266-27 The practical factor of securing for civil suits the best evidence that can be obtained is also a major consideration in criminal trials. However, the law on prescription of crimes rests on a more fundamental principle. Being more than a statute of repose, it is an act of grace whereby the state, after the lapse of a certain period of time, surrenders its sovereign power to prosecute the criminal act. While the law on prescription of civil suits is interposed by the legislature as an impartial arbiter between two contending parties, the law on prescription of crimes is an act of amnesty and liberality on the part of the state in favor of the offender [People v. Moran, supra, at p. 405]. Hence, in the interpretation of the law on prescription of crimes, that which is most favorable to the accused is to be adopted [People v. Moran, supra; People v. Parel, 44 Phil. 437 (1923); People v. Yu Hai, 99 Phil. 725 (1956)]. The application of the rule on constructive notice in the construction of Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Code would most certainly be favorable to the accused since the prescriptive period of the crime shall have to be reckoned with earlier, i.e., from the time the notarized deed of sale was recorded in the Registry of Deeds. In the instant case, the notarized deed of sale was registered on May 26, 1961. The criminal informations for falsification of a public document having been filed only on October 18, 1984; or more than ten (10) years from May 26, 1961, the crime for which the accused was charged has prescribed. The Court of Appeals, therefore, committed no reversible error in affirming the trial court's order quashing the two informations on the ground of prescription. prLL [G.R. No. 158015. August 11, 2004.] LAURA and ERIBERTO BAUTISTA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FERNANDO MORELOS, respondents. In Jimenez v. Commission on Ecumenical Mission and Relations of the United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, 18 we held that the authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its general characteristics, similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine signature. Dissimilarities as regards spontaneity, rhythm, pressure of the pen, loops in the strokes, signs of stops, shades, that may be found between the questioned signature and the genuine one are not decisive on the question of the former's authenticity. The result of examinations of questioned handwriting, even with the benefit of aid of experts and scientific instruments, is, at best, inconclusive. There are other factors that must be taken into consideration, such as the position of the writer, the condition of the surface on which the paper where the questioned signature is written, his state of mind, feelings and nerves, and the kind of pen and paper used. These play an important role on the general appearance of the signature. Unless, therefore, there is, in a given case, absolute absence, or manifest dearth, of direct or circumstantial competent evidence on the character of a questioned handwriting, much weight should not be given to characteristic similarities, or dissimilarities, between a questioned handwriting and an authentic one. Jurisprudence Criminal Law; Falsification

". . . Every circumstance against guilt and in favor of innocence must be considered. Suspicion no matter how strong should not sway judgment, for wellestablished is the rule that the prosecution must rely on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of the defense; that appellants need not prove their innocence because that is presumed; that the presumption of innocence is a conclusion of law in favor of the accused, whereby his innocence is not only established but continues until sufficient evidence is introduced to overcome the proof which the law has created that is, his innocence; that conscience must be satisfied that defendant has been proven guilty of the offense charged. Only by proof beyond reasonable doubt which requires moral certainty, 'a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to act upon it' may the presumption of innocence be overcome.' (People v. Inguito, 117 SCRA 641, 649)." (at p. 75). G.R. No. 101919. July 3, 1992, RODOLFO ALCANTARA, petitioner-appellant, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee. Again, the respondent failed to honor the constitutional guarantees securing unto the accused the right to be convicted on the strength of the prosecution's evidence and not the weakness of the evidence of the defense. Sad to note, too, that the respondent court also failed to consider that the prosecution was not able to prove the elements of the charge of Falsification of Public Document as defined and penalized under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. In the case of People v. Guinto, this Court held, that: cdrep "The principle has been dinned into the ears of the bench and the bar that in this jurisdiction, accusation is not synonymous with guilt. The accused is protected by the constitutional presumption of innocence which the prosecution must overcome with contrary proof beyond reasonable doubt. This Court has repeatedly declared that even if the defense is weak, the case against the accused must fail if the prosecution is even weaker, for the conviction of the accused must rest not on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of the prosecution. Indeed, if the prosecution has not sufficiently established the guilt of the accused, he has a right to be acquitted and released even if he presents naught a shred of evidence. . . . The accused-appellants have been condemned . . . based on uncertain evidence clearly insufficient to sustain their conviction. It is their guilt and not their innocence that has been presumed. It is their innocence and not their guilt that should have been pronounced. In these circumstances, only one thing that has to be done if the Constitution is to be observed and justice is to be served." (184 SCRA 287) RECEBIDO vs. PEOPLE; G.R. No. 141931. December 4, 2000 On the second issue: We hold that the Court of Appeals did not commit any grave abuse of discretion when it affirmed petitioner's conviction by the trial court. The petitioner admits that the deed of sale that was in his possession is a forged document as found by the trial and appellate court. Petitioner, nonetheless, argues that notwithstanding this admission, the fact remains that there is no proof that the petitioner authored such falsification or that the forgery was done under his direction. This argument is without merit. Under the circumstance, there was no need of any direct proof that the petitioner was the author of the forgery. As keenly observed by the Solicitor General, "the

questioned document was submitted by petitioner himself when the same was requested by the NBI for examination. Clearly in possession of the falsified deed of sale was petitioner and not Caridad Dorol who merely verified the questioned sale with the Provincial Assessor's Office of Sorsogon." In other words, the petitioner was in possession of the forged deed of sale which purports to sell the subject land from the private complainant to him. Given this factual backdrop, the petitioner is presumed to be

the author of the forged deed of sale, despite the absence of any direct evidence of his authorship of the forgery. Since the petitioner is the only person who stood to benefit by the falsification of the document found in his possession, it is presumed that he is the material author of the falsification. As it stands, therefore, we are unable to discern any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals. PEOPLE vs. SENDAYDIEGO, G.R. Nos. L-33252-54. January 20, 1978 The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified document and he made use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification. This is especially true if the use of uttering of the forged documents was so closely connected in time with the forgery that the user of possessor may be proven to have the capacity of committing the forgery, or to have close connection with the gorgers, and therefore, had complicity in the forgery. G.R. No. 102737. August 21, 1996, VELOSO vs. COURT OF APPEALS REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FORGERY CANNOT BE PRESUMED. Mere variance of the signatures cannot be considered as conclusive proof that the same were forged. Forgery cannot be presumed. Forgery should be proved by clear and convincing evidence and whoever allege it has the burden of proving the same. G.R. No. 122973. July 18, 2000, LADIGNON vs. C.A. It is also worth stressing that private respondent claim that her signature on the subject Deed of Absolute Sale is forged. As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. 10 Was the evidence presented by private respondent against the Deed of Absolute Sale clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant to overcome both the presumption of regularity attached to public documents and to meet the stringent requirements to prove forgery? Far from being clear and convincing, all private respondent had to offer by way of evidence was her mere denial that she had signed the same. Such mere denial will not suffice to overcome the positive value of the subject Deed, a notarized document. Indeed, even in cases where the alleged forged signature was compared to samples of genuine signatures to show its variance therefrom, this Court still found such evidence insufficient, to wit

"Petitioner contends that his signature on the power of attorney was falsified. He also alleges that the same was not duly notarized for as testified by Atty. Tubig himself, he did not sign thereon nor was it ever recorded in his notarial register. To bolster his argument, petitioner had presented checks, marriage certificate and his residence certificate to prove his alleged genuine signature which when compared to the signature in the power of attorney, showed some difference. We found, however, that the basis presented by the petitioner was inadequate to sustain his allegation of forgery. Mere variance of the signatures cannot be considered as

conclusive proof that the same were forged. Forgery cannot be presumed (TenioObsequio vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. 107967, March 1, 1994). Petitioner, however, failed to prove his allegation and simply relied on the apparent difference of the signatures. His denial had not established that the signature on the power of attorney was not his. xxx xxx xxx Documents acknowledged before a notary public have the evidentiary weight with respect to their due execution. The questioned power of attorney and deed of sale, were notarized and therefore, presumed to be valid and duly executed. Atty. Tubig denied having notarized the said documents and alleged that his signature has also been falsified. He presented samples of his signature to prove his contention. Forgery should be proved by clear and convincing evidence and whoever alleges it has the burden of proving the same. Just like the petitioner, witness Atty. Tubig merely pointed out that his signature was different from that in the power of attorney and deed of sale. There had never been an accurate examination of the signature, even that of the petitioner. To determine forgery, it was held in Cesar vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. Nos. 54719-50, 17 January 1985, quoting Osborn, The Problem of Proof) that: "The process of identification, therefore, must include the determination of the extent, kind, and significance of this resemblance as well as of the variation. It then becomes necessary to determine whether the variation is due to the operation of a different personality, or is only the expected and inevitable variation found in the genuine writing of the same writer. It is also necessary to decide whether the resemblance is the result of a more or less skillful imitation, or is the habitual and characteristic resemblance which naturally appears in a genuine writing. When these two questions are correctly answered the whole problem of identification is solved." 11 G.R. No. 140472. ECUMENICAL MISSION June 10, 2002 JIMENEZ vs. COMMISSION ON

This was exactly what the appellate court did. After comparing the allegedly forged signature of Francisca on the 1936 Deed of Sale with her authentic or genuine specimen, the CA made its independent conclusion that there was nothing irregular in the signature on the questioned document. This right nay, duty of the RTC judge was exercised by the justices of the appellate court when they overturned the former's findings. In the words of the CA:

"The findings of the handwriting experts from the NBI and PC are of doubtful correctness because the documents from which the sample signatures were taken were either mere photocopies, or dated years away from the questioned deed of sale of 1936. In its 'Questioned Document Report No. 241780' (Exh. 'E'), the NBI concluded that the questioned signatures and sample ones of Francisca 'were NOT WRITTEN by one and the same person', but made no conclusion as to the signature of Nicanor due to the need for additional sample signatures as 'the sample signatures submitted are in different style, which cannot be used as basis for a scientific analysis.' The questioned signatures on the deed of sale were compared by NBI with the sample/standard signatures on three documents, to wit: 1) Exhibit 'F' (Kasulatan ng Bileng Mabibileng Muli dated April 15, 1932), 2) Exhibit 'G' (Kasulatan ng Bileng Mabibileng Muli dated April 23, 1933), and 3) Exhibit 'H' (Marriage Contract dated January 12, 1930). On the other hand, the PC Crime Laboratory in its 'Questioned Document Report No. 196-84' (Exh. 'S') found that the sample and questioned signatures of both spouses were written by two different persons.

In its examination it used the standard signatures of Francisca on three documents, namely: Exhibits 'F', 'G', and 'R-2' (Contract of Surety dated March 16, 1933), while the sample signatures of Nicanor came from eight (8) documents, to wit: Exhibits `F', 'G', 'R-2', 'T' (consisting of two pages from a book entitled 'Yearbook of Agriculture, 1936'), 'U' (consisting of two pages from a book entitled 'An Enumeration of Philippine Fungi', printed in 1937), 'V' (Secondary Report Card for the school year 1946-1947), 'W' (An Order Blank of E.R. Moore Company dated February 11, 1949). In sum there were actually nine (9) documents (Exhs. 'F', 'G', 'H', 'R-2', 'T', 'U', 'V', 'W', and 'X') from which the standard signatures of both spouses came from. Three of these (Exhs. 'R-2', 'T' and 'U') however were but machine copies, and neither the originals nor the certified true copies were offered as evidence. As such no probative value should be accorded to them and they should be disregarded in the appreciation of signatures. While the remaining six (6) documents cannot be a good basis for accurate examination and comparison of signatures because these standard signatures were not close in point of time to the questioned signatures. Some of these documents were executed in 1930, 1932 and 1933 and the others in 1946 and 1949, apparently several years apart from the 1936 subject deed of sale. The passage of time and a person's increase in age may have decisive influences in one's (his) writing characteristics. Thus, authorities are of the opinion that in order to bring about an accurate comparison and analysis, the standards of comparison must be as close as possible in point of time to the suspected signature. (Causapin vs CA 233 SCRA 615) "The findings of the handwriting experts are not conclusive upon the court. On the contrary, courts can totally disregard them and make their own separate independent finding for themselves on the matter. As this Court has once observed, the authenticity of signatures is not a highly technical issue in the same sense that questions concerning, e.g., quantum physics or topology or molecular biology, would constitute matters of a highly technical nature. The opinion of a handwriting expert is certainly much less compelling upon a judge than an opinion rendered by a specialist of a highly technical issue. The signatures on a questioned document can be sighted by a judge who can and should exercise independent judgment on the issue of authenticity of such

signatures (Gamido vs. CA 251 SCRA 101). And this exactly what we have done here. We have examined and analyzed the subject signatures, and have found no substantial indicia or reason to suspect their authenticity. Contrary to the findings of the NBI and PC, upon comparison of the questioned signature of Francisca with her sample signatures on Exh. "F', 'G' and 'H' we find resemblances but no stark and distinguishing difference. The slight dissimilarities do not indicate forgery for these are natural, expected and inevitable variations in genuine signatures made by one and the same person. Even the sample signatures of Nicanor submitted by the appellees show clear variations in structure, flourish, and style. Those found in Exhibits 'F', 'G', 'H', 'V' and 'W' are markedly different from that in Exhibit 'X'. It must be pointed out that the crux of the matter here is forgery and any positive assertion of it can not just be accepted blandly. Forgery cannot be presumed, it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Those who make the allegation of forgery have the burden of proving it since a mere allegation is not evidence (Tenio-Obsequio vs. CA 230 SCRA 550). The evidence of the appellees' failed to prove the forgery they claim." 18

G.R. No. 149454. May 28, 2004 BPI vs. CASA Clear, Positive and Convincing Examination and Evidence The examination by the PNP, though inconclusive, was nevertheless clear, positive and convincing. Forgery "cannot be presumed." 47 It must be established by clear, positive and convincing evidence. 48 Under the best evidence rule as applied to documentary evidence like the checks in question, no secondary or substitutionary evidence may inceptively be introduced, as the original writing itself must be produced in court. 49 But when, without bad faith on the part of the offeror, the original checks have already been destroyed or cannot be produced in court, secondary evidence may be produced. 50 Without bad faith on its part, CASA proved the loss or destruction of the original checks through the Affidavit of the one person who knew of that fact 51 Yabut. He clearly admitted to discarding the paid checks to cover up his misdeed. 52 In such a situation, secondary evidence like microfilm copies may be introduced in court. The drawer's signatures on the microfilm copies were compared with the standard signature. PNP Document Examiner II Josefina de la Cruz testified on cross-examination that two different persons had written them. 53 Although no conclusive report could be issued in the absence of the original checks, 54 she affirmed that her findings were 90 percent conclusive. 55 According to her, even if the microfilm copies were the only basis of comparison, the differences were evident. 56 Besides, the RTC explained that although the Report was inconclusive, no conclusive report could have been given by the PNP, anyway, in the absence of the original checks. 57 This explanation is valid; otherwise, no such report can ever be relied upon in court.

Even with respect to documentary evidence, the best evidence rule applies only when the contents of a document such as the drawer's signature on a check is the subject of inquiry. 58 As to whether the document has been actually executed, this rule does not apply; and testimonial as well as any other secondary evidence is admissible. 59 Carina Lebron herself, the drawer's authorized signatory, testified many times that she had never signed those checks. Her testimonial evidence is admissible; the checks have not been actually executed. The genuineness of her handwriting is proved, not only through the court's comparison of the questioned handwritings and admittedly genuine specimens thereof, 60 but above all by her. The failure of CASA to produce the original checks neither gives rise to the presumption of suppression of evidence 61 nor creates an unfavorable inference against it. 62 Such failure merely authorizes the introduction of secondary evidence 63 in the form of microfilm copies. Of no consequence is the fact that CASA did not present the signature card containing the signatures with which those on the checks were compared. 64 Specimens of standard signatures are not limited to such a card. Considering that it was not produced in evidence, other documents that bear the drawer's authentic signature may be resorted to. 65 Besides, that card was in the possession of BPI the adverse party. We have held that without the original document containing the allegedly forged signature, one cannot make a definitive comparison that would establish forgery; 66 and that a comparison based on a mere reproduction of the document under controversy cannot produce reliable results. 67 We have also said, however, that a judge cannot merely rely on a handwriting expert's testimony, 68 but should also exercise independent judgment in evaluating the authenticity of a signature under scrutiny. 69 In the present case, both the RTC and the CA conducted independent examinations of the evidence presented and arrived at reasonable and similar conclusions. Not only did they admit secondary evidence; they also appositely considered testimonial and other documentary evidence in the form of the Affidavit. The best evidence rule admits of exceptions and, as we have discussed earlier, the first of these has been met. 70 The result of examining a questioned handwriting, even with the aid of experts and scientific instruments, may be inconclusive; 71 but it is a non sequitur to say that such result is not clear, positive and convincing. The preponderance of evidence required in this case has been satisfied. 72 G.R. No. 151060. August 31, 2005 - JN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. PHILIPPINE EXPORT AND FOREIGN LOAN GUARANTEE CORPORATION. Anent the issue of forgery, the CA is correct in reversing the decision of the trial court. Save for the denial of Narciso Cruz that it was not his signature in the Undertaking and the perfunctory comparison of the signatures, nothing in the records would support the claim of forgery. Forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. 52 Mere denial will not suffice to overcome the positive value of the Undertaking, which is a notarized document, has in its favor the presumption of regularity, and carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution. 53 Even in cases where the alleged forged signature was compared to samples of genuine signatures to show its variance therefrom, this Court still found such evidence insufficient. 54

Mere variance of the signatures cannot be considered as conclusive proof that the same were forged. 55 eBcNoH G.R. No. 96227. APPEALS February 1, 1993 OPENA vs. HON. COURT OF

ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF PRESENTATION AND NON-PRESENTATION OF NOTARY PUBLIC TO TESTIFY ON EXECUTION OF DOCUMENT NOTARIZED BY HIM AND ALLEGED AS FORGED. Atty. Caoayan's testimony could have weighed heavily in favor of the petitioner's defense, if petitioner is to be believed, since Atty. Caoayan was ostensibly the lawyer who notarized the alleged deed of absolute sale, and could therefore have validated petitioner's claim that Guillerma Gotgotao's signature on the said document was genuine. Thus, petitioner's failure to present this material witness creates the presumption that if such testimony had been given, it would have been adverse to the petitioner's claim. NO COMPARISON OF PARTYS SIGNATURE A claim of forgery cannot be accepted where no comparison of a partys signature was made and no witness (save for the party herself) was presented to testify on the same. (Lagdinon vs. Court of Appeals, 336 SCRA 42)