1 The unmerited obscurity to which writers like myself are long condemned, encourages such people to appropriate their

thoughts without so much as naming them. 1

The examination of Arthur Schopenhauer and Sigmund Freud is destined to be a bumpy ride, with one particularly nasty bump to get over on the road. Ultimately, the authenticity of Freuds work is at stake, and the title, father of modern psychology. There are stunning similarities between many aspects of Freuds psychology and Schopenhauers philosophy. This issue is the topic of debate from time to time in intellectual circles, but never achieves the amplification needed to gain attention, other than blather and gossip. Remarkably, the people blathering are usually more acquainted with Freud than Schopenhauer; indeed, this is no surprise. Schopenhauers philosophy is nearly extinct and the very mention of his name sends shrills streaking up professors spines. Undoubtedly there will always be disagreement as to Schopenhauers influence on Freud. On one hand, Freud honorably mentions Schopenhauers profound influence in several of his major texts, but, on the other hand, I think he intentionally fudges the date as to when he was formally introduced to the philosophers work. I dont want to get too wrapped up in this issue; there are more interesting elements at hand, when comparing and contrasting the work of these two great minds. Nevertheless, this is an obstacle that we need to negotiate. If we assume that Freud was introduced to Schopenhauers philosophy during the latter part of his life, then we also have to conclude that he lived during the turn of the century Vienna, which marked the zenith of Schopenhauers fame, and yet, failed to
1

Arthur Schopenhauer, On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason and the Will in Nature. translated by Mme. Karl Hillebrand (London: George Bell and Sons, 1891) 230.

come in contact with his work. This was a period when Schopenhauers philosophy was all the rage, and the voice of a whole generation that was badly bruised by war and poverty.
Arthur Schopenhauer with the epigrammatic punch and elegant style which set him off from his academic and professional colleagues in philosophy was the most widely read and influential in the Vienna of the 1890s. 2

Yet, Freud had no recollection of this mans philosophy regardless of the fact that his friends, colleagues, and neighbors were very much interested in the sage of Frankfurt. Apparently, it was only until years later that Freud read The World as Will and Representation and acknowledges that Schopenhauer is in many cases the original voice of which his is only the echo. Nevertheless, this bump bounces many scholars right off the road. Why stop short at petty concerns? No matter what side one takes on this issue, I think it is undeniable that the synthesis of these two works yields some very remarkable discoveries. More so, in Freuds case, which unattached from Schopenhauers philosophy is merely a surface show of concepts without any foundation or ground, in effect, a mere shell without the kernel 3 . The combination of these systems gives the reader a chance to trace the roots of psychoanalysis, down deep into the rich, fecund, soil of Schopenhauers philosophy. In order to do this, the shell needs to be cracked and then reattached around the kernel. As a result, Freuds work not only takes on new meaning, but also gains support from one of the only complete metaphysical systems of all time. Due to lack of space and the scope of the essay, I am only able to chip off and attach several large pieces of the shell

2 3

Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin, Wittgensteins Vienna. (New York: Touchstone Book, 1973) 164. Schopenhauer frequently refers to the metaphor of the shell and kernel.

over the kernel. The areas I examine in this essay are the theories of the unconscious and repression, and the primacy of the sexual impulse. Nevertheless, each element is important to the development of Freuds sexual theory; moreover, equally important to psychoanalysis on the whole. Schopenhauers description of the unconscious is not as apparent as that which we find in Freuds case. He frequently refers to unconscious motives, unconscious desires, and hints at the underlying layer of consciousness as the abyss into which unpleasant experiences are stored, but never isolates the unconscious as something toto diversus from the intellect. In fact, unconscious is not even listed in, The World as Will and Representations forty-page index. As a result, the only way to explain Schopenhauers theory of the unconscious is to describe the root and origin of consciousness itself. This takes us headlong into Schopenhauers metaevolution, which is as prescient to Darwins theory of natural selection, contemporary evolutionary psychology, and molecular biology, as it is to Freuds metapsychology and theories of sexuality. Consciousness is the necessary starting-point of all examinations and consequently, Schopenhauers philosophy is fundamentally idealistic, on the grounds that the only world we know is in our head; in other words, the world is my representation. At this point, Schopenhauers epistemology is in accordance with the Cartesian premise, cogito ergo sum and he considers Descartes the father of modern philosophy, that is, even though he arrives at his conclusions

provisionally and only through skeptical means. Nevertheless, in a post-Kantian world, one should be able to see their way through Cartesian skepticism. The empirical world is not as Nietzsche claims an anarchy of atoms; on the contrary, it is ordered, and conditioned by the intellect with help from the forms of knowledge. This is the extent of Schopenhauers connection to Kants epistemology. Schopenhauer groups the forms of knowledge, space, time, and causality together under the heading complex of reality; a matrix governed by the universal and necessary formulas creating the empirical world. Although, the objective real world exists for us in this complex, the complex, as such, is not a single representation; it is a matrix within which there emerge the possible representations of space, time, causality, that constitute our various real world experiences. In short, empirical reality is completely intellectual. There is one profound difference between Schopenhauer and Kant. Kant works his way around Cartesian skepticism by designating the thing-in-itself or noumena, as the underlying foundation of all phenomena and claims the individual is unable to know the thing-in-itself, a condition as susceptible to doubt as the solipsistic direction of Cartesian epistemology. Schopenhauer considers Kants distinction between noumena and phenomena as the most important philosophical discovery of all time. However, this still leaves many unanswered questions, and as a result, Kant fails to advance beyond this point. How far, in this respect, Schopenhauer stands above Kant. Hitherto this point, I highlighted the world in purely empirical terms; yet, there is another angle from which we can peer into reality. In some circles, the

heightened sense of awareness is considered a gift and in others, a burden; decide for yourself. Allow me to start from the beginning. One gets the sense when reading Schopenhauers earliest writings that he was searching for something that he knew from both inner and outer experience to be the root of all existence, but did not yet have the language to describe. In his student notebooks, he describes himself as impregnated with an idea and anticipates its arrival with the verve of an expecting mother. The idea Schopenhauer conceives and nurtures is that even though intellectual restraints and metaphysical necessity prohibit knowledge of the thing-in-itself from entering consciousness, there is a sense in which man has a special inwardly-directed awareness.
Consequently, a way from within stands open to us to that real inner nature of things to which we cannot penetrate from without. It is, so to speak, a subterranean passage, a secret alliance, which as if by treachery, places us all at once in a fortress that could not be taken by attack from without. 4

Schopenhauer is referring to self-consciousness; the mysterious inwardly-directed awareness that reveals a glimpse of the will; not quite the thing-in-itself, but indeed its nearest and dearest relative. Not only is the will the underlying force of all nature, but also the primary foundation of consciousness. Unlike most philosophers, Schopenhauer does not posit consciousness as the primary constituent of all existence, and the will as secondary and in service of the conscious mind.
All philosophers before me, from the first to the last, place the true and real inner nature or kernel of man in the knowing consciousnessThis extremely old, universal, and fundamental error this colossal and fundamental confusion of the earlier with later, or of ground with consequent, must first of all be set aside, and instead of it the true state of the case must be brought to perfectly distinct consciousness. 5

4 5

Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation: trans. E.F.J. Payne (New York: Dover, 1958) 195. Ibid., 199.

On the contrary, the will is the primary force of all nature and consciousness is merely a secondary feature, a slave to the will, and the product of biological evolution. In metaevolutionary terms, consciousness develops in direct proportion to the organisms needs and wants, and therefore, the evolutionary step from asexual reproduction to agemogenetic reproduction brings about conditions to survive that promote the fruition and development of consciousness. Bryan Magee states:
Well before Darwin, [Schopenhauer] took an evolutionary view of mind, seeing it essentially as a survival mechanism which was necessitated at a certain stage in the evolution of living organismsThe mind created by the will for purposes of survival, exist to serve it, and subservient to it throughout the life of the organism. 6

Schopenhauer proposes that consciousness came to be as a tool to aid in reproduction and biological variation, but remains an accident, the product of chance and error, not part of some divine plan. The primary foundation of consciousness which is common to both man and animal, otherwise known as animal consciousness, is longing, striving, and craving, in short, willing. Humankind has the cognitive power to reflect upon willing via self-consciousness, whereas the animal merely follows directions dictated by the will; primarily guided to self-preservation and without any inwardly-directed cognitive interaction.
Longing, craving, willing or aversion, shunning and not willing, are peculiar to every consciousness; man has them in common with the polyp. Accordingly, this is the essential and the basis of every consciousness. The difference of its manifestations in the various species of animal beings depends on the different extension of their spheres of knowledge in which the motives of those manifestations are to be found. 7

Even though consciousness assumes different levels in various species and throughout evolution, it does not mean that willing, the original foundation of
6 7

Bryan Magee, The Philosophy of Schopenhauer. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997) 156 - 157. Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation: Volume II, trans. E.F.J. Payne (New York: Dover, 1958) 204.

consciousness withdraws at the higher levels. On the contrary, the squirrel and human both have the primary foundation of willing and striving as the supreme element of consciousness, yet the latter is of a more complex level. The catalyst that sparks the increasing complexity of biological life is a major issue that puzzles many scholars. Darwin changes how we view this problem by introducing natural-selection as the mechanism promoting survival and increasing complexity. In many cases, Schopenhauers philosophy is in accordance with natural selection and Darwin even quotes his philosophical predecessor in chapter 20 of The Descent of Man, but there is a fundamental difference between both systems. Darwin claims that natural selection is an automatic physical process, whereas Schopenhauer claims the process is automatic but metaphysical. The latter case is not to be confused with biotonic phenomena that was introduced by Walter Elsasser in his essay, The Physical Foundation of Biology. Both Schopenhauer and Darwin perceive an algorithmic development but disagree as to what drives the development. The level of consciousness exclusive to man includes a secondary foundation, the capacity for abstract knowledge, concept formation, and reasoning. Knowledge at this level of consciousness is indirect and borrows material from the external world to form concepts, retain memories, and form languages. The faculty of reason organizes the content supplied by empirical reality, just as the faculty of understanding shapes the world of phenomena. However, when and how does knowledge change from perception into abstract knowledge? In a beautiful passage, he describes the shift thusly:

8 As from the direct light of the sun to the borrowed reflected light of the moon, so do we pass from the immediate representation of perception, which stands by itself and is its own warrant, to reflection, to the abstract, discursive concepts of reason, which have their whole content only from that knowledge of perception, and in relation to it. 8

By concept, Schopenhauer refers to a special class of representations. Concepts do not just emerge immediately in the conscious mind; rather concepts are merely, representations of representations. Their content derives from representations belonging to the first class of the principle of sufficient reason: intuitive, perceptive, complete, empirical representations. The individuals mind would undergo sensory overload were it to retain every minute detail of experience. Instead, the faculty of reason changes the form of knowledge from the empirical to the abstract. Much is lost in the abstractification process and ultimately for very good reason. One would never be able to link concepts together if one were to retain every detail of every experience. In effect the faculty of reason screens and locates the major elements of intuitive perceptions. This is why we remember only the crucial elements of our childhood and not the meaningless events. Once the faculty of understanding passes intuitive perception over into the faculty of reason, it begins the shift from the empirical to the abstract. In other words, reason allocates concepts that symbolize experience and then designates words to describe the concepts. Language plays an important role in Schopenhauers philosophy because language helps the faculty of reason complete the abstractification process. Schopenhauer describes language as inadequate, in the sense that words and hence concepts can never supply the real meaning of the

Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation: Volume I, trans. E.F.J. Payne (New York: Dover, 1958) 35.

empirical perceptions they represent. Language serves its purpose and no more. It can only preserve an experience. As I previously stated, Schopenhauer admits that mankind only knows the surface layer of consciousness, and that beyond this layer there resides a mystical and illusive core. Schopenhauer states:
To make the matter more clear, let us compare our consciousness to a sheet of water of some depth. Then the distinctly conscious ideas are merely the surface; on the other hand the mass of the water is the indistinct feelings, the after-sensation of perceptions and intuitions and what is experienced in general, mingled with the disposition of our own will that is the kernel of our inner natureThe whole process of our thinking and resolving seldom lies on the surface, that is to say, seldom consists in a concatenation of clearly conceived judgements; although we aspire to this in order to be able to give an account of it to ourselves and others. But usually the rumination of material from outside, by which it is recast into ideas, takes place in the obscure depths of the mind. This rumination goes on almost as unconsciously as the conversion of nourishment into the humours and substance of the body. Hence it is that we are often unable to give any account of the origin of our deepest thoughts; they are the offspring of our mysterious inner being. 9

Mankind, instead of blindly following the wills mandates of self-preservation and replication has the reflective power to peer into the inner workings of the will, and underneath the crust of consciousness. This power is self-consciousness, the means through which the individual comes to know the inner nature of the will. Through the intellect, plus self-consciousness, our passions and urges take on a deeper meaning, in that the individual comes to gain the ability to reflect upon them. However, the passions and urges themselves are more direct, whereas reflection and introspection are indirect. Passions are direct because they represent merely whether the circumstance is in agreement with the will, or whether or not it goes against the will. The will is the primary element of self-consciousness as in consciousness, and therefore, any sort of impression on the will appears directly to
9

Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation: Volume II, trans. E.F.J. Payne (New York: Dover, 1958) 136.

10

self-consciousness. Therefore, various feelings, i.e., love, hatred, fear, etc; seem so much closer to the individuals inner being. Self-consciousness represents the highest point in the development of the cognitive apparatus; assuming that human beings are the most complex and intelligent organisms. The interior monologue of our self-conscious reverie is composed by the intellect, and the will either approves or disapproves depending on the circumstances. Proof of this is that we tend to draw pleasant images into the horizon of our mindscape when we feel down and out, so as to create a false sense of delight. In this regard, Schopenhauer says, The intellect strikes up the tune and the will dances. If the will is the underlying force of all nature and the primary foundation of consciousness, then how does the intellect, strike up the tune, and why is it that the will dances? The intellect gets the will to dance, but only for a short time. Soon afterwards, the will regains control from the intellect and declares its supremacy by filtering certain thoughts from entering consciousness. The will prohibits certain images from entering consciousness, so as to spare the individual from pain and suffering. The premise is that if the individual is truly master of oneself, and if certain images cause pain, heartache, anxiety, depression, i.e., death of a loved one, abusive experiences, etc., the conclusion follows that the intellect needs restraint from the will, in order to preserve the sanctity of the individuals image. Schopenhauer states:
By prohibiting the intellect from having certain representations, by absolutely preventing certain trains of thought from arising, because it knows, or in other words experiences from the self-same intellect, that they

11 would arouse in it any one of the emotions previously described. It then curbs and restrains the intellect, and forces it to turn to other things. 1 0

The problematic representations are exiled to the depths of consciousness, deep underneath the mysterious and illusive core. The only way to pull the image from the unter-conscious is through trickery and cunning. The question remains, Why would someone want to bring a problematic representation or unhealthy image into consciousness? Years later, Freud will turn this question into the foundation of psychoanalysis. On an individual level, one has little control as to what gets concealed from consciousness, insofar as the will assumes that it is not in the individuals best interest to recall such experiences. Consequently, the wills discretion about revealing certain things to consciousness extends into the realm of conduct and motive. The will disguises the real motive underlying an action, just as it conceals a representation that would cause harm. The former and the latter are similar in that both cases serve to maintain self-opinion. Schopenhauer writes extensively on the law of motivation and there is enough material to fill a thousand pages, but for the sake of this essay I must drastically limit the scope of his argument by teasing out only the most important points.
1. The intellect is often misled as to the real motive of an action. 2. The intellect passes on the motive to the will but is completely unaware how the will is going to execute the motive. 3. The individual has to spy on the will in order to catch a sight of the real intention underlying an action.

10

Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation: Volume II, trans. E.F.J. Payne (New York: Dover, 1958) 203.

12

In reference to No 2., the intellect sends a motive to will and then the will executes the motive. Once the intellect passes the motive to the will, it has no control as to how the will is going to execute the motive. This is why Schopenhauer claims that often we do not know what we desire or fear and sometimes it takes years to discover the real desire and motive. We do not know what we really fear, because we lack the courage to bring it to clear consciousness. 11 Both the banishing of problematic representations and the hidden motives, desires, fears, etc., underlying all actions are all for the sake of the individual as a defense against possible harms. This explains the lack of courage to face a fear, or unhealthy desire. Consequently, the motives underlying actions are disguised, and therefore it creates a giant divide between not only the self and the world, but also, in relation to itself. Along these lines, the empirical world reveals the deed and not the motive. For Schopenhauer, the deed on the surface may appear genuinely moral but upon deeper investigation, one is likely to find a self-interested motive. Often one has to make incursions into the great abyss to find the real motive underlying an action. The motive of an action has its roots in the will and therefore remains mostly hidden to the empirical mind. This takes a trained eye and sinister mind; motives are concealed with the utmost skill and deliberation. By tracing the development of consciousness throughout evolution from the primary foundation of willing in consciousness to the secondary foundation of representation, and ultimately, reaching its zenith in self-consciousness, the case becomes clear that the advent of self-consciousness puts the individual in a different
11

Ibid., 210.

13

position from all other beings. The individual comes to know the inner essence of nature, inwardly through self-consciousness, which in turn, adds a dimensional to human consciousness that works both for and against the individual. Schopenhauer describes the former as a false sense of delight and the latter as problematic representations. The intellects tendency to draw up offensive images plays a profound role in the development of consciousness, so much so that a mechanism to bury the problematic representations is needed to spare the individuals selfopinion. In effect, the real motive of our actions and desires is often concealed and disguised by a more acceptable facade. Along the same lines, Schopenhauer considers politeness a mask that conceals the egoism at the root of all interests. The individual has a false sense of self, and therefore must also have a false sense of everyone else in the world. The world is a giant masquerade. This is a necessary condition of existence. If a magician reveals his secrets, the crowd stops showing up; they know they were duped and refuse to fall for the same trick twice. Nature wants to keep her crowd, and so will do anything possible in order to fool the audience into sticking around for the next set. Ninety-seven years later, Freud published five essays on metapsychology; the essay on the unconscious was the longest of five. Freuds theory of the unconscious is inextricably linked to repression, and indeed, on common ground with Schopenhauer. Yet, at this point in his career (1915) 12 he was still unfamiliar with Schopenhauers philosophy. He states:
Repression is a preliminary phase of condemnation, something between flight and condemnation; it is a concept which could not have been formulated before the time of psychoanalytic research. 1 3
12

Scholars claim that after 1915 Freud drastically changed his mind about Schopenhauers philosophy.

14

And again in his essay On Dreams (1901):

Hitherto philosophers have had no occasion to concern themselves with a psychology of repression. We may therefore be permitted to make a first approach to this hitherto unknown topic 1 4

After digesting these statements, I advise the reader to reread the quote I include at the header of the first page and add in a footnote at the bottom of this page. 1 5 Let us examine Freuds theories of the unconscious and repression that were conceived without any knowledge of Schopenhauers philosophy. The Schopenhauerian counterpart to the Freudian theory of the unconscious is offset in list form at the end of the section, so as not to take away from the subject at hand, which at this point is Freud. In demonstrating the necessity of the unconscious, Freud claims that assuming the unconscious is not really a stretch from assuming the existence of other minds. We know in the Cartesian sense that consciousness and the empirical world are products of the mind, but what proof do we have that other minds exist? This is a popular philosophical issue known as the problem of other minds. Freud claims that we know other minds exist from their observable utterances and actions, yet, the knowledge one has of their own action and utterances is far more intimate than knowledge of another person. If consciousness operates on only one level, another persons actions and utterances should be as intimate as our own. This is obviously not the case. In fact, there are many levels of consciousness, some explicit and others implicit. Moreover, if we assume that the conscious mind operates on only

13

Sigmund Freud, General Psychological Theory . ed. Philip Rieff (New York: Touchstone Books, 1997) 104 14 Sigmund Freud, The Freud Reader. ed. Philip Rieff (New York: Norton Books, 1989), 165. 15 The unmerited obscurity to which writers like myself are long condemned, encourages such people to appropriate their thoughts without so much as naming them.

15

one level then we also must agree that empirical content is the primary element in consciousness. Even if this is true, the empirical world is necessarily subjective, and consequently everyone paints his or her own image of the world. This creates a gap in knowledge of the self and other. Freuds states that thoughts immediately present in the mind are conscious, whereas all other thoughts remain unconscious. Some thoughts rise up to consciousness and others remain in the unconscious. The unconscious is the workshop of all psychic activity, and the source of instinct presentations and wish-impulses. The energy of all psychic activity stems from the unconscious and the restraint it meets decides whether or not the thought passes into consciousness. The thoughts quarantined to a repressed state have failed to enter through the screening process. They are repressed to the unconscious so as to avoid pain. Repression does not demolish the wish or desire, but merely prevents the idea from entering consciousness. Once a desire or wish is repressed, the only way to bring it back to consciousness is indirectly, through trickery or coercion; otherwise, the repressed wish remains active in the unconscious and under resistance, so as to not slip into consciousness. The repressed content is active in the unconscious and on many occasions and in various ways, the content intrudes upon the mind. The resistance against recalling certain memories is one of many ways the repressed content intrudes upon daily life. In fact, Freud claims that a repressed impulse is able to be satisfied in daily life and bring the individual pleasure, but at the same time, such cases also arouse pain because of conflicting ideals and internal warfare.

16

Another way in which the repressed impulse struggles to work its way to the surface is by disguising itself in different sources and entering consciousness in different forms. Metaphorically speaking, the ability of the instinct to morph into different forms for the sake of entering consciousness is like someone that gets rejected at the door of a crowded bar, and then tries to sneak in by changing their clothes and hairstyle. When this fails the individual then tries to get in from the side door, and then the back door, then by bribing the security guard, etc The repressed impulse is busy at work in the unconscious and will try to enter consciousness in one form or another. This takes me to the two stages of repression. Freud describes primal repression as the first phase of repression. In this phase, an impulse is rejected from entering consciousness depending on the affect it has on the individual. Consequently, the impulse remains unchanged and in a state of fixation. The second phase is repression proper. In this phase, the repressed content assumes different forms and derivations and makes itself present in various and sundry ways. The thoughts and other content attached to the various forms of the repressed impulse are also subject to the first phase of repression. Once again, the ideas are rejected from consciousness; some remain fixated and others are rendered to phase two. Freud notes that in analysis it is important to trace the series of changes the impulses undergoes back to the original impulse. This goes to show that the repressed instinct operates efficiently from within the unconscious. The mechanism of repression is not concerned with the chameleonlike nature of instincts and impulses; consciousness is top priority. From the censors point of view, the

17

repressed impulses must never enter consciousness, but from holistic standpoint, they must be resolved, so as to avoid mental illness. It is no surprise that repression is the cornerstone of psychoanalysis. By an act of self-deception, the individual replaces the gaps in memory caused by the repressed content. The actual events are too traumatic to appear in consciousness and so, the gaps are filled with a fictionalized version of reality. It must be so; the reality of the event is the cause of the pain, and the pain in turn triggers the mechanism of repression. The repression or withdrawal from consciousness is the cause of the gap; therefore, it must necessarily be replaced by a phantasmagoric version. The substitution of reality with fantasy makes it hard to pinpoint the real motive underlying any action or thought. As a result, it is the analysts task to unravel the web of fantasy and reality. There are many interesting parallels between Freud and Schopenhauers theories of repression and unconscious, some of which I am sure the reader noticed from early on the essay. Allow me to highlight some of the more interesting parallels:
1. For Schopenhauer the core of our being is the will, and in Freuds case, the Id or unconscious; both occupy the primary parts of mental life and serve as the source of all wishing and desiring. Both cases support that the majority of our mental processes occur underneath the surface of consciousness. Along these lines, Schopenhauer claims that empirical reality reveals the deed and not the motive. The motive is as concealed to the passive agent as it is to the active agent. 2. For Schopenhauer, as with Freud, the original portion of our cognitive apparatus is also the source of all striving and self-preservation and the secondary rational portion of the cognitive apparatus serves as a tool for the original part. 3. For Schopenhauer, as with Freud, thoughts, wishes, desires, etc., that are too traumatic are repressed into the unconscious, so as to spare the individuals well-being and self-opinion. Without resolution, the repressed impulses accumulate and eventually lead to complete madness or neurosis. In addition, both conclude that indirect means are the only way to capture the real workings of the will, or unconscious. On Freuds behalf, this extends to clinical

18 treatment; analysts employ indirect techniques to lure unconscious and repressed content to the surface. 4. For Schopenhauer, as with Freud, the actual events exiled to the unconscious are replaced by fictionalized versions. This is the nexus of Schopenhauer philosophy of madness, which he defines as an illness of memory, in that the individual in an effort to save their sanity; creates false impressions to replace the repressed content.

In this sense, Schopenhauers philosophy and Freuds metapsychology serve as important tools in deepening knowledge of the self; regardless as to whether or not Freud was acquainted with Schopenhauer. Unconscious motivation and the repression of traumatic experiences are fundamental concerns and the keys that turn all the locks to both systems. This takes us headlong into the second section: the primacy of the sexual impulse. I intentionally chose the primacy of the sexual impulse to follow the previous section because one is unable to speak about the latter topic without first setting down the former. For Schopenhauer, as with Freud, the explanation of the unconscious and repression is inextricably linked to the sexual impulse. Explaining one without the other is like explaining space without time. Starting with the sexual-impulse would lead many references to the unconscious and repression; I am convinced any discussion of Freud or Schopenhauer must necessarily take up in this order. Schopenhauer sent the second volume of The World as Will and Representation to his publisher Brockhaus confident of its success. Needless to say, he was very disappointed to receive a letter rejecting the publication of his work. Here is Schopenhauers response to his publisher:
Sir, - Your refusal was as unexpected as it was disappointingIs the notorious degeneracy of the age really so great that while Hegels nonsense attains many editions, a publisher will not venture printing a work of mine which contains the labor of my whole life?My work will be left as posthumousIt will not fail to comeIf you were here, I would show you

19 the chapter On the Metaphysics of Sexual Love, which traces this passion to its primal source. I will take any wager you would hesitate no longer. 1 6

Schopenhauers prediction was correct; Brockhaus accepted the offer to publish the second volume of his work. Needless to say, the chapter On the Metaphysics of Sexual Love was the decisive factor. The ideas put forth in this chapter are as prescient today as they were over a hundred years ago. Let me get right to the heart of the matter. The inner essence of all phenomena is the will, and its presence in consciousness is marked by the instincts of striving, wishing, desiring, etc The question remains; what is the wills intent or goal? Or, in other words, how do we characterize the will? After all, this supreme force must have some direction, otherwise, all striving would be fruitless and not worth the effort. The fruitlessness of our efforts is true to a degree, but does not imply that the will is without direction or intent. Schopenhauer states, the sole purpose and intent of the will is expressed as the will-to-live, the striving to life and existence, the echoes of which we hear in self-consciousness and the shadows of which we see in the empirical world. This is true of all matter: inorganic and organic. Everything is perpetually in bloom. Therefore, the will is the inner essence of all phenomena, primarily directed to maintaining and procuring of life, in other words, the will-to-live. I ask, How is the will-to-live expressed in nature? There are several expressions of the will-tolive apparent in nature, self-preservation and the sexual-impulse. If the will is only concerned with self-preservation, life would not have as many worries and troubles. On the contrary, the sexual-impulse is not concerned with the individuals needs and wants, but rather, maintaining the species, and all future generations to come.
16

Helen Zimmern, Schopenhauer (Great Britain: Urwin Brothers, 1932) 121.

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The sexual impulse as it appears in consciousness and without any connection to a particular individual is the will-to-live. The sexual impulse as it appears in consciousness and directed to a particular individual is sexual love, or amorousness. The primary function of both impulses is the composition of the future generation, or in the language of contemporary biology, passing on our genes. Schopenhauer explains that the sexual impulse is the second strongest impulse, next to self-preservation. The sexual impulses position in second place does not mean that it is any less important than self-preservation; in fact, the sexual impulse is the focus of all private and public affair and is woven into the fabric of our being. This drive is an a priori part of our being and present in different degrees throughout the duration of our life. Schopenhauer writes this in the middle of the nineteenth century, imagine if he lived during the current time; he would have been a marketing guru. (This came to me, as I was distracted while driving down the L.I.E. at 80 mph., by a half-naked woman posing on a billboard the size of a basketball court.) The sexual desire is a force that controls and manipulates all our motives and actions, dominates all our thoughts, and always sneaks into the forefront of consciousness. The sight of a beautiful man or woman disrupts the stream of consciousness and overpowers all mental effort. Needless to say, I doubt anyone reads the books in the library at the Playboy Mansion. Schopenhauer states:
It is the ultimate goal of almost all human effort; it has an unfavourable influence on the most important affairs, interrupts every hour the most serious occupations, and sometimes perplexes for a while even the greatest of minds. It does not hesitate to intrude with its trash, and to interfere with the negotiations of statesmen and the investigations of the learned. It knows how

21 to slip its love-notes and ringlets even into the ministerial portfolios and philosophical manuscripts. Every day it brews and hatches the worst and most perplexing quarrels and disputes, destroys the most valuable relationships, and breaks the strongest bonds. 1 7

Why does the sexual impulse have such a powerful effect? For Schopenhauer the principle force arousing such an attraction is caused by the a priori longing to perpetuate the species and pass on the seed of life. As a bachelor living in New York, I was particularly intrigued by this conclusion. All the long nights, expensive bar tabs, meaningless conversations, wasted time, sappy love-notes, heated arguments, rendezvous, seedy motels, and blind-dates, are all for the sake of the next generation. Stop the bus! The next generation is something that sexual partners go to great lengths to avoid, so much so that they willing use contraceptives that lessen sexual pleasure. This almost seems contradictory. So, what is this thing we call love? Love is a delusion, a trick, and a cataract that clouds our vision. Where love is, reason is not. Love is the concentration of the sexual impulse directed to a particular individual. The profundity of the relationship between a man and woman is directly proportional to the quality of their potential progeny. Schopenhauer claims, the more individualized the choice the more intense the passion. In this context, he is referring to the degree of which a particular member of the opposite sex fulfills personal criteria as to that which they consider desirable and physically arousing. However, love itself has nothing to do with the two individuals; its function is to continue the species. If this were something apparent to consciousness as a matter of fact, then sexual mating strategy would be limited to saying, Lets
17

Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation: Volume I, trans. E.F.J. Payne (New York: Dover, 1958) 533.

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make babies! Mating strategy loses its fire when taken from this angle. Obviously, this is not the case. In order to keep loves flame aglow; nature has to play a trick on men and women. The trick is more accurately, a delusion. The human race is tricked into thinking that the love one has for an individual is objective, when on the contrary, the love between two individuals is subjective. The impulse is subjective, on the grounds that it is concerned with the species and therefore, the will. Schopenhauer states:
Now in this case the sexual impulse, though in itself a subjective need, knows how to assume very skillfully the mask of an objective admiration, and thus to deceive consciousness; for nature requires this stratagem in order to attain her ends. But in every case of being in love, however objective and touched with the sublime that admiration may appear to be, what alone is aimed at is the generation of the individual of a definite disposition. 1 8

Why does nature resort to trickery? Man is in essence egoistic; self-preservation reigns supreme. Therefore, nature has to create the illusion that love is something that concerns the individual, in order to rouse the ego. This is only possible through delusion. Schopenhauer states that the delusion is instinctual; the sense of the species which presents to the will what is useful to it. The instinct he describes is sexual preference, or in other words, sexual-mating strategy. On a qualitative level, What do men look for in women, and vice versa? What men look for in women and why look for what they do, are two different questions. The surface truth is sensual or physical satisfaction. Sensual pleasure serves as a navigation device that brings

18

Ibid., 538.

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two individuals together for the good of the species. Beauty might be in the eye of the beholder, but the beholder does not work alone. The real truth is that, what is at stake when choosing a mate is the quality of the offspring. When a man and a woman get along, or hit it off as they say, this is indicative of their potential to have a harmonious child. On the other side of the coin, when a man and a woman possess a mutual aversion to each other, this is indicative of the dissatisfactory child they would produce. This goes over well with my friends wives, especially the ones I get along with. Schopenhauer states:
We have in fact a very definite, distinct, and indeed complicated instinct, namely that to select the other individual for sexual satisfaction, a selection that is so fine, so serious, and so capriciousIn fact, we have in this an instructive explanation of the inner nature of all instinct, which, as here, almost always sets the individual in motion for the good of the species. 1 9

Accordingly, a man will choose a woman with qualities that offset his own, i.e., a tall man will choose a short woman, a big nosed woman will choose a pug-nosed man, etc. The sexual instinct is a purification process that maintains the quality of the species, by limiting the number of runts. In effect, runts require too much parental investment and take valuable time away from nurturing progeny that could maintain the quality of the species rather than lower it. Along the same lines as Schopenhauer, Freud states the majority of the content in the unconscious, is repressed sexual desires. So, therefore this is where we should look, if we want to find the real core of our being. Norman O. Brown states:
It is in our unconscious repressed desires that we shall find the essence of our being, the clue to our neurosis (as long as reality is repressive), and the clue to what we might be if reality ceased to repress. 2 0
19 20

Ibid., 538 539. Norman O. Brown. Life Against Death: The Psychoanalytic Meaning of History, 2nd ed. (New Hampshire: Wesleyan University Press, 1985), 23.

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However, peering into the real nature of our being is not as easy as it sounds, and often, what we find is not what we expect. Consequently, what we find are perverse and abnormal sexual desires. Why are such impulses restricted to the unconscious, furthermore, why are they labeled perverse or abnormal? The impulses are restricted to the unconscious following subordination to the realityprinciple, and labeled abnormal or perverse because of social restraints. However, I am jumping the gun a little bit. Freuds most notable achievement is the broadening of the sexual impulse to childhood. Sexuality is not a secondary impulse or the byproduct of physiological development. On the contrary, sexuality is intrinsic to our being.
From the very beginning elements from the sexual instincts are taken up into it component-parts of the erotic interest-which are more or less clearly visible in childhood and are invariably discovered in the neurotic by psychoanalysis in later years. 2 1

In effect, children are bundles of erotic sensations, or in Freudian language, polymorphously perverse; insofar as that, every part of the body triggers pleasurable sensations. What spurred the transition from adult sexuality to infantile sexuality? Ultimately, Freud noticed a trend in his dream analysis, the regression back to childhood. Brown states:
In analyzing neurotic symptoms and dreams, Freud found that they invariably contained a nucleus representing a return or regression to the experiences of early-childhood. 2 2

Nevertheless, why do the adults neurotic symptoms and dreams mark the unconscious regression back to an infantile state?

21 22

Sigmund Freud. Sexuality and the Psychology of Love, ed. Philip Rieff, (New York: Collier Books, 1993), 50. Norman O. Brown. Life Against Death: The Psychoanalytic Meaning of History, 2nd ed. (New Hampshire: Wesleyan University Press, 1985), 23.

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According to Freud, infantile sexuality is of supreme importance. The child is dominated by the pleasure-principle and in a state of perpetual foreplay; everything is playful, rich, and carnal. Well, Ill be damned to believe that my three year old niece is sexual! Freud was not implying this. Freud defines sexuality as the longing to find pleasure in the body. Observing a child for a short period of time will prove that they are experts at finding the body from the feet all the way up to the head, as a source of pleasure. This is a good point to introduce the two fundamental drives. In mankind, the first and primary drive, is self-preservation. However, even self-preservation is blended with sexuality. Let me explain. Freud outlines two competing instincts: self-preservation and sexual instinct. The self-preservation instinct is the older of the two and characterized as the striving, and clinging, to life. However, the self-preservation instinct is laced with sexuality, in the form of the childs love for the mother, or parents, in general. This is the grounding for the infamous Oedipus Complex. The original satisfaction of the sexual instinct also marks the satisfaction of the self-preservation instinct.
To begin with, sexual activity attaches itself to functions serving the purpose of self-preservation and does not become independent of them until laterAt it origin it attaches itself to one of the vital somatic functions; it has as yet no sexual object, and is thus auto-erotic; and its sexual aim is dominated by an erotogenic zone. 2 3

This is a very profound element of sexual development, mainly because primal love carves out the individuals choice of future love-objects. Depending on the circumstances of the primal love; the mothers love and nurturing simulates a

23

Sigmund Freud, The Freud Reader. ed. Philip Rieff (New York: Norton Books, 1989), 263-264.

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utopian vision of reality, more accurately, unreality, and the child necessarily comes to believe this simulated version of reality. Brown states:
The infants world of pleasure and play is built out of wishes uninhibited by the reality principle and satisfied by unreal, hallucinatory fulfillment. Through an elementary mechanism, wish-fulfillment thinking, which survives also in daydreaming and fantasy of adults, the child is able to create a world where dreams come true and wishes are omnipotent. 2 4

On one hand, not only does primal love create a warped vision of reality, in so far as the external world, but also, on the other hand, it creates a sense of inhibition, in so far as erotogenic pleasures. The mother instills in the child a Polly Annalike optimism and false sense of sexual freedom. This poses a problem. As the child grows older, the pleasure principle comes up against another current, the sensual current, in other words, the reality-principle. The pleasure-principle subordinates itself to the reality-principle and as a result, infantile sexuality is sublimated into adult sexuality. In Freudian language, the pleasure-principle meets the reality-principle. Children are dominated by the pleasure-principle; therefore, free of any libidinal restrictions. In childhood, there is no distinction between the unconscious and conscious. Everything is unrepressed at this state of sexual development. At this unrepressed state of libidinal freedom, the sexual impulse is not restricted to genitals. This restriction is the residual effect of social modification. In the beginning there are no limits to sexuality and as I previously stated, children are in perpetual foreplay and live as if in a giant orgasmatorium; excitement of any part of the body causes immediate pleasure. What causes the narrowing down of the sexual impulse to the genitals?
24

Norman O. Brown. Life Against Death: The Psychoanalytic Meaning of History, 2nd ed. (New Hampshire: Wesleyan University Press, 1985), 38.

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Freud attributes education as the cause of the narrowing down of the sexual impulse from erotogenic polymorphous perversity to genital function. By this, he does not mean grades K-12, but rather social education, and acclimation to ones culture. In this regard, a child is a maverick, an outlaw, and free of any social restraints; i.e., a young boy will think nothing of grabbing his genitalia in public. In this case, pleasure is not restricted to a time or place and there is no distinction between unconscious and conscious. Infantile sexuality is a purely narcissistic indulgence and the body serves as a giant orb of pleasure. Satisfaction is not sought from without, but from within. The self is an immediate source of pleasure. Proof of this is the playfulness of a child and their willingness to participate in any playful action. From the Freudian point of view, this form of play is sexual, in so far, as the child is gaining pleasure from the body. Brown states:
Freud is not merely referring to all the activities conventionally recognized as childrens play; he is also making a structural analysis of the infantile activities which he insisted were sexual and perverse, of which thumbsucking is the prototype. 2 5

A childs playfulness, or rather the degeneration of a childs playfulness is of supreme importance to Freud. Such a transition marks the collision of the pleasureprinciple and the reality-principle. Freud notes that things start to change after puberty and the pleasure-principle comes against resistance from the reality-principle. The reality-principle begins to dictate rules as to what is socially acceptable and what is not. This marks the narrowing down of polymorphous perversity to the genital function. The
25

Norman O. Brown. Life Against Death: The Psychoanalytic Meaning of History, 2nd ed. (New Hampshire: Wesleyan University Press, 1985), 32.

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individual does not willing subordinate to the reality-principle and comes up against great resistance. This is because we are erotic to core. Our childhood memories do not escape us. The years of libidinal freedom are permanently woven into the fabric of our being. We all long to regress back to this period of uninhibited pleasure; the regressive element in dreams proves this point. This poses a conflict between the pleasure-principle and reality principal. The individual is accustomed to constant play when dominated by pleasure-principle, but does not want to be told, when and who to play with. However, the reality-principle limits the sexual impulse by dictating unnatural social constraints upon the individual. The memories of childhood never wear off and so the individual is always reminiscent of the original state of libidinal freedom. Therefore, the unrepressed state of infantile sexuality carves out our adult sexual life. Our adult life is a longing for a retreat back to the childhood pleasures of auto-eroticism and self-embodied ecstasy. Proof of this is that adults go to great lengths to increase bodily sensation. The current trend of piercing is indicative of this retreat back to self-contained ecstasy. In some cases, the piercing is described as turning the whole body into the tip of a penis. 26 We also have the opportunity to make this regression back to childhood in our dreams and day-fantasies. In short, we all want to go back to playtime, but come up against too many restraints. Indeed, a tragic twist of fate; All work and no play makes Jack a dull boy. 27

26 27

Quentin Tarantino, Pulp Fiction. (California: Mirimax Films, 1994) Stephen King, The Shining

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There are many interesting parallels between Freud and Schopenhauers theories of sexuality, some of which I am sure the reader noticed from earlier on in the essay. Allow me to highlight some of the more interesting parallels:
1. Freud, like Schopenhauer, considers the sexual impulse as the second strongest impulse next to self-preservation. 2. Freud, like Schopenhauer, considers the sexual impulse as the force that controls and manipulates all our motives and actions, and dominates our thoughts, and always sneaks into the forefront of consciousness. 3. Freud, like Schopenhauer, considers sexual love a delusion, and a disease of the eye. 4. Freud, like Schopenhauer, considers restriction of the sexual impulse unnatural, and contrary to the real essence of being. On these grounds, Schopenhauer is a staunch proponent of polygamy, and feels that monogamy is an artificial institution that goes against the vehemence of sexual desire. 5. Freud, like Schopenhauer, considers the sexual act as the source of guilt and shame. 6. Freud, like Schopenhauer, considers the choice of a mate as unconsciously disguised by ulterior motives and falsified judgements.

There are important similarities between Freud and Schopenhauers theories of sexuality, each of which are deepened by a cooperative venture. The question as to whether or not Freud had Schopenhauer in mind when developing his own theory of sexuality is of secondary importance. In this regard, the primary concern is to trace Freuds psychology back into Schopenhauers metaphysics. The results are astonishing. At the conclusion of this essay, the reader should have a strong sense of the importance in joining together Schopenhauer and Freud; both are two great men and models in their field. Admittedly, I am a firm believer in the necessity of metaphysics and the limits of science. Schopenhauers philosophy provides a stable foundation for the metaphysics of psychoanalysis. Is such an overhaul necessary? I think so, or rather, I have to believe so, when I find myself extracting Schopenhauers words and phrases from Freuds writings. Sometimes, they are

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trivial issues, i.e., metaphors, poetic verses, essay structures, method of argumentation, and epitaphs. More often than not, they are psychologized versions of ideas central to Schopenhauers philosophy. Designating Schopenhauers metaphysics as the foundation of Freuds system is the second best option to charging Freud with violating the authors responsibility to cite the original source of an idea(s). Moreover, Freuds refusal to cite any biographical data on Schopenhauer proves he was withholding pertinent information. The biographical dynamics 2 8 of Schopenhauers life serves as an insightful psychoanalytic case study, more so than, Leonardo da Vinci.

28

In his book Schopenhauer, Bryan Magee notes the profoundly interesting nature of the philosophers life. For someone of Schopenhauers force of temperament to have, as his very first experience of life, total dependence on a human being so violently rejected or, at the least, for the first object of those volcanic emotions to have been so glacially indifferent and unresponsive was evidently a traumatic experience for him in the literal sense of that term. (Magee is referring to Schopenhauer being disowned by his mother. Indeed, a fiery situation.) According to todays textbooks of child psychology, maternal rejection is likely to result in a neurotic distrust of people in general which has the common consequences: first, a lowered if not depressed view of the worldsecond, a cut offness from people, an inability to form close relationships with anyone; third, a neurotic sense of personal insecurity, whether in the form of anxiety attacks, or phobias, or hypochondria, or a permanent conviction that catastrophe is imminent. Every one of these afflictions was suffered by Schopenhauer in extreme degree. His first English biographer, writing many years before Freud, says of him: He was naturally nervous. Whenever the postman bought a letter he would start at the thought of possible evil. He confessed, If I have nothing that alarms me I grow alarmed at this very condition, as if there must be something of which I am only ignorant for a time He was easily angered, suspicious and irritableHe would never trust himself under the razor of a barberHis valuables were hiddenPeriods of blind terror would seize him at various times during his lifeThese panics, heightened by a lively imagination, made such periodical attacks of horror and a burden to him