G.R. No. 177807 & G.R. No.

177933 Subject Matter: Constitutional Law

October 11, 2011

Court of Appeals reversed the RTCs decision and ruled that the ordinance was a valid exercise of the right of the local government unit to promote the general welfare of its constituents pursuant to its police powers.

Gancayco vs. City Government of Quezon City G.R. No. 177807 Petitioners: Justice Emilio A. Gancayco (Retired) Respondents: City Government of Quezon City and Metro Manila Development Authority G.R. No. 177933 Petitioners: Metro Manila Development Authority Respondents: Justice Emilio A. Gancayco (Retired)

Issue: Whether Ordinance No. 2094 is a valid exercise of police power.

Held: Yes, it is a valid delegation of Police Power Facts: Retired Justice Emilio A. Gancayco bought a parcel of land located EDSA,3 Quezon City. A few years later, the Quezon City Council issued Ordinance No. 2904, entitled "An Ordinance Requiring the Construction of Arcades, for Commercial Buildings to be Constructed in Zones Designated as Business Zones in the Zoning Plan of Quezon City, and Providing Penalties in Violation Thereof. It required the relevant property owner to construct an arcade along EDSA. An arcade is defined as any portion of a building above the first floor projecting over the sidewalk beyond the first storey wall used as protection for pedestrians against rain or sun. It bears emphasis that at the time Ordinance No. 2904 was passed by the city council, there was yet no building code passed by the national legislature. Thus, the regulation of the construction of buildings was left to the discretion of local government units. Under this particular ordinance, the city council required that the arcade is to be created by constructing the wall of the ground floor facing the sidewalk a few meters away from the property line. Thus, the building owner is not allowed to construct his wall up to the edge of the property line, thereby creating a space or shelter under the first floor. In effect, property owners relinquish the use of the space for use as an arcade for pedestrians, instead of using it for their own purposes. The ordinance covered the property of Justice Gancayco. Subsequently, Justice Gancayco sought the exemption of a two-storey building being constructed on his property from the application of Ordinance No. 2904 that he be exempted from constructing an arcade on his property. The City Council acted favorably on Justice Gancaycos request "subject to the condition that upon notice by the City Engineer, the owner shall, within reasonable time, demolish the enclosure of said arcade at his own expense when public interest so demands." The MMDA then sent a notice of demolition to Justice Gancayco alleging that a portion of his building violated the National Building Code of the Philippines in relation to Ordinance No. 2904. He did not comply with the notice. The MMDA then proceeded to demolish the party wall of the ground floor structure. The City Government of Quezon City claimed that the ordinance was a valid exercise of police power, regulating the use of property in a business zone. Justice Gancayco filed a Petition with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. The RTC ruled that the ordinance was unconstitutional. The Ratio: Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. The power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public health, public safety, public morals, and the general welfare. In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfil the objectives of the government. For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare. Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted considerably if on the mere plea of petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned provision is invalidated. Moreover, in the absence of evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect of the provision in question, there is no basis for its nullification in view of the presumption of validity which every law has in its favor. It is clear that the primary objectives of the city council of Quezon City when it issued the questioned ordinance ordering the construction of arcades were the health and safety of the city and its inhabitants; the promotion of their prosperity; and the improvement of their morals, peace, good order, comfort, and the convenience. At the time that the ordinance was passed, there was no national building code enforced to guide the city council; thus, there was no law of national application that prohibited the city council from regulating the construction of buildings, arcades and sidewalks in their jurisdiction.

G.R. No. 196271, G.R. No. 196305, G.R. No. 197221, G.R. No. 197280, G.R. No. 197282, G.R. No. 197392, G.R. No. 197454 October 18, 2011 Subject Matter: Constitutional Law G.R. No. 196271 Kida et al vs. Senate of the Philippines Petitioners: Datu Michael Abas Kida, et al Respondents: Senate of the Philippines G.R. No. 196305 Mapupuno vs. Brilliantes Petitioners: Basari D. Mapupuno Respondents: Sixto Brilliantes, et al G.R. No. 197221 Petitioners: Rep. Edcel Lagman Respondents: Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, jr. G.R. No. 197280 Petitioners: Almarim Centi Tillah, et al Respondents: Commission on Elections G.R. No. 197282 Petitioners: Atty. Romulo Macalintal Respondents: Commission on Elections and the Office of The President G.R. No. 197392 Petitioners: Luis Biraogo Respondents: Commission on Elections G.R. No. 197454 Petitioners: Jacinto Paras Respondents: Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, jr. Facts: The State, through the 1987 Constitution, mandated the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras. Later, RA No. 9333 was passed by Congress to reset the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005, and on the same date every 3 years thereafter. It was not ratified in a plebiscite. Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 (House Bill No. 4146 and Senate Bill No. 2756) was enacted, resetting the ARMM elections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country. The petitioners then assailed the constitutionality of both HB No. 4146 and SB No. 2756, and challenged the validity of RA No. 9333 as well for non-compliance with the constitutional plebiscite requirement. The petitions further maintained that RA 10153 is unconstitutional for its failure to comply with the threereading requirement of Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution. Also cited as grounds are the alleged violations of the right of suffrage of the people of ARMM, as well as the failure to adhere to the "elective and representative" character of the executive and legislative departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the petitioners challenged the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the elective ARMM officials until the officials elected under the May 2013 regular elections shall have assumed office. Corrolarily, they also argue that the power of appointment also gave the President the power of control over the ARMM, in complete violation of Section 16, Article X of the Constitution.

Issues: I. Whether the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections II. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 violates Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution III. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 requires a supermajority vote and plebiscite IV. Whether the grant of the power to appoint OICs or hold over those already occupying the office is unconstitutional V. Whether the proposal to hold special elections is constitutional and legal.

Held: : RA No. 10153 is constitutional. Ratio: I. Synchronization is a recognized constitutional mandate.

While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections. It is clear from the transitory provisions of the 1987 Constitution that the terms of office of Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, the local officials, the President and the Vice-President have been synchronized to end on the same hour, date and year noon of June 30, 1992. It is likewise evident from the wording of the mentioned provisions that the term of synchronization is used synonymously as the phrase holding simultaneously since this is the precise intent in terminating their Office Tenure on the same day or occasion. Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a "local" election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution. II. The Presidents Certification on the Urgency of RA No. 10153.

Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws, they must pass through three readings on separate days. The exception is when the President certifies to the necessity of the bills immediate enactment.

The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: the bill has passed three readings on separate days and it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved. This exception is also supported by the weight of legislative practice. III. RA No. 10153 does not require a supermajority vote and plebiscite

The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature, as evident from the Constitution. No elections may be held on any other date for the positions of President, Vice President, Members of Congress and local officials, except when so provided by another Act of Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to whom Congress may have delegated either the power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the execution of that power. Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled August 2011 elections and setting another date for regional elections synchronized with the presidential, congressional and other local elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a policy decision in the exercise of its legislative wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an adjustment measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other elections. After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the contrary by ordering special elections instead at the call of the COMELEC. Statutorily, COMELEC has no power to call for the holding of special elections unless pursuant to a specific statutory grant. True, Congress did grant, via Sections 5 and 6 of BP 881, COMELEC with the power to postpone elections to another date. However, this power is limited to, and can only be exercised within, the specific terms and circumstances provided for in the law. Such law states that COMELEC may postpone or change the date of the elections only specific grounds provided in the law. In the present case, the postponement of the ARMM elections is by law is pursuant to the constitutional mandate of synchronization of national and local elections. By no stretch of the imagination can these reasons be given the same character as the circumstances contemplated by Section 5 or Section 6 of BP 881, which all pertain to extralegal causes that obstruct the holding of elections.

Section 18, Article X of the Constitution plainly states that "The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by the majority of the votes case by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose." With these wordings as standard, we interpret the requirement to mean that only amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the creation of autonomous regions require ratification through a plebiscite. These amendments to the Organic Act are those that relate to: (a) the basic structure of the regional government; (b) the regions judicial system and, (c) the grant and extent of the legislative powers constitutionally conceded to the regional government under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. The date of the ARMM elections does not fall under any of the matters that the Constitution specifically mandated Congress to provide for in the Organic Act. Therefore, even assuming that the supermajority votes and the plebiscite requirements are valid, any change in the date of elections cannot be construed as a substantial amendment of the Organic Act that would require compliance with these requirements. IV. Holdover Option is Unconstitutional

It has been broadly stated that the legislature cannot, by an act postponing the election to fill an office the term of which is limited by the Constitution, extend the term of the incumbent beyond the period as limited by the Constitution. In the case of the terms of local officials, their term has been fixed clearly and unequivocally, allowing no room for any implementing legislation with respect to the fixed term itself and no vagueness that would allow an interpretation from this Court. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should stay at three years as fixed by the Constitution and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress. Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional appointment power of the President. Hence, holdover whichever way it is viewed is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken. V. The COMELEC has no authority to order special elections