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action under Rule 65. Clearly, the Capas RTC's order dismissing the petition for certiorari on the ground that the proper remedy is an ordinary appeal, is erroneous. Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property based on the Revised Penal Code while Casupanan and Capitulo filed the civil action for damages based on Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Although these two actions arose from the same act or omission, they have different causes of action. The criminal case is based on culpa criminal punishable under the Revised Penal Code while the civil case is based on culpa aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code. And par 6, sec 1 of Rule 111. Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to file his counterclaim in a separate civil action, there can be no forum-shopping if the accused files such separate civil action. Under the present Rule 111, the offended party is still given the option to file a separate civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto by reserving such right in the criminal action before the prosecution presents its evidence. Also, the offended party is deemed to make such reservation if he files a separate civil action before filing the criminal action. If the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is filed separately but its trial has not yet commenced, the civil action may be consolidated with the criminal action. The consolidation under this Rule does not apply to separate civil actions arising from the same act or omission filed under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code. Section 2, Rule 111 of the present Rules did not change the rule that the separate civil action, filed to recover damages ex-delicto, is suspended upon the filing of the criminal action. Section 2 of the present Rule 111 also prohibits the filing, after commencement of the criminal action, of a separate civil action to recover damages ex-delicto. Section 3 of the present Rule 111, like its counterpart in the amended 1985 Rules, expressly allows the "offended party" to bring an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code. As stated in Section 3 of the present Rule 111, this civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the "offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action." There is no question that the offended party in the criminal action can file an independent civil action for quasi-delict against the accused. Section 3 of the present Rule 111 expressly states that the "offended party" may bring such an action but the "offended party" may not recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action. Clearly, Section 3 of Rule 111 refers to the offended party in the criminal action, not to the accused. Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission. The first a criminal case where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil case for quasi-delict without violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently of each other. The commencement or prosecution of the criminal action will not suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The only
limitation is that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. In most cases, the offended party will have no reason to file a second civil action since he cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused. In some instances, the accused may be insolvent, necessitating the filing of another case against his employer or guardians. Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which states that the counterclaim of the accused "may be litigated in a separate civil action." This is only fair for two reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal case. The accused is therefore forced to litigate separately his counterclaim against the offended party. If the accused does not file a separate civil action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may set in since the period continues to run until the civil action for quasi-delict is filed. Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the same way that the offended party can avail of this remedy which is independent of the criminal action. To disallow the accused from filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him due process of law, access to the courts, and equal protection of the law.Thus, the civil action based on quasidelict filed separately by Casupanan and Capitulo is proper.
Back to Blog Older Entry | Newer Entry People vs Bayotas
263 scra 239 Extinction of Civil Liability Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest. Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged. In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of the accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability. Counsel for the accused-appellant on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General arguing that death of the accused while judgment of the conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties. ISSUE: Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability.
HELD: Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. Corollary, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: a) Law b) Contracts c) Quasi-contracts d) Quasi-delicts. Where the civil liability survives, as explained above, an action for recovery therefore may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Sec.1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with the provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. Applying this set of rules the court ruled that the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, rape. Consequently, the appeal was hereby dismissed. Categories: Civil Law, Criminal Law, Persons and Family Relations
3. In an order of August 1, 1977, the presiding judge, His Honor, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the motion. A motion for reconsideration of the order was denied in the order of August 5, 1977 but the arraignment was deferred to August 18, 1977 to afford time for petitioner to elevate the matter to the appellate court. 4. A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the accused in the Court of Appeals. In an order of August 17, 1977 the Court of Appeals restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with the arraignment of the accused until further orders of the Court. 5. In a comment that was filed by the Solicitor General he recommended that the petition be given due course. 6. On May 15, 1978 a decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals granting the writ and perpetually restraining the judge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the accused in the case until the Department of Justice shall have finally resolved the petition for review. 7. On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice, Hon. Catalino Macaraig, Jr., resolving the petition for review reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused. 8. A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated April 10, 1978 with the trial court, attaching thereto a copy of the letter of Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr. In an order of August 2, 1978 the private prosecutor was given time to file an opposition thereto. 9. On November 24, 1978 the Judge denied the motion and set the arraignment, stating that the motions trust being to induce this Court to resolve the innocence of the accused on evidence not before it but on that adduced before the Undersecretary of Justice, a matter that not only disregards the requirements of due process but also erodes the Courts independence and integrity. 10. The accused then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the Court of Appeals. 11. On January 23, 1979 a restraining order was issued by the Court of Appeals against the threatened act of arraignment of the accused until further orders from the Court. In a decision of October 25, 1979 the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order of January 23, 1979. 12. A motion for reconsideration of said decision filed by the accused was denied in a resolution of February 19, 1980.
13. Hence this petition for review of said decision. Petitioner and private respondent filed their respective briefs while the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation in lieu of brief reiterating that the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals be reversed and that respondent Judge be ordered to dismiss the information. ISSUE: Whether the trial court, acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits? RULING: YES. The rule in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation. In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.