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Demafiles v. Comelec FACTS: Respondent Galido won over Petitioner due to the Provincial Board voting toreject returns.

Petitioner challenged the right of 2 board members to sit, consideringthat they were reelectionists. Respondent Commission ruled in favor of Petitioner.Galido then asked for reconsideration, stating that the 2 board members in questionwere disqualified only when the board was acting as a provincial but not asmunicipal. In light of this, Respondent Commission reversed its previous decision. ISSUES: 1. W/N this case is moot and the board had the authority to reject the returns fromPrecinct 7.2. W/N the board members who were candidates for reelection were disqualifiedfrom sitting in the board in its capacity as a municipal board of canvassers.3. W/N Respondent Commission can order the board of canvassers to count a return. HELD: RA 4970 reads the first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the municipalityof Sebaste shall be elected in the next general elections for local officials and shallhave qualified. The Supreme Court ruled that and shall have qualified is devoid of meaning. The term of office of municipals shall begin in the 1st day of Januaryfollowing their election, despite the fact that Sebaste was a newly createdmunicipality.No, a canvassing board may not reject any returns due to whatever cause.However, since there is a possibility of fraud, the canvass made and proclamationshould be annulled. The law states any member of a provincial board or of municipal council who is a candidate for office in any election, shall be incompetentto act on the said body. Since Respondent Commission has the power to annul andillegal canvass and proclamation, there is no reason as to why it cannot ordercanvassing bodies to count all returns which are otherwise regular Arabay Inc. v. CFI of Zamboanga FACTS: The Municipality of Dipolog enacted Ordinance No. 19 that charged tax forthe selling and distribution of gasoline, lubricating oils, diesel fuel oils, and petroleumbasedproducts. Arabay Inc., distributor of gas, oil and other petroleum products,contested the validity of such on the ground that the tax is beyond the power of amunicipality to levy under Sec. 2 of RA No. 2264, which provides that municipalitiesmay not impose tax on articles subject to specific tax except gasoline. ISSUE: W/N Arabay Inc. is entitled to a refund. HELD: The ordinance levied a sales tax not only because of the character of theordinance as a sales tax ordinance, but also because the phraseology of theprovision reveals in clear terms the intention to impose a tax on sale. It is evident fromthe terms that the amount of the tax that may be collected is directly dependentupon to the volume of sales. Since Sec. 2 of the Local Autonomy Act prohibits themunicipality from imposing sales and specific tax, with the exception of gasoline,there subsists the right of Arabay Inc. to a refund. The reasonable and practicalinterpretation of the terms of the proviso in question resulted in

the conclusion thatCongress, in excluding gasoline, deliberately and intentionally meant to put it withinthe power of such local governments to impose whatever type or form of taxes. National Housing Corp. v. Juco, F: Juco was an employee of the NHA. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal w/ MOLE but his case wasdismissed by the labor arbiter on the ground that the NHA is a govt-owned corp. and jurisdiction over itsemployees is vested in the CSC. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision and remanded the case tothe labor arbiter for further proceedings. NHA in turn appealed to the SCISSUE: Are employees of the National Housing Corporation, a GOCC without original charter, covered bythe Labor Code or by laws and regulations governing the civil service?HELD: Sec. 11, Art XII-B of the Constitution specifically provides: "The Civil Service embraces everybranch, agency, subdivision and instrumentality of the Government, including every government ownedand controlled corporation.The inclusion of GOCC within the embrace of the civil service shows a deliberate effort at the framersto plug an earlier loophole which allowed GOCC to avoid the full consequences of the civil servicesystem. All offices and firms of the government are covered.This consti provision has been implemented by statute PD 807 is unequivocal that personnel of GOCCbelong to the civil service and subject to civil service requirements."Every" means each one of a group, without exception. This case refers to a GOCC. It does not covercases involving private firms taken over by the government in foreclosure or similar proceedings.xxxFor purposes of coverage in the Civil Service, employees of govt- owned or controlled corps. whethercreated by special law or formed as subsidiaries are covered by the Civil Service Law, not the LaborCode, and the fact that pvt. corps. owned or controlled by the govt may be created by special charterdoes not mean that such corps. not created by special law are not covered by the Civil Service.xxxThe infirmity of the resp's position lies in its permitting the circumvention or emasculation of Sec. 1, Art.XII-B [now Art IX, B, Sec. 2 (1)] of the Consti. It would be possible for a regular ministry of govt to createa host of subsidiary corps. under the Corp. Code funded by a willing legislature. A govt-owned corp.could create several subsidiary corps. These subsidiary corps. would enjoy the best of two worlds. Theirofficials and employees would be privileged individuals, free from the strict accountability required bythe Civil Service Dec. and the regulations of the COA. Their incomes would not be subject to thecompetitive restraint in the open market nor to the terms and conditions of civil service employment.Conceivably, all govt-owned or controlled corps. could be created, no longer by special charters, butthrough incorp. under the general law. The Constitutional amendment including such corps. in theembrace of the civil service would cease to have application. Certainly, such a situation cannot beallowed

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, vs. SEAGATETECHNOLOGY (PHILIPPINES), Facts.Respondent is a resident foreign corporation duly registered with theSecurities and Exchange Commission to do business in the Philippines, with principaloffice address at the new Cebu Township One, Special Economic Zone, BarangayCantao-an, Naga, Cebu;2.[Petitioner] is sued in his official capacity, having been duly appointed andempowered to perform the duties of his office, including, among others, the duty toact and approve claims for refund or tax credit;3.[Respondent] is registered with the Philippine Export Zone Authority (PEZA)and has been issued PEZA Certificate No. 97044 pursuant to Presidential Decree No.66, as amended, to engage in the manufacture of recording components primarilyused in computers for export. Such registration was made on 6 June 1997;4.[Respondent] is VAT [(Value Added Tax)]-registered entity as evidenced byVAT Registration Certification No. 97-083-000600-V issued on 2 April 1997;5.VAT returns for the period 1 April 1998 to 30 June 1999 have been filed by[respondent];6.An administrative claim for refund of VAT input taxes in the amount of P28,369,226.38 with supporting documents (inclusive of the P12,267,981.04 VATinput taxes subject of this Petition for Review), was filed on 4 October 1999 withRevenue District Office No. 83, Talisay Cebu;7.No final action has been received by [respondent] from [petitioner] on[respondent's] claim for VAT refund."The administrative claim for refund by the [respondent] on October 4, 1999 was notacted upon by the [petitioner] prompting the [respondent] to elevate the case to [theCTA] on July 21, 2000 by way of Petition for Review in order to toll the running of thetwo-year prescriptive period."For his part, [petitioner] . . . raised the following Special and Affirmative Defenses, towit:1. [Respondent's] alleged claim for tax refund/credit is subject to administrativeroutinary investigation/examination by [petitioner's] Bureau;2.Since 'taxes are presumed to have been collected in accordance with lawsand regulations,' the [respondent] has the burden of proof that the taxes sought tobe refunded were erroneously or illegally collected . . .;3.In Citibank, N.A. vs. Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 459 (1997), the SupremeCourt ruled that:"A claimant has the burden of proof to establish the factual basis of his or her claimfor tax credit/refund."4.Claims for tax refund/tax credit are construed in 'strictissimi juris' against thetaxpayer. This is due to the fact that claims for refund/credit [partake of] the natureof an exemption from tax. Thus, it is incumbent upon the [respondent] to prove thatit is indeed entitled to the refund/credit sought. Failure on the part of the[respondent] to prove the same is fatal to its claim for tax credit. He who claimsexemption must be able to justify his claim by the clearest grant of organic or statutory law. An exemption from the common burden cannot be permitted to existupon vague implications;5.Granting, without admitting, that [respondent] is a Philippine Economic ZoneAuthority (PEZA) registered Ecozone Enterprise, then its business is not subject toVAT pursuant to Section 24 of Republic Act No. ([RA]) 7916 in relation to Section 103of the Tax Code, as amended. As [respondent's] business is not subject to VAT, thecapital goods and services it alleged to have purchased are considered not used inVAT taxable business. As such, [respondent] is not entitled to refund of input taxeson

such capital goods pursuant to Section 4.106.1 of Revenue Regulations No.([RR])7-95, and of input taxes on services pursuant to Section 4.103 of saidregulations.6. [Respondent] must show compliance with the provisions of Section 204 (C)and 229 of the 1997 Tax Code on filing of a written claim for refund within two (2)years from the date of payment of tax.'"On July 19, 2001, the Tax Court rendered a decision granting the claim for refund. IssuePetitioner submits this sole issue for our consideration:"Whether or not respondent is entitled to the refund or issuance of Tax CreditCertificate in the amount of P12,122,922.66 representing alleged unutilized input VATpaid on capital goods purchased for the period April 1, 1998 to June 30, 1999." Held The Court's Ruling The Petition is unmeritorious.Sole Issue:Entitlement of a VATRegistered PEZA Enterprise to a Refund of or Credit for InputVATNo doubt, as a PEZAregistered enterprise within a special economic zone,respondent is entitled to the fiscal incentives and benefits 8 provided for in either PD66 9 or EO 226. 10 It shall, moreover, enjoy all privileges, benefits, advantages orexemptions under both Republic Act Nos. (RA) 7227 11 and 7844.Preferential Tax TreatmentUnder Special LawsIf it avails itself of PD 66, notwithstanding the provisions of other laws to thecontrary, respondent shall not be subject to internal revenue laws and regulations forraw materials, supplies, articles, equipment, machineries, spare parts and wares,except those prohibited by law, brought into the zone to be stored, broken up,repacked, assembled, installed, sorted, cleaned, graded or otherwise processed,manipulated, manufactured, mixed or used directly or indirectly in such activities. 13Even so, respondent would enjoy a netoperating loss carry over; accelerateddepreciation; foreign exchange and financial assistance; and exemption from exporttaxes, local taxes and licenses.Comparatively, the same exemption from internal revenue laws and regulationsapplies if EO 226 15 is chosen. Under this law, respondent shall further be entitled toan income tax holiday; additional deduction for labor expense; simplification of customs procedure; unrestricted use of consigned equipment; access to a bondedmanufacturing warehouse system; privileges for foreign nationals employed; taxcredits on domestic capital equipment, as well as for taxes and duties on rawmaterials; and exemption from contractors' taxes, wharfage dues, taxes and dutieson imported capital equipment and spare parts, export taxes, duties, imposts andfees, 16 local taxes and licenses, and real property taxes. A privilege available to respondent under the provision in RA 7227 on tax and duty-free importation of raw materials, capital and equipment 18 is, ipso facto, alsoaccorded to the zone 19 under RA 7916. Furthermore, the latter law notwithstanding other existing laws, rules and regulations to the contrary extendsto that zone the provision stating that no local or national taxes shall be imposedtherein. No exchange control policy shall be applied; and free markets for foreign exchange, gold, securities and future shall be allowed and maintained. Banking andfinance shall also be liberalized under minimum Bangko Sentral regulation with theestablishment of foreign currency depository units of local commercial banks andoffshore banking units of foreign banks.In the same vein, respondent benefits under

RA 7844 from negotiable tax credits forlocally-produced materials used as inputs. Aside from the other incentives possiblyalready granted to it by the Board of Investments, it also enjoys preferential creditfacilities and exemption from PD 1853

Alfon v. Republic Facts: Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte was born on 15 May 1952 at the UST Hospital toFilomeno Duterte and Estrella. She was registered at the Local Civil Registrars Office as Maria EstrellaVeronica Primitiva Duterte. On 15 June 1952, she was baptized as Maria Estrella Veronica PrimitivaDuterte at the St. Anthony de Padua Church, Singalong, Manila. Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte hasbeen taken cared of by Mr. and Mrs. Hector Alfon. She lived in Mandaluyong for 23 years with her uncle,Hector Alfon. When Maria Estrella started schooling, she used the name Estrella S. Alfon. She attendedher first grade up to fourth year high school at Stella Maris College using the name Estrella S. Alfon.After graduating from high school she enrolled at the Arellano University and finished Bachelor of Science in Nursing. Her scholastic records from elementary to college show that she was registered bythe name of Estrella S. Alfon. Petitioner has exercised her right of suffrage under the same name. Shehas not committed any felony or misdemeanor.She filed a verified petition on 28 April 1978 praying that her name be changed from Maria EstrellaVeronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella S. Alfon. Issue The CFI (Branch XXIII) partially denied petitioners prayeron 29 December 1978, granting the change of first name but not the surname. held The Supreme Court modified the appealed order in as much as that petitioner is allowed to change notonly her first name but also her surname so as to be known as Estrella S. Alfon; without costs. 1. Principally is not equivalent to exclusively The word principally as used in article 364 of the Civil Code is not equivalent to exclusively so thatthere is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child should choose to use the surname of itsmother to which it is equally entitled. In the case at bar, the lower court erred in reasoning that aslegitimate child of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon she should principally use the surname of herfather. 2. Grounds for change of name The following may be considered, among others, as proper or reasonable causes that may warrant thegrant of a petitioner for change of name; (1) when the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or isextremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) when the request for change is a consequence of a changeof status, such as when a natural child is acknowledged or legitimated; and (3) when the change isnecessary to avoid confusion (1 Tolentino 660, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1953 ed; Haw Liong v.Republic). In the case at bar, to avoid confusion, the petition of name should be granted as thepetitioner has been using the name of Estrella S. Alfon since childhood.

Rura v. Lopena Facts: Teodulo Rura was accused, tried and convicted of five (5) counts of estafa committed on differentdates in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tubigon-Clarin, Tubigon, Bohol, denominated as CriminalCase 523, 524, 525, 526 and 527. The 5 cases were jointly tried and a single decision was rendered on18 August 1983. Rura was sentenced to a total prison term of 17 months and 25 days. In each criminalcase the sentence was 3 months and fifteen 15 days.Rura appealed to the RTC Bohol but said court affirmed the decision of the lower court. When the casewas remanded to the court of origin for execution of judgment, Rura applied for probation. Theapplication was opposed by a probation officer of Bohol on the ground that Rura is disqualified forprobation under Section 9 (c) of PD 968 or the Probation Law (i.e. applicable to those who havepreviously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not less than 1month and 1 day and/or a fine of not less than P200). Issue The court denied the application for probation. Amotion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence the instant petition Held The Supreme Court granted the probation and directed the judge to give due course to the petitionersapplication for probation; without costs. 1. Previous applies to date of conviction, not to date of commission of a crime The statute relates previous to the date of conviction, not to the date of the commission of the crime.When the accused applied for probation he had no previous conviction by final judgment. When heapplied for probation the only conviction against him was the judgment which was the subject of hisapplication. Conviction does not retroact to the day of the commission of the crim