Civil Procedure DIGESTED CASES University of Santo Tomas Faculty of Civil Law

CIVIL PROCEDURE Jurisdiction 2 Page

CIVIL PROCEDURE JURISDICTION NAVALES V. ABAYA FACTS: Petitioners consisting of more than three hundred junior officers and enl isted men, mostly from the elite units of the AFP who all took part in a failed coup attempt in Oakwood Suites, Makati, filed a writ of habeas corpus before the Supreme Court questioning the jurisdiction of the Judge Advocate General in fil ing charges against them for violations of the Articles of War Sections 67, 96, and 97. The Regional Trial Court acquitted 290 of the original 331 soldiers who participated in the mutiny. Petitioners contend that the Judge Advocate General due to the fact that their participation in the mutiny was not service connected . The present petitions for prohibition and for habeas corpus were then filed wi th the Supreme Court. Acting on the prayer for the issuance of temporary restrai ning order in the petition for prohibition, the Supreme Court directed the parti es to observe the status quo prevailing before the filing of the petition. Wheth er or not the Regional Trial Court can divest the military courts of jurisdictio n. ISSUE: HELD: RA 7055 provides that "Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other persons subject to military law, including members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offenses penalized under the Revised Pe nal Code, other special penal laws, or local government ordinances, regardless o f whether or not civilians are co-accused, victims, or offended parties which ma y be natural or juridical persons, shall be tried by the proper civil court, exc ept when the offense, as determined before arraignment by the civil court, is se rvice-connected, in which case the offense shall be tried by court-martial: Prov ided, That the President of the Philippines may, in the interest of justice, ord er or direct at any time before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil courts." As used in this Section, service-connected cr imes or offenses shall be limited to those defined in Articles 54 to 70, Article s 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended. In im posing the penalty for such crimes or offenses, the court-martial may take into consideration the penalty prescribed therefor in the Revised Penal Code, other s pecial laws, or local government ordinances. The second paragraph of the above p rovision explicitly specifies what are considered service-connected crimes or off enses under Commonwealth Act 408 (CA 408), as amended, also known as the Articles of War. Section 1 of RA 7055 vests on the military courts the jurisdiction over the foregoing offenses. In view of the clear mandate of RA 7055, the Regional T rial Court cannot divest the General Court-Martial of its jurisdiction over thos e charged with violations of Articles 63, 64, 67, 96 and 97 of the Articles of W ar, as these are specifically included as service-connected offenses or crimes und er Section 1 thereof. Pursuant to the same provision of law, the military courts have jurisdiction over these crimes or offenses. There was no factual and legal basis for the Regional Trial Court to rule that violations of said articles of the Articles of War were committed in furtherance of coup detat and, as such, abs orbed by the latter crime. It bears stressing that, after a reinvestigation, the Panel of Prosecutors found no probable cause for coup detat against Navales, et al., and recommended the dismissal of the case against them. The trial court app roved the recommendation and dismissed the case as against Navales et al. There is, as yet, no evidence on record that the Navale et al., committed the violatio ns of Articles 63, 64, 96, and 97 of the Articles of War in furtherance of coup detat. In fine, in making the sweeping declaration that these charges were not se rvice-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the crime of coup deta t, the RTC (Branch 148) acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. Such declara tion is, in legal contemplation, necessarily null and void and does not exist.

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CIVIL PROCEDURE JURISDICTION EMILIO Lao v. Republic FACTS: Government Service Insurance System GSIS is the registered owner of three parcels of land with a five-storey building and other improvements thereon. GSI S entered into a lease-purchase agreement with the Republic through the office o f the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC). The lease was vitiated by force as th e term was clearly in advantage of the OGCC. GSIS filed for nullification of the contract contending the former President Marcos used his influence to perfect t he lease agreement. The OGCC contended, among other things that the Regional Tri al Court did not have jurisdiction as the alleged transactions were under the ju risdiction of the Sandiganbayan pursuant to Executive Order No. 9. ISSUE: HELD: While it is true that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case maybe raise d at any stage of the proceedings. It is nevertheless settled that a party may b e barred from raising it on the ground of estoppel. After voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision it is improper and too late for a party to question the jurisdiction of the court. A party who has invoked jurisdi ction to secure affirmative relief cannot be permitted afterwards to deny the sa me jurisdiction to escape liability. Thus petitioner is estopped from questionin g the jurisdiction of the courts below. Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case. 4 Page

CIVIL PROCEDURE JURISDICTION TIJAM vs. SIBONGHANOY FACTS: Petitioner filed for recovery of a sum of money from respondent Sibongaha noy. Defendants filed a counter bond with Manila Surety and Fidelity Co. Judgmen t was in favor of the plaintiffs, a writ of execution was issued against the def endant. Defendants moved for writ of execution against surety which was granted. Surety moved to quash the writ but was denied, appealed to CA without raising t he issue on lack of jurisdiction. CA affirmed the appealed decision. Surety then filed Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction against CFI Cebu in view of the effectivity of Judiciary Act of 1948 a month before the filing of the petition for recovery. Act placed original exclusive jurisdiction of inferi or courts all civil actions for demands not exceeding 2,000 exclusive of interes t. CA set aside its earlier decision and referred the case to SC since it has ex clusive jurisdiction over "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior c ourt is in issue. ISSUE: Whether or not surety bond is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court for the first time upon appeal. HELD: The C ourt believes that that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this pl ea after almost fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss rais ing the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time. A party may be esto pped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reaso ns. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches. Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily su bmitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too l ate for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court -"undesirab le practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adv erse. : Other merits on the appeal. The surety insists that the lower court shou ld have granted its motion to quash the writ of execution because the same was i ssued without the summary hearing. In the case at bar, the surety had been notif ied of the plaintiffs motion for execution and of the date when the same would be submitted for consideration. In fact, the surety s counsel was present in cou rt when the motion was called, and it was upon his request that the court a quo gave him a period of four days within which to file an answer. Yet he allowed th at period to lapse without filing an answer or objection. The surety cannot now, therefore, complain that it was deprived of its day in court The orders appeale d from are affirmed. 5 Page

CIVIL PROCEDURE JURISDICTION MODESTA CALIMLIM AND LAMBERTO MAGALI vs. HON. PEDRO A. RAMIREZ and FRANCISCO RAM OS Judgment for a sum of money and a writ of execution was rendered in favor of Ind ependent Mercantile Corporation against a certain Manuel Magali. The Notice of L evy made on a parcel of land registered in the name of "Domingo Magali, married to Modesta Calimlim", specified that the said levy was only against "all rights, title, action, interest and participation of the defendant Manuel Magali over t he parcel of land described in this title." However, when the Sheriff issued the final Deed of Sale, it was erroneously stated therein that the sale was with re spect to "the parcel of land described in this title" and not only over the righ ts and interest of Manuel Magali in the same. The execution of the said final De ed of Sale was annotated at the back of said title. Petitioner Modesta Calimlim, surviving spouse of Domingo Magali, filed a petition with the respondent Court praying for the cancellation of the TCT. An opposition to the said petition was filed by Independent Mercantile Corporation. After the parties submitted their r espective Memoranda, the respondent Court issued an Order dismissing the petitio n. The herein petitioners did not appeal the dismissal of the petition as they f iled for the cancellation of the TCT. Instead, they filed a complaint praying fo r the cancellation of the conveyances and sales that had been made on the proper ty previously registered in the name of Domingo Magali, herein private responden t Francisco Ramos who claimed to have bought the property from Independent Merca ntile Corporation. Private respondent Francisco Ramos failed to obtain a title o ver the property in his name in view of the existence of an adverse claim annota ted on the title thereof at the instance of the herein petitioners. Private resp ondent Francisco Ramos filed a Motion to dismiss on the ground that the same is barred by prior judgment or by statute of limitations. Resolving the said Motion , the respondent Court, dismissed Civil Case on the ground of estoppel by prior judgment. A Motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied by th e respondent Judge. A second Motion for reconsideration was similarly denied. IS SUE: HELD: Whether or not the dismissal of civil case can be annulled and set as ide. FACTS: It is neither fair nor legal to bind a party by the result of a suit or proceedi ng which was taken cognizance of in a court which lacks jurisdiction over the sa me irrespective of the attendant circumstances. The equitable defense of estoppe l requires knowledge or consciousness of the facts upon which it is based. The s ame thing is true with estoppel by conduct which may be asserted only when it is shown, among others, that the representation must have been made with knowledge of the facts and that the party to whom it was made is ignorant of the truth of the matter. The inequity of barring the petitioners from vindicating their righ t over their property in the Civil Case is rendered more acute in the face of th e undisputed fact that the property in question admittedly belonged to the petit ioners, and that the title in the name of the private respondent was the result of an error committed by the Provincial Sheriff in issuing the deed of sale in t he execution proceeding. The 6 Page

Motion To Dismiss filed by the private respondent shall be deemed denied and the respondent Court is ordered to conduct further proceedings in the case. 7 Page

CIVIL PROCEDURE JURISDICTION EUSTACIO ATWEL Vs CONCEPCION PROGRESSIVE ASSOC., INC Emiliano Melgazo founded and organized Concepcion Progressive Association. As CP AI president, he bought a parcel of land in behalf of the association. The prope rty was later on converted into a wet market where agricultural, livestock and o ther farm products were sold. It also housed a cockpit and an area for various f orms of amusement. The income generated from the property, mostly rentals from t he wet market, was paid to CPAI. When Emiliano Melgazo died, his son, petitioner Manuel Melgazo, succeeded him as CPAI president and administrator of the proper ty. On the other hand, petitioners Atwel and Pilpil were elected as CPAI vice-pr esident and treasurer, respectively. Other elected officers and members formed t heir own group and registered themselves in the Securities and Exchange Commissi on as officers and members of respondent CPAI. However, petitioners not listed a s members. CPAI alleged that it was the owner of the property and petitioners, w ithout authority, were collecting rentals from the wet market vendors. Petitione rs filed a case in the SEC for mandatory injunction where they contended that si nce the property was purchased using the money of petitioner Manuel Melgazo s fa ther, it belonged to the deceased and it was impossible for the CPAI to have acq uired ownership over the property in 1968 when it was only in 1997 that it was i ncorporated and registered with the SEC. It ruled that CPA to be one and the sam e as CPAI, CPA as the owner of poperty and not Melgazo. It ruled in favor of CPA I. Petitioners went to the CA and contested the jurisdiction of the SEC special commercial court over the case. CA affirmed the decision. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are estopped from questioning jurisdiction after participating i n the proceeding. The Court agreed with the petitioners that estoppel cannot app ly because a court s jurisdiction is conferred exclusively by the Constitution o r by law, not by the parties agreement or by estoppel. The jurisdiction of the SEC over intra-corporate controversies and other cases enumerated in Section 5 o f PD 902-A was transferred to the courts of general jurisdiction. In the case at bar, the elements of an intra-corporate controversy are not present. The record s reveal that petitioners were never officers nor members of CPAI. CPAI itself a dmitted this in its pleadings. In fact, petitioners were the only remaining memb ers of CPA which, obviously, was not the CPAI that was registered in the SEC. Th e determination as to who is the true owner of the disputed property entitled to the income generated therefrom is civil in nature and should be threshed out in a regular court - conflict among the parties here was outside the jurisdiction of the special commercial court The rule remains that estoppel does not confer j urisdiction on a tribunal that has none over the cause of action or subject matt er of the case. Unfortunately for CPAI, no exceptional circumstance appears in t his case to warrant divergence from the rule. Jurisdiction by estoppel is not av ailable here. HELD: FACTS: 8 Page

CIVIL PROCEDURE JURISDICTION DAVAO LIGHT & POWER CO Vs THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RODOLFO M. BELLAFLOR, and FRANCISCO TESORERO FACTS: Davao Light & Power Co., filed a complaint for damages against private re spondent Francisco Tesorero before the RTC praying for damages in the amount of P11,OOO,OOO.OO. Instead of filing its answer, private respondent filed a motion to dismiss claiming that: (a) the complaint did not state a cause of action; (b) the plaintiff s claim has been extinguished or otherwise rendered moot and acad emic; (c) there was non-joinder of indispensable parties; and (d) venue was impr operly laid. Of these four grounds, the last mentioned is most material in the c ase at bar. The trial court issue a Resolution dismissing petitioner s complaint on the ground of improper venue. The plaintiff being a private corporation, und oubtedly Banilad, Cebu City is the plaintiff s principal place of business as al leged in the complaint, and which for purposes of venue, is deemed as its reside nce. Conversely, in the defendant s motion to dismiss, it alleged and submitted that the plaintiffs principal office is in Davao City, as stated in the Contract of Lease and another Contract of Lease of Generating Equipment executed by the p laintiff with the NAPOCOR. The motion on the ground of improper venue was grante d and petitioner s motion for reconsideration was denied. The Court of Appeals r endered the assailed judgment, denied due course and dismissed the petition. The petitioner filed the instant petition. ISSUE: HELD: Whether or not the venue wa s proper. It is private respondent s contention that the proper venue is Davao City, and n ot Cebu City. Private respondent argue that petitioner is estopped from claiming that its residence is in Cebu City, in view of contradictory statements made by petitioner prior to the filing of the action for damages. It cannot be disputed that petitioner s principal office is in Cebu City, per its amended articles of incorporation and by-laws. Private respondent is not a party to any of the cont racts presented. He is a complete stranger to the covenants executed between pet itioner and NAPOCOR, despite his protestations that he is privy thereto, on the rather flimsy ground that he is a member of the public for whose benefit the ele ctric generating equipment subject of the contracts were leased or acquired. We are likewise not persuaded by his argument that the allegation or representation made by petitioner in either the complaints or answers it filed in several civi l cases that its residence is in Davao City, should estop it from filing the dam age suit before the Cebu courts. Moreover, there is no showing that private resp ondent is a party in those civil cases or that he relied on such representation by petitioner. 9 Page

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS 10 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 1 JOSEFINA POTESTAS CABRERA vs. MARIANO T. TIANO FACTS: heirs. Since at the time of the sales his daughters Josefina and Crecencia did n ot know about the sale, they did not object to it. Crecencia and Josefina filed an action for recovery of property against the ventee, Mariano Tiano. He was the n served his summons and contended a special defense of prescription. He contend ed that it was not from the date of filing of the complaint but from the time of service of the summons that the prescription period interrupts. ISSUE: HELD: Wh ether or not the prescription period stops at the time of the filing of the comp laint. Ciriaco Potestas, father of respondent sold a parcel of land without the consent of 3 of his Civil actions are deemed commenced from date of the filing and docketing of the complaint with the Clerk of Court, without taking into account the issuance and service of summons. Commencement of the suit prior to the expiration of the pres criptive period, interrupts the prescription period. Prescription period commenc es at the time when the suit is filed. The established rule is that the commence ment of a suit prior to expiration period interrupts the running of the statute as to parties to the action. The contention that the period was not interrupted until after the defendant received the summons legal basis. 11 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 1 LOURDES DELA CRUZ V. COURT OF APPEALS The petition for review seeks to nullify Resolution of the Court of Appeals, whi ch reversed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court reinstated the Decision of the Manila Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), which ordered petitioner Dela Cruz t o vacate the subject lot in favor of respondent. Petitioner Lourdes dela Cruz, w as one of the lessees of the house of the Reyes family. After a fire ravaged the house, the Reyes demanded all the lessees to vacate the premises. Dela Cruz ref used and subsequently, the lot was sold by the Reyes to Tan. Tan sent eviction n otice to dela Cruz and then finally filed an ejection case against them. The cas e was filed in the MeTC after 1 year of the instance of forcible entry. Dela Cru z contended that the MeTC have no jurisdiction over the complaint. ISSUE: Whethe r or not the MeTC has jurisdiction over the complaint. RULING: The original juri sdiction over ejectment cases lies in first level courts. Section 1 of Rule 70 o f the rules of court defines 2 kinds of procedure that is under the jurisdiction of Summary Procedure which is cognizance by first level courts. In action of fo rcible entry, 3 requisites must concur 1) Plaintiffs must allege prior physical possession of the property 2) Deprivation of possession 3) Must be files within 1 year. The other kind of ejectment is unlawful detainer were one unlawfully wit hholds a property after an expiration or termination of the right to possess. Th e court finds that the ejectment case falls within the latter. In unlawful detai ner cases, jurisdiction is conferred by allegation in the pleadings. FACTS: 12 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 1 REPUBLIC V. KENRICH DEVELOPMENT CORP FACTS: This case stemmed from the construction by respondent Kenrick Development Corporation of a concrete perimeter fence around some parcels of land located b ehind the Civil Aviation Training Center of the Air Transportation Office. Parce ls of land were allegedly registered in the name of Alfonso Concepcion. The Soli citor General filed a complaint of cancellation of the TCTs against Kenrich Corpo ration. After numerous pretrial conferences the OSG moved to declare the defenda nt in default. Kenrich contended that it filed an answer through Atty. Garlitos, its counsel which was denied by the lawyer. It was found that another person si gned for Atty. Garlitos. ISSUE: Whether or not an answer can be admitted despite the lack of signature by the counsel. HELD: Only the signature of either the pa rty himself or his counsel operates to validly convert a pleading from one that is unsigned to one that is signed. Counsels authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. He may not delegate it to just any person. Procedural requ irements which have been labeled as mere technicalities have their own valid rai son d eitre. Procedural rules are promulgated into law designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases and while the court related the rules from time to time, it must not let it be the last bastion for erring litigants. 13 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 1 ATTY. ERLANDO A. ABRENICA vs. LAW FIRM OF ABRENICA, TUNGOL AND TIBAYAN FACTS: Respondents filed cases in the Securities and Exchange Commission against petitioner praying for the full accounting of earnings with regards to a sale o f a clients property. The SEC initially heard the cases but they were later trans ferred to the Regional Trial Court pursuant to RA 8799, which transferred jurisd iction over intra-corporate controversies from the SEC to the courts. After obta ining an unfavorable decision, Petitioner filed an appeal to the CA. The respond ents opposed the motion contending that the proper mode is a certiorari under Ru le 43. They also filed for the motion for execution contending that the judgment was immediately executor and unless stayed by the proper mode of appeal after t he expiration of the 15 day period certiorari. Petitioner contends that he was l ate for filing the appeal because he resorted to a wrong mode. He prays that his petition for certiorari be granted and that Rule 1 Sec 5 provides for liberalit y of application of the rules. ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for certiorari i s proper. HELD: No compelling reason exists to relax the stringent of applicatio n of the rules set on this case. Petitioner had known about the rules but did no t file the proper mode of appeal until it expired. Time and again, the court hav e filed dismissals of incorrect appeals. While litigation is not a game of techn icalities, still, it does not follow that the rules of court may be ignored at w ill and at random to prejudice of the orderly presentation and resolution of the issues. Procedural rules should not be belittled or dismissed simply because th ey may have resulted in prejudice to a partys substantial rights. 14 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 1 MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CITY LAND DEVELOPMENT C ORPORATION, FACTS: This was originally a case of an action for torts and damages and specifi c performance with a prayer for temporary restraining order. The damages were no t specifically stated in the prayer but the body of the complaint assessed a P 7 8.75M. damages suffered by the petitioner. The amount of docket fee paid was onl y P41O.OO. The petitioner then amended the complaint and reduced the damages to P1O M only. ISSUES: When does a court acquire jurisdiction. Whether or not an am ended complaint vests jurisdiction in the court. The court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not vest jurisdiction in the court, mu ch less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. All complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for. Damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. HELD: 15 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 1 PROTON PILIPINAS CORP. V. BANQUE NATIONAL DE PARIS Petitioner Proton availed of the credit facilities of herein respondent National e de Paris (BNP) to guarantee the payment of its obligation to Automotive Corpor ation Philippines, Asea One Corporation and Autocorp Group). Under the terms of the trust agreement, Proton would receive imported passenger motor vehicles and hold them in trust for BNP. Proton would be free to sell the vehicles subject to the condition that it would deliver the proceeds of the sale to BNP, to be appl ied to its obligations to it. A few weeks after, Proton failed to deliver the pr oceeds of the sale. Pursuant to the agreement, Proton was issued a letter of dem and by BNP. The BNP filed for an action for recovery and damages in the Makati R TC. Proton filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that BNP failed to pay the co rrect docket fees and that BNP failed to send additional letters. ISSUE: HELD: W hether or not jurisdiction was acquired over the complaint by BNP. FACTS: In the case at bar, jurisdiction was not acquired. Respondent merely relied on t he assessment made by the clerk of court which turned out to be incorrect. Under the circumstances, the clerk of court has the responsibility of reassessing wha t respondent must pay within the prescriptive period, failing which the complain t merits dismissal. BNP must be reassessed of the proper docket fees. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading but the pa yment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction ov er the subject matter or nature on the action. Although the payment of the prope r docket fees is a jurisdictional requirement, the trial court may allow the pla intiff in an action to pay the same within a reasonable time within the expirati on of applicable prescription or reglementary period. If the plaintiff fails to comply with this requirement, the defendant should timely raise the issue of jur isdiction or else he would be considered in estoppel. 16 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 1 SUN INSURANCE OFFICE V. HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge and MANUEL C HUA UY PO TIONG. Petitioner Sun Insurance Office filed a complaint for the consignation of a prem ium refund on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial declaration of its nullity against private respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Private responden t was declared in default for failure to file the required answer within the reg lementary period. On the other hand, private respondent filed a complaint for th e refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment agains t petitioner. Although the prayer in the complaint did not quantify the amount o f damages sought said amount may be inferred from the body of the complaint to b e about Fifty Million Pesos. Only the amount of P21O.OO was paid by private resp ondent as docket fee which prompted petitioners counsel to raise his objection, which was disregarded by respondent Judge. The Court thereafter returned the sa id records to the trial court with the directive that they be re-raffled to the other judges to the exclusion of Judge Castro. The Court issued a Resolution dir ecting the judges to reassess the docket fees and requires all clerks of court t o issue certificates of re-assessment of docket fees. All litigants were likewis e required to specify in their pleadings the amount sought to be recovered. Judg e Maximiano Asuncion, to whom Civil Case was thereafter assigned, issued an Orde r requiring the parties in the case to comment on the Clerk of Court s letter-re port. Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals questioning the said order of Judge Asuncion. Court of Appeals rendered a decis ion ruling, among others, Denying due course to the petition insofar as it seeks annulment of the order Whether or not a court acquires jurisdiction over a case when the correct and proper docket fee has not been paid. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of t he prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the su bject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleadin g is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment o f the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescrip tive or reglementary period. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Cour t or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee. The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Clerk of Court of the court a quo is instructed to reassess and determine the additional filing fee that should be paid by private respondent considering the total amount of t he claim sought in the original complaint and the supplemental complaint as may be gleaned from the allegations and the prayer thereof and to require private re spondent to pay the deficiency. HELD: ISSUE: FACTS: 17 P a g e

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CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 1 ADELFA S. RIVERA, CYNTHIA S. RIVERA, and JOSE S. RIVERA Vs FIDELA DEL ROSARIO FACTS: A complaint for rescission of a deed of sale was filed by herein responde nts, heirs of Fidela del Rosario, which was signed by the deceased, which was fr audulently executed. They averred that Fidela signed the deed wherein facts demo nstrate that she intended to sign a deed of mortgage. Petitioner contends that t he trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case since that the proper docket fee was not properly assessed and paid. Respondents contend that they did not know that they paid the incorrect amount and fault the clerk of court. ISSU E: HELD: Whether or not jurisdiction was properly acquired. This Court has ruled that the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fee vest a trial court with ju risdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. If the amount of doc ket fees paid is insufficient considering the amount of the claim, the clerk of court of the lower court involved or his duly authorized deputy has the responsi bility of making a deficiency assessment. The party filing the case will be requ ired to pay the deficiency, but jurisdiction is not automatically lost. it is be yond dispute that respondents paid the full amount of docket fees as assessed by the Clerk of Court. If petitioners believed that the assessment was incorrect, they should have questioned it before the trial court. Instead, petitioners bela tedly question the alleged underpayment of docket fees through this petition, at tempting to support their position with the opinion and certification of the Cle rk of Court of another judicial region. Needless to state, such certification ha s no bearing on the instant case. 19 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 1 Neypes v Court of Appeals FACTS: Neypes filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/o r reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the RTC again st the private respondents. Later, in an order, the trial court dismissed petiti oners complaint on the ground that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal and, on the 15th day therea fter filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for reconsideration which petitioners recei ved on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a not ice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998. The court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late. This was recei ved by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsiderat ion but this too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998. Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the CA. In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the 15day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since thi s was the day they received the final order of the trial court denying their mot ion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 , only five days had elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period f or appeal. On September 16, 1999, the CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that t he 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the d ay they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint. Accordi ng to the appellate court, the order was the final order appealable under the Rule s. Whether or not it is proper to allow a fresh period to file an appeal in lieu of dismissal of the Motion for Reconsideraiton. To standardize the appeal perio ds provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal thei r cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40, Rule 42, Rule 43 and Rule 45. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted f rom receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsider ation (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution. The SC thus he ld that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh per iod of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denyin g their motion for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken wit hin 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word or signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from a nother. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily i mplies. 20 P a g e HELD: ISSUE :

Hence, the use of or in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from noti ce of the final order, which we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 or der denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration. Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which shortened the appe al period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The origin al period of appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh period of 15 days becomes signifi cant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for reconsi deration. In this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision i s given another opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize and /or rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch a nd to have judgments of courts become final at some definite time, we likewise a spire to deliver justice fairly. 21 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 2 CAUSE OF ACTION 22 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 2 HEIRS OF DOLLETON V. FIL-ESTATE MANAGEMENT INC. Petitioners Heirs filed for quieting of title and/or recovery of ownership and p ossession with preliminary injunction/restraining order and damages against resp ondents Fil-Estate Management Inc. They claimed that they have been in open, exc lusive, and notorious possession of parcels of land for more than 90 years until Fil-Estate forcibly ousted them. Fil-Estate contended that that have in their p ossession numerous certificates covering the parcels of land and can only be att acked collaterally pursuant to PD 1529. The respondents also filed a motion to d ismiss on the grounds that the petitioners do not have a cause of action the RTC dismissed the complaint filed by the petitioner. ISSUE: HELD: The elementary te st for failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded. The inquiry is into the suffic iency, not the veracity, of the material allegations. If the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis on which it can be maintained, it should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be presented by the defendant. T his Court is convinced that each of the Complaints filed by petitioners sufficie ntly stated a cause of action. The Complaints alleged that petitioners are the o wners of the subject properties by acquisitive prescription. As owners thereof, they have the right to remain in peaceful possession of the said properties and, if deprived thereof, they may recover the same. The petitioners are in open, co ntinuous and notorious possession of the disputed parcels of land for more than 90 years. The rule of civil procedure provides the elements of a cause of action ; 1) a right in favor of a plaintiff. 2) An obligation on the part of the defend ant to violate such right. 3) an act or omission on the part of defendant of the right of the plaintiff which constitutes such right. Whether or not there is a sufficient cause of action. FACTS: 23 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 2 SPOUSES JUAN J. DIAZ and ELIZABETH L. DIAZ vs. JOSE DIAZ Action for a sum of money was filed before the Regional Trial Court of by privat e respondent Jose Diaz against petitioners Juan and Elizabeth Diaz. The complain t stemmed from a property bought in Greenhills by Elizabeth Diaz. It was bought with money of a previous sale of lot both co-owned by Jose and Elizabeth. The Gr eenhills property was effectively and partly held in trust by Elizabeth for Jose . Jose demands P2 million for his part of the lot taking into account the curren t value of the lot. Elizabeth Diaz filed a motion to dismiss for lack of cause o f action. Petitioners maintain that private respondent s Complaint failed to sta te a cause of action as it contained mere averments of facts and conclusions of law that neither establish any right or claim on the part of private respondent nor constitute wrongful acts or omissions violative of his right. ISSUE: HELD: W hether or not there constitutes a sufficient cause of action. FACTS: It has been consistently ruled that a complaint states a cause of action when it contains the following elements: (1) the legal right of plaintiff, (2) the corr elative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the defendan t in violation of said legal right. In the case at bar, the connection which pet itioners seek can readily be found by an examination of the Complaint in its ent irety. In his Complaint, private respondent alleged that he was entitled to rece ive P15,000.00 as his share in the sales proceeds of the Mandaluyong property. H e thereafter claimed that, with his knowledge and without his objection, the sam e P15,000.00 was used by his brother in paying for the Greenhills property. Havi ng allowed his brother to use his money, private respondent demanded the return of the present equivalent of his contribution following the sale of the Greenhil ls property but the said demand was rejected. Hypothetically admitting these all egations, private respondent s Complaint satisfies all the elements of a cause o f action. 24 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 2 Zepeda Vs China Banking Spouses Zepeda obtained a loan from respondent China Bank and subsequently faile d to uphold their obligations with said loan. Allegedly they approached the bank and negotiated a restructuring of the loan, which was said to have been granted . However; there were no documents to prove this. Respondent bank then proceeded to extrajudicially foreclose their property where itself emerged as the highest bidder. The petitioners failed to redeem the property. Petitioners argued the f oreclosure proceedings should have been annulled due to the bank failing to comp ly with the posting and publication requirements of the law. Additionally, they claimed the real estate mortgage and promissory note was signed in blank, with n o copy furnished to them. Respondents motion for dismissal was denied. Hence it f iled a special answer with affirmative defenses, including a set of 20 questions , which were never answered by the Petitioners. The Trial Court denied China Ban ks affirmative defenses as well as its motion to expunge the complaint for being premature. The CA ruled in favor of respondent on the reasons of Zepedas acting in bad faith when ignoring the hearings of the court, and China Banks affirmativ e defenses, failed to answer the 20 questions, and that the complaint failed to show cause of action. ISSUE: HELD: Whether or not spouses complaint contained the sufficient cause of action. FACTS: An action is formal statement of the operative facts which gives rise to a remed ial right. Thus upon only the concurrence of the 3 requisites is their sufficien t cause of action. We find allegations of the complaint sufficient to establish a cause of action. Thus, the Spouses have sufficient cause of action. 25 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 2 GERONIMO QUADRA vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Quadra, the Chief Legal Officer of respondent Philippine Charity Sweepsta kes Office (PCSO) when he organized and actively participated in the activities of Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Employees Association (CUGCO), an organization composed of the rank and file employees of PCSO, and then later, the Associatio n of Sweepstakes Staff Personnel and Supervisors (CUGCO) (ASSPS [CUGCO]). He was administratively charged before the Civil Service Commission with violation of Civil Service Law and Rules for neglect of duty and misconduct and/or conduct pr ejudicial to the interest of the service. The CSC found Quadra guilty and summar ily dismissed him. Quadra filed a petition for reinstatement together with damag es to the Court of Industrial Relations. The PCSO moved to dismiss the case on t he grounds that it has no jurisdiction over PCSO and that the complaint lacked a valid cause of action. The case remained in the CIR until it was established. S ubsequent the NLRC labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of Quadra. The PCS O contended that the filing of the case with CIR tantamount to splitting cause o f action. ISSUE: HELD: Whether or not there was a splitting of the cause of acti on. The court agrees with the petitioner that the filing of a petition for damages b efore CIR did not constitute a splitting of a cause of action under the Rules of Court. Splitting a cause of action is the act of dividing a single cause of act ion, claim or demand into two parts, and bringing such suit for one of such part s only, only intending to reserve the rest for another separate action. The purp ose of the rule is to avoid harassment and vexation of the defendant and the mul tiplicity of suits. Thus, Quadra did not split the cause of action when it filed the case in CIR. 26 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 2 ROGELIO MARISCAL vs. COURT OF APPEALS Private respondent Bella Catalan filed a complaint against petitioner Rogelio Ma riscal before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo for the annulment of their marr iage contracted on the ground that it was void ab initio for having been solemni zed without a valid marriage license and being bigamous. She also sought to reco ver from Mariscal a sum of money she allegedly sent to him while she was working as a nurse over the course of their marriage. She also filed another criminal c ase on a separate RTC for bigamy and perjury. Mariscal moved to dismiss the acti on for damages contending a splitting of action along with annulment and equival ent damages. Whether or not the separate criminal case files constitutes on spli tting a cause of action and litis pendentia. To interpose a cause of action in a counterclaim and again invoke it in a complaint against the same person or part y would be splitting a cause of action not sanctioned by the Rules. The filing o f the criminal complaint and civil action for damages does not constitute litis pendentia. In litis pendentia, what is essential is the identity and similarity of the issues under construction. Interpose a cause of action is a counter claim and again to invoke it in a complaint with the same person is tantamount with t he splitting of a cause of action. HELD: ISSUE: FACTS: 27 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 2 HEIRS OF HINOG V MELICOR FACTS: Private respondents own a parcel of land. They allowed Bertuldo Hinog to use a portion of the said property for a period of ten years and construct there on a small house. After the expiration of the ten-year period, they demanded the return of the occupied portion and removal of the house constructed thereon but Hinog refused and instead claimed ownership. Private respondents filed a compla int for Recovery of Ownership and Possession, Removal of Construction and Damages against Hinog. Trial ensued but Hinog died without completing his evidence. New counsel appeared for the deceased and filed a motion to expunge the complaint fr om the record and nullify all court proceedings on the ground that private respo ndents failed to specify the amount of damages claimed so as to pay the correct docket fees and further alleged that the private respondents failed to pay the c orrect docket fee since the main subject matter of the case cannot be estimated as it is for recovery of ownership, possession and removal of construction. Priv ate respondents opposed. The trial court ordered the complaint to be expunged fr om the records. The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not grave abuse of discretio n was committed by the trial court in reinstating the complaint upon the payment of deficiency docket fees. It must be clarified that the said order is but a re solution on an incidental matter. The remedy against an interlocutory order is t o continue with the case in due course and, when an unfavorable verdict is hande d down, to take an appeal in the manner authorized by law.Only when the court is sued such order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of disc retion and when the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the r emedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief will certiorari be considered an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order. Such spec ial circumstances are absolutely wanting in the present case. Nonpayment at the time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long a s the fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, mor e so when the party involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules. T hus, when insufficient filing fees were initially paid by the plaintiffs and the re was no intention to defraud the government HELD: 28 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 2 Flores v. Mallare-Philipps FACTS: Respondent Binongcal filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of j urisdiction since the amount of the demand was only P11,643.00 and refused to pa y representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit. Fernando Calion allegedly indebted to petitioner joined in moving for the dismissal of the comp laint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Counsel for petitioner opposed the Motion to Dismiss. The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdict ion. Petitioner appealed by certiorari from the order of Judge Mallare-Phillipps who dismissed his complaint for lack of jurisdiction. ISSUE: HELD: In cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as plaintiffs or as defendants, under Sec tion 6 of Rule 3, the total of all the claims shall now furnish the jurisdiction al test. Needless to state, if the causes of action are separate and independent , their joinder in one complaint is permissive and not mandatory, and any cause of action where the amount of the demand is twenty thousand pesos or less may be the subject of a separate complaint filed with a metropolitan or municipal tria l court. In the case at bar, the lower court correctly held that the jurisdictio nal test is subject to the rules on joinder of parties pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and that, after a careful s crutiny of the complaint, it appears that there is a misjoinder of parties for t he reason that the claims against respondents Binongcal and Calion are separate and distinct and neither of which falls within its jurisdiction. No. order appea led from is affirmed Whether or not the case should be dismissed for lack of jur isdiction 29 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 3 PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS 30 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE SALONGA Rule 3 vs. WARNER BARNES FACTS: Westchester Fire Insurance Company of New York entered into a contract with Tina J. Gamboa for the shipment of one case of rayon yardage. U pon arrival, it was discovered that there were a shortage of 1,723.12 pesos on t he shipment from San Francisco, California, on steamer Clovis Victory, to Manila . Consignee, Jovito Salonga, demanded from American President Lines agents of th e ship Clovis Victory, demanding settlement, and when apparently no action was t aken on this claim, plaintiff demanded payment thereof from Warner, Barnes and C o., Ltd., as agent of the insurance company in the Philippines to pay him the ex cess amount. In the meantime, American President Lines agreed to pay to the plai ntiff the amount under its liability in the bill of lading, and when this offer was rejected, the claim was finally settled. As a result, the amount claimed in the complaint as the ultimate liability of the defendant under the insurance con tract was reduced. The trial court held that defendant, as agent of Westchester Fire Insurance is responsible upon the insurance claim subject to the suit. ISSU E: HELD: It is claimed that this action should have been filed against its princ ipal, the Westchester Fire Insurance. This point is also well taken. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires that "every action must be prosecuted in t he name of the real party in interest." A corollary proposition to this rule is that an action must be brought against the real party in interest, or against a party which may be bound by the judgment to be rendered therein. The real party in interest is the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or t he "party entitled to the avails of the suit" In the case at bar, the defendant issued upon in its capacity as agent of Westchester Fire Insurance in spite of t he fact that the insurance contract has not been signed by it. As we have said, the defendant did not assume any obligation thereunder either as agent or as a p rincipal. It cannot, therefore, be made liable under said contract, and hence it can be said that this case was filed against one who is not the real party in i nterest Whether or not the defendant is the real party in interest. 31 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 3 EDUARDO RAYO v. METROBANK FACTS: Midas Diversified Export obtained loans from Metrobank. To secure the pay ment OF the loan, a mortgage was executed in favor of Metrobank over three parce ls of land When Midas failed to pay, Metrobank extrajudicially foreclosed the re al estate mortgage. At the bidding, Metrobank acquired the property. Metrobank p osted a bondrecquired for the issuance of a writ of possession. Rayo, a coassign ee of the property filed an action for nullification of the sale. Metrobank oppo sed for the motion contending that he is not a real party in interest. ISSUE: HE LD: Initially, it is recognized herein petitioner as the co-assignee of the subj ect real properties. However, while petitioner would be injured by the judgment in this suit, the petitioner has no present substantial interest to institute th e annulment of judgment proceedings and nullify the order granting the writ of p ossession. Rayo would not be injured by the judgment. An ex-parte application fo r a writ of possession not a strictly judicial process contemplated in Article 4 43 of the New Civil Code. It is a judicial proceeding for the enforcement of ones right of possession. Whether or not petitioner has a legal personality in the s uit. 32 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 3 Hon. Carlos Fortich Vs Hon Renato Corona FACTS: This case concerns the motion for reconsideration of the courts resolution dated November 17, 1998 and motion to refer the case to the Court en banc. In p revious case, the Court voted two-two on the separate motions for reconsideratio n as a result of which the decision was affirmed. The Court noted in a resolutio n dated January 27, 1999 that the movants have no legal personality to seek redr ess before the Court as their motion to intervene was already denied and that th e motion to refer the case to the Court en banc is akin to a second MR which is prohibited. In this motion, both respondents and intervenors prayed that the cas e be referred to the Court en banc inasmuch as their earlier MR was resolved by a vote of two-two, the required number to carry a decision under the Constitutio n was not met. ISSUE: Whether or not the referral to the court en banc partakes of the nature of a second motion for reconsideration. HELD: It is affirmative. T he contention, therefore, that the Resolution of November 17, 1998 did not dispo se of the earlier MR of the Decision dated April 24, 1998 is flawed. Consequentl y, the present MR necessarily partakes of the nature of a second motion for reco nsideration which, according to the clear and unambiguous language of Rule 56, S ection 4, in relation to Rule 52, Section 2, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedur e, is prohibited. True, there are exceptional cases when this Court may entertai n a second motion for reconsideration, such as where there are extraordinarily p ersuasive reasons. Even then, we have ruled that such second MRs must be filed w ith express leave of court first obtained. In this case, not only did movants fa il to ask for prior leave of court, but more importantly, they have been unable to show that there are exceptional reasons for us to give due course to their se cond motions for reconsideration. Stripped of the arguments for referral of this incident to the Court en banc, the motions subject of this resolution are nothi ng more but rehashes of the motions for reconsideration which have been denied i n the Resolution of November 17, 1998. To be sure, the allegations contained the rein have already been raised before and passed upon by this Court in the said R esolution. 33 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RAMON P. ARON vs. Heirs of Alfredo REALON Rule 3 Roman Realon was the owner of two parcels of land which was inherited by Alfredo Realon and his siblings. Sometime in 1979, Alfredo executed a contract to sell his undivided portion of the lot to petitioner. He also obliged himself to execu te a deed of final sale. However Alfredo failed to register the sale. To secure the balance of the purchase price Aaron, mortgaged the property to the remaining heir. Alfredo Realon died and his successors were unaware about the sale. Engr. Ilaban filed, the attorney-infact of Aron, filed a case for consignation agains t the heirs of Realon. The Realons countered by contending that undue influence w as present at the execution of the sale and that the balance of the price due in the contract to sell was not paid. Aaron contended that the contract to sell wa s superseded by the deeds of the sale with mortgage. In respond the Realons conte nded that even the other heirs did not receive the proceeds from the contract to sell allegedly executed by Alfredo. The Regional Trial Court held that there wa s fraud present. ISSUE: HELD: Whether or not the other heirs of Alfredo are the real parties in interest. FACTS: The settled rule is that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the nam e of the real party in a fiduciary capacity. The beneficiary must be deemed as t he real party in interest. Thus the presence of all the indispensible party is a condition sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power. The plaintiff is man dated to implead all indispensable party and in the absence of one render all su bsequent judgment voids. Failure to include the other heirs as indispensible par ties in the complaint to nullify the contract to sell is fatal to the complaint. 34 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 3 ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR v. HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN Paciencia Regala owns a fishpond, which her Attorney-in-Fact Faustino Mercado le ased to Eduardo Lapid for a three years. Lessee in turn sub-leased the fishpond to Rafael Lopez during the last seven months of the original lease. Ernesto Sale nga was hired by Eduardo Lapid as fishpond watchman. In the sub-lease, Rafael Lo pez rehired respondent Salenga. Ernesto Salenga sent the demand letter to Rafael Lopez and Lourdes Lapid for unpaid salaries and non-payment of the share in the harvest. Salenga file a Complaint before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudic ation Board (PARAB). Pending resolution of the agrarian case, the instant case w as instituted by petitioner Antonio Baltazar, an alleged nephew of Faustino Merc ado, through a Complaint-Affidavit against private respondents before the Office of the Ombudsman for violation of RA 3019. Petitioner maintains that respondent Ilao, Jr. had no jurisdiction to hear and act on DARAB Case No. 552-P filed by respondent Salenga as there was no tenancy relation between respondent Salenga a nd Rafael L. Lopez, and thus, the complaint was dismissible on its face. ISSUES: Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to pursue the instant petition . Whether or not the Ombudsman likewise erred in reversing his own resolution. FACTS: The "real-party-in interest" is "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Th e Complaint-Affidavit filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, there is no ques tion on his authority and legal standing. Faustino Mercado, is an agent himself and as such cannot further delegate his agency to another. An agent cannot deleg ate to another the same agency. Re-delegation of the agency would be detrimental to the principal as the second agent has no privity of contract with the former . In the instant case, petitioner has no privity of contract with Paciencia Rega la, owner of the fishpond and principal of Faustino Mercado. The nature of the c ase is determined by the settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint. Respondent Salengas complaint and its attachment clearly spells out the jurisdictional allegations that he is an agricultural tenant in possession of the fishpond and is about to be ejected from it, clearly, respondent Ilao, Jr. could not be faulted in assuming jurisdic tion as said allegations characterize an agricultural dispute. A defense asserte d in an answer or motion to dismiss is not to be considered in resolving the iss ue on jurisdiction as it cannot be made dependent upon the allegations of the de fendant. The instant petition is denied for lack of merit, and the Order and Mem orandum of the Office of the Special Prosecutor are affirmed. HELD: 35 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 3 MACLARING LUCMAN vs. ALIMATAR MALAWI et al. FACTS: After the failure of elections, respondents remained in office in a holdo ver capacity pursuant to the provisions of sec. 1 of R.A. No. 6676 and COMELEC r esolution no. 2888. Respondents attempted to open their respective barangay s IR A s bank account, eventually, they allowed to open but not allowed to withdraw o wing to the absence of the requisite Accountant s advise. They filed a special c ivil action for mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction t o compel petitioner to allow them to open and maintain deposit accounts and to w ithdraw. Respondents Pangcoga, Sarip, Cadar, Macarambon and Usman testified duri ng the trial that they were duly elected chairpersons and testified further the refusal of the petitioner to allow the withdrawal despite of documents presented . RTC rendered a decision commanding petitioner to pay respondents except Alimat ar Malawi who failed to testify, the IRA s of their respective barangays even wi thout accountant s advice. CA affirmed the decisions. ISSUES: Whether or not res pondents have the causes of actions against the petitioner. Whether or not respo ndents have the legal personality to institute the petition for mandamus. HELD: The relationship being contractual in nature, mandamus is therefore not an avail able remedy since mandamus does not lie to enforce the performance of contractua l obligations. Furtheremore, respondents have no legal personality to institute petition since the funds for which the bank accounts were created belong to the barangay headed by respondents. The case at bar was not initiated by the baranga ys themselves. Neither did the barangay chairmen file the suit in representation of their respective barangays. Only the barangays are the only lawful recipient s of these funds 36 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 3 ELPIDIO S. UY Vs COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Petitioner and Public Estates Authority, as a single proprietorship doing busine ss in the name of Edison Development executed a landscaping and construction agr eement in Heritage Park, Taguig. A few months after, alleging a huge discrepancy between the report and actual progress of the site terminated the project,Uy fi led a complaint for recovery of the spent funds which was granted by the Regiona l Trial Court against PEA. Heritage filed a petition for injunction against Uy c ontending that the Regional Trial Court did not acquirejurisdiction over the cas e since Heritage was not impleaded ISSUE: HELD: Whether or not Heritage is an in dispensible party. An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court s act ion in the litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can b e had. The party s interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other parties that his legal pr esence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. Through a deed of assignment, PEA ceased to be the project manager and assigned its rights to Heri tage. Thus PEA is no longer a party-in-interest. Instead, it is now private resp ondent HPMC, as the assignee, who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgm ent in the suit. In its absence, there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the parties before the court which is effective, complete or equitable. We thus reiterate that HPMC is an indispensable party. 37 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 3 COMMISSIONER ANDREA D. DOMINGO vs. HERBERT MARKUS EMIL SCHEER Respondent was granted a permanent resident status card by the Bureau of Immigra tion and Deportation. The BID received information that Scheer was wanted by the German Federal Policeand that a warrant of arrest had been issued against him. The BID obtained custody of Scheer for deportation proceeding. Scheer has filed a petition for certiorari, questioning the legal standing of the Immigration Com missioner. He contends that the commissioner has no authority to decide whether an alien may stay or not. The Regional Trial Court rendered a judgment annulling the summary deportation proceedings. Domingo, the commissioner of Immigration c ontends that the judgment is void because the Board of Commissioners were not im pleaded in the complaint filed. ISSUE: HELD: Whether or not the Board of Commiss ioners is an indispensible party. FACTS: The respondent was arrested and detained on the basis of the Summary Deportation Order of the BOC. The petitioner caused the arrest of the respondent in obedien ce to the said Deportation Order. Thus, the BOC is an indispensible party. Secti on 7 of Rule 3 requires indispensible parties to be joined as plaintiffs and def endants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. Without the presence of indispensable parties to the suit, the judgment of the court cannot attain r eal finality. The However, the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a gro und for the dismissal of an action. Parties may be added by order of the court o n motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. 38 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 3 VICTORIANA BORLASA vs. VICENTED POLISTICO FACTS: An action was instituted by petitioner against respond ent in the Court of First Instance for the purpose of securing the dissolution o f a voluntary association named Turuhan Polistico & Co., and to compel the defen dants to account for and surrender the money and property of the association in order that its affairs may be liquidated and its assets applied according to law . The trial judge having sustained a demurrer for defect of parties and the plai ntiffs electing not to amend, the cause was dismissed, and from this order an ap peal was taken by the plaintiffs to this court. ISSUE: HELD: To require all memb ers to appear would be quite impossible. Hence, some members must be made to sue but only in behalf of all the members who are not around and it is impracticabl e to bring them all to the court. A number of them may sue for the benefit of al l. Whether or not a suit in behalf of some members proper. 39 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 3 MARIBETH CORDOVA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and HON. JUDGE RICARDO TORNILLA FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for breach of contract and damages, praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction with the Regional Trial Cou rt against private respondents, spouses Romeo and Marietta Laguardia, and Judge Ricardo F. Tornilla, along with the Sheriff and his deputies. Cordova failed to include a certificate of forum shopping. The complaint, however, did not include the certification against forum shopping required. It was only subsequently tha t petitioner submitted the certification in compliance with the circular and thu s, the private respondents filed a motion to dismiss. The RTC dismissed the comp laint for lack of merit and for failure to prosecute. ISSUE: Whether or not ther e was substantial compliance in the requirements. HELD: the requirement under Administrative Circular No. 04-94 for a certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory. The subsequent compliance with this requirem ent does not excuse a partys failure to comply therewith in the first instance. I n those cases where the Court excused non-compliance with the certificate requir ement, special circumstances or compelling reasons existed, which made the stric t application of the circular clearly inequitable. In this case, however, petiti oners action hardly justifies a deviation from the mandatory nature of the aforequoted provision. Hence, petitioners complaint was clearly dismissible on the gro und of forum shopping. 40 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 3 EPIFANIO SAN JUAN, JR. vs. JUDGE RAMON A. CRUZ FACTS: Loreto San Juan executed a last will and testament naming Oscar Casa as one of t he devisees. Upon Loretos death, Atty. Teodorcio Aquino petitioned for a probate in the will. On the pendency of the proceeding, Oscar Casa died intestate. Aquin o substituted Casa in the proceeding. The probate court denied the substitution contending that Aquino was not an executor or administrator of Casas estate. Peti tioner heir emphasized that it is only in the absence of an executor or administ rator that the heirs may be allowed by the court to substitute the deceased part y. He averred that the purported heirs simply agreed among themselves to appoint a representative to be substituted for the deceased, which is contrary to the r equirement of a prior hearing for the court to ascertain who the rightful heirs are. Petitioner, filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. ISSU E: HELD: Whether or not substitution is permitted in the proceedings. The heirs of the estate of Oscar Casa do not need to first secure the appointmen t of an administrator of his estate, because from the very moment of his death, they stepped into his shoes and acquired his rights as devisee/legatee of the de ceased Loreto San Juan. Thus, a prior appointment of an administrator or executo r of the estate of Oscar Casa is not necessary for his heirs to acquire legal ca pacity to be substituted as representatives of the estate. Said heirs may design ate one or some of them as their representative before the trial court. The seco nd paragraph of Section 17 Rule 3 is explicit. The heirs may be allowed to be su bstituted for the deceased without requiring the appointment of an executor or a dministrator. The pronouncement in Law v. Court of Appeals is an exception where a legal representative after unreasonable delay. Thus, Aquino cannot substitute Casa. Proper parties for substitution are the heirs. 41 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 3 GLICERIO R. BRIOSO vs. SALVADORA RILI-MARIANO Spouses Salvadora Rili-Mariano and Leonardo C. Mariano repurchased a property th rough the Land Bank of the Philippines hey previously sold to Glicerio Brioso un der a pacto de retro sale. Despite repeated demands, however, Glicerio refused t o deliver the entire property to the Spouses Mariano. The spouses filed a case f or recovery against Brioso. The occupants of the land, heirs of Brioso, contende d that the Marianos lost their standing on the property since Glicerio Brioso, as signed the deed of the house to his son. Briosos also contended that Land Bank sh ould be impleaded. ISSUE: Whether there was a valid substitution of deceased Gli cerio Non-compliance with the rule on substitution of a deceased party renders t he proceedings and judgment of the trial court infirm because the court acquired no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal representatives or of the heirs o n whom the trial and the judgment would be binding. In other words, a party s ri ght to due process is at stake. In the instant case, it is true that the trial c ourt, after receiving a notice of Glicerio s death, failed to order the appearan ce of his legal representative or heirs. Instead, the trial court issued an Orde r merely admitting respondents motion for substitution. There was no court orde r for Glicerio s legal representative to appear, nor did any such legal represen tative ever appear in court to be substituted for Glicerio. Neither did the resp ondents ever procure the appointment of such legal representative, nor did Glice rio s heirs ever ask to be substituted for Glicerio. Clearly, the trial court fa iled to observe the proper procedure in substituting Glicerio. As a result, cont rary to the Court of Appeals decision, no valid substitution transpired in the present case. HELD: FACTS: 42 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 3 ISMAEL MATHAY vs. CONSOLIDATED BANK AND TRUST COMPANY FACTS: Petitioners filed a case for a class suit against Consolidated Mines Inc. . They were former stock holders of the company. Consolidated Mines sent a board resolution requiring stockholders to signify to a special subscription which au thorized a loan of the company to Metrobank. The parties in the suit contended t hat the consolidated mines fraudulently filed a certification to the loan. Conso lidated mines questions Mathay et als capacity to institute a class suit. ISSUE: HELD: Whether or not petitioners have the capacity to institute a class suit. The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are accordingly: (1) that the subject matter of the controversy be one of common or general interest to many persons, and (2) that such persons be so numerous as to make it impracti cable to bring them all to the court. An action does not become a class suit mer ely because it is designated as such in the pleadings. Whether the suit is or is not a class quit depends upon the attending facts, and the complaint, or other pleading initiating the class action should allege the existence of the necessar y facts, to wit, the existence of a subject matter of common interest, and the e xistence of a class and the number of persons in the alleged class, 3 in order t hat the court might be enabled to determine whether the members of the class are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, to contrast the number appearing on the record with the number in the class and to determine whether claimants on record adequately represent the class and the sub ject matter of general or common interest By the phrase subject matter pertains to the physical facts. The thing real or personal and not the delict committed. Th us, petitioners do not have the capacity to institute a class suit. 43 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 3 ORTIGAS & COMPANY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP vs. HON. VIVENCIO M. RUIZ FACTS: Petitioner is the duly registered owner of several adjacent parcels of la nd. Pedro del Rosario filed a class suit on behalf of 104 other residents seekin g the titles of petitioner to be held null and void. Inocencio Bernardo et al al so filed a classs suit against the same petitioner s construction of fences and high walls, roads, streets and canals on the land in dispute. ISSUE: HELD: Wheth er or not the class suits were proper. A class suit is not proper in this case as such presupposes a common and general interest by several plaintiffs in a single specific thing under Section 12, Rul e 3 of the Rules of Court. Consequently, it cannot be maintained when each of th ose impleaded as alleged plaintiffs "has only a special or particular interest i n the specific thing completely different from another thing in which the defend ants have a like interest." It is not a case where one or more may sue for the b enefit of all or where the representation of class interest affected by the judg ment or decree is indispensable to make each member of the class an actual party In the case at bar, a class suit would not lie because each of the defendants h as an interest only in the particular portion of the land he is actually occupyi ng, and not in the portions individually occupied by the other defendants. They do not have a common or general interest in the subject matter of the controvers y 44 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 3 NEWSWEEK, INC., petitioner, vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, FACTS: Private respondents, incorporated sugarcane planters in Negros Occidental claiming to have 8,500 members and several individual sugar planters, filed Civ il Case No. 15812 in their own behalf and/or as a class suit in behalf of all su garcane planters in the province of Negros Occidental, against petitioner and tw o of petitioners non-resident Newsweek correspondents Fred Bruning and Barry Ca me. The complaint alleged that petitioner and the other defendants committed lib el against them by the publication of the article "An Island of Fear" in the Feb ruary 23, 1981 issue of petitioner s weekly news magazine Newsweek. The article supposedly portrayed the island province of Negros Occidental as a place dominat ed by big landowners or sugarcane planters who not only exploited the impoverish ed and underpaid sugarcane workers/laborers, but also brutalized and killed them with impunity. Complainants therein alleged that said article, taken as a whole , showed a deliberate and malicious use of falsehood, slanted presentation and/o r misrepresentation of facts intended to put them (sugarcane planters) in bad li ght, expose them to public ridicule, discredit and humiliation here in the Phili ppines and abroad, and make them objects of hatred, contempt and hostility of th eir agricultural workers and of the public in general. ISSUE: HELD: Whether or n ot a class suit is proper. The class suit is not proper. In the case of Corpuz and Cuaderno, the court has ruled that in order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim mu st be identifiable. For a defamation to be directed at a particular class, it is essential that the allegation must be so sweeping and all embracing that an ind ividual can prove that a defamatory statement is directed to him. The disputed p ortion not the articles which he claims to be libelous was never pointed out. 45 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE OPOSA Rule 3 vs. FACTORAN FACTS: A Civil Case was filed before Regional Trial Court. The principal plainti ffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. The original defendant was the Honorable Ful gencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Environment and Natural Resources Secretary. His s ubstitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala , was subsequently ordered upon proper motion. The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers class suit and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use an d enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country s virgin tropic al rainforests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally co ncerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn." Conse quently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered, ordering defendant to cance l all existing timber license agreements in the country. Factoran filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint stating the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and the issue is a political question which properly pertains to the legisl ative or executive branches. Subsequently, respondent Judge issued an order gran ting the motion to dismiss. The respondent Judge ruled that the granting of the reliefs prayed for would impair contracts. Plaintiffs thus filed the instant spe cial civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court asking for rescission and setting aside the dismissal order since the respondent Judge grav ely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. ISSUE: HELD: Whether or not a class suit was the proper course of action taken. The civil case is indeed a class suit. The case however has a special and novel element. The personality of the minors to sue for the succeeding generations is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as a balanced a nd healthful ecology is concerned. Every generation has a responsibility to pres erve the ecology. The minors right to a sound environment constitutes at the same time the performance of the obligation to ensure the protection of the rights o r the generations to come. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Co nsequently, since the parties are so numerous, it becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare t hat the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the fi ling of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Cour t are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latte r being but an incident to the former. 46 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 4 VENUE OF ACTIONS 47 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY Rule 4 v. THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL FACTS: Petitioner filed an action in the Court of First Instance for the condemn ation of certain real estate. Petitioner alleged in its complaint that it was au thorized by law to construct a railroad line from Paniqui to Tayug in the Provin ce of Tarlac, and that it is for the purpose of condemning lands for the constru ction for such line that the action was brought. After filing and duly serving t he complaint on the defendants, who were persons having interest in the land in question, Petitioner, pending determination of the action, took possession of an d occupied the lands described in the complaint, built its line, and put the sam e in operation. A week before the date set for hearing of the case, Petitioner g ave notice to the defendants that it would move for a dismissal of the action on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter, since it had just ascertained that the lands actually were situated in Nueva Ecija, inst ead of the Province of Tarlac. The trial court dismissed the action upon such gr ound presented by Petitioner. From such pronouncement, this appeal was taken. IS SUE: Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over lands HELD: It was the intention of the Philippine Commission to give to the Courts of First Instance the most perfect and complete jurisdiction possible over the subject matters men tioned in connection therewith. Such jurisdiction is not made to depend upon loc ality. There is no suggestion of limitation. The jurisdiction is universal. The law provides simply that certain actions affecting real estate "shall be brought in the province where the land, or some part thereof, is situated." The prohibi tion here is clearly directed against the one who begins the action and lays the venue. The court, before the action is commenced, has nothing to do with either . The plaintiff does both. Only when that is done does the section begin to oper ate effectively so far as the court is concerned. The prohibition is nor a limit ation on the power of the court but on the rights of the plaintiff. It is not to take something from the court but to grant something to the defendant. Its word ing clearly deprives the court of nothing which it had, but gives the defendant, as against the plaintiff, certain rights which he did not have. It establishes a relation not between the court and the subject, after, but between the plainti ff and the defendant. It relates not to jurisdiction but to trial. It touches co nvenience, not substance. It simply gives to defendant the unqualified right, if he desires it, to have the trial take place where his land lies and where, prob ably, all of his witnesses live. Its object is to secure to him a convenient tri al. 48 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 4 HEIRS OF PEDRO LOPEZ v. HONESTO DE CASTRO FACTS: Two separate actions for registration were lodged over the same parcel of land. The first action was instituted in the then Court of First Instance of Ca vite in 1956 by Pedro Lopez, et al. The second action, meanwhile, was filed befo re the then Court of First Instance of Cavite in Tagaytay City sometime in 1967 by Honest de Castro, et al. The first case encountered a lot of opposition first from the Municipality of Silang, Cavite, since it alleges that a portion of the land sought to be registered had been leased to private persons, and was in fac t the formers patrimonial property, to which the applicants answered that the who le of the land passed to them by inheritance. The municipality sought for a dism issal of the application for registration, which the court denied. The court rea soned that even if the land was the property of the Municipality of Silang, by v irtue of its incorporation into the city of Tagaytay, it became property of the latter. Thus, according to the court, the municipality of Silang has no personal ity to appear in the proceedings. In 1971, after due investigation regarding the application, the court accordingly rendered a decision approving the applicatio n and ordering the issuance of a corresponding decree of registration to Lopez, et al. In the second case, meanwhile, although the application for registration was filed only in 1967, or 11 years after the filing of the first action, the co urt of Tagaytay City promulgated a decision in 1968 adjudicating the land in fav or of de Castro, et al. De Castro, et al. claim that pursuant to Republic Act 37 49, the Tagaytay court held jurisdiction now over the case, and as such, was the proper venue for any action involving registration of lands covered by its juri sdiction. ISSUE: HELD: Whether or not the trial court was divested of its jurisd iction. It has been submitted that a court having territorial jurisdiction over the prop erty should take cognizance of its registration, upon the creation of the Tagayt ay City branch, Pedro Lopez, et al.s application for registration should have bee n transferred to that court inasmuch as the property involved is located in that city. It appears, however, that the Cavite City branch remained the venue of pe titioners application for registration, according to RA 3749. Notably, the law is not clear on whether or not the phrase "in the same place" refers to the judi cial district/province or the place where a branch of the court is stationed. He nce, considering the general rule that once a court acquires jurisdiction over a case it remains with that court until its full termination, the phrase "in the same place" should be interpreted as referring to the province of Cavite. The Ca vite City branch of the CFI of Cavite thus correctly retained jurisdiction over the application for registration because there was no jurisdictional question in volved in the proceedings in Land Registration Case No. 299. What was in questio n was whether the Cavite City branch of the Cavite CFI was the proper venue for said case upon the creation of the Tagaytay City branch. Venue is procedural, no t jurisdictional, and hence may be waived. It is meant to provide convenience to the parties, rather than restrict their access to the courts as it relates to t he place of trial. 49 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 4 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GLASGOW CREDIT AND COLLECTION SERVICES, INC. and CITYSTATE SAVINGS BANK, INC. FA CTS: Petitioner filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Manila for civi l forfeiture of assets with urgent plea for issuance of TRO and/or writ of preli minary injunction against the bank deposits maintained by Glasgow Credit and Col lection Servicesin Citystate Savings Bank, Inc.. Acting on the plea for the issu ance of a TRO, the RTC Manila issued a 72-hour TRO, and the case was raffled for hearing. The summons intended for Glasgow remained unserved, as it could no lon ger be found at its last address, and left no forwarding address. Subsequently, the OSG received a copy of Glasgows Motion to Dismiss by Way of Special Appearanc e, alleging that the court had no jurisdiction over its person as summons had no t been duly served upon it, among others. The Republic opposed such motion, cont ending that the action is quasi in rem where jurisdiction over the person of the defendant was not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction upon the court. The tri al court dismissed the case on the ground of improper venue as it should have be en filed in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. ISSUE: Whether or not the complai nt was correctly dismissed due to improper venue. HELD: The Supreme Court issued A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC, the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture. The o rder dismissing the Republics complaint for civil forfeiture of Glasgows account i n CSBI has not yet attained finality on account of the pendency of this appeal. Thus, the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture applies to the Republics complaint. Moreover, Glasgow itself judicially admitted that the Rule of Proced ure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture is "applicable to the instant case." Section 3, Title II (Civil Forfeiture in the Regional Trial Court) of the Rule of Procedur e in Cases of Civil Forfeiture provides that a petition for civil forfeiture sha ll be filed in any regional trial court of the judicial region where the monetar y instrument, property or proceeds representing, involving, or relating to an un lawful activity or to a money laundering offense are located; provided, however, that where all or any portion of the monetary instrument, property or proceeds is located outside the Philippines, the petition may be filed in the regional tr ial court in Manila or of the judicial region where any portion of the monetary instrument, property, or proceeds is located, at the option of the petitioner. U nder Section 3, Title II of the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture, therefore, the venue of civil forfeiture cases is any RTC of the judicial region where the monetary instrument, property or proceeds representing, involving, or relating to an unlawful activity or to a money laundering offense are located. Pasig City, where the account sought to be forfeited in this case is situated, i s within the National Capital Judicial Region (NCJR). Clearly, the complaint for civil forfeiture of the account may be filed in any RTC of the NCJR. Since the RTC Manila is one of the RTCs of the NCJR, it was a proper venue of the Republics complaint for civil forfeiture of Glasgows account. 50 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 4 POLYTRADE CORPORATION v. VICTORIANO BLANCO FACTS: Petitioner initiated a suit for collection of money against Victoriano Bl anco, in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan of the place where the latter re sided. Blanco filed a motion to dismiss the action on the ground of improper ven ue since, he claims, according to the contract, suit may be lodged in the courts of Manila. This Motion was denied by the CFI of Bulacan and rendered judgment a gainst Victoriano. ISSUE: Whether or not venue was properly laid in Bulacan HELD : According to Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court on venue of personal actions triable by courts of first instance and this is one provides that such " actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides , at the election of the plaintiff." Qualifying this provision in Section 3 of t he same Rule which states that venue may be stipulated by written agreement "By written agreement of the parties the venue of an action may be changed or transf erred from one province to another." No such stipulation appears in the contract s covering the first two causes of action. The general rule set forth in Section 2 (b), Rule 4, governs, and as to said two causes of action, venue was properly laid in Bulacan, the province of defendant s residence. The stipulation adverte d to is only found in the agreements covering the third and fourth causes of act ion. An accurate reading, however, of the stipulation, "The parties agree to sue and be sued in the Courts of Manila," does not preclude the filing of suits in the residence of plaintiff or defendant. The plain meaning is that the parties m erely consented to be sued in Manila. Qualifying or restrictive words which woul d indicate that Manila and Manila alone is the venue are totally absent therefro m. We cannot read into that clause that plaintiff and defendant bound themselves to file suits with respect to the last two transactions in question only or exc lusively in Manila. For, that agreement did not change or transfer venue. It sim ply is permissive. The parties solely agreed to add the courts of Manila as trib unals to which they may resort. They did not waive their right to pursue remedy in the courts specifically mentioned in Section 2(b) of Rule 4. Renuntiatio non praesumitur. 51 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 4 UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION v. ALBERT LIM FACTS: Petitioner corporation sold to Albert Lim grocery products in the totalin g more than P800 thousand pesos. After tendering partial payments, Lim refused t o settle his obligation despite repeated demands from Universal Robina. This pro mpted the latter to file with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, a complai nt against Lim for a sum money. A month after the case was instituted, the RTC i ssued an Order dismissing the complaint motu proprio on grounds of lack of juris diction and improper venue. Universal Robina accordingly filed an amended compla int alleging that the parties agreed that the proper venue for any dispute relat ive to the transaction is Quezon City. The trial court granted the motion and ad mitted the amended complaint. Summons was served on Lim thereafter, however, the latter failed to file an answer within the prescribed period. The trial court, upon motion of Universal Robina, declared Lim in default and allowed the former to present evidence ex parte. However, the trial court, still unsure whether ven ue was properly laid, issued an Order directing Universal Robina to file memoran dum of authorities on whether it can file a complaint in Quezon City. Still unde cided concerning the venue of actions, the trial court dismissed the complaint o n the ground of improper venue. ISSUE: Whether or not improper venue is a proper ground for dismissal. HELD: Indeed, it was grossly erroneous for the trial cour t to have taken a procedural short-cut by dismissing motu proprio the complaint on the ground of improper venue without first allowing the procedure outlined in the rules of court to take its proper course. Although we are for the speedy an d expeditious resolution of cases, justice and fairness take primary importance. The ends of justice require that respondent trial court faithfully adhere to th e rules of procedure to afford not only the defendant, but the plaintiff as well , the right to be heard on his cause. Rules of Court explicitly provide that imp roper venue not impleaded in the motion to dismiss or in the answer is deemed wa ived. Thus, a court may not dismiss an action motu proprio on the ground of impr oper venue as it is not one of the grounds wherein the court may dismiss an acti on motu proprio on the basis of the pleadings. A trial court may not motu propri o dismiss a complaint on the ground of improper venue, thus: Dismissing the comp laint on the ground of improper venue is certainly not the appropriate course of action at this stage of the proceedings, particularly as venue, in inferior cou rts as well as in the courts of first instance (now RTC), may be waived expressl y or impliedly. Where the defendant fails to challenge timely the venue in a mot ion to dismiss as provided by Section 4 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, and all ows the trial to be held and a decision to be rendered, he cannot on appeal or i n a special action be permitted to belatedly challenge the wrong venue, which is deemed waived. 52 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 4 PACIFIC CONSULTANTS INTERNATIONAL ASIA, INC. v. KLAUS SCHONFELD FACTS: Private respondent was hired as a Sector Manager of Pacicon Philippines, Inc., a subsidiary of Pacific Consultants International in the Philippines, to c onsult in services for water and sanitation in the Philippines. Pacific Consulta nts transmitted a Letter of Employment to respondent, who accepted the same whil e making a few minor modifications. Contract states that in case of any question or dispute arising between parties, the proper venue for such action would be t he Court of Arbitration in London. Respondent was issued an Alien Employment Per mit by the Department of Labor and Employment, which permit was applied for by P PI, and went on to serve for over a year. Upon notice of termination from Pacifi c, respondent filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal. Pa cific argued that the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the case, as respon dent was an alien, and that according to the contract of employment, the London Court would be the proper venue, or the Court in Tokyo, Japan where Pacific Cons ultants held office, or even in Canada, which was respondents home state. The Lab or Arbiter, as well as the NLRC gave due course to the petition to dismiss filed by Pacific Consultants and dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Court of App eals reversed. ISSUE: Whether or not a clause in a contract can validly limit th e venue of an action. In the instant case, no restrictive words like were stated in the contract. It cannot be said that the court of arbitration in London is a n exclusive venue to bring forth any complaint arising out of the employment con tract. The settled rule on stipulations regarding venueis that while they are co nsidered valid and enforceable, venue stipulations in a contract do not, as a ru le, supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court in the absence of qualifying or restrictive words. They should be considered me rely as an agreement or additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place. They are not exclusive but, rather permissive. If the intention of the p arties were to restrict venue, there must be accompanying language clearly and c ategorically expressing their purpose and design that actions between them be li tigated only at the place named by them. Pacific Consultants contend that Schonf eld should have filed his Complaint in his place of permanent residence, or wher e Pacific Consultant holds its principal office, at the place where the contract of employment was signed, in London as stated in their contract. By enumerating possible venues where Schonfeld could have filed his complaint, however, Pacifi c Consultants itself admitted that the provision on venue in the employment cont ract is indeed merely permissive. HELD: 53 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 6 KINDS OF PLEADINGS 54 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 6 PRO-LINE SPORTS CENTER v. COURT OF APPEALS, et al. FACTS: Petitioner instituted a criminal case against Universal Athletics and Ind ustrial Products, Inc. for Unfair Competition, claiming that the latter was manu facturing fake Spalding balls. A search warrant was issued after having been duly applied for, and during the search, machineries and equipment used in the manufa cture of said fake balls were placed under judicial custody. However, the case w as dismissed with finality since the element of actual sale to the public of suc h goods was not proven by Pro-Line. After dismissal, Universal filed a civil sui t for damages against Pro-Line for alleged malicious and baseless prosecution, c iting the application for the search warrant, the actual search, and the seizure of the equipment of Universal, among other grounds. Pro-Line naturally denied a ll allegations in the complaint. Further, it also filed a counterclaim for damag es based mainly on the unauthorized and illegal manufacture by Universal of fake Spalding balls. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of the claim of Universal, while dismissing at the same time Pro-Lines counter claim. ISSUE: Whether or not the counterclaim should be sustained. HELD: Counterclaim for damages by the Pro-Line based on the illegal and unauthorized manufacture of "Spalding" balls certainly constitutes an independent cause of ac tion which can be the subject of a separate complaint for damages against Univer sal. However, this separate civil action cannot anymore be pursued as it is alre ady barred by res judicata, the judgment in the criminal case (against Universal ) involving both the criminal and civil aspects of the case for unfair competiti on. To recall, petitioner ProLine, upon whose initiative the criminal action for unfair competition against respondent Universal was filed, did not institute a separate civil action for damages nor reserve its right to do so. Thus the civil aspect for damages was deemed instituted in the criminal case. No better manife station of the intent of petitioner to recover damages in the criminal case can be expressed than their active participation in the prosecution of the civil asp ect of the criminal case through the intervention of their private prosecutor. O bviously, such intervention could only be for the purpose of recovering damages or indemnity because the offended party is not entitled to represent the People of the Philippines in the prosecution of a public offense. A counterclaim partak es of the nature of a complaint and/or a cause of action against the plaintiffs. It is in itself a distinct and independent cause of action, so that when proper ly stated as such, the defendant becomes, in respect to the matter stated by him , an actor, and there are two simultaneous actions pending between the same part ies, where each is at the same time both a plaintiff and defendant. A countercla im stands on the same footing and is to be tested by the same rules, as if it we re an independent action. 55 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 6 FELIPE YULIENCO v. COURT OF APPEALS and ADVANCE CAPITAL CORPORATION FACT: An action for collection of a sum of money based on promissory notes was f iled by private respondent against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court. Petit ioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of litis pendentia since another c ase between the same parties was then being tried in the RTC of Makati. Private respondent claims that the two cases are not the same, in that they involve diff erent causes of action, i.e. different promissory notes. The trial court agreed with private respondent. On petition for certiorari, prohibition and/or injuncti on, Yulienco claimed private respondent is barred from instituting the case file d with the Quezon City RTC since it should have been filed as a compulsory count erclaim in the Makati case. Private respondent, for its part, maintains that the two cases are distinct and separate from each other since the Quezon City case is an ordinary collection suit, while the Makati case is for injunction, and tha t the two cases involve different promissory notes. The Court of Appeals denied said petition and affirmed the decision of the trial court. ISSUE: HELD: Whether or not the suit for collection of money was proper. A counterclaim is defined as any claim for money or other relief which a defendi ng party may have against an opposing party. The Makati case is basically an inj unction suit, a petition for prohibition. On the other hand, the Quezon City sui t is an ordinary action for collection of sums of money. In the former, Yulienco essentially seeks to prohibit or enjoin the disposition and/or sale of his prop erty, the proceeds of which will answer for his unpaid obligations to ACC. Promi ssory notes are also involved in that case but they are specifically identified as different, and are intimately related to or secured by the real estate mortga ges. In the Quezon City case, ACC simply seeks to collect from YULIENCO his unpa id monetary obligations covered by specific but unsecured Promissory Notes. Need less to say, they are not the promissory notes subject of the first action. Neit her are they substantially, intimately and reasonably relevant to nor even remot ely connected with the promissory notes and the cause of action in the injunctio n suit. Simply put, the promissory notes in both cases differ from and are not r elated to each other. There is, therefore, a dissimilarity in the subject matter of both cases arising from separate and distinct transactions and necessarily r equiring different evidence to support the divergent claims. More importantly, t he "one compelling test of compulsoriness" i.e., the logical relationship betwee n the claim and counterclaim, does not apply here. To reiterate, there is no log ical relationship between Yulienco s petition for injunctive relief and ACC s co llection suit, hence separate trials of the respective claims of the parties wil l not entail a substantial duplication of effort and time as the factual and/or legal issues involved, as already explained, are dissimilar and distinct. 56 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 6 CONSUELO V. CALO v. AJAX INTERNATIONAL, INCORPORATED Petitioner ordered from Ajax International, Inc. several feet of John Shaw wire rope. Upon delivery of the wire rope, petitioner found out that it was short of 30 feet, which prompted her to communicate with Ajax for either completion of de livery or account adjustment in view of the undelivered wire rope. Petitioner di d not receive any response from Ajax, and instead, a complaint was filed for col lection of sum of money was against her by one Adolfo Benavides (Benavides), who claimed to have acquired the outstanding credit account of petitioner from Ajax . Subsequently, a judgment by default was entered, and a writ of execution was i ssued against petitioner. A petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus wa s applied for which was granted and the case was remanded for further proceeding s. Petitioner then filed a complaint against Ajax asking for completion of deliv ery or that she be relieved from paying for the 300 feet of wire rope which rema ined undelivered, which complaint included a prayer for damages. Ajax moved for dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject of the present suit was int imately related to the case between Benavides and petitioner, which motion was g ranted by the court, which found Calos claim to be a compulsory counter-claim, wh ich should be filed in the Benavides case. ISSUE: Whether or not the claim is in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim The dismissal of the complaint by the c ourt because of the pendency of the Benavides case is based on the supposition t hat formers claim is a compulsory counter-claim that should be filed in the latte r case. There is no question that it arises out of the same transaction which is the basis of Benavides complaint and does not require the presence of third part ies over whom the municipal court could not acquire jurisdiction. However, Calo s claim is not a compulsory counterclaim in the Benavides case for the simple re ason that the amount thereof exceeds the jurisdiction of the municipal court. Th e rule that a compulsory counterclaim not set up is barred, when applied to the municipal court, presupposes that the amount involved is within the said court s jurisdiction. As noted, it would come to the absurd situation where a claim mus t be filed with the municipal court which it is prohibited from taking cognizanc e of, being beyond its jurisdiction. Besides, the reason underlying the rule, wh ich is to settle all related controversies in one sitting only, does not obtain. For, even if the counterclaim in excess of the amount cognizable by the inferio r court is set up, the defendant cannot obtain positive relief. The Rules allow this only for the defendant to prevent plaintiff from recovering from him. This means that should the court find both plaintiff s complaint and defendant s coun terclaim (for an amount exceeding said court s jurisdiction) meritorious, it wil l simply dismiss the complaint on the ground that defendant has a bigger credit. Since defendant still has to institute a separate action for the remaining bala nce of his counterclaim, the previous litigation did not really settle all relat ed controversies. HELD: FACTS: 57 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 6 ALBERTO T. REYES v. THE COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO KALAW, JR. Petitioners were the lessees of a building owned by Teodoro Kalaw. Petitioners r eceived notices to vacate the premises to give way for the demolition of the bui lding in order that a new one may be erected thereon. A total of three notices w ere sent out by Kalaw to remind his tenants of the impending demolition. The las t notice gave Petitioners 24 hours within which to leave the premises. As schedu led, Kalaw began the demolition of the building, and fenced the area around it. The tenants, who were still occupying the premises, filed a complaint for forcib le entry and detainer with the City Court, praying for a writ of preliminary inj unction, and damages. Kalaw counterclaimed for ejectment and damages for alleged loss of the use of the premises. The City Court rendered a decision in favor Pe titioners which Kalaw appealed to the then Court of First Instance. The CFI reve rsed the decision of the City Court and ordered Petitioners to vacate the premis es, and to pay the rentals which fell due during the suit. Such decision was aff irmed by the Court of Appeals with an additional award of temperate damages in f avor of Kalaw. Petitioners contest the award of such damages, arguing that since such damages were not raised during the trial at the City Court, the same may n ot be awarded by the Court of Appeals. ISSUE: Whether or not the failure to clai m temperate damages level prohibits a claim for the same in a separate action. H ELD: Since temperate damages are neither "rents" nor "reasonable compensation fo r the use and occupation of the premises," nor "fair rental value" as above-stat ed, and since the agreed rental itself was adjudged in favor of Kalaw, the Supre me Court is constrained to deny the temperate damages awarded by the Court of Ap peals.The Rules expressly provide that upon appeal from the judgment of a justic e of the peace to the court of first instance, the ease shall stand for trial de novo (Section 9, Rule 40). This provision has been interpreted to mean that par ties are prevented from raising issues in the court of first instance which were not raised in the justice of the peace court. While said damages arose out of, or are necessarily connected with, the same transaction or occurrence which was the wrongful withholding of possession, they are not a compulsory counterclaim b ecause they exceed the jurisdiction of the inferior court. A compulsory counterc laim is barred if not set up, when applied to municipal courts presupposes that the amount involved is within the said court s jurisdiction. The reason for the rule relating to counterclaims is to avoid multiplicity of suits and to dispose of the whole matter in controversy in one action. This reason, however, does not obtain where the amount exceeds the jurisdiction of the inferior court. FACTS: 58 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 6 ALICE A.I. SANDEJAS v. SPS. ARTURO IGNACIO, JR. and EVELYN IGNACIO A blank check was left by Arturo Igmacio in the possession of his sisters, Rosit a and Alice Sandejas intended for the payment of the lease of a property, for th e benefit of his nephew, Benjamin Espiritu. The amount and the date of the check were left blank because Arturo did not know the details of the renewal of the a foresaid lease. The sisters, believing that Rosita was entitled to Three Million Pesos from Arturo, by virtue of the sale of a property which they allegedly coowned, went to the Security Bank and Trust Company to open a joint account, in w hich they deposited the said blank check, which they filled in by writing the am ount of Three Million Pesos. In this transaction, Alice got her driver, Kudera, to stand in as Dr. Borja, the payee of the check. No ID was required of Kudera p ursuant to the standing policy of the bank, and the check was thereafter validly cleared. When the time came that Arturo questioned such transaction, the whole amount of Three Million had already been withdrawn by Rosita and Alice. Subseque ntly, a complaint was filed by Arturo and his wife for recovery of a sum of mone y, against SBTC and its officers, and Alice, Rosita, and Benjamin. Alice and Ros ita filed their respective answers, in which Rosita interposed a counterclaim in hers, owing to the alleged Three Million that Arturo did not give her, but shou ld have, in light of the sale of the property they co-owned. ISSUE: Whether or n ot the counterclaim is merely permissive. HELD: The Supreme Court has laid down the following tests to determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not, to wit: (1) Are the issues of fact or law raised by the claim and the counterclaim largely the same? (2) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants cla ims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (3) Will substantially the same ev idence support or refute plaintiffs claim as well as the defendants counterclaim ? And, (4) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim, such that the conduct of separate trials of the respective claims of the partie s would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and t he court? Court agrees with the view of the RTC that Rosita s counterclaim for t he recovery of her alleged share in the sale of the property is permissive in na ture. The evidence needed to prove respondents claim to recover the amount of T hree Million Pesos from petitioners is different from that required to establish Rosita s demands for the recovery of her alleged share in the sale of the subje ct property. The recovery of respondents claim is not contingent or dependent u pon the establishment of Rosita s counterclaim such that conducting separate tri als will not result in the substantial duplication of the time and effort of the court and the parties. FACTS: 59 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 7 PARTS OF A PLEADINGS 60 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 7 SOLID HOMES, INC. v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and EVELYN VERGEL DE DIOS FACTS: Respondents applied with the Department of Environment and Natural Resour ces, a Small Scale Mining Permit, over a parcel of land, which belonged to Solid Homes, Inc.. Thus, Solid Homes, filed a protest with the DENR regarding such pe rmit. Upon the lapse of the permit, or after two years, the case still had not b een settled by the DENR. While its protest was under consideration, Solid Homes also filed an application for a Small Scale Mining Permit of its own. However, s uch application was not accepter due to the pending protest it had filed. The sa me year, the protest was dismissed by the DENR, which was properly appealed by S olid Homes. While the appeal was pending, Solid Homes filed a complaint for quie ting of title with the Regional Trial Court. Among its prayers, Solid Homes soug ht for the issuance of a TRO, and after due hearing, for a writ of preliminary i njunction against Evelyn. The trial court dismissed the application for a writ o f preliminary injunction on the ground of forum shopping. The Court of Appeals a ffirmed such finding. ISSUE: HELD: It is not the caption of the pleading but the allegations therein that determine the nature of the action and the Court shall grant relief warranted by the allegations and the proof even if no such relief is prayed for. When petitioner filed a complaint for quieting of title with the Regional Trial Court, it still had a pending appeal with the DENR regarding the denial of its protest over the grant of a mining permit to private respondent ov er the subject property. There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adv erse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion other than by appea l or certiorari in another. The principle applies not only with respect to suits filed in courts but also in connection with litigations commenced in the courts while an administrative processes and in anticipation of an unfavorable adminis trative ruling and a favorable court ruling. This is specially so, as in this ca se, where the court in which the second suit was brought, has no jurisdiction. f orum-shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. Consequen tly, where a litigant sues the same party against whom another action or actions for the alleged violation of the same right and the enforcement of the same rel ief is/are still pending, the defense of litis pedentia in one case is a bar to the others; and, a final judgment in one would constitute res judicata and thus would cause the dismissal of the rest. In either case, forum-shopping could be c ited by the other party as a ground to ask for summary dismissal of the two or m ore complaints or petitions, and for the imposition of the other sanctions, whic h are direct contempt of court, criminal prosecution, and disciplinary action ag ainst the erring lawyer. Whether or not forum shopping is present in the case. 61 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 7 REYNALDO DE CASTRO v. HON. MANUEL B. FERNANDEZ, JR. FACTS: Petitioner was charged with and convicted of the crime of rape of a minor . From the decision, petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation, praying that the trial court direct the Office of the Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary in vestigation in accordance with the Rules of Court. Reynaldo also asked that the charge filed against him be amended to acts of lasciviousness, instead of rape, claiming that under Republic Act 8353, the act of complained of is not covered a s one of the instances of rape. The trial court denied the Motion for Reinvestig ation, as well as the Motion for Reconsideration. By virtue of such denial, peti tioner brought a Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court, under Rule 65 o f the Rules of Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal taken is the proper actio n. HELD: Reynaldo availed of the wrong remedy in assailing the trial courts Order s. Reynaldo filed before the Court a petition captioned "Petition for Certiorari " and specifically stated that the petition is based on Rule 65. However, petiti oner also stated that the issues raised are pure questions of law, which properl y fall under Rule 45. Under Rule 65, a special civil action for certiorari lies where a court has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In this case, Reynaldo failed to allege any circ umstance which would show that in issuing the assailed Orders, the trial court a cted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Mor eover, following the hierarchy of courts, a special civil action for certiorari assailing an order of the Regional Trial Court should be filed with the Court of Appeals and not with the Supreme Court. He did not raise any special reason or compelling circumstance that would justify direct recourse to this Court. On the other hand, if the petition is to be treated as a petition for review under Rul e 45, the petition would fail because only judgments or final orders that comple tely dispose of the case can be the subject of a petition for review. In this ca se, the assailed Orders are only interlocutory orders. Reynaldo should have proc eeded with the trial of the case and if the trial court renders an unfavorable v erdict, he should assail the Orders as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment to be rendered in this case. Additionally, the pet ition will not prosper because Reynaldo failed to comply with the requirements u nder Rule 45 as to the documents, and their contents, which should accompany the petition. Hence, on the issue alone of the propriety of the remedy sought by pe titioner, this petition must fail. 62 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 7 NELSIE CAETE v. GENUINO ICE COMPANY A complaint for cancellation of title was filed by petitioners against Genuino I ce Company regarding several parcels of land. In the complaint, petitioners alle ged that Genuino Ice, as well as its predecessors-in-interest were never in actu al, adverse, and physical possession of the subject properties. The petitioners alleged that this being the fact of the matter, they are ineligible to have acqu ired the properties pursuant to the Friar Lands Act. Genuino Ice moved to dismis s the complaint, which motion was denied by the trial court. Petitioners filed a Second Amended Complaint, which sought to annul, in addition to the titles alre ady alleged in the complaint, several more titles which Genuino Ice holds. Genui no Ice once again moved for dismissal of the Second Amended Complaint for, among others, lack of a valid cause of action. The trial court denied this second mot ion to dismiss, which prompted Genuino Ice to file a petition for certiorari wit h the Court of Appeals. The CA granted Genuino Ices petition for certiorari, and dismissed the second amended complaint for failure to state a cause of action. I SSUE: Whether or not the complaint properly stated a cause of action HELD: It is axiomatic that the averments of the complaint determine the nature of the actio n, and consequently, the jurisdiction of the courts. This is because the complai nt must contain a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plain tiff s cause of action and must specify the relief sought. No rule is better est ablished than that which requires the complaint to contain a statement of all th e facts constituting the plaintiff s cause of action.The basic rules of proper p leading and procedure require that every pleading shall contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the case may be, o mitting the statement of mere evidentiary facts. A pleading should state the ult imate facts essential to the rights of action or defense asserted, as distinguis hed from mere conclusions of fact, or conclusions of law. General allegations th at a contract is valid or legal, or is just, fair and reasonable, are mere concl usions of law. Likewise, allegations that a contract is void, voidable, invalid, illegal, ultra vires, or against public policy, without stating facts showing i ts invalidity, are mere conclusions of law. In the resolution of a motion to dis miss based on failure to state a cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint as well as its annexes must be considered. The test in such case is wh ether a court can render a valid judgment on the complaint based upon the facts alleged and pursuant to the prayer therein. FACTS: 63 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS BANK Rule 7 v. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: When petitioner Banco Filipino reached the allowable lim it in branch site holdings, pursuant to the General Banking Act, it conceived an d organized Tala Realty as a transferee corporation in order to effectively cont inue to expand its business. Petitioner then sold to Tala Realty some of the for mers branch sites, which it then leased thereafter from Tala Realty. All was goin g well, until Tala Realty demanded payment of increased rentals, deposits and go odwill from petitioner, with a threat of ejectment in case of failure to comply with such demands. However, petitioner alleged that a trust was created by virtu e of the transactions it had with Tala Realty, and that the latter was establish ed only to serve as a corporate medium to warehouse the legal titles of the subj ect properties for the beneficial interest of petitioner. Petitioner failed to c omply prompting Tala Realty filed numerous ejectment suits against the former, a nd compelled petitioner to file seventeen actions for recovery of real propertie s, all of which were uniformly worded in their material allegations. Tala Realty filed separate motions to dismiss, which were granted by the trial court. Petit ioner moved for reconsideration, but the trail court denied such motion. Instead of filing an appeal, however, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the same, on the ground that such recourse to Rule 65 is patently malapropos. ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for certiorari is the proper action. HELD: The proper remedy from the adverse re solutions of the Court of Appeals is an ordinary appeal to this Court via a peti tion for review under Rule 45 and not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. T he availability to Banco Filipino of the remedy of a petition for review from th e decision of the Court of Appeals effectively foreclosed its right to resort to a petition for certiorari. a\ special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Certiorari is not allowed when a party to a case fails t o appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy. The remedies of app eal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. In the case at bar, Banco Filipino has failed to show any valid reason why the issu es raised in its petition for certiorari could not have been raised on appeal. T o justify its resort to a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, it erroneously claims that an appeal is not a speedy and adequate remedy because fu rther delay in the disposition of this case would effectively deprive Banco Fili pino of the full use and enjoyment of its properties. However, the further delay that would inadvertently result from the dismissal of the instant petition is o ne purely of Banco Filipino s own doing. The Supreme Court cannot countenance an intentional departure from established rules of procedure simply to accommodate a case that has long been pending in the courts of law because of the party s o wn fault or negligence. 64 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 7 GLICERIA SARMIENTO v. EMERITA ZARATAN Petitioner filed an ejectment case against respondent Emerita Zaratan, in which judgment was rendered in favor of Sarmiento by the trial court. Respondent accor dingly filed her notice of appeal, and pursuant to such, the Regional Trial Cour t directed Respondent to submit her memorandum in accordance with the Rules of C ourt. On the last day for filing such memorandum, Respondents counsel filed a mot ion for extension of time within which to file said memorandum, which was not ac ted upon in due time. Nevertheless, six days after the lapse of the fifteen-day reglementary period, Respondent filed her memorandum. The trial court dismissed the appeal on the ground of the filing of the requisite memorandum after the lap se of the reglementary period for perfecting an appeal. Respondent moved for rec onsideration of such dismissal, which motion was denied by the RTC. Aggrieved, R espondent filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was g ranted, and in effect nullified and set aside the Orders of the RTC, and the rei nstatement of Respondents appeal. From this pronouncement, Sarmiento filed a moti on for reconsideration, alleging that in terms of procedure, there was a fatal e rror committed by Respondent when the latter, in the verification, stated that R espondent was the respondent, when in fact, she was the petitioner, thus implyin g that Respondent did not understand what she was signing. According to Sarmient o, this defect of the verification renders the petition without legal effect. IS SUE: Whether or not such defect in the verification is a fatal defect which meri ts outright dismissal of the case A verification is required to secure an assura nce that the allegations of the petition have been made in good faith, or are tr ue and correct, not merely speculative. This requirement is simply a condition a ffecting the form of pleadings and non-compliance therewith does not necessarily render it fatally defective. Perusal of the verification in question shows ther e was sufficient compliance with the requirements of the Rules and the alleged d efects are not so material as to justify the dismissal of the petition in the Co urt of Appeals. The defects are mere typographical errors. There appears to be n o intention to circumvent the need for proper verification and certification, wh ich are intended to assure the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations i n the petition and to discourage forum shopping. HELD: FACTS: 65 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS Rule 7 v. and TF KO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Private respondents secured several loans and credit accommodations from various banks after being granted by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board the nece ssary license to construct and sell low-cost housing units. One of the creditor banks was the Far East Bank and Trust Company, which was the predecessor-in-inte rest of the Bank of the Philippine Isalnds, herein petitioner. Private responden ts averred, in its petition for declaration in the state of suspension of paymen ts with approval of the proposed rehabilitation plan, that some of its creditor banks, including BPI, had already commenced foreclosure proceedings on the prope rties given to secure its loans. Such foreclosure proceedings were pending at th e time Private respondents filed its above-mentioned petition. The trial court i ssued a Stay Order to prohibit the enforcement of all claims against Private res pondents, upon finding that the latters petition was sufficient in form and in su bstance. It also appointed one Pedro Suson as rehabilitation receiver. BPI filed its Verified Comment on Private respondentss petition, and, after due trial and hearing, the trial court decided in favor of Private respondents. BPI then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which denied the same on the g round of a number of procedural errors, one of them being the lack of signature of the authorized person in the verification and certification against forum-sho pping. ISSUE: Whether or not such defect grants an outright denial of the petiti on for review HELD: The requirement regarding verification of a pleading is form al, not jurisdictional. Such requirement is simply a condition affecting the for m of the pleading, non-compliance with which does not necessarily render the ple ading fatally defective. Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in g ood faith. The court may order the correction of the pleading if verification is lacking or act on the pleading although it is not verified, if the attending ci rcumstances are such that strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served. While petitioner attac hed to the petition for review the requisite verification and certification agai nst forum shopping, the same did not show that the signatory therein was duly au thorized by petitioner. However, the lapse was rectified when petitioner submitt ed the necessary board resolution and special power of attorney upon the filing of the motion for reconsideration. A perusal of the petition for review before t he Court of Appeals reveals that the case should have been properly determined o n the merits instead of being dismissed outright. As abovementioned, the "proced ural lapses" cited by the appellate court were either not supported by the recor ds of the case or would not have warranted the outright dismissal of the case. I n denying due course to the petition, the appellate court gave premium to form a nd failed to consider the important rights of the parties in the case at bar. At the very least, petitioner substantially complied with the procedural requireme nts for appeal, hence, it is best to give due course to the petition. 66 P a g e FACTS: COURT OF APPEALS

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 7 ROBERN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. JUDGE JESUS V. QUITAIN and NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION Respondent National Power Corporation sought to expropriate a parcel of land bel onging to petitioner. Such property forms part of a low-cost housing project in Davao City. NPC then filed a Complaint for Eminent Domain against petitioner Rob ern Development, and instead of filing an answer, petitioner countered with a Mo tion to Dismiss, alleging, among others, that Nemesio Caete, the person who signe d the verification and certification in the Complaint, was not the president, th e general manager, or an officer specifically authorized under the NPC charter t o sign the same. Before the Motion could be resolved, NPC filed a Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Possession upon depositing a downpayment with the Philippin e National Bank, which Writ was granted by the trial court. Upon such issuance, NPC proceeded to occupy the property. Robern Development then filed a Petition f or Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, assailing the patent defect of the Moti on for Expropriation which, according to petitioner, called for a dismissal of t he same. ISSUE: Whether or not a defect warrants a dismissal of the Motion for E xpropriation HELD: The disputed verification and certification are sufficient in form. Verification is intended to assure that the allegations therein have been prepared in good faith or are true and correct, not mere speculations. Generall y, lack of verification is merely a formal defect that is neither jurisdictional nor fatal. Its absence does not divest the trial court of jurisdiction. The tri al court may order the correction of the pleading or act on the unverified plead ing, if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rul e may be dispensed with in order to serve the ends of justice.In this case, the questioned verification stated that Atty. Caete was the acting regional legal cou nsel of NPC at the Mindanao Regional Center in Iligan City. He was not merely a retained lawyer, but an NPC in-house counsel and officer, whose basic function w as to prepare legal pleadings and to represent NPCMindanao in legal cases. As re gional legal counsel for the Mindanao area, he was the officer who was in the be st position to verify the truthfulness and the correctness of the allegations in the Complaint for expropriation in Davao City. As internal legal counsel, he wa s also in the best position to know and to certify if an action for expropriatio n had already been filed and pending with the courts. FACTS: 67 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 7 VERONIQUE HUIBONHOA v. ANGEL CONCEPCION and HON. RAYMUNDO Z. ANNANG Respondent Angel Concepcion filed a complaint against petitioner Veronique Huibo nhoa for the issuance of a preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory inju nction to immideiately restrain the latter from performing her job as manager of Poulex Supermarket, among others. On the same day the complaint was filed, Judg e Annang issued a temporary restraining order effective for 72 hours. Three days after such issuance, petitioner, along with other stockholders of Poulex, filed a complaint for injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or w rit of preliminary injunction to prevent Concepcion from interfering with the ma nagement and operations of Poulex. Petitioner filed a Motion, seeking the issuan ce of an order certifying the expiration of the TRO issued in favor of Concepcio n. Judge Annang then declared such expiration, but also directed the continued c losure of Poulex. From this decision, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals to annul the previous orders of Judge Annang for havi ng been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals dismissed this petition on the ground of for um-shopping, among others, since the petition for certiorari was filed when the Civil Case filed against Concepcion was pending with the trial court. ISSUE: HEL D: forum shopping exists when a party seeks a favorable opinion, other than by a ppeal or certiorari in another. The rationale against forum shopping is that a p arty should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in two different fora . Filing multiple petitions or complaints constitutes abuse of court processes, which tends to degrade the administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, and adds to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets o f the courts. To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopp ing, the most important question to ask is whether the elements of litis pendent ia are present or whether a final judgment in one case will result to res judica ta in another. Otherwise stated, to determine forum shopping, the test is to see whether in the two or more cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought. The reliefs sought in the two actions a re also different. In the civil case, aside from the main action for a permanent injunction, complainants therein also claimed damages. In the petition for cert iorari, Huibonhoa sought the prevention of the implementation of the assailed or ders of Judge Annang. The only common thread between the two actions is with res pect to the TRO sought to prevent respondent Concepcion from interfering with th e operations of the supermarket, but said relief is only incidental and does not constitute the main cause of action in both cases. Whether or not forum-shoppin g is present in this case. FACTS: 68 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 7 NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS and NSC-HDCTC EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION-FFW Disagreement between petitioner National Steel Corporation and the respondent NS C-HDTC Monthly/Daily Employees Organization-FFW (Union) arose regarding the givi ng of year-end incentives and Productivity and Quality Bonus to the employees of NSC. Having agreed on the submission of the case for voluntary arbitration, the parties appeared before the voluntary arbitrator, Rene Ofreneo, who found no me rit in the demand of the Union for a productivity and quality bonus, but ordered NSC to distribute the year-end award, as according to the Collective Bargaining Agreement and such practice having been done for four years by petitioner. Upon this decision, petitioner filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration regarding the award of the year-end incentive, which Motion was denied by Ofreneo. Petitio ner filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. The CA, for its part, dismissed petitioners petition on the ground of failure to comply with the requi rements of law regarding the law on forum-shopping. It held that Atty. Padilla, one of the counsels of record of petitioner was a mere retained counsel, who had no direct interest with the outcome of the suit. As such, said the CA, Atty. Pa dilla had no authority under the law to sign the certification in behalf of the petitioner. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for review should be denied. HELD : In the instant case, the certification was signed by NSCs counsel. NSC argues t hat contrary to the findings of the Court of Appeals, NSCs counsel of record was duly authorized to represent them not only before the Voluntary Arbitrator but a lso to prepare the petition for review filed before the Court of Appeals. To sup port this claim, petitioner attached to its petition before this Court a Secreta rys Certificate. Counsel of petitioner, Atty. Padilla also submitted a Verificati on cum Certification where he stated that he prepared the petition upon the expl icit instructions of the VP-Marketing & Resident Manager of petitioner corporati on. While it is admitted that the authorization of petitioners counsel was submit ted to the appellate court only after the issuance of its Resolution dismissing the petition based on non-compliance with the Circular regarding forum-shopping, the Supreme Court holds that in view of the peculiar circumstances of the prese nt case and in the interest of substantial justice, the procedural defect may be set aside, pro hac vice. As held by the Court: "Technical rules of procedure sh ould be used to promote, not frustrate, justice. While the swift unclogging of c ourt dockets is a laudable objective, the granting of substantial justice is an even more urgent ideal." By recognizing the signature of the authorized counsel in the certification, no circumvention of the rationale, that is to prevent the ills of forum shopping, is committed. FACTS: 69 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 8 MANNER OF MAKING ALLEGATIONS IN PLEADINGS 70 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 8 CEROFERR REALTY CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO D. SANTIAGO FACTS: Petitioner Ceroferr Realty Corporation filed a suit against private respo ndent Ernesto Santiago for damages and injunction from dispute over the ownershi p of a land located in Quezon City. The complaint alleged that Santiago was occu pying, without any right, a portion of a parcel of land belonging to Petitioner, which was being used by the former as a jeepney terminal. Private respondent, f or his part, countered that he had the legal title to the land, thus, he had the right to utilize the land as such. During the trial, it was found out that the main issue of the case revolved around the actual bounds of the land owned by Pe titioner. It appears that the title held by Petitioner merely referred to the la nd by its lot number, while the title held by private respondent was replete wit h technical descriptions and the accompanying metes and bounds of the lot. Priva te respondent then filed a motion to dismiss Petitioners complaint, on the ground that the trial court cannot pass upon the issue of damages without first determ ining the true ownership of the lot in question. The trial court then issued an order denying Petitioners complaint for lack of cause of action and lack of juris diction, holding that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be the subject of a collateral attack. Petitioner appealed then to the Court of Appeals, insisting t hat the complaint stated a cause of action which was determinable on its face. S uch appeal was dismissed by the CA. ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint states a cause of action HELD: The Rules of Court require that the complaint must state a concise statement of the ultimate facts or the essential facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action. A comp laint states a cause of action only when it has its three indispensable elements , namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under what ever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named def endant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on th e part of such defendant violative of the right of plaintiff or constituting a b reach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may m aintain an action for recovery of damages. If these elements are not extant, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. These elements are present in the case at bar. A defen dant who moves to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action , as in this case, hypothetically admits all the averments thereof. The test of sufficiency of the facts found in a complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or not admitting the facts alleged the court can render a valid judgm ent upon the same in accordance with the prayer thereof. The hypothetical admiss ion extends to the relevant and material facts well pleaded in the complaint and inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Hence, if the allegations in the complai nt furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same s hould not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be assessed by the def endants. 71 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 8 FRANCISCO S. TANTUICO, JR. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al. In the case for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages fil ed by the Republic of the Philippines against Benjamin Romualdez, Ferdinand Marc os, and Imelda Marcos, herein petitioner Francisco Tantuico was impleaded as def endant, the theory that he acted in unlawful concert with Romualdez, et al. in t he misappropriation and theft of public funds, among others. After Tantuicos moti on for production and inspection of documents was denied by the Sandiganbayan, h e filed a Motion for a Bill of Particulars, alleging that the complaint filed ag ainst him was couched in too general terms and shorn of particulars that would i nform him of the factual and legal bases thereof. The Sandiganbayan thereafter d enied Tantuicos motion on the ground that the particulars sought by the latter ar e evidentiary in nature, thus not necessary in the filing of the complaint. From such order of the Sandiganbayan, Tantuico moved for reconsideration, which moti on was also denied by the aforesaid court. This prompted Tantuico to file a peti tion for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition against the Sandiganbayn, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, when such court denied his motion for a bil l of particulars, even though the complaint of the Republic of the Philippines f ailed to properly provide a concise statement of the facts necessary for him to prepare his defense. ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint properly provided a sta tement of the facts. HELD: A complaint is defined as a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff s cause or causes of action. Like all other pleadings allowed by the Rules of Court, the complaint shall contain in a methodical and logical form a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimat e facts on which the plaintiff relies for his claim, omitting the statement of m ere evidentiary facts. Its office, purpose or function is to inform the defendan t clearly and definitely of the claims made against him so that he may be prepar ed to meet the issues at the trial. The complaint should inform the defendant of all the material facts on which the plaintiff relies to support his demand; it should state the theory of a cause of action which forms the bases of the plaint iff s claim of liability. Where the complaint states ultimate facts that constit ute the three essential elements of a cause of action, the complaint states a ca use of action, otherwise, the complaint must succumb to a motion to dismiss on t hat ground of failure to state a cause of action. However, where the allegations of the complaint are vague, indefinite, or in the form of conclusions, the prop er recourse would be, not a motion to dismiss, but a motion for a bill of partic ulars. Anent the contention of the Solicitor General that the petitioner is not entitled to a bill of particulars because the ultimate facts constituting the th ree essential elements of a cause of action for recovery of ill-gotten wealth ha ve been sufficiently alleged in the complaint, it would suffice to state that in a motion for a bill of particulars, the only question to be resolved is whether or not the allegations of the complaint are averred with sufficient definitenes s or particularity to enable the movant properly to prepare his responsive plead ing and to prepare for trial. As already discussed, the allegations of the compl aint pertaining to the herein petitioner are deficient because the averments the rein are mere conclusions of law or presumptions, unsupported by factual premise s. FACTS: v. 72 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE SOLEDAD DY Rule 8 v. COURT OF APPEALS and ODEL BERNARDO LAUSA FACTS: Task Force Kalikasan of Butuan C ity confiscated two trucks carrying various sized lumber products, owned by Sole dad Dy. Task Force Kalikasan was created pursuant to an Executive Order issued b y the Mayor of Butuan City, which had the end purpose of combatting illegal logg ing, and the transportation of illegally procured lumber. Upon seizure, Odel Lau sa, head of the Task Force applied for, and was granted a temporary seizure orde r with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. Upon submission of a proper memorandum-report regarding the trucks and the lumber, the Community Env ironment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) of Butuan City issued a notice co nfiscation which was duly posted for three days. More than two months after the lumber had been forfeited, Dy filed a suit for replevin in the RTC, wherein the same court issued a temporary order of replevin. Lausa, for his part, filed a mo tion for the approval of a counterbond, as well as for a motion to dismiss the w rit of execution, on the ground that Dy should have gone before the DENR, since according to the Revised Forrestry Code, resort should first be made to it. CA r eversed the decision of the trial court, on the ground that the court has no jur isdiction to act on the case, since the administrative remedies provided for by law have not yet been exhausted by Dy, thus, the petition for replevin lacks a v alid cause of action. ISSUE: Whether or not the non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is tantamount to lack of cause of action upon the filing of a suit in court HELD: A party must exhaust all administrative remedies before he can resor t to the courts. In a long line of cases, we have consistently held that before a party may be allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condit ion that he should have availed himself of all the means afforded by the adminis trative processes. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can st ill be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned even opportuni ty to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy sho uld be exhausted first before a court s judicial power can be sought. The premat ure invocation is fatal to one s cause of action. Accordingly, absent any findin g of waiver or estoppel, the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action. Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of the private respondents failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have been the proper cause of action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdic tion over the case and consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of the truck. Exhaustion of the remedies in the administrative forum, being a condition precedent prior to one s recourse to the courts and more importantly, being an element of private respondents rights of action is too significant to be waylai d by the lower court. As petitioner clearly failed to exhaust available administ rative remedies, the Court of Appeals correctly set aside the assailed orders of the trial court granting petitioner s application for a replevin writ and denyi ng private respondent s motion to dismiss. Having been forfeited pursuant to P.D . No. 705, as amended, the lumber properly came under the custody of the DENR an d all actions seeking to recover possession thereof should be directed to that a gency. 73 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 8 LA MALLORCA v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, MARIANO BELTRAN, et al. Private respondent Mariano Beltran, along with his wife and three children, Mila gros, Racquel and Fe, were the passengers of a bus owned and operated by La Mall orca. Upon reaching their destination, they all alighted from the bus towards a shaded part of the side of the road. Respondent returned to the bus to retrieve their belongings, and unknown to him, his daughter, followed him. Respondent sta yed on the running board of the bus, waiting for the conductor to hand him his b ag, when the driver accelerated, without any signal coming from the conductor, w hich prompted respondent to jump from the bus, which had moved about ten feet. U pon his return to the place where he left his family, he went over to where a nu mber of people were gathered, looking down at the body of a girl who had her hea d crushed, and was lifeless. The girl turned out to be his daughter, Racquel. Su its were initiated, first, for breach of contract of carriage against La Mallorc a, and second, for quasidelict. La Mallorca, in its answer, stated that the two actions were incompatible, and this moved for dismissal of the case. This motion filed by La Mallorca was denied by the trial court, as well as the Court of App eals, which both found La Mallorca liable for quasi-delict, although the contrac t of carriage was found to have already been terminated. ISSUE: Whether or not t here is incompatibility between the two actions. HELD: The plaintiffs sufficient ly pleaded the culpa or negligence upon which the claim was predicated when it w as alleged in the complaint that "the death of Raquel Beltran, plaintiffs daugh ter, was caused by the negligence and want of exercise of the utmost diligence o f a very cautious person on the part of the defendants and their agent." This al legation was also proved when it was established during the trial that the drive r, even before receiving the proper signal from the conductor, and while there w ere still persons on the running board of the bus and near it, started to run of f the vehicle. The presentation of proof of the negligence of its employee gave rise to the presumption that the defendant employer did not exercise the diligen ce of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its employ ees. And this presumption, as the Court of Appeals found, petitioner had failed to overcome. Even assuming arguendo that the contract of carriage has already te rminated, herein petitioner can be held liable for the negligence of its driver, as ruled by the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. F ACTS: 74 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 8 GREGORIO ARANETA, INC. v. LYRIC FILM EXCHANGE, INC. After respondent Lyric Film Exchange, Inc. discovered damage to the walls of a b uilding it was leasing from petitioner Gregorio Araneta Inc., it demanded that t he latter, pursuant to the contract of lease, repair the same. Petitioner procee ded on complying with the demand, hired a contractor, and set to work on the dam age. During this time, respondent moved all its equipment out of the premises. I t did this, because it treated the contract of lease as terminated upon the disc overy of the damage. Respondent communicated this to petitioner through an espec ial directors meeting of the same. The trial court held that respondent had no ri ght to cancel the contract of lease, and instead, gave judgment for the payment of the lease for the unexpired portion of seven months. Lyric interposes this ap peal, claiming that the trial court did not allow it to present evidence to prov e its case, through certain documents, which it asserts will prove its case. ISS UE: Whether or not the trial court erred in not allowing Lyric Film to present d ocuments as evidence HELD: Araneta, in its complaint recited three letters essen tially complying with the contract and when the defendant tendered testimony to show that the party who signed those letters was not authorized by defendant, th e trial court refused to receive the testimony on the ground that the letters ha ving been set out in the complaint and not denied in the answer, section 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure controlled. In this, the trial court was in error. A raneta was suing on the written contract of lease, not on these letters. They mi ght have some evidential value, but evidence, even in writing, does not necessar ily have a proper place in the pleadings. However, even granting that such rulin g of the trial court was incorrect, plaintiff has not been harmed thereby becaus e of our view of the case it is immaterial whether or not such letters were auth orized. FACTS: 75 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 8 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LEODIGARIO SARABIA This case involves the expropriation of a parcel of land belonging to respondent Leodigario Sarabia to be used as an extension of the Kalibo Airport. The Air Tr ansportation Office took possession of the property without paying just compensa tion therefore. In time, the property was used as a parking area, the site for t he control tower, the crash fire rescue station, and the headquarters of the PNP Aviation Security Group. A number of stalls were also erected thereon to be sue d by retailers in selling their wares. Almost half a decade after the taking of the lot, the Republic of the Philippines filed with the RTC an action for exprop riation of the lot. Three commissioners were duly tasked to ascertain the just c ompensation for the subject property, and after investigation, it was found that a portion of the lot was not actually and physically occupied by ATO. During th e hearing, the trial court directed the Republic to present evidence to prove th at the unoccupied portion of the lot is still needed for public use. The Republi c answered that there is no need to present evidence by virtue of the fact that more than half of the lot is already being utilized for the Kalibo Airport. From this, the trial court rendered a decision stating that the occupied portion is to be expropriated, but the unoccupied portion should be returned to the owners thereof. Upon elevation to the Court of Appeals, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. ISSUE: Whether or not the Republic should have presented evide nce to prove its occupation of the entire lot HELD: Respondents admissions in the ir Answer and Pre-Trial Brief are judicial admissions which render the taking of the lot in 1956 conclusive or even immutable. And well-settled is the rule that an admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedin gs in the same case, does not require proof. A judicial admission is an admissio n made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, for purpose s of the truth of some alleged fact, which said party cannot thereafter disprove . Indeed, an admission made in the pleading cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive as to him, and that all proofs submitte d by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith should be ignored whether ob jection is interposed by a party or not. FACTS: 76 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 8 FELIX CAMITAN v. COURT OF APPEALS and THE FIDELITY INVESTMENT CORPORATION Spouses Mateo and Lorenza Camitan conveyed by way of sale, a parcel of land belo nging to them, in favor of private respondent Fidelity Investment Corporation. T he Original Certificate of Title was then given to private respondent, without h owever, transferring it by name. Upon the spouses death, their heirs, Felix, Fran cisco, Severo and Victoria, without the knowledge of private respondent, filed a petition for the issuance of a new Owners copy, alleging that the original had b een lost, which petition was granted by the trial court, which at the same time declared void the first Owners copy. When Fidelity Investment learned of the peti tion and order for the first time, it caused the annotation of a notice of sale on the title of the property. It then filed a Notice of Adverse Claim with the R egister of Deeds thereafter. Fidelity Investment argued that the Order issued by the court is null and void for having issued the same without jurisdiction sinc e the original copy of the title exists and has been in the formers possession. M oreover, the heirs of the spouses Camitan had no standing to file the petition, since the spouses had already conveyed all their interests in the property prior to their deaths. A decision was rendered in favor of Fidelity Investment. Upon appeal, the heirs of the spouses argued that the court erred in finding that the Owners Copy was not lost since there was no documentary evidence to prove such c onclusion. According to the heirs, Fidelity Investment was not even able to prov ide a photocopy of the title to prove its possession thereof. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in deciding in favor of private respondent. HELD: A review of the records of the case shows that petitioners never questioned res pondents possession of the Owners Copy, its actual and physical possession and occ upation of the property, as well as its payment of real estate taxes due on the property. Although petitioners put their unmistakably sparse denial of responden ts allegations relative to the execution of the deed of sale in its favor and its possession of the Owners Copy under the heading "SPECIFIC DENIALS" and antecedin g it with the adverb "specifically, the same cannot function as an operative deni al within the purview of the Rules. A denial is not specific simply because it i s so qualified by the defendant. A general denial does not become specific by th e use of the word "specifically." When the matters of whether the defendant alle ges having no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief, are plainly and necessarily within the defendants knowledge, his alleged ignorance or lack of information will not be considered as a specific denial. In one case, it was he ld that when a respondent makes a "specific denial" of a material allegation of the petition without setting forth the substance of the matters relied upon to s upport its general denial, when such matters were plainly within its knowledge a nd the defendant could not logically pretend ignorance as to the same, said defe ndant fails to properly tender an issue. Petitioners "specific denial" in this ca se is ineffective and amounts to an admission pursuant to Rule 8, Sec. 11 of the Rules of Court. 77 P a g e FACTS:

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 9 EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PLEAD 78 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 9 CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS v. HON. JUDGE MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR. Samir Beiruty and Mohammed Al-Sulain were passengers of a Plane owned and operat ed by petitioner Cathay Pacific Airways. Upon landing in Manila, they were both denied entry for lack of visas, and they had to return to Hongkong. However, pet itioners employees gave their claim tags to someone else, thus, they lost some of their baggages, and this led to a filing of a complaint for damages against pet itioner. Summons was served on petitioner, and it filed two motions for extensio n to file its answer, which motions were not acted upon by the trial court. Befo re the expiration of the second extension filed, petitioner filed its answer. Af ter the answer had been filed, Beiruty and Al-Sulain filed a motion to declare p etitioner in default. Upon receiving a copy, the latter filed an opposition to t he motion. However, before petitioner filed its opposition, the court issued the order of default, which was received by petitioner four months after. Beiruty a nd Al-Sulain then presented their evidence ex-parte, and a decision was rendered against petitioner. Upon receipt of the decision, petitioner filed a motion to lift the order of default and set aside the default judgment. Said motion was de nied on the ground that it was filed out of time, when the decision had already become final and executory. Thus, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, pr ohibition and mandamus. ISSUE: Whether or not the default order proper. HELD: It should be borne in mind that the policy of the law is to have every litigated c ase tried on the merits as much as possible. It is for this reason that judgment s by default are frowned upon. The needless delay and trouble spawned by the unf ortunate order of default and judgment by default assailed in the instant case w arrant calling attention once more to a previous reminder made by this Court thr ough Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee: Time and again the Court has enjoined trial judges to act with circumspection and not to precipitately declare parties in de fault, needlessly compelling the aggrieved party to undergo the additional expen se, anxiety and delay of seeking the intervention of the appeciate courts and de priving them of the much needed time and attention that could instead have well been devoted to the study and disposition of more complex and complicated cases and issues. FACTS: 79 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 9 GUILLERMA S. SABLAS v. ESTERLITA S. SABLAS and RODULFO S. SABLAS FACTS: Respondents Esterlita and Rodulfo Sablas filed a complaint for judicial p artition, inventory and accounting was filed by against spouses Pascual Lumanas and Guillerma Sablas. After the respondents were served with summons and a copy of the complaint, they filed a motion for extension within which to file their a nswer. However, the answer was filed after the extension asked for by the spouse s themselves. Since there was no motion to declare the spouses Sablas in default , the trial court admitted the answer filed. The day after the answer was filed, Esterlita and Rodulfo filed a motion to declare the spouses Sablas in default. This motion was denied by the trial court. Their motion for reconsideration havi ng been denied as well, respondents elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals, which ruled that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in admitti ng the answer of the spouses Sablas, although the same was filed out of time. IS SUE: Whether or not respondents were in default. HELD: The rule on default requi res the filing of a motion and notice of such motion to the defending party. It is not enough that the defendant fails to answer the complaint within the reglem entary period. The trial court cannot motu proprio declare a defendant in defaul t as the rules leave it up to the claiming party to protect his or its interests . The trial court should not under any circumstances act as counsel of the claim ing party. It is within the sound discretion of the trial court to permit the de fendant to file his answer and to be heard on the merits even after the reglemen tary period for filing the answer expires. The Rules of Court provides for discr etion on the part of the trial court not only to extend the time for filing an a nswer but also to allow an answer to be filed after the reglementary period. The rule is that the defendants answer should be admitted where it is filed before a declaration of default and no prejudice is caused to the plaintiff. Where the answer is filed beyond the reglementary period but before the defendant is decla red in default and there is no showing that defendant intends to delay the case, the answer should be admitted. Therefore, the trial court correctly admitted th e answer of petitioner spouses even if it was filed out of time because, at the time of its filing, they were not yet declared in default nor was a motion to de clare them in default ever filed. Neither was there a showing that petitioner sp ouses intended to delay the case. 80 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 9 MONARCH INSURANCE CO., INC., ALLIED GUARANTEE INSURANCE COMPANY, and EQUITABLE I NSURANCE CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: A ship owned and operated by Aboitiz Shipping sank at sea due to a typhoo n during its voyage from Hong Kong to Manila. All plaintiffs, Monarch Insurance Co., Inc., Tabacalera Insurance Company. Allied Guarantee Insurance Company (All ied), and Equitable Insurance Corporation, are insurance companies of the shippe rs of goods on board the ship. Aboitiz claims that it is not liable for the loss of the goods by virtue of the limited liability rule under maritime law. Accord ing to Aboitiz, the ship sank by reason of force majeure, without any negligence on the part of the master of the vessel. The court granted Monarch and Tabacale ras motion to declare Aboitiz in default since the latter had repeatedly failed t o appear. The trial court then rendered judgment against Aboitiz, ordering it to pay damages to the plaintiffs. Aboitiz filed a motion for reconsideration of th e decision and/or for new trial to lift the order of default. The Court of Appea ls affirmed the decision of the trial court regarding the order of default, and allowed Aboitiz to present its evidence, thus prompting the plaintiffs to file a petition for certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not presentation of evidence before the CA can be allowed. HELD: Aboitiz was precluded from presenting evidence to p rove its defenses in the court a quo for having been declared in default. The co urt disagrees with petitioners that this circumstance prevents the respondent Co urt of Appeals from taking cognizance of Aboitiz defenses on appeal. It should be noted that Aboitiz was declared as in default not for its failure to file an answer but for its absence during pre-trial and the trial proper. In Aboitiz an swer with counterclaim, it claimed that the sinking of the M/V P. Aboitiz was du e to an act of God or unforeseen event and that the said ship had been seaworthy and fit for the voyage. Aboitiz also alleged that it exercised the due diligenc e required by law, and that considering the real and hypothecary nature of marit ime trade, the sinking justified the extinguishment of its liability for the los t shipment. A judgment of default does not imply a waiver of rights except that of being heard and presenting evidence in defendant s favor nor could it be inte rpreted as an admission by the defendant that the plaintiff s causes of action f ind support in the law or that the latter is entitled to the relief prayed for. This is especially true with respect to a defendant who had filed his answer but had been subsequently declared in default for failing to appear at the trial si nce he has had an opportunity to traverse, via his answer, the material averment s contained in the complaint. Such defendant has a better standing than a defend ant who has neither answered nor appeared at trial. The former should be allowed to reiterate all affirmative defenses pleaded in his answer before the Court of Appeals. Likewise, the Court of Appeals may review the correctness of the evalu ation of the plaintiffs evidence by the lower court. 81 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 9 PARAMOUNT INSURANCE CORP. v. A.C. ORDOEZ CORP. and FRANKLIN SUSPINE A vehicular accident involving a Honda City sedan owned by Maximo Mata, the pred ecessor-ininterest of petitioner Paramount Insurance Corp., and a truck mixer ow ner by respondent A.C. Ordoez Corporation occurred. Petitioner filed a claim for damages against A.C. Ordoez and Franklin Suspine, the driver at the time of the a ccident. According to the Sheriffs Return of Service, summons remained unserved o n Suspine, while it was served on respondent and received by Samuel Marcoleta of its Receiving Section. Upon the lapse of the period within which to file an ans wer, petitioner lodged a Motion to Declare respondent in default. The latter fil ed an Omnibus Motion alleging that summons was improperly served on it, thus ask ing for an extension of 15 days to file its answer. Pending its motion to declar e the other party in default, Paramount filed a Second Motion to Declare Defenda nts in Default. In its answer, respondent alleged honest mistake and business re verses that prevented it from hiring a lawyer, as well as justice and equity. Th e answer with counterclaim specifically denied liability, averred competency on the part of Suspine, and due selection and supervision of employees on the part of respondent. The trial court admitted the answer and denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. ISSUE: Whether or not the answer was properly admitted. HEL D: On its face, the return shows that the summons was received by an employee wh o is not among the responsible officers enumerated by law. Such being invalid, p etitioner should have sought the issuance and proper service of new summons inst ead of moving for a declaration of default. Thus, there was no grave abuse of di scretion when the Metropolitan Trial Court admitted respondent corporations Answe r. Although it was filed beyond the extension period requested by respondent cor poration, however, Sec. 11, Rule 11 grants discretion to the trial court to allo w an answer or other pleading to be filed after the reglementary period, upon mo tion and on such terms as may be just. An answer should be admitted where it had been filed before the defendant was declared in default and no prejudice is cau sed to plaintiff. The hornbook rule is that default judgments are generally disf avored. There is likewise no merit in petitioners claim that respondent corporati on lacks legal personality to file an appeal. Although the cancellation of a cor porations certificate of registration puts an end to its juridical personality, S ec. 122 of the Corporation Code, however provides that a corporation whose corpo rate existence is terminated in any manner continues to be a body corporate for three years after its dissolution for purposes of prosecuting and defending suit s by and against it and to enable it to settle and close its affairs. Moreover, the rights of a corporation, which is dissolved pending litigation, are accorded protection by law pursuant to Sec. 145 of the Corporation Code. FACTS: 82 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 10 AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS 83 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 10 RAFAEL BAUTISTA And LIGAYA ROSEL v. MAYA-MAYA COTTAGES, INC. FACTS: A complaint was filed for cancellation of title and damages by respondent Maya-Maya Cottages, Inc. against spouses Rafael and Ligaya Bautista. Respondent asserts that the spouses Bautista, through dubios means, were able to secure an Original Certificate of Title over a parcel of land. The spouses Bautista filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it does not state a cause of action, which the trial court granted. Respondent this then filed a motion fo r reconsideration with motion for leave to file an amended complaint for quietin g of title, since the technical description in the spouses title does not cover t he disputed lot. The spouses filed their opposition, contending that the amended complaint, if admitted would substantially modify respondents theory. Respondents motion for leave to file an amended complaint was granted. This prompted the sp ouses to file a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with the Cou rt of Appeals. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting the amen ded complaint. HELD: A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, in the case of a reply, at any time within ten days after it is served. The above provision clearly shows t hat before the filing of any responsive pleading, a party has the absolute right to amend his pleading, regardless of whether a new cause of action or change in theory is introduced. It is settled that a motion to dismiss is not the respons ive pleading contemplated by the Rule. Records show that petitioners had not yet filed a responsive pleading to the original complaint in Civil Case No. 371. Wh at they filed was a motion to dismiss. It follows that respondent, as a plaintif f, may file an amended complaint even after the original complaint was ordered d ismissed, provided that the order of dismissal is not yet final, as in this case . Verily, the Court of Appeals correctly held that in issuing the assailed Order admitting the amended complaint, the trial court did not gravely abuse its disc retion. Hence, neither certiorari nor prohibition would lie. 84 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 10 ALPINE LENDING INVESTORS and ROGELIO L. ONG v. ESTRELLA CORPUZ A replevin complaint against Alpine Lending Investors and Zenaida Lipata was fil ed by respondent. It appears that Lipata told respondent that she would help the latter apply for a garage franchise from the Land Transportation Office. Howeve r, after Corpuz gave respondent the original registration papers for her vehicle , Lipata took off with the same, represented herself to be the owner thereof, an d mortgaged the same to Alpine. Instead of filing an answer, Alpine submitted a Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that it was not a juridical person, hence not a proper party to the case. This motion was denied by the court. Respondent then filed motion to Admit Amended Complaint with the trial court two days late, but the court admitted it anyway. Alpine filed a Motion to Expunge respondents motion on the ground that it was not accompanied by a notice of hearing, to which resp ondent answered that a notice of hearing was unnecessary, as it is a non-litigat ed motion. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting respondents a mended complaint. HELD: Pleadings may be amended by adding or striking an allega tion or the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party or a mistaken or inadequate allegation or description in any other respect, so that the actual merits of the controversy may speedily be determined, without re gard to technicalities, and in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner. A pa rty may amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any time before a respon sive pleading is served or, in the case of a reply, at any time within ten days after it is served. As earlier mentioned, what petitioner Alpine filed was a mot ion to dismiss, not an answer. Settled is the rule that a motion to dismiss is n ot a responsive pleading for purposes of Section 2, Rule 10. As no responsive pl eading had been filed, respondent could amend her complaint as a matter of right . It is the correlative duty of the trial court to accept the amended complaint; otherwise, mandamus would lie against it. In other words, the trial court s dut y to admit the amended complaint was purely ministerial. In fact, respondent sho uld not have filed a motion to admit her amended complaint. It has always been t he policy of this Court to be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings in ord er that the real controversies between or among the parties may be presented and cases be decided on the merits without delay. FACTS: 85 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 10 REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS and BRITISH STEEL ASIA, LTD. FACTS: Respondent Remington Industrial Sales filed a complaint for sum of money and damages arising from breach of contract against British Steel. The latter mo ved for dismissal of the complaint on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action. The Regional Trial Court denied the motion to dismiss, as well as th e motion for reconsideration filed thereafter. Meanwhile, British Steel filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals, claiming th at the complaint did not contain a single averment that British Steel had in fac t committed any act or is guilty of any omission in violation of respondents righ ts. Around the same time, respondent sought to amend its complaint by incorporat ing therein additional factual allegations which constitute its cause of action against British Steel. Remington also prayed that the proceedings in the special civil action be suspended by reason of its motion to admit the amended complain t. The trial court thereafter admitted the amended complaint, while the Court of Appeals issued an order directing the trial court to dismiss respondents suit ag ainst British Steel. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in orderin g the dismissal of the complaint despite the amended complaint. HELD: A pleading may be amended as a matter of right before a responsive pleading is served. Thi s only means that prior to the filing of an answer, the plaintiff has the absolu te right to amend the complaint whether a new cause of action or change in theor y is introduced. The reason for this rule is implied in the subsequent Section 3 of Rule 10. Under this provision, substantial amendment of the complaint is not allowed without leave of court after an answer has been served, because any mat erial change in the allegations contained in the complaint could prejudice the r ights of the defendant who has already set up his defense in the answer. Convers ely, it cannot be said that the defendants rights have been violated by changes made in the complaint if he has yet to file an answer thereto. In such an event, the defendant has not presented any defense that can be altered or affected by the amendment of the complaint in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 10. The defe ndant still retains the unqualified opportunity to address the allegations again st him by properly setting up his defense in the answer. Considerable leeway is thus given to the plaintiff to amend his complaint once, as a matter of right, p rior to the filing of an answer by the defendant. The right granted to the plain tiff under procedural law to amend the complaint before an answer has been serve d is not precluded by the filing of a motion to dismiss or any other proceeding contesting its sufficiency. Moreover, amendment of pleadings is favored and shou ld be liberally allowed in the furtherance of justice in order to determine ever y case as far as possible on its merits without regard to technicalities. This p rinciple is generally recognized to speed up trial and save party litigants from incurring unnecessary expense, so that a full hearing on the merits of every ca se may be had and multiplicity of suits avoided. 86 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 10 PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY v. WILLIAM GOTHONG & ABOITIZ INC. Respondent William Gothong & Aboitiz, Inc. entered into a contract of lease with the Philippine Ports Authority for docking space in the North Harbor for a peri od of time. PPA, believing that the period for the lease had already expired, se nt a letter to respondent asking the latter to vacate the premises and to turn o ver the improvements thereon, pursuant to the lease contract. Respondent filed a n injunction suit against PPA, when the latter refused respondents request to rec onsider the demand. Before PPA filed its answer, respondent amended its complain t for the first time to which PPA filed its answer. Respondent amended its compl aint for the second time, and this was met by strong opposition from PPA. The tr ial court denied the admittance of this second amended complaint. Respondent the reafter filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court found the trial court to have committed grave abuse of discretion and dir ected the trial court to admit respondents second amended complaint. ISSUE: Wheth er or not trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion. HELD: Section 3, Rul e 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure amended the former rule in such manner that the phrase "or that the cause of action or defense is substantially altere d" was stricken-off and not retained in the new rules. The clear import of such amendment in Section 3, Rule 10 is that under the new rules, "the amendment may (now) substantially alter the cause of action or defense." This should only be t rue, however, when despite a substantial change or alteration in the cause of ac tion or defense, the amendments sought to be made shall serve the higher interes ts of substantial justice, and prevent delay and equally promote the laudable ob jective of the rules which is to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive dispositi on of every action and proceeding. The application of the old Rules by the RTC a lmost five years after its amendment by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure patent ly constitutes grave abuse of discretion. FACTS: 87 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 10 SWAGMAN HOTELS AND TRAVEL, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS and NEAL B. CHRISTIAN FACTS: The president and vice-president of petitioner Swagman Hotels and Travel, Inc. procured a loan from Neal Christian to be secured by three promissory note s. The loan would be payable after three years. However, before the three years lapsed, Christian informed petitioner that he was terminating the loans and dema nded for payment of the total amount of the loan. He then commenced action in th e Regional Trial Court for collection of sum of money and damages against Swagma n Hotels. The latter, for its part, stated that there exists no cause of action since the loans have not yet become due and demandable. Since the three promisso ry notes were given on different dates, during the pendency of the case, two of the three notes matured. By virtue of such occurrence, the trial court ruled tha t these two promissory notes are already litigable, and thus ordered Swagman Hot els to pay Christian the sum secured by such notes. Court of Appeals, who affirm ed the trial courts decision. ISSUE: Whether or not lack a cause of action may be cured by subsequent accrual of a cause of action. Amendments of pleadings are a llowed under Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 5 thereof app lies to situations wherein evidence not within the issues raised in the pleading s is presented by the parties during the trial, and to conform to such evidence the pleadings are subsequently amended on motion of a party. Thus, a complaint w hich fails to state a cause of action may be cured by evidence presented during the trial. However, the curing effect under Section 5, Rule 10 is applicable onl y if a cause of action in fact exists at the time the complaint is filed, but th e complaint is defective for failure to allege the essential facts. HELD: 88 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 10 ADOLFO GASPAR v. LEOPOLDO DORADO FACTS: An execution sale was effected over a parcel of land to satisfy the debt of Vicente Alamodin in favor of C.N. Hodges. The property was made subject of th e sale because Alamodin owned an undivided half portion of the lot. However, it appears that prior to the execution sale, Alamodin conveyed, by way of sale, his share of the lot to the his co-owner, petitioner Adolfo Gaspar. Thus, after lea rning of such execution sale, Gaspar went to court to ask for the award of damag es against C.N. Hodges. After C.N. Hodges had filed its answer, but before trial was commenced, Gaspar was allowed by the trial court to amend his complaint, wh erein he prayed for the annulment of the execution sale. After due hearing, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner, and declared the execution sale to be null and void. C.N. Hodges argued on appeal that the trial court nev er acquired jurisdiction over the original complaint since it only prayed for da mages, the amount of which was not cognizable by the trial court. It also argued that since the court did not have jurisdiction, it had no authority to allow Ga spar to amend his complaint. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in admi tting the amended complaint HELD: Amendment of a defective pleading should be al lowed, but "when it is evident that the court has no jurisdiction over the perso n and the subject matter, that the pleading is so fatally defective as not to be susceptible of amendment, or that to permit such amendment would radically alte r the theory and the nature of the action, then the court may refuse the amendme nt of the defective pleading and order the dismissal of the case." The rule is a lways in favor of liberality in construction so that the real matter in dispute may be submitted to the judgment of the Court. Imperfections of form and technic alities of procedure should be disregarded unless substantial rights would other wise be prejudiced. In testing the sufficiency of a complaint neither its captio n nor its prayer is decisive. The allegations as a whole must be considered. In the instant case we find that in his original complaint Gaspar put in issue the validity of the sheriff s sale in favor of defendant Hodges and claimed exclusiv e and absolute ownership of the property in question by virtue of the prior sale in his favor and of its registration in the land registry of Capiz. The resolut ion of this question, on which his prayer for damages was predicated and without which no decision could be rendered, was within the jurisdiction of the trial c ourt. The amendment of the complaint, therefore, was merely a matter of form and not of substance 89 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 12 BILL OF PARTICULARS 90 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 12 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SANDIGANBAYAN and FERDINAND MARCOS, JR. Roman Cruz is impleaded as an alleged crony of President Ferdinand Marcos.When t he Presidential Commission on Good Governance went after the cronies, in hopes o f recovering the wealth he and his family and cronies amassed during his reign, an alias summons was served upon him in Hawaii, his place of exile. Since he was not able to file a responsive pleading, he was then declared in default, upon m otion by the Republic of the Philippines. When the order of exile was lifted aft er the death of the fallen President, his wife, Imelda Marcos moved to set aside the order of default, which motion was granted by the Sandiganbayan. Respondent Sandiganbayan found that a myriad of events, such as their exile, President Mar cos ill health and numerous other civil and criminal suits against the latter was reasonable cause to lift the order of default. The Presidents son, Ferdinand Mar cos, Jr. (BongBong), as the executor of his fathers estate, petitioned the court for extension of time to file a responsive pleading, which the court granted. Ho wever, instead of filing an answer, Bong-Bong filed a Motion For Bill of Particu lars, praying for clearer statements of the allegations which he called mere conc lusions of law, too vague and general to enable defendants to intelligently answ er. Such motion was granted by the Sandiganbayan. The Republic argued that since Bong-Bong filed a motion for extension of time to file an answer, the Sandiganba yan should not have accepted the formers motion for bill of particulars. It argue d that the charges were clear, and that other parties, such as Cruz, also linked to the controversy of ill-gotten wealth, have already filed their own answers, thus proving that the complaint was not in fact couched in too general terms. IS SUE: Whether or not the granting of a Bill of Particulars is warranted in this c ase HELD: Considering that a motion for extension of time to plead is not a liti gated motion but an ex parte one, the granting of which is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the court; that in some cases we have allowed defendant s to file their answers even after the time fixed for their presentation; that w e have set aside orders of default where defendants failure to answer on time was excusable; that the pendency of the motion for a bill of particulars interrupts the period to file a responsive pleading; and considering that no real injury w ould result to the interests of petitioner with the granting of the motion for a bill of particular. The only objection to the action of said court would be on a technicality. But on such flimsy foundation, it would be erroneous to sacrific e the substantial rights of a litigant. While it is true that there was no posit ive act on the part of the court to lift the default order because there was no motion nor order to that effect, the anti-graft courts act of granting respondent the opportunity to file a responsive pleading meant the lifting of the default order on terms the court deemed proper in the interest of justice. It was the op erative act lifting the default order and thereby reinstating the position of th e original defendant whom respondent is representing, founded on the courts discr etionary power to set aside orders of default. 91 P a g e FACTS:

As to the propriety of the granting of the motion for a bill of particulars, we find for respondent as the allegations against former President Marcos appear ob viously couched in general terms. They do not cite the ultimate facts to show ho w the Marcoses acted in unlawful concert with Cruz in illegally amassing assets, p roperty and funds in amounts disproportionate to Cruzs lawful income, except that the former President Marcos was the president at the time. That the late presid ents co-defendants were able to file their respective answers to the complaint do es not necessarily mean that his estates executor will be able to file an equally intelligent answer, since the answering defendants defense might be personal to them. 92 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 13 FILING AND SERVICE OF PLEADINGS, JUDGMENTS AND OTHER PAPERS 93 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 13 HEIRS OF BENJAMIN MENDOZA v. COURT OF APPEALS and J.A. DEVELOPMENT CORP. FACTS: Private respondent J.A. Development Corporation filed a complaint against Benjamin Mendoza for unlawful detainer. Respondent asserted it purchased the pr operty subject of the suit, however the title of the same is still in the name o f tis predecessor-in-interest. Sometime after the purchase, respondent found out that Mendoza and his heirs have been occupying the premises with the tolerance of its predecessor-in-interest. Respondent thereafter notified Mendoza and his h eirs that it was the new owner of the property and asked that they vacate the sa me. Mendoza went to respondent and asked that he and his heirs be allowed to sta y on the property until such time that it would be needed. A kasunduan was made by the parties to this effect. However, when respondent once again asked Mendozas heirs to vacate the property when the former decided to make some improvements thereon, the heirs told respondent that they were no longer honoring the kasundu an. Respondent went to court to enforce its rights. The heirs alleged that they were the owners of the property by virtue of their occupation of the same. The t rial court rendered a decision to the effect that since the question of ownershi p is yet to be answered, a suit for ejectment cannot prosper. On appeal, the Cou rt of Appeals reversed the decision and ordered remanded. The heirs moved for re consideration on the ground that they were not furnished a copy of the petition for review, nor of the appellate courts decision. ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs are bound by the decision. HELD: The conclusion that petitioners were deprived of due process is inescapable. If any party has appeared by counsel, service upo n him shall be made upon his counsel unless service upon the party himself is or dered by the court. Notice or service made upon a party who is represented by co unsel is a nullity. Notice to the client and not to his counsel of record is not notice in law. While this rule admits of exceptions, such as when the court or tribunal orders service upon the party or when the technical defect is waived, n one applies in this case. The proceedings in the appellate court, which culminat ed in the promulgation of the assailed decision, were obviously flawed. Despite the Entry of Judgment, the assailed decision could not have become final and exe cutory on that date. In fact, in an apparent suspension of its own rules, the Co urt of Appeals entertained petitioners motion for reconsideration although it ul timately denied the same. Be that as it may, we find that the disposition of thi s case on the merits will best serve the ends of justice. The lack of notice to petitioners counsel deprived them of the opportunity to participate in the proce edings before the Court of Appeals particularly on the issue of whether the MTCC has jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case filed by respondent. A remand to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings, giving the parties the opportun ity to ventilate their claims on this issue, is therefore appropriate. 94 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 13 CHARLES N. UY v. JUDGE NELIDA S. MEDINA FACTS: Petitioner Charles Uy filed a complaint against his parents, spouses Carl os and Nelia Uyfor recovery of personal property with prayer for replevin of the owners duplicate copy of the title of a parcel of land, which he alleges to be h is. The spouses Uy, for their part, claim that they were, in fact, the owners of the land, which was currently being occupied by petitioner. They allege that th ere is another case involving the same parcel of land, instituted by them agains t Charles, for the latter to reconvey the property to them. After the preliminar y conference, the spouses Uy served a copy of their Position Paper upon petition er by registered mail, and filed its original copy with the trial court. An Affi davit of Service/Filing was attached to the Position Paper with an explanation t hat personal service was not resorted to because of time constraint, lack of man power, and in order to minimize expenses. Because of the method of service, peti tioner filed a Motion to Consider Defendants Position Paper as Not Filed for fail ure to comply with the Rules of Court. Judge Nelida Medina, denied this motion. ISSUE: Whether or not the judge is guilty of gross negligence for not finding th e Position Paper as improper HELD: It has been submitted that personal service a nd filing are preferred for obvious reasons. Plainly, such should expedite actio n or resolution on a pleading, motion or other paper; and conversely, minimize, if not eliminate, delays likely to be incurred if service or filing is done by m ail, considering the inefficiency of the postal service. Likewise, personal serv ice will do away with the practice of some lawyers who, wanting to appear clever , resort to the following less than ethical practices. If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation to our set of adjective rules requiring per sonal service whenever practicable, Section 11 of Rule 13 then gives the court t he discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes of service or filing were resorted to and no written explanation was made as to wh y personal service was not done in the first place. The exercise of discretion m ust, necessarily, consider the practicability of personal service, for Section 1 1 itself begins with the clause "whenever practicable".We thus take this opportu nity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil proced ure, personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of service or filing, the exception. 95 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 13 MARINDUQUE MINING v. COURT OF APPEALS and NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION Private respondent NAPOCOR instituted an action for expropriation against Marind uque Mining for the construction of a Transmission Line Project. Respondent soug ht to expropriate only a portion of the property owned by Marinduque Mining. Mar induque, in its answer, countered that respondent should expropriate the whole o f the property since the remaining portion would be useless to it anyway, if onl y the desired portion would be taken by respondent. The trial court rendered a d ecision in favor of Marinduque Mining, and denied respondents Motion for Reconsid eration. Respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the trial court by registered mail. Marinduque Mining claimed that respondent had enough resources and manpowe r to effectuate personal delivery. The trial court granted the petition, and den ied respondents Notice of Appeal. Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the t rial court and ordered the trial court to give due course to the Notice of Appea l. ISSUE: Whether or not it was proper for NAPOCOR to file its Notice of Appeal by registered mail HELD: Personal service of pleadings and other papers is the g eneral rule while resort to the other modes of service and filing is the excepti on. When recourse is made to the other modes, a written explanation why service or filing was not done personally becomes indispensable. If no explanation is of fered to justify resorting to the other modes, the discretionary power of the co urt to expunge the pleading comes into play. In this case, NAPOCOR complied with the Rules. NAPOCOR s notice of appeal sufficiently explained why the notice of appeal was served and filed by registered mail - due to lack of manpower to effe ct personal service. This explanation is acceptable for it satisfactorily shows why personal service was not practicable. Moreover, the Court of Appeals correct ly considered the importance of the issue involved in the case. Therefore, the C ourt of Appeals did not err when it ruled that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of its Orders. FACTS: 96 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 14 SUMMONS 97 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 13 MARIA VICTORIA CANO-GUTIERREZ v. FACTS: HERMINIO GUTIERREZ Maria Victoria Cano and Herminio Gutierrez were married with two children, Jeric o and James Marlon. Some years after the celebration of their marriage, Victoria left the conjugal home due to maltreatment brought about by extreme jealousy by Herminio. Three years after Victoria left the conjugal dwelling, she learned th at Herminio had already remarried and that a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage had been filed by the latter. She alleged that she did not receive a copy of the summons, as well as the petition for annulment. This was because, according to Victoria, the summons was delivered to her old residence, that Herm inio knew that she was no longer living there, and that worse, the person with w hom the summons was left was not a resident of said address. ISSUE: Whether or n ot there was a valid service of summons. HELD: In the case at bar, the Officer s Return issued by Process Server Bartolome A. Alunan shows that the summons was served "thru Ms. Susan B. Gutierrez (sister-in-law), who claimed to be authorize d to receive the same and acknowledge the receipt hereof appearing on the origin al copy of summons in behalf of said respondent." Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him. Service of such writ i s the means by which the court may acquire jurisdiction over his person. Under R ule 14, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, whenever practicable, th e summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him. Under this rule, service is made only on the defendant himself. However, Section 7 of the same rule provides that, if, for justifiable reasons, the defendant cannot be se rved in person, within a reasonable time, service may be effected a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or b) by leaving the copies at defenda nt s office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge th ereof. 98 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 14 Umandap vs. Sabio Jr. FACTS: Respondent Domingo Estomo filed against petitioner Joel Umandap an action for damages based on breach of contract. Process Server Marmolejo effected subs tituted service of the summons and copy of the Complaint upon petitioner, by lea ving a copy thereof at petitioner s home and office address to a certain Joseph David who refused to receive and acknowledge the same. Petitioner failed to file his Answer and, on motion of private respondent, was declared in default. There after, private respondent was allowed to adduce his evidence ex parte. On May 8, 1998, the trial court rendered a judgment against petitioner. Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules o f Court assailing the resolutions of the trial court dated October 2, 1998 and J anuary 18, 1999. Petitioner argued before the Court of Appeals that the trial co urt never acquired jurisdiction over his person because there has been no valid service of summons; that the substituted service of summons was improper and inv alid since the process server s return failed to show on its face the impossibil ity of personal service. Whether or not that the substituted service of summons was improper and invalid due to failure to show the impossibility of personal se rvice. Petitioner s allegation, as it turns out, that the process server went to his home and office address only once is, as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, "unsubstantiated and self-serving assertion of the petitioner." We have no reason to disbelieve or disregard the statement in the return that perso nal service of summons was attempted on several occasions. It is likewise not de nied that the address stated therein is both the residence and office address of petitioner at the time the summons was served. Thus, the place of service is no t in issue. Significantly, petitioner admitted receipt by a nephew of his wife o f the summons and the complaint. He claims; however, that his nephew misplaced t he same and ultimately failed to inform him. The return indicates that the nephe w was a person of sufficient age and discretion residing therein. In any event, petitioner never alleged in any of his pleadings that the nephew was incompetent to receive the summons and that he was not a resident therein. The presumption that the process server left or tendered the summons upon a person of sufficient age and discretion stands unrebutted. In light of these facts, the requirements of substituted service were all complied with. The appellate court s reliance o n the process server s return that summons was validly served in consonance with the principle of presumption in favor of regularity of performance of official functions of a public officer rests on a firm basis. HELD: ISSUE: 99 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 14 VICENTA PANTALEO v. HONORATO ASUNCION FACTS: Plaintiff Vicenta Pantaleon, instituted an action to recover from Asuncio n a sum of money. The summons originally issued was returned by the sheriff of N ueva Ecija unserved, with the statement according to reliable information, Asunc ion was residing in B-24 Tala Estate, Caloocan, Rizal. An alias summons was issu ed for service in the place mentioned. However, the provincial sheriff of Rizal returned it unserved, with information that Asuncion had left the Tala Estate si nce February 18, 1952, and that diligent efforts to locate him proved to no avai l. On plaintiffs motion, the court ordered, defendant be summoned by publication, and the summons was published to a newspaper of general circulation in Nueva Ec ija. Defendants failed to appear or answer and were then declared in default. Af ter a hearing in the absence of the defendant and without notice to him, the cou rt rendered judgment for the plaintiff. After a month, the defendant filed a pet ition for relief from said order upon the ground of mistake and excusable neglig ence. Asuncion stated that he received notice of a registered letter at the Post Office in San Jose, Nueva Ecija, his old family residence; that he proceeded im mediately to the latter municipality to claim said letter, which he received tha t the letter contained copy of said order and of the judgment of he was surprise d for he had not been summoned or notified of the hearing. His failure to appear before the court is excusable due to the mistake of the authorities concerned i n not complying with the provisions of Rule 7, section 21, of the Rules of Court . Upon denial of the petition for relief, defendant appealed. ISSUE: HELD: Wheth er or not summons by publication vest the court jurisdiction. Strict compliance with the terms of the statute is necessary to confer jurisdict ion through service by publication. The lower court had no authority to issue or der and declare the defendant in default. Such decision is null and void. Consti tutional Law states that personal service of summons, within the forum, is essen tial to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, who do es not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court. Summons by publ ication cannot consistently with the due process clause in the Bill of Rights co nfer upon the court jurisdiction over said defendant. 100 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 14 CITIZENS SURETY & INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. v. HON. JUDGE MELENCIO-HERRERA FACTS: Surety bonds in favor of Gregorio Fajardo were issued by petitioners to gu arantee payment of a promissory note executed by Dacanay and in favor of Manufac turers Bank and Trust Co., to guarantee payment of another promissory note. Sant iago and Josefina Dacanay executed Indemnity Agreements, binding to jointly and several indemnify plaintiff for any losses, cost and expenses and an additional security, Dacanays mortgaged to plaintiff of a parcel of land in Baguio City cov ered by Certificate of Title. The promissory notes were unpaid and as a result p laintiff Surety was compelled to pay Fajardo and the Manufacturers Bank. The Daca nays failed to reimburse the Surety for such payments. The Surety caused the ext rajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage to pay its claim. At the petitioners reque st, respondent judge caused summons to be made by publication in the newspaper, but despite publication defendants did not appear within the 60 days from last p ublication as required by the summons. Plaintiff seeks that the defendants be de clared in default. Respondent judge dismissed the case despite plaintiff Suretys argument that summons by publication was sufficient and valid under Rule 14, Sec tion 16 of the Revised Rules of Court. ISSUE: HELD: Whether or not the court acq uired jurisdiction through service of summons by publication Personal service is required by due process of law to support a personal judgmen t, and when the proceeding is strictly in personam brought to determine the pers onal rights and obligations of the parties, personal service within the state or a voluntary appearance in the case is essential to the acquisition of jurisdict ion so as to constitute compliance with the constitutional requirement of due pr ocess. The proceedings are ordered suspended and held pending until the plaintif f petitioner succeeds in ascertaining the whereabouts of the defendants or locat ing the properties to enable proper summons to be issued conformably. 101 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 14 MAGDALENA ESTATE, INC., v. RENE NIETO and HELEN GARCIA, FACTS: Defendants bought from the plaintiff a parcel of land. However, the defen dants had not fully paid the consideration for the said lot, by special arrangem ent with the plaintiff, the former were able to have the title to said lot trans ferred in their names. They had made partial payments only and the balance of th eir account was secured by a promissory note which they executed with terms and conditions that the defendants shall pay plaintiff the sum of P12,000.00, with i nterest thereon, said amount to be payable without demand in monthly installment s and in case of failure to pay any installment due, the total obligation or the balance automatically becomes due. A letter of demand was made by plaintiff abo ut the installments, defendants did not comply with their obligation. Plaintiffs legal counsel sent a letter of demand which was received by the defendants. Desp ite receipt of said letter, defendants did not comply and even failed to make a reply. Plaintiff presented a statement of account stating the amount owing to it inclusive of interest. There was an ex-parte reception of evidence because the defendants appellants had been declared in default, plaintiff having complied wi th the courts order allowing service of summons and copy of the complaint upon th e defendants-appellants through publication in a newspaper of general circulatio n. Plaintiff claims that summons could not be served personally upon the defenda nts because they concealed themselves and when the sheriff went to Cebu City whe re defendant-appellant Nieto holds office, could not be found but when the decis ion was served at the same address, the defendants appellants were able to recei ve it. Defendant-appellants appealed. ISSUE: HELD: Whether or not service of sum mons by publication vest the lower court jurisdiction The lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendants-a ppellants. The Court could not validly acquire jurisdiction on a non-appearing d efendant, absent a personal service of summons within the forum.The proper recou rse for a creditor in the same situation as petitioner is to locate properties, real or personal, of the resident defendant debtor with unknown address and caus e them to be attached under Rule 57, Section 1 (f), the attachment converts the action into a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem and the summons by publication m ay then accordingly be deemed valid and effective. 102 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 14 SPOUSES PATRICK AND RAFAELA JOSE VS. SPOUSES HELEN AND ROMEO BOYON FACTS: Petitioners filed a complaint for specific performance against respondent s to compel them to facilitate the transfer of ownership of a parcel of land sub ject of a controverted sale. The RTC issued a summons to respondents. As per ret urn of the summons, substituted service was resorted to by the process server al legedly because efforts to serve personally to respondents failed. Meanwhile, pe titioners filed an ex parte motion for leave of court to effect summons by publi cation and the judge issued an order granting the same. The respondents were dec lared in default and petitioners were thereafter allowed to submit their evidenc e ex parte. Helen Boyon, who was then out of the country, was surprised to learn from her sister of the resolution issued by the court. Respondents filed an Ad Cautelam motion questioning, among others, the validity of the service of summon s effected by the court a quo. The court issued an order denying the said motion on the basis of the defaulted respondent supposed loss of standing in court. On ce again, the respondents raised the issue of the jurisdiction of the trial cour t via a motion for reconsideration and the same was denied. The petitioners move d for the execution of the controverted judgment which the judge granted. Therea fter, respondents filed before the CA a petition for certiorari which held that the trial court had no authority to issue the questioned resolution and orders. ISSUE: Whether or not summons by publication can validly be served. HELD: Courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by the service of summons , such service may be done personal or substituted service, where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines. However, extraterritorial s ervice of summons or summons by publication applies only when the action is in r em or quasi in rem. That is, the action against the thing itself instead of agai nst the defendants person if the action is in rem or an individual is named as de fendant and the purpose is to subject the individuals interest in a piece of prop erty to the obligation or loan burdening it if quasi in rem. In the instant case , what was filed before the trial court was an action for specific performance d irected against respondents. While the suit incidentally involved a piece of lan d, the ownership or possession thereof was not put in issue. Moreover, court has consistently declared that an action for specific performance is an action in p ersonam. Hence, summons by publication cannot be validly served. 103 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 14 MA. IMELDA M. MANOTOC, Petitioner vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and AGAPITA TRA JANO In the case of Trajano vs. Manotoc for wrongful death of the deceased Archimedes Trajano committed by Military Intelligence under the command of Ma. Imelda M. M anotoc. Based upon the complaint, the Regional Trial Court issued a summons at t he house of Manotoc. The said Mackey dela Cruz, as caretaker, received the summo ns. Manotoc was declared in default for failure to answer. Whether or not a vali d jurisdiction was acquired for the service of summons over the petitioner. HELD : ISSUE: FACTS: The Regional Trial Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the petitioner, becau se the substituted service of summons was defective in nature or invalid at the first place. The main fact that the summons was not sent in the petitioner s dwe lling. The said caretaker was not a person of suitable age and discretion and wa s not resided in the said address. Hence the requisites of substituted summons w as not followed, therefore the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the petitio ner at the first place. 104 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 15 MOTIONS 105 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 15 VETTE INDUSTRIAL SALES v. SUI SOAN S. CHENG et al. A complaint for specific performance was filed by Cheng Sui Soan against Vette I ndustrial Sales Co., Inc., et al. based on unpaid obligations arising from his t ransfer of his interest in the stocks of Vette Industrial. Vette, et al. filed t heir answer, and after the issues were joined, Sui filed a Motion to Set Pretria l. Vette, et al. received the motion, but did not attend, since there was no not ice from the trial court setting the pre-trial date. A pre-trial hearing was sub sequently set for January 15, 2004, but was postponed and moved to May 21, 2004. Sui and his counsel, however, on the date of the pre-trial failed to appear, an d the trial court ordered the dismissal of the case. Atty. Ferrer, Suis counsel, filed a Manifestation and Motion for Reconsideration, which was granted, explain ing that he arrived late since he came from South Cotabato, as he served in the Provincial Board of Canvassers. Vette, et al. opposed said motion, asserting tha t Sui did not comply with the three-day notice rule which is mandatory under the Rules of Court, and that Sui failed to submit proof of receipt by Vette, et al. of the manifestation and motion. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in not dismissing the case HELD: The Court has consistently held that a motion whi ch does not meet the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is considered a worthless piece of paper, which the clerk of court has no right to receive and the trial court has no authority to act upon. However, the re are exceptions to the strict application of this rule. When the trial court r eceived Suis Manifestation and Motion for Reconsideration, it did not immediately resolve the motion, but allowed petitioners to file their comment and also leav e to file a rejoinder if Sui files a reply. These circumstances justify a depart ure from the literal application of the rule because petitioners were given the opportunity to study and answer the arguments in the motion. It is the policy of the Court to afford party-litigants the amplest opportunity to enable them to h ave their cases justly determined, free from the constraints of technicalities.4 1 It should be remembered that rules of procedure are but tools designed to faci litate the attainment of justice, such that when rigid application of the rules tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, this Court is empower ed to suspend their operation. FACTS: 106 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 15 MARIKINA VALLEY DEVELOPMENT v. HON. NAPOLEON R. FLOJO FACTS: A complaint for reconveyance of a parcel of land was instituted by Jose R eyes Sytangco against Marikina Valley Development Corporation and Milagros Liamz on. It appears that Sytangco gave funds to Liamzon to purchase the property for him and his wife, but Liamzon, in evident bad faith, used the funds to procure t he property for herself, and afterwards, transferred the same to Marikina Valley , which was a closed corporation owned by the Liamzon family. Liamzon and Mariki na Valley denied the allegations of Sytangco, and after due hearing, the trial c ourt rendered a decision, directing Marikina Valley to execute a Deed of Conveya nce covering the property in favor of Sytangco. Marikina Valley filed for recons ideration, which was denied by the trial court, and the court also dismissed the notice of appeal filed by the former for being pro forma. Upon elevation to the Court of Appeals, the latter court also dismissed the same based on the same gr ound. The CA reasoned that since the motion for reconsideration merely submitted , reiterated, repleaded, repeated or reaffirmed the same arguments that had been previously been considered and resolved in the decision, the motion is pro form a. ISSUE: Whether or not the motion filed by is merely pro forma. HELD: A motion for reconsideration, when sufficient in form and substance that is, when it sat isfies the requirements of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court interrupts the cunning of the period to perfect an appeal. A motion for reconsideration that does not c omply with those requirements will, upon the other hand, be treated as pro forma intended merely to delay the proceedings and as such, the motion will not stay or suspend the reglementary period. The net result will be dismissal of the appe al for having been unseasonably filed. In their motion, petitioners claimed that the evidence submitted was insufficient to show that the downpayment for the pu rchase of the property had in fact come from private respondents predecessor-in -interest Jose Reyes Sytangco. In effect, petitioners here aver that the presump tion of regularity of private transactions carried out in the ordinary course of business had not been overturned by the testimony of Jose Reyes Sytangco himsel f. This reflected petitioners appraisal of the trial court s conclusion that Jo se and Aurelia Reyes Sytangco had handed over to Milagros Liamzon the amount of P41,000.00 to complete the downpayment of the Reyes Sytangco spouses on the Espaa lot. The trial court had not discussed the presumption of regularity of private transactions invoked by petitioners. The Court is, therefore, unable to charact erize the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners as simply pro forma. T hat motion for reconsideration, it may be noted, had been filed no more than ten days after receipt of the trial court s decision by petitioner Marikina Valley. 107 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 16 MOTION TO DISMISS 108 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 16 PELTAN DEVELOPMENT INC., et al V COURT OF APPEALS, et al. FACTS: Alejandro Q. Rey (Rey) and Juan B. Araujo (Araujo) applied for a free pat ent over a parcel of land, which they had been occupying and cultivating for man y years. However, such free patent application was held in abeyance due to the e xistence of a title covering the land in the name of Peltan Development Inc. (Pe ltan). Rey and Araujo conducted investigation regarding said title and found tha t the Original Certificate of Title, from which Peltans title came from was ficti tious and spurious. Thus, they filed an action for the cancellation of Peltans ti tle, along with others like it. Peltan alleged that Rey and Araujo were not real parties-interest, as they had no existing legal right over the subject land, th us were was a lack of cause of action. The trial court ruled in favor of Peltan, thereby dismissing the complaint filed by Rey and Araujo. Upon appeal, the Cour t of Appeals reversed the decision, on the basis of a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court involving the same issue. Hence, Peltan filed a petition for revi ew. ISSUE: Whether or not Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of th e trial court HELD: The Court holds that private respondents are not the proper parties to initiate the present suit. The complaint, praying as it did for the c ancellation of the transfer certificates of title of petitioners on the ground t hat they were derived from a "spurious" OCT, assailed in effect the validity of said title. While private respondents did not pray for the reversion of the land to the government, we agree with the petitioners that the prayer in the complai nt will have the same result of reverting the land to the government under the R egalian doctrine. Gabila vs. Barriga ruled that only the government is entitled to this relief. The Court in that case held:The present motion to dismiss is act ually predicated on Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court, i.e., f ailure of the complaint to state a cause of action, for it alleges in paragraph 12 thereof that the plaintiff admits that he has no right to demand the cancella tion or amendment of the defendant s title, because, even if the said title were canceled or amended, the ownership of the land embraced therein, or of the port ion thereof affected by the amendment, would revert to the public domain. In his amended complaint the plaintiff makes no pretense at all that any part of the l and covered by the defendant s title was privately owned by him or by his predec essors-ininterest. Indeed, it is admitted therein that the said land was at all times a part of the public domain until December 18, 1964, when the government i ssued a title thereon in favor of defendant. Thus, if there is any person or ent ity to relief, it can only be the government. 109 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 16 ALFREDO VERGEL DE DIOS and EMILY B. VERGEL DE DIOS v. RISTOL LABORATORIES (PHILS.), INC., and P.P. LAGDAMEO Petitioner had been working as a detailman, in charge of promoting products for Bristol Laboratories. After some years of service, Bristol sent a letter to Alfr edo, terminating his employment on grounds attached to the notice of termination . Bristol, it appears, this letter to its employees, leaving Alfredo ostracized. Alfredo then filed with the Court of First Instance an action for damages for t he alleged libelous comments and insults directed at him by Bristol. Bristol, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint stat es no cause of action. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Bristol. On appeal, Alfredo reasons that he was not asking for damages based on the Labor L aw, but based on the Civil Code, for quasi-delict. ISSUE: Whether or not the com plaint does not state a cause of action. HELD: In order to sustain a dismissal o n the ground that the complaint states no cause of action, the insufficiency of the cause of action must appear on the face of the complaint, and the test of th e sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint to constitute a cause of act ion is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a val id judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the complaint. For th e purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the fact s alleged in the complaint. 5 The admission, however, is limited only to all mat erial and relevant facts which are well pleaded in the complaint. The admission of the truth of material and relevant facts well pleaded does not extend to rend er a demurrer an admission of inferences or conclusions drawn therefrom, even if alleged in the pleading; nor mere inferences or conclusions from facts not stat ed; nor conclusions of law; nor matters of evidence; nor surplusage and irreleva nt matter.The admission of the truth of material and relevant facts well pleaded does not extend to render a demurrer an admission of inferences or conclusions drawn therefrom, even if alleged in the pleading; nor mere inferences or conclus ions from facts not stated; nor conclusions of law; nor matters of evidence; nor surplusage and irrelevant matter. FACTS: 110 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 16 FLORENTINO PINEDA v. HEIRS OF ELISEO GUEVARRA FACTS: The heirs of Eliseo Guevara instituted an action for the nullification of the certificates of title of a parcel of land, which they claim belonged to the ir parents, and are covered by titles in the names of Florentino Pineda and othe r persons. According to the heirs, the land was purchased by their father, and t hat such sale was annotated at the back of the Original Title of the land. Pined a filed an answer with counterclaim, raising the defense of lack of cause of act ion, averring that he was a buyer in good faith, and laches. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint on the ground of laches, but the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court, stating that laches is not one of the grounds enumerated under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. ISSUE: Whether or not a complaint may be dismissed on the ground of laches HELD: In the case at bar, whi le the trial court correctly set the case for hearing as though a motion to dism iss had been filed, the records do not reveal that it extended to the parties th e opportunity to present evidence. For instance, counsel for the heirs of Guevar a filed and served written interrogatories on one of the defendants but the tria l court held in abeyance the resolution of the motion to order the defendant to submit answers to the written interrogatories. The trial court likewise denied t he Ex Parte Motion To Set Trial filed by the heirs of Guevara. These were the in stances which would have enabled the trial court to receive evidence on which to anchor its factual findings. Although the trial court heard oral arguments and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda, the presentation of e vidence on the defenses which are grounds for a motion to dismiss was not held a t all. Otherwise, the oral arguments and memoranda submitted by the parties woul d have enabled this Court to review the trial courts factual finding of laches in stead of remanding the case for trial on the merits. A perusal of the records pr ecludes this Court from making a categorical declaration on whether the heirs of Guevara were guilty of laches. In reversing the RTCs order of dismissal, the Cou rt of Appeals held that "laches could not be a ground to dismiss the complaint a s it is not enumerated under Rule 16, Section 1." This is not entirely correct. Under paragraph (h) thereof, where a claim or demand set forth in the plaintiffs pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished, the same m ay be raised in a motion to dismiss. The language of the rule, particularly on t he relation of the words "abandoned" and "otherwise extinguished" to the phrase "claim or demand deemed set forth in the plaintiffs pleading" is broad enough to include within its ambit the defense of bar by laches. However, when a party mov es for the dismissal of the complaint based on laches, the trial court must set a hearing on the motion where the parties shall submit not only their arguments on the questions of law but also their evidence on the questions of fact involve d. Thus, being factual in nature, the elements of laches must be proved or dispr oved through the presentation of evidence by the parties. As discussed above, an apparent delay in the filing of a complaint as shown in a pleading does not aut omatically warrant the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of laches. 111 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 18 PRE-TRIAL 112 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE ANDRES C. SARMIENTO Rule 18 v. HON. CELESTINO C. JUAN and BELFAST SURETY & INSURANCE CO., INC. Belfast Surety a nd Insurance Co. Inc. filed an action against Andres Sarmiento (Andres) and his father, Benjamin Sarmiento, Sr. for indemnification under a prior indemnity agre ement executed by them in connection with a bail bond. After Andres filed an ans wer with compulsory counterclaim, Belfast filed a motion to dismiss the case aga inst Benjamin and to schedule the case for pre-trial. The motion was granted by Judge Celestino Juan (Judge Juan) and a pre-trial date was set. However, during pre-trial, nobody appeared except Atty. Castillo, counsel for Belfast. Andres, m eanwhile, sent a motion on the same day to the court asking for the postponement of the hearing on the ground of stomach pains. This motion was denied by the tr ial court and Belfast was allowed to present evidence ex parte. It is not clear whether the ex parte presentation of evidence had already been done, nor that a decision had been rendered, but Andres filed a petition with the Supreme Court t o annul the aforementioned orders of Judge Juan. The petition was remanded to th e Court of Appeals, who denied the same. In this petition for review, Andres con tends that pre-trial was premature inasmuch as there was still no answer filed b y Belfast to his counterclaim, thus the last pleading had not yet been filed so as to authorize a pretrial under the Rules of Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the p re-trial was valid HELD: The requirement that the pre-trial shall be scheduled " after the last pleading has been filed" is intended to fully apprise the court a nd the parties of all the issues in the case before the pre-trial is conducted. It must be remembered that the issues may only be ascertained from the allegatio ns contained in the pleadings filed by the parties. The last permissible pleadin g that a party may file would be the reply to the answer to the last pleading of claim that had been filed in the case, which may either be the complaint, a cro ss-claim, a counterclaim or a third party complaint, etc. Any pleading asserting a claim must be answered, and the failure to do so by the party against whom th e claim is asserted renders him liable to be declared in default in respect of s uch claim. There are, however, recognized exceptions to the rule, making the fai lure to answer a pleading of claim as a ground for a default declaration, such a s the failure to answer a complaint in intervention, or a compulsory counterclai m so intimately related to the complaint such that to answer to same would merel y require a repetition of the allegations contained in the complaint In the case presently considered, the nature of the counterclaim in the petitioner s answer has not been made clear, except to categorize it as a compulsory counterclaim. Such being the case, it is likely to be one where the answering thereof is not n ecessary, and the failure to do so would not be a ground to be declared in defau lt. In any event, the private respondent s failure to answer the petitioner s co unterclaim after the period to file the answer had lapsed is no obstacle to hold ing a pre-trial.1wph1.t The requirement that the last pleading must have been filed before a pre-trial may be scheduled should more appropriately be construed to me an not only if the last pleading had been actually filed, but also if the period for filing the same had expired. FACTS: 113 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 18 ROLANDO AGULTO, et al. v. WILLIAM Z. TECSON William Tecson filed an action for damages against Rolando Agulto, et al. (Agult o, et al.) in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Agulto, et al. filed thei r answer, claiming that Tecson has no cause of action against them and prayed fo r the dismissal of the case. The trial court dismissed the case for failure to p rosecute, but the action was subsequently revived upon Tecsons motion. The RTC th en required the parties to appear during the pre-trial conference. On the date o f the pre-trial conference, Agulto and his counsel were informed by an employee of the RTC that the judge was on leave. The counsel for the petitioners suggeste d an alternative date for pre-trial, and the RTC employee said that such suggest ion was not yet official as the date would depend on the calendar of the court a nd the Tecsons counsel. On the suggested date, however, the pre-trial conference did push through, and since Agulto, et al. were not apprised thereof, they faile d to appear, and the RTC allowed Tecson to present his evidence ex parte. Agulto , et al. then filed a petition for certiorari claiming that the RTC gravely abus ed its discretion, and that they were robbed of their day in court, thus the pre -trial conference was not valid. ISSUE: Whether or not the pre-trial conference was proper according to the Rules of Court HELD: Under the present Section 3, Ru le 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the notice of pre-trial should be se rved on counsel. The counsel served with notice is charged with the duty of noti fying the party he represents. It is only when a party has no counsel that the n otice of pre-trial is required to be served personally on him. Thus, the present rule simplifies the procedure in the sense that notice of pretrial is served on counsel, and service is made on a party only if he has no counsel. It does not, however, dispense with notice of pre-trial. The failure of a party to appear at the pre-trial has adverse consequences. If the absent party is the plaintiff, t hen he may be declared non-suited and his case dismissed. If it is the defendant who fails to appear, then the plaintiff may be allowed to present his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof. Thus, sending a notice of pretrial stating the date, time and place of pre-trial is mandatory. I ts absence will render the pre-trial and subsequent proceedings void. This must be so as part of a party s right to due process. Here, no notice of pre-trial wa s served on counsel of petitioners in connection with the pre-trial held. Hence, the RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion when it issued its order allowing respondent to present his evidence ex parte. If no notice of pre-trial is serve d, all the proceedings at the pre-trial et seq. are null and void. Hence, the ab sence of the requisite notice of pre-trial to the defendant s counsel (or to the defendant himself, in case he has no counsel) nullifies the order allowing the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte. The fact that the respondent was all owed to present his evidence ex parte not only because the petitioners failed to appear at the pre-trial but also because they failed to file their pre-trial br ief is of no moment. Although the failure of the defendant to file a pre-trial b rief has the same effect as his failure to appear at the pre-trial (this is, the plaintiff may be allowed to present his evidence ex parte and the court shall r ender judgment on the basis thereof), a condition precedent is FACTS: 114 P a g e

the service of notice of pre-trial. Otherwise, the defendant will be groping in the dark as to when exactly he is supposed to file his pre-trial brief. More spe cifically, under Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the pa rties are required to file with the court and serve on the adverse party, in suc h manner as shall ensure their receipt thereof at least three days before the da te of the pre-trial, their respective pre-trial briefs. Clearly, the date of the pre-trial is the reckoning point for the filing of the pre-trial brief. But wit hout prior notice of pre-trial, the parties cannot reasonably be expected to kno w the date of the pre-trial. Therefore, it is imperative for the trial court to serve notice of pre-trial on counsel. It is only after being notified of the pre -trial that the twin duties to file the pre-trial brief and to appear at the pre -trial arise. Without such notice, a party cannot be faulted for and made to suf fer the adverse consequences of his failure either to file the pre-trial brief o r to appear at the pre-trial. 115 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 19 INTERVENTION 116 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 19 FIRST PHILIPPINE HOLDINGS CORPORATION SANDIGANBAYAN, et al. The Presidential Commission on Good Governance instituted an action for reconvey ance, accounting and restitution of certain funds and properties allegedly acqui red by Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez, et al. though abuse of right and power and unjust enrichment. The funds and properties subject of the case are sequestered shares of stock in the Philippines Commercial International Bank (PCIBank), allegedly acquired by Romualdez, et al. in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practic es Act, and therefore subject to forfeiture in favor of the government. First Ph ilippine Holdings Corporation filed its own Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Complaint in Intervention pending before the Sandiganbayan. It averred th at Trans Middle East Equities, another Romualdez front borrowed the amount used to buy said shares of stock from another corporation, which in turn, used PCIBan k funds. FPHC therefore asked in its Complaint in Intervention that the said pro perties be returned to it. The Sandiganbayan dismissed FPHCs complaint in interve ntion because according to such court, the right sought to be enforced by the la tter is personal between it and Equities, and also intra-corporate in nature, th us the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the same. On elevation to the Supr eme Court, Equities argued that the Sandiganbayan was correct in dismissing FPHCs complaint in intervention since the latter did not own any shares of stock of P CIBank, and will only become such owner if the sales document of the shares in f avor of its present owners is annulled. ISSUE: Whether or not FPHC has a legal i nterest to allow it to intervene in the case Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in a proceeding, becomes a litigant there in to enable him to protect or preserve a right or interest which may be affecte d by such proceeding. Its purpose, according to Francisco, is "to settle in one action and by a single judgment the whole controversy (among) the persons involv ed".The Court has no doubt that petitioner has a legal interest in the shares wh ich are the subject of the controversy. At the very least, it is "so situated as to be adversely affectted by a distribution or disposition of the (sequestered shares) in the custody of the court". The PCGG prays that, among other propertie s, the shares in question should be returned and reconveyed to it. On the other hand, FPHC claims that said shares belong to it, not to respondent Romualdez or Equities. Clearly, therefore, petitioner would be adversely affected by any judg ment therein distributing or disposing of the property, whether to PCGG or to Eq uities. Unquestionably, the shares are sequestered and thus are "in the custody of the court", because by sequestration properties are placed in the control of a court to preserve them and/or to prevent their sale, encumbrance or dispositio n pending the determination of the legality or illegality of their acquisition a nd their true ownership. No such final determination is possible unless the part ies who have legitimate but conflicting claims are made parties or, as in this c ase, allowed to intervene in the main action. HELD: FACTS: v. 117 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE ESTEBAN YAU Rule 19 v. THE MANILA BANKING CORPORATION THE MANILA BANKING CORPORATION v. ESTEBAN YAU, et al. FACTS: Petitioner Esteban Yau, a judgment creditor of Ricardo Silverio, Sr. , applied for, and was granted a writ of execution to satisfy the judgment. It a ppears, however, that the only property of Silverio that could be found is his p roprietary membership share in the Manila Golf and Country Club. Accordingly, th e sheriff levied upon such share, and during the public auction sale, Yau emerge d as the highest bidder, and a corresponding Certificate of Sale was issued in h is name. However, at the time of the execution sale, the shares Silverio were ap parently subject to a prior levy pursuant to separate writs of preliminary attac hment by the Manila Banking Corporation (Manila Bank). Yau then filed separate m otions to intervene in the cases involving said shares, and one trial court gran ted said motion, but the second motion was denied by the other. Accordingly, the shares were transferred to Yaus name. Manila Bank thereafter filed a petition fo r certiorari before the CA, which was granted. The Court of Appeals found that s ince the shares were in custodia legis, the order was null and void. ISSUE: Whet her or not the intervention, which led to the transfer to Yau of the shares is v alid HELD: The contention of Manilabank that Yau has no legal interest in the ma tter in litigation lacks buoyancy. Under Section 2, Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court, which was the governing law at the time the instant case was decided by the trial court and the appellate court, a person may, before or during trial , be permitted by the Court in its discretion to intervene in an action, if he h as legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of th e parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be adver sely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof. Yau falls under the last instance. It is recognized that a judgment creditor who has reduced his claim to judgment may be allowed to intervene and a purchaser who acquires an interest in property upon which an attachment has been levied may intervene in the underlying action in wh ich the writ of attachment was issued for the purpose of challenging the attachm ent. Clearly, Yau, being the judgment creditor of Silverio and the purchaser at the public auction sale of the Silverio share, would be adversely affected by th e disposition of the Silverio share, subject of the writ of attachment should a decision be rendered in favor of Manilabank and, as such, has standing to interv ene to protect his interest. Besides, no purpose will be served by not allowing Yau to protect his interests where the Silverio share is under custodia legis. I f we follow the contention of Manilabank, this would result in a violation of th e aforementioned principle of judicial stability or non-interference. Lastly, on the matter of allowing the intervention after trial, suffice it to state that t he rules now allow intervention before rendition of judgment by the trial court. After trial and decision in a case, intervention can no longer be permitted. Th e permissive tenor of the provision on intervention shows the intention of the R ules to give to the court the full measure of discretion in permitting or disall owing the same. The rule on intervention was evidently intended to expedite and economize in litigation by permitting parties interested in the subject matter, or anything related therein, to adjust the matter in one instead of several suit s. 118 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 23 DEPOSITIONS PENDING ACTION 119 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SANDIGANBAYAN, BIENVENIDO R. TANT OCO, JR. and DOMINADOR R. SANTIAGO FACTS: Rule 23 A claim for reconveyance was filed against respondents by petitioner Presidentia l Commission on Good Government. Respondents subsequently filed a motion for lea ve to file interrogatories. Petitioner then filed a motion to strike out the int errogatory for being queer, weird and procedurally bizarre as it is improper and i rrelevant. The Sandiganbayan refuted such motion for leave to file interrogatori es and impelled Tantoco and Santiago to amend their interrogatories such that it primarily required factual details relative to the specific assertions of PCGGs amended complaint. Sandiganbayan admitted such amendment, which PCGG opposed mai nly on the ground that the interrogatories dig into evidentiary matters. ISSUE: Whether or not evidentiary issues may be delved into in interrogatories. HELD: I f the ultimate facts are alleged in general terms or "not averred with sufficien t definiteness trial, a bill of particulars seeking a more definite statement may be ordered by the court upon motion. A bill of particulars is, however, limited to creating more particular or definite the ultimate facts in a pleading. Its f unction is not to supply evidentiary matters. Such matters may be inquired into before the trial. It is the purpose of the law that the parties before the trial should discover for themselves of all the facts relevant to the action, not onl y those known to them individually, but also those known to adversaries; and the Rules of Court make this ideal possible through depositions. 120 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE FORTUNE CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS and INTER-MERCHANTS CORP ORATION FACTS: Rule 23 Petitioner Fortune filed an action for breach of contract against Respondent. Up on the filing by Respondent of its answer, Petitioner served written interrogato ries which were answered by Respondent. Consequently, a notice to take depositio n upon oral examination of a certain Juanito Teope was sent by Petitioner, which was opposed by Respondent stating that it had previously availed of one mode of discovery and that Teope has no intention to abscond or leave the country and i s very much willing to testify in open court. The trial court prohibited the Dep osition. ISSUE: mode. HELD: The liberty of a party to make discovery is practica lly unrestricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and not pri vileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of law. The court could not thereby observe the behavior of the deponent does not justify t he denial of the right to take deposition. In the absence of proof, the allegati on that petitioner merely intended to annoy, harass or oppress the proposed depo nent cannot ably support the setting aside of a notice to take deposition. Petit ion was granted. Whether or not a party, after availing of one mode of discovery may once more avail of another 121 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE AYALA LAND, INC. v. HON. JUDGE LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ASB REALTY COR P. and E.M. RAMOS & SONS, INC. FACTS: Rule 23 ASB Realty, Inc. and E.M. Ramos & Sons, Inc., Respondents in this case, filed an action for nullification of a Contract to Sell against Petitioner Ayala Land. R espondent, afterwards, filed a Motion for leave to take Testimony by Deposition upon Oral Examination of Emerito Ramos, Sr. Although still of sound mind, he was already 87 years old and the possibility of him not being able to testify on it s behalf is more than likely in the course of the trial. Motion was granted and the parties scheduled a date for cross-examination of Ramos. Petitioner, objecte d to the propriety and admissibility of the deposition. The trial court ordered the cross-examination be taken. Ramos subsequently died hence Respondents sought the admission of the deposition. Deposition of Ramos was admitted. Petitioner o bjected to its admissibility. ISSUE: Whether or not the deposition is admissible . HELD: The rules on discovery should not be unduly restricted; otherwise, the p erceived advantage of a liberal discovery procedure in ascertaining the truth an d expediting the disposal of litigation would be defeated. The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence while the weight of evidence pe rtains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade. I n this case, the trial court permitted the taking of Ramos deposition chiefly bec ause of his advance age which ground is considered valid and justified under the Rules of Court. 122 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE JONATHAN LANDOIL INTERNATIONAL CO., INC. v. SPOUSES SUHARTO MANG UDADATU and MIRIAM SANGKI MANGUNDADATU FACTS: Rule 23 A complaint for damages against Petitioner Jonathan Landoil International Co., I nc. who was declared in default and consequently a decision in favor of Responde nts was rendered. Motion for New Trial was filed by petitioner, which was eventu ally denied by the trial court and afterwards a writ of execution was issued. Pe titioner filed a motion to quash said writ and also filed a Petition for Prohibi tion before the Court of Appeals seeking to enjoin the implementation of the wri t. Notice to take Deposition upon Oral Examination of Atty. Peligro and Atty. Ma rio was served by Respondents intending to prove that Petitioner had not receive d a decision from the trial court denying its Motion for New Trial. Deposition p roceeded and subsequently, the trial court denied Petitioners Motion to Quash Wri t. The Court of Appeals ruled that Petitioner may no longer avail of a depositio n due to the termination of the trial. ISSUE: Whether or not an oral deposition can no longer be availed of. HELD: No existing rule limits the taking of deposit ion. Depositions may be taken at any time after the institution of any action, w henever necessary or convenient. Depositions are allowed, provided they are take n in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court and provided, further, that a circumstance for their admissibility exists. In the instant case, Sectio n 4(c)(2) of Rule 23 governs the circumstances where the witnesses of petitioner resided beyond 100 kilometers from the place of hearing. Further, notwithstandi ng the fact that a trial has already been terminated, a deposition can still be properly initiated. 123 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE HYATT INDUSTRIAL MANUFACTURING CORP. and YU HE CHING v. LEY CONS TRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORP. and PRINCETON DEVELOPMENT CORP. FACTS: Rule 23 Due to failure to transfer shares in a real property and to develop the same, a complaint for specific performance was commenced by Respondent Ley Construction against Petitioner Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing despite full payment of the pu rchase price. Princeton Development Corp. was also impleaded due to its purchase of the subject property was bought by it. Both Hyatt and Ley sought to avail of taking depositions. However, Petitioner contended that such taking of depositio ns will delay the proceedings. The scheduled depositions were consequently calle d off by the trial court and thereafter set the date for pre-trial. Ley refused to enter into pre-trial and upon motion by Hyatt and Ching as well as Respondent Princeton, the complaint was subsequently dismissed. A petition for Certiorari was filed by Respondent Ley relating to the order of the trial court declining t o suspend the pre-trial. The Court of Appeals ordered the taking of the depositi on. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a proper grant of taking a deposition. HELD: The trial court, before dismissing Leys complaint, gave two options which are ei ther to enter into a pre-trial or terminate the pre-trial conference and apply f or deposition later on. The trial court erred in forcing Ley to choose only from these options and in dismissing its complaint upon its refusal to choose either of the two. The taking of deposition is permissible without any showing that pr ejudice to any party might result provided it is taken in accordance with the pr ovisions of the Rules of Court. A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC directs trial courts to issu e orders requiring parties to avail of interrogatories to parties under Rule 45 and request for admission of adverse party under Rule 26 or make use of depositi ons under Rule 23. 124 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE JOWEL SALES v. CYRIL SABINO FACTS: Rule 23 In view of the vehicular accident which caused the death of respondent Cyril Sab inos son, a complaint for damages was initiated against Petitioner Jowel Sales. A deposition and cross-examination of a certain Bueneres Corral was commenced by the respondent in the presence of Petitioners counsel. Due to the fact that Corra l has absconded and left the country, a Formal Offer of Exhibit was made, offeri ng as evidence said deposition, which was opposed by Petitioner for the reason t hat the requirements for the admission of such under Rule 23 of the Rules of Cou rt has not been complied with. The said evidence was admitted, which the Court o f Appeals upheld. ISSUE: Whether or not the deposition is permissible. HELD: Whi le depositions may be used as evidence in court proceedings, they are generally not meant to be a substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party o r witness. However, the Petitioner has not asserted and presented evidence that deponent Corral has undeniably returned to the country but only offered such as a possibility. The petition was therefore denied. 125 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE JONATHAN D. CARIAGA v. COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPIN ES and DAVAO LIGHT & POWER CO. FACTS: Rule 23 Respondent Davao Light and Power Co. sought the arrest of petitioner for the cla ndestine sale of Respondents supplies and he sought the. A certain Ricardo was ap prehended and he executed a sworn statement stating therein that the pilfered it ems came from Petitioner Cariaga. The prosecution was unable to present Ricardo as a witness since personal service of a subpoena could not be effected for the reason that he was in Sultan Kudarat. Petitioner Cariaga was convicted of qualif ied theft, relying upon the sworn statement. The Court of Appeals affirmed said conviction. ISSUE: Whether or not the sworn statement was admissible. HELD: It h as been previously ruled that " unable to testify or for that matter unavailab ility , does not cover the case of witnesses who were subpoenaed but did not app ear. Admission of testimony given by witness out of court must be strictly compl ied with. The witness cannot be categorized as one that cannot be found despite due diligence, unavailable or unable to testify. The Court must exercise its coe rcive power to arrest." On this score alone, the sworn statement of Ricardo Cari aga should not have been admitted as evidence for the prosecution, and we shall no longer delve into the other aspects of this rule. The decision of the Court o f Appeals is hereby reversed. 126 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE PFEGER R. DULAY v. RODRIGO S. DULAY FACTS: Rule 23 Petitioner having taken care of Respondent, opened a trust account with the bank of Boston making the former as trustee of said account. Rodrigo discovered that Petitioner had emptied the account. Respondent, in seeking to recover his bank deposit, filed a complaint against Petitioner. Respondent Rodrigo then filed for the issuance of Letters Rogatory to get the deposition of several witnesses res iding abroad where Petitioner lived. Dulay, moved for the filing of cross-examin ation questions which was granted. The trial court ordered that the Clerk of Cou rt in Boston, Massachusetts conduct the examination. The deposition was, however , actually taken before a Notary Public. The answer to interrogatories and cross -interrogatories were submitted by the Respondent to the court and was admitted over the objections of Petitioners. The Court of Appeals also held it proper to admit such. ISSUE: Whether or not there was compliance with the requirements upo n submission of the documents. HELD: Respondent cannot be faulted for the delay neither can the trial court be blamed for allowing the admission of the depositi ons taken not in strict adherence to its original directive. It was not within t he trial courts power, much less the respondents, to compel the Clerk of Court of Boston to have the deposition taken before it. Respondent Rodrigo substantially complied with the requirements for depositions taken in foreign countries. The a uthentication made by the consul was a ratification of the authority of the nota ry public who took the questioned depositions. With such ratification, there is no more impediment to their admissibility. This petition is thus denied. 127 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 23 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SANDIGANBAYAN, LUCIO TAN FACTS: Presidential Commission for Good Government, sought for reversion, reconv eyance, and restitution before Respondent Sandiganbayan against Respondents Luci o Tan. PCGG alleged that Respondent had an agreement with then President Ferdina nd E. Marcos whereby the former President would appropriate 60% of Shareholdings , Inc. owned by Respondent Tan. It was averred that Respondent Tan made bribes i n consideration of the governments continued support for his business endeavors. Petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to take Deposition of Rolando Gapud upon Ora l Examination being the former financial adviser of the President and his testim ony can only be taken upon oral examination due to personal risks. Due to failur e of service of summons upon all defendants and their failure to answer, said mo tion was denied. ISSUE: Whether or not the taking of deposition was proper. HELD : Allusion to any fact other than Gapud s cooperation was not offered by PCGG th at would support the deponent s claim of fear for his safety. No proof or any al legation has been presented to show that a real threat to Gapud s life exists up on his return to the Philippines, and that adequate security cannot be provided by petitioner for such a vital witness. Petitioner PCGG s reasons do not amount to an "exceptional" or "unusual" case for us to grant leave and reverse responde nt court. 128 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 23 HEIRS OF PEDRO PASAG v. SPOUSES LORENZO and FLORENTINA PAROCHA FACTS: An action for Declaration of Nullity of Documents and Title and Recovery of Possession and Ownership was filed by petitioners against Spouses Lorenza and Florentina Parocha. Petitioners, during trial, were given 10 days to submit the ir formal offer of documentary exhibits and having failed to do so, the trial co urt considered such as a waiver of their right to make a formal offer of evidenc e. Court of Appeals affirmed ISSUE: Whether or not there was a waiver of the rig ht to make their formal offer of evidence. HELD: Emphasis must be had on the nec essity of a formal offer of evidence to enable judges to support their findings of facts and their judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the p arties at the trial. Failure to submit within a considerable period of time is a considered a waiver. There is a considerable difference between identification of documentary evidence and its formal offer. The former is done in the course o f the pre-trial, and trial is accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an e xhibit; while the latter is done only when the party rests its case. 129 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 25 INTERROGATORIES TO PARTIES 130 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 25 ELENA S. ONG v. HON. JUDGE FRANCISCO V. MAZO, ELVIRA C. LANUEVO and CHARITO A. T OMILLOSO FACTS: Elvira C. Lanueva and Charito A. Tomilloso, respondents in this case, fil ed an action for damages against Petitioner Elena S. Ong stemming from a vehicul ar accident between a bus owned by Petitioner which bumped into a jeepney owned by Lanueva with Tomilloso as passenger. Petitioner served written interrogatorie s upon Respondents along with a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion seeking that th e court directs them to answer the interrogatories. Denial by the trial court on the ground that it constituted a fishing expedition which would be more appropria tely ventilated in a pre-trial conference. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial corre ctly issued such denial. HELD: It was blatantly erroneous for the trial court to disallow petitioners written interrogatories. The time-honored cry of fishing exp edition is no longer a valid reason to prevent a party from inquiring into the fa cts underlying the opposing partys case through discovery procedures. Therefore, the remedy of certiorari is necessary. . 131 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 25 EDWARD T. MARCELO, MARCELO FIBERGLASS CORPORATION v. SANDIGANBAYAN and PRESIDENT IAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT FACTS: Respondent Presidential Commission on Good Government filed a complaint a gainst Petitioners for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth. Respondent PCGG served a Request for Admission upon Petitioner Edward and the latter filed a response including a counterclaim also seeking the admission on matter stated therein. PC GG subsequently filed a Pre-trial Brief and Petitioner also filed with Written I nterrogatories, First Set and Request for Admission. Other Petitioner Corporatio ns likewise filed their trial Briefs with Written Interrogatories, First Set and some included a Request for Admission. PCGG answered only the written interroga tories and request for admission prompting the Petitioner Corporations to file a Motion for Summary Judgment on the ground that the matters set forth in their w ritten interrogatories are deemed established for Respondent PCGGs failure to ans wer such. Sandiganbayan denied the motion for summary judgment. ISSUE: Whether o r not denial of the motion for summary judgment was proper. HELD: Summary judgme nt is found to be in order. Summary judgment may still ensue as a matter of law even if the pleadings appear, on their face, to raise issues, when the affidavit s, depositions and admissions illustrate that such issues are not genuine. Respo ndent Republic cannot plausibly evade the consequences of its failure to answer written interrogatories and requests for admission. If the plaintiff fails or re fuses to answer the interrogatories, it may be a good basis for the dismissal of his complaint for non-suit unless he can justify such failure or refusal. The l aw imposes serious sanctions on the party who refuses to make discovery, such as dismissing the action or proceeding or part thereof. 132 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 26 ADMISSION BY ADVERSE PARTY 133 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 26 FORTUNATA DUQUE v. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES ENRICO BONIFACIO and DRA. EDNA BONI FACIO FACTS: A complaint was filed by petitioner against Respondents contending that t he latter negotiated to her several checks claiming that they were the holders i n due course and that such were properly funded. The checks were, however, disho nored and the spouses continue to refuse any replacement or to pay in cash. Peti tioner Duque filed and served a Request for Admission requesting that Respondent s admit that they negotiated the check for valuable consideration and that they are indebted to Petitioner. The trial court deemed the failure to respond as an implied admission of the matters set forth in the request. On the ground of defe ctive service of the Request for Admission, the Court of Appeals reversed the ju dgment. ISSUES: Whether or not there was proper personal service upon the respon dent. HELD: Petitioners failed to comply with the requirements under Section 1 o f Rule 26 which provides that a party may serve upon any other party a written r equest for the admission by the latter of the genuineness of any material and re levant document described in and exhibited with the request; and that copies of the documents should be delivered with the request unless copies have already be en furnished. Records show that only the counsel of the Respondents Spouses was furnished copies of the requests. Under Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court , all notices must be served upon counsel and not upon the party. However, the g eneral rule cannot apply where the law expressly provides that notice must be se rved upon a definite person. In such cases, service must be made directly upon t he person mentioned in the law and upon no other in order that the notice be val id. 134 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 26 SALVADOR D. BRIBONERIA v. COURT OF APPEALS, GERTRUDES B. MAG-ISA, married to and assisted by PEDRO MAG-ISA FACTS: A complaint was filed by petitioner for annulment of a sale made by the p etitioners wife to Respondent without Petitioners consent. Petitioner Salvador ser ved a Request for Admission which was answered by Respondent alleging that most of the matters in the request had been admitted, denied or clarified in their ve rified answer and that all other matters were irrelevant. ISSUE: Whether or not the material facts in the request for admission are relevant. HELD: Section 1, R ule 26 of the Rules of Court provides that a request for admission must be serve d directly upon the party; otherwise, the party to whom the request is directed cannot be deemed to have admitted the genuineness of any relevant document in an d exhibited with the request or relevant matters of fact set forth therein, on a ccount of failure to answer the request for admission. The instant case shows th at the request for admission was not served to the respondent but only upon her counsel. Therefore, Respondent cannot be deemed to have admitted the facts and d ocuments for having failed to file her answer within the period fixed in the req uest. 135 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 26 PRISCILLA SUSAN PO v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE JULIAN LUSTRE and JOSE P . MANANZAN FACTS: Petitioner Priscilla Susan Po (Po) filed a complaint for damages against Respondent Jose P. Mananzan (Mananzan), the operator of a banca service at Pagsa njan Falls, for the accidental capsizing of the banca Petitioner Po and her frie nd was riding on the way back to town. Upon the filing of Respondent Mananzans an swer, Petitioner Po served a Request for Admission and upon delay in answering s uch, the latter moved for summary judgment. Respondent Mananzan opposed the summ ary judgment and subsequently answered the Request for Admission. The trial cour t denied the Motion for Summary Judgment on the ground that the interrogatories are reiterations of the allegations in the complaint which were already answered and denied by Respondent Mananzan, hence, the present petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in holding that Respondent Mananzan need not answer the Request for Admission served upon him by Petitioner Po HELD: Petition DENIE D. An examination of Petitioner Po s complaint and her request for admission con firms the trial court s finding (which the Court of Appeals upheld) that the "fa ct" set forth in the request for admission, including the amount of damages clai med, are the same factual allegations set forth in her complaint which the defen dant either admitted or denied in his answer. A party should not be compelled to admit matters of fact already admitted by his pleading and concerning which the re is no issue, nor should he be required to make a second denial of those alrea dy denied in his answer to the complaint. A request for admission is not intende d to merely reproduce or reiterate the allegations of the requesting party s ple ading but should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact, or documents de scribed in and exhibited with the request, whose purpose is to establish said pa rty s cause of action or defense. Unless it serves that purpose, it is, as corre ctly observed by the Court of Appeals, "pointless, useless," and "a mere redunda ncy." 136 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 26 ROGER MANZANO v. LUZ DESPABILADERAS FACTS: An action for the recovery of a sum of money against Respondent was filed by petitioner. The court, after pre-trial, acknowledged a mutual agreement ente red into by the parties and that Petitioner shall present an offer to stipulate. The petitioner instead filed a Request for Admission which was not replied by R espondent. For such failure to respond to the Request for Admission, Petitioner moved for Partial Judgment alleging an implied admission by Respondent. An order by the trial court stated that matters not answered under oath are deemed admit ted and rendered a decision in favor of Petitioner. ISSUE: Whether or not there is implied admission upon failure to answer a Request for Admission. HELD: After having failed to discharge what is incumbent upon the respondent under Rule 26, to deny under oath the facts bearing on the main issue contained in the "Reques t for Admission," respondent was deemed to have admitted that she received the c onstruction materials, the cost of which was indicated in the request. 137 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 26 BAY VIEW HOTEL, INC. v. KER & CO.and PHOENIX ASSURANCE CO. FACTS: A cash shortage and unremitted collection of a substantial amount was dis covered upon a cashier and Petitioner Bay View filed a claim upon a fidelity gua rantee bond from Respondent Ker & Co. secured by Petitioner Bay View Hotel again st acts of fraud and dishonesty of its accountable employees. Respondent refused payment and Petitioner subsequently instituted a complaint for collection of a sum of money. Respondent filed a Request for Admission furnished upon Petitioners counsel. Respondent Ker moved for the dismissal of the complaint for failure to answer said request as well as on the ground of implied admission of the facts contained therein. Also, the proper party for collection is Petitioners principal , Respondent Phoenix Assurance Co. Petitioner opposed the motion contending that the proper action is not for the dismissal but for amendment of the complaint i n order to bring the necessary or indispensable parties to the suit. Amended was made, impleading Phoenix. The trial court dismissed the case. ISSUE: Whether or not admissions made prior to impleading additional parties extend to such parti es. HELD: An admission is in the nature of evidence and form part of the records of the case and therefore could be availed of by any party even by one subseque ntly impleaded. Amendments per se cannot set aside the legal effects of a reques t for admission for its significance has not been affected by the amendment. Pet itioner s failure to answer the request for admission should have been corrected by filing a motion to be relieved of the consequences of the implied admission with respect to respondent Phoenix. 138 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 27 PRODUCTION OR INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS OR THINGS 139 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 27 SOLIDBANK CORPORATION v. GATEWAY ELECTRONICS CORPORATION FACTS: Gateway obtained a loan from Solidbank. As a security for said loan, Resp ondent Gateway assigned to Petitioner Solidbank the proceeds of its Back-end Ser vices Agreement with Alliance Semiconductor. Respondent failed to pay, thus, pet itioner filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money. A motion for product ion and Inspection of Documents was filed on the basis of information received f rom Alliance that Respondent had already received from Alliance payment for the Back-end Agreement. The motion was granted. Unsatisfied with the documents produ ced by Respondent, Petitioner filed a motion to cite the former in contempt for refusal to produce documents. Motion was denied. However, the court reprimanded the Respondent for not exerting diligent efforts to produce the documents and th ereafter, pronounced as established, documents not produced by Respondent. The C ourt of Appeals nullified the ruling of the trial court. ISSUE: Whether or not a Motion for Production and Inspection complies with the Rules of Court. HELD: Th e purpose of the statute is to enable a party-litigant to discover material info rmation which, by reason of an opponent s control, would otherwise be unavailabl e for judicial scrutiny, and to provide a convenient and summary method of obtai ning material and competent documentary evidence in the custody or under the con trol of an adversary. It is a further extension of the concept of pretrial. Rule 27 of the Revised Rules of Court permits fishing for evidence, the only limitatio n being that the documents, papers, etc., sought to be produced are not privileg ed, that they are in the possession of the party ordered to produce them and tha t they are material to any matter involved in the action. Mutual knowledge of al l relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation. A m otion for production and inspection of documents should not, however, demand a r oving inspection of a promiscuous mass of documents. The inspection should be li mited to those documents designated with sufficient particularity in the motion, such that the adverse party can easily identify the documents he is required to produce. 140 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 27 SECURITY BANK CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES AGUSTIN P. UY and PACITA TANG SIOC TEN FACTS: An extra-judicial foreclosure of a mortgage over their property was sough t to be enjoined by respondents against Petitioner Security Bank. Petitioner fil ed an answer with compulsory counterclaim and cross-claim. However, instead of f iling an answer to the cross-claim, Respondent Spouses filed two Motions for pro duction of documents and suspension and/or extension of time to file answer to c rossclaim. Respondent Spouses averred the documents, papers and instruments were made and executed by petitioner in processing and approving the loans and mortg age must first be produced in order that they can prepare and file an answer to the cross-claim. The motion was denied by the trial court which was subsequently reversed by the Court of Appeals. ISSUE: Whether or not the granting of the mot ions was proper. HELD: A party may only be compelled to produce or allow the ins pection of documents if six procedural requisites are complied with. Petitioner contends a requisite has not been satisfied, arguing that Respondents Spouses ha ve not shown the relevancy or materiality of the documents in the present case w hich was for the declaration of the nullity of the Real Estate Mortgages between Jackivi and Petitioner SBC. The existence or the absence of other mortgages exe cuted by Jackivi, Petitioner insists, has absolutely no bearing on the said case , for the reason that it does not in any way determine the validity or the inval idity of the subject Real Estate Mortgages. In the present case, the CA did not err in affirming the trial court ruling that there was "good cause" for the gran t of the Motions for inspection of documents. The latter s holding that the docu ments were not indispensable to the preparation of the answer of Respondent Spou ses to the cross-claim did not militate against Respondent availment of this imp ortant mode of discovery. 141 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 27 AIR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION v. PENNSWELL, INC. FACTS: Sundry goods were sold by respondent Pennswell to Petitioner Air Philippi nes Corporation. For Petitioners failure to comply with its obligations under sai d contract, a complaint for sum of money was filed by Respondent. After filing a n answer, Petitioner filed a motion to compel respondent to give a detailed list of the ingredients and chemical components of several products. Said motion was granted by the trial court and reversed on reconsideration on the ground that t he information sought constituted a trade secret. Court of Appeals affirmed said ruling. ISSUE: Whether or not trade secrets cannot be the subject of compulsory disclosure. HELD: Trade secrets should receive greater protection from discover y, because they derive economic value from being generally unknown and not readi ly ascertainable by the public. Rule 27 sets an unequivocal proviso that the doc uments, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible thing s that may be produced and inspected should not be privileged. Section 24 of Rul e 130 draws the types of disqualification by reason of privileged communication. There are, however, other privileged matters that are not mentioned by Rule 130 . A trade secret is defined as a plan or process, tool, mechanism or compound kn own only to its owner and those of his employees to whom it is necessary to conf ide it. 142 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 30 TRIAL 143 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 30 ARTURO H. TROCIO v. JORGE LABAYO FACTS: An action was lodged by Petitioner seeking to set aside his dismissal fro m the position of Municipal Treasurer. Notices for Hearing were sent to the part ies, however, Petitioner failed to appear. Respondent moved for the conduct of t he trial proper since no pre-trial can be conducted due to Petitioners absence an d his witness came all the way from Manila. Petitioners counsel insisted that the Notice of Hearing was null and void since it was not stated therein that the he aring set was for purposes of pre-trial. The lower court dismissed the case for lack of interest to prosecute since Petitioner had 1month from the sending of th e notice to advice the court of the defect, which Petitioner Trocio did not do. ISSUE: Whether or not the Notice of Hearing was defective. HELD: Hearings are not confined to a trial but embrace several stages of litigat ion. It does not preclude pre-trial. A hearing "does not necessarily mean presen tation of evidence." It could cover the determination of a motion to dismiss, or any motion for that matter. Pre-trial is primarily intended to make certain tha t all issues necessary to the disposition of a cause are properly raised. Thus, to obviate the element of surprise, parties are expected to disclose at a pre-tr ial conference all issues of law and fact which they intend to raise at the tria l, except such as may involve privilege or impeaching matter." The suspicion ent ertained by the lower court as to its being resorted to as a dilatory tactic by Petitioner was not without basis. He had more than a month to seek clarification of the nature of the scheduled hearing. What was even more revealing as to his lack of good faith was his absence on the day of hearing. 144 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 30 NIC V. GARCES and INES GARCIA-GARCES v. HON. JUDGE VICENTE P. VALENZUELA and HER NAN MAGLUPAY FACTS: Respondent filed a complaint against Petitioners claiming that he was for cibly ejected from the land belonging to the latter and his house therein was il legally demolished. Petitioners lawyer was able to commence the cross-examination of Respondents witness but was unable to finish, thus, the parties scheduled the resumption of trial on three dates. Prior to the first of three scheduled heari ngs, however, Petitioners counsel filed for the postponement for the reason that he was required to give his expert testimony before another court on the same da te. The motion was denied for being a dilatory tactic and the two other schedule d trial dates were also cancelled. ISSUE: Whether or not the denial on the motio n for postponement was proper. HELD: No circumstances could reasonably justify t he conclusion that the Petitioners motion for postponement was "manifestly dilato ry," and was not occasioned by oversight, as claimed. In any case, even concedin g that His Honor was correct in denying the application for cancellation of the first of the three prearranged hearing dates, it was grave abuse of discretion f or him to cancel the other dates of trial and thereby shut the door to the defen dants presentation of their proofs. It is of paramount importance that as much as possible each party be accorded full opportunity to ventilate his claims and defenses to the end that all the facts may be laid before the Court and the case decided completely on its merits, even if in the process some delay may take pl ace. This is especially true where the delay will not work any substantial preju dice to the other party, as in this case, where there were still have two other hearing dates left, and there was absolutely no reason to suppose that the defen dants would not appear on said dates. 145

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CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 32 TRIAL BY COMMISSIONER 146 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 32 JUAN A. GOCHANGCO v. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL SY HO and MILAGROS MINORIA FACTS: C.N. Hodges lodged an action for unlawful detainer against Respondents. F or Respondent Sys failure to file an Answer, he was declared in default. The lots subject of the action, were sold to petitioner Juan A. Gochangco. Petitioner Ju an informed Respondents of his acquisition and he was allowed by the court to pr esent evidence ex-parte as regards Respondent Sy who was declared in default. Re spondent Sy then filed a motion to set aside order of default. The trial court r endered a judgment against Respondents to vacate the premises which prompted res pondents to file a petition for certiorari seeking to nullify the proceedings an d judgment was rendered in their favor the court holding that the Clerk of Court is not legally authorized to receive evidence ex-parte. ISSUE: Whether or not t he Clerk of Court is not authorized t receive evidence ex-parte. HELD: No provis ion of law or principle of public policy prohibits a court from authorizing its clerk of court to receive the evidence of a party litigant. After all, the recep tion of evidence by the clerk of court constitutes but a ministerial task. The d eclaration that reception of evidence ex parte is null and void does not reflect long observed and established judicial practice with respect to default cases. It is not quite consistent, too, with the several explicitly authorized instance s under the Rules where the function of receiving evidence may be delegated to c ommissioners, inclusive of the Clerk of Court in particular situations. Rule 136 empowers the clerk of court, when directed by the judge inter alia to receive e vidence relating to the accounts of executors, administrators, guardians, truste es and receivers, or relative to the settlement of the estates of deceased perso ns, or to guardianships, trusteeships, or receiverships. In some instances, the competence of the clerk of court is assumed. 147 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 33 DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE 148 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 33 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JUAN C. TUVERA, VICTOR P. TUVERA and TWIN PEAKS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION FACTS: Respondent Twin Peaks Development Corporation was granted the award of th e Timber License Agreement (TLA) to operate logging operations on forest land. P etitioner Republic filed a complaint for restitution and damages and had Preside ntial Commission on Good Government issue a Writ of Sequestration on all assets Respondent Twin Peaks on the ground that all assets are ill-gotten wealth for ha ving been acquired through fraudulent means. Petitioner Republic alleged that at the time the TLA was issued, Respondent lacks the qualification to be a grantee for lack of sufficient logging equipment and that it was incorporated to engage in a real estate business, not logging operations. Petitioner Republic presente d on trial three witnesses. Respondents filed a Demurrer to Evidence contending that the case of Ysmael v. Secretary of Environment effectively bars Petitioner from pursuing. Petitioner opposed claiming that a demurrer is not based on the i nsufficiency of its evidence but on the strength of evidence of respondents as s hown by their own exhibits. Sandiganbayan sustained the Demurrer on the basis of Res judicata. ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan dismissal due to the demu rrer was proper. HELD: Res judicata is an inappropriate ground for sustaining a demurrer to evidence, even as it stands as a proper ground for a motion to dismi ss. A demurrer may be granted if, after the presentation of plaintiffs evidence, it appears upon the facts and the law that the plaintiff has shown no right to r elief. In contrast, the grounds for res judicata present themselves even before the presentation of evidence, and it should be at that stage that the defense of res judicata should be invoked as a ground for dismissal. A motion to dismiss b ased on lack of cause of action is filed by the defendant after the plaintiff ha s presented his evidence on the ground that the latter has shown no right to the relief sought. While a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 is based on preliminary objections which can be ventilated before the beginning of the trial, a motion t o dismiss under Rule 33 is in the nature of a demurrer to evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence and is presented only after the plaintiff has rest ed his case. The Sandiganbayans Resolution shows that dismissal of the case on de murrer to evidence was principally anchored on the Republics failure to show its right to relief because of the existence of a prior judgment which consequently barred the relitigation of the same issue. Therefore, Sandiganbayan based its di smissal on the existence of the Ysmael case which, according to it, would render the case barred by res judicata. 149 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 33 RADIOWEALTH FINANCE COMPANY vs. DEL ROSARIO FACTS: Spouses Vicente & Maria Del Rosario jointly and severally executed, signed and d elivered in favor of Radiowealth Finance Company a promissory note. Thereafter, respondents defaulted on the monthly installments. Despite repeated demands, the y failed to pay their obligation. Petitioner claims that respondents are liable for the whole amount of their debt and the interest thereon, after they defaulte d on the monthly installments. Respondents counter that the installments were no t yet due and demandable. They theorize that the action for immediate enforcemen t of their obligation is premature because its fulfillment is dependent on the s ole will of the debtor. Hence, they consider that the proper court should first fix a period for payment, pursuant to Articles 1180 and 1197 of the Civil Code. ISSUE: Whether or not the installments had already became due and demandable. HE LD: The installments had already become due and demandable is bolstered by the f act that respondents started paying installments on the promissory note. The obl igation of the respondents had matured & they clearly defaulted when their check s bounced. Per the acceleration clause, the whole debt became due one month afte r the date of the note because the check representing their first installment bo unced. 150 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 33 MANILA BANKING CORPORATION v. UNIVERSITY OF BAGUIO, INC. FACTS: Petitioner granted a credit line secured by promissory notes and continui ng suretyship agreements in favor of Respondent for construction of additional b uildings and purchase of new equipment. The loan was not paid and it was subsequ ently discovered that the proceeds of the loan were diverted to Respondent Group Developers. Hence, a complaint was lodged for sum of money. Respondent Universi ty prayed by way of cross-claim that Respondent GDI be ordered to pay the amount it would have to pay Petitioner. Respondent GDI subsequently executed a dacion en pago deed by transferring to Petitioner MBC a parcel of land to settle the lo an. Respondent University filed a Motion to Dismiss since there was no more caus e of action as the loan had already been settled. However, said motion was denie d and it was ruled that due to the execution of the dacion en pago deed, the ban k had no cause of action against Respondent University for the claim for the sum of money had already been satisfied. ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the case without trial was proper. HELD: Respondent Universitys motion to dismiss th e amended complaint was improper since it was filed after it filed its answer. I t can also be noted that such motion cannot be sustained based solely on the all egations of the initiatory pleading since the motion was based on the deed of da cion en pago, which was not even alleged in the complaint. A motion to dismiss b ased on lack of cause of action is filed after the plaintiff has presented his e vidence on the ground plaintiff has shown no right to the relief sought. While a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 is based on preliminary objections which can be ventilated before the beginning of the trial, a motion to dismiss under Rule 33 is in the nature of a demurrer to evidence on the ground of insufficiency of ev idence and is presented only after the plaintiff has rested his case. 151 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 34 JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 152 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 34 ANACLETO R. MENESES v. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORMS FACTS: Anacleto Meneses, et al. co-owned of a parcel of rice land, which was dis tributed to farmerbeneficiaries through the governments land reform program. Peti tioners then lodged a claim for payment of just compensation rentals had not bee n paid since the distribution to the farmerbeneficiaries.. Respondent Department of Agrarian Reform contends that the filing of the case is premature because va luation has to be determined before any resort to the court. Farmer-beneficiarie s claimed that they had no unpaid rents and the jurisdiction over the case belon gs to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). The parties during the hearing agreed that the sole issue to be resolved is whether or not P etitioners were entitled to just compensation. Thus, the trial court issued an o rder giving the parties a period within which to file their respective motions f or judgment on the pleadings or comments, after which the case shall be deemed s ubmitted for resolution. The trial court dismissed the complaint while Court of Appeals affirmed the said decision. ISSUE: Whether or not the motion for judgmen t on pleadings was appropriate. HELD: Judgment on the pleadings is proper when a n answer fails to render an issue or otherwise admits the material allegations o f the adverse party s pleading according to Section 1 Rule 34 of the Rules of Co urt. The essential question is whether there are issues generated by the pleadin gs. A judgment on the pleadings may be sought only by a claimant, who is the par ty seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim; or to obtain a declaratory relief. Respondents filed separate answers which by themselves tende red issues, as it made specific denials of the material allegations in the compl aint and asserted affirmative defenses, which would bar recovery by petitioners. Furthermore, it was erroneous for the trial court to require a motion for judgm ent on the pleadings filed by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform since it has no l egal standing. It was clearly meant by the trial court that a motion for summary judgment was the more proper recourse, which is designed for the prompt disposi tion of actions and may be rendered if the pleadings on file show that, after a summary hearing, there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact. The movi ng party is thus entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 153 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 35 SUMMARY JUDGMENTS 154 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 35 LEY CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORP. v. UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: A suit for collection of sum of money against Petitioners Ley Constructio n et al. was lodged by Respondent Union Bank on several promissory notes. The am ount incurred was admitted by Petitioners in its answer. However, they averred t hat an additional time was given them to pay their obligations and further claim ed that the promissory notes were in fact renewals of the previous promissory no tes. Respondent Bank filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the ground t hat Petitioners Answer failed to raise a genuine issue, which necessitates a tria l on the merits. A summary judgment was granted. ISSUE: Whether or not the order for summary judgment is proper HELD: Petitioners asserted that no hearing was c arried out prior to the granting of said judgment. In summary judgment proceedin g, the court is simply likely to act on the basis of what is in the records of t he case and that the hearing contemplated by the Rules has for its purpose a det ermination of whether there is a genuine issue, not to receive evidence.In the i nstant case, Answer to Respondent Bank s Complaint had no verification and no af fidavit to support its allegation that Petitioners were given an extension of ti me to settle their obligation. Having admitted that they incurred the obligation , a hearing cannot serve any relevant objective. The records already provide suf ficient basis for the court to decide on Respondents motion. Thus, this Court fin ds that even if the trial court did not conduct a hearing, this fact would not a ffect the validity of the summary judgment. The Rule 35 requirement of furnishin g a copy of the motion 10 days before the hearing applies to a motion for summar y judgment and not to a motion to resolve such motion. Quite notably, Petitioner s already filed its opposition to Respondent s motion for summary judgment. Twic e did they seek reconsideration of the resolution or summary judgment, which wer e denied by the court. That they were deprived of the opportunity to question th e motion could not be said in this case. 155 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 35 RAY VELASCO v. COURT OF APPEALS, FIRMWOOD DEVELOPMENT and STA. CLARA HOUSING INDUSTRIES FACTS: A complaint for accounting with preliminary injunction and enjoining the disposal of partnership properties filed by Petitioners against Respondent Sta. Clara Housing Industries and several of the its former partners. Injunction was issued against Respondent who allegedly violated such order. Respondent Firmwood subsequently filed a complaint for the delivery of personal property and damage s against Petitioners contending that it owned such seized crates and it had the right to the possession thereof. The Supreme Court then set aside the restraini ng order. Petitioners, in its answer, claimed that Respondent Firmwood is not th e owner of the crates but Respondent Sta. Clara. Petitioners, by virtue of the r estraining order, asserted their authority to seize the crates. A complaint in i ntervention was filed by Respondent Sta. Clara alleging that it has a legal inte rest since it is answerable to Respondent Firmwood for damages arising from a wa rranty to deliver the crates which belongs to the latter. Both respondents there after filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court and the Court of Appe als upheld the propriety of the summary judgment. ISSUE: Whether or not summary judgment is proper. HELD: A relief by summary judgment expedites or promptly dis poses of cases where the facts appear undisputed and certain from the pleadings, admissions and affidavits. This rule does not vest in the court summary jurisdi ction to try the issues on pleadings and affidavits, but gives the court limited authority to enter summary judgment only if it clearly appears that there is no genuine issue of material fact. In the answer to the complaint in intervention, petitioners had deemed admitted the ownership and right of possession of Sta. C lara over the property taken by them and the fact that the temporary restraining order by this Court by virtue of which the seizure was effected had already bee n lifted. The remaining issue raised by petitioners in objecting to the reliefs prayed for in the complaints of private respondents is whether petitioners posse ssed the authority to seize and hold under their custody the crates of plywood b y virtue of the temporary restraining order of this Court which undisputedly had been lifted and of no more force and effect. There is therefore absent in this case any genuine issue of fact but a question purely of law. 156 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 39 EXECUTION, SATISFACTION AND EFFECT OF JUDGMENTS 157 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 39 PAQUITO BUAYA vs. STRONGHOLD INSURANCE CO. FACTS: Respondent filed a complaint against petitioner, a manager of their Cebu branch for the collection of a sum of money, which is allegedly his unremitted p remium collections owing to the Stronghold. For failure of petitioner and his co unsel to appear at the pre-trial, he was defaulted and Stronghold was allowed to present his evidences, without the other party. On the basis of Strongholds evid ence, the court decided on September 17, 1987, in favor of Stronghold. petitione r appealed to the CA, and on March 30, 1990, decided in favor of petitioner, ann ulling the decision and remanding the case to the lower court for further procee dings. The lower court therefore set a hearing on December 13, 1990 but petition er filed a Motion of Postponement of the hearing and was granted. He repeated his motion and gave several reasons to postpone the hearings. On July 26, 1991, Stro nghold opposed the motion, but the court granted petitioners motion provided that the next time he does it, it will be considered a waiver of his right to presen t evidence. Stronghold filed a motion to reinstate its previous decision dated, September 17, 1987. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied . He files a Petition for Certiorari assailing the orders of the court but was dis missed for lack of merit. The courts decision has became final and executory. ISS UE: HELD: Courts are duty-bound to put an end to controversies. Any attempt to p rolong, resurrect or juggle them should be firmly struck down. The system of jud icial review should not be misused and abused to evade the operation of final an d executory judgments. Moreover, the remand of a case does not nullify the entir e proceedings. It merely authorizes the trial court to receive additional eviden ce, not to conduct a trial de novo. Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right, it is axiomatic that once a decision attains finality, it becomes the law of the case regardles s of any claim that it is erroneous. Having been rendered by a court of competen t jurisdiction acting within its authority, the judgment may no longer be altere d even at the risk of occasional legal infirmities or errors it may contain. Lit igations must end and terminate sometime and somewhere. The effective and effici ent administration of justice requires that once a judgment has become final, th e prevailing party should not be deprived of the fruits of the verdict by subseq uent suits on the same issues filed by the same parties. Whether or not the deci sion become final and executory. 158 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 40 APPEAL FROM MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS TO THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT 159 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 40 Republic V Luriz FACTS Dr. Dioscoro Carbonilla, filed a complaint for ejectment against respondents, Ma rcelo Abiera and Maricris Abiera Paredes, with the Municipal Trial Court. The re spondents alleged that they are the owners of the land as they are in continuous possession of relevant documents the petitioner do not have. The MTC dismissed the complaint summarily for lack of merit. The petitioner argued that he had suf ficiently established his ownership of the subject properties and presented copi es of Transfer Certificate of Title and Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Esta te (Residential Building) with Waiver and Quitclaim of Ownership. Consequently, he asserted the right to recover possession thereof. ISSUE: Whether or not the documents of Carbonilla is enough to prove ownership o f the property. HELD: The only question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises; that is, to the possess ion de facto and not to the possession de jure. It does not even matter if a par tys title to the property is questionable.15For this reason, an ejectment case wi ll not necessarily be decided in favor of one who has presented proof of ownersh ip of the subject property. Key jurisdictional facts constitutive of the particu lar ejectment case filed must be averred in the complaint and sufficiently prove n. 160 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Provost V Court of Appeals FACTS: Rule 40 Respondents Victor and Fe Ramos are the owners of a parcel of land in Putingbala s, Tupsan Grande. Sometime in May 1992, the Provosts, the petitioners, construct ed a fence separating the two lots. In 1994, the respondents demanded the return of the area of their lot that they believe the petitioners encroached on, but t he latter refused. The respondents thus had a relocation survey, which showed th at the fence was indeed on their land. The petitioners disagreed, arguing that t he cadastral survey plan used had been disapproved as defective. The Ramos coupl e anchor their claim on the deed of donation and an old survey plan, while the P rovosts base theirs on the deed of absolute sale and the corrected survey plan. The MTC dismissed the respondents complaint and held that they failed to prove th eir ownership and possession of the disputed area. Upon appeal, the RTC affirmed the MTC decision, stating that the claim by the Ramoses over the property was b ased on a disapproved survey plan. In reversing the RTC decision, the Court of A ppeals reasoned that the petitioners had no right to move the common boundary su ch that the area of the adjoining lot was reduced to 3,552 square meters. ISSUE: Whether or not the Provosts encroached on the property of the Ramoses. HELD: Ru les on Civil Procedure allow the RTC, which have the jurisdiction over complaint s for recovery of ownership, to decide on cases brought on appeal from the MTC w hich, even without jurisdiction over the subject matter, may decide the case on its merits. In this case, the MTC of Mambajao should have dismissed the complain t outright for lack of jurisdiction but since it decided the case on its merits, the RTC rendered a decision based on the findings of the MTC. 161 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Encarnacion Rule 40 V Amigo FACTS: Respondent Amigo allegedly entered and took posession of a portion of a property sometime in 1985 without the permission of the owner. In 1995, petitioner Encar nacion was the registered owner of the property by virtue of the waiver of right s executed by his mother-in-law. In 2001, a letter demanding the respondent to v acate the property was sent by the petitioner. The demand remained unheeded, whi ch caused the petitioner to file a complaint for ejectment. The Municipal Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner. On appeal, the Regional Tr ial Court dismissed the case on the grounds that the MTC had no jurisdiction ove r the case. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed a petition for review. Based on the allegations in this complaint. the Court of Appeals held that the proper action is accion publiciana and not unlawful detainer. ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC ha s properly acquired jurisdiction of the case HELD: While it is true that the demand letter was received by the respondent on February 12, 2001, thereby making the filing of the complaint for ejectment fall within the requisite one year from last demand for complaints for unlawful deta iner, it is also true that petitioner became the owner of the lot in 1995 and ha s been since deprived possession of a portion thereof. Almost six years have ela psed from the date of the petitioner s dispossession in 1995 up to his filing of complaint for ejectment in 2001. The length of time that the petitioner was dis possessed of his property made his cause of action beyond the ambit of an accion interdictal and effectively made it one for accion publiciana. After the lapse of the one-year period, the suit must be commenced in the RTC.The respondent s a ctual entry on the land of the petitioner was in 1985 but it was only sixteen ye ars after that the petitioner filed his ejectment case. The respondent should ha ve filed an accion publiciana case which is under the jurisdiction of the RTC. H owever, the RTC should have not dismissed the case; it should have taken cogniza nce of the case. If the case is tried on the merits by the Municipal Court witho ut jurisdiction over the subject matter, the RTC on appeal may no longer dismiss the case. Moreover, the RTC shall decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented in the lower court, without prejudice to the admission of the amended pleadings and additional evidence. 162 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 41 APPEAL FROM THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS 163 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 41 Five Star Marketing Corp V Booc FACTS: Petitioner Five Star constructed a four-storey building financed mainly b y a loan and using the subject property as collateral. The third floor of said b uilding was rented to the father of.James Booc, the respondent herein, who in th e late 1980s was allowed to use half of the ground floor for his business rent-f ree. Years later, petitioner and respondent entered into an Agreement12 wherein the latter became the lessee of the other spaces in the building. Respondent rai sed several defenses, among them that petitioner has no cause of action for ejec tment against him: that petitioner has no legal personality to sue; that the cou rt has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; and that the premises in questio n have been occupied by the respondent for free since the erection of the buildi ng; and that respondent and his father filed a case in the Securities and Exchan ge Commission against petitioner and the president of the latters corporation. Se veral years later, the petitioner notified all the occupants that it had withdra wn all free-rental privileges granted to them, as had been resolved by the petit ioners board of directors. It likewise notified them of the rental rates of the u nits concerned and further required any interested occupant to negotiate and ent er into a lease agreement with petitioner. Petitioner filed an action for unlawf ul detainer against respondent before the MTCC, Iligan City, who in turn contend ed that petitioner did not send a demand for them to vacate or pay rent. ISSUE: Whether or not demand for rentals is necessary for the MTC to acquire jurisdicti on over the unlawful detainer case. HELD The Court had the occasion to clarify t he three modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, namely: a) ordinary appeal o r appeal by writ of error, where judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal ac tion by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. The first mode of appeal is taken to the CA on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and la w; b) petition for review, where judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercis e of its appellate jurisdiction. The second mode is brought to the CA on questio ns of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law; and c) petition for revi ew to this Court. This mode is elevated to this Court only on questions of law.T he instant case arose from an ejectment case commenced by the petitioner before the MTCC which was later elevated to the RTC on appeal. Aggrieved by the RTC s r eversal of the MTCC decision, petitioner directly elevated the case to this Cour t on pure questions of law.Clearly, petitioner raises only questions of law that require the interpretation and application of the rules of procedure laid down by the Rules of Court. However, considering that the assailed decision was rende red by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction as it was brought b efore it from the MTCC, petitioner should have elevated the case to the CA, inst ead of appealing directly before this Court. 164 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 41 Fernandez V Court of Appeals FACTS: After acquiring ownership of a lot in Bacolod City through his predecesso rs, Prudencio Fernandez tried to eject Jesus Ciocon and other occupants off the property. Allegedly, Ciocon asked Fernandez that he be given a last chance to repu rchase the lot, to which Fernandez refused. After this rejection, Ciocon institu ted against Fernandez for reconveyance of the land or what remains of it after d educting portions already sold to others. Ciocon claimed he had paid for the ful l reconveyance price to Fernandez, for which Fernandez signed a receipt. The cas e was tried in the sala of Judge Jocson, who noted that the parties were indiffe rent about submitting to a decision based on extant. Incomplete records proceede d to render judgment that dismissed both complaints and ordered private responde nt Ciocon and the intervenors to deliver immediate possession off to the heirs o f Fernandez. Ciocon filed an appeal. Judge Jocson, upon motion for reconsiderati on subsequently rendered a second decision that set aside the first judgment. In this second decision, the judge explained that the Court of Appeals, after rece iving the notices of appeal and the incomplete records, remanded the case and orde red the re-taking of the testimonies of witnesses Ciocon and Tolentino. The seco nd decision was a complete reversal of the first decision and directed the retur n of the disputed lot to Ciocon and intervenors except the portions still being litigated. It also ordered the cancellation of the new title issued to Fernandez and the issuance of a new title in the name of Jesus Ciocon and intervenors. IS SUE: Whether or not the second decision was proper. HELD: The trial court no lon ger had jurisdiction to render or reverse the decision. The records show that th e notices of appeal from the first decision of the trial court were filed within the reglementary period and were duly approved. At such time, the appeals were perfected. There is abundant jurisprudence stating that after perfection of an a ppeal, the trial court loses jurisdiction to amend a decision, and also to issue orders for execution pending appeal. The perfection of an appeal divests the tr ial court of jurisdiction over a case and the trial court may issue orders only if in the exercise of its residual functions. No amount of rationalization, even a declaration that a new decision is being made in the best interest of justice , can confer on the trial court the jurisdiction it had lost. Jurisdiction canno t be acquired, waived, enlarged, diminished or extended by any act or omission o f the parties. Neither is it conferred by acquiescence of the court. 165 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Neypes Rule 41 v Court of Appeals FACTS: Neypes filed an action for annulment of judgment and t itles of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction b efore the RTC against the private respondents. Later, in an order, the trial cou rt dismissed petitioners complaint on the grounds that the action had already bee n prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal in March 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter, filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court dismissed in July. Five days after receiving the courts de cision, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the appe al fees on August 3, 1998. On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late, which was received by the petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this, too, was denied in September 3, 1998. The petitioners assailed the dismis sal of the notice of appeal before the CA, where the petitioners claimed that th ey had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-day regl ementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was th e day they received the final order of the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only f ive days had elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period for appea l. On September 16, 1999, the CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-da y period to appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to th e appellate court, the order was the final order appealable under the Rules. Wheth er or not it is proper to allow a fresh period to file an appeal in lieu of dism issal of the Motion for Reconsideraiton. To standardize the appeal periods and t o afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it pr actical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of ap peal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall als o apply to Rule 40, Rule 42, Rule 43 and Rule 45. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denyi ng the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial ) or any final order or resolution. The SC thus held that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from J uly 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsidera tion). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rul es which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of jud gment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word or signifies d isassociation and independence of one 166 P a g e HELD: ISSUE :

thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of or in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or with in 15 days from notice of the final order, which we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration. N either does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 whic h shortened the appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The original period of appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial o r motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is given another opportunity to review the case and, in the p rocess, minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve c ases with dispatch and to have judgments of courts become final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly. 167 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 42 PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 168 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rosa Rica Sales V Ong Rule 42 FACTS: Atty. Joseph M. Baduel wrote Ong of the intent of Mandaue Prime Estate Re alty, which the former was representing, to use the lots the latter was occupyin g and asked the latter to vacate within thirty (30) days from receipt of the let ter. The latter refused to vacate, prompting Prime Estate Realty to file a case of Unlawful detainer against him. During the case, Ross Rica Sales Center, Inc. had acquired the lands through a sale from Prime Estate Realty. Meanwhile, the M TC resolved the ejectment case, ordering Ong to vacate the premises in question and peacefully turn over possession thereof to Rosa Rica Sales. On appeal, the R TC rendered a judgment affirming the MTCs decision in its entirety. Ong filed a m otion for reconsideration, an appeal and a motion for extension with the RTC, wh ich issued an order that concurrently gave due course to Ongs notice of appeal, d enied their motion for reconsideration, and granted petitioners motion for immedi ate execution pending appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC decision has already become final and executory at the time the petition for review was filed. HELD: Since the unlawful detainer case was filed with the MTC and affirmed by the RTC , petitioners should have filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals and not a Notice of Appeal with the RTC. However, we consider this to have been remedied by the timely filing of the Motion for Reconsideration on the following day, which may be deemed as an effective withdrawal of the defective Notice of Appeal. Perforce, the period of appeal was tolled by the Motion for Reconsiderat ion and started to run again from the receipt of the order denying the Motion fo r Reconsideration. A Motion for Additional Time to File the Petition was likewis e filed with the Court of Appeals. Counting fifteen (15) days from receipt of th e denial of the Motion for Reconsideration and the ten (10)-day request for addi tional period, it is clear that respondents filed their Petition for Review on t ime. 169 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 43 APPEALS FROM THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS AND QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCIES 170 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 43 St. Martin Funeral Homes V NLRC FACTS Private respondent alleges that he started working as Operations Manager o f petitioner St. Martin Funeral Home. However, there was no contract of employme nt executed between him and petitioner nor was his name included in the semi-mon thly payroll. He was dismissed from his employment for allegedly misappropriatin g P38,000.00, which was intended for payment by petitioner of its value added ta x (VAT). Petitioner claims that private respondent was not its employee but only the uncle of Amelita Malabed, the owner of petitioner St. Martin s Funeral Home . When private respondent took over the management of the business after Amelitas mother died, Amelita discovered that there were arrears in the payment of taxes and other government fees, although the records purported to show that the same were already paid. She made some changes in the business operation, to which pr ivate respondent was no longer allowed to participate. Responded filed a complai nt charging the petitioner of illegally terminated his employment and appealed t o the NLRC, which rendered a resolution setting aside the questioned decision an d remanding the case to the labor arbiter for immediate appropriate proceedings. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC for lack of merit, hence the present petition alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion. ISSUE: Whether or not the SC should entertain the pre sent petition HELD: The case should be remanded to the Court of Appeals, which is granted exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final adjudications of the Regional Trial Courts and the quasi-judicial agencies. This would necessarily contradict what has bee n ruled and said all along that the appeal does not lie from decisions of the NL RC. However, under such excepting clause literally construed, the appeal from th e NLRC cannot be brought to the Court of Appeals, but to this Court by necessary implication. The same exceptive clause declares that the Court of Appeals has n o appellate jurisdiction over decisions falling within the appellate jurisdictio n of the Supreme Court. These cases can be properly excluded from the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. However, because of the aforemen tioned amendment by transposition, also supposedly excluded are cases falling wi thin the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Labo r Code. This is illogical and impracticable, and Congress could not have intende d that procedural gaffe, since there are no cases in the Labor Code the decision s, resolutions, orders or awards wherein are within the appellate jurisdiction o f the Supreme Court or of any other court for that matter. 171 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Golangco V Fung FACTS: FACTS: Rule 43 In a Resolution, GIO II Celso R. Dao found Fung guilty of the administrative cha rges against the latter for oppression, abuse of authority, gross inefficiency, gross neglect of duty, and grave misconduct all arising from the same incidentan d and recommended his dismissal from service. This Resolution was disapproved by Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr., who recommended the reassignme nt of the case to another graft investigating officer so that the administrative and criminal aspects of the case can be reconciled. On assuming the Office of t he Ombudsman, Aniano A. Desierto disapproved GIO Onos Resolution recommending the dismissal of the administrative complaint against respondent, which had already been approved by Assistant Ombudsman Aportadera by authority of then-Acting Omb udsman Villa. Fung filed a Motion for Reconsideration of GIO Daos Resolution and was denied. Aggrieved, Fung filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court impugning the validity of Desiertos Resolution. ISSUE: Whether or not a pet ition for review is proper for questioning internal resolutions of the Ombudsman HELD: The Court of Appeals cannot review the orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal or non-administrative cases because it has jurisdiction only over orders, directives and decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases only. The appellate court correc tly ruled that its jurisdiction extends only to decisions of the Office of the O mbudsman in administrative cases. 172 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 45 APPEAL BY CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT 173 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 45 BOSTON BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SPOUSES MANALO FACTS: Xavierville Estate, Inc. (XEI for brevity) sold to The Overseas Bank of M anila (OBM for brevity) some residential lots in Xavierville Subdivision. Nevert heless, XEI continued selling the residential lots in the subdivision. Carlos Ma nalo, Jr.(Carlos for brevity) offered downpayment. In a letter to Perla Manalo, wife of Carlos, (Perla for brevity) Ramos confirmed the reservation of the lots. In the letter he also pegged the price of the lots. The corresponding Contract of Conditional Sale would then be signed. Perla conformed to the letter agreemen t. Thereafter, Spouses constructed a house. They were notified of XEIs resumption of selling operations. However, they did not pay the balance of the downpayment as they did not receive a Contract of Conditional Sale. Commercial Bank of Mani la (CBM) acquired Xavierville from OBM. CBM requested Perla to stop any on-going construction on the property since it was the owner of the lot and she had no p ermission for such construction. Perla informed them that her husband had a cont ract with OBM. She promised to send CBM the documents. However, she failed to do so. Thus, CBM filed a complaint for unlawful detainer, but later on, CBM withdr ew its complaint. CBM was renamed the Boston Bank of the Philippines. Consequent ly, Spouses filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against the C BM. They alleged that they had always been ready and willing to pay the installm ents but no contract was forthcoming and further alleged that upon their partial payment of the downpayment, they were entitled to a Deed of Absolute Sale. Spou ses adduced in evidence the separate Contracts of Conditional Sale executed betw een XEI and three other buyers to prove that XEI continued selling residential l ot. RTC ordered the herein Petitioner to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale in favo r of the spouses upon the payment of the balance of the purchase price. It ruled that under the letter agreement, the parties had a "complete contract to sell" and that they had already partially consummated the same. The Court of Appeals s ustained. ISSUE: Whether or not the factual issues raised by the Petitioner are proper. HELD: The rule is that only legal issues may be raised in a Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court. The reason is that it is not a trier of facts, and is not to review and calibrate the evidence on record. Generally, th e findings of facts of the trial court, as affirmed on appeal by the Court of Ap peals, are conclusive on this Court, unless, the case falls under any of the exc eptions. We have reviewed the records and we find that, indeed, the Ruling of th e appellate court dismissing Petitioners MR is contrary to law and is not support ed by evidence. 174 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 45 NATIVIDAD v. MTRCB FACTS: Petitioner is a movie producer and a director, filed with the MTRCB an ap plication for a permit to exhibit a movie apparently based on the Chiongs rape ca se. Relatives of the famous rape-slay victims Chiong sisters requested the Board to disapprove the showing of the film from screening. Regional Trial Court ex-p arte issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining petitioner from exhibiting t he film for 72 hours and set for summary hearing the extended duration of the sa id TRO. After three days, the RTC issued another Order extending the life of the TRO to its full duration of twenty days. An Omnibus Motion was filed by petitio ner praying for the dismissal of the main petition and the lifting of the TRO an d cited as grounds the alleged failure of the Chiong relatives to exhaust availa ble administrative remedies; the lack of jurisdiction of the court over the subj ect matter of the petition; and the failure of the petition itself to state a ca use of action. Furthermore, petitioner requests for a retrial of the facts on wh at he claims errors of the CA. ISSUE: Whether or not there was violation of the Sub Judice Rule. HELD: Question s of fact are not proper subjects for this Court unless there is clear and convi ncing proof that the judgment of the CA is based on a misapprehension of facts; or when the CA failed to give notice and to appreciate certain relevant facts of substance which if properly considered would justify a different conclusion; an d when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts in the li ght of the evidence on record. Petitioner failed to convince this Court to depar t from this well-established doctrine. 175 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 47 ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENTS OR FINAL ORDERS AND 176 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 47 GRANDE v. UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: Petitioner filed a petition for Annulment of Judgment which seeks the ann ulment of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in a case for reconveyance of lan d owned by the University of the Philippines(UP for brevity). The Court of Appea ls dismissed the appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC for b revity) dismissing their complaint for recovery of ownership and reconveyance of the subject property on the ground of lack of cause of action. RTC concluded th at the subject property was covered by a Torrens title as early as 1914 but it w as only in 1984 or 70 years after the issuance of the title, that Petitioners fi led their action for recovery of ownership and reconveyance. During the interreg num, ownership of the property was acquired by Respondent UP as an innocent purc haser for value. Consequently, RTC rendered a Decision in favor of UP which was likewise upheld by the appellate court. ISSUE: Whether or not the action for ann ulment of judgment is proper. HELD: The annulment of judgments, as a recourse, i s equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional cases, as where there is n o available or other adequate remedy. It is generally governed by Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 1 thereof expressly states that the Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals (CA for brevity)of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil action of Regional Trial Courts(RTCs f or brevity)for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for re lief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of t he petitioner." Clearly, Rule 47 applies only to petitions for the nullification of judgments rendered by RTCs filed with the CA. It does not pertain to the nul lification of decisions of the CA. Rule 47 applies only to petitions for nullifi cation of judgments rendered by RTCs filed with the CA it does not pertain to th e nullification of decisions of the CA. Petitions for annulment of judgment are not among the cases originally cognizable by the SC. It is totally inappropriate to extend Rule 47 to the review of decisions of the CA. 177 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 47 FRAGINAL v. PARAAL FACTS: The heirs of Toribia Belmonte Paraal filed with the Office of the Provinci al Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adju dication Board (DARAB) a Complaint for Termination of Tenancy Relationship, Ejec tment, and Collection of Arrear Rentals and Damages against Faringal. Fraginalfi led an Answer questioning the jurisdiction of the PARAD on the ground that they are not tenants of the Heirs of Toribia Paraal, for the land they are tilling is a public agricultural land within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department o f Environment and Natural Resources. PARAD issued a Decision ordering the ejectm ent of Fraginal. Faringal filed an action for annulment of judgment against PARA D on the ground of extrinsic fraud. ISSUE: Whether or not an action for annulment of judgment is proper. HELD: The r emedy of annulment of judgment is extraordinary in character and will not so eas ily and readily lend itself to abuse by parties aggrieved by final judgments. Ru le 47, Sec 1 clearly limits the subject matter of petitioners for annulment to f inal judgments and orders rendered by RTC in civil actions. Final judgments or O rders of quasi-judicial tribunals or administrative bodies such as the NLRC, the Ombudsman, the CSC, the OP, and, in this case, the PARAD, are not susceptible t o petitions for Annulment under Rule 47. Direct recourse to a petition for annul ment of judgment not allowed if other appropriate remedies are available such as a petition for new trial and a petition for relief from judgment or an appeal. 178 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 47 ALABAN v. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Private respondent Francisco Provido filed a Petition for the probate of the Last Will and Testament of the late Soledad Provido Elevencionado (decedent for brevity).Respondent alleged that he was the heir of the decedent and the exe cutor of said will. Regional Trial Court rendered its Decision allowing the prob ate of the will of the decedent and directing the issuance of letters testamenta ry to Respondent. More than four months later or on 4 October 2001, Alaban and r elatives (Petitioners for brevity) filed a motion for the reopening of the proba te proceedings. Likewise, they filed an Opposition to the allowance of the will of the decedent as well as the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent. T hey claimed that they are the intestate heirs of the decedent. Petitioners claim ed that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the Petition due to non-paymen t of the correct docket fees, defective publication and lack of notice to the ot her heirs. ISSUE: Whether or not an exclusion in the probate proceedings annuls a final and executory judgment. HELD: It has been held that a proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem . Thus, it is binding upon the whole world. Any executor, devisee or legatee nam ed in a will, or any other person interested in the estate may, at any time afte r the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed. Notice of the time and place for proving the will must be publishe d in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, as well as furnished to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator. Co nsequently, with the corresponding publication of the Petition, the court s juri sdiction extends to all persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate of the decedent. Moreover, an action for annulment of judgment is a r emedy in law independent of the case where the judgment sought to be annulled wa s rendered. The purpose of such action is to have the final and executory judgme nt set aside so that there will be a renewal of litigation. However, it is resor ted to in cases where the ordinary remedies of are no longer available through n o fault of the Petitioner; and based on only extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdic tion or denial of due process. In the case at bar, the probate proceedings exten d to Petitioners and they cannot file for an action of annulment of judgment whi ch became final and executory because they slept on their rights. 179 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 47 REPUBLIC v. ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST FACTS: National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC for brevity) and Ka wasaki Heavy Industries entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA for brevity) in a shipyard business named PHILSECO, with a shareholding of 60-40 respectively . NIDCs interest was later transferred to the National Government. Pursuant to Pr esident Aquinos Proclamation No.5, which established the Committee on Privatizati on and Asset Privatization Trust (Respondent for brevity) which allowed for the disposition of the governments non-performing assets, Respondent allowed Kawasaki Heavy Industries to choose a company to which it has stockholdings in order to top the winning bid of JG Summit Holdings over PHILSECO. JG Summit protested all eging that such act would effectively increase Kawasakis interest in PHILSECOa shi pyard is a public utility--and thus violative of the Constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not Respondents act is valid. HELD: A shipyard such as PHILSECO being a public utility as provided by law, Sec tion 11 Article XII of the Constitution applies. Notably, JVA accorded the parti es the right of first refusal under the same terms. This phrase implies that when either party exercises the right of first refusal, they can only do so to the ex tent allowed them by the JVA or under the proportion of 60%-40% of the shares of stock. Thus, should the NIDC opt to sell its shares of stock to a third party, Kawasaki could only exercise its right of first refusal to the extent that its t otal shares of stock would not exceed 40% of the entire shares of stock of SNS o r PHILSECO. NIDC, on the other hand, may purchase even beyond 60% of the total s hares. As a government corporation and necessarily a 100% Filipino-owned corpora tion, there is nothing to prevent its purchase of stocks even beyond 60% of the capitalization as the Constitution clearly limits only foreign capitalization. 180 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 57 PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT 181 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 57 DAVAO LIGHT & POWER CO. Vs THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RODOLFO M. BELLAFLOR, and FRANCISCO TESORERO FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against private respondent Franc isco Tesorero. Instead of filing its answer, private respondent filed a motion t o dismiss claiming that the complaint did not state a cause of action, there was non-joinder of indispensable parties, and venue was improperly laid. The trial court dismissed petitioner s complaint on the ground of improper venue. The plai ntiff being a private corporation, undoubtedly Banilad, Cebu City is the plainti ff s principal place of business as alleged in the complaint, and which for purp oses of venue, is deemed as its residence. Conversely, in the defendant s motion to dismiss, it alleged and submitted that the plaintiffs principal office is in Davao City, as stated in the Contract of Lease and another Contract of Lease of Generating Equipment executed by the plaintiff with the NAPOCOR. The motion on t he ground of improper venue was granted and petitioner s motion for reconsiderat ion was denied. The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed judgment, denied due course and dismissed the petition. The petitioner filed the instant petition. IS SUE: Whether or not the venue was proper. It is private respondent s contention that the proper venue is Davao City, and not Cebu City. Private respondent argue that petitioner is estopped from claiming that its residence is in Cebu City, i n view of contradictory statements made by petitioner prior to the filing of the action for damages. It cannot be disputed that petitioner s principal office is in Cebu City, per its amended articles of incorporation and by-laws. Private re spondent is not a party to any of the contracts presented. He is a complete stra nger to the covenants executed between petitioner and NAPOCOR, despite his prote stations that he is privy thereto, on the rather flimsy ground that he is a memb er of the public for whose benefit the electric generating equipment subject of the contracts were leased or acquired. We are likewise not persuaded by his argu ment that the allegation or representation made by petitioner in either the comp laints or answers it filed in several civil cases that its residence is in Davao City, should estop it from filing the damage suit before the Cebu courts. Moreo ver, there is no showing that private respondent is a party in those civil cases or that he relied on such representation by petitioner. HELD: 182 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 57 CONSOLIDATED PLYWOOD INDUSTRIES, INC vs. HON. AUGUSTO B. BREVA and MINDANAO HEMP EXPORT CORPORATION The case involves the claim of one of two co-owners for reim bursement from the other of expenses incurred for the repair and preservation of the common property which consists of a parcel of land with a warehouse and off ice building standing thereon. One of the registered co-owners is the petitioner , Consolidated Plywood Industries, Inc. who had purchased an undivided one-half portion from the Consolidated Bank & Trust Company. The other registered co-owne r is the Mindanao Hemp Export Corporation. CPII occupied the property, using the warehouse to store its products. It made repairs and improvements on the proper ty. For such, it sought to recover expenses from MHEC. Extra-judicial demands pr oduced no result and thereafter filed suit for collection. Summons was issued bu t went unserved for the reason that defendant is no longer doing business at sai d address and nobody around the place knows its present whereabouts. The Trial C ourt sought to ascertain from the Securities and Exchange Commission, but it sim ply furnished the same address. CPII moved for service of summons by publication , which was effected in a newspaper of general circulation. Copy of the alias su mmons was also sent by registered mail addressed to MHEC. No answer being filed, MHEC was declared in default and CPII presented its evidence ex parte. The Tria l Court conducted an ocular inspection and found that CPII was using the entire warehouse as well as the office building standing on the property. The Trial Cou rt denied said plaintiff reimbursement and instead dismissed the complaint "for lack of merit." The court declared that a co-owner cannot put the property to hi s sole use and benefit gratis without the express agreement of the other co-owne rs. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the defenda nt. HELD: Petitioner s suit is for the collection of a sum of money, a personal action, as distinguished from a real action. It is, too, an action strictly in personam, a s to which personal service of summons is essential to the acquisition of jurisd iction over the person of the defendant. In other words, summons by publication cannot confer upon the Court jurisdiction over said defendant and that the prope r recourse for a creditor in the same situation as petitioner is to locate prope rties of the resident defendant debtor with unknown address and cause them to be attached under Rule 57, section 1(f). In which case, the attachment converts th e action into a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem and the summons by publication may then accordingly be deemed valid and effective. Since MHEC can no longer be found at its address and due to a failure to effect proper service of summons, the Trial Court never acquired jurisdiction over the person of said defendant an d therefore could not lawfully render a valid judgment. A service of summons by publication not having been preceded by attachment of property does not confer j urisdiction over the person of the defendant. Petitioner s action dismissed. The Court also directs that, in a second action, efforts be exerted to cause person al service on respondent corporation on its president, manager, secretary, or an y of its directors as may become known from the records of the Securities and Ex change Commission or such others as may become available prior to effecting serv ice of summons by publication. FACTS: 183 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 57 RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION vs. THE HONORABLE PACIFICO P. DE CASTRO and PHILIPPINE VIRGINIA TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION In a civil case entitled "Badoc Planters versus Philippine Virginia Tobacco Admi nistration," which was an action for recovery of unpaid tobacco deliveries, an P artial Judgment Order was issued ordering the defendant PVTA to pay jointly and severally, the plaintiff Badoc. BADOC filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for a Writ of Execution which was granted. Accordingly, the Branch Clerk of Court, issued a Writ of Execution addressed to the Special Sheriff, who then issued a Notice o f Garnishment addressed to the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC)reques ting a reply within five days to said garnishment as to any property which the P VTA might have in its possession or control. Upon receipt of such Notice, RCBC n otified PVTA thereof to enable the PVTA to take the necessary steps for the prot ection of its own interest. Upon an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion filed by BADOC, the r espondent Judge granted the motion and directed the petitioner to deliver in che ck the amount garnished to the Sheriff and is ordered to cash the check and deli ver the amount to the plaintiff. In compliance with said Order, RCBC delivered t o the Sheriff a certified check. PVTA thereafter filed a Motion for Reconsiderat ion which was granted by the court, setting aside the Orders of Execution and of Payment and the Writ of Execution, and ordering petitioner and BADOC to restore , jointly and severally, the account of PVTA with the said bank in the same cond ition and state it was before by reimbursement. PVTA claims that the manner in w hich the bank complied with the Sheriffs Notice of Garnishment indicated breach of trust and dereliction of duty as custodian of government funds as it prematur ely delivered the garnished to the special sheriff. That due to its lack of prud ence makes it answerable jointly and severally with BADOC for the wrongful relea se of the money from the deposit of the PVTA. The respondent Judge sustained suc h contention and blamed RCBC for the supposed hasty release of the amount. A Mot ion for Reconsideration of the said Order filed by RCBC was denied ISSUE Whether or not there is solidary liability for reimbursement of garnished funds. Petiti oner cannot be compelled to make restitution solidarily with the plaintiff BADOC . Plaintiff was responsible for the issuance of the Writ of Execution and Order of Payment and so, it alone should bear the consequences of a subsequent annulme nt of such court orders; hence, only the plaintiff can be ordered to restore the account of the PVTA. PVTA has been endowed with a personality distinct and sepa rate from the government. Accordingly, it is declared that the funds of the PVTA can be garnished since "funds of public corporation which can sue and be sued a re not exempt from garnishment." RCBC cannot be charged with lack of prudence fo r immediately complying with the order to deliver the garnished amount. Since th e funds in its custody are precisely meant for the payment of lawfullyincurred o bligations, RCBC cannot rightfully resist a court order to enforce payment of su ch obligations. That such court order subsequently turned out to have been erron eously issued should not operate to the detriment of one who complied with its c lear order. HELD: FACTS: 184 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 57 INSULAR BANK OF ASIA & AMERICA vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and COMMERCIAL CR EDIT CORPORATION Petitioner IBAA made a money market placement with respondent and in considerati on of such, respondent executed a Non-Negotiable Repurchase Agreement whereby it conveyed to petitioner securities issued by International Corporate Bank. Petit ioner and respondent also executed a resale agreement which bound IBAA to re-sel l to CCC the securities. On the due date of the securities, CCC caused to be iss ued a cashier s check to IBAA which was, however, dishonored upon presentment fo r being drawn against uncollected deposits. IBAA then advised CCC of the dishono r and demanded cash payment. CCC admitted difficulty in replacing the dishonored check and proposed payment on a staggered basis, attaching a copy of a Central Bank letter approving its (CCC s) request for additional standby credit facility to meet its maturing placements. Due to respondent s failure, IBAA filed an act ion for recovery of sum of money with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of pre liminary attachment claiming that defendant, in its fiduciary capacity, embezzle d and fraudulently misapplied or converted to his own use the money, has been gu ilty of fraud in contracting the debt , and has removed or disposed of his prope rty, or is about to do so, with intent to defraud his creditors. The trial court issued an order granting the preliminary attachment against real and personal p roperties of CCC. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of A ppeals. Despite the issuance of a status quo order from the Court of Appeals, de posits of CCC were garnished and properties were attached. Petitioner reiterated its apprehension over CCC s financial viability and ability to pay and claimed that CCC never had any serious intention to pay such that the intention to defra ud IBAA was very apparent. The circumstances in the case at bar fall, according to IBAA, under Rule 57, Section 1 (d), of the Rules of Court. The Court of Appea ls set aside the RTC order of attachment. ISSUE: HELD: FACTS Whether or not the petitioner was performing acts to defraud its creditors. There is no reversible error in the questioned Court of Appeals decision and the Court finds it to be in accordance with law. The contention that at the time th e obligation was incurred by CCC, it already had the fraudulent intent not to pa y the obligation or indebtedness is not borne out by the records. Upon the other hand, CCC has not denied that it was undergoing financial difficulties and had in fact called a creditor s meeting to make full disclosure of its business cond ition and negotiate for payment of its outstanding obligations. The Court of App eals found, on the other hand, that there was no dissipation of assets, in fact, respondent s withdrawal of money from Far East Bank and Trust Co. was intended to finance its operations. Inability to pay, we rule, is not necessarily synonym ous with fraudulent intent not to honor an admitted obligation. The purpose of a ttachment is to secure a contingent lien on defendant s property until plaintiff can obtain a judgment and have such property applied to its satisfaction in suc h cases where the means of satisfaction thereof are liable to be removed beyond the jurisdiction or improperly disposed of (by fraud or otherwise) or placed bey ond the reach of creditors. 185 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 57 ABOITIZ & COMPANY, HONORABLE VICENTE N. CUSI JR., and the PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF DAVAO DEL SUR vs. COTABATO BUS COMPANY The instant petition stemmed from a Civil Case in which a writ of preliminary at tachment was issued ex-parte by the Court on the strength of an affidavit of mer it attached to the verified complaint filed by petitioner Aboitiz & Co., Inc. as plaintiff in said case, for the collection of money, which defendant therein, t he respondent in the instant case, Cotabato Bus Co., owed the said petitioner. B y virtue of the writ of preliminary attachment, the provincial sheriff attached personal properties of the defendant. The ground for the issuance of the writ is , as alleged in the complaint, that the defendant "has removed or disposed of it s properties or assets, or is about to do so, with intent to defraud its credito rs." The petitioner made reference to respondent company s "nil" bank account, a s if to show removal of company s funds, and cited as well the alleged non-payme nt of its other creditors, including secured creditors like the Development Bank of the Philippines to which all its buses have been mortgaged, despite its dail y income averaging P12,000.00, and the removal of five attached buses. Responden t company filed an "Urgent Motion to Dissolve or Quash Writ of Attachment" alleg ing among other things that the defendant has not been selling or disposing of i ts properties, neither does it intend to do so, much less to defraud its credito rs and that it has also been acquiring and buying more assets. The lower court d enied the motion. Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. Hence, the defendant went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of herein respondent Judge. The C ourt of Appeals issued a restraining order upon the trial court from enforcing f urther the writ of attachment and from proceeding with the hearing of the Civil Case. It declared "null and void the order/writ of attachment, ordered the relea se of the attached properties, and made the restraining order originally issued permanent. ISSUE HELD Whether or not removal was effected in fraud of creditors. FACTS We find that the respondent Court of Appeals has not committed any reversible er ror, much less grave abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the instant petition is h ereby denied, but the trial court is hereby ordered to immediately proceed with the hearing of Civil Case. The respondent Court of Appeals correctly took its po sition in the negative on the question of whether insolvency, which petitioners in effect claims to have been proven particularly by company s bank account whic h has been reduced to nil, may be a ground for the issuance of a writ of attachm ent. The dwindling of respondent s bank account is easily explained by it having to meet heavy operating expenses. Moreover, as the buses were mortgaged, their removal, as alleged, to provide the basis of the writ should be very remote. The removal for repairs cannot be the removal intended as ground for the issuance o f a writ of attachment under section 1 (e), Rule 57, of the Rules of Court. The repairs were for interest of the riding public, clearly not to defraud its credi tors, as there is no showing that they were not put on the run after their repai rs. 186 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 57 FILINVEST CREDIT CORPORATION vs. THE HONORABLE JUDGE BENJAMIN RELOVA and ERNESTO SALAZAR FACTS: Filinvest Credit Corporation filed a complaint in the lower court against defend ants Rallye Motor Co., Inc. and Emesto Salazar for the collection of a sum of mo ney with damages and preliminary writ of attachment. From the allegations, it ap pears that in payment of a motor vehicle, Salazar executed a promissory note in favor of Rallye and to secure the note, Salazar also executed in favor of Rallye a deed of chattel mortgage. Rallye, for valuable consideration, assigned all it s rights, title and interest to the note and mortgage to Filinvest. Petitioner, thereafter, came to know that Rallye had not delivered the motor vehicle subject of the chattel mortgage to Salazar. Salazar defaulted in complying with the ter ms and conditions of the promissory note and chattel mortgage. Rallye also faile d and refused to pay Filinvest despite demand.According to Petitioner, the defen dants intentionally, fraudulently and with malice concealed from it the fact tha t there was no vehicle delivered, otherwise, it would not have accepted the nego tiation and assignment of the rights and interest covered by the promissory note and chattel mortgage. A prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment was granted . Petitioner submitted with its complaint the affidavit of one Gil Mananghaya, w ho is the Collection Manager of Filinvest. More than a year later, defendant Sal azar moved that the writ of preliminary attachment issued ex parte quashed and a rgued that when he signed the promissory note and chattel mortgage, Filinvest wa s not his creditor. Therefore, he could not be said to have committed fraud when he contracted the obligation. Respondent added that as the motor vehicle and th e consideration for the promissory note had admittedly not been delivered to him , his repudiation of the loan and mortgage is more justifiable. The court a quo, ordered the dissolution and setting aside of the writ and the return to defenda nt Salazar of all his properties attached. Petitioner in its memorandum contends that respondent Judge erred In dissolving the writ already enforced without Sal azar s posting a counter-replevin bond as required by Rule 57, Section 12; and i n finding that there was no fraud on the part of Salazar, despite evidence in ab undance to show fraud. ISSUE: Whether or not there was concealment to defraud cr editors. HELD: Considering the claim of respondent Salazar that Rallye did not deliver the moto r vehicle to him, it follows that the invoice and receipt of the sale of the mot or vehicle both signed by him was fictitious. It also follows that the Promissor y Note was without consideration and therefore fake; the Chattel Mortgage over t he non-existent vehicle was likewise a fraud; the registration of the vehicle in the name of Salazar was a falsity; and the assignment by Rallye with the confor me of respondent Salazar in favor of petitioner was fraudulent. Petitioner, in t he ordinary course of business, relied on the regularity and validity of the tra nsaction. The Court ruled that the failure of respondent Salazar to disclose the material fact of non-delivery of the motor vehicle, there being a duty on his p art to reveal them, constitutes fraud and that the court a quo committed grave a buse of discretion in dissolving and setting aside the writ of preliminary attac hment. 187

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CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 57 WILLIAM ALAIN MIALHE v. ELAINE MIALHE DE LENCQUESAING and HERVE DE LENCQUESAING FACTS: Petitioner was the administrator of real properties co-owned by him, his sisters respondent Elaine, Monique, and their mother. Petitioner along with his mother and the other sister filed an Action for Partition. Among the issues offe red was the matter of petitioner s account as said administrator. Therein, respo ndent sued petitioner for estafa alleging that he had misappropriated respondent s share in rentals of the common properties. Coverage of the suit thereafter ap peared in a major newspaper. Feeling that his reputation was tainted, petitioner filed a verified complaint for damages. Petitioner also prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment of respondent s 1/6 undivided interest in t he properties alleging that respondent is a non-resident of the Philippines. The trial court granted such writ. Respondent thereafter filed a motion to lift the writ on the ground that the complaint did not comply with Section 3 of Rule 57 and that petitioner s claim was for unliquidated damages. The motion was denied. It was declared that the writ null and void. ISSUE: HELD: While it is rather pr oper that attachment may issue in an action against a party who resides out of t he Philippines, irrespective of the nature of the action or suit, and while each of the grounds under Section 1 (f) of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court is independ ent of the others, it is still imperative that the amount sought must be certain and liquidated, which is one of the indispensable requirements for the issuance of a writ of attachment. The writ was therefore null and void. Whether or not s ummons may be served by publication. 188 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 57 MERCEDES GRUENBERG and ALBERT GRUENBERG v. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Private respondent as administrator of the intestate estate of the late W illiam Gruenberg filed for annulment of sale and recovery of ownership and posse ssion of a house and lot, having been allegedly sold in fraud of creditors. She then filed a motion for issuance of writ of preliminary attachment on the proper ties of petitioners, asserting that the latter are indebted to her. Petitioners opposed stating that the case was an action for annulment of sale and recovery o f the properties, and not for recovery of sum of money, further contending that a writ of preliminary attachment is not the proper remedy to protect the rights of the estate. Issuance the writ was effected wherein the trial court stated tha t no opposition had been filed to the motion. Notice of garnishment was thereupo n served. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order and a moti on to recall the writ and notice of garnishment on the ground that it was not tr ue that petitioners did not oppose the motion of private respondent upon discove ring that the their opposition was not attached to the record, the same having b een forwarded to another branch to which the civil case was originally assigned. Petitioners motions were denied. A petition for certiorari was however dismiss ed Court of Appeals. ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of the writ of attachmen t and garnishment es was proper. HELD: The writ of preliminary attachment was he ld to be improvidently issued. It was held that the issuance merely recited the grounds alleged in the private respondent s motion without any specific details as to the supposed fraud committed by the petitioners whey they contracted the d ebt and the alleged disposition or concealment by the petitioners of the propert ies. The rules on such issuance must be construed strictly in favor of the defen dant. It further explained that attachment must be issued on concrete and specif ic grounds and not on general averments merely quoting the words of the pertinen t rules. Therefore, the validity of the claim of the respondent will have to be threshed out in special proceedings, not in the case for annulment of the deed o f sale, as what private respondent seeks to be secured is not the judgment in th e main case but a mere claim against the estate which is still to be considered and adjudicated by the court. The Court hereby grants the petition. 189 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 57 VICENTE CHUIDIAN v. SANDIGANBAYAN FACTS: PCGG sequestered petitioner s assets as he was allegedly a dummy President Ferdi nand Marcos in several companies said to have been illegally acquired by the for mer. A frozen the Letter of Credit was ordered which was issued to the petitione r by the Philippine National Bank. Consequently, petitioner filed an action agai nst PNB before the District Court of California seeking to compel PNB to pay the proceeds of the Letter of Credit. PNB opposed and averred that it has no liabil ity whatsoever for a breach of contract under the principles of illegality, inte rnational comity and act of state. Philguarantee thereafter intervened, alleging that PNB was excused from making payments since the settlement was void due to illegality, duress and fraud. Judgment in favour of PNB was rendered by the Fede ral Court exempting PNB from making such payments and denied Philguarantee s act ion to set aside the settlement agreement. A complaint was brought before the Sa ndiganbayan against the known cronies of the Marcoses including the petitioner, seeking for the reconveyance, reversion, accounting and restitution of all forms of wealth allegedly procured illegally and stashed away by the defendants. The Republic filed a motion for issuance of a writ of attachment over the Letter of Credit, citing as one of the grounds that petitioner disposed of his property wi th the intent of defrauding plaintiff Republic under Section 1(c) of Rule 57. Pe titioner contended that Section 1(c) is not applicable because no fiduciary rela tionship exists between plaintiff and petitioner. Sandiganbayan thereafter issue d the writ of attachment against the Letter of Credit. on grounds of res judicat a, petitioner subsequently filed a motion to lift order of attachment and that t he government is estopped from pursuing the case for failing to prosecute him af ter a long period of time. Improvident. ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of wr it of attachment was proper. HELD: Improvident issuance of the writ of attachmen t was not effectively shown. The Court held that for a writ to be discharged, th e defect, as contemplated in Rule 57, must be in the very issuance of the attach ment writ and when it is proven that the allegations of the complaint were decep tively framed, or when the complaint fails to state a cause of action. The groun ds offered by herein petitioner have nothing to do with the issuance of the writ of attachment. Supervening events which may or may not justify the discharge of the writ are not within the purview Rule 57. The Court, moreover, reiterated th at only two ways can a writ of attachment be nullified, either by filing a count erbond immediately or by moving to quash on the ground of improper and irregular issuance. The motion to lift attachment failed to demonstrate any infirmity or defect in the issuance of the writ of attachment, and neither did petitioner fil e any counterbond. To question the propriety of such issuance was belatedly done by herein petitioner. 190 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 58 TRIAL 191 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 58 DUNGOG V. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: A complaint was filed by private respondent Gothong Lines due to non-deli very of parcels of land in breach of the contract between herein respondent and petitioner. The petitioner therefore questioned the propriety of the grant by th e trial court of a writ of preliminary injunction. Upon elevation of the case, t he Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner s appeal for certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction was proper. HELD: A p reliminary injunction may be granted at any stage of a proceeding, prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party, court, or agency to perform or refra in from performing a particular act or acts. The issuance rests entirely within the courts sound discretion and cannot be interfered with except in cases of pate nt abuse. It is merely temporary, subject to final disposition of the principal action. Its purpose is to preserve the status quo of the matter subject of the a ction to protect the rights of the plaintiff during the pendency of the suit. It is provided by Rule 58 Section 3 of the Rules of Court that preliminary injunct ion may be had when it appears that plaintiff is entitled to the relief sought. The issuance of the writ preliminary injunction would no doubt preserve the stat us quo between petitioners and private respondent that existed prior to the comm encement of the case. Until the issue on the parties respective rights and obli gations have been determined after the trial such situation must be maintained. 192 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 58 MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY v. RIVERA VILLAGE LESSEE HOMEOWNERS ASSOC IATION INC. FACTS: An injunctive writ was issued involving a piece of property upon motion b y the respondent Rivera Village Homeowners Association. Prior to the action, the members of said association made a request for sale of portion of subject prope rty by the petitioner in accordance with the Urban Land Reform Act. Petitioner M IAA denied such request. Hence, respondent filed a petition for mandamus and pro hibition with prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, which petitio n seeks to restrain the MIAA from implementing its Conceptual Development Plan. MIAA filed its answer alleging that the association is not entitled to a writ of mandamus since it does not have a clear legal right to possess the subject prop erty. The trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. The Court of Appeal s annulled such order and issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining re spondent from evicting the members of Rivera Village Homeowners Association. Pet itioner seeks a review of the Court of Appeals decision in its issuance of such writ . ISSUE: Whether or not issuance of preliminary injunction can be availed o f. HELD: A Writ of Preliminary injunction is regarded as a mere auxiliary remedy which may not independently stand of the main case. The determination of the ho meowners association s entitlement to a writ of preliminary injunction is alread y moot and academic since the petition filed before the trial court was correctl y dismissed. Writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are prerogative writ s of equity and a grant of such is generally within the discretion of the courts to be exercised on equitable principles. The respondent homeowners association clearly exhibited failure to establish any clear legal right to the issuance of the writs of mandamus and prohibition. The Court therefore maintained trial cour ts dismissal of the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction. 193 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 58 TANDUAY DISTELLERA, INC. v. GINEBRA SAN MIGUEL, INC. FACTS: Tanduay Distellera Inc. (Tanduay for brevity) developed a new gin product distinguished by its sweet smell, smooth taste and affordable price. The brand name eventually chosen was Ginebra Kapitan which allegedly differs in terms of col or scheme, size and arrangement of text; other label features; and uses resealab le twist cap to distinguish it from Ginebra San Miguel and other local gin product s which use the crown cap or tansan. Tanduay applied for its patent name which w as granted. Ginebra San Miguel Inc. (San Miguel for brevity) applied for the iss uance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to stop Tanduay from manufacturing suc h products. The trial court granted the Writ based on affidavits presented. The above-entitled case reached to the Court of Appeals (CA for brevity). The CA uph eld the trial courts ruling that San Miguel has sufficiently established its righ t to prior use and registration of the word Ginebra as a dominant feature of its t rademark. It ruled that based on San Miguels extensive, continuous and substantia lly exclusive use of the word Ginebra, it has become distinctive of San Miguels gin products, thus, a clear and unmistakable right was shown. ISSUE: HELD: Whether or not the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was proper. No. The Writ was not proper. The court held that the issue can only be resolved after a fullblown trial because a doubt exists over San Miguels exclusive right r elating to the word Ginebra. San Miguels claim to the exclusive use of the word Gine bra is clearly still in dispute because of Tanduays claim that it has, as others h ave, also registered the word Ginebra for its gin products. It is not evident whet her San Miguel has the right to prevent other business entities from using the w ord Ginebra. It is not settled if Ginebra is indeed the dominant feature of the trad emarks, if it is a generic word that as a matter of law cannot be appropriated, or if it is merely a descriptive word that may be appropriated based on the fact that it has acquired a secondary meaning. Moreover, it further held that court should exercise great caution in issuing injunction. It should be granted only w hen the court is fully satisfied that the law permits it and the emergency deman ds it. There is no also irreparable injury because there is no submission of pro of that the damage is irreparable and incapable of pecuniary estimation. San Mig uels claim cannot be the basis for a valid Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Hence, it constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on t he part of the CA granting it. 194 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 58 GUY v. COURT OF APPEALS Northern Islands is a family-owned corporation organized by Spouses Francisco an d Simny Guy (Spouses Guy for brevity). When they incorporated Lincoln Continenta l as a holding company, fifty percent (50%) shares of stock of Northern Islands was held in trust for their three (3) daughters, to wit: Respondents Geraldine, Gladys and Grace (Respondent sisters for brevity). Upon instruction of Spouses G uy, Atty. Andres Gatmaitan, President of Lincoln Continental, indorsed the said shares of stocks and delivered them to Simny Guy. Later, Spouses Guy found out t hat their son Gilbert Guy (Guy for brevity) has been disposing of the assets of their corporations without authority. In order to protect the assets of Northern Islands, the said share or stocks were then registered in the names of Responde nt sisters thus enabling them to assume an active role in the management of Nort hern Islands. Due to this, a disagreement ensued. Lincoln Continental filed with the RTC for the annulment of shares of stocks, contended that they are the owne r of the said shares of stocks which the Respondent sisters have in possession. It prayed for an award of damages; management of Northern Islands be restored to Gilbert; and Temporary Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory In junction to prohibit Respondent sisters from exercising any right of ownership o ver the disputed shares. On a series of events, trial court granted the Writ of Injunction. Respondent sisters asked the Court of Appeals to issue a preliminary injunction then a permanent injunction from the said order of the trial court. The appellate court granted and ruled in favor of Respondent sisters. Petitioner (Guy) appealed and raised as one of the issues on whether the Respondent sister s are entitled to the injunctive relief granted. ISSUE: Whether or not the issua nce of the writ of preliminary injunction was proper. HELD: YES. They are entitl ed with the injunctive relief under Section 3, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civi l Procedure. They have shown their clear and established right to the disputed s hares of stock because they have physical possession of the two stock certificat es equivalent to the said number of shares. Lincoln Continental is a mere truste e of the Guy family and Respondent sisters. The latter constitute a majority of the board of directors of Northern Islands, and accordingly have management and control of the company at the inception of the case. Petitioner Guy failed to es tablish by clear and convincing evidence his ownership of the shares of stock in question. Thus, the Court of Appeals was correct in determining the urgent nece ssity to issue an injunctive writ in order to prevent serious damage to the righ ts of Respondents and Northern Islands. FACTS: 195 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 58 BACOLOD CITY WATER DISTRICT v. LABAYEN Respondent City filed a case for Injunction with a Prayer for Temporary Restrain ing Order and/or Preliminary Mandatory Injunction (TRO and/or PMI for brevity) a gainst Petitioner for the implementation of its new rates because it was imposed without public hearing in violation of due process. At first, the complaint was dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Later, Respondent Cit y filed an Urgent Motion for the Issuance of TRO and/or PMI praying that the cas e be set for hearing. The Court granted the TRO. The judge issued a final injunc tion allegedly confirming the previous preliminary injunction which is in truth, the judge referring to is the TRO earlier issued. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration raising that it issued a final injunction without the petitione r being heard which was denied. The petitioner filed a Petition for Review at th e Court of Appeals but was likewise, denied on the ground that the TRO earlier i ssued has been elevated to the same level as the preliminary injunction in the p rocedure, grounds and requirements by Section 4, Rule 58 because the Judge has d eliberately omitted to call it as TRO in the latter orders. ISSUE: HELD: Whether or not there is a writ of preliminary injunction issued. FACTS: NONE. It was clear that a TRO was clearly stated in the order. It was only when Petitioner expressed its vehement objection on the latter Order when Respondents just wanted to construe the TRO as a preliminary injunction to justify the vali dity of the final injunction. A restraining order, is issued to preserve the sta tus quo until the hearing of the application for preliminary injunction which ca nnot be issued ex parte. Under Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a judge may issue a temporary restraining order with a limited life of twenty (20) days from date of issue. If no action is taken by the judge on the application for preliminary injunction within the said twenty (20) days, the temporary restraining order wou ld automatically vacated and expire on the 20th day by the sheer force of law, n o judicial declaration to that effect being necessary. The failure of respondent court to fix a period for the ordered restraint did not lend the temporary rest raining order a breath of semi-permanence which can only be characteristic of a preliminary injunction. The twenty (20) day period provided by the Rules of Cour t should be deemed incorporated in the Order where there is an omission to do so . The court held that it is because of this rule on non-extendibility that Respo ndent City was prompted to move that hearings be set for its application of a pr eliminary injunction. Now, they cannot take advantage of this omission by respon dent trial court. 196 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 58 DAVID v. NAVARRO Petitioner was the mother of the businessman Andrew David who was shot by uniden tified men. One of the suspects in this case was her wife. Petitioner filed a se ttlement of estate of her son and she likewise prayed to be the special administ ratix of such. Meanwhile, the wife sold to Respondents the lot to which the Peti tioner opposed on the ground that she has another prospective buyer. The wife pr oceeded with the sale and did not give any share to Petitioner. Thereafter, Resp ondents occupied the property. Petitioner filed for annulment of sale to which t he Municipal Trial Court (MTC for brevity) rendered a favorable judgment. MTC gr anted execution pending the appeal of Resondents in the Regiol Trial Court (RTC for brevity) because of failure of the latter to file supersedeas bond. RTC did not issue any TRO or injunction then until the writ was implemented. Undaunted, Respondents went to the CA for injunction to which the latter granted. Later, RT C reversed the decision of the MTC granting the annulment of the deed of the con ditional sale. ISSUE: HELD: Whether or not the CA imprudently issued a Writ of P reliminary Injunction. FACTS: YES. Writ of Preliminary Injunction will not issue if the act sought to be enjoi ned is a fait accompli. The Writ of Execution had already been enforced and Resp ondents were evicted from the property, as they were placed in possession of the property. It was also clear that MTC is mandated to issue the writ of execution under Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court for failure of respondents to f ile supersedeas bond. Respondent also committed a procedural lapse when instead of refilling their petition with injunction to the RTC, they sought recourse to CA. However, court dismissed the petition on the ground that RTC reversed the de cision of the MTC and ordered the dismissal of the complaint. Court ruled that t he writ of execution issued by the MTC had, thus, become functus officio. 197 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 59 RECEIVERSHIP 198 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 59 ARRANZA v. B.F. HOMES INC. Respondent filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC for brevity) a Petition for Rehabilitation and a declaration that it was in a state of suspens ion of payments because of the closure of Banco Filipino in which Respondent has a huge investment. The SEC placed Atty. Orendain as a Receiver (Receiver for br evity) who unified all the homeowners association which was later called Home Ins urance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC), as representative of all homeowners. Lat er the Receiver was replaced by the new Board. They revoked the authority given to the Receiver and instead recognized BF Paraaque Homeowners Association, Inc., as the representative of all homeowners; deferred purchase of new pumps; deploy ed its own security guards in the subdivision; and took management of clubhouse. Petitioners filed a class suit and later a cease-and-desist/status quo order ra ising issues on the following basic needs of the homeowners such as water, secur ity and right of way. HLURB granted but Respondent filed a prohibition to the Co urt of Appeals. Respondent asserts that the SEC, not the HLURB, has jurisdiction over because the SEC being the appointing authority, should be the one to take cognizance of controversies arising from the performance of the receiver s dutie s based on the contracts entered into by the former receiver. Court of Appeals f inds for the respondents. Whether or not HLURB will still retain jurisdiction ov er claims by subdivision owners once it has been placed under receivership. YES. The court held being under receivership does not divest the HLURB of that juris diction. The appointment of a receiver does not dissolve a corporation, nor does it interfere with the exercise of its corporate rights. In this case, where the re appears to be no restraints imposed upon Respondent as it undergoes rehabilit ation and receivership, Respondent continues to exist as a corporation and hence , continues or should continue to perform its contractual and statutory responsi bilities to Petitioners as homeowners. Receivership is aimed at the preservation of, and at making more secure, existing rights. It cannot be used as an instrum ent for the destruction of those rights. A receiver is a person appointed by the court or quasi-judicial administrative agency, in behalf of all the parties for the purpose of preserving and conserving the property and preventing its possib le destruction or dissipation. It is the duty of the receiver to administer the assets of the receivership estate and in the management and disposition of the p roperty committed to his possession. He acts in a fiduciary capacity and with im partiality towards all interested persons. Claims of the Petitioners are basical ly not pecuniary in nature and for the ideal community living that respondents p ortrayed they would have when they bought real estate from it which is under the purposes why HLURB was created although it could incidentally involve monetary considerations. HELD: ISSUE: FACTS: 199 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 60 REPLEVIN 200 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 60 YANG v. VALDEZ Respondent Spouses Ricardo and Milagros Morante (Respondents for brevity) applie d for a Writ of Replevin (Writ for brevity) against Petitioner to recover posses sion of two (2) Isuzu-cargo trucks (trucks for brevity). Respondents alleged tha t they had actual use and possession of the trucks but the same were illegally d etained by Petitioner and even succeeded registering it in his favor. Respondent judge granted the Writ and rejected the counter-bond of Petitioner by being fil ed out of time. Petitioner contended that the replevin bond was defective for it was merely an undertaking of the Respondents bondsmen to pay the sum of P560,000 .00, and that no tangible security such as cash, property or surety was placed t hereby at the disposal and custody of the court. Moreover, Petitioner contended that Respondents are not the registered owners of trucks and thus, the Writ shou ld not have been issued. ISSUE: HELD: Whether the judge acted with grave abuse o f discretion in granting the Writ. FACTS: NO. The judge did not act with grave abuse of discretion. The sufficiency of a b ond is a matter that is addressed to the sound discretion of the court which mus t approve the bond. It is not necessary that the obligation of the bond be suppo rted by cash or personal property or real property or the obligation of a surety other than the person giving the bond. A sworn declaration as found in this cas e is sufficient. A bond can be merely a written obligation under seal, commercia l matter, secured by a mortgage on real property, the mortgagee may be the oblig ee or a third party surety whose personal credit is added to that of the princip al obligor under the bond. This Court finds the Respondents need not be holder o f the legal title over the property because under Rule 60, Section 2, it suffice s that he is "entitled to the possession thereof. This Court also finds that the counter bond that the Petitioner offered was really filed out of time. Under Sec tion 5, Petitioner may "at any time before the delivery of the property to the p laintiff" require the return of the property; Section 6, he may do so, "within f ive (5) days after the taking of the property by the officer." Both these period s are mandatory in character and command the judge to disapprove the counter-bon d if not complied. In the instant case, the trucks were taken into custody by th e Sheriff on January 7, 1985. Petitioner s counter bond was filed on January 25, 1985. Clearly, the counter bond was filed beyond the mandated periods to file t he same. 201 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 60 NICANOR. B. PAGKALINAWAN Vs. HON. JUDGE AMADOR E. GOMEZ and NORBERTO L. DAYRIT FACTS: A complaint for replevin was lodged by private respondent for the recover y of a vehicle seized by herein Petitioner Nicanor Pagkalinawan, an NBI agent, p ursuant to a search warrant which has been the subject of a theft. Respondent Ju dge issued an order directing the Sheriff to take under his custody the said veh icle. Upon service of the writ, petitioner was obliged to transfer the custody o f the vehicle to the Provincial Sheriff who took over its possession and turned it over to respondent Dayrit. ISSUE: Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion upon the issuance of t he writ. HELD: The vehicle subject matter of the case, having been properly seiz ed in pursuance of a search warrant issued by it, was being held in custodia leg is. Such a situation stemmed from the fact that respondent Judge compelled petit ioner, through a replevin action, to deliver the vehicle to the Sheriff for its turnover to private respondent. Such a situation is proper. Upon filing an appro priate pleading that a search warrant has been issued by another court of first instance, the trial court cannot require any proper officer of the Court to take the property subject of the replevin action if theretofore it came into the cus tody of another public officer by virtue of a search warrant. Only the trial cou rt that issued such a search warrant can validly make an order for its release. Confusion can be avoided if courts of coordinate jurisdiction are not permitted to interfere with each other s lawful orders. The foremost importance of such is to guarantee firm and consistent judicial actions. 202 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 61 SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE 203 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 61 DAISIE DAVID vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RAMON VILLAR Respondent Villar, though married, had an intimate relationship with petitioner who is his secretary, which produced several offsprings. During the summer of 19 91, with the petitioners consent, the respondent and his family took one of the p etitioners children for a vacation and upon their return, respondent refused to r eturn the child. This prompted the petitioner to file a petition for habeas corp us. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner, granting rightful custody to the natural mother. The court further ordered that a temporary monthl y support to the minor children be given by respondent upon the finality of the decision. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision stating that c ustody may be decided in a habeas corpus case contemplates a situation where the parents are married to each other but are separated. Hence, the Habeas Corpus w as not proper. ISSUE: HELD: It must be noted that in the instant case, the child is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, and his father, p rivate respondent, was married to another woman other than the childs mother. Whi le it is accepted that the right to custody of minor children is relevant in cas es where the married parents are for some reason separated from each other, it d oes not necessarily follow that the same cannot take place in any other situatio n. In accordance with article 176 of the Family Code, the child is deemed to be under the parental authority of his biological mother, herein petitioner, who is entitled to have custody of him. As it has been noticed that petitioner has not been given of her rightful custody of her child by private respondent, she is e ntitled to the issuance of the writ of Habeas Corpus. The Family Code articulate s that no child under 7 years of age shall be separated from the mother unless th e court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. The fact that private respon dent has recognized the minor child may be a ground for ordering him to give sup port to the latter, but certainly not providing him with custody of the child. W hether or not the remedy of habeas corpus is proper. FACTS: 204 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 61 BUENAVENTURA SAN JUAN Vs. HON. Judge MANUEL E. VALENZUELA and DOROTEA MEJIA On the ground of a prior and subsisting marriage between petitioner and one Isab el Bandin, the marriage between respondent Mejia and petitioner San Juan was dec lared null and void. Respondent thereafter lodged an action against petitioner s eeking support for herself and her two minor children, which was granted to be p aid to the plaintiff each month until final judgment of the case. Petitioner mov ed for reconsideration stating that the amount is grossly disproportionate to pe titioner s means and that the petitioner is not obliged to support respondent as their marriage is null and void, and that no evidence was presented as to petit ioner s present financial capability. ISSUE: HELD: Whether or not the support pe ndent lite was proper. FACTS: The petitioner s willingness to pay the amount of support pendente lite in the m anner indicated in his manifestation, and the approval thereof by the respondent Judge have rendered the petition moot and academic. Also, petitioner sought the reduction of the amount of support pendente lite on the ground that the sum pre viously fixed by respondent judge is beyond his means to pay. The amount fixed i n the order is only provisional, however, not final in character in the sense th at it can be the subject of modification, depending on the changing conditions a ffecting the ability of the obligor to pay the amount fixed for support. 205 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 62 INTERPLEADER 206 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 62 LEONARDO OCAMPO vs. LEONORA TIRONA FACTS: A parcel of land was bought by petitioner. Respondent Tirona occupied a p ortion of the land as lessee. Petitioner received a letter stating among others, that, in view of the fact that the subject premises was declared under area for priority development, respondent is invoking her right of first refusal. Respon dent further asserted that with reference to such, she will temporarily stop pay ing her monthly rentals until the National Housing Authority has processed the p ertinent papers concerning the amount due to petitioner by reason of the impleme ntation of the above law. Petitioner demanded payment of the rentals and that re spondent vacate the premises which the latter refused. Accordingly, a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages was filed by petitioner. Respondent asserted i n her answer that the original owners of the land could not transfer ownership t o petitioner since they had executed a deed of conveyance and waiver in favor of one Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola making her the lessor. In is further noted th at TCT of said land has not been registered under petitioners name. Trial court, however, rendered judgment in favor of petitioner, which was set aside on appeal to the Court of Appeals. ISSUE: HELD: Quite notably, an interpleader is regarde d as a remedy whereby a person who has property in his possession, or an obligat ion to be rendered, without claiming any right in both, or claims an interest wh ich is not disputed by the conflicting claimants, comes to court and asks that t he persons who claim such property or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be required to litigate among themselves. In th is case, an action for interpleader may be proper when the lessee does not know the person to whom to pay rentals due to conflicting claims on the property. In order to determine finally who is entitled to one or the other thing. The remedy is afforded to protect a person against a double vexation in respect of one lia bility. In the case at bar, no action for interpleader was even initiated by res pondent. Her good faith is put in question in respondents preference for Mendiola . Tirona should have used reasonable diligence in hailing the contending claiman ts to court. Tirona need not have awaited actual institution of a suit by Ocampo against her before filing for an interpleader. Whether or not the action for in terpleader is proper. 207 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 63 DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES 208 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE FELISA LIM Vs REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: Rule 63 Having lost her citizenship by reason of marriage to a Chinese national, a petit ion was filed by Lim alleging that she was formerly a citizen of the Philippines , maintaining that she has all the qualifications for repatriation and prays tha t she be permitted to take the oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen. Trial c ourt granted the petition. Solicitor General appealed and maintained that the lo wer court erred in declaring petitioner repatriated as a Filipino citizen since there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of the citizen ship of an individual. ISSUE: HELD: Whether or not declaratory relief can be iss ued in citizenship cases. No action or proceeding shall be maintained for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. Quite notably, courts of justice settle justiciabl e controversies, which imply a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. As an incident only of the adjudication of the right of the parties to a controversy, the court may pass upon, and make a pron ouncement relative to, their status. Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond j udicial power. Repatriation of a female Filipino citizen, having lost her citize nship through marriage to an alien, can be done upon termination of her marital status by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register said oath in the proper civil registry. The prayer in the petition of appellee in the case suggests that she is cognizant of applicable legal provisio ns. Moreover, it is noticeable that her purpose is to settle her political statu s prior to marriage. By her petition, she hopes to establish that she was a form er citizen of the Philippines before contracting marriage. The result of such, i n effect, is one for a declaratory relief, which has been repeatedly held to be inapplicable to the political status of natural persons. 209 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 63 MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION EDGARDO ISIP, HON. JUDGE MANUEL CALANOG, JR. and HON. JUDGE TIRSO VELASCO. Respondent Philippine Consumers Foundation filed a petition to the Board of Ener gy against MERALCO, which sought for the immediate refund to MERALCO consumers o f all the savings it realized under P. D. No. 551. Such law provides for lowerin g the cost to consumers of electricity by reducing the franchise tax payable by electric franchise holders and the tariff on fuel oils for the generation of ele ctric power by public utilities. MERALCO contended that it is authorized by the BOE to retain its savings. PCFI filed and was denied motion for reconsideration hence the instant petition for certiorari which was also denied by the Supreme C ourt. Respondents filed with respondent Regional Trial Court a petition for decl aratory relief and prayed for a ruling on who should be entitled to the savings realized by MERALCO under P.D. No. 551. They insisted that pursuant to Section 4 of P.D. No. 551, the savings belong to the consumers. ISSUE: HELD: FACTS: Whether or not an action for declaratory relief can be availed of. An action for declaratory relief may only be considered only before the breach o r violation of the statute, deed, or contract to which it refers. It secures an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a sta tute, deed, or contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compli ance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof. The petition gives a practical remedy in ending controversies, which have not r eached the stage where other relief is immediately available. It supplies the ne ed for a form of action that will set controversies at rest before they lead to repudiation of obligations, invasion of rights, and the commission of wrongs. He re, private respondents brought the petition for declaratory relief long after t he alleged violation of P.D. No. 551. 210 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE ANTONIO DELUMEN v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES Rule 63 A petition was filed by petitioners Delumen alleging that they are the legitimat e children of Pacencia Pua, a Filipino woman, and Mariano Delumen who was declar ed a Filipino citizen by the trial court in an order. It prayed for determinatio n of their citizenship and to declare their corresponding rights and duties. It is further alleged in the petition that the petitioners have continuously reside d in the Philippines since their birth, have considered themselves as Filipinos, had exercised the right to vote in the general elections of 1946 and 1947, and were registered voters for the elections in 1951. The Solicitor General filed an answer alleging that the petition states no cause of action, there being no adv erse party against whom the petitioners have an actual or justiciable controvers y. After hearing, the Court of First Instance of Samar rendered a decision decla ring the appellees to be Filipinos by birth and blood. From this decision the So licitor General has appealed. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for declaratory relief filed is proper.. HELD: Theappealed decision is reversed and the petitio n dismissed without pronouncement as to costs. The appellant s contention is ten able, since there is nothing in the petition which even intimates that the alleg ed status of the appellees as Filipino citizens had in any instance been questio ned or denied by any specific person or authority. and it is not pretended that on any occasion their citizenship was controverted. It is not accurate to say, a s appellees do, that an actual controversy arose after the filing by the Solicit or General of an opposition to the petition, for the reason that the cause of ac tion must be made out by the allegations of the complaint or petition, without t he aid of the answer. As a matter of fact, the answer herein alleges that the pe tition states no cause of action. An action for declaratory judgment, however, c annot be invoked solely to determine or try issues or to determine a moot, abstr act or theoretical question, or decide claims which are uncertain or hypothetica l. "Own doubts, or by fears of others does not confer a cause of action." In vie w of what had been said, it becomes unnecessary to discuss either the second con tention of the Solicitor General that the trial court erred in holding that the petition for declaratory relief may be utilized to obtain a judicial pronounceme nt as to appellees citizenship. HELD: FACTS: 211 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 63 FELIPE OLLADA v. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES On grounds that it was an unlawful invasion of the jurisdiction of the Board of Accountancy, in excess of the powers of the Central Bank and unconstitutional in that it unlawfully restrained the legitimate pursuit of one s trade, for himsel f and allegedly on behalf of numerous other CPAs assailed the requirement of the Import-Export Department of the Central Bank that CPAs such as him must submit to an accreditation under oath before they could certify financial statements of their clients applying for import dollar allocations. Accordingly, a petition f or Declaratory Relief was filed to nullify said accreditation requirement. Centr al Bank filed a motion to dismiss the petition for Declaratory Relief for lack o f cause of action and contended that the Central Bank has the responsibility of administering the Monetary Banking System of the Republic and is authorized to p repare and issue, through its Monetary Board, rules and regulations to make effe ctive the discharge of such responsibility; that the accreditation requirement a lleged in the petition was issued in the exercise of such power and authority; t hat the purpose of such requirement is not to regulate the practice of accountan cy in the Philippines but only the manner in which certified public accountants should transact business with the Central Bank. Complaint was dismissed. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for declaratory relief was proper. HELD: An action f or declaratory relief should be filed before there has been a breach of a contra ct, statutes or right, and that it is sufficient to bar such action, that there had been a breach which would constitute actionable violation. The rule is that an action for Declaratory Relief is proper only if adequate relief is not availa ble through the means of other existing forms of action or proceeding. Petitione r commenced this action as, and clearly intended it to be one for Declaratory Re lief under the provisions of Rule 66 of the Rules of Court. On the question of w hen a special civil action of this nature would prosper, we have already held th at the complaint for declaratory relief will not prosper if filed after a contra ct, statute or right has been breached or violated. In the present case such is precisely the situation arising from the facts alleged in the petition for decla ratory relief. As vigorously claimed by petitioner himself, respondent had alrea dy invaded or violated his right and caused him injury all these giving him a co mplete cause of action enforceable in an appropriate ordinary civil action or pr oceeding. FACTS: 212 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 63 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO FACTS: Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Chur ch of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Ciprianos wife left for t he United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Ciprian o discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then marri ed a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him lived in Califo rnia, USA. Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authori ty to remarry invoking Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. F inding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic through t he Office of the Solicitor General sought reconsideration but it was denied. ISS UE: HELD: A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating hi m or her to remarry. Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our ow n courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Such foreign law must also be pr oved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other f act, such laws must be alleged and proved. Furthermore, respondent must also sho w that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically requ ired in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage. However, the present peti tion submits no sufficient evidence and on record, the Court is unable to declar e, based on respondents bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be ma de properly upon respondents submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor. Whether or not the allegations were accordance with the rules of evidence. 213 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 65 CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS 214 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 65 EMELINDA ABEDES v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS RELIA QUIZON ARCIGA and SHERIFF RONBERTO VALINO FACTS: Respondent Relia Arciga filed an action against Wilfredo Abedes, husband of herein petitioner, seeking support for her daughter. A decision was rendered declaring Abedes the natural father and was ordered to support the child. The ju dgment became final and executory but unfortunately, no personal property of Wil fredo could be levied upon to satisfy the judgment. Later, a property was discov ered to be allegedly registered in the name of Wilfredo and was levied. Petition er filed a Notice of Third Party Claim alleging that said property belongs exclu sively to her, and Wilfredo had no present and existing right thereto. Trial cou rt issued the ruling in Emelindas favor. Respondent filed an appeal with the Cour t of Appeals, which reversed and set aside the appealed order. ISSUE: case. HELD : In the instant case, no appeal was made on the resolution of the appellate cou rt. She, instead, filed a petition for certiorari in an effort to salvage her lo st appeal. Evidently, appeal was available to petitioner. It was also the speedy and adequate remedy under the circumstances. Petitioner was, therefore, unsucce ssful in satisfying the rudiments for the writ of certiorari under Rule 65 to is sue. Petitioner was unable to show that there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A petition for certiorari un der Rule 65 is proper if there exists grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac k or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and ade quate remedy in the ordinary course of law. However, the proper remedy of petiti oner from the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals is an ord inary appeal to this Court via a petition for review under Rule 45 and not a pet ition for certiorari under Rule 65. We have underscored that the remedy of certi orari is not a substitute for lost appeal. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. Hence, the special ci vil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, where the latter remedy is available. Such a remedy will not be a cure for failure to timely file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Pa renthetically, it must be emphasized that under Rule 56, Sec. 5(f) of the Rules of Court, which governs the procedure in the Supreme Court, a wrong or inappropr iate mode of appeal, as in this case, merits an outright dismissal. Whether or n ot the Court of Appeals has statutory jurisdiction over the subject matter of th e 215 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 65 ADAM GARCIA v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and LEGASPI OIL OMPANY Petitioner filed with the Regional Arbitration Branch No. V, Legaspi City, a com plaint for illegal suspension, dismissal, and other labor standard violations ag ainst private respondents. Petitioner worked as the Production Maintenance Forem an of Legaspi Oil Company. e is accused of violating the Company Rules and Regul ations by encashing the payment for himself and non-payment to the operator of t he amount released for the use of a DPWH grader in one of the companys projects A ccordingly, petitioner was placed under preventive suspension for thirty working days without pay and after investigation, was later terminated due to dishonest y and loss of trust and confidence. On its decision, Executive Labor Arbiter ren dered judgment in favor of pettioner. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Co mmission set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Hence the petition for review. ISSUE: Whether or not the out right dismissal of the petition for certiorari was proper. HELD: Upon review of an NLRC decision through a special civil action for certiorari, resolution is co nfined only to issues of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion on the part of the labor tribunal. Hence, the Court refrains from reviewing factual assessme nts of lower courts and agencies exercising adjudicative functions. Occasionally , however, the Court is constrained to delve into factual matters where there ar e contradictory findings. In this instance, the Court may look into the records of the case and re-examine the questioned findings. Thus, we see no error on its part when it made anew a factual determination of the matters and on that basis reversed the ruling of the NLRC. A certiorari can be properly resorted to where the factual findings complained of are not supported by the evidence on record. In a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, errors of jur isdiction and grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdict ion are ascribed to the lower courts or quasijudicial tribunals. The general rul e is that certiorari does not lie to review errors of judgment of the trial cour t, as well as that of a quasi-judicial tribunal. In certiorari proceedings, judi cial review does not go as far as to examine and assess the evidence of the part ies and to weigh the probative value thereof. Such questions are proper only in an ordinary appeal either by writ of error from the judgment or final order of t he trial court, or a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court fro m a decision or final order of a quasi-judicial body. Indeed, a certiorari proce eding is limited in scope and narrow in character. FACTS: 216 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 65 New Frontier Sugar Corporation v. Regional Trial Court of Iloilo FACTS: Petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of state of suspension of payments with approval of proposed rehabilitation plan under the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation upon anticipating that it cannot meet i ts obligations with its creditors as they fell due. Respondent Equitable PCI Ban k filed opposed with motion to exclude property, alleging that petitioner is not qualified for corporate rehabilitation, as it can no longer operate because it has no assets left. An Omnibus Order was issued terminating the proceedings and dismissing the case. Petitioner then filed with the CA a special civil action fo r certiorari, which was denied by the CA. The CA ruled that the petition could n ot be corrected because what petitioner filed before the CA was a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court instead of an ordinary appeal. ISSUE: HELD: It is submitted that certiorari is a remedy for the correc tion of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. It is an original and in dependent action that was not part of the trial that had resulted in the renditi on of the judgment or order complained of. More importantly, since the issue is jurisdiction, an original action for certiorari may be directed against an inter locutory order of the lower court prior to an appeal from the judgment; or where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or adequate remedy. A petition for cert iorari should be filed not later than sixty days from the notice of judgment, or der, or resolution, and a motion for reconsideration is generally required prior to the filing of a petition for certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an opportunity to correct the alleged error. The Omnibus Order issued by the trial court is a final order since it terminated the proceedings and dismissed the cas e before the trial court; it leaves nothing more to be done. As such, petitioners recourse is to file an appeal from the Omnibus Order. Whether or not the petiti on for certiorari was improper. 217 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 65 EQUITABLE PCI BANK V. NG SHEURIG NGOR Respondents lodged an action for annulment and/or reformation of documents and c ontracts against petitioner. Respondents claimed that petitioner induced them to avail of its peso and dollar credit facilities so they accepted petitioners such proposal and signed the bank s pre-printed promissory notes. Respondents were, however, unaware of the fact that the documents contained identical escalation c lauses granting petitioners authority to increase interest rates without their co nsent. Petitioner, in its answer, asserted that respondents knowingly accepted a ll the terms and conditions contained in the promissory notes. After trial, the validity of the promissory notes was upheld. The trial court, however, invalidat ed the escalation clause contained therein because it violated the principle of mutuality of contracts. Notices of appeal were filed by both parties. However, s uch notices were denied. Petitioner moved for the reconsideration and respondent s, on the other hand, prayed for the issuance of a writ of execution which was t hereafter issued and properties of petitioner were levied upon. Petitioner filed a petition for relief in the Regional Trial Court but withdrew such and instead filed a petition for certiorari with an application for an injunction in the CA to enjoin the implementation and execution the omnibus order. Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari and found petitioner guilty of forum shopp ing. ISSUE: Whether or not dismissal of the petition for certiorari was appropri ate. HELD: Herein petitioner s petition for relief in the RTC and its petition f or certiorari in the Court of Appeals did not have identical causes of action. T he petition for relief from the denial of its notice of appeal was based on the judgment or final order preventing it from taking an appeal by fraud, accident, m istake or excusable negligence. On the other hand, its petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, a special civil action, sought to correct the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction committed by the Regional Trial Court. It may be noted that in a petition for relief, the judgment or final ord er is rendered by a court with competent jurisdiction while a petition for certi orari, the order is rendered by a court without or in excess of its jurisdiction . FACTS: 218 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 65 EMELITA DORAN V. HON.JUDGE HENRY LUCZON FACTS: Petitioner filed an complaint against respondent Judge Campos with grave miscond uct. The administrative matter was reffered to Executive Judge Jimmy Henry F. Lu czon, Jr. of Regional Trial Court Tuguegarao City, for investigation, report, an d recommendation. After being asked for opinion whether it is procedurally permi ssible to file a demurrer to evidence or a motion to dismiss, Judge answered in the affirmative with the advice that counsel must first seek leave of court. Dem urrer to evidence was permitted. Petitioner, in an unusual move, challenged Judg e Luczon s ruling via Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court with pray er for the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction. She alleged that the Investigating Judge, in allowing respondent to file a demurrer to evid ence, committed grave abuse of discretion. Whether or not a petition for certior ari is the proper remedy. ISSUE: HELD: Respondent judges act may not be challenged by a petition for certiorari under Ru le 65 when it allowed a demurrer to evidence or motion to dismiss after the peti tioner had completed the presentation of her evidence in support of her affidavi t-complaint. Judge Luczon was designated by this Court merely to investigate and submit a report and the appropriate recommendation relative to the said complai nt. Simply stated, his function is merely investigative and recommendatory in na ture. He has no power to pronounce judgment on the controversy as such function belongs only to the Supreme Court pursuant to its power of supervision and contr ol over court personnel and officers. His designation as investigator, therefore , does not involve the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial power. 219 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 65 ALFREDO Bokingo V. Court Of Appeals FACTS: Petitioner is one of the defendants in the complaint for injunction and d amages filed by Ernesto Campos et al. with the RTC. From the complaint, Campos a nd co-claimants assert to have a better right to file a public land application covering the subject land as petitioners and his co-claimants application for the titling of the subject land was dismissed by the Provincial Environment and Natu ral Resources Officer. Petitioner, lodged with the Regional Trial Court motion t o dismiss alleging that PENRO has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim. Acting thereon, the RTC denied the motion to dismiss and ruled in favor of Campos. Petitioner forthwith filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for ce rtiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court a quo in de nying his motion to dismiss. Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision dis missing the said petition for lack of merit, in fact and in law. It ruled that t he remedy of certiorari is unavailing since the denial of the motion to dismiss is considered an interlocutory order. Whether or not an interlocutory order can be the subject of an extraordinary petition for certiorari. HELD: Court of Appea ls properly sustained that the mere fact that petitioner failed to move for the reconsideration of the court a quos order denying his motion to dismiss was suffi cient cause for the outright dismissal of the said petition. No error can theref ore be had in the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of petitioners petition for c ertiorari filed therewith. Certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unl ess a motion for reconsideration is first filed before the respondent court to a llow it an opportunity to correct its errors, if any. Petitioner did not proffer any compelling reason to warrant deviation by the Court of Appeals from this sa lutary rule. As further observed by the Court of Appeals, petitioner failed to e ven allege grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court, a quo in renderin g the order denying his motion to dismiss. ISSUE: 220 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 65 LIBRADO CABRERA V. COMELEC FACTS: Petitioner was the candidate filed an election protest against private responden t Michael Montenegro, the winning candidate. The trial court required the partie s to submit their respective preliminary conference briefs. Montenegro moved for the dismissal of the protest upon finding fatal defects in petitioners prelimina ry conference brief. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and his subseq uent motion for reconsideration. Montenegro subsequently brought the issue to th e COMELEC via a petition for certiorari and prohibition. The First Division of t he Commission granted the petition, annulled and set aside the orders of the tri al court denying the motion to dismiss. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsider ation of the division ruling which the COMELEC en banc, denied. An instant petit ion for certiorari before the Supreme Court was thereafter instituted. ISSUE: Wh ether or not a petition for certiorari is a proper remedy. HELD: It is rather es sential for a petitioner to aver caprice and arbitrariness characterized the act of the court or agency whose exercise of discretion is being assailed in an app lication for a writ of certiorari. Grave abuse of discretion contemplates a situ ation where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by, or to act at all in contemplation of, law. Grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. In the instant case, the petitioner has utterly failed to show to the Court that the COMELEC, in issuing the assailed resolutions, acted capriciously such that its act is annullable by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. 221 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 65 VANGIE BARRAZONA vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT SAN-AN REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORP. FACTS: Respondent filed a complaint for collection of sum of money with Damages. Petitioner has been leased units in a building owned by San-an Realty and Devel opment Corporation for a period of two years. Petitioner defaulted in the paymen t of the monthly rentals and failed to pay despite demands. Petitioner filed wit h the Regional Trial Court a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the trial cour t has no jurisdiction over the complaint considering that the allegations therei n clearly indicate that the action is one for ejectment or illegal detainer whic h is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC. Motion to Dismiss was denied f or lack of merit. Petitioner hence filed the instant Petition for Certiorari all eging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in t he denial of her motion to dismiss and that such is unconstitutional as it does not state its legal basis. Conversely, respondent contends that the complaint is for the collection of unpaid rentals as there is absolutely no allegation that its intent is to eject petitioner from the premises; petitioner should have firs t filed a motion for reconsideration before resorting to the extraordinary suit of certiorari; and the assailed order denying petitioners motion to dismiss is in terlocutory and, therefore, cannot be the subject of a petition for certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not the denial the Motion to Dismiss was proper. HELD: While t he rule is that before certiorari may be availed of, petitioner must first file a motion for reconsideration with the lower court of the act or order complained of, however, such rule is not without exception. The Court have, in several ins tances, dispensed with the filing of a motion for reconsideration of a lower cou rts ruling, such as: where the proceedings in which the error occurred is a paten t nullity; where the question is purely of law; when public interest is involved ; where judicial intervention is urgent or its application may cause great and i rreparable damage; and where the court a quo has no jurisdiction, as in this cas e. In petitioner s complaint, the allegation clearly shows that San-an Realty ma de several demands upon Barrazona to pay her overdue rentals and to vacate the p remises; and that the last demand to pay and vacate in writing was on March 27, 2002. San-an Realty thus complied with Section 2, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of C ivil Procedure which provides that the lessor may proceed against the lessee onl y after demand to pay and vacate. 222 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 65 MAYON ESTATE CORPORATION vs. MARIETTA ALTURA FACTS: Petitioner corporation filed a civil suit for forcible entry and damages with the against the President of the Concerned Citizen Farmers Association and Vice-President of the Doa Flora Farmers Association. Trial court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner that the defendants are ordered to vacate the premis es in question and remove all the improvements they constructed thereon, and to restore the possession of the lots to the plaintiff. When the decision became fi nal and executory, the petitioner moved for the issuance of a writ of execution, which was granted. Respondents filed a petition for prohibition with writ of pr eliminary injunction and damages to enjoin the enforcement of the Writ of Demoli tion issued by the Municipal Trial Court, on the ground that the same was issued beyond the five-year period during which a judgment may be executed by motion. The RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order because of which the sheriff was no t able to fully implement the writ of demolition and rendered a Decision in favo r of the respondents which gave due course to the instant Petition for Prohibiti on and the issuance of a corresponding Writ of Prohibition to prevent petitioner from enforcing the decision of the respondent Court. The Clerk of Court, howeve r, failed to issue the said writ. No appeal was taken by the petitioner, thus, t he decision became final and executory. The respondents filed a Petition for Cer tiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Injunction and Temporary Restraining Ord er claiming that the orders setting aside a decision that had long become final and executory were tainted with grave abuse of discretion. ISSUES: Whether or no t the petition for certiorari was validly granted. HELD: The decision of the RTC granting a writ of prohibition had long become final and executory; hence, immu table, beyond the jurisdiction of the RTC to amend, modify, or reverse. Nothing is more settled in law than that when a final judgment is executory, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. There is no denying the fact that the decisio n of the MTC had long become final and executory when the respondents filed thei r petition for prohibition with the RTC. What the respondents sought to prevent was the enforcement of the MTC decision, on their claim that such decision could be effected only via an action to enforce the decision of the MTC, and not by m ere motion. The judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the m odification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law. The doctrine is founded on considerations of public policy and s ound practice that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments must become fina l at some definite point in time. The only recognized exceptions are the correct ions of clerical errors in which case no prejudice to any party, and, of course, where the judgment is void. 223 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 65 HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION vs. SECRETARY MICHAEL DEFENSOR Chairman of th e Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council FACTS: Petitioners subsequently filed the instant petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary rest raining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, seeking to prevent responde nts from enforcing the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9207, otherwise known as the National Government Center (NGC) Housing and Lan d Utilization Act of 2003. ISSUE: Whether or not the rules and regulations of RA 9207 are null and void. HELD: A petition for prohibition is not the proper remed y to assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Gener ally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the l imits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels. Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, pet itioners remedy is an ordinary action for its nullification, an action which prop erly falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. In any case, peti tioners allegation that respondents are performing or threatening to perform funct ions without or in excess of their jurisdiction may appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through a writ of injunction or a temporary restraining order. S ince the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the assai led IRR issued by the Committee in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power, the judicial course to assail its validity must follow the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, m andamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not g ive the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. 224 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 65 PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY vs. PRIMEX COCO PRODUCTS, INC. FACTS: The Philippine Coconut Authority adopted a resolution authorizing the est ablishment and operation of additional PCA plants in view of the increasing dema nd for desiccated coconuts (DCN) in the world market. The opening of new plants was made subject to implementing guidelines and approval of the President. Prime x Coco Products filed an application for registration with the PCA as a new expo rter, trader, and manufacturer of such products. PCA did not immediately issue t he certificate of registration. Primex filed thereafter a petition for mandamus against the PCA. RTC rendered judgment in favor of Primex and ordered the PCA to act on the application. A a petition for certiorari and mandamus against the PC A was in the Supreme Court to nullify Resolution No. 018-93 which aims to deregu late the establishment of new coconut processing plants. The PCA later renewed t he registration of Primex as a coconut product processor while the case was pend ing. Supreme Court afterwards rendered a decision declaring Resolution No. 018-9 3 and all certificates of registration issued under it null and void for having been issued in excess of the power of PCA. Primex was prompted to file a petitio n for mandamus against the PCA and a regular certificate of registration was iss ued. PCA appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which it dismissed ISSUE: Whether or not it is the ministerial duty to issue a certificate of registratio n. HELD: Supreme Court finds that the petition has been mooted. As correctly obs erved by the court a quo, no damage was actually suffered by respondent since it has continued to operate for the whole period of 1999 although under provisiona l certificates of registration. Mandamus is an extraordinary writ and discretion ary remedy and should not be granted when it will achieve no beneficial result s uch as when act sought to be compelled has been performed. In this case, respond ent had no cause of action to compel petitioner to issue a renewal certificate o f registration for every year from 1999 at the time it filed the petition for ma ndamus. At that time, respondent had no right to demand and the petitioner had n o correlative duty, to issue a renewal certificate for the years following the f iling of the petition, hence, there could not have been any default on the part of petitioner. Where a person or entity has not yet failed to perform a duty, ac tion for mandamus is premature. 225 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 65 DARNOC REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. AYALA CORPORATION FACTS: Respondent contracted to sell parcels of land to Western Minolco Corporat ion. Subsequently, Western Minolco executed a Deed of Assignment of Right to buy land over said lots in favor of Darnoc Realty Development Corporation. Conseque ntly, respondent executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over said lots in favor of pet itioner. Both lots are subject to restriction annotated at the back of their res pective certificates of title which states the building proper must have a heigh t of not more than twenty-three meters above the ground directly beneath the poi nt in question. Petitioner submitted to the respondent corporation amended build ing plans for the construction of office building. Respondent replied claiming t hat the height of the building to be constructed by petitioner exceeds the maxim um limitation and would not approve the same unless further amended to conform t o the height requirement. Petitioner files a petition to declare the height rest riction unconstitutional. ISSUE: Whether or not Supreme Court has jurisdiction o ver the controversy HELD: Petitioner in this case resorted directly to the Supre me Court without filing any case in the lower court. It further alleged that the instant case is one that falls within the concurrent jurisdiction of this Court and with the Court of First Instance. Such contention is patently erroneous. Ju risdiction of a court over the subject matter of an action is conferred only by the Constitution or by law. It cannot be fixed by the will of the parties. Thus, there has to be a judgment rendered by an inferior court, which as stated, is a bsent in the instant case. Neither does this case involve the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, executive agreement, law, ordinance or executive orde r or regulation. While the Supreme Court shall exercise concurrent jurisdiction with Court of First Instance in petitions for the issuance of writs of certiorar i, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus, petitioner has not sho wn that it is entitled to any of the writs mentioned above. Petitioner s content ion that any way if the case is filed with the Court of First Instance the case will eventually be appealed to the Supreme Court is not a justification for fili ng this case directly with the Supreme Court. 226 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 65 MARISSA A. MOSSESGELD vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL FACTS: Petitioner, single, gave birth to a baby boy while the presumed father, o ne Eleazar Siriban Calasan, married, signed the birth certificate as the informa nt, indicating thereinthe childs first name as Jonathan, middle name as Mossesgel d, and last name as Calasan. Both the presumed father, and the mother, accomplis hed the dorsal side of the certificate of live birth stating that the informatio n contained therein were true and correct. In addition, lawyer Calasan executed an affidavit admitting paternity of the child. Due to the refusal of the person in charge at the hospital to placing the presumed fathers surname as the childs su rname in the certificate of live birth, petitioner himself submitted the certifi cate to the office of the local civil registrar for registration. The municipal treasurer, as officer in charge of the office of the local civil registrar, reje cted the registration on the basis of Circular No. 4 of the Civil Registrar Gene ral, providing that under Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines, ill egitimate children born on or after August 3, 1988, shall use the surname of the ir mother. Calasan personally went to the Local Civil Registrar to inquire about the status of the registration of his illegitimate childs certificate of birth, but was furnished with a copy of the letter of the Civil Registrar General denyi ng registration of the certificate of live birth using the fathers surname, for i t is contrary to law. Calasan filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition for mandamus to compel the Local Civil Registrar to register the certificate of liv e birth of his alleged illegitimate son using his surname. ISSUE: Whether or not mandamus lies to compel registration of a certificate of live birth of an illeg itimate child. HELD: Mandamus will not lie to compel the local civil registrar t o register the certificate of live birth of an illegitimate child using the fath ers surname, even with the consent of the latter. Mandamus does not lie to compel the performance of an act prohibited by law. The Family Code of the Philippines provides, under Article 176, that illegitimate children shall use the surname an d shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled t o support in conformity with this Code. This rule is upheld regardless of whether or not the father admits paternity. The Family Code has effectively repealed th e provisions of Article 366 of the Civil Code of the Philippines giving a natura l child acknowledged by both parents the right to use the surname of the father. The Family Code has limited the classification of children to legitimate and il legitimate, thereby eliminating the category of acknowledged natural children an d natural children by legal fiction. 227 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 65 NILO PALOMA vs. DANILO MORA FACTS: Petitioner was appointed General Manager of the Palompon, Leyte Water Dis trict. He was subsequently terminated by virtue of Resolution No. 8-95, which wa s passed by respondents as Chairman and members of the Board of the Water Distri ct. The Board, in the same Resolution, designated respondent Valentino Sevilla a s Officer-in-Charge. Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with prayer for pr eliminary injunction with damages before the RTC to contest his dismissal with t he prayer to be restored to the position of General Manager. ISSUE: Whether or n ot mandamus will lie to compel reinstatement. HELD: Mandamus does not lie to com pel the Board of Directors of the Palompon, Leyte Water District to reinstate pe titioner because the Board has the discretionary power to remove him under Secti on 23 of P.D. No. 198, as amended by P.D. No. 768 or the Provincial Water Utilit ies Act. Mandamus lies to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to compel the performance of a discretionary duty. Mandamus will not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion of a public officer wh ere the law imposes upon said public officer the right and duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any matter in which he is required to act. It is his ju dgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court. 228 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 65 DOMINGO R. MANALO vs. PAIC SAVINGS BANK and THERESE V. VARGAS FACTS: S. Villanueva Enterprises, Inc., represented by its president, Therese Va rgas, impleaded as a respondent, obtained a loan from PAIC Savings and Mortgage Bank, also a respondent. As security for the loan, respondents mortgaged two lot s. However, respondent Vargas failed to pay the loan. Consequently, the mortgage was foreclosed and the lots were sold at public auction to respondent bank, bei ng the highest bidder. A Certificate of Sale was issued to respondent bank and e ventually registered. Seven years later, respondent Vargas filed with the Region al Trial Court a complaint for annulment of mortgage and extrajudicial foreclosu re against respondent bank. In due course, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissin g the complaint for lack of merit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in a Decisio n dated, affirmed the RTC Decision, sustaining the legality of the mortgage and the foreclosure proceedings. The Decision of the Appellate Court then became fin al and executory. In the meantime, respondent bank filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition for issuance of a writ of possession which was granted and iss ued a writ of possession. Earlier, respondent Vargas sold to Armando Angsico the lots then respondent Vargas leased to Domingo Manalo, petitioner, a portion of the same lots. Later, Angsico assigned and transferred to petitioner all his rig hts to the property. Petitioner filed a complaint for specific performance and d amages and impleaded as defendants are respondent bank respondent Vargas. Petiti oner alleged that he has legal interest in the subject lots and prayed that the trial court issue a writ of mandamus compelling respondent bank to allow him to redeem or repurchase the subject lots. ISSUE: Whether or not mandamus will lie t o compel redemption or repurchase. HELD: Mandamus is not the proper recourse to enforce petitioners alleged right of redemption. To begin with, mandamus applies as a remedy only where petitioners right is founded clearly in law and not when i t is doubtful. In varying language, the principle echoed and reechoed is that le gal rights may be enforced by mandamus only if those rights are well-defined, cl ear and certain. When respondent Vargas failed to exercise her right of redempti on within the one-year redemption period, respondent bank ipso facto became the absolute owner of the lots. Surprisingly, however, she sold the to Angsico, who eventually transferred his rights to petitioner. Not only that, respondent Varga s still leased to petitioner a portion of the subject lots. Verily, when respond ent bank became the owner of the lots, respondent Vargas could no longer legally transfer, cede and convey the property to petitioner. 229 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 65 HILARION M. HENARES, JR vs. LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY BOARD and DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS FACTS: Asserting their right to clean air, petitioners contend that the bases fo r their petition for a writ of mandamus to order the LTFRB to require PUVs to us e CNG as an alternative fuel, lie in Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitu tion, our ruling in Oposa v. Factoran, and Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8749 ot herwise known as the Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999. Petitioners attempted to co mpel judicial action against the bane of air pollution and related environmental hazards. Petitioners alleged that the particulate matters such as complex mixtu res of dust, dirt, smoke, and liquid droplets emitted into the air from various engine combustions have caused detrimental effects on health. Petitioners aver t hat other than the writ applied for, they have no other plain, speedy and adequa te remedy in the ordinary course of law. Petitioners insist that the writ in fac t should be issued pursuant to the very same Section 3, Rule 65 of the Revised R ules of Court that the Solicitor General invokes. ISSUE: Whether or not mandamus lies to compel the use of CNG. HELD: Mandamus will not generally lie from one b ranch of government to a coordinate branch, for the obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other. The need for future changes in both legislation and it s implementation cannot be preempted by orders from this Court, especially when what is prayed for is procedurally infirm. Besides, comity with and courtesy to a coequal branch dictate that we give sufficient time and leeway for the coequal branches to address by themselves the environmental problems raised in this pet ition. The Clean Air Act designates the DENR to set the emission standards for f uel use and the task of developing an action plan. As far as motor vehicles are concerned, it devolves upon the DOTC and the line agency whose mandate is to ove rsee that motor vehicles prepare an action plan and implement the emission stand ards for motor vehicles, namely the LTFRB. Regrettably, however, the plain, spee dy and adequate remedy herein sought by petitioners, i.e., a writ of mandamus co mmanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG, is unavailing. Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a d uty. Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to o rder owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. At most the LTFRB has been tasked to gr ant preferential and exclusive Certificates of Public Convenience or franchises to operators of NGVs based on the results of the DOTC surveys. 230 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 65 MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.) and V ICTORINO X. FORNIER FACTS: Respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Philippines and represented himself to be a nat ural-born citizen of the Philippines in his certificate of candidacy. Victorino Fornier initiated a petition before the Commission on Elections to disqualify Po e and upon the theory that Poe made a material misrepresentation in his certific ate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth , according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners. His mother was an American and his father was a Spanish national. Granting that the father was a Filipino c itizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to Poe, the latte r being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner asserted that the f ather contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Poes mother and even if no such prior marriage had existed, Poes father marrie d Bessie Kelly Poe only a year after the birth of respondent. ISSUE: Whether or not there was material misrepresentation in the certificate of candidacy. HELD: It is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natu ral-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respo ndent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affi rmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumptio n that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometim e in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Ca rlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" t hat the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of responden t FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens re gardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate. But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would prepo nderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Se ction 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. 231 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SERAFIN R. CUEVAS Rule 65 vs. ATTY. JOSEFINA G. BACAL FACTS: Respondent passed the Career Executive Service Ex amination. She was appointed Regional Director of the Public Attorneys Office. La ter, she was designated as acting chief Public Attorney. Upon change of administ ration, respondent was appointed Regional Director. Respondent argued she was re moved without cause. Respondent Josefina G. Bacal passed the Career Executive Se rvice Examinations. She was conferred CES eligibility and appointed Regional Dir ector of the Public Attorneys Office. She was later on appointed by then Presiden t Ramos to the rank of CESO III. She was designated by the Secretary of Justice as Acting Chief Public Attorney. Her appointment was confirmed by President Ramo s and took her oath and assumed office. Respondent filed a petition for quo warr anto questioning her replacement as Chief Public Attorney. The petition, which w as filed directly with this Court, was dismissed without prejudice to its refili ng in the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, respondent brought her case in the Cour t of Appeals whichruled in her favor, finding her to be lawfully entitled to the Office of Chief Public Attorney. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents transfer amounted to a removal without cause. HELD: What should be emphasized in this cas e is that respondent does not have the rank appropriate for the position of Chie f Public Attorney, her appointment to that position cannot be considered permane nt, and she can claim no security of tenure in respect of that position. Respond ent therefore has no ground to complain. As respondent does not have the require d Rank, her appointment to that position cannot be considered permanent and she cannot claim the right to a security of tenure. She may have been considered for promotion to Rank I to make her appointment as Chief Public Attorney permanent. This, however, did not materialize as petitioner Demaisip was appointed in her place. If respondent was paid a salary equivalent to Salary Grade 30 while holdi ng such office, it was only because, under the law, if a CESO is assigned to a p osition with a higher salary grade than that corresponding to his/her rank, he/s he will be allowed the salary of the CES position. Security of tenure in the car eer executive service is thus acquired with respect to rank and not to position. The guarantee of security of tenure to members of the CES does not extend to th e particular positions to which they may be appointed. Accordingly, respondent d id not acquire security of tenure by the mere fact that she was appointed to the higher position of Chief Public Attorney since she was not subsequently appoint ed to the rank of CESO I based on her performance in that position as required b y the rules of the CES Board. 232 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 66 QUO WARRANTO 233 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 66 MA. LUTGARDA P. CALLEJA VS. JOSE PIERRE A. PANDAY Respondents filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court for quo warranto with Damages and Prayer for Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction, Damages and Issuan ce of Temporary Restraining Order against herein petitioners. Respondents allege d that they had been members of the board of directors and officers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated, but petitioners, who are also among the incorporators an d stockholders of said corporation, forcibly and with the aid of armed men usurp ed the powers which supposedly belonged to respondents.Regional Trial Court Bran ch 58 issued an Order transferring the case to the Regional Trial Court in Naga City. However, the Executive Judge of RTC, Naga City refused to receive the case folder of the subject case for quo warranto, stating that improper venue is not a ground for transferring a quo warranto case to another administrative jurisdi ction. Regional Trial Court Branch 58 then proceeded to issue and serve summons on herein petitioners (respondents below). Petitioners filed their Answer raisin g therein the affirmative defenses of improper venue, lack of jurisdiction, and wrong remedy of quo warranto. Thereafter, the other petitioners also filed their Answer, also raising the same affirmative defenses. All the parties were then r equired to submit their respective memoranda. Regional Trial Court Branch 58 den ied the Motion to Dismiss and ordered the case remanded to the Regional Trial Co urt Naga City which under A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC has been designated as special co urt to try and decide intra-corporate controversies under R.A. 8799. Petioner th en filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Whether a branch of the regional trial court which has no juris diction to try and decide a case has authority to remand the same to another coequal court Tthe assailed order cannot ordinarily be reviewed through a petition under Rule 45. An order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and therefore not appealable, nor can it be the subject of a petition for review on certiorari. Such order may only be reviewed in the ordinary course of law by an appeal from the judgment after trial. The ordinary procedure to be followed in that event is to file an answer, go to trial, and if the decision is adverse, re iterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment. However in the interest of justice and to prevent more violence between the parties, the court preceded to give due course to a case despite the wrong remedy resorted by the petitioner. E vidently, the Regional Trial Court Branch 58 lacks jurisdiction over respondents petition for quo warranto. Based on the allegations in the petition, the case wa s clearly one involving an intra-corporate dispute. The trial court should have been aware that under R.A. No. 8799 and the aforementioned administrative issuan ces of this Court, RTC-Br. 58 was never designated as a Special Commercial Court ; hence, it was never vested with jurisdiction over cases previously cognizable by the SEC. Such being the case, Regional Trial Court Branch 58 did not have the requisite authority or power to order the transfer of the case to another branc h of the Regional Trial Court. The only action that RTC-Br. 58 could take on the matter was to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. Thus, the filing o f the petition with the Regional Trial Court Branch 58 which had no jurisdiction over those kinds of actions, was clearly erroneous. 234 P a g e HELD: ISSUE: FACTS:

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 67 EXPROPRIATION 235 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 67 NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. HON. ENRIQUE T. JOCSON NAPOCOR filled cases of eminent domain against private citizens for the acquisit ion of a right of way easement over portion of the parcels of land described in the complaint for its Negros Panay Interconnection Project, particularly the Bac olod Tamonton Transmission Line. The complaints uniformly allege that petitioner urgently needs position of the affected land to enable it to construct its towe r and transmission line and it had negotiated with the offered to pay defendants for the portion affected by the transmission line, but the parties failed to re ach an agreement, and be pray that, among others, that the Regional Trial Court fix the provisional value of the portion of the parcels of land sought to be exp ropriated pursuant to Sec.2, Rule 67 of the Rules of the Court. The Regional Tri al Court fixed the provisional values of the subject areas and directed the NAPO COR to deposit the amounts with the PNB pending decision on the merits. In compl iance with said Order. NAPOCOR deposited the sum. Two of the defendants however, filed motions for reconsideration alleged that the provisional value of the pro perty has been set much too low, since the expropriation of their areas would ren der the remaining portion practically at a loss considering that the presence of the transmission lines will pose a danger to the inhabitants in the area as wel l as destroy the marketability of the remaining potion after expropriation. More over, the subject areas are located near several posh subdivisions. The RTC gran ted their motion and the NAPOCOR, in compliance, deposited an additional amount with the PNB. Regional Trial Court Judge Enrique Jocson issued another Order inc reasing the amounts to be received as compensation. NAPOCOR in a response filled a complaint of grave abuse of discretion against the said judge, saying the inc reases are excessive and unconscionable. Nevertheless, due to the urgent need to complete the interconnection project, NAPOCOR deposited the order additional am ounts. Still despite doing so, NAPOCOR claimed the Judge stubbornly refused to i ssue the writ of possession. ISSUE: HELD: FACTS: Whether or not the court acted capriciously and therefor in excess of its jurisd iction. A judge cannot validly withhold the issuance of a writ of possession in expropri ation while awaiting full payment. The government could immediately take possess ion of the property upon deposit of the provisional value with the National or P rovincial Treasurer. Respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amount ing to lack of jurisdiction, and is otherwise either unmindful or ignorant of th e law: when he fixed the provisional values of the properties for the purpose of issuing a writ of possession on the basis of the market value and the daily opp ortunity profit petitioner may derive in violation or in disregard of P.D. No. 4 2; in increasing the same without hearing; in directing the defendants to manife st within twenty-four (24) hours whether or not they are accepting and withdrawi ng the amounts, representing the provisional values, deposited by the plaintiff for each of them as "final and full satisfaction of the value of their respectiv e property (sic); " in declaring the provisional values as the final values and directing the release of the amounts deposited, in full satisfaction thereof, to the defendants even if not all of them made the manifestation; and in suspendin g the issuance of the writ of possession until after the suspending the amounts shall have been released to and received by defendants. 236 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 67 REPUBLIC V. GINGOYON The present controversy has its roots with the promulgation of the Courts decisio n in Agan v. PIATCO. This decision nullified the Concession Agreement for the Bui ld-Operate-and-Transfer Arrangement of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Pa ssenger Terminal III entered into between the Philippine Government and the Phili ppine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. as well as the amendments and supple ments thereto. The agreement had authorized PIATCO to build a new international airport terminal (NAIA 3), as well as a franchise to operate and maintain the sa id terminal during the concession period of 25 years. The contracts were nullifi ed, among others, that Paircargo Consortium, predecessor of PIATCO, did not poss ess the requisite financial capacity when it was awarded the NAIA 3 contract and that the agreement was contrary to public policy. At the time of the promulgati on of the 2003 Decision, the NAIA 3 facilities had already been built by PIATCO and were nearing completion. However, the ponencia was silent as to the legal st atus of the NAIA 3 facilities following the nullification of the contracts, as w ell as whatever rights of PIATCO for reimbursement for its expenses in the const ruction of the facilities. After the promulgation of the rulings in Agan, the NA IA 3 facilities have remained in the possession of PIATCO, despite the avowed in tent of the Government to put the airport terminal into immediate operation. The Government and PIATCO conducted several rounds of negotiation regarding the NAI A 3 facilities. It also appears that arbitral proceedings were commenced before the International Chamber of Commerce International Court of Arbitration and the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, although the Go vernment has raised jurisdictional questions before those two bodies. The Govern ment filed a Complaint for expropriation and sought upon the filing of the compl aint the issuance of a writ of possession authorizing it to take immediate posse ssion and control over the NAIA 3 facilities. The Government also declared that it had deposited the amount in Cash with the Land Bank of the Philippines, repre senting the NAIA 3 terminals assessed value for taxation purposes. ISSUE: FACTS: Whether or not Rule 67 of the Rules of Court or Rep. Act No. 8974 governs the ex propriation proceedings in this case. RULING: Rule 67 of the Rules of Court governs the expropriation proceedings in this case to the exclusion of all other laws. On the other hand, PIATCO claims that it is Rep. Act No. 8974 which does apply. Rule 67 outlines the procedure under which eminent domain may be exercised by the Government. Yet by no means does it serve at present as the solitary guideline through which the State may expropriate pr ivate property. Quite notably, Section 19 of the Local Government Code governs t he exercise by local government units of the power of eminent domain through an enabling ordinance. Rep. Act No. 8974, covers expropriation proceedings intended for national government infrastructure projects. Rep. Act No. 8974, which provi des for a procedure eminently more favorable to the property owner than Rule 67, inescapably applies in instances when the national government expropriates prop erty for national government infrastructure projects. Thus, if expropriation is en gaged in by the national government for 237 P a g e

purposes other than national infrastructure projects, the assessed value standar d and the deposit mode prescribed in Rule 67 continues to apply. Under both Rule 67 and Rep. Act No. 8974, the Government commences expropriation proceedings th rough the filing of a complaint. Unlike in the case of local governments which n ecessitate an authorizing ordinance before expropriation may be accomplished, th ere is no need under Rule 67 or Rep. Act No. 8974 for legislative authorization before the Government may proceed with a particular exercise of eminent domain. The most crucial difference between Rule 67 and Rep. Act No. 8974 concerns the p articular essential step the Government has to undertake to be entitled to a wri t of possession. 238 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 67 MASIKIP V. CITY OF PASIG FACTS: Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land, whi ch the City of Pasig sought to expropriate a portion thereof for the sports devel opment and recreational activities of the residents of Barangay Caniogan. This wa s in January 1994. Masikip refused. On March 23, 1994, City of Pasig sought agai n to expropriate said portion of land for the alleged purpose that it was in line with the program of the Municipal Government to provide land opportunities to d eserving poor sectors of our community. Petitioner protested, so City of Pasig fi led with the trial court a complaint for expropriation. The Motion to Dismiss fi led by Masikip was dismissed by the rial court on the ground that there was genu ine necessity to expropriate the property. Case was elevated to the Court of App eals, which dismissed petition for lack of merit. Hence, this petition. Whether or not N there was genuine necessity to expropriate the property. ISSUE: HELD: Eminent domain is the right of a government to take and appropriate private prope rty to the public use, whenever the public exigency requires it, which can be do ne only on condition of providing a reasonably compensation therefor. It is the p ower of the State or its instrumentalities to take private property for public u se and is inseparable from sovereignty and inherent in government. This power is lodged in the legislative branch of government. It delegates the power thereof to the LGUs, other public entities and public utility corporations, subject only to constitutional limitations. LGUs have no inherent power of eminent domain an d may exercise it only when expressly authorized by statute. Sec. 19, LGC: LGU m ay, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise th e power of eminent domain for public use, purpose or welfare for the benefit of the poor and landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provis ions of the Constitution and pertinent laws. Provided: (1) power of eminent doma in may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously ma de to the owner and such offer was not accepted; (2) LGU may immediately take po ssession of the property upon the filing of expropriation proceedings and upon m aking a deposit with the proper court of at least 15% fair market value of the p roperty based on the current tax declaration; and (3) amount to be paid for expr opriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair mar ket value at the time of the taking of the property There is already an establis hed sports development and recreational activity center at Rainforest Park in Pa sig City. Evidently, there is no genuine necessity to justify the expropriation. T he records show that the Certification issued by the Caniogan Barangay Council w hich became the basis for the passage of Ordinance No. 4, authorizing the exprop riation, indicates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound Homeo wners Association, a private, non-profit organization, not the residents of Canio gan. 239 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 67 NATIONAL POWER CORP. vs. SPOUSES NORBERTO AND JOSEFINA DELA CRUZ METROBANK Petitioner needed to acquire an easement of right-of-way over portions of land w ithin the areas of Dasmarias and Imus, Cavite for the construction and maintenanc e of a proposed Transmission Line Project. Petitioner filed a Complaint for emin ent domain and expropriation of an easement of right-ofway against respondents a s registered owners of the parcels of land sought to be expropriated. After resp ondents filed their respective answers to petitioners Complaint, petitioner depos ited the sum to cover the provisional value of the land in accordance with Secti on 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner subsequently filed an Urgent ExParte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession, which the trial court gra nted in its Order. The trial court issued a Writ of Possession over the lots own ed by respondents spouses de la Cruz and respondent Ferrer. The commissioners co nducted an ocular inspection of S.K. Dynamics property and recommended that the p roperty to be expropriated by petitioner. Upon the submission of the commissione rs report, petitioner was not notified of the completion or filing of it nor give n any opportunity to file its objections to it. The Trial Court approved the fin dings of the commissioners and granted the Motion filed by respondent Reynaldo F errer adopting said valuation report. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsiderat ion of the abovementioned Order, but said motion was denied in the trial courts O rder. Unsatisfied with the amount of just compensation, petitioner filed an appe al before the CA but was dismissed for lack of merit. ISSUES: HELD: The legal ba sis for the determination of just compensation was insufficient Just compensatio n is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property sought to be exprop riated. The measure is not the takers gain but the owners loss. The compensation, to be just, must be fair not only to the owner but also to the taker. Even as un dervaluation would deprive the owner of his property without due process, so too would its overvaluation unduly favor him to the prejudice of the public. To det ermine just compensation, the trial court should first ascertain the market valu e of the property, to which should be added the consequential damages after dedu cting therefrom the consequential benefits which may arise from the expropriatio n. If the consequential benefits exceed the consequential damages, these items s hould be disregarded altogether as the basic value of the property should be pai d in every case. It is clear that in this case, the sole basis for the determina tion of just compensation was the commissioners ocular inspection of the properti es in question, as gleaned from the commissioners report. The trial courts relianc e on the said report is a serious error considering that the recommended compens ation was highly speculative and had no strong factual moorings. Clearly, the le gal basis for the determination of just compensation in this case is insufficien t as earlier enunciated. This being so, the trial courts ruling in this respect s hould be set aside. This case is remanded to the said trial court for the proper determination of just compensation in conformity with this Decision. No costs. Whether or not the valuation of just compensation was proper. FACTS: 240 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS. SANTA LORO VDA. DE CAPIN AND SPS. JULITO QUIMCOAND GLORIA CAPIN Rule 67 Petitioner expropriated several parcels of land, which will be traversed and aff ected by its transmission towers and lines. Among the lots affected by the petit ioner s Interconnection Project were those owned by the respondents located. The reafter, petitioner began to construct on respondents properties its power line s and transmission towers, which were completed. Upon its completion of the cons truction of the power lines and transmission towers, petitioner imposed several restrictions upon the respondents on the use of their lands, which included the prohibition against planting or building anything higher than three meters below the area traversed by its transmission lines as the high tension electric curre nt passing through said lines pose danger to life and limbs. Petitioner then pai d respondents for the portions of their lots affected by the Interconnection Pro ject. Only later did respondents discover that in comparison to the measly sums they were paid by petitioner, the other landowners within their area who resiste d the expropriation of their properties in court or who entered into compromise agreements with the petitioner were paid by petitioner as just compensation for the portions of their properties similarly affected by the petitioner s Intercon nection Project. Accordingly, respondents filed a Complaint for Rescission of Ag reement, Recovery of Possession of Parcels of Land, and Removal of Tower and Tra nsmission Lines against the petitioner. Petitioner, in its Answer, countered tha t respondents claim for compensation for the full value of their properties tra versed by its transmission lines was contrary to its Charter, according to which , petitioner is obligated only to pay the easement fee equivalent to 10% of the market value of the land as just compensation, plus the cost of damaged improvem ents. The RTC rendered a Resolution in favor of the respondents and upon appeal by the petitioner, the appellate court rendered a Decision affirming the Resolut ion. Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the appellate court s Decision, but it was denied. Hence, petitioner filed the present Petition before this Cou rt. ISSUE: HELD: Whether or not the determination of the amount of just compensa tion was proper. FACTS: This case ceased to be an action for expropriation when NPC dismissed its compla int for expropriation. Since this case has been reduced to a simple case of reco very of damages, the provisions of the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of th e just compensation to be paid were no longer applicable. Petitioner herein cann ot hide behind the mantle of protection of procedural laws when it has so arbitr arily violated respondents right to just compensation for their properties take n for public use. In this casepetitioner already admitted that it had taken port ions of respondents lands for the construction of its power lines and transmiss ion towers pursuant to its Interconnection Project. However, the parties could n ot agree on the amount of just compensation that petitioner should pay for the l ands taken. Respondents insist that they be paid the full market value, while pe titioner believed that it was only bound to pay easement fees equivalent to 10% of the market value of the respondents lots as indicated in their tax declarati ons, pursuant to petitioner s Charter. Evidently, based on the foregoing, what r emained for the determination of the RTC was the proper amount of damages 241 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 67 REPUBLIC V. SARABIA Air Transportation Office took possession and control of a portion of land at Po ok Kalibo, Aklan covered by an Original Certificate of Title in the names of the private respondents who are heirs of the late Segundo De la Cruz. In time, seve ral structures were erected thereon, including the control tower, the Kalibo cra sh fire rescue station, the Kalibo airport terminal and the headquarters of the PNP Aviation Security Group. Stores and restaurants made of light materials were constructed on the area. Private respondents filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession with Damages. ATO intervened in that case and alleged that the occupa nts of the stores and restaurants are its lessees. Petitioner assured private re spondents that they would be paid the fair market value of the subject land. How ever, the parties did not agree on the amount of compensation. Petitioner Republ ic, represented by the ATO, filed an action for the expropriation of the entire Lot. The trial court appointed three commissioners to ascertain the just compens ation for the subject property. Upon conduct of ocular inspection and hearing, t he commissioners submitted a report to the trial court and recommended that valu ation on the lot. Trial court directed petitioner to present evidence to prove t hat the remaining portion not actually and physically occupied by the government is still needed for public purpose. However, petitioner countered that there is no need to present evidence thereon considering that almost one-half of the pro perty has already been in fact occupied and devoted to public purpose. The trial court asserted that just compensation should be based not at the time of taking but at the time on the issuance of writ of possession To the trial court, the d ate of the issuance of the writ has to be considered in fixing the just compensa tion because the same signified petitioners proper acquisition and taking of the property which involves not only physical possession but also the legal right to possess and own the same. Petitioner Republic filed an appeal. The Court of App eals affirmed the appealed decision. ISSUE: HELD: Whether or not just compensati on should be fixed at the time of actual taking of possession. FACTS: Compensation for property expropriated must be determined as of the time the exp ropriating authority takes possession thereof and not as of the institution of t he proceedings. The value of the property should be fixed as of the date when it was taken and not the date of the filing of the proceedings. For where property is taken ahead of the filing of the condemnation proceedings, the value thereof may be enhanced by the public purpose for which it is taken; the entry by the p laintiff upon the property may have depreciated its value thereby; or, there may have been a natural increase in the value of the property from the time it is t aken to the time the complaint is filed, due to general economic conditions. The owner of private property should be compensated only for what he actually loses ; it is not intended that his compensation shall extend beyond his loss or injur y. And what he loses is only the actual value of his property at the time it is taken. This is the only way the compensation to be paid can be truly just; i.e., just not only to the individual whose property is taken, but to the public, which is to pay for it. 242 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 68 FORECLOSURE OF REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE 243 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 68 PRUDENTIAL BANK V. ALVIAR Respondents, spouses are the registered owners of a parcel of land. They execute d a deed of real estate mortgage in favor of petitioner Prudential Bank to secur e the payment of a loan. Respondents executed a promissory note covering the sai d loan, which provides that the loan matured on August 1976 and that the note is secured by a real estate mortgage as aforementioned. On March 1979, respondents paid petitioner P2,000,000.00, to be applied to the obligations and for the rel ease of the real estate mortgage for the loan covering the two lots. The payment was acknowledged by petitioner who accordingly released the mortgage over the t wo properties. Petitioner moved for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgag e on the property covered. Per petitioners computation, respondents had the total obligation of P1,608,256.68, covering the three promissory notes plus assessed past due interests and penalty charges. The public auction sale of the mortgaged property was set. Respondents filed a complaint for damages with a prayer for t he issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, claiming that they have paid th eir principal loan secured by the mortgaged property, and thus the mortgage shou ld not be foreclosed. For its part, petitioner averred that the payment made on March 1979 was not a payment made by respondents, but by G.B. Alviar Realty and Development, which has a separate loan with the bank secured by a separate mortg age. The trial court dismissed the complaint and ordered the Sheriff to proceed with the extrajudicial foreclosure. Respondents sought reconsideration of the de cision. The trial court issued an order setting aside its earlier decision and a warded attorneys fees to respondents. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals but it was denied by the latter. FACTS: ISSUES: Whether or not a foreclosure of the mortgaged property for the non-payme nt of the loans is proper. HELD: It was improper for petitioner in this case to seek foreclosure of the mortgaged property because of non-payment of all the thr ee promissory notes. While the existence and validity of the dragnet clause cannot be denied, there is a need to respect the existence of the other security given for one of the promissory notes. The foreclosure of the mortgaged property shou ld only be for the P250,000.00 loan covered by such promissory note, and for any amount not covered by the security for the second promissory note. As held in o ne case, where deeds absolute in form were executed to secure any and all kinds of indebtedness that might subsequently become due, a balance due on a note, aft er exhausting the special security given for the payment of such note, was in th e absence of a special agreement to the contrary, within the protection of the m ortgage, notwithstanding the giving of the special security. This is recognition that while the dragnet clause subsists, the security specifically executed for su bsequent loans must first be exhausted before the mortgaged property can be reso rted to. The mortgage contract, as well as the promissory notes subject of this case, is a contract of adhesion, to which respondents only participation was the affixing of their signatures or adhesion thereto. A contract of adhesion is one in which a party imposes a ready-made form of contract which the other party may a ccept or reject, but which the latter cannot modify. Petition Denied. 244 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 68 NATALIA BUSTAMANTE vs. SPOUSES RODITO ROSEL and NORMA ROSEL Norma Rosel entered into a loan agreement with petitioner Natalia Bustamante and her late husband Ismael C. Bustamante and putting as collateral portion of his parcel of land and in the event that she failed to pay, the lender has the optio n to buy or purchase the collateral. When the loan was about to mature, responde nts proposed to buy the said collateral guarantee. Petitioner, however, refused to sell and requested for extension of time to pay the loan and offered to sell to respondents another residential lot, with the principal loan plus interest to be used as down payment. Respondents refused to extend the payment of the loan and to accept the lot in Road 20 as it was occupied by squatters and petitioner and her husband were not the owners thereof but were mere land developers entitl ed to subdivision shares or commission if and when they developed at least one h alf of the subdivision area. Hence, petitioner tendered payment of the loan to r espondents which the latter refused to accept, insisting on petitioner s signing a prepared deed of absolute sale of the collateral. Respondents filed with the RTC a complaint for specific performance with consignation against petitioner an d her spouse. Respondents sent a demand letter asking petitioner to sell the col lateral pursuant to the option to buy embodied in the loan agreement. On the oth er hand, petitioner filed in the RTC a petition for consignation, and deposited the amount with the City Treasurer. When petitioner refused to sell the collater al and barangay conciliation failed, respondents consigned the amount with the t rial court. Trial court rendered a decision denying the plaintiff s prayer for t he defendants execution of the Deed of Sale to Convey the collateral in plainti ffs favor and ordering the defendant to pay the loan with interest thereon. Res pondents appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeal s rendered decision reversing the ruling of the RTC. Hence, this petition. ISSUE : HELD: Whether or not the stipulation in the loan contract was valid and enforc eable. FACTS: We note the eagerness of respondents to acquire the property given as collateral to guarantee the loan. The sale of the collateral is an obligation with a suspe nsive condition. It is dependent upon the happening of an event, without which t he obligation to sell does not arise. Since the event did not occur, respondents do not have the right to demand fulfillment of petitioner s obligation, especia lly where the same would not only be disadvantageous to petitioner but would als o unjustly enrich respondents considering the inadequate consideration for a 70 square meter property. Respondents argue that contracts have the force of law be tween the contracting parties and must be complied with in good faith. There are , however, certain exceptions to the rule, specifically Article 1306 of the Civi l Code. A scrutiny of the stipulation of the parties reveals a subtle intention of the creditor to acquire the property given as security for the loan. This is embraced in the concept of pactum commissorium, which is proscribed by law. A si gnificant task in contract interpretation is the ascertainment of the intention of the parties and looking into the words used by the parties to project that in tention. In this case, the intent to appropriate the property given as collatera l in favor of the creditor appears to be evident, for the debtor is obliged to d ispose of the collateral at the pre-agreed consideration amounting to practicall y the same amount as the loan. In effect, the creditor acquires the collateral i n the event of non payment of the loan. This is within the concept of pactum com missorium. Such stipulation is void. 245 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE WRIT OF AMPARO 246 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Writ of Amparo SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES V s RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO FACTS: Raymond Manalo and Reynaldo Manalo, brothers in this case were abducted b y military men on the suspicion that they were members New Peoples Army. The brot hers managed to escape detention after which they filed a Petition for Prohibiti on, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order against the military. The Rule o n the Writ of Amparo took effect while the case was pending and eventually the r espondents filed a manifestation and omnibus motion to treat their existing peti tion as an Amparo petition. The Court of Appeals granted the issuance of the wri t of Amparo and thereafter ordered the Secretary of National Defense and the Chi ef of Staff of the Armed Forces to furnish all unofficial investigation reports as to the Manalo brothers custody, to confirm the present places of official assi gnment of military officials involved, and produce all records as well as medica l reports of the Manalo brothers. ISSUE: HELD: Whether or not the issuance of th e writ was proper. It was ruled that a continuing violation over the right to security was present and such writ can be considered as the most potent remedy available to any perso n whose right to life, liberty, and security has been violated or is threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission by public officials or employees a nd by private individuals or entities. Understandably, since their escape, the M analos have been under concealment and protection by private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty, and security. The circumstances of responden ts abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed. These, as the Court explained, constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable through a petition for a Writ of Amparo . 247 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE WRIT OF KALIKASAN 248 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Writ of Kalikasan OPOSA V FACTORAN A Civil Case was filed before Regional Trial Court. The principal plaintiffs the rein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Environment and Natural Resources Secretary. His substitu tion in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was s ubsequently ordered upon proper motion. The complaint was instituted as a taxpay ers class suit and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republi c of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoy ment of the natural resource treasure that is the country s virgin tropical rain forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impract icable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that t hey "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn." Consequently , it is prayed for that judgment be rendered, ordering defendant to cancel all e xisting timber license agreements in the country. Factoran filed a Motion to Dis miss the complaint stating the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him an d the issue is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative o r executive branches. Subsequently, respondent Judge issued an order granting th e motion to dismiss. The respondent Judge ruled that the granting of the reliefs prayed for would impair contracts. Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special ci vil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court asking for resciss ion and setting aside the dismissal order since the respondent Judge gravely abu sed his discretion in dismissing the action. ISSUE: HELD: Whether or not a class suit was proper. FACTS: The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just t o several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parti es are so numerous, it becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to brin g all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all conc erned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the s aid civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former. This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners min ors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unbor n. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their pe rsonality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on th e concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. 249 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Writ of Kalikasan METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs. CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY FACTS: A suit was lodged before the Regional Trial Court to compel the concerned government agencies to take steps in cleaning the Manila Bay. According to the Concerned Citizens, the government had not taken notice of the present danger to public health and the depletion and contamination of the marine life of Manila Bay due to the minimal SB level standard of water quality in such a way that swi mming, among others, is no longer permissible. The Department of Environment and Natural resources testified in behalf of the petitioners, asserting safe-level bathing of the bay and that appropriate measures were already being taken to sig nificantly reduce pollution in those particular waters. The trial court decided in favor of the respondents and held the government agencies to be in violation of PD 1152 and further ordered them to facilitate the rehabilitation. The petiti oners on appeal asserted that PD 1152 merely pertains to the cleaning of specifi c pollution incidents and does not cover cleaning any particular waters in gener al. ISSUES: HELD: As defined by law, obligations to perform the duties and on ho w they carry out such duties are two distinct concepts. The former pertains to t he discretionary duties of the petitioners while the latter is their ministerial duty. What is involved this case is the discretion of the petitioners to choose not to perform or to perform their duties. As clearly enunciated in their chart ers that aside from performing their main function as an agency, they are also m andated to perform certain functions directly or indirectly relating to the clea nup, rehabilitation, protection, and preservation of the Manila Bay. It was furt her held that Sections 17 and 20 of the Environment Code include cleaning in gen eral. The Code provides that in case the water quality has deteriorated, the gov ernment agencies concerned shall act on it to bring back the standard quality of water and that government agencies concerned are to take action in cleaning-up in case the polluters failed to do their part. Moreover, it emphasizes that gove rnment agencies should effect cleaning for the sake of meeting and maintaining t he right quality standard. This presupposes that the government agencies concern ed have the duties of cleaning the water not only in times when the water is pol luted. Moreover, even without such provisions, it is the inescapable the duty to protect the environment has always been stressed by the Constitution, that the S tate shall protect and advance the right to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature as a reasonable need of present and future generations. Whether or not cleaning the Manila Bay is a ministerial act that can be induced by mandamus. 250 P a g e