TO: CYS

FR: RMB
DATE: 17 NOVEMBER 2011
RE: RA 9262

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC October 19, 2004

RE: RULE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN

RE S O LUTI ON

Acting on the report of the Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court submitting for this
Court's consideration and approval the Proposed Rule on Violence Against Women and Their
Children, the Court Resolved to APPROVE the same.

The Rule shall take effect on November 15, 2004 following its publication in a newspaper of
general circulation not later than October 30, 2004.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,

Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Morales, Callejo, Sr., Tinga, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ.,
concur.
Azcuna, J., on leave.

RULE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN

SECTION 1. Applicability. - This Rule shall apply to petitions for protection orders in cases of
violence against women and their children under R.A. No. 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-
Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004."

The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.

SEC. 2. Construction. - This Rule shall be liberally construed to promote its objectives pursuant
to the principles of restorative justice.

SEC. 3. Objectives. - The objectives of this Rule are:

(a) To protect the rights of the family and its members particularly women and children
from violence and threats to their personal safety and security;

(b) To enable the courts to manage and monitor cases involving violence against women
and children and the members of their family or household;

(c) To prevent any disruption in the daily lives of the offended parties and assist them to
regain control of their lives;

(d) To ensure that treatment is provided for the offended parties and offenders; and
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 (e) To hold the offenders accountable for their acts.

SEC. 4. Definitions. - As used in this Rule:

(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts
committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or a woman with
whom the person has or had a dating or sexual relationship, or with whom he has a
common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without
the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological
harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault,
coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.

(b) "Children" refers to persons below eighteen years of age or older but are unable to
fully take care of themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination
because of a physical or mental disability or condition. It includes the biological children
of the offended party and other children under her care.

(c) "Members of the family" shall include husband and wife, parents and children, the
ascendants or descendants, brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood, whether
living together or not.

(d) "Members of the household" shall include:

(1) Spouses, common-law spouses, former spouses, whether living together or

not, and their children;

(2) Relatives by consanguinity or affinity up to the sixth civil degree, including

stepparents and stepchildren living together in the same house; and

(3) Domestic helpers in the service of the employer, whose services are usually
necessary or desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment of the home, who
attend to the personal comfort and convenience of the members of the household.

(e) "Battery" refers to an act of inflicting physical harm upon the woman or her child
resulting in physical and psychological or emotional distress.

(f) "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature committed against a
woman or her child. It includes the following:

(1) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child
as a sex object, making demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks, physically
attacking the sexual parts of the victim's body, forcing the offended party to watch
obscene publications and indecent shows or to do indecent acts or make films
thereof, forcing the wife and mistress or lover to live in the conjugal home or
sleep together in the same room with the abuser;

(2) acts causing or attempting to cause the offended party to engage in any sexual
activity by force, threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or
other harm or coercion; and

(3) prostitution of the woman or her child.

(g) "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental
or emotional suffering of the offended party such as intimidation, harassment, stalking,
damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital
infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the offended party to witness the physical,

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sexual or psychological abuse; of a member of the family to which the offended party
belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or .to witness abusive injury to pets or to
unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody or visitation of common
children.

(h) "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially
dependent which includes the following:

(1) withdrawing of financial support or preventing the offended party from

engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity, except in
cases where the other spouse or partner objects on valid, serious and moral
grounds as defined in Article 73 of the Family Code;

(2) depriving or threatening to deprive financial resources and the right to the use
and enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in common;

(3) destroying household property; and

(4) controlling the offended party's own money or property or solely controlling
the conjugal money or property.

(i) "Stalking" refers to an intentional act of knowingly and without lawful justification,
following the woman or her child or placing the woman or her child under surveillance
directly or indirectly or through a combination thereof.

(j) "Sexual relationship" refers to a single sexual act which may or may not result in the
bearing of a common child;

(k) "Program of intervention for offended parties" refers to a specialized program that
provides advocacy, shelter, crisis intervention, social services, treatment, counseling,
education, or training.

(I) "Program of intervention for offenders" refers to court-ordered treatment of offenders

given by agencies or persons who have demonstrated expertise and experience in anger
control, management of alcohol, substance abuse; and other forms of intervention to stop
violence,

(m) "Safe Place or Shelter" refers to any home or institution managed by the Department
of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) or by any agency or voluntary organization
accredited by the DSWD or any other suitable place the resident of which is willing to
receive the offended party temporarily.

(n) "Safety plan" refers to a written plan of action prepared by a social worker and
approved by the court to secure the protection of the offended party.

(o) "Protection order" is an order issued by the court to prevent further acts of violence
against women and their children, their family or household members, and to grant other
necessary relief. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm,
minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to
regain control of their life.

(p) "Barangay protection order" (BPO) refers to the protection order issued by the
Punong Barangay, or in his absence the Barangay Kagawad, ordering the perpetrator to
desist from committing acts of violence against the family or household members
particularly women and their children under Sections 5a and 5b of R.A. No. 9262.

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 (q) "Temporary protection order" (TPO) refers to the protection order issued by the court
on the filing of the application and after ex parte determination of its need. It may also be
issued in the course of a hearing, motu proprio or upon motion.

(r) "Permanent protection order" (PPO) refers to the protection order issued by the court
after notice and hearing.

(s) "Live-link television testimony" refers to the testimony of a child, who is an

eyewitness or offended party in violence against women and their children, taken in a
room outside the courtroom and televised to the courtroom by live-link television, as
provided for in Section 25 of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness. It may also
refer to the live-link testimony of an adult female victim of violence, which may be
allowed at the discretion of the court.

SEC. 5. Acts of violence against women and their children under R.A. No. 9262. - Violence
against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:

(a) Causing, threatening or attempting to cause physical harm to the woman or her child;

(b) Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent physical harm;

(c) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct
which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or to desist from conduct which
the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict .or restricting
the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force,
physical or other harm or threat of physical on other harm, or intimidation directed
against the woman or her child.

This shall include, but is not limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or
effect of controlling or restricting the movement or conduct of the woman or her child:

(1) Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the woman or her child of

custody or access to her/his family;

(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial

support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's
children insufficient financial support;

(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right;
and

(4) Preventing the woman from engaging in any legitimate profession,

occupation, business or activity except in cases where the spouse or partner on
valid, serious and moral grounds, or controlling the victim's own money or
property, or solely controlling the conjugal or common money or property;

(d) Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical ham on oneself for the purpose of
controlling her actions or decisions;

(e) Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child to engage in any sexual
activity which does not constitute rape, by force or threat of force, physical harm, or
through intimidation directed against the woman or her child or her/his immediate family;

(f) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another,

that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her
child.

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 This shall include, but is not limited to, the following acts:

(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;

(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her
child;

(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her
child against her/his will;

(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals
or pets of the woman or child; and

(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence; or

(g) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or
her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial
of financial support or custody of a minor child or denial of access to the woman's child.

SEC. 6. Remedies of offended party. - The offended party may file a separate petition for
protection order without claiming damages. The offended party may also pursue other remedies
in accordance with Part II of this Rule by the filing of any of the following:

(a) Criminal action;

(b) Criminal action with reservation of a separate civil action; or

(c) Civil action for damages.

Part I

PETITION FOR PROTECTION ORDER

SEC. 7. Form of petition. - A petition for protection order shall be in writing, signed and verified
by the petitioner. It shall be accompanied by a certificate of non-forum shopping which the
petitioner must sign personally.

SEC. 8. Who may file petition. - A petition for protection order may be filed by any of the
following:

(a) The offended party;

(b) Parents or guardians of the offended party;

(c) Ascendants, descendants or collateral relatives of the offended party within the fourth
civil degree of consanguinity or affinity;

(d) Officers or social workers of the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD) or social workers of local government units (LGUs);

(e) Police officers, preferably those in charge of women and children's desks;

(f) Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad;

(g) Lawyer, counselor, therapist or healthcare provider of the petitioner; or

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 (h) At least two concerned, responsible citizens of the place where the violence against
women and their children occurred and who have personal knowledge of the offense
committed.

The filing of a petition for protection order by the offended party suspends the right of all other
authorized parties to file similar petitions. A petition filed by the offended party after the filing of
a similar petition by an authorized party shall not be dismissed but shall be consolidated with the
petition filed earlier.

SEC. 9. Where to file the petition. - The verified petition for protection order may be filed with
the Family Court of the place where the offended party resides. If there is no existing Family
Court, it may be filed with the regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court
in cities, municipal trial court or municipal circuit trial court with territorial jurisdiction over the
place of residence of the offended party.

SEC. 10. Contents of the petition. - The petition filed by the offended party shall contain the
following:

(a) The name, age and residence of the offended party;'

(b) The name, age and residence of the respondent;

(c) A description of the relationship between the offended party and the respondent;

(d) A complete description of the alleged act constituting violence including the date,
time and place of occurrence;

(e) A request for counsel and the reasons for such;

(f) A request for waiver of application fees;

(g) The relief from violence prayed for, including protection orders to cover any
designated family or household member who consents to such relief.

If the petitioner is not the offended party, the petition shall be accompanied by an affidavit of the
petitioner attesting to the following:

(a) facts showing the authority of the petitioner to file the petition;

(b) circumstances of the abuse suffered by the offended party; and

(c) circumstances of consent given by or refusal to consent of the offended party to file
the petition.

When disclosure of the address will pose danger to the life of the offended party, it shall be so
stated in the petition. In such a case, the petitioner shall attest that the offended party is; residing
in the municipality or city over which the court has territorial jurisdiction, and shall provide a
mailing address for purposes of service processing.

SEC. 11. Reliefs available to the offended party. - The protection order shall include any, some
or all of the following reliefs:

(a) Prohibiting the respondent from threatening to commit or committing, personally or

through another, acts of violence against the offended party;

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(b) Prohibiting the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or
otherwise communicating in any form with the offended party, either directly or
indirectly;

(c) Removing and excluding the respondent from the residence of the offended party,
regardless of ownership of the residence, either temporally for the purpose of protecting
the offended party, or permanently where no property rights are violated. If the
respondent must remove personal effects from the residence, the court shall direct a law
enforcement agent to accompany the respondent to the residence, remain there until the
respondent has gathered his things and escort him from the residence;

(d) Requiring the respondent to stay away from the offended party and any designated
family or household member at a distance specified by the court;

(e) Requiring the respondent to stay away from the residence, school, place of
employment or any specified place frequented regularly by the offended party and any
designated family or household member;

(f) Directing lawful possession and use by the offended party of an automobile and other
essential personal effects, regardless of ownership, and directing the appropriate law
enforcement officer to accompany the offended party to the residence of the parties to
ensure that the offended party is safely restored to the possession of the automobile and
other essential personal effects;

(g) Ordering temporary or permanent custody of the child/children with the offended
party, taking into consideration the best interests of the child. An offended party who is
suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome shall not be disqualified from having custody
of her children. In no case shall custody of minor children be given to the batterer of a
woman who is suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome;

(h) Directing the respondent to provide support 'o the woman and/or her child, if entitled
to legal import. Notwithstanding other laws to the contrary, the court shall order an
appropriate percentage of the income or salary of the respondent to be withheld regularly
by his employer and to automatically remit it directly to the offended party. Failure to
withhold, remit or any delay in the remittance of support to the offended party without
justifiable cause shall render the respondent or his employer liable for indirect contempt
of court;

(i) Prohibiting the respondent from carrying or possessing any firearm or deadly weapon
and ordering him to surrender the same to the court for appropriate disposition, including
revocation of license and disqualification to apply for any license to carry or possess a
firearm. If the respondent is .a law enforcement agent, the court shall order him to
surrender his firearm and shall direct the appropriate authority to investigate him and take
appropriate action thereon;

(j) Directing the DSWD or any appropriate agency to prepare a program of intervention
for the offended party that provides advocacy, temporary shelter, crisis intervention,
treatment, therapy, counseling, education, training and other social services that the
offended party may need;

(k) Requiring the respondent to receive professional counseling from agencies or persons
who have demonstrated expertise and experience in anger control, management of
alcohol, substance abuse and other forms of intervention to stop violence. The program of
intervention for offenders must be approved by the court. The agency or person is
required to provide the court with regular reports of the progress and result of
professional counseling, for which the respondent may be ordered to pay; and

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 (I) Awarding the offended party actual damages caused by the violence inflicted,
including, but not limited to, property damage, medical expanses, childcare expenses and
loss of income; and compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages, subject to Sections
26a and 35 of this Rule.

The court may grant such other forms of relief to protect the offended party and any designated
family or household member who consents to such relief.

SEC. 12. Duties of the clerk of court. - The clerk of court shall assist the petitioner or the
offended party by:

(a) Communicating in a language understood by the petitioner;

(b) Providing the petitioner with a standard petition form written in English with
translation into the major local dialects, including the instructions for its accomplishment;

(c) Ensuring the privacy of the offended party to the extent practicable while the form is
being accomplished;

(d) Advising the petitioner on the availability of legal assistance from the Public
Attorney's Office of the Department of Justice or any public legal assistance office;

(e) Advising the petitioner on entitlement of support services from the DSWD and LGUs;

(f) Advising the petitioner on the availability of an affidavit of indigency in lieu of

payment of the filing fee;

(g) Providing the offended party with a certified copy of the protection order as well as
giving the necessary information regarding the process for its service and enforcement;

(h) Making available informative materials on violence against women and their children,
including their rights as victims; and

(i) Informing the offended party that compensation is available from the Department of
Justice Board of Claims in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 7309 (1992),
otherwise known as "An Act Creating a Board of Claims Under the Department of Justice
for Victims of Unjust Imprisonment or Detention and Victims of Violent Crime and For
Other Purposes."

SEC. 13. Exemption from payment of docket fee and other expenses. - If the offended party is
an indigent or there is an immediate necessity due to imminent danger or threat of danger to act
on a petition for a protection order, the court shall accept the petition without payment of the
filing fee and other fees and of transcripts of stenographic notes.

SEC. 14. Raffle in multi-sala courts. - The petition filed in a multi-sala court shall be raffled
without delay.

If an action contains an application for a protection order, it shall be the subject of a special
raffle.

SEC. 15. Ex parte issuance of temporary protection order. - (a) If the court is satisfied from the
verified allegations of the petition that there is reasonable ground to believe that an imminent
danger of violence against women and their children exists or is about to recur, the court may
issue ex parte a temporary protection order which shall be effective for thirty days from service
on the party or person sought to be enjoined.

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(b) The temporary protection order shall include notice of the date of the preliminary conference
and hearing on the merits. The following statements must be printed in bold-faced type or in
capital letters on the protection order issued by the court:

"VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS PUNISHABLE BY LAW.

"IF THE RESPONDENT APPEARS WITHOUT COUNSEL ON THE DATE OF THE

PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE AND HEARING ON THE MERITS ON THE ISSUANCE OF
.A PERMANENT PROTECTION ORDER, THE COURT SHALL NOT RESCHEDULE OR
POSTPONE THE PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE AND HEARING BUT SHALL APPOINT
A LAWYER FOR THE RESPONDENT AND IMMEDIATELY PROCEED WITH SAID
HEARING.

"IF THE RESPONDENT FAILS TO APPEAR ON THE DATE OF THE PRELIMINARY

CONFERENCE AND HEARING ON THE MERITS DESPITE PROPER NOTICE, THE
COURT SHALL ALLOW EX PARTE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE BY THE
PETITIONER AND RENDER JUDGMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE PLEADINGS AND
EVIDENCE ON RECORD. NO DELEGATION OF THE RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE
SHALL BE ALLOWED."

(c) The court shall likewise order the immediate issuance of a notice requiring the respondent to
file an opposition within five days from service. It shall further order service of (1) the notices to
file opposition and of dates of the preliminary conference and hearing, (2) the protection order,
and (3) copy of the petition, upon the respondent by the court sheriff, or any person authorized
by the court, who may obtain the assistance of law enforcement officers.

SEC. 16. Notice where no temporary protection order is issued ex parte. - Where no temporary
protection order is issued ex parte, the clerk of court shall forthwith issue the corresponding
notice to the respondent requiring him to file an opposition within five days. The date of the
preliminary conference and hearing on the merits shall be indicated on the notice.

Where the notice could not be served personally or by substituted service despite diligent efforts,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court shall apply as far as practicable.

SEC. 17. Enforceability of protection order. - The protection order issued by the court shall be
enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. Violation of the protection order shall be punishable by
a fine ranging from Five Thousand (P5.000.00) Pesos to Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos or
imprisonment of six months or both.

SEC. 18. Duties of the law enforcement officer. - Upon the receipt of the protection order, the
law enforcement officer shall use all reasonable means to enforce the order and prevent further
violence, such as by:

(a) Taking any action necessary to provide for the safety of the offended party;

(b) Taking custody of the weapon used in the violence against women and their children;

(c) Transporting or obtaining transportation for the offended party to a safe place;

(d) Assisting the offended party in obtaining medical treatment, including transportation
to a medical clinic or hospital; and

(e) Assisting the offended party in removing essential personal effects from the residence.

The law enforcement officer shall submit a written report to the court within twenty-four hours
from receipt setting forth compliance with such order.

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SEC. 19. Duties of social worker. - The social worker assigned by the court shall assist the
petitioner seeking a protection order by:

(a) Preparing a case study and a program of intervention for the offended party, including
her children, and referring them to DSWD havens, crisis intervention centers and private
entities rendering appropriate social services;

(b) Formulating a safety plan which shall be approved by the court; and

(c) Monitoring the measures indicated in the protection order.

SEC. 20. Opposition to petition. - (a) The respondent may file an opposition to the petition
which he himself shall verify. It must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall
show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued.

(b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party
complaint, but any cause of action which could be the subject thereof may be litigated in a
separate civil action.

SEC. 21. Effect of failure to file an opposition. - If the respondent fails to file an opposition to
the petition within the period above provided, the court, motu proprio or on motion of the
petitioner, shall issue the corresponding order as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the
petition.

SEC. 22. Prohibited pleadings and motions. - The following pleadings, motions or petitions
shall not be allowed:

(a) Motion to dismiss the petition except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter or over the parties;

(b) Motion for extension of time to file opposition, affidavit, position paper and other
pleadings;

(c) Dilatory motion for postponement;

(d) Motion for a bill of particulars;

(e) Third-party complaint;

(f) Reply;

(g) Motion to declare the respondent in default;

(h) Intervention;

(i) Memorandum;

(j) Petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued
by the court;

(k) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a protection order, or for reopening of
trial; and

(I) Petition for relief from judgment.

SEC. 23. Preliminary conference. -

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(a) When conducted. - A preliminary conference, which is mandatory, shall be held on the
date indicated in the notice.

(b) Notice.—The notice shall be served the parties, including the offended party, who
shall be required to notify their respective counsels, if any. The parties shall appear in
person at the preliminary conference and submit their position papers setting forth the
law and the facts relied upon by them.

(c) Nature and purpose.—The court shall consider:

(1) The propriety of issuing a protection order. The court shall not deny the
issuance of a protection order due to the lapse of time between the act of violence
and the filing of the petition, subject to Section 24, R.A. No. 9262. The issuance
of a barangay protection order or the pendency of an application for a barangay
protection order shall not preclude a petitioner from applying for, or the court
from granting, a protection order;

(2) The simplification of the issues; and

(3) Such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the petition.

The court shall not refer the case or any issue thereof to a mediator,

(d) Prohibited compromise.—The court shall not allow compromise on any act
constituting the crime of violence against women and their children and other prohibited
matters, such as the following:

(1) The civil status of persons;

(2) The validity of a marriage, declaration of nullity or annulment of a marriage or

of a legal separation;

(3) Any ground for declaration of nullity or annulment of a marriage or of legal

separation;

(4) Future support;

(5) The jurisdiction of courts; and

(6) Future legitime.

(e) Effect of failure to appear.—

(1) If the petitioner fails to appear personally, the petition shall be dismissed
unless the counsel or a duly authorized representative of the petitioner appears in
court and gives a justifiable reason for the non-appearance of the petitioner;
however, if the petition is filed by a person other than the offended party, it shall
not be dismissed if the offended party is present and does not agree to its
dismissal.

(2) If the respondent appears without counsel, the court shall not reschedule or
postpone the conference but shall appoint a lawyer for the respondent and
immediately proceed therewith; and

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 (3) If the respondent has filed his opposition but fails to appear despite proper
notice; the petitioner shall be allowed to present evidence ex parte. The court shall
then render judgment on the basis of the pleadings and evidence on record.

SEC. 24. Protection order issued after preliminary conference. - Within five days after the
termination of the preliminary conference, the court may issue a protection order, based on the
pleadings and stipulations or admissions made by the parties.

SEC. 25. Order for further hearing. - In case the court determines the need for further hearing,
it may issue an order containing the following:

(a) Facts undisputed and admitted;

(b) Factual and legal issues to be resolved;

(c) Evidence, including objects and documents that have been marked and will be
presented;

(d) Names of witnesses who will be ordered to present their direct testimonies in the form
of affidavits; and

(e) Schedule of the presentation of evidence by both parties which shall be done in one
day, to the extent possible, within the 30-day period of the effectivity of the temporary
protection order issued.

SEC. 26. Hearing. -

(a) Rule applicable. - The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure shall apply as far as
practicable.

(b) Period to hear petition.—The court shall, to the extent possible, endeavor to conduct
in one day the hearing en the merits for the issuance of a permanent protection order.
Where the court is unable to finish the hearing within one day and the temporary
protection order issued is due to expire, it may extend or renew the temporary protection
order for a period of thirty days each time until final judgment is rendered. The court may
modify the extended or renewed temporary protection order as may be necessary to meet
the needs of the parties.

(c) Evidence of history of abusive conduct.—The court may allow the introduction of any
evidence of history of abusive conduct of a respondent even if the same was not directed
against the victim, provided the same is relevant.

(d) Exclusion of persons from courtroom.—The court may order the exclusion from the
courtroom of all persons who do not have a direct interest in the case. Such an order may
be made if the court determines on the record that requiring a party to testify in open
court:

(1) would not enhance the ascertainment of truth;

(2) would cause the party psychological harm or inability to effectively

communicate due to embarrassment, fear or timidity;

(3) would violate the right of a party to privacy; or

(4) would be offensive to decency or public morals.

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SEC. 27. Prohibited acts. - The court hearing a petition for a protection order shall not order,
direct, force or in any way unduly influence the applicant for a protection order to compromise
or abandon any of the reliefs sought in the petition for protection under the law and this Rule.
Failure to comply with this section shall render the judge administratively liable.

SEC. 28. Availability of live-link television to eyewitnesses or victims. - (a) The testimony of a
child, as an eyewitness or an offended party in an act of violence against women and their
children, may be taken by live-link television. The application for an order for live-link
testimony, the factors to be considered by the court in granting or denying the use of live-link
television and the procedure involved in the actual taking of the testimony shall be followed as
provided for in Section 25 of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness.

(b) The testimony of an adult female, victim of violence, may likewise be taken by live-link
television, if it appears that she would suffer trauma if she were to testify in the presence of the;
offender or perpetrator.

SEC. 29. Period to decide. - (a] The court shall decide the petition within thirty days after
termination of the hearing on the merits.

(b) Where no hearing has been conducted, the court shall decide the petition within ten days after
the termination of the preliminary conference.

SEC. 30. Judgment. - If the court finds the petition meritorious, it shall render judgment
granting the offended party permanent protection against acts of violence and such other
necessary reliefs provided in Section 11 of this Rule. The court shall not deny the issuance of a
permanent protection order due to the lapse of time between the act of violence and the filing of
the petition, subject to Section 24, R.A. No. 9262. The judgment shall be immediately executory.

SEC. 31. Appeal. - Any aggrieved party may appeal by filing a notice of appeal with the court
that rendered the final order or judgment within fifteen days from notice and serving a copy
thereof upon the adverse party. The appeal shall not stay the enforcement of the final order or
judgment.

Part II

APPLICATION FOR PROTECTION ORDER AS AN INCIDENT

IN A CRIMINAL OR CIVIL ACTION AND OTHER REMEDIES

SEC. 32. Applicability to applications for protection orders filed as incidents in civil or
criminal cases. - The foregoing provisions shall also apply to applications for protection orders
filed as incidents in criminal or civil actions.

SEC. 33. When petition may proceed separately from or be deemed instituted with criminal
action. - (a) An offended party may file a petition for protection order ahead of a criminal action
arising from the same act. The same shall proceed separately from the criminal action and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the petitioner, the court may
consolidate the petition with the criminal action.

(b) Where the offended party chooses to file a criminal action, the petition for protection order is
deemed instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party reserves the right to
institute it separately.

SEC. 34. When petition may proceed separately from or be deemed instituted with the civil
action for damages. - (a) An offended party may file a petition for protection order ahead of a
civil action for damages arising from the same act. The same shall proceed separately from the
civil action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the petitioner,
the court may consolidate the petition with the civil action.
13
(b) Where the offended party chooses to file a civil action for damages, the petition for protection
order is deemed instituted with the civil action.

SEC. 35. Prosecution of civil action for damages. - The civil action for damages shall be
governed by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. However, the offended party cannot recover the
same damages twice for the same act or omission.

SEC. 36. Prosecution of criminal action. - An act of violence covered by R.A. No. 9262
constituting a criminal offense shall subject the offender to criminal proceedings, which shall be
governed by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Where the judgment of conviction declares that the guilt of the accused has been proved beyond
reasonable doubt, the permanent protection order shall issue as a matter of course.

Where the judgment of acquittal declares that the quantum of evidence is not enough to sustain a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt, the court shall determine whether or not to issue a
permanent protection order.

Where the judgment of acquittal expressly declares that the basis of the offender's criminal
liability did not exist, a permanent protection order shall not issue. A temporary protection order
that may have been earlier issued shall be dissolved.

SEC. 37. Bond to keep the peace. - The court may also order any person, against whom a
permanent protection order is issued, to give a bond to keep the peace. It shall be the duty of said
person to present two sufficient sureties who shall undertake that such person will not commit
the violence sought to be prevented, and that in case such violence is committed they will pay the
amount determined by the court in its judgment. The court in its discretion shall fix the duration
of the bond.

Part III

COMMON PROVISIONS

SEC. 38. Reproduction of evidence. - An order granting the issuance of a permanent protection
order is without prejudice to a trial on the merits of the criminal or civil action involving
violence against women and their children. The evidence adduced during the hearing for the
issuance of a permanent protection order may, upon motion, be reproduced in the criminal or
civil action without prejudice to the cross-examination of witnesses and presentation of
additional evidence.

SEC. 39. Jurisdiction and venue for criminal actions or civil actions. - The Family Court shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and their children
regardless of the amount of damages claimed. The action may also be filed with the appropriate
regional trial courts in places where there are no Family Courts, at the option of the offended
party.

SEC. 40. Privacy and confidentiality of proceedings. - All hearings of cases of violence against
women and their children shall be conducted in a manner consistent with the dignity of women
and their children and respect for their privacy.

Records of the cases shall be treated with utmost confidentiality. Whoever publishes or causes to
be published, in any format, the name, address, telephone number, school, business address,
employer or other identifying information of the parties or an immediate family or household
member, without their consent or without authority of the court, shall be liable for contempt of
court and shall suffer the penalty of one year imprisonment and a fine of not more than Five
Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos.

14
 Part IV

BARANGAY PROTECTION ORDER

SEC. 41. Venue. - Applications for barangay protection orders shall observe the following rules
on venue:

(a) where the parties reside, in the same barangay, the dispute shall be brought for
settlement in said barangay;

(b) where the parties reside in different barangays in the same city or municipality, the
dispute shall be settled in the barangay where the respondent or any one of the
respondents actually resides, at the choice of the complainant;

(c) disputes arising at the workplace where the contending parties are employed or at the
institution where such parties are enrolled for study, shall be brought in the barangay
where such workplace or institution is located; and

(d) any objection relating to venue shall be raised before the Punong Barangay during the
proceedings before him. Failure to do so shall be deemed a waiver of such objections.

SEC. 42. Where to file complaint for violation of a barangay protection order. - A complaint
for violation of a barangay protection order may be filed with any metropolitan trial court,
municipal trial court in cities, municipal trial court or municipal circuit trial court that has
territorial jurisdiction over the barangay which issued the said protection order.

SEC. 43. Procedure. - (a) The complaint shall be accompanied by affidavits and other evidence
proving the alleged violation;

(b) Upon receipt of the complaint, the court shall issue an order requiring the accused to submit
within five days his counter-affidavit, the affidavits of his witnesses and other evidence in his
behalf;

(c) If the court, upon a consideration of the complaint, the counter-affidavits of the accused and
other evidence submitted by the parties, finds no cause or ground to hold the accused for trial, it
shall order the dismissal of the case; otherwise, it shall set the case for arraignment and trial;

(d) Violation of a barangay protection order shall be punishable by imprisonment of thirty days
without prejudice to any other criminal or civil action that the offended party may file for any of
the acts committed; and

(e) A judgment of violation of a barangay protection order may be appealed to the regional trial
court whose decision shall be final. An appeal from a judgment of violation of a barangay
protection order shall not stay the enforcement of a protection order that might have been issued
by the trial court during the trial.

SEC. 44. Issuance of protection order when warranted; contempt of court for violation. -
During trial or upon judgment, the trial court may motu proprio issue a protection order when
warranted. Violation of any protection order issued under this Section shall constitute contempt
of court punishable under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, without prejudice to any other criminal
or civil action that the offended party may file for any of the acts committed.

SEC. 45. Effectivity. - This Rule shall take effect on the 15th day of November 2004 following
its publication in a newspaper of general circulation not later than 30 October 2004.

15
 1. The Court shall withhold the real name of the victim-survivor and shall use
fictitious initials instead to represent her. Likewise, the personal circumstances of the victims-
survivors or any other information tending to establish or compromise their identities, as well as
those of their immediate family or household members, shall not be disclosed. (People v.
Cabalguinto, GR No. 167693, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 419, 425-426, citing Section 40,
Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children; Section 63, Rule XI, Rules and
Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.")

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 182835 April 20, 2010

RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD, Respondents.

16
DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case concerns a claim of commission of the crime of violence against women when a
former boyfriend sent to the girl the picture of a naked woman, not her, but with her face on it.

The Indictment

The public prosecutor charged petitioner-accused Rustan Ang (Rustan) before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, of violation of the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act or Republic Act (R.A.) 9262 in an information that reads:

That on or about June 5, 2005, in the Municipality of Maria Aurora, Province of Aurora,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, in a purposeful and reckless conduct, sent through the Short
Messaging Service (SMS) using his mobile phone, a pornographic picture to one Irish Sagud,
who was his former girlfriend, whereby the face of the latter was attached to a completely naked
body of another woman making it to appear that it was said Irish Sagud who is depicted in the
said obscene and pornographic picture thereby causing substantial emotional anguish,
psychological distress and humiliation to the said Irish Sagud.1

The Facts and the Case

The evidence for the prosecution shows that complainant Irish Sagud (Irish) and accused Rustan
were classmates at Wesleyan University in Aurora Province. Rustan courted Irish and they
became "on-and-off" sweethearts towards the end of 2004. When Irish learned afterwards that
Rustan had taken a live-in partner (now his wife), whom he had gotten pregnant, Irish broke up
with him.

Before Rustan got married, however, he got in touch with Irish and tried to convince her to elope
with him, saying that he did not love the woman he was about to marry. Irish rejected the
proposal and told Rustan to take on his responsibility to the other woman and their child. Irish
changed her cellphone number but Rustan somehow managed to get hold of it and sent her text
messages. Rustan used two cellphone numbers for sending his messages, namely, 0920-4769301
and 0921-8084768. Irish replied to his text messages but it was to ask him to leave her alone.

In the early morning of June 5, 2005, Irish received through multimedia message service (MMS)
a picture of a naked woman with spread legs and with Irish’s face superimposed on the figure
(Exhibit A).2 The sender’s cellphone number, stated in the message, was 0921-8084768, one of
the numbers that Rustan used. Irish surmised that he copied the picture of her face from a shot he
took when they were in Baguio in 2003 (Exhibit B).3

After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text messages from Rustan. He boasted that it
would be easy for him to create similarly scandalous pictures of her. And he threatened to spread
the picture he sent through the internet. One of the messages he sent to Irish, written in text
messaging shorthand, read: "Madali lang ikalat yun, my chatrum ang tarlac rayt pwede ring
send sa lahat ng chatter."4

Irish sought the help of the vice mayor of Maria Aurora who referred her to the police. Under
police supervision, Irish contacted Rustan through the cellphone numbers he used in sending the
picture and his text messages. Irish asked Rustan to meet her at the Lorentess Resort in Brgy.
Ramada, Maria Aurora, and he did. He came in a motorcycle. After parking it, he walked
towards Irish but the waiting police officers intercepted and arrested him. They searched him and
seized his Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone and several SIM cards. While Rustan was being
questioned at the police station, he shouted at Irish: "Malandi ka kasi!"

17
Joseph Gonzales, an instructor at the Aurora State College of Technology, testified as an expert
in information technology and computer graphics. He said that it was very much possible for one
to lift the face of a woman from a picture and superimpose it on the body of another woman in
another picture. Pictures can be manipulated and enhanced by computer to make it appear that
the face and the body belonged to just one person.

Gonzales testified that the picture in question (Exhibit A) had two distinct irregularities: the face
was not proportionate to the body and the face had a lighter color. In his opinion, the picture was
fake and the face on it had been copied from the picture of Irish in Exhibit B. Finally, Gonzales
explained how this could be done, transferring a picture from a computer to a cellphone like the
Sony Ericsson P900 seized from Rustan.

For his part, Rustan admitted having courted Irish. He began visiting her in Tarlac in October
2003 and their relation lasted until December of that year. He claimed that after their relation
ended, Irish wanted reconciliation. They met in December 2004 but, after he told her that his
girlfriend at that time (later his wife) was already pregnant, Irish walked out on him.

Sometime later, Rustan got a text message from Irish, asking him to meet her at Lorentess Resort
as she needed his help in selling her cellphone. When he arrived at the place, two police officers
approached him, seized his cellphone and the contents of his pockets, and brought him to the
police station.

Rustan further claims that he also went to Lorentess because Irish asked him to help her identify
a prankster who was sending her malicious text messages. Rustan got the sender’s number and,
pretending to be Irish, contacted the person. Rustan claims that he got back obscene messages
from the prankster, which he forwarded to Irish from his cellphone. This explained, he said, why
the obscene messages appeared to have originated from his cellphone number. Rustan claims that
it was Irish herself who sent the obscene picture (Exhibit A) to him. He presented six pictures of
a woman whom he identified as Irish (Exhibits 2 to 7).5

Michelle Ang (Michelle), Rustan’s wife, testified that she was sure Irish sent the six pictures.
Michelle claims that she received the pictures and hid the memory card (Exhibit 8) that
contained them because she was jealous and angry. She did not want to see anything of Irish.
But, while the woman in the pictures posed in sexy clothing, in none did she appear naked as in
Exhibit A. Further, the face of the woman in Exhibits 2, 4, 5 and 6 could not be seen. Irish denied
that she was the woman in those four pictures. As for Exhibits 3 and 7, the woman in the picture
was fully dressed.

After trial, the RTC found Irish’s testimony completely credible, given in an honest and
spontaneous manner. The RTC observed that she wept while recounting her experience,
prompting the court to comment: "Her tears were tangible expression of pain and anguish for the
acts of violence she suffered in the hands of her former sweetheart. The crying of the victim
during her testimony is evidence of the credibility of her charges with the verity borne out of
human nature and experience."6 Thus, in its Decision dated August 1, 2001, the RTC found
Rustan guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.

On Rustan’s appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), 7 the latter rendered a decision dated January
31, 2008,8 affirming the RTC decision. The CA denied Rustan’s motion for reconsideration in a
resolution dated April 25, 2008. Thus, Rustan filed the present for review on certiorari.

The Issues Presented

The principal issue in this case is whether or not accused Rustan sent Irish by cellphone message
the picture with her face pasted on the body of a nude woman, inflicting anguish, psychological
distress, and humiliation on her in violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.

The subordinate issues are:

18
 1. Whether or not a "dating relationship" existed between Rustan and Irish as this term is
defined in R.A. 9262;

2. Whether or not a single act of harassment, like the sending of the nude picture in this
case, already constitutes a violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262;

3. Whether or not the evidence used to convict Rustan was obtained from him in violation
of his constitutional rights; and

4. Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture presented in
the case.

The Court’s Rulings

Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 provides that violence against women includes an act or acts of a
person against a woman with whom he has or had a sexual or dating relationship. Thus:

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act,

(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts
committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a
woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom
he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or
without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual,
psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts,
battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.

xxxx

Section 5 identifies the act or acts that constitute violence against women and these
include any form of harassment that causes substantial emotional or psychological
distress to a woman. Thus:

SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. – The crime of violence
against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:

xxxx

h. Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another,

that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her
child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:

xxxx

5. Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;

The above provisions, taken together, indicate that the elements of the crime of violence against
women through harassment are:

1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman;

2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of

harassment against the woman; and

3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her.

19
One. The parties to this case agree that the prosecution needed to prove that accused Rustan had
a "dating relationship" with Irish. Section 3(e) provides that a "dating relationship" includes a
situation where the parties are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during
the course of the relationship. Thus:

(e) "Dating relationship" refers to a situation wherein the parties live as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis
during the course of the relationship. A casual acquaintance or ordinary socialization between
two individuals in a business or social context is not a dating relationship. (Underscoring
supplied.)

Here, Rustan claims that, being "romantically involved," implies that the offender and the
offended woman have or had sexual relations. According to him, "romance" implies a sexual act.
He cites Webster’s Comprehensive Dictionary Encyclopedia Edition which provides a colloquial
or informal meaning to the word "romance" used as a verb, i.e., "to make love; to make love to"
as in "He romanced her."

But it seems clear that the law did not use in its provisions the colloquial verb "romance" that
implies a sexual act. It did not say that the offender must have "romanced" the offended woman.
Rather, it used the noun "romance" to describe a couple’s relationship, i.e., "a love affair."9

R.A. 9262 provides in Section 3 that "violence against women x x x refers to any act or a series
of acts committed by any person against a woman x x x with whom the person has or had a
sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the law itself distinguishes a sexual relationship from a
dating relationship. Indeed, Section 3(e) above defines "dating relationship" while Section 3(f)
defines "sexual relations." The latter "refers to a single sexual act which may or may not result in
the bearing of a common child." The dating relationship that the law contemplates can, therefore,
exist even without a sexual intercourse taking place between those involved.

Rustan also claims that since the relationship between Irish and him was of the "on-and-off"
variety (away-bati), their romance cannot be regarded as having developed "over time and on a
continuing basis." But the two of them were romantically involved, as Rustan himself admits,
from October to December of 2003. That would be time enough for nurturing a relationship of
mutual trust and love.

An "away-bati" or a fight-and-kiss thing between two lovers is a common occurrence. Their

taking place does not mean that the romantic relation between the two should be deemed broken
up during periods of misunderstanding. Explaining what "away-bati" meant, Irish explained that
at times, when she could not reply to Rustan’s messages, he would get angry at her. That was all.
Indeed, she characterized their three-month romantic relation as continuous.10

Two. Rustan argues that the one act of sending an offensive picture should not be considered a
form of harassment. He claims that such would unduly ruin him personally and set a very
dangerous precedent. But Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 punishes "any act or series of acts" that
constitutes violence against women. This means that a single act of harassment, which translates
into violence, would be enough. The object of the law is to protect women and children.
Punishing only violence that is repeatedly committed would license isolated ones.

Rustan alleges that today’s women, like Irish, are so used to obscene communications that her
getting one could not possibly have produced alarm in her or caused her substantial emotional or
psychological distress. He claims having previously exchanged obscene pictures with Irish such
that she was already desensitized by them.

But, firstly, the RTC which saw and heard Rustan and his wife give their testimonies was not
impressed with their claim that it was Irish who sent the obscene pictures of herself (Exhibits 2-
7). It is doubtful if the woman in the picture was Irish since her face did not clearly show on
them.
20
Michelle, Rustan’s wife, claimed that she deleted several other pictures that Irish sent, except
Exhibits 2 to 7. But her testimony did not make sense. She said that she did not know that
Exhibits 2 to 7 had remained saved after she deleted the pictures. Later, however, she said that
she did not have time to delete them.11 And, if she thought that she had deleted all the pictures
from the memory card, then she had no reason at all to keep and hide such memory card. There
would have been nothing to hide. Finally, if she knew that some pictures remained in the card,
there was no reason for her to keep it for several years, given that as she said she was too jealous
to want to see anything connected to Irish. Thus, the RTC was correct in not giving credence to
her testimony.1avvphi1

Secondly, the Court cannot measure the trauma that Irish experienced based on Rustan’s low
regard for the alleged moral sensibilities of today’s youth. What is obscene and injurious to an
offended woman can of course only be determined based on the circumstances of each case.
Here, the naked woman on the picture, her legs spread open and bearing Irish’s head and face,
was clearly an obscene picture and, to Irish a revolting and offensive one. Surely, any woman
like Irish, who is not in the pornography trade, would be scandalized and pained if she sees
herself in such a picture. What makes it further terrifying is that, as Irish testified, Rustan sent the
picture with a threat to post it in the internet for all to see. That must have given her a nightmare.

Three. Rustan argues that, since he was arrested and certain items were seized from him without
any warrant, the evidence presented against him should be deemed inadmissible. But the fact is
that the prosecution did not present in evidence either the cellphone or the SIM cards that the
police officers seized from him at the time of his arrest. The prosecution did not need such items
to prove its case. Exhibit C for the prosecution was but a photograph depicting the Sony Ericsson
P900 cellphone that was used, which cellphone Rustan admitted owning during the pre-trial
conference.

Actually, though, the bulk of the evidence against him consisted in Irish’s testimony that she
received the obscene picture and malicious text messages that the sender’s cellphone numbers
belonged to Rustan with whom she had been previously in communication. Indeed, to prove that
the cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan, Irish and the police used such numbers to summon
him to come to Lorentess Resort and he did.12 Consequently, the prosecution did not have to
present the confiscated cellphone and SIM cards to prove that Rustan sent those messages.

Moreover, Rustan admitted having sent the malicious text messages to Irish. 13 His defense was
that he himself received those messages from an unidentified person who was harassing Irish and
he merely forwarded the same to her, using his cellphone. But Rustan never presented the
cellphone number of the unidentified person who sent the messages to him to authenticate the
same. The RTC did not give credence to such version and neither will this Court. Besides, it was
most unlikely for Irish to pin the things on Rustan if he had merely tried to help her identify the
sender.

Four. Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an
electronic document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as
provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).

But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture, Exhibit A,
for the first time before this Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the
admission of the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be
deemed to have already waived such ground for objection.14

Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic
Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative
proceedings.15

In conclusion, this Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element of the
crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.
21
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 30567 dated January 31, 2008 and its resolution dated April 25, 2008.

SO ORDERED.

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

ATT E S TAT I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

C E R T I F I CAT I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

Proclaimed by General Assembly Resolution 48/104 of 20 December 1993

DECLARATION ON ELIMINATION OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN

The General Assembly,

Recognizing the urgent need for the universal application to women of the rights and principles
with regard to equality, security, liberty, integrity and dignity of all human beings,

Noting that those rights and principles are enshrined in international instruments, including the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,

Recognizing that effective implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women would contribute to the elimination of violence against women
and that the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, set forth in the present
resolution, will strengthen and complement that process,

Concerned that violence against women is an obstacle to the achievement of equality,

development and peace, as recognized in the Nairobi Forward-looking Strategies for the

22
Advancement of Women, in which a set of measures to combat violence against women was
recommended, and to the full implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination against Women,

Affirming that violence against women constitutes a violation of the rights and fundamental
freedoms of women and impairs or nullifies their enjoyment of those rights and freedoms, and
concerned about the long-standing failure to protect and promote those rights and freedoms in
the case of violence against women,

Recognizing that violence against women is a manifestation of historically unequal power

relations between men and women, which have led to domination over and discrimination
against women by men and to the prevention of the full advancement of women, and that
violence against women is one of the crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced into
a subordinate position compared with men,

Concerned that some groups of women, such as women belonging to minority groups,
indigenous women, refugee women, migrant women, women living in rural or remote
communities, destitute women, women in institutions or in detention, female children, women
with disabilities, elderly women and women in situations of armed conflict, are especially
vulnerable to violence,

Recalling the conclusion in paragraph 23 of the annex to Economic and Social Council
resolution 1990/15 of 24 May 1990 that the recognition that violence against women in the
family and society was pervasive and cut across lines of income, class and culture had to be
matched by urgent and effective steps to eliminate its incidence,

Recalling also Economic and Social Council resolution 1991/18 of 30 May 1991, in which the
Council recommended the development of a framework for an international instrument that
would address explicitly the issue of violence against women,

Welcoming the role that women's movements are playing in drawing increasing attention to the
nature, severity and magnitude of the problem of violence against women,

Alarmed that opportunities for women to achieve legal, social, political and economic equality in
society are limited, inter alia, by continuing and endemic violence,

Convinced that in the light of the above there is a need for a clear and comprehensive definition
of violence against women, a clear statement of the rights to be applied to ensure the elimination
of violence against women in all its forms, a commitment by States in respect of their
responsibilities, and a commitment by the international community at large to the elimination of
violence against women,

Solemnly proclaims the following Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women
and urges that every effort be made so that it becomes generally known and respected:

Article 1

For the purposes of this Declaration, the term "violence against women" means any act of
gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological
harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of
liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life.

Article 2

Violence against women shall be understood to encompass, but not be limited to, the following:

23
 (a) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family, including
battering, sexual abuse of female children in the household, dowry-related
violence, marital rape, female genital mutilation and other traditional practices
harmful to women, non-spousal violence and violence related to exploitation;

(b) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring within the general
community, including rape, sexual abuse, sexual harassment and intimidation at
work, in educational institutions and elsewhere, trafficking in women and forced
prostitution;

(c) Physical, sexual and psychological violence perpetrated or condoned by the

State, wherever it occurs.

Article 3

Women are entitled to the equal enjoyment and protection of all human rights and fundamental
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field. These rights include,
inter alia:

(a) The right to life;

(b) The right to equality;

(c) The right to liberty and security of person;

(d) The right to equal protection under the law;

(e) The right to be free from all forms of discrimination;

(f) The right to the highest standard attainable of physical and mental health;

(g) The right to just and favorable conditions of work;

(h) The right not to be subjected to torture, or other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.

Article 4

States should condemn violence against women and should not invoke any custom, tradition or
religious consideration to avoid their obligations with respect to its elimination. States should
pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating violence against
women and, to this end, should:

(a) Consider, where they have not yet done so, ratifying or acceding to the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women or
withdrawing reservations to that Convention;

(b) Refrain from engaging in violence against women;

(c) Exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate and, in accordance with national
legislation, punish acts of violence against women, whether those acts are
perpetrated by the State or by private persons;

(d) Develop penal, civil, labor and administrative sanctions in domestic legislation
to punish and redress the wrongs caused to women who are subjected to violence;
women who are subjected to violence should be provided with access to the

24
mechanisms of justice and, as provided for by national legislation, to just and
effective remedies for the harm that they have suffered; States should also inform
women of their rights in seeking redress through such mechanisms;

(e) Consider the possibility of developing national plans of action to promote the
protection of women against any form of violence, or to include provisions for
that purpose in plans already existing, taking into account, as appropriate, such
cooperation as can be provided by non-governmental organizations, particularly
those concerned with the issue of violence against women;

(f) Develop, in a comprehensive way, preventive approaches and all those

measures of a legal, political, administrative and cultural nature that promote the
protection of women against any form of violence, and ensure that the re-
victimization of women does not occur because of laws insensitive to gender
considerations, enforcement practices or other interventions;

(g) Work to ensure, to the maximum extent feasible in the light of their available
resources and, where needed, within the framework of international cooperation,
that women subjected to violence and, where appropriate, their children have
specialized assistance, such as rehabilitation, assistance in child care and
maintenance, treatment, counseling, and health and social services, facilities and
programmers, as well as support structures, and should take all other appropriate
measures to promote their safety and physical and psychological rehabilitation;

(h) Include in government budgets adequate resources for their activities related
to the elimination of violence against women;

(i) Take measures to ensure that law enforcement officers and public officials
responsible for implementing policies to prevent, investigate and punish violence
against women receive training to sensitize them to the needs of women;

(j) Adopt all appropriate measures, especially in the field of education, to modify
the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women and to eliminate
prejudices, customary practices and all other practices based on the idea of the
inferiority or superiority of either of the sexes and on stereotyped roles for men
and women;

(k) Promote research, collect data and compile statistics, especially concerning
domestic violence, relating to the prevalence of different forms of violence
against women and encourage research on the causes, nature, seriousness and
consequences of violence against women and on the effectiveness of measures
implemented to prevent and redress violence against women; those statistics and
findings of the research will be made public;

(l) Adopt measures directed towards the elimination of violence against women
who are especially vulnerable to violence;

(m) Include, in submitting reports as required under relevant human rights

instruments of the United Nations, information pertaining to violence against
women and measures taken to implement the present Declaration;

(n) Encourage the development of appropriate guidelines to assist in the

implementation of the principles set forth in the present Declaration;

(o) Recognize the important role of the women's movement and non-
governmental organizations world wide in raising awareness and alleviating the
problem of violence against women;
25
 (p) Facilitate and enhance the work of the women's movement and non-
governmental organizations and cooperate with them at local, national and
regional levels;

(q) Encourage intergovernmental regional organizations of which they are

members to include the elimination of violence against women in their
programmers, as appropriate.

Article 5

The organs and specialized agencies of the United Nations system should, within their respective
fields of competence, contribute to the recognition and realization of the rights and the principles
set forth in the present Declaration and, to this end, should, inter alia:

(a) Foster international and regional cooperation with a view to defining regional
strategies for combating violence, exchanging experiences and financing
programmers relating to the elimination of violence against women;

(b) Promote meetings and seminars with the aim of creating and raising awareness
among all persons of the issue of the elimination of violence against women;

(c) Foster coordination and exchange within the United Nations system between
human rights treaty bodies to address the issue of violence against women
effectively;

(d) Include in analyses prepared by organizations and bodies of the United

Nations system of social trends and problems, such as the periodic reports on the
world social situation, examination of trends in violence against women;

(e) Encourage coordination between organizations and bodies of the United

Nations system to incorporate the issue of violence against women into ongoing
programmers, especially with reference to groups of women particularly
vulnerable to violence;

(f) Promote the formulation of guidelines or manuals relating to violence against

women, taking into account the measures referred to in the present Declaration;

(g) Consider the issue of the elimination of violence against women, as

appropriate, in fulfilling their mandates with respect to the implementation of
human rights instruments;

(h) Cooperate with non-governmental organizations in addressing the issue of

violence against women.

Article 6

Nothing in the present Declaration shall affect any provision that is more conducive to the
elimination of violence against women that may be contained in the legislation of a State or in
any international convention, treaty or other instrument in force in a State.

26
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 182367 December 15, 2010

CHERRYL B. DOLINA, Petitioner,

vs.
GLENN D. VALLECERA, Respondent.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about a mother’s claim for temporary support of an unacknowledged child, which
she sought in an action for the issuance of a temporary protection order that she brought against
the supposed father.

The Facts and the Case

In February 2008 petitioner Cherryl B. Dolina filed a petition with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary protection order against respondent Glenn D. Vallecera before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Tacloban City in P.O. 2008-02-071 for alleged woman and child abuse under
Republic Act (R.A.) 9262.2 In filling out the blanks in the pro-forma complaint, Dolina added a

27
handwritten prayer for financial support3 from Vallecera for their supposed child. She based her
prayer on the latter’s Certificate of Live Birth which listed Vallecera as the child’s father. The
petition also asked the RTC to order Philippine Airlines, Vallecera’s employer, to withhold from
his pay such amount of support as the RTC may deem appropriate.

Vallecera opposed the petition. He claimed that Dolina’s petition was essentially one for financial
support rather than for protection against woman and child abuses; that he was not the child’s
father; that the signature appearing on the child’s Certificate of Live Birth is not his; that the
petition is a harassment suit intended to force him to acknowledge the child as his and give it
financial support; and that Vallecera has never lived nor has been living with Dolina, rendering
unnecessary the issuance of a protection order against him.

On March 13, 20084 the RTC dismissed the petition after hearing since no prior judgment exists
establishing the filiation of Dolina’s son and granting him the right to support as basis for an
order to compel the giving of such support. Dolina filed a motion for reconsideration but the
RTC denied it in its April 4, 2008 Order,5 with an admonition that she first file a petition for
compulsory recognition of her child as a prerequisite for support. Unsatisfied, Dolina filed the
present petition for review directly with this Court.

The Issue Presented

The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the RTC correctly dismissed Dolina’s
action for temporary protection and denied her application for temporary support for her child.

The Court’s Ruling

Dolina evidently filed the wrong action to obtain support for her child. The object of R.A. 9262
under which she filed the case is the protection and safety of women and children who are
victims of abuse or violence.6 Although the issuance of a protection order against the respondent
in the case can include the grant of legal support for the wife and the child, this assumes that both
are entitled to a protection order and to legal support.

Dolina of course alleged that Vallecera had been abusing her and her child.1avvphil But it
became apparent to the RTC upon hearing that this was not the case since, contrary to her claim,
neither she nor her child ever lived with Vallecera. As it turned out, the true object of her action
was to get financial support from Vallecera for her child, her claim being that he is the father. He
of course vigorously denied this.

To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, first establish the filiation of the
child, if the same is not admitted or acknowledged. Since Dolina’s demand for support for her
son is based on her claim that he is Vallecera’s illegitimate child, the latter is not entitled to such
support if he had not acknowledged him, until Dolina shall have proved his relation to him.7 The
child’s remedy is to file through her mother a judicial action against Vallecera for compulsory
recognition.8 If filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter of obligation.9 In short,
illegitimate children are entitled to support and successional rights but their filiation must be duly
proved.10

Dolina’s remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an action against Vallecera for compulsory
recognition in order to establish filiation and then demand support. Alternatively, she may
directly file an action for support, where the issue of compulsory recognition may be integrated
and resolved.11

It must be observed, however, that the RTC should not have dismissed the entire case based
solely on the lack of any judicial declaration of filiation between Vallecera and Dolina’s child
since the main issue remains to be the alleged violence committed by Vallecera against Dolina
and her child and whether they are entitled to protection. But of course, this matter is already
water under the bridge since Dolina failed to raise this error on review. This omission lends
28
credence to the conclusion of the RTC that the real purpose of the petition is to obtain support
from Vallecera.

While the Court is mindful of the best interests of the child in cases involving paternity and
filiation, it is just as aware of the disturbance that unfounded paternity suits cause to the privacy
and peace of the putative father’s legitimate family.12 Vallecera disowns Dolina’s child and
denies having a hand in the preparation and signing of its certificate of birth. This issue has to be
resolved in an appropriate case.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Regional Trial Court of
Tacloban City’s Order dated March 13, 2008 that dismissed petitioner Cherryl B. Dolina’s action
in P.O. 2008-02-07, and Order dated April 4, 2008, denying her motion for reconsideration dated
March 28, 2008.

SO ORDERED.

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 167693 September 19, 2006

(Formerly G.R. Nos. 147678-87)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
MELCHOR CABALQUINTO, appellant.

DECISION

TINGA, J.

This case presents an opportunity for the Court not only to once again dispense due requital for
the sufferings of a child who has been defiled by her own father, but also to effectuate the
provisions of Republic Act No. 7610 (RA 7610), otherwise known as the Special Protection of
Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, and its implementing rules,
RA 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004,
and its implementing rules, and our own Rule on Violence Against Women and their Children.1

The provisions on confidentiality of these enactments uniformly seek to respect the dignity and
protect the privacy of women and their children. Sec. 29 of RA 7610 provides:

29
 Sec. 29. Confidentiality. — at the instance of the offended party, his name may be
withheld from the public until the court acquires jurisdiction over the case.

It shall be unlawful for any editor, publisher, and reporter or columnist in case of printed
materials, announcer or producer in the case of television and radio broadcasting,
producer and director in the case of the movie industry, to cause undue and
sensationalized publicity of any case of a violation of this Act which results in the moral
degradation and suffering of the offended party.

Sec. 44 of RA 9262 similarly provides:

Sec. 44. Confidentiality.—All records pertaining to cases of violence against women and
their children including those in the barangay shall be confidential and all public officers
and employees and public or private clinics or hospitals shall respect the right to privacy
of the victim. Whoever publishes or causes to be published, in any format, the name,
address, telephone number, school, business address, employer, or other identifying
information of a victim or an immediate family member, without the latter's consent, shall
be liable to the contempt power of the court.

Any person who violates this provision shall suffer the penalty of one (1) year
imprisonment and a fine of not more than Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).

Likewise, the Rule on Violence Against Women and their Children states:

Sec. 40. Privacy and confidentiality of proceedings.—All hearings of cases of violence

against women and their children shall be conducted in a manner consistent with the
dignity of women and their children and respect for their privacy.

Records of the cases shall be treated with utmost confidentiality. Whoever publishes or
causes to be published, in any format, the name, address, telephone number, school,
business address, employer or other identifying information of the parties or an
immediate family or household member, without their consent or without authority of the
court, shall be liable for contempt of court and shall suffer the penalty of one year
imprisonment and a fine of not more than Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos.

It is worth mentioning in this connection that the Court has resolved to refrain from posting in its
Internet Web Page the full text of decisions in cases involving child sexual abuse in response to a
letter from a mother of a child abuse victim addressed to the Chief Justice expressing anxiety
over the posting of full text decisions of the Supreme Court on its Internet Web Page. The mother
submitted that confidentiality and the best interest of the child must prevail over public access to
information and pleaded that her daughter's case, as well as those of a similar nature, be excluded
from the Web Page.2

The Court required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), National Press Club (NPC), Philippine Press Institute (PPI), Kapisanan ng
mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP) and the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD) to comment on whether or not it is proper to post the full text of decisions of similar
cases on the Supreme Court Web Page.

The position of the OSG in its Comment3 is noteworthy. The OSG submits that the posting of the
full text of decisions in cases involving child abuse on the Supreme Court Web Page violates the
right to privacy of the aggrieved parties. In order to determine whether the subject matter upon
which the right to privacy being invoked falls within the constitutionally-protected zone of
privacy, it must be shown that the person's expectation of privacy is reasonable. The
reasonableness of such expectancy depends on a two–part test: (1) whether by his conduct, the
individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) whether this expectation is one that
society recognizes as reasonable.
30
According to the OSG, the fact that the aggrieved child may have consented, through a parent or
guardian, to a public hearing of the case does not negate the expectation of privacy which the
child may later invoke because child victims cannot be presumed to have intended their initial
agreement to extend beyond the termination of their case to the posting of the decision reached
by the Court on the Web Page. Moreover, such an expectation of privacy is reasonable
considering the various statutes and rules which reveal the intention of the State to maintain the
confidentiality of information pertaining to child abuse cases.

The OSG invites the Court's attention to a New Jersey statute which provides that all court
documents which state the name, address and identity of a child victim in certain sexual assault,
endangering the welfare and abuse and neglect cases should remain confidential. The name of
the victim shall not appear in any public record; rather, initials or a fictitious name shall appear.
The offenses covered by the law include aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated
criminal sexual contact, criminal sexual contact, endangering the welfare of children, and any
action alleging an abused or neglected child. Thus, in Application of V Pub. Corp., 120 N.J. 508
(1990), and Div. of Youth & Fam. Serv. V. J.B., 120 N.J. 112 (1990), the New Jersey Supreme
Court provided guidelines in the implementation of this statute.

In conclusion, the OSG suggests the adoption of a system of coding which could include the use
of pseudonyms in cases of a similar nature. Short of withdrawing the full text of decisions in
such cases from the Web Page, the OSG proposes that the Court instead replace the material
information, such as the name of the child-victim, in its decisions.

The DSWD imparted the same sentiment. It submits that the court records of child abuse cases
should be treated with strict confidentiality not only throughout the court proceedings, but even
after the promulgation of the decision in order to protect the right to privacy of the child and her
family and to preclude instances where undue disclosure of information may impair the
treatment and rehabilitation of the child-victim.4

The Court likewise appreciates the separate comments of the KBP and NPC. The KBP informs
the Court that its members have agreed not to identify in their broadcasts the names of children
who are victims of abuse or are in conflict with the law.5 The NPC, on the other hand, tells us
that the prevailing media practice is to inquire whether these individuals wish to have their
names appear in the report. If they do not, media would normally take off the names and merely
provide a very general description of the individual in recognition of the need to carefully
balance the right to information with the welfare of the parties involved.6

Taking all these opinions into account and in view of recent enactments which unequivocally
express the intention to maintain the confidentiality of information in cases involving violence
against women and their children, in this case and henceforth, the Court shall withhold the real
name of the victim-survivor7 and shall use fictitious initials instead to represent her. Likewise,
the personal circumstances of the victims-survivors or any other information tending to establish
or compromise their identities, as well those of their immediate family or household members,
shall not be disclosed.8

On February 18, 2002, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, convicted Melchor
Cabalquinto (Cabalquinto) on two (2) counts for the rape of his eight-year old daughter, AAA.
The dispositive portion of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, finding accused guilty in both Criminal Case No. Q-98-79683 and
Criminal Case No. Q-98-79684, for Rape, judgment is hereby rendered sentencing
accused MELCHOR CABALQUINTO Y MINGO to suffer the penalty of DEATH on
both counts, pursuant to the penalty imposed under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code of the Philippines as amended by RA 7659.

Accused is further ordered to indemnify his daughter-victim the sum of Seventy Five
Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) for damages, in each count.
31
 SO ORDERED.9

This case was initiated by a sworn statement filed by AAA, assisted by her mother, ABC,10 which
resulted in the filing of two (2) Informations for rape, the first alleging:

That on or about the 8th day of November 1998, in xxx City, Philippines, the said
accused by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously undress [AAA], his own daughter, 8 years old, a minor, put himself on top of
her, inside the room of their residence located at xxx,11 this City, and thereafter have
carnal knowledge with her against her will and without her consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.12

and the second stating:

That on or about the 13th day of November 1998, in xxx City, Philippines, the said
accused by means of force and intimidation did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously undress [AAA], his own daughter, 8 years of age, a minor, put himself on top
of her, inside the room of their residence located at xxx,13 this City, and thereafter have
carnal knowledge with her against her will and without her consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.14

Cabalquinto pleaded not guilty on arraignment. Trial on the merits ensued which resulted in his
conviction and the imposition of the penalty of death. The records of the case were thereafter
forwarded to this Court on automatic review.

On December 10, 2002, the Court issued a Resolution requiring the parties to submit their
respective briefs. The parties complied. Pursuant to the case of People v. Efren Mateo,15 however,
the Court issued a Resolution on September 14, 2004, transferring the case to the Court of
Appeals for appropriate action.

The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court and added an award of P50,000.00 as
moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.16 The case is again before us for our final
disposition.

The prosecution presented as witnesses AAA herself, her mother ABC, and Dr. Stella Guerrero-
Manalo (Dr. Manalo) of the Child Protection Unit (CPU) of the Philippine General Hospital
(PGH).

ABC testified that she is the common-law wife of Cabalquinto and that they have four children,
namely: BBB, CCC, the child-victim AAA, and DDD. At around 8:45 p.m. of November 13,
1998, she was on her way home to xxx, and saw her sons BBB and CCC outside the house, and
her youngest daughter DDD playing with a cousin. As she was approaching the house, she
noticed that the door was closed although the lights were on. Since there is a half-inch gap
between the door and the wall, she peeped through the gap and saw Cabalquinto lying face down
making pumping motions on their daughter, AAA, who was lying underneath him with her
panties pulled down. When she heard Cabalquinto tell AAA to open her legs ("ibuka mo"), she
kicked and pounded the door. Cabalquinto immediately lay down. AAA then stood up and
opened the door. ABC entered the room and confronted Cabalquinto who only denied her
accusation. She then asked AAA what her father did to her. AAA did not say anything but looked
pale. 17

After regaining her composure, she went to her sister-in-law EEE, who lived on the second floor
of the house, and confided to the latter. At around 10:00 o'clock that night, she went to her sister's
house in xxx to seek advice. Her sister told her to report the matter to the barangay officials. The

32
barangay officials, in turn, told her to go to the police which she did the following day,
November 14, 1998.18

AAA's Salaysay was taken by the police and they were referred to the CPU of PGH. Because
there was no doctor on duty, she and AAA returned to the CPU on November 16, 1998. AAA
was examined by a doctor and a medical certificate was issued. They returned to the police
station where she executed her Salaysay. They then proceeded to the fiscal's office to lodge a
complaint.19

ABC further testified that during the police investigation on November 14, 1998, AAA revealed
to the police that a similar incident happened to her on November 8, 1998, the day of her friend's
birthday celebration.20

AAA testified that at around 8:45 p.m. on November 13, 1998, she was inside their house in xxx,
with her father, Cabalquinto, when the latter instructed her to close the door and windows and
turn off the light. She obeyed but did not turn off the light. Her father then told her to lie down
and immediately placed himself on top of her. He then undressed her, brought out his penis,
asked her to masturbate him and to suck his penis, inserted his penis in her private parts and
licked her private parts. He told her not to tell her ninang DDD or her mother; otherwise, he
would kill them all. She felt pain in her stomach and pelvis after the incident.21

Corroborating her mother's testimony, AAA stated that while they were at the police station, she
disclosed that she was also raped by her father on November 8, 1998. She remembered the
incident because it was the day her friend, FFF, celebrated her birthday. According to AAA, her
father had been drinking that night. When she went home to drink water, she was called by her
father, told to close the door and windows and to turn off the lights. She obeyed but did not turn
off the lights. Her father then placed himself on top of her and told her to masturbate him.22

AAA further testified that she was not enrolled in school because her mother had been abroad.23

It should be mentioned that in her Sinumpaang Salaysay dated November 14, 1998, AAA stated
that her father had raped her seven (7) times since her mother left for abroad. She said that she
distinctly remembered having been raped by her father on November 8, 1998, her friend's
birthday; August 16, 1998 during the fiesta; and on November 13, 1998, the day before her
statement was taken. However, she said no longer remembered the exact dates of the other
incidents.24

Dr. Manalo, who conducted the physical examination of AAA, testified that AAA had no injury
on her genitalia; that her hymen is quite large and distensible possibly because of penile
penetration; and that she recovered a strand of pubic hair inside AAA's vaginal vault which could
only have reached the area as a consequence of penile penetration because AAA did not have
pubic hair yet.25

On cross-examination, Dr. Manalo stated that she did not find any traces of bleeding in AAA's
vagina but that injury is uncommon in incestuous rape.26

The trial court admitted the following documentary evidence formally offered by the
prosecution: (1) Referral Letter to the Office of the Prosecutor; (2) Sinumpaang Salaysay of
ABC; (3) Sinumpaang Salaysay of AAA; (4) medical certificate; (5) birth certificate of AAA;
and (6) Curriculum Vitae of Dr. Stella Manalo.27

Testifying as lone witness for his defense, Cabalquinto denied that he raped AAA on November 8
and 13, 1998. He claimed that on November 13, 1998, he just slept in the sala of their house with
AAA and DDD, while his sons, BBB and CCC, slept in another room. On November 8, 1998, he
claimed that after cooking the food for FFF's birthday party, he went home and slept. He averred
that the cases filed against him were the offshoot of frequent quarrels between his common-law
wife, ABC, and his brother, GGG.28
33
We have meticulously and painstakingly examined the records as well as the transcripts of
stenographic notes and find no cause to overturn the findings of fact and conclusions of the trial
court and the Court of Appeals. We affirm Cabalquinto's conviction.

Cabalquinto's claim that there are material inconsistencies between the testimonies of AAA and
ABC with regard to whether AAA cried out as she was being raped because while AAA testified
that she shouted twice, ABC stated that she did not see AAA struggle nor hear her call out, is
unconvincing.

AAA was firm and unwavering in her narration of her traumatic experience. During cross
examination, she remained steadfast in her assertion that her father inserted his penis inside her
genitals and raped her, even demonstrating what she understood of the word rape by forming a
circle with her fingers and moving her middle finger inside and out indicating sexual
intercourse.29

Thus, the trial court gave full credence to AAA's testimony and ruled:

From the testimony of the principal witness, [AAA] alone, viz, the testimony of the
accused, there is no reason to doubt that accused has [sic] molested his daughter, and had
carnal knowledge of her, on two occasions, nighttime on November 8 and 13, 1998, when
[AAA] was then only 8 years old, inside their dwelling.

The testimony of [AAA] was even more bolstered by the consistency of her declaration
under cross by the defense counsel, Atty. Torralba of the Public Attorney's Office, whose
attempt to discredit [AAA]'s accusation by making it appear that she would not have
known how to testify that she was raped by her own father, had she not been coached by
someone else to say so, miserably failed. In the following portions of [AAA]'s cross-
examination by the Defense, instead of destroying [AAA]'s credibility the more that it
was established that accused indeed raped her (sic) daughter.

xxxx

[AAA]'s declaration that she was raped corroborates the testimony of the doctor who
testified that a strand of hair was found inside [AAA]'s vaginal vault. The doctor's
testimony that the presence of a strand of hair inside the vaginal vault would not be
possible without sexual intercourse, bolsters the accusation of [AAA] that she had been
raped. Of course, there is no test to determine whose hair was it, but considering [AAA]'s
testimony that accused had carnal knowledge of her twice prior to examination, a
conclusion that the hair is accused's is plausible. The idea that that hair was purposely
placed inside [AAA]'s vagina would be absurdity. Thus, when [AAA] pointed to her
father as the person who molested her, this Court can only believe because no daughter in
[AAA]'s age would accuse her own father of any wrongdoing, if it is not for the fact that
he had wronged her, and that hair (pubic or not) is accused's.30

ABC's testimony of what she witnessed regarding the act of rape corroborates AAA's account.
The inconsistency between the testimony of AAA and her mother pertains merely to a
circumstance that is of little consequence to the question of whether rape was actually
committed. Whether AAA cried out or not does not discount rape.

It should be emphasized that AAA was but eight (8) years old when the rapes happened. A child
of her tender years cannot be expected to be able to recount the details of her torment with
exactitude. In People v. Villar,31 the accused questioned the inconsistency between the victim's
declaration in her sworn statement and her direct testimony in court as to the exact time when
she was first raped by the accused in 1993.32 The Court held that it cannot impose the burden of
exactness in the victim's recollection of her harrowing experience more so because the victim
was an innocent and tender nine (9)-year old lass when she was first raped.33 Citing People v.

34
Sagucio,34 we also held that errorless testimony cannot be expected especially when a witness is
recounting the details of a harrowing experience.

On the other hand, ABC must have also been so devastated by what she witnessed her husband
doing to their daughter that she might have perceived things differently from AAA.

Persons who witness an event may perceive it from different points of reference, hence they may
have different accounts of how the incident took place. What is important is that their testimonies
reinforce each other on the essential facts and that their versions corroborate and substantially
coincide with each other to make a consistent and coherent whole.35 The fact therefore that the
statements of AAA and ABC differ on some minor details does not in any way affect their
credibility or detract from the integrity and truthfulness of their declarations. The variations in
their testimonies present a believable narration of what actually happened, made more so
precisely because of their imperfections.36

Cabalquinto offers a flimsy excuse in answer to the serious accusation against him. He claims
that ABC's frequent spats with his brother motivated her to file the rape cases against him.

It is improbable that a victim of tender years, especially one unexposed to the ways of the world
as AAA must have been, would impute a crime as serious as rape to her own father if it were not
true. There is no doubt in our minds that AAA was impelled solely by a desire to let justice find
its way.37

As regards ABC, we are convinced that she did not expose AAA to the ignominy that rape
victims must face only to get back at Cabalquinto's brother. Had that been her motive, she would
have accused Cabalquinto's brother and not Cabalquinto himself. No mother would possibly
wish to stamp her child falsely with the stigma that follows a rape only for the purpose of
punishing someone against whom she has no grudge whatsoever.38 ABC's zeal in prosecuting this
case demonstrates to us her yearning that the law may do her daughter justice even as her own
father had so depravedly wronged her.

Further, the contemporaneous and subsequent conduct of mother and child are revealing of the
veracity of the rape charge. It should be emphasized that upon witnessing the outrage done to her
daughter, ABC immediately confronted Cabalquinto. Shortly afterwards, she confided to her
sister-in-law and traveled all the way to xxx to seek her own sister's advice. The following day,
mother and child went to the police to report the incident and to execute their sworn statements.
ABC also took her daughter to the CPU of PGH for the latter's medical examination.

These significant circumstances cannot be ignored. We are compelled to believe, especially in

the face of Cabalquinto's plain denial, that AAA was indeed sexually abused and raped by her
own father.

Carnal knowledge of a woman under 12 years of age is rape as defined under Art. 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, and is qualified when the offender is a parent of the victim, in which case,
the death penalty shall be imposed as provided under the Death Penalty Law.39 In this case, the
qualifying circumstances of the victim's minority and her relationship with the accused as the
latter's daughter were properly alleged in the Informations, proven during trial and not refuted by
Cabalquinto. However, in view of Republic Act No. 9346 which prohibits the imposition of the
death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole should instead be
imposed.

As regards the civil liability of Cabalquinto, we affirm the award of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity for each count and additionally award AAA P75,000.00 as moral damages and
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count consistent with current jurisprudence.40 Moral
damages, separate and distinct from the civil indemnity, are automatically granted in rape cases.
Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are imposed to deter fathers with aberrant sexual
behaviors from sexually abusing their daughters.41
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WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, in Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-98-79683 and Q-98-79684, as well as the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 00260, are AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Appellant MELCHOR
CABALQUINTO is sentenced, in each of the criminal cases subject of this review, to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole and to pay the victim, AAA (to be
identified through the Informations filed with the trial court in this case), the amounts of
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and the further sum of P25,000.00
as exemplary damages plus costs.

SO ORDERED.

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