Labor Cases: 7th Assign. 2-I <3 1. 2. 3. Alhambra Industries v.

NLRC, 238 SCRA 232 Interorient Maritime Enterprises v. NLRC, 235 SCRA 268 Colegio De San Juan De Letran v. Association of Employees And Faculty Of Letran, 340 SCRA 587. Farrol v. CA. 325 SCRA 331 Vh Manufacturing Inc. v. NLRC, 322 SCRA 417 Cebu Filveneer Corporation v. NLRC, 286 SCRA 556 Golden Thread Knitting Industries v. NLRC, 304 SCRA 720 Central Pangasinan Electric Coop Inc. v. Macaraeg, 395 SCRA 720 Salvador v. Philippine Mining Service Corp., 395 SCRA 729 Habana v. NLRC, 298 SCRA 537 PLDT v. Tolentino, 438 SCRA 555 Fujitsu Computer Products of the Phils. v. CA, 454 SCRA 737 Genuino Ice Co Inc v. Magpantay, 493 SCRA 195 Lakpue v. Belga, 473 SCRA 617 Micro Sales Operation Network V NLRC, 472 SCRA 328 Challenge Socks Corp v. CA, 474 SCRA 356 Chua v. NLRC, 453 SCRA 244 Paguio Transport Corp v. NLRC, 294 SCRA 657 Santos v. San Miguel Corporation, 399 SCRA 172 Philippine National Construction Corporation v. Matias, 458 SCRA 148 Vitarich Corp v. NLRC, 307 SCRA 509 Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development Corp v. NLRC, 290 SCRA 479 Leonardo v. NLRC, 333 SCRA 589 Floren Hotel v. NLRC, 458 SCRA 128 Batongbacal v. Associated Bank, 168 SCRA 600 Stellar Industrial Service Inc v. NLRC, 252 SCRA 323 Santos v. NLRC, 287 SCRA 117 Aparente Sr v. NLRC, 331 SCRA 82 Eastern Telecommunications Phils Inc v. Diamse, 491 SCRA 239 Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corp v. Nlrc, 206 SCRA 702

4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30.

ALHAMBRA INDUSTRIES V. NLRC (RUPISAN) 238 SCRA 232 BELLOSILLO; November 18, 1994 NATURE Special civil action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari FACTS - Alhambra employed Rupisan as salesman on 6-mo probationary basis. Alhambra made surprise audit, alleged violations were purportedly committed by him. He was placed under 1-mo preventive suspension. He protested. He alleges that charges against him had become academic when he was given clearance of all accountabilities. - A day before end of suspension, he was terminated. He sued Alhambra. - Labor Arbiter found that the termination was for just cause, but there was a violation of due process (failure to furnish copy of audit report). - Both parties appealed to NLRC which affirmed Arbiters findings. ISSUE WON NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in sustaining finding of Labor Arbiter that Rupisan was illegally dismissed but directing his reinstatement so he could have explained HELD YES - Employment is no longer just an ordinary human acctivity. For most families the main source of their livelihood, employment has now leveled off with property rights which no one may be deprived of without due process of law. - Termination of employment is not anymore a mere cessation or severance of contractual relationship but an economic phenomenon affecting members of the family. This explains why under the broad principles of social justice the dismissal of employees is adequately protected by the laws of the state. - A termination without just cause

entitles a worker to reinstatement regardless of whether he was accorded due process. On the other hand, termination of a worker for cause, even without procedural due process, does not warrant reinstatement, but the employer incurs liability for damages. - Since the Labor Arbiter found a valid ground for dismissal, it erred when it directed reinstatement. - To order reinstatement and compel the parties to start the procedure from step one would be circuitous because almost invariably that same issue of validity of the ground of dismissal would be brought back to the Labor Arbiter for adjudication. We laid down in Wenphil Corporation v. NLRC3 that an otherwise justly grounded termination without procedural due process would only sanction payment of damages - Standards of due process in judicial as well as administrative proceedings have long been established. In its bare minimum due process of law simply means giving notice and opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered. - When the private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner, he was afforded the right to an investigation by the labor arbiter. Although belatedly, private respondent was afforded due process before the labor arbiter wherein the just cause of his dismissal had been established. With such finding, it would be arbitrary and unfair to order his reinstatement with backwages. - It will be highly prejudicial to the interests of the employer to impose on him the services of an employee who has been shown to be guilty of the charges that warranted his dismissal from employment. Indeed, it will demoralize the rank and file. - However, the petitioner must nevertheless be held to account for failure to extend to private respondent his right to an investigation before causing his dismissal.

INTERORIENT MARITIME ENTERPRISES INC V NLRC (TAYONG) 235 SCRA 268 FELICIANO; August 11, 1994 NATURE PETITION for reviewof a decision of the National Labor Relations Commission FACTS - Captain Rizalino Tayong, a licensed Master Mariner with experience in commanding ocean-going vessels, was employed on 1989 by petitioners for 1 yr as stated in his employment contract. He assumed command of petitioners vessel at the port of Hongkong. His instructions were to replenish bunker and diesel fuel, to sail to South Africa and there to load 120,000 metric tons of coal. However, while in HK and unwarding cargo, he received a weather report that a storm would hit HK, so precautionary measures were taken to secure the safety of the vessel and its crew, considering that the vessels turbocharger was leaking and the vessel was 14 yrs old. He also followed-up the requisition by the former captain for supplies of oxygen and acetylene necessary for the welding-repair of the turbo-charger and the economizer. -The vessel then sailed from HK for Singapore. Captain Tayong reported a water leak from M.E. Turbo Chapter No. 2 Exhaust gas casing so he was instructed to black off the cooling water and maintain reduced RPM unless authorized by the owners. However, the vessel stopped in mid-ocean for 6 hrs and 45 minutes due to a leaking economizer. He was instructed to shut down the economizer and use the auxiliary boiler instead. - The Chief Engineer reminded Captain Tayong that the oxygen and acetylene supplies had not been delivered. He then informed the shipowner that the departure of the vessel for South Africa may be affected because of the delay in the delivery of the supplies. The shipowner advised Captain Tayong to contact its technical director who

would provide a solution for the supply of said oxygen and acetylene. The technical director recommended to Captain Tayong that by shutting off the water to the turbo charger and using the auxiliary boiler, there should be no further problem. Captain Tayong agreed to the recommendation of the technical director, but communicated his reservations regarding proceeding to South Africa without the requested supplies. So the shipowner advised him to wait for the supplies. - Finally, the vessel arrived at South Africa. However, Captain Tayong was instructed to turn-over his post to the new captain, and was repatriated to the Philippines after serving petitioners for around 2 wks. He was not informed of the charges against him, and was just sent a letter after arriving in the Philippines. He therefore instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal before the POEA, claiming his unpaid salary for the unexpired portion of the written employment contract, plus attorneys fees. - POEA: dismissed complaint, there was valid cause for his untimely repatriation (the company alleged that due to Captain Tayongs refusal to sail immediately to South Africa, the vessel was placed off-hire by the charterers, and the charterers refused to pay the charter hire or compensation corresponding to 12 hours, amounting to US $15,500.00.They fired Captain Tayong for lost of confidence; POEA believed that the Captains concern for the oxygen and acetylene was not legitimate as these supplies were not necessary or indispensable for running the vessel.) - NLRC: reversed and set aside POEA decision because Captain Tayong had not been afforded an opportunity to be heard and that no substantial evidenced was adduced to establish the basis for petitioners loss of trust or confidence. Captain had acted in accordance with his duties to maintain the seaworthiness of the vessel and to insure the safety of the ship and crew. ISSUE

WON Captain Tayong was arbitrarily dismissed and without cause as reasonably established in an appropriate investigation (whether or not Captain Tayong had reasonable grounds to believe that the safety of the vessel and the crew under his command or the possibility of substantial delay at sea required him to wait for the delivery of the supplies needed for the repair of the turbo-charger and the economizer before embarking on the long voyage from Singapore to South Africa) HELD YES Ratio It is well settled in this jurisdiction that confidential and managerial employees cannot be arbitrarily dismissed at any time, and without cause as reasonably established in an appropriate investigation. Such employees, too, are entitled to security of tenure, fair standards of employment and the protection of labor laws. Reasoning - Captain Tayong was denied any opportunity to defend himself. Petitioners curtly dismissed him from his command and summarily ordered his repatriation to the Philippines without informing him of the charge or charges against him, and much less giving him a chance to refute any such charge. In fact, it was only 2 months after his repatriation that Captain Tayong received a telegram dated 24 October 1989 from InterOrient requiring him to explain why he delayed sailing to South Africa. - NLRCs conclusion was supported by substantial evidence: The official report of the technical director, which stated that a disruption in the normal functioning of the vessels turbo charger and economizer had prevented the full or regular operation of the vessel and that he was the one who recommended the reduction of RPM during the voyage to South Africa instead of waiting in Singapore for the supplies that would permit shipboard repair of the malfunctioning machinery and equipment, supported

NLRCs conclusion that Captain Tayong did not arbitrarily and maliciously delay the voyage to South Africa. - Captain Tayong's decision (arrived at after consultation with the vessel's Chief Engineer) to wait seven (7) hours in Singapore for the delivery on board the Oceanic Mindoro of the requisitioned supplies needed for the welding-repair, on board the ship, of the turbo-charger and the economizer equipment of the vessel, did not constitute merely arbitrary, capricious or grossly insubordinate behavior on his part. In the view of the NLRC, that decision of Captain Tayong did not constitute a legal basis for the summary dismissal of Captain Tayong and for termination of his contract with petitioners prior to the expiration of the term thereof. Obiter - The captain of a vessel is a confidential and managerial employee within the meaning of the above doctrine. A master or captain, for purposes of maritime commerce, is one who has command of a vessel. A captain commonly performs three (3) distinct roles: (1) he is a general agent of the shipowner; (2) he is also commander and technical director of the vessel; and (3) he is a representative of the country under whose flag he navigates. Of these roles, by far the most important is the role performed by the captain as commander of the vessel; for such role (which, to our mind, is analogous to that of "Chief Executive Officer" [CEO] of a presentday corporate enterprise) has to do with the operation and preservation of the vessel during its voyage and the protection of the passengers (if any) and crew and cargo. In his role as general agent of the shipowner, the captain has authority to sign bills of lading, carry goods aboard and deal with the freight earned, agree upon rates and decide whether to take cargo. The ship captain, as agent of the shipowner, has legal authority to enter into contracts with respect to the vessel and the trading of the vessel, subject to applicable limitations established by statute, contract or

instructions and regulations of the shipowner. To the captain is committed the governance, care and management of the vessel. Clearly, the captain is vested with both management and fiduciary functions. - Indeed, if the ship captain is convinced, as a reasonably prudent and competent mariner acting in good faith that the shipowner's or ship agent's instructions (insisted upon by radio or telefax from their officers thousand of miles away) will result, in the very specific circumstances facing him, in imposing unacceptable risks of loss or serious danger to ship or crew, he cannot casually seek absolution from his responsibility, if a marine casualty occurs, in such instructions. 23 - Compagnie de Commerce v. Hamburg: xxx where by the force of circumstances, a man has the duty cast upon him of taking some action for another, and under that obligation adopts a course which, to the judgment of a wise and prudent man, is apparently the best for the interest of the persons for whom he acts in a given emergency, it may properly be said of the course so taken that it was in a mercantile sense necessary to take it." - ON management prerogative: that prerogative is nevertheless not to be exercised, in the case at bar, at the cost of loss of Captain Tayong's rights under his contract with petitioner's and under Philippine law. Disposition petitioners having failed to show grave abuse of discretion amounting to loss or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the NLRC in rendering its assailed decision, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners

KAPUNAN; September 18, 2000 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - Private respondent Ambas, the newly elected president of the Association of Employees and Faculty of Letran (Union) wanted to continue the renegotiation of its CBA with petitioner Colegio de San Juan de Letran (Letran) for the last 2 years of the CBAs 5 year lifetime. However, petitioner claimed the CBA was already prepared for signing by the parties. The CBA was submitted to a referendum by the union members, who rejected it. - Petitioner accused the union officers of bargaining in bad faith before the NLRC which decided in favor of petitioner but was later reversed on appeal with the NLRC. - The Union notified the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of its intention to strike on the grounds of petitioners refusal to bargain. Later, the parties agreed to disregard the unsigned CBA and start negotiating a new 5 year CBA for which the Union submitted its proposals. Ambas protested a recent changing of her schedule and petitioner sent the Union a letter dismissing Ambas for alleged insubordination after which the Union amended its notice of strike to include the said dismissal. - Both parties again discussed the ground rules for the CBA renegotiation but petitioner stopped the negotiations after purportedly receiving information that a new group of employees (ACEC) filed a petition for certification election, giving rise to the issue of majority representation of the employees. - The Union finally went on strike and the Sec. of Labor and Employment assumed jurisdiction, ordering those on strike to return to work and for petitioner to accept them under the same terms before the strike. All were readmitted except Ambas. The Sec. issued an order declaring petitioner guilty of unfair labor practice and directing the reinstatement of Ambas with backwages. Letrans MFR was

COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN V ASSN OF EMPLOYEES AND FACULTY OF LETRAN 340 SCRA 587

denied and the CA affirmed the Sec.s decision, hence this petition. ISSUES 1. WON petitioner is guilty of unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain with the union 2. WON the termination of the Ambas amounts to an interference of the employees right to self-organization HELD 1. YES - Petitioner is guilty of unfair labor practice by its stern refusal to bargain in good faith with respondent union. - Article 252 defines collective bargaining as the performance of a mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement. The Union, in sending its proposals during the 2nd CBA negotiations, kept up its end of the bargain while Letran devised ways and means to prevent the negotiation. - Letran also failed to make a timely reply to the Unions proposals (no counter-proposal a month later), violating Article 250 which requires such a reply within 10 days upon receipt of a written notice of said proposals. Letrans refusal to reply is an indication of bad faith, showing a lack of sincere desire to negotiate. - In a last ditch effort, Letran suspended the bargaining process on the ground that it allegedly received information that ACEC had filed a petition for certification election. The mere filing of a petition for certification election does not ipso facto justify the suspension of negotiations when there is no legitimate representation issue raised; also, such an action for intervention had already prescribed. 2. YES - While we recognize the right of the employer to terminate the services of an employee for just cause, the dismissal of employees must be made within the parameters of law and pursuant to the tenets of equity and fair play and must be exercised in good faith. It must not amount to interfering with, restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization as it

would amount to unlawful labor practice under Article 248. -It would appear that Letran terminated Ambas in order to strip the union of a leader who would fight for her co-workers rights at the bargaining table and frustrate their desire to form a new CBA. The charge of insubordination was a mere ploy to give a color of legality to the action to dismiss her. Management may have the prerogative to discipline its employees for insubordination but when it interferes with employees right to self-organization, it amounts to union-busting which is a prohibited act. Disposition petition is DENIED for lack of merit

his preventive suspension had expired. Ferrol even manifested his willingness to settle the case. RCPI informed him that his employment had already been terminated. The conflict was sent to the grievance committee. Two years later, it was submitted for voluntary arbitration. - VA ruled in favor of Farrol. RCPI filed a petition for certiorari before the CA which reversed VA decision. CA also dismissed MFR. - Farrol now filed a petition for review on certiorari on the ground that his dismissal was illegal because he was not afforded due process and that he cannot be held liable for the loss of trust and confidence reposed in him. ISSUE WON he was illegally terminated HELD YES - BOP resides on the employer to prove that there was valid cause for dismissal, and that he was afforded the opportunity to be heard and defend himself. - For the 1st notice, RCPI required petitioner to explain why he failed to account for the shortage. The 2nd notice was that informing Farrol of his termination. it does not clearly cite the reasons for dismissal, nor were there facts and circumstances in support thereof. - Even assuming there was a breach of trust and confidence, there was no evidence that Farrol was a managerial employee. The term trust and confidence is restricted to managerial employees. - RCPI alleges that under its rules, petitioners infarction is punishable by dismissal. However, employers rules cannot preclude the state from inquiring whether strict and rigid application or interpretation would be too harsh to the employee. This is Farrols 1st offense, to which the Court holds that dismissal is too harsh and grossly disproportionate. Disposition CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and new one entered REINSTATING the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator subject to the MODIFICATION that petitioners separation pay be recomputed to

include the period within which backwages are due. For this purpose, this case is REMANDED to the Voluntary Arbitrator for proper computation of backwages, separation pay, 13th month pay, sick leave conversion and vacation leave conversion. VH MANUFACTURING INC V NLRC (GAMIDO) 322 SCRA 417 DE LEON; January 19, 2000 NATURE Before us is a petition for certiorari FACTS - Since November 5, 1985 Gamido was employed in VH Manufacturings business of manufacturing liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) cylinders. He served as a quality control inspector with the principal duty of inspecting LPG cylinders for any possible defects. His service with the company was abruptly interrupted on February 14, 1995, when he was served a notice of termination of his employment. - His dismissal stemmed from an incident on February 10, 1995 wherein VHs company President, Alejandro Dy Juanco, allegedly caught private Gamido sleeping on the job. On that same day, private respondent was asked through a written notice from the petitioners Personnel Department to explain within twentyfour (24) hours why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for his violation of Company Rule 15-b which provides for a penalty of separation for sleeping during working hours. Without delay, private respondent replied in a letter which reads: "Sir, ipagpaumanhin po ninyo kung nakapikit ako sa aking puwesto dahil hinihintay ko po ang niliha hi Abreu para i quality pasensiya na po kung hindi ko po namalayan ang pagdaan ninyo dahil maingay po ang painting booth." Notwithstanding his foregoing reply, he was terminated. - Feeling aggrieved, he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, praying for reinstatement to his position as quality control inspector. Labor Arbiter declared that Gamidos dismissal is

FARROL V CA (RCPI) 325 SCRA 331 YNARES-SANTIAGA; February 10, 2000 FACTS - Wenifrado Farrol was the station cashier of RCPI Cotabato City Station. - There was a P50K cash shortage in the branchs Peragram Petty Cash Funds. Farrol was required to explain the cash shortage. He paid to P25K to RCPI - He was then required to explain why he should not be dismissed. Petitioner wrote to the Field Auditor stating that the missing funds were used for the payment of the retirement benefits earlier referred by the Branch Manager and that he already paid P25k. After he made 2 more payments of the cash shortage, he was placed under preventive suspensions. He still made 2 payments of the balance. - RCPI then sent Farrol a letter informing him of the termination of his services for alleging that part of the cash shortage was used for payment of salaries and retirement benefits, disregard of policies involving statistical reports, malversation/misappropriation (which is a ground for dismissal), and loss of trust and confidence. - Unaware of the termination letter, he requested his reinstatement since

anchored on a valid and just cause. NLRC reversed the decision. ISSUE WON Gamidos dismissal was too harsh a penaltly for his violation of company rule 15-b HELD YES - Basically, the reason cited for the dismissal of private respondent is sleeping on the job in violation of Company Rule 15-b. But according to Gamido, he was not sleeping on the job but was merely idle, waiting for the next cylinder to be checked. - In view of the gravity of the penalty of separation, as provided by the Company Rules and Regulation., in termination disputes, the burden of proof is always on the employer to prove that the dismissal was for a just and valid cause. What is at stake here is not only the job itself of the employee but also his regular income therefrom which is the means of livelihood of his family. - A thorough review of the record discloses that, contrary to the findings of the Labor Arbiter, petitioners claim that private respondent slept on the job was not substantiated by any convincing evidence other than the bare allegation of the officer. - Next, VHs reliance on the authorities it cited that sleeping on the job is always a valid ground for dismissal, is misplaced. The authorities cited involved security guards whose duty necessitates that they be awake and watchful at all times inasmuch as their function, to use the words in Luzon Stevedoring Corp. v. Court of Industrial Relations, is "to protect the company from pilferage or loss." Accordingly, the doctrine laid down in those cases is not applicable to the case at bar. - Finally, while an employer enjoys a wide latitude of discretion in the promulgation of policies, rules and regulations on work-related activities of the employees, those directives, however, must always be fair and reasonable, and the corresponding penalties, when prescribed, must be commensurate to the offense involved and to the degree of the

infraction. In the case at bar, the dismissal meted out on private respondent for allegedly sleeping on the job, under the attendant circumstances, appears to be too harsh a penalty, considering that he was being held liable for first time, after nine 9 of unblemished service, for an alleged offense which caused no prejudice to the employer, aside from absence of substantiation of the alleged offense. Neither was it shown that private respondents alleged negligence or neglect of duty, if any, was gross and habitual. Thus, reinstatement is just and proper. Disposition petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the challenged Decision and Order of public respondent NLRC are AFFIRMED. CEBU FILVENEER CORPORATION V NLRC (VILLAFLOR) 286 SCRA 556 PUNO; February 24, 1998 FACTS - Villaflor was the chief accountant of CFC. The top execs were Italians: Cordaro (president), Kun (GM), Marinoni (Production manager). Guillermo was the accounting clerk of Villaflor. Kun resigned from the company and asked for the liquidation of his investment: P125k. Two weeks later, he asked Guillermo for a blank check and a blank check voucher. Guillermo gave him. Three days later, Villlaflor noticed that a check voucher was missing. She asked Guillermo, who said that Mr. Kun has it. - Villaflor immediately informed Mr. Cordaro of what happened. She also wrote to the bank demanding the return of the encashed check. Marinoni charged Villaflor of complicity in Kuns irregular disbursement of company funds. Two days later, she was prevented entry to the office by the security guards. Her office drawer and safe were also forcibly opened upon order of Marinoni. Villaflor reported the incident to the PNP. - Marinoni suspended her for 30 days without pay for failure to come to work for half a day (the day she was

prevented entry). The next day she was preventively suspended for 30 days pending investigation of her involvement in Kuns booboo. The company also printed a newspaper ad for an accountant. Villaflor filed for illegal dismissal with the LA. LA decided in her favor. NLRC affirmed. ISSUE WON Villaflor was illegally dismissed HELD YES - Due to its far reaching implications, our Labor Code decrees that an employee cannot be dismissed, except for the most serious causes. Article 282 enumerates the causes for which the employer may terminate an employee. - Company says its loss of trust. The SC said that Villaflors omission cannot be described as willful to justify dismissal. A breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly and purposely. Petitioners merely proved the omission of the private respondent but there is no evidence whatsoever that it was done intentionally. Company says shes grossly or habitually negligent in the performance of her duties. The SC said that since she has not been remiss in the performance of her duties in the past, she cant be charged with habitual negligence. Neither is her negligence gross in character. Gross negligence implies a want or absence of or failure to exercise slight care or diligence or the entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them. She had not the slightest reason to distrust Kun because he was the GM and appears to have conducted himself well in the performance of his duties in the past. At most, its error of judgment, not gross negligence. Disposition NLRC decision affirmed. GOLDEN THREAD KNITTING INDUSTIRES V NLRC (MACASPAC) 304 SCRA 720

BELLOSILLO; March 11, 1999 NATURE Petition to review decision of NLRC FACTS - several employees of Golden Thread Knitting Industries (GTK) were dismissed for different reasons. 2 employees were allegedly for slashing the companys products (towels), 2 for redundancy, 1 for threatening the personnel manager and violating the company rules, and 1 for abandonment of work. - The laborers filed complaints for illegal dismissal. They allege that the company dismissed them in retaliation for establishing and being members of the Labor Union. GTK, on the other hand, contend that there were valid causes for the terminations. The dismissals were allegedly a result of the slashing of their products, rotation of work, which in turn was caused by the low demand for their products, and abandonment of work. WRT to the cases involving the slashing of their products and threats to the personnel manager, the dismissals were in effect a form of punishment. - The labor arbiter ruled partially in favor of GTK. He said that there was no showing that the dismissals were in retaliation for establishing a union. He, however, awarded separation pay to some employees. - NLRC, however, appreciated the evidence differently. It held that there was illegal dismissal and ordered reinstatement. ISSUE WON there was illegal dismissal HELD YES Ratio Dismissal is the ultimate penalty that can be meted to an employee. It must therefore be based on a clear and not on an ambiguous or ambivalent ground. Reasoning - WRT to the case involving slashing of towels, the employees were not given procedural due process. There was no notice and hearing, only

outright denial of their entry to the work premises by the security guards. The charges of serious misconduct were not sufficiently proved. - WRT to the employees dismissed for redundancy, there was also denial of procedural due process. Hearing and notice were not observed. Thus, although the characterization of an employees services is a management function, it must first be proved with evidence, which was not done in this case. the company cannot merely declare that it was overmanned. - WRT to the employee dismissed for disrespect, the SC believed the story version of the company (which essentially said that the personnel manager was threatened upon mere service of a suspension order to the employee), but ruled that the dismissal could not be upheld. the dismissal will not be upheld where it appears that the employees act of disrespect was provoked by the employer. xxx the employee hurled incentives at the personnel manager because she was provoked by the baseless suspension imposed on her. The penalty of dismissal must be commensurate with the act, conduct, or omission to the employee. - The dismissal was too harsh a penalty; a suspension of 1 week would have sufficed. GTK exercised their authority to dismiss without due regard to the provisions of the Labor Code. The right to terminate should be utilized with extreme caution because its immediate effect is to put an end to an employee's present means of livelihood while its distant effect, upon a subsequent finding of illegal dismissal, is just as pernicious to the employer who will most likely be required to reinstate the subject employee and grant him full back wages and other benefits. Disposition Decision AFFIRMED

PUNO; January 22, 2003 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - De Vera was employed as teller and Geronima Macaraeg as cashier by Central Pangasinan Electric cooperative inc. They accommodated and encashed two hundred eleven crossed checks of Evelyn Joy Estrada (de Veras sister) amounting to P6,945,128.95 payable to the cooperative despite the absence of any transaction or any outstanding obligation with it. They credited the checks as part of their collection and deposited the same together with their cash collection to the coops account at the Rural Bank of Central Pangasinan. - The finance department noticed these checks which bounced (insufficient funds).De Vera and Macaraeg were confronted with the discovery. De Vera admitted that the checks were issued by her sister and that she encashed them from the money collected from petitioners customers. - De Vera testified and admitted that she encashed the checks of Evelyn Joy Estrada because the latter is her older sister. Macaraeg admitted that she knew of the accommodations given by respondent de Vera to her sister; that she allowed her subordinate to do it because respondent de Vera is her kumare, and that she knew that Mrs. Estradas checks were sufficiently funded. - On March 19, 1999, on the basis of the findings and recommendation of Atty. Fernandez (presided over the hearing), the General Manager issued to respondents separate notices of termination for serious misconduct, and breach of trust and confidence reposed on them by management. Respondents questioned their dismissal before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB),claiming that their dismissal was without just cause and in violation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), which requires that the case should first be brought before a grievance committee.

Eventually, the parties agreed to submit the case to a voluntary arbitrator for arbitration. - LA-ruled in favor of defendants and ordered their reinstatement CA-affirmed ISSUES 1. WON the procedure leading to the termination of respondents Maribeth de Vera and Geronima Macaraeg was in violation of the provisions of the CBA 2. WON the respondents were validly dismissed HELD 1. Issue is moot and academic - The parties active participation in the voluntary arbitration proceedings, and their failure to insist that the case be remanded to the grievance machinery, shows a clear intention on their part to have the issue of respondents illegal dismissal directly resolved by the voluntary arbitrator. 2. YES - The respondents were validly dismissed. Article 282(c) of the Labor Code allows an employer to dismiss employees for willful breach of trust or loss of confidence. Proof beyond reasonable doubt of their misconduct is not required, it being sufficient that there is some basis for the same or that the employer has reasonable ground to believe that they are responsible for the misconduct and their participation therein rendered them unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded of their position. Reasoning - the acts of the respondents were clearly inimical to the financial interest of the petitioner. During the investigation, they admitted accommodating Evelyn Joy Estrada by encashing her checks from its funds for more than a year. They did so without petitioners knowledge, much less its permission. - there was willful breach of trust on the respondents part, as they took advantage of their highly sensitive positions to violate their duties. - the acts of the respondents caused damage to the petitioner. During those times the checks were illegally

encashed, petitioner was not able to fully utilize the collections, primarily in servicing its debts. - it is not material that they did not misappropriate any amount of money, nor incur any shortage relative to the funds in their possession. The basic premise for dismissal on the ground of loss of confidence is that the employees concerned hold positions of trust. The betrayal of this trust is the essence of the offence for which an employee is penalized. - the respondents held positions of utmost trust and confidence. As teller and cashier, respectively, they are expected to possess a high degree of fidelity. They are entrusted with a considerable amount of cash. Respondent de Vera accepted payments from petitioners consumers while respondent Macaraeg received remittances for deposit at petitioners bank. They did not live up to their duties and obligations.

SALVADOR V PHILIPPINE MINING SERVICE CORP 395 SCRA 729 PUNO; January 22, 2003 FACTS - JOSE V. SALVADOR was first employed by respondent in 1981. He rose from the ranks and assumed the position of Plant Inspection Foreman in 1991. He was tasked to: (1) supervise plant equipment and facility inspection; (2) confirm actual defects; (3) establish inspection standards and frequency; (4) analyze troubles and recommend counter measures; and (5) prepare weekly/monthly inspection schedule.[3] - As early as March 1, 1985, respondent instituted the shift boss scheme whereby the foreman from the Plant Section and the foreman from the Mining Section rotate as shift boss throughout their night shift to oversee and supervise both the mining and plant operations. The shift boss was entrusted with the care, supervision and protection of the entire plant.

CENTRAL PANGASINAN ELECTRIC COOP INC V MACARAEG 395 SCRA 720

- Aside from his employment with respondent, petitioner co-owned and managed LHO-TAB Enterprises, with his partner Ondo Alcantara. They were engaged in the manufacture and sale of hollow blocks. On September 29, 1997, petitioners employment relation with respondent was tainted with charges of pilferage and violation of company rules and policy, resulting to loss of confidence. Respondents evidence disclose that on September 29, 1997, at about 9:30 a.m., Koji Sawa, respondents Assistant Resident Manager for Administration, was on his way back to his office in the plant. He and his driver, Roberto Gresones, saw petitioner operating respondents payloader, scooping fine ore from the stockpile and loading it on his private cargo truck. As the truck was blocking the access road leading to the stockyards gate, Sawas car stopped near the stockpile and the driver blew the horn thrice. Petitioner did not hear him because of the noise emanating from his operation of the payloader. Sawas driver found a chance to pass through when the payloader maneuvered to get another scoop from the fine ore stockpile. - As it was contrary to respondents standard operating procedure for the plant foreman to operate the payloader, Sawa went to the administration office to check the delivery receipt covering the loading operation of petitioner that morning. However, sales-in-charge Eduardo Guangco was in the wharf, overseeing the loading of respondents product. Hence, it was only in the afternoon that Sawa was able to verify the delivery receipt covering petitioners loading transaction. The delivery receipt showed that it was dolomite spillage that was purchased by buyer Ondo Alcantara, not the fine ore that he saw petitioner loading on his truck. The receipt also showed it was not the respondent but Alcantara, the buyer, who was responsible for loading the spillage he purchased from the plant. - On the basis of the foregoing facts PMSC terminated Salvador for pilferage of company property. Labor Arbiter and NLRC ruled in favor of

Salvador but CA reversed. Hence, this recourse. ISSUES 1. WON the charge of pilferage against petitioner was supported by substantial evidence to warrant his dismissal from the service 2. WON the employer was well within its rights in imposing a harsh penalty considering the length of the employees service HELD 1. YES Ratio The settled rule in administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings is that proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required in determining the legality of an employers dismissal of an employee, and not even a preponderance of evidence is necessary as substantial evidence is considered sufficient. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence or relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise. Thus, substantial evidence is the least demanding in the hierarchy of evidence. Reasoning - The Labor Code provides that an employer may terminate the services of an employee for just cause and this must be supported by substantial evidence. In the case at bar, our evaluation of the evidence of both parties indubitably shows that petitioners dismissal for loss of trust and confidence was duly supported by substantial evidence. 2. NO Ratio As a general rule, employers are allowed wider latitude of discretion in terminating the employment of managerial employees as they perform functions which require the employers full trust and confidence. Reasoning - To be sure, length of service is taken into consideration in imposing the penalty to be meted an erring employee. However, the case at bar involves dishonesty and pilferage by petitioner which resulted in

respondents loss of confidence in him. Unlike other just causes for dismissal, trust in an employee, once lost is difficult, if not impossible, to regain. Moreover, petitioner was not an ordinary rank-and-file employee. He occupied a high position of responsibility. As foreman and shift boss, he had over-all control of the care, supervision and operations of respondents entire plant. It cannot be over-emphasized that there is no substitute for honesty for sensitive positions which call for utmost trust. Fairness dictates that respondent should not be allowed to continue with the employment of petitioner who has breached the confidence reposed on him. - In the case at bar, respondent has every right to dismiss petitioner, a managerial employee, for breach of trust and loss of confidence as a measure of self-preservation against acts patently inimical to its interests. Indeed, in cases of this nature, the fact that petitioner has been employed with the respondent for a long time, if to be considered at all, should be taken against him, as his act of pilferage reflects a regrettable lack of loyalty which he should have strengthened, instead of betrayed. Disposition The petition is DENIED.

HABANA V NLRC (HOTEL NIKKO) 298 SCRA 537 KAPUNAN; November 16, 1998 NATURE Petition for certiorari seeking reversal of NLRC decision which affirmed LA FACTS On March 16, 1989, petitioner Antonio Habana was employed by Hotel Nikko Manila Garden (Nikko) as Rooms Division Director (RDD). One of his tasks as RDD was to conduct regular and surprise inspection of all work areas to ensure quality of performance. In the course of his employment, petitioner encountered several

problems: his frequent clashes with Dolores Samson (his Senior Rooms Mgr) ; frequent absence and tardiness; rampant violations of hotel rules due to his failure to effectively manage his own division; and complaints regarding the overall quality (or lack thereof) of service of Nikko. As a result, private respondent Mr. Okawa, who replaced private respondent Mr. Yokoo as the executive asst. for Sales, issued a memorandum instructing petitioner, along with 2 others, to conduct and report daily inspection of the guestrooms and public areas. Petitioner sent a memorandum of protest claiming that Mr. Okawas orders was a form of harassment to ease him out of his position and illustrated in detail the other forms of alleged harassment supposedly perpetrated by Mr. Okawa. He, however, manifested that he had no intention to resign. - But on May 2, 1990, petitioner went to the Hotels Comptroller asking for his severance pay of P120,000 plus accrued benefits of P11, 865.28. The check was not given to him until he submitted his resignation letter (part of standard procedure). He also executed an Affidavit of Quitclaim, along with his resignation. The very next day, however, respondents received a letter from petitioner (addressed to Mr. Okawa) who insisted that he was forced to resign because he could no longer endure Mr. Okawas acts of harassment against him. 2 weeks later, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages against Hotel Nikko and its officers, including his direct superiors, Yokoo and Okawa. The LA dismissed the complaint finding that petitioner voluntarily resigned and that the alleged acts of harassment were non-existent. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the LAs decision likewise finding that petitioner

voluntarily resigned as manifested by his act of negotiating for a huge amount of separation pay. When his MFR was dismissed, he came to the SC. ISSUE WON the resignation was forced upon Habana or he did so voluntarily HELD The resignation was voluntary. Ratio Voluntary resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who finds himself in a situation where he believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service and he has no other choice but to disassociate himself from his employment. Reasoning - In this case, petitioner was clearly having trouble performing his job, which undeniably carries immense responsibilities. Notable too was petitioners failure to see eye to eye with his immediate bosses, Mr. Yokoo and Mr. Okawa. Because of these difficulties, it was quite reasonable for petitioner to think of, and eventually, relinquishing his position voluntarily (and get a fat sum as severance pay in the bargain) instead of waiting to be fired. - Petitioner laments that he was completely stripped of his powers and functions as Director when Mr. Okawa tasked him with inspecting the hotels guest and public areas. Conducting these daily inspections, in effect, demoted him to a mere room inspector one notch higher than a bellboy. He claims that the humiliation he endured in going room to room, inspecting toilets and garbage areas, was all part of a malicious scheme to harass him out of his position. These orders were not borne out of mere whim and caprice. They were made in response to the complaints they were getting. Moreover, these measures executed by the hotels top management were legitimate exercise of management prerogatives. - Petitioner asserts that private respondents coerced and intimidated him to resigning through their collective acts of harassment.

Contrariwise, private respondents contend that it was petitioner who approached them indicating his desire to resign due to his difficulty in coping with his responsibilities and his differences with his immediate boss, Mr. Okawa. - Petitioner could not have been intimidated by private respondents to quit. In his memorandum, petitioner emphatically vowed not to resign despite private respondents alleged acts of harassment. Surprisingly, however, after only a few days he did quit alleging that he was forced and harassed to do so. If petitioner was adamant in his intention not to be coerced into leaving, how could he suddenly be forced to resign? Petitioner glaringly contradicted himself. His excuse is thus, unbelievable and unjustifiable. - Moreover, the issue in this case is factual in nature and firm is the principle that factual findings of the NLRC, particularly when they coincide with those of the LA, are accorded respect, even finality, and will not be disturbed for as long as such findings are supported by substantial evidence. We have painstaking reviewed the records of this case and we find no justifiable reason to overturn the findings of both the LA and the NLRC. Disposition Petition is DISMISSED

HABANA V NLRC (HOTEL NIKKO) 298 SCRA 537 KAPUNAN; November 16, 1998 NATURE Petition for certiorari seeking reversal of NLRC decision which affirmed LA FACTS On March 16, 1989, petitioner Antonio Habana was employed by Hotel Nikko Manila Garden (Nikko) as Rooms Division Director (RDD). One of his tasks as RDD was to conduct regular and surprise inspection of all work areas to ensure quality of performance. In the course

of his employment, petitioner encountered several problems: his frequent clashes with Dolores Samson (his Senior Rooms Mgr) ; frequent absence and tardiness; rampant violations of hotel rules due to his failure to effectively manage his own division; and complaints regarding the overall quality (or lack thereof) of service of Nikko. As a result, private respondent Mr. Okawa, who replaced private respondent Mr. Yokoo as the executive asst. for Sales, issued a memorandum instructing petitioner, along with 2 others, to conduct and report daily inspection of the guestrooms and public areas. Petitioner sent a memorandum of protest claiming that Mr. Okawas orders was a form of harassment to ease him out of his position and illustrated in detail the other forms of alleged harassment supposedly perpetrated by Mr. Okawa. He, however, manifested that he had no intention to resign. - But on May 2, 1990, petitioner went to the Hotels Comptroller asking for his severance pay of P120,000 plus accrued benefits of P11, 865.28. The check was not given to him until he submitted his resignation letter (part of standard procedure). He also executed an Affidavit of Quitclaim, along with his resignation. The very next day, however, respondents received a letter from petitioner (addressed to Mr. Okawa) who insisted that he was forced to resign because he could no longer endure Mr. Okawas acts of harassment against him. 2 weeks later, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages against Hotel Nikko and its officers, including his direct superiors, Yokoo and Okawa. The LA dismissed the complaint finding that petitioner voluntarily resigned and that the alleged acts of harassment were non-existent. On appeal, the

NLRC affirmed the LAs decision likewise finding that petitioner voluntarily resigned as manifested by his act of negotiating for a huge amount of separation pay. When his MFR was dismissed, he came to the SC. ISSUE WON the resignation was forced upon Habana or he did so voluntarily HELD The resignation was voluntary. Ratio Voluntary resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who finds himself in a situation where he believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service and he has no other choice but to disassociate himself from his employment. Reasoning - In this case, petitioner was clearly having trouble performing his job, which undeniably carries immense responsibilities. Notable too was petitioners failure to see eye to eye with his immediate bosses, Mr. Yokoo and Mr. Okawa. Because of these difficulties, it was quite reasonable for petitioner to think of, and eventually, relinquishing his position voluntarily (and get a fat sum as severance pay in the bargain) instead of waiting to be fired. - Petitioner laments that he was completely stripped of his powers and functions as Director when Mr. Okawa tasked him with inspecting the hotels guest and public areas. Conducting these daily inspections, in effect, demoted him to a mere room inspector one notch higher than a bellboy. He claims that the humiliation he endured in going room to room, inspecting toilets and garbage areas, was all part of a malicious scheme to harass him out of his position. These orders were not borne out of mere whim and caprice. They were made in response to the complaints they were getting. Moreover, these measures executed by the hotels top management were legitimate exercise of management prerogatives. - Petitioner asserts that private respondents coerced and intimidated

him to resigning through their collective acts of harassment. Contrariwise, private respondents contend that it was petitioner who approached them indicating his desire to resign due to his difficulty in coping with his responsibilities and his differences with his immediate boss, Mr. Okawa. - Petitioner could not have been intimidated by private respondents to quit. In his memorandum, petitioner emphatically vowed not to resign despite private respondents alleged acts of harassment. Surprisingly, however, after only a few days he did quit alleging that he was forced and harassed to do so. If petitioner was adamant in his intention not to be coerced into leaving, how could he suddenly be forced to resign? Petitioner glaringly contradicted himself. His excuse is thus, unbelievable and unjustifiable. - Moreover, the issue in this case is factual in nature and firm is the principle that factual findings of the NLRC, particularly when they coincide with those of the LA, are accorded respect, even finality, and will not be disturbed for as long as such findings are supported by substantial evidence. We have painstaking reviewed the records of this case and we find no justifiable reason to overturn the findings of both the LA and the NLRC. Disposition Petition is DISMISSED

FUJITSU COMPUTER PRODUCTS OF THE PHILS V CA (DE GUZMAN, ALVAREZ) 454 SCRA 737 CALLEJO SR; April 8, 2000 NATURE A petition for review assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals in reversing the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). FACTS - Petitioner Fujitsu Computer Products Corporation of the Philippines (FCPP) is a corporation organized and existing under Philippine laws engaged in the manufacture of hard

disc drives, MR heads and other computer storage devices for export. - Respondent Victor de Guzman began working for FCPP on September 21, 1997 as Facilities Section Manager. As of 1999, he was also holding in a concurrent capacity the position of Coordinator ISO 14000 Secretariat. Allan Alvarez, on the other hand, was employed as a Senior Engineer on April 21, 1998. He was assigned at the Facilities Department under the supervision of respondent De Guzman. - The garbage and scrap materials of FCPP were collected and bought by the Saros Trucking Services and Enterprises (Saros). On January 15, 1999, respondent De Guzman as Facilities Section Manager, for and in behalf of FCPP, signed a Garbage Collection Agreement with Saros, and the latters signatory therein was its owner and general manager, Larry Manaig. - De Guzman served as middleman between Sta. Rosa Bible Baptist Church and Saro. The Church was looking for scrap metal, and was willing to buy the purlins at P3. The scrap metal was then delivered from FCPP to Sta. Rosa Bible Baptist Church. - Ernesto Espinosa, HRD and General Affairs Director of FCPP, received a disturbing report from Manaig. Manaig reported that respondent De Guzman had caused the anomalous disposal of steel [purlins] owned by FCPP. Two of Manaigs employees, Roberto Pumarez and Ma. Theresa S. Felipe, executed written statements detailing how respondent De Guzman had ordered the steel purlins to be brought out. Thereafter, petitioner Espinosa sent a two-page Inter-Office Memorandum dated July 24, 1999 to respondent De Guzman, effectively placing him under preventive suspension. - On July 28, 1999, respondent Alvarez sent an e-mail message to his coemployees, expressing sympathy for the plight of respondent De Guzman. Respondent Alvarez used a different computer, but the event viewer system installed in the premises of petitioner FCPP was able to trace the e-mail message to him. Respondent

Alvarez submitted a written Explanation dated September 29, 1999 where he apologized, readily admitted that he was the sender of the e-mail message in question, and claimed that he acted alone with his own conviction. He alleged, however, that he was only expressing his sentiments, and that he was led by his desire to help a friend in distress. - Respondent Alvarez was informed that his services were terminated on the ground of serious misconduct effective August 13, 1999. Respondent De Guzmans employment was, thereafter, terminated effective August 23, 1999 through an Inter-Office Memorandum. - The respondents then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the petitioners with prayer for reinstatement, full backwages, damages and attorneys fees before the NLRC. Labor Arbiter Antonio R. Macam ruled in favor of FCPP, stating that it was justified in terminating the employment of the respondents. According to the Labor Arbiter, respondent De Guzman, a managerial employee, was validly dismissed for loss of trust and confidence. Citing a number of cases,[24] the Labor Arbiter stressed that where an employee holds position of trust and confidence, the employer is given wider latitude of discretion in terminating his services for just cause. - The NLRC sustained the ruling of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed the respondents appeal for lack of merit. The NLRC also affirmed the Labor Arbiters finding that respondent De Guzman, a managerial employee who was routinely charged with the custody and care of the petitioners property, was validly dismissed on the ground of willful breach of trust and confidence. In so far as the dismissal of respondent Alvarez was concerned, the Commission held that the circumstances surrounding the sending of the clearly malicious and premeditated e-mail message constituted no less than serious misconduct. Hence, respondent Alvarezs dismissal was also justified under the circumstances.

- The CA reversed the ruling of the NLRC and held that the respondents were illegally dismissed. According to the appellate court, the non-payment of the scrap steel purlins by the Sta. Rosa Bible Baptist Church (Sta. Rosa) to Saros was not a valid cause for the dismissal of respondent De Guzman. Contrary to the findings of the Labor Arbiter, respondent De Guzman did not betray the trust reposed on him by his employer, as the transaction involving the sale of scrap steel purlins was between Sta. Rosa and Saros. Anent the dismissal of respondent Alvarez, the CA ruled that his act of sympathizing and believing in the innocence of respondent De Guzman and expressing his views was not of such grave character as to be considered serious misconduct which warranted the penalty of dismissal. ISSUES 1. WON De Guzman is guilty of breach of confidence, thus warranting dismissal 2. WON Alvarez committed serious misconduct in sending the e-mail HELD 1. NO - De Guzman is not guilty of breach of confidence. Ratio To be a valid ground for dismissal, loss of trust and confidence must be based on a willful breach of trust and founded on clearly established facts. A breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly and purposely, without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. It must rest on substantial grounds and not on the employers arbitrariness, whims, caprices or suspicion; otherwise, the employee would eternally remain at the mercy of the employer. In order to constitute a just cause for dismissal, the act complained of must be workrelated and shows that the employee concerned is unfit to continue working for the employer. Reasoning - The term trust and confidence is restricted to managerial employees. In this case, it is undisputed that

respondent De Guzman, as the Facilities Section Manager, occupied a position of responsibility, a position imbued with trust and confidence. - The Court had the occasion to reiterate in Nokom v. National Labor Relations Commission the guidelines for the application of the doctrine of loss of confidence: Loss of confidence should not be simulated; > It should not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal or unjustified; > It may not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary; and > It must be genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify earlier action taken in bad faith. - The scrap metals, including the steel purlins, were already classified as scrap materials and ready for disposal. No less than the written statements of the witnesses for the petitioners confirm this. - No fraud or bad faith could be attributed to respondent De Guzman, as evinced by his readiness to disclose his participation in the transaction between Saros and Sta. Rosa. - Loss of trust and confidence as a just cause for termination of employment is premised on the fact that the employee concerned is invested with delicate matters, such as the handling or care and protection of the property and assets of the employer. After such scrap materials are weighed, loaded onto a truck and carried out of the company premises, the petitioner FCPP can no longer be considered the owner thereof, and ceases to exercise control over such property. In this case however, Saros, as the new owner of the scrap materials in question, including the steel purlins, was free to contract with anyone as it wished. - A condemnation of dishonesty and disloyalty cannot arise from suspicions spawned by speculative inferences. Because of its subjective nature, this Court has been very scrutinizing in cases of dismissal based on loss of trust and confidence because the same can easily be concocted by an abusive employer.

Thus, when the breach of trust or loss of confidence theorized upon is not borne by clearly established facts, as in this case, such dismissal on the ground of loss of confidence cannot be allowed. 2. NO - Alvarez did not commit serious misconduct in sending the e-mail. Ratio Misconduct has been defined as improper or wrong conduct. It is the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment. The misconduct to be serious must be of such grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial and unimportant. Reasoning - For misconduct or improper behavior to be a just cause for dismissal, (a) it must be serious; (b) must relate to the performance of the employees duties; and (c) must show that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer. - The Court finds that respondent Alvarezs act of sending an e-mail message as an expression of sympathy for the plight of a superior can hardly be characterized as serious misconduct as to merit the penalty of dismissal. - There is no showing that the sending of such e-mail message had any bearing or relation on respondent Alvarezs competence and proficiency in his job. To reiterate, in order to consider it a serious misconduct that would justify dismissal under the law, the act must have been done in relation to the performance of his duties as would show him to be unfit to continue working for his employer. Disposition Petition is denied. Decision of the CA is affirmed, with costs against the petitioners.

Review on certiorari FACTS - Alfonso Magpantay (respondent) was employed as a machine operator with Genuino Ice Company, Inc. (petitioner). On November 18, 1996, respondent filed against petitioner a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for moral and exemplary damages. In his Position Paper, respondent alleged that he was dismissed from service effective immediately by virtue of a memorandum, after which he was not allowed anymore to enter the company premises. Respondent bewailed that his termination from employment was done without due process.Petitioner countered that he was not illegally dismissed, since the dismissal was based on a valid ground, i.e., he led an illegal strike at petitioners sister company, Genuino Agro Industrial Development Corporation, which lasted from November 18 to 22, 1995, resulting in big operation losses on the latters part. Petitioner also maintained that respondents dismissal was made after he was accorded due process. - Petitioner initially claimed that respondents acts were tantamount to serious misconduct or willful disobedience, gross and habitual neglect of duties, and breach of trust. Subsequently, petitioner amended its position paper to include insubordination among the grounds for his dismissal, since it came out during respondents crossexamination, and the matter was reported only after the new personnel manager assumed his position in August 1996. - Labor Arbiter of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dismissed the case for lack of merit finding that petitioner had valid cause to dismiss respondent. Labor Arbiters Decision affirmed. Motion for reconsideration of the NLRC Decision was denied. Special civil action for certiorari with the CA was filed. Petitioner filed its Comment, contending that the petition was filed out of time, considering that contrary to respondents claim that the NLRC Resolution dated August 31, 1999 was

received on December 20, 1999, it was actually received on September 15, 1999, as shown in the registry return card. Petitioner also reiterated its arguments that respondent was dismissed for cause and with due process. - CA rendered the assailed Decision granting the petition and declaring respondents dismissal as illegal. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the CA denied. ISSUES 1. WON the petition was filed by petitioner out of time 2. WON he was illegally dismissed (and on what ground) 3. WON there was due process under Section 2 (d), Rule 1, Book VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code provides for the standards of due process HELD 1. NO - The New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides the rule for the service of notices and resolutions in NLRC cases, to wit: Sec. 4. Service of notices and resolutions. a) Notices or summons and copies of orders, resolutions or decisions shall be served on the parties to the case personally by the bailiff or the duly authorized public officer within three (3) days from receipt thereof by registered mail; Provided, that where a party is represented by counsel or authorized representative, service shall be made on such counsel or authorized representative; - The presumption is that the decision was delivered to a person in his office, who was duly authorized to receive papers for him, in the absence of proof to the contrary. It is likewise a fundamental rule that unless the contrary is proven, official duty is presumed to have been performed regularly and judicial proceedings regularly conducted, which includes the presumption of regularity of service of summons and other notices. The registry return of the registered mail as having been received is prima facie proof of the

GENUINO ICE CO INC V MAGPANTAY 493 SCRA 195 AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; June 27, 2006 NATURE

facts indicated therein. Thus, it was necessary for respondent to rebut that legal presumption with competent and proper evidence. Records show that Ducut is not an employee of the FEU Legal Aid Bureau, but is connected with the Computer Services Department. The FEU Legal Aid Bureau has its own personnel which include Ms. dela Paz who is the one authorized to receive communications in behalf of the office. It has been ruled that a service of a copy of a decision on a person who is neither a clerk nor one in charge of the attorneys office is invalid. The CA was correct in ruling that the reckoning period should be the date when respondents counsel actually received the NLRC Resolution dated August 31, 1999, which was on December 20, 1999. Petitioner, however, pointed out that a certain Ruby D.G. Sayat received a copy of their Motion for Reconsideration filed by registered mail on August 16, 2000. Respondent contended that at the time Sayat received the motion, she was then detailed at the office and was authorized to receive said pleading, and that it was an isolated and exceptional instance. On this matter, the FEU Acting Postmaster certified that Sayat is a permanent employee of the FEU Legal Aid Bureau. As such, she is authorized to receive communications in behalf of the office and need not possess an express authority to do so. More importantly, the Court has consistently frowned upon the dismissal of an appeal on purely technical grounds. While the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural right, it is, nonetheless, an essential part of our judicial system. Courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, but rather, ensure amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of a cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. 2. NO, on the ground of habitual neglect of duties but YES on the ground of insubordination. The Court sustained the CAs finding that respondents four-day absence does not amount to a habitual neglect of duty; however, the Court found that

respondent was validly dismissed on ground of willful disobedience or insubordination. - FOR HABITUAL NEGLECT OF DUTY: Neglect of duty, to be a ground for dismissal, must be both gross and habitual. Gross negligence connotes want of care in the performance of ones duties. Habitual neglect implies repeated failure to perform ones duties for a period of time, depending upon the circumstances. On the other hand, fraud and willful neglect of duties imply bad faith on the part of the employee in failing to perform his job to the detriment of the employer and the latters business. Thus, the single or isolated act of negligence does not constitute a just cause for the dismissal of the employee. Thus, the Court agrees with the CA that respondents four-day absence is not tantamount to a gross and habitual neglect of duty. As aptly stated by the CA, (W)hile he may be found by the labor courts to be grossly negligent of his duties, he has never been proven to be habitually absent in a span of seven (7) years as GICIs employee. The factual circumstances and evidence do not clearly demonstrate that petitioners [respondent] absences contributed to the detriment of GICIs operations and caused irreparable damage to the company. - FOR INSUBORDINATION OR WILLFUL DISOBEDIENCE: On this point, the CA opined that petitioner included insubordination as a mere afterthought. It noted that petitioner seemed to be irresolute in stating the cause of respondents dismissal, as in its Position Paper, it originally relied on respondents four-day absence or participation in the illegal strike as a cause for dismissal but later on amended its Position Paper to include insubordination. Thus, the CA did not make any factual finding or conclusion in its Decision vis--vis petitioners allegation of respondents insubordination. While its perception may be true, it should not have deterred the CA from making any resolution on the matter. For one, respondent was able to argue against petitioners allegation of insubordination before the Labor

Arbiter and the NLRC. For another, it was respondent himself who raised the subject before the CA, wherein he stated in his Petition. Further, the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are non-litigious in nature. As such, the proceedings before it are not bound by the technical niceties of the law and procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law, as dictated by Article 221 of the Labor Code: ART. 221. Technical rules not binding and prior resort to amicable settlement. In any proceeding before the Commission or any of the Labor Arbiters, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of this Code that the Commission and its members and the Labor Arbiters shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process. This rule applies equally to both the employee and the employer. In the interest of due process, the Labor Code directs labor officials to use all reasonable means to ascertain the facts speedily and objectively, with little regard to technicalities or formalities. What is essential is that every litigant is given reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his right, introduce witnesses and relevant evidence in his favor, which undoubtedly, was done in this case. Willful disobedience, or insubordination as otherwise branded in this case, as a just cause for dismissal of an employee, necessitates the concurrence of at least two requisites: (1) the employee's assailed conduct must have been willful, that is, characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. Company policies and regulations are generally valid and binding on the parties and must be complied with

until finally revised or amended, unilaterally or preferably through negotiation, by competent authority. For misconduct or improper behavior to be a just cause for dismissal, the same must be related to the performance of the employees duties and must show that he has become unfit to continue working for the employer. In the case at bench, petitioner informed respondent, through a Memorandum dated November 14, 1995, that he was being transferred to its GMA, Cavite operations effective November 20, 1995. - Due to his refusal to report to the Cavite plant, petitioner reiterated its order transferring respondent in its Memorandum dated November 24, 1995, where respondent was also warned that his failure to report to the Cavite plant will be considered as an absence without leave (AWOL) and insubordination. Respondent was required to comply with the order within 24 hours from receipt, otherwise, disciplinary action will be imposed on respondent. Respondent replied with a request that he remain in the Otis plant since a transfer to the Cavite plant will entail additional expenditure and travel time on his part. Petitioner again wrote respondent inviting him to appear before the Plant Level Investigation on December 11, 1995 for the latter to be able to clarify his reasons for refusing the transfer. Finally, petitioner issued its Memorandum dated December 12, 1995 informing respondent of its decision to terminate his services. The rule is that the transfer of an employee ordinarily lies within the ambit of the employers prerogatives. The employer exercises the prerogative to transfer an employee for valid reasons and according to the requirement of its business, provided the transfer does not result in demotion in rank or diminution of the employees salary, benefits and other privileges. In this case, petitioners order for respondent to transfer to the GMA, Cavite Plant is a reasonable and lawful order was made known to him and pertains to his duties as a machine operator. There was no demotion involved or

diminution of salary, benefits and other privileges, and in fact, petitioner was even willing to provide respondent with monetary allowance to defray whatever additional expenses he may incur with the transfer. Such being the case, respondent cannot adamantly refuse to abide by the order of transfer without exposing himself to the risk of being dismissed. Hence, his dismissal was for just cause in accordance with Article 282 (a) of the Labor Code. Consequently, respondent is not entitled to reinstatement or separation pay and backwages. 3. YES - Simply stated, the employer must furnish the employee a written notice containing a statement of the cause for termination and to afford said employee ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires, and the employee must be notified in writing of the decision dismissing him, stating clearly the reasons therefor. - The CA found that petitioner failed to observe the twin requirements of notice and hearing, stating that its Memorandum dated December 13, 1995 does not squarely meet the standards of due process. The circumstances surrounding respondents dismissal, however, prove the contrary. The CA failed to take into account that prior to the Memorandum dated December 13, 1995, petitioner sent respondent several memoranda apprising him of the possible implications of his refusal to comply with the order of transfer. Thus, in its Memorandum dated November 24, 1995, petitioner notified respondent that his continued non-compliance with the order of transfer might bring about disciplinary action. Respondent replied to this memorandum, stating the reasons for his refusal, i.e., additional expenses, longer travel time, and union concerns. Petitioner sent another Memorandum on December 9, 1995, asking respondent to appear on December 11, 1995, for further clarification of his reasons for refusing the transfer. Despite the meeting, and since respondent, apparently,

stubbornly refused to heed petitioners order, it was then that the Memorandum dated December 13, 1995 was issued to respondent informing him of the managements decision to terminate his services. Clearly, respondents right to due process was not violated. Disposition petition is GRANTED. The CA Decision dated August 3, 2000 and Resolution dated March 16, 2001 are SET ASIDE, and the NLRC Decision dated June 30, 1999 is REINSTATED. LAKPUE V BELGA 473 SCRA 617 YNARES-SANTIAGO; October 20, 2005 FACTS - Petitioner Tropical Biological Phils., Inc. (Tropical), a subsidiary of Lakpue Group of Companies, hired on March 1, 1995 respondent Ma. Lourdes Belga (Belga) as bookkeeper and subsequently promoted as assistant cashier. On March 19, 2001, Belga brought her daughter to the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) for treatment of broncho-pneumonia. On her way to the hospital, Belga dropped by the house of Marylinda O. Vegafria, Technical Manager of Tropical, to hand over the documents she worked on over the weekend and to give notice of her emergency leave. - While at the PGH, Belga who was pregnant experienced labor pains and gave birth on the same day. On March 22, 2001, or two days after giving birth, Tropical summoned Belga to report for work but the latter replied that she could not comply because of her situation. On March 30, 2001, Tropical sent Belga another memorandum ordering her to report for work and also informing her of the clarificatory conference scheduled on April 2, 2001. Belga requested that the conference be moved to April 4, 2001 as her newborn was scheduled for check-up on April 2, 2001. When Belga attended the clarificatory conference on April 4, 2001, she was informed of her dismissal effective that day. ISSUE WON Belga was illegally dismissed

HELD YES - Tropical terminated Belga on the following grounds: (1) Absence without official leave for 16 days; (2) Dishonesty, for deliberately concealing her pregnancy; (3) Insubordination, for her deliberate refusal to heed and comply with the memoranda sent by the Personnel Department on March 21 and 30, 2001 respectively Tropical cites the following paragraphs of Article 282 of the Labor Code as legal basis for terminating Belga: Article 282. Termination by employer. An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes: (a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work; (c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative - We have defined misconduct as a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. Such misconduct, however serious, must, nevertheless, be in connection with the employees work to constitute just cause for his separation - Her absence for 16 days was justified considering that she had just delivered a child, which can hardly be considered a dereliction of duty or wrongful intent on the part of Belga. -Tropical harps on the alleged concealment by Belga of her pregnancy. This argument, however, begs the question as to how one can conceal a full-term pregnancy. We agree with respondents position that it can hardly escape notice how she grows bigger each day. While there may be instances where the pregnancy may be inconspicuous, it has not been sufficiently proven by Tropical that Belgas case is such - The charge of disobedience for Belgas failure to comply with the

memoranda must likewise fail. Disobedience, as a just cause for termination, must be willful or intentional. In the instant case, the memoranda were given to Belga two days after she had given birth. It was thus physically impossible for Belga to report for work and explain her absence, as ordered - Tropical avers that Belgas job as Treasury Assistant is a position of responsibility since she handles vital transactions for the company. It adds that the nature of Belgas work and the character of her duties involved utmost trust and confidence. - In order to constitute a just cause for dismissal, the act complained of must be work-related such as would show the employee concerned to be unfit to continue working for the employer. More importantly, the loss of trust and confidence must be based on the willful breach of the trust reposed in the employee by his employer. A breach of trust is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly and purposely, without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently - Belga was an assistant cashier whose primary function was to assist the cashier in such duties as preparation of deposit slips, provisional receipts, post-dated checks, etc. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, these functions are essentially clerical.

MICRO SALES OPERATION NETWORK V NLRC 472 SCRA 328 QUISUMBING; October 11, 2005 NATURE For review on certiorari of the Resolutions the CA dismissing petitioners special civil action for certiorari against the NLRC Resolution, which affirmed the Labor Arbiters Decision finding petitioners herein liable for illegal dismissal. FACTS - Micro Sales Operation Network is a domestic corporation engaged in local

transportation of goods by land. Petitioner Willy Bendol was the companys operations manager at the time of the controversy. - Private respondents Larry Hermosa, Leonardo de Castro, and Ramil Basinillo were employed by the company as driver, warehouseman, and helper, respectively. Hermosa was hired on November 17, 1997, de Castro on February 1, 1996, and Basinillo on February 4, 1998. Hermosa failed to promptly surrender the ignition key of the companys vehicle after discharging his duties. Such failure was allegedly contrary to the companys standard operating procedure. Thus, he was asked to explain within 24 hours why disciplinary action should not be meted on him. He explained that he kept the ignition key because the vehicle was stalled when its battery broke down. Unsatisfied with Hermosas explanation, the company dismissed him on January 9, 1999. - LA found that private respondents were illegally dismissed. NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiters decision. It also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. CA dismissed the petition for being defective in form. ISSUES 1. WON the private respondents were unjustly dismissed 2. WON there was willful disobedience on the part of the private respondents, justifying their dismissal HELD 1. YES - Hermosa was unjustly dismissed 2. NO - For willful disobedience to be a valid cause for dismissal, the following twin elements must concur: (1) the employee's assailed conduct must have been willful, that is, characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. - Both elements are lacking. We find no hint of perverse attitude in

Hermosas written explanation. On the contrary, it appears that the alleged company procedure for leaving the ignition key of the companys vehicles within office premises was not even made known to him. Petitioners failed to prove Hermosa willfully disobeyed the said company procedure. At any rate, dismissal was too harsh a penalty for the omission imputed to him. Disposition NLRC Resolution affirming the Labor Arbiters Decision, finding petitioners liable for illegal dismissal, is AFFIRMED. CHALLENGE SOCKS CORP V CA (NLRC, ANTONIO ET AL) 474 SCRA 356 YNARES-SANTIAGO; November 8, 2005 NATURE CERTIORARI under RULE 45 FACTS - CHALLENGE SOCKS CORP (CSC) hired Elvie Buguat as knitting operator. - In the course of her employment, she incurred absences and tardiness without prior approval and had been neglectful of her duties. - May 25, 1998: she failed to check the socks she was working on causing excess use of yarn and damage to the socks design. - She was suspended for 5 days and warned that a repetition of the same act would mean dismissal from the service. - February 2, 1999: she committed the same infraction and was given a warning. - Despite the previous warnings, Buguat continued to be habitually absent and inattentive to her task. - March 1, 1999: she again failed to properly count the bundle of socks assigned to her. - March 2, 1999: CSC terminated her services on grounds of habitual absenteeism without prior leave, tardiness and neglect of work. - Thereafter, Buguat filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.[8] - LA: Buguat was illegally dismissed; ordered CSC to reinstate her without

loss of seniority rights and benefits, but w/o backwages; ruled that mistake in counting bundles of socks is tolerable and should be punished by suspension only. - NLRC: adopted the findings of LA. Denied CSC's Appeal and MR. - CA: reversed and set aside LAs and NLRCs decisions; CSC was ordered to pay BUGUAT full backwages; remanded to the Regional LA for the computation of the backwages. - CA also noted that petitioner failed to comply with the twin-notice requirement in terminating an employee hence, the dismissal was considered ineffectual. ISSUE WON Buguats termination is valid HELD YES Reasoning - One of the just causes for terminating an employment under Article 282 of the Labor Code is gross and habitual neglect by the employee of her duties. This cause includes gross inefficiency, negligence and carelessness. Such just causes is derived from the right of the employer to select and engage his employees. - As a knitting operator, Elvie was required to check the socks she was working on and to count the bundles of socks she had to pack to be forwarded to the Looping Section. - Her repeated commission of the same offense could be considered willful disobedience. Elvie, despite the suspension and warning, continued to disregard the company rules and regulations. - Habitual neglect implies repeated failure to perform ones duties for a period of time. Buguats repeated acts of absences without leave and her frequent tardiness reflect her indifferent attitude to and lack of motivation in her work. Her repeated and habitual infractions, committed despite several warnings, constitute gross misconduct. Habitual absenteeism without leave constitute gross negligence and is sufficient to justify termination of an employee.

- Her repeated negligence is not tolerable; neither should it merit the penalty of suspension only. - The record of an employee is a relevant consideration in determining the penalty that should be meted out. - An employees past misconduct and present behavior must be taken together in determining the proper imposable penalty. The totality of infractions or the number of violations committed during the period of employment shall be considered in determining the penalty to be imposed upon an erring employee. The offenses committed by him should not be taken singly and separately but in their totality. Fitness for continued employment cannot be compartmentalized into tight little cubicles of aspects of character, conduct, and ability separate and independent of each other. - It is the totality, not the compartmentalization, of such company infractions that Buguat had consistently committed which justified her dismissal. - Terminating an employment is one of petitioners prerogatives. - Management has the prerogative to discipline its employees and to impose appropriate penalties on erring workers pursuant to company rules and regulations. - The Court has upheld a companys management prerogatives so long as they are exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employers interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid agreements. - In the case at bar, petitioner exercised in good faith its management prerogative as there is no dispute that Buguat had been habitually absent, tardy and neglectful of her work, to the damage and prejudice of the company. Her dismissal was therefore proper. - The law imposes many obligations on the employer such as providing just compensation to workers, observance of the procedural requirements of notice and hearing in the termination of employment. On the other hand, the law also

recognizes the right of the employer to expect from its workers not only good performance, adequate work and diligence, but also good conduct and loyalty. The employer may not be compelled to continue to employ such persons whose continuance in the service will patently be inimical to his interests. - The employer has the burden of proving that the dismissed worker has been served two notices: (1) one to apprise him of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought, and (2) the other to inform him of his employers decision to dismiss him. - A review of the records shows that private respondent was served a written termination notice on the very day she was actually dismissed from the service. It was not shown that CSC notified Elvie in advance of the charge or charges against her nor was she given an opportunity to refute the charges made against her. - Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission: Upheld as valid the dismissal for just cause even if there was no compliance with the requirements of procedural due process. While the procedural infirmity cannot be cured, it should not invalidate the dismissal. However, the employer should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of due process. Disposition CAS DECISION IS AFFIRMED; backwages is DELETED; Nominal damages (for violation of Buguats statutory due process) in the amount of P30,000.00. CHUA V NLRC (SCHERING-PLOUGH CORP ET AL) 453 SCRA 244 MELO; March 11, 2005 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of a decision and resolution of the CA FACTS - On June 1, 1995, Dennis Chua was hired as a Professional Medical Representative by Schering-Plough Corporation (SPC), and thereafter

became a regular employee on December 1, 1995. As a Professional Medical Representative, he was tasked to promote SPC and its products to physicians, hospitals, paramedics, including trade and government outlets in his assigned territory. - One of the petitioners duties was to submit a Daily Coverage Report (DCR) every Monday, or at least to mail the same to the Field Operations Manager. Furthermore, he was required to have call cards signed by any of the eighty (80) doctors under his coverage to show that he indeed visited them and handed out promotional items. This system enabled the SPC to know how many doctors the petitioner had visited in a week and the number of call cards he was required to submit. - Respondent Roberto Z. Tada, Field Operations Manager of the corporation for the Bicol Region, noticed that the petitioner filed his DCRs late, and in batches at that. Specifically, a batch of DCRs up to January 10, 1997 was filed only on March 13, 1997, while another batch was filed only on March 18, 1997. The petitioner also failed to submit the DCRs for the period covering February 10, 1997 to April 7, 1997. Respondent Tada also found some discrepancies in the DCRs submitted by the petitioner. - On April 6, 1997, respondent Tada confronted the petitioner regarding the said discrepancies, to which Tada merely replied, Pagbigyan mo na lang ako, boss. Tulungan mo na lang ako, boss. - On April 8, 1997, Tada went to the petitioners residence and confiscated all the paraphernalia used by the latter for his fieldwork, including the call cards and medicine samples. The car assigned to the respondent was likewise confiscated. - On April 9, 1997, the petitioner filed an application for a three-day sick leave, but indicated therein that he was going on leave only for two (2) days, from April 10 to 11, 1997. However, after the lapse of his applied leave of absence, the petitioner failed to report for work.

- On April 15, 1997, the petitioner had already filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) against the SPC, Epitacio Titong, Jr. (as President and General Manager), Danny T. Yu (as Division Manager) and Roberto Z. Tada (as Field Operations Manager - On April 16, 1997, the petitioner received a telegram from the SPC instructing him to report to the office on April 18, 1997 and to see respondent Danny T. Yu who was the Division Manager. The petitioner, however, failed to comply. - On April 18, 1997, respondent Tada sent a Memorandum to the petitioner requiring the latter to explain the late submission of DCRs, insufficiency of the information on the call cards, etc. - The same letter informed the petitioner that he was under preventive suspension effective April 11, 1997 while the case was under investigation. - On May 8, 1997, while the case for illegal dismissal was pending resolution before the arbitration branch of the NLRC, the SPC sent another letter to the petitioner, informing him that his employment was terminated. - On September 30, 1998, Labor Arbiter Ramon Valentin C. Reyes rendered a Decision declaring the petitioners dismissal from employment as illegal. The Labor Arbiter held that the SPC failed to establish any ground for the petitioners dismissal and ordered the SPC to reinstate him. - SPC appealed the decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC. - On October 19, 1999, the NLRC issued a Resolution, finding respondent to have validly dismissed complainant. - The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said resolution, but the same was dismissed. - The petitioner sought relief from the CA, which affirmed, in toto, the resolution of the NLRC, and consequently denied the petitioners MFR ISSUE

WON petitioners dismissal employment was illegal

form

HELD NO - The petitioners termination from employment was anchored on the following: (a) gross and habitual neglect; (b) serious misconduct; and (c) willful disobedience to the lawful orders of the employer. Thus, it all boils down to the filing of the requisite DCRs due every Monday. As found by both the NLRC and the CA, the petitioner failed to file the DCRs on time on several occasions, and instead filed them in batches. Furthermore, the petitioner failed to submit the DCRs for February 10, 1997 to April 7, 1997. Considering that about ninety percent (90%) of the petitioners work as a medical representative entails fieldwork, such DCRs were vital to his job; the DCRs were the primary basis upon which the petitioners employer could track his accomplishments and work progress. Without the said DCRs, the employer would have no basis to determine if the petitioner was actually performing his assigned tasks or not. - In the same light, the petitioner also failed to submit several doctors call cards, and submitted others which were incomplete; that is, undated although signed by the doctors. It must be stressed that the said call cards were also vital to the petitioners fieldwork. The requirement of asking the doctors to affix their signatures in the call cards, the date of the visit, as well as the samples and promotional items, if any, given to the doctors, enabled the SPC to verify whether such doctors were indeed visited by the petitioner. - Gross negligence under Article 282 of the Labor Code, as amended, connotes want of care in the performance of ones duties, while habitual neglect implies repeated failure to perform ones duties for a period of time, depending upon the circumstances. Clearly, the petitioners repeated failure to submit the DCRs on time, as well as the failure to submit the doctors call cards constitute habitual neglect of

duties. Needless to state, the foregoing clearly indicates that the employer had a just cause in terminating the petitioners employment. ***But because there was a violation of the petitioners statutory right to two notices prior to the termination of his employment for a just cause, he is entitled to nominal damages of P30,000.00, absent sufficient evidence to support an award for actual or moral damages. (In line with the ruling in Agabon) Disposition The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed with modification that petitioner is entitled to above stated award for nominal damages.. PAGUIO TRANSPORT CORP V NLRC (MELCHOR) 294 SCRA 657 PANGANIBAN; August 28, 1998 NATURE Petition for review of NLRC decision FACTS - Complainant Wilfredo Melchor was hired by respondent company as a taxi driver under the "boundary system. He was to drive the taxi unit assigned to him on a 24-hour schedule per trip every two 2 days, for which he used to earn an average income from P500 to P700 per trip, exclusive of the P650 boundary and other deductions. - He was involved in a vehicular accident along Quirino Ave when he accidentally bumped a car. He was allegedly advised to stop working and have a rest. When reported for work, he was told that his service was no longer needed. - He then filed complaint for illegal dismissal. - Paguio maintained that Melchor was not illegally dismissed since there was no employer-employee relationship. (no control, no payment of compensation) Even if EER existed, complainant's termination arose out of a valid cause since he was already involved in 3 accidents. - NLRC ruling: there was illegal dismissal

ISSUES 1. WON an employer-employee relationship exists 2. WON dismissal was for a just cause 3. WON Melchor was afforded due process 4. WON doctrine of strained relations applies HELD 1. YES Ratio The relationship of taxi owners and taxi drivers is the same as that between jeepney owners and jeepney drivers under the "boundary system." This relationship is that of employeremployee and not of lessor-lessee. The fact that the drivers do not receive fixed wages but get only the excess of that so-called boundary they pay to the owner/operator is not sufficient to withdraw the relationship between them from that of employer and employee. Reasoning - He was considered an employee because he was engaged to perform activities which were usually necessary or desirable in the usual trade of the employer. - This is different from lease of chattels, wherein the lessor loses complete control over the chattel leased. In the case of jeepney owners/operators and jeepney drivers, the former exercise supervision and control over the latter. 2. NO Ratio Employer has the burden of proving that the dismissal of an employee is for a just cause. The failure of the employer to discharge this burden means that the dismissal is not justified and that the employee is entitled to reinstatement and backwages. - Mere involvement in an accident, absent any showing of fault or recklessness on the part of an employee, is not a valid ground for dismissal. 3. NO Ratio The twin requirements of notice and hearing are essential elements of due process. The employer must furnish the worker two written notices: (1) one to apprise him of the particular acts or omissions for which

his dismissal is sought and (2) the other to inform him of his employer's decision to dismiss him. The essence of due process lies simply in an opportunity to be heard, and not always and indispensably in an actual hearing. 4. NO Ratio Strained relations must be demonstrated as a fact. - The doctrine on "strained relations" cannot be applied indiscriminately since every labor dispute almost invariably results in "strained relations"; otherwise, reinstatement can never be possible simply because some hostility is engendered between the parties as a result of their disagreement. Reasoning - Paguios allegation that private respondent was incompetent and reckless in his manner of driving, which led to his involvement in three vehicular accidents, is not supported by the records. No evidence was properly submitted by petitioner to prove or give credence to his assertions. SANTOS V SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION 399 SCRA 172 SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ; March 14, 2003 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS Petitioner Carmelita Santos was appointed Finance Director of respondent SMCs Beer Division for Luzon Operations. On September 15, 1987, SMC issued a Memorandum prohibiting the encashment of personal checks at respondent's Plants and Sales Offices. Thereafter, SMC noticed that petitioner encashed her 3 personal checks in various Metro Manila Sales Offices. SMC commenced an audit investigation. Petitioner received from respondent an inter-office memorandum requiring her to explain in writing why no disciplinary action should be taken against her in view of

her unauthorized encashment of her 3 personal checks at respondent's sales offices. Petitioner admitted that she encashed three personal checks at respondent's sales offices but claimed that such act was not irregular since all personnel in respondent's Beer Division were allowed to encash their personal checks at any sales office upon clearance from the region management concerned. She stated that her encashment of personal checks had prior clearance. She further clarified that only two of the three checks she encashed were dishonored for insufficiency of funds, but she promptly funded the checks upon receipt of notice of such dishonor, thereby causing no damage to respondent. Meanwhile, the audit results revealed that, aside from petitioner's reported encashment of 3 personal checks, she had previously encashed 50 personal checks in varying amounts, which were not endorsed by the Sales Operations Manager or the Region Finance Officer. Additionally, petitioner encashed 2 other personal checks. After receiving such report, SMC formed an Investigating Panel to conduct a full-blown investigation. - The Investigating Panel found the encashment by petitioner of her personal checks with the region/sales offices as highly irregular transactions to the detriment of the Company. It recommended that Santos be terminated from employment. - In a memorandum, SMC adopted the findings of the Investigating Panel and informed petitioner of her termination from employment for abuse of position as Finance Director, engaging in highly irregular transactions to the detriment of the company and employer's loss of trust and confidence. - The complaint filed by petitioner against SMC for illegal dismissal was dismissed by the Labor Arbiter for lack of merit. The NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiters decision. Upon an MR filed by SMC, the NLRC dismissed the complaint filed by Santos. Hence, this recourse. ISSUE

WON SMC dismissed the petitioner from employment without just cause HELD NO Under the Labor Code, a valid dismissal from employment requires that: (1) the dismissal must be for any of the causes expressed in Article 282 of the Labor Code and (2) the employee must be given an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.Article 282(c) of the same Code provides that "willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer" is a cause for the termination of employment by an employer. This ground should be duly established. Substantial evidence is sufficient as long as such loss of confidence is well-founded or if the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee concerned is responsible for the misconduct and her act rendered her unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded of her position. It must be shown, though, that the employee concerned holds a position of trust. The betrayal of this trust is the essence of the offense for which an employee is penalized. - Petitioner argues that her position as Finance Director of respondent's Beer Division is not one of trust but one that is merely functional and advisory in nature. She possesses no administrative control over the plants and region finance officers, including cashiers. She reports to two superiors. Petitioner's argument is misplaced. As Finance Director, she is in charge of the custody, handling, care and protection of respondent's funds. The encashment of her personal checks and her private use of such funds, albeit for short periods of time, are contrary to the fiduciary nature of her duties. - Moreover, petitioner has functional control over all the plant and region finance officers, including cashiers, within the Luzon Operations Area. In fact, she is the highest ranking managerial employee for the finance section of the Luzon Beer Division Operations. Obviously, her position is a factor in abetting the encashment of her personal checks.

- Indeed, there is substantial ground for respondent's loss of confidence in petitioner. She does not deny encashing her personal checks at respondent's sales offices and diverting for her own private use the latter's resources. The audit investigation accounted for all the checks she encashed, some of which were dishonored for insufficiency of funds. The Investigating Panel concluded that petitioner not only encashed her personal checks at respondent's sales offices, but also used company funds to temporarily satisfy her insufficient accounts. This Court has held that misappropriation of company funds, although the shortages had been fully restituted, is a valid ground to terminate the services of an employee of the company for loss of trust and confidence. - Petitioner contends that there is a prolonged practice of other payroll personnel, including persons in managerial levels, who encashed personal checks but remained unpunished by respondent. She asserts that her administrative superiors even encouraged her to encash her checks at the nearest sales office since her appearance at the bank for encashment would entail undue digression from her daily work routine. Prolonged practice of encashing personal checks among respondent's payroll personnel does not excuse or justify petitioner's misdeeds. Her willful and deliberate acts were in gross violation of respondent's policy against encashment of personal checks of its personnel, embodied in its Memorandum. She cannot feign ignorance of such memorandum as she is duty-bound to keep abreast of company policies related to financial matters within the corporation. Equally unmeritorious are her claims that the acts complained of are regular, being with the knowledge and consent of her superiors, Francisco Gomez de Liano and Ben Jarmalala, and that she is being charged because she resisted the sexual advances of her superior. Suffice it to state that she could have proved

these matters during the investigation had she attended the proceedings. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION V MATIAS 458 SCRA 148 PANGANIBAN; May 6, 2005 FACTS - Rolando Matias was employed by Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) as Chief Accountant and Administrative Officer. During his employment with the company, various parcels of land situated at Don Carlos Bukidnon were placed in the names of certain employees as trustees for the purpose of owning vast tracts of land more than the limit a corporation can own which were primarily intended for CDCP agricultural businesses. By internal arrangement documents transferring back the properties to the corporation were executed. A piece of land was registered in the name of Matias. CDCP was later converted a government owned or controlled corporation, and the name of CDCP was changed to Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC). Under a new set up, PNCC offered a retrenchment program and on December 31, 1984 Matias availed of the said program. - Sometime in 1985, the Conjuangco Farms owned by Mr. Danding Conjuangco acquired CDCP Farms Corporation wh[ich] took over the operations of said farms. Not long after, or in 1989, CDCP Farms Corporation ceased to operate. In July 1992, two former CDCP employees, namely Reynaldo Tac-an and Luciano Tadena went to the house of Matias and brought with them duly accomplished documents and Special Power of Attorney for his signature and informed him that the lands in Bukidnon under his name with all the others were invaded by squatters, and that the said land were covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) where Matias name was included in

the list of landowners. Matias reluctantly signed the document and after six months, he signed an acknowledgment receipt of P100,000.00. - The original title registered in the name of Matias was cancelled and a new title was issued. The transfer of said parcel of land was made possible because Rolando Matias and Elena Esmeralda Matias received managers checks from the Land Bank of the Philippines in the amount of P102,355.96 and P219.22 and bond worth P203,478.48 as payment of Land Transfer Acquisition. - On August 12, 1996, Matias was rehired by PNCC as Project Controller in Zambales PMMA Project. - Not long after, Mr.Alday, Head of the Realty Management Group of PNCC invited Matias to his office and showed him a listing of parcels of land in the name of different persons with the corresponding status including the latters name. On the basis of the listing, Mr. Alday told Matias that the transfer of the property registered in the latters name was not yet consummated by the LBP and then requested Matias to execute a Deed of Assignment in favor of PNCC pertaining to the said property, which Matias did and guaranteed in writing that the parcel of land is free from any lien or encumbrance. - On April 20, 1998, a memorandum was issued to Matias by PNCC directing the former to explain in writing why none of the following actions, falsification, estafa, dishonesty, and breach of trust and confidence, should be taken against him in connection with the Deed of Assignment. PNCC alleges that respondent fraudulently breached its trust and confidence when, without its knowledge and consent, he disposed of the Bukidnon property; though actually belonging to petitioner, that property had purportedly been merely placed in trust under his name. Thereafter, he assigned the same property to petitioner, allegedly despite his full knowledge that the title had already been transferred -with his active planning and

participation -- to the Republic of the Philippines . - In due time, Matias submitted his written explanation. However, he was later advised that he was terminated from the service on the ground of loss of trust and confidence. Hence, Matias filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims against PNCC alleging that the dismissal on the ground of loss of trust and confidence was without basis. ISSUE WON the dismissal of Matias on the ground of loss of trust and confidence was without basis HELD YES Ratio: To constitute a valid cause to terminate employment, loss of trust and confidence must be proven clearly and convincingly by substantial evidence. To be a just cause for terminating employment, loss of confidence must be directly to the duties of the employee to show that he or she is woefully unfit to continue working for the employer. Reasoning - Undeniably, the position of project controller -- the position of respondent at the time of his dismissal -- required trust and confidence, for it related to the handling of business expenditures or finances. However, his act allegedly constituting breach of trust and confidence was not in any way related to his official functions and responsibilities as controller. In fact, the questioned act pertained to an unlawful scheme deliberately engaged in by petitioner in order to evade a constitutional and legal mandate. - It has oft been held that loss of confidence should not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are illegal, improper and unjustified. It must be genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify an earlier action taken in bad faith. Be it remembered that at stake here are the sole means of livelihood, the name and the reputation of the employee. Thus, petitioner must prove an actual breach of duty

founded on clearly established facts sufficient to warrant his loss of employment. - We stress once more that the right of an employer to dismiss an employee on account of loss of trust and confidence must not be exercised whimsically. To countenance an arbitrary exercise of that prerogative is to negate the employees constitutional right to security of tenure. In other words, the employer must clearly and convincingly prove by substantial evidence the facts and incidents upon which loss of confidence in the employee may be fairly made to rest; otherwise, the latters dismissal will be rendered illegal. VITARICH CORP V NLRC (RECODO) 307 SCRA 509 BELLOSILLO; May 20, 1999 NATURE Special Civil Certiorari action in the SC.

FACTS - Private respondent, Isagani Recodo, started working at Vitarich as an Accounting clerk. He gradually moved up the organization ladder until he was made Sales Manager for Western Visayas in 1988. He was dismissed in October 15, 1992 for alleged violation of a memorandum dated August 4, 1992 and also for violation of company policies relating to credit extensions and cash advances. He was also terminated for loss of trust and confidence. - Apparently, his new boss, Onofre Sebastian, was under pressure from senior management to address and correct all the problems he had inherited from his predecessor. The problems included high account receivable level in the sales territory of Recodo. The two had a meeting sometime middle of July to address the problems, including the A/R level of one Rex Cordova. - The August 4 Memorandum referred to contains instructions to Recodo to ground salesmen with thirty say overdue A/R so that the levels of said A/R can be regularized. Apparently,

Recodo received the said memo garbled and had to verify its contents on September 5, 1992. In the meantime, he postponed the grounding of Cordova until August 20 to bring about the desired reduction. The reduction hoped for in fact happened when Cordovas A/R went down from Pesos 800,000 to just Pesos 250,000. Huffing and puffing, Sebastian was asked to explain why he should not be terminated for failure to ground Cordova in compliance with the August 4 memo of Sebastian. - Recodo complied with the order to explain and an investigation was conducted by the Head of Personnel, a certain Enriquez. In his report, Enriquez found that there was no defensible ground for terminating Recodos services in the absence of documented warnings given to Recodo to justify any loss of trust and confidence in him. Nonetheless, Recodo was terminated on October 15, 1992. - Private respondent filed a complaint for illegal termination, non-payment of managerial bonus, and for moral and exemplary damages. The Labor Arbiter ruled illegal dismissal. The NLRC initially overturned the ruling but on appeal by Recodo, the finding of the Labor Arbiter was upheld. Hence this action. ISSUE WON the NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion in finding in favor of Recode HELD NO . In rectifying its previous appreciation and assessment of Recodos dismissal, the NLRC did not commit any abuse of discretion. A careful scrutiny of the records reveal that the decision of the Labor Arbiter is suffused with established facts and a correct understanding of them. Reasoning - While it may be true that there was a delay on the part of Recodo in implementing his superiors order with regard Cordovas grounding, the question is whether the delay constitutes disobedience and whether

this disobedience was willful to merit loss of confidence. The SC, in AHS Philippines, Inc. vs. CA, explained that willful disobedience of the employers lawful orders, as a just cause for dismissal of an employee, envisages the concurrence of at least two requisites: a. the employees assailed conduct must be willful or intentional, the willfulness being characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; b. the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. - In the case at bar, the noncompliance by Recodo was not an open defiance but as one of the discretions which he had to take under the circumstances in his capacity as sales manager. As it turned out, the result both Recodo and Sebastian hoped for was achieved by not immediately grounding Cordova. - While an employer is allowed wide latitude to dismiss employees on loss of trust and confidence, still the loss thereof must have some basis and must be proved by the employer otherwise the social justice policy of the labor lawsand the constitution will be for naught. The guidelines for the application of the doctrine of loss of confidence are: a. loss of confidence should not be simulated b. it dhould not be used as subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal, or unjustified c. it should not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary d. it must be genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify earlier action taken in bad faith Disposition the resolution f the NLRC is affirmed with the modification that corresponding back wages of respondent be forthwith updated and released to him.

ATLAS CONSOLIDATED MINING & DEVELOPMENT CORP V NLRC (VILLACENCIO) 290 SCRA 479 PUNO; May 21, 1998 NATURE petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court of Decision dated December 27, 1994 of NLRC which ordered the payment of separation pay and backwages to private respondent Isabelo O. Villacencio, and its Resolution dated August 18, 1995 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. FACTS - private respondent Isabelo O. Villacencio worked with petitioner ACMDC from January 23, 1970 to February 2, 1990. He started as an ordinary laborer/helper in the Mill Department. In 1973, he became supervisor of the Tailings Disposal Department. In 1982, he was elevated as a junior staff of the department. Finally, he was promoted general foreman of the Tailings Disposal and Water Supply Department with a monthly salary of P7,440.00. He held this position until his services were terminated on February 2, 1990. - As general foreman, Villacencio was the second-to-the-highest man in the department which has a field office located in Magdugo, Toledo City. Under Villacencio were some fifty nine (59) workers whom he supervised through regular field inspections. Villacencio was assigned a service jeep and a service motorcycle which he used alternately. He was given the privilege to withdraw the necessary fuel/gasoline for the vehicles at the Transport Department located inside the main compound of ACMDC. - September 8, 1989 - Engineer Sanchez of the Services Division wrote a memorandum requesting that Villacencio be investigated for alleged anomalies at the Magdugo Tailings Field Office. Villacencio was charged before the Special Investigation Board with acts of malfeasance consisting of:

1. withdrawal of company-owned gasoline for the refueling of his personal jeep; 2. use of company personnel on company time as well as companyowned materials for the assembly of a jeep not belonging to the company; and 3. granting of authority to noncompany personnel to withdraw company-owned stocks. - January 1990 - He was summoned and investigations were conducted. the Special Investigation Board found Villacencio guilty of the charge of withdrawing on various dates a total of 192 liters of company-owned gasoline which he used to refuel his private jeep and of the charge of using company personnel on company time in the assembly of his jeep. The third charge was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Villacencio was dismissed from work on February 2, 1990. - February 19, 1990 - Villavicencio lodged a complaint against ACMDC before the Regional Arbitration Cebu City, for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement and backwages plus damages. The case was assigned to Labor Arbiter Reynoso A. Belarmino. - Meanwhile, ACMDC initiated a criminal complaint against Villacencio for the misappropriation of 192 liters of gasoline amounting to P1,086.72. An Information for Estafa was filed against Villacencio before the Municipal Trial Court of Toledo City. After trial, he was found guilty and sentenced to prision correccional as maximum, and to pay ACMDC the amount of P1,086.72 for the misappropriated gasoline. - Villacencio appealed his conviction to RTC Toledo City. For failure of the prosecution to establish the guilt of Villacencio beyond reasonable doubt, the appellate court acquitted him - August 9, 1993 - Labor Arbiter Belarmino rendered a Decision dismissing Villacencio's complaint of illegal dismissal for lack of merit. - December 27, 1994 - NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter's decision. - Both parties filed their respective Motion for Reconsideration. ACMDC's motion assailed the public respondent's decision for allegedly

misapprehending the Labor Arbiter's decision. On the other hand, Villacencio's motion prayed for reinstatement and award of backwages in addition to separation pay. - August 18, 1995 NLRC rendered a Resolution granting Villacencio's prayer for backwages and denying ACMDC's motion. ISSUES 1. WON NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in reversing the Decision of the Labor Arbiter and holding Villavicencios dismissal illegal 2. WON there is willful breach of trust HELD 1. NO - In illegal dismissal cases, the employer bears the burden of proof to show that the dismissal is for a just or authorized cause. The charges against private respondent are: (1) withdrawal of 192 liters of gasoline from company stocks for his private use; and (2) knowingly allowing company personnel to work on company time in the assembly of a privately-owned jeep. To prove the first charge, petitioner presented the Tenders Logbook showing the unsigned entries of gasoline withdrawals allegedly made by Villavicencio . Wilfredo Caba and Bienvenido Villacencio also testified that Villavicencio refused to sign the entries when requested to do so. (1) The evidence for the Villavicencio shows that during his more than twenty (20)-year stint with petitioner, he received several awards and commendations for his contribution in the areas of production, services and smooth operation of his department. The management recognized his ability in handling his subordinates and in protecting company assets in relation to his assigned duties. As a stickler for company rules, he never held back on issuing warnings, admonitions and even suspensions against erring subordinates. Consequently, he earned the ire of some of his subordinates. Among them were Wilfredo Caba., June Climaco, Felix Gonzales and

Bienvenido Villacencio. In sum, Villavicencios position is that the logbook entries do not prove that he received the 192 liters of gasoline since his signature does not appear therein and that the witnesses presented by the petitioner to explain the absence of his signature in the logbook entries were motivated by vengeance since he offended their feelings when he disciplined them and denied their requests for promotion. - The Standard Guidelines of ACMDC require that all withdrawals of consumable items and the borrowing of company materials and equipments should be recorded in the Tender's Logbook by the tender on duty and should be signed by the withdrawing party. The tender on duty is also required to immediately report to his supervisor any discrepancy, error or irregularity. Needless to stress, the best evidence of any withdrawal is the Tender's Logbook. In the case at bar, the gasoline withdrawal entries were made by tenders Caba and Villacencio. Villavicencios signature does not appear in the logbook, thus, there is no proof that he actually withdrew and received the gasoline. (2) The Authorization to Work Overtime dated May 14, 1989 indicates that A. Saavedra, A. Sepada and V. Rago were among those authorized to work overtime 'to assist in emergency repair of busted 280 CIC Tailings Line' on that date. The same does not show or affirm petitioner's contention that said workers were not actually authorized or did not actually perform the required work but were at the Magdugo Field Office working on private respondent's personal jeep. On the contrary, the Authorization to Work Overtime appears regular on its face, as in fact, the same bears the imprimatur indicated by the signature not only of private respondent alone but of three (3) other officers: the Supervisor, J.V. Climaco, Jr., the Department Head, J. N. Tecson, and the Division Manager, C. N. Sanchez. If ever there was an irregularity, these officers would likewise have to be answerable to the company, instead of letting private respondent bear the burden alone.

2. NO - We reject the ruling of the Labor Arbiter that since Villavicencio neglected to inspect the logbook and thus failed to discover the irregularity, he committed breach of trust. Ratio Settled is the rule that under Article 283(c) of the Labor Code, the breach of trust must be willful. A breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly and purposely, without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. It must rest on substantial grounds and not on the employer's arbitrariness, whims, caprices or suspicion; otherwise, the employee would eternally remain at the mercy of the employer. It should be genuine and not simulated; nor should it appear as a mere afterthought to justify earlier action taken in bad faith or a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal or unjustified. It has never been intended to afford an occasion for abuse because of its subjective nature. Private respondent explained that he failed to inspect the logbook for about two (2) months before its disappearance because he was preoccupied with some emergency works brought about by a storm. With the foregoing explanation, it cannot be said that Villavicencios failure was willful. Disposition the assailed Decision and Resolution of public respondent NLRC are AFFIRMED.

LEONARDO V NLRC (REYNALDO'S MKTG CORP) 333 SCRA 589 DE LEON JR; June 16, 2000 NATURE Petitions for certiorari seeking the annulment of a Decision of the public respondent, NLRC. FACTS - Petitioner AURELIO FUERTE was originally employed by private respondent REYNALDO'S MARKETING

CORPORATION on August 11, 1981 as a muffler specialist, receiving P45.00 per day. He was appointed as supervisor in 1988and his compensation was increased. - DANILO LEONARDO was hired by private respondent on March 4, 1988 as an auto-aircon mechanic. - FUERTE alleges that on January 3, 1992, he was instructed to report at private respondent's main office where he was informed by the company's personnel manager that he would be transferred to its Sucat plant due to his failure to meet his sales quota, and for that reason, his supervisor's allowance would be withdrawn. - For a short time, FUERTE reported for work at the Sucat plant; however, he protested his transfer, subsequently filing a complaint for illegal termination. - LEONARDO abandoned his post following an investigation wherein he was asked to explain an incident of alleged "sideline" work which occurred on April 22, 1991. It would appear that late in the evening of the day in question, the driver of a red Corolla arrived at the shop looking for LEONARDO. The driver said that, as prearranged, he was to pick up LEONARDO who would perform a private service on the vehicle. When reports of the "sideline" work reached management, it confronted LEONARDO and asked for an explanation. According to private respondent, LEONARDO gave contradictory excuses, eventually claiming that the unauthorized service was for an aunt. - When pressed to present his aunt, it was then that LEONARDO stopped reporting for work. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal some ten months after his termination. ISSUES 1. WON the demotion of Fuerte by the private respondent is proper 2. WON Fuerte's action constitutes abandonment 3. WON the dismissal of Leornado is justified HELD 1. YES

- Private respondent's justification is well-illustrated in the record. Complainant Fuerte's failure to meet his sales quota which caused his demotion and the subsequent withdrawal of his allowance is fully supported by Exhibit "4" of respondents' position paper showing that his performance for the months of July 1991 to November 1991 is below par. Reasoning - FUERTE nonetheless decries his transfer as being violative of his security of tenure, the clear implication being that he was constructively dismissed. We have held that an employer acts well within its rights in transferring an employee as it sees fit provided that there is no demotion in rank or diminution in pay. 11 The two circumstances are deemed badges of bad faith, and thus constitutive of constructive dismissal. In this regard, constructive dismissal is defined in the following manner: an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued employment becomes impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or diminution in pay; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee. 12

- However, this arrangement appears to us to be an allowable exercise of company rights. An employer is entitled to impose productivity standards for its workers, and in fact, non-compliance may be visited with a penalty even more severe than demotion. Thus, the practice of a company in laying off workers because they failed to make the work quota has been recognized in this jurisdiction. - In the case at bar, the petitioners' failure to meet the sales quota assigned to each of them constitute a just cause of their dismissal, regardless of the permanent or probationary status of their employment. Failure to observe prescribed standards of work, or to fulfill reasonable work assignments due to inefficiency may constitute just cause for dismissal. Such inefficiency

is understood to mean failure to attain work goals or work quotas, either by failing to complete the same within the allotted reasonable period, or by producing unsatisfactory results. This management prerogative of requiring standards may be availed of so long as they are exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer's interest. 2. NO - his actions do not constitute abandonment. The filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal, as in this case, is inconsistent with a charge of abandonment. Ratio To constitute abandonment there must be (1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention, as manifested by some overt acts, to sever the employer-employee relationship. 3. YES - He was not terminated by the company but Leonardo abandoned his position in light of the pending investigation against him. Abandonment is a valid ground for dismissal. - He protests that he was never accorded due process. This begs the question, for he was never terminated; he only became the subject of an investigation in which he was apparently loath to participate. As testified to by Merlin P. Orallo, the personnel manager, he was given a memorandum asking him to explain the incident in question, but he refused to receive it. In an analogous instance, we held that an employee's refusal to sign the minutes of an investigation cannot negate the fact that he was accorded due process. Disposition Petition dismissed.

FLOREN HOTEL V NLRC (CALIMLIM, RICO, ET AL) 458 SCRA 128 QUISUMBING; May 6, 2005 FACTS - At the time of their termination, private respondents Roderick A. Calimlim, Ronald T. Rico and Jun A. Abalos were working in the hotel as

room boys, private respondent Lito F. Bautista as front desk man, and private respondent Gloria B. Lopez as waitress. They all started working for the hotel in 1993, except for Jun A. Abalos who started only in 1995. - In the afternoon of June 6, 1998, petitioner Dely Lim randomly inspected the hotel rooms to check if they had been properly cleaned. When she entered Room 301, she found private respondent Lito F. Bautista sleeping half-naked with the air-conditioning on. Lim immediately called the attention of the hotels acting supervisor, Diosdado Aquino, who had supervision over Bautista. Lim admonished Aquino for not supervising Bautista more closely, considering that it was Bautistas third offense of the same nature. When she entered Room 303, she saw private respondents Calimlim and Rico drinking beer, with four bottles in front of them. They had taken these bottles of beer from the hotels coffee shop. Like Bautista, they had switched on the air conditioning in Room 303. - That same afternoon, Dely Lim prepared a memorandum for Bautista, citing the latter for the following incidents: (1) sleeping in the hotel rooms; (2) entertaining a brother-inlaw for extended hours during duty hours; (3) use of hotel funds for payment of SSS loan without management consent; (4) unauthorized use of hotels air-con; and (5) failure to pay cash advance in the amount of P4,000. - Dely Lim tried to give Bautista a copy of the memorandum but Bautista refused to receive it. Bautista then went on absence without leave. Calimlim and Rico, embarrassed by the incident, went home. When they returned to work the next day, they were served with a notice of suspension for one week. - Like Bautista, they refused to receive the notice of suspension, but opted to serve the penalty. Upon their return on June 15, 1998, they saw a memorandum dated June 13, 1998 on the bulletin board announcing (a) the suspension as room boys of Calimlim and Rico, or alternately, (b) returning to work on

probation as janitors for the following reasons: unsatisfactory work, having a drinking spree inside the hotels rooms, cheating on the Daily Time Record, being absent without valid reason, leaving work during duty time, tardiness, and sleeping on the job. The memorandum also included Calimlim and Ricos new work schedule. - Calimlim and Rico submitted handwritten apologies and pleaded for another chance, before they went AWOL - On June 25, 1998, Calimlim, Rico and Bautista filed separate complaints, for illegal dismissal and money claims, before the Labor Arbiter. Abalos and Lopez later also filed separate complaints for underpayment of wages, non-payment of their 13th month pay, and service incentive leave pay. On July 7, 1998, after they stopped working, Abalos and Lopez amended their complaints. They claimed that petitioners orally dismissed them when they refused to withdraw their complaints. - Petitioners alleged that they did not dismiss private respondents but that private respondents had abandoned their jobs. Private respondents filed a manifestation and motion dated November 24, 1998, praying that petitioners be ordered to reinstate them to their former positions since after all, according to petitioners, they were not dismissed. - Petitioners opposed the motion and argued that private respondents cannot be reinstated since they were not illegally dismissed but they had abandoned their jobs and management simply considered them dismissed for abandonment. - On March 19, 1999, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaints but ordered petitioners to pay private respondents their proportionate 13th month pay, and service incentive leave pay. He likewise ordered petitioners to pay Calimlim and Rico indemnity. - The Labor Arbiter found that Calimlim, Rico, and Bautista did not report for work and they did not show any order of dismissal, thus constructively, they abandoned their work and were not illegally

dismissed. The Labor Arbiter also ruled that Calimlim and Ricos demotion and reassignment were valid exercises of management prerogatives. The reassignment was intended to enable management to supervise them more closely and, in any event, did not involve a diminution of wages. The Labor Arbiter, however, held petitioners liable for indemnity to Calimlim and Rico for not observing the twin notices rule. - Private respondents appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission - On March 22, 2000, the NLRC rendered its decision. It reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and ordered the hotel management to immediately reinstate complainantsappellants to their former positions without loss of seniority rights, with full backwages and other benefits until they are actually reinstated. In the event that reinstatement was no longer possible, the respondentappellees should pay herein private respondents their separation pay in addition to the payment of their full backwages; their incentive leave pay and their 13th month pay, together with P1,000 to each of them as indemnity. - Later, the NLRC also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. - On September 10, 2002, the Court of Appeals decided the petition as follows: (1) The Court declares that the private respondents Roderick A. Calimlim and Jose Abalos [should be Ronald T. Rico] were illegally dismissed by petitioner Floren Hotel/Ligaya Chu who is ORDERED to reinstate them to their former positions without loss of [seniority] rights, with full backwages and other benefits until they are actually reinstated; but if reinstatement is no longer possible, Floren Hotel/Ligaya Chu shall pay their separation pay in addition to their backwages. (2) Declaring private respondents Lito Bautista, Jun Abalos and Gloria Lopez to have abandoned their employment, and, therefore, not entitled to either backwages nor separation pay; and (3) ORDERING Floren Hotel/Ligaya Chu to

pay all the private respondents their 13th month pay and incentive leave pay as computed in the Decision of the Labor Arbiter ISSUES 1. WON the Court of Appeals erred in giving due course to the petition for certiorari filed before the appellate court 2. WON the private respondents were illegally dismissed 3 WON the Court of Appeals erred in ordering petitioners to pay Calimlim and Rico indemnity of P1,500 4 WON the appellate court erred in ordering petitioners to pay all of private respondents their proportionate 13th month pay and incentive leave pay HELD 1. NO Acceptance of a petition for certiorari as well as the grant of due course thereto is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 3, Rule 46 of the same rules does not specify the precise documents, pleadings or parts of the records that should be appended to the petition other than the judgment, final order, or resolution being assailed. The Rules only state that such documents, pleadings or records should be relevant or pertinent to the assailed resolution, judgment or orders. 2. YES Petitioners claimed that all five private respondents were guilty of abandoning their jobs. Thus, it was incumbent upon petitioners to show that the two requirements for a valid dismissal on the ground of abandonment existed in this case. Specifically, petitioners needed to present, for each private respondent, evidence not only of the failure to report for work or that absence was without valid or justifiable reasons, but also of some overt act showing the private respondents loss of interest to continue working in his or her job. - It was true that private respondents abandoned their jobs, then petitioners should have served them with a

notice of termination on the ground of abandonment as required under Sec. 2, Rule XIV, Book V, Rules and Regulation Implementing the Labor Code, in effect at that time. Said Section 2 provided that: Notice of Dismissal. Any employer who seeks to dismiss a worker shall furnish him a written notice stating the particular acts or omission constituting the grounds for his dismissal. In cases of abandonment of work, the notice shall be served at the workers last known address. - But petitioners failed to comply with the foregoing requirement, thereby bolstering further private respondents claim that they did not abandon their work but were illegally dismissed. - None of the private respondents in this case had any intention to sever their working relationship. Just days after they were dismissed, private respondents Calimlim, Rico, Bautista, Abalos and Lopez filed complaints to protest their dismissals. The wellestablished rule is that an employee who takes steps to protest his layoff cannot be said to have abandoned his work. That private respondents all desired to work in the hotel is further shown by the fact that during the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, shortly after private respondents received petitioners position paper where the latter averred that private respondents were never terminated, private respondents filed a manifestation and motion asking that petitioners be ordered to allow them back to work. This is nothing if not an unequivocal expression of eagerness to resume working. 3. YES (should have reinstated) - Article 279 of the Labor Code gives to Calimlim and Rico the right to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges or separation pay in case reinstatement is no longer possible, and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits. It was thus error for the Court of Appeals to affirm the NLRC decision to award Calimlim and Rico indemnity in addition to the measure of damages provided in Article 279. The award of indemnity is a penalty awarded only when the

dismissal was for just or authorized cause but where the twin-notice requirement was not observed. 4. NO Petitioners did not question the propriety of the award of proportionate 13th month pay and service incentive leave in the Court of Appeals. They assailed the NLRC decision on only one ground: Respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing the Labor Arbiters decision insofar as it relates to the issues of illegal dismissal. Hence, the correctness of the cited award in the NLRC ruling was never brought before the appellate court and is deemed to have been admitted by petitioners. It cannot therefore be raised anymore in this petition. The decision of the NLRC as regards the award of 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay became binding on petitioners because the failure to question it before the Court of Appeals amounts to an acceptance of the ruling. In any event, the award appears to us amply supported by evidence and in accord with law. Disposition Assailed decision MODIFIED

proper amount. Apparently, said letter fell on deaf ears. - On March 15, 1982, the board approved the following resolution: BE IT RESOLVED that the new management be given the necessary flexibility in streamlining the operations of the Bank and for the purpose it is hereby resolved that the Bank officers at the Head Office and the Branches with corporate rank of Manager and higher be required, as they hereby are required to submit IMMEDIATELY to the President their courtesy resignations. - Petitioner did not submit his courtesy resignation. On May 3, 1983, he received a letter from the Board saying that his resignation has been accepted. Petitioner wrote to the executive VP asking for reconsideration. He stated therein that he thought the call for the submission of courtesy resignations was only for erring "loathsome" officers and not those like him who had served the bank honestly and sincerely for sixteen years. - Starting May 4, 1983, he was not paid. He filed for illegal dismissal and damages with the NLRC. The NLRC ruled in favor of the petitioner. On MFR, the NLRC reversed. ISSUE WON the bank may legally dismiss for refusal to tender the courtesy resignation which the bank required in line with its reorganization plan HELD NO - While it may be said that the private respondent's call for courtesy resignations was prompted by its determination to survive, we cannot lend legality to the manner by which it pursued its goalBy directing its employees to submit letters of courtesy resignation, the bank in effect forced upon its employees an act which they themselves should voluntarily do. It should be emphasized that resignation per se means voluntary relinquishment of a position or office. 11 Adding the word "courtesy" did not change the essence of resignation. That courtesy

BATONGBACAL V ASSOCIATED BANK 168 SCRA 600 FERNAN; December 21, 1988 NATURE Review of the decision of the NLRC FACTS - Bienvenido Batongbacal, a lawyer, worked for Citizens Bank and Trust Company from 1961. On 1975, Citizens Bank and Trust Company merged with the Associated Banking Corporation. The merged corporate entity later became known as Associated Bank. In the new bank, petitioner resumed his position as assistant vice-president. - On March 1982, he learned that his salary was very much below compared to the other Asst. VPs of the bank. He wrote to the Board of Directors asking that he be paid the

resignations were utilized in government reorganization did not give private respondent the right to use it as well in its own reorganization and rehabilitation plan. There is no guarantee that all employers will not use it to rid themselves arbitrarily of employees they do not like, in the guise of "streamlining" its organization. On the other hand, employees would be unduly exposed to outright termination of employment which is anathema to the constitutional mandate of security of tenure - The record fails to show any valid reasons for terminating the employment of petitioner. There are no proofs of malfeasance or misfeasance committed by petitioner which jeopardized private respondent's interest. - However, we agree with the Solicitor General and the NLRC that petitioner is not entitled to an award of the difference between his actual salary and that received by the assistant vice-president who had been given the salary next higher to his. There is a semblance of discrimination in this aspect of the bank's organizational set-up but we are not prepared to preempt the employer's prerogative to grant salary increases to its employees. In this connection, we may point out that private respondent's claim that it needed to trim down its employees as a selfpreservation measure is belied by the amount of salaries it was giving its other assistant vice-presidents Disposition Remanded to the NLRC to determine WON the petitioner is a managerial employee STELLAR INDUSTRIAL SERVICE INC V NLRC (PEPITO) 252 SCRA 323 REGALADO; January 24, 1996 NATURE Special Civil Action for Certiorari FACTS - Stellar Industrial Services, Inc., an independent contractor engaged in the business of providing manpower services, employed private

respondent Roberto H. Pepito as a janitor on January 27, 1975 and assigned the latter to work as such at the Maintenance Base Complex of the Philippine Airlines in Pasay City. - Pepito worked for 15 years. - According to petitioner, private respondent committed infractions of company rules ranging from tardiness to gambling, but he was nevertheless retained as a janitor out of humanitarian consideration and to afford him an opportunity to reform. - Stellar finally terminated private respondent's services on January 22, 1991 because of Absent Without Official Leave/Virtual Abandonment of Work Absent from November 2 December 10, 1990. - Private respondent had insisted that during the period in question he was unable to report for work due to severe stomach pain and that, as he could hardly walk by reason thereof, he failed to file the corresponding official leave of absence. Attached was a medical certificate. - Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal deduction and underpayment of wages with prayer for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. - LA was of the view that Pepito was not entitled to differential pay, or to moral and exemplary damages for lack of bad faith on the part of the company, he opined that private respondent had duly proved that his 39-day absence was justified on account of illness and that he was illegally dismissed without just cause. He ordered the respondent to immediately reinstate complainant to his former position as Utilityman, without loss of seniority rights and with full backwages and other rights and privileges appurtenant to his position until he is actually reinstated. - The respondent is further ordered to pay the complainant reasonable attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the amount recoverable by the complainant. - LAs decision was affirmed by NLRC ISSUES 1. WON serious misconduct for nonobservance of company rules and

regulations may be attributed to Pepito 2. WON the extreme penalty of dismissal meted to him by Stellar may be justified under the circumstances

HELD 1. NO Stellar's company rules and regulations on the matter could not be any clearer, to wit: "Absence Without Leave" Any employee who fails to report for work without any prior approval from his superior(s) shall be considered absent without leave. In the case of an illness or emergency for an absence of not more than one (1) day, a telephone call or written note to the head office, during working hours, on the day of his absence, shall be sufficient to avoid being penalized. In the case of an Illness or an emergency for an absence of two (2) days or more, a telephone call to the head office, during regular working hours, on the first day of his absence, or a written note to the head office, (ex. telegram) within the first three (3) days of his absence, and the submission of the proper documents (ex. medical certificate) On the first day he reports after his absence shall be sufficient to avoid being penalized. 1st offense- three (3) days suspension 2nd offense- seven (7) days suspension 3rdoffense- fifteen (15) days suspension 4th offense- dismissal with a period of one (1) year - There was substantial compliance with said company rule by private respondent. He immediately informed his supervisor of the fact that he could not report for work by reason of

illness. At the hearing, it was also established without contradiction that Pepito was able to talk by telephone to one Tirso Pamplona, foreman, and he informed the latter that he would be out for two weeks as he was not feeling well. Added to this is his letter to the chief of personnel which states that, on November 2, 1990, he relayed to his supervisor his reason for not reporting for work and that, thereafter, he made follow-up calls to their office when he still could not render services. As earlier noted, these facts were never questioned nor rebutted by petitioner. - While there is no record to show that approval was obtained by Pepito with regard to his absences, the fact remains that he complied with the company rule that in case of illness necessitating absence of two days or more, the office should be informed beforehand about the same that is, on the first day of absence. Since the cause of his absence could not have been anticipated, to require prior approval would be unreasonable. On this score, then, no serious misconduct may be imputed to Pepito. Necessarily, his dismissal from work, tainted as it is by lack of just cause, was clearly illegal. 2. NO - Petitioner's reliance on Pepito's past infractions as sufficient grounds for his eventual dismissal, in addition to his prolonged absences, is unavailing. The correct rule is that previous infractions may be used as justification for an employee's dismissal from work in connection with a subsequent similar offense. - In the present case, private respondent's absences, as already discussed, were incurred with due notice and compliance with company rules and fie had not thereby committed a "similar offense" as those lie had committed in the past. Furthermore, as correctly observed by the labor arbiter, those past infractions had either been "satisfactorily explained, not proven, sufficiently penalized or condoned by the respondent." In fact, the termination notice furnished Pepito only indicated that he was being dismissed due to his absences from

November 2. 1990 to December 10, 1990 supposedly without any acceptable excuse therefor. There was no allusion therein that his dismissal was due to his supposed unexplained absences on top of his past infractions of company rules. To refer to those earlier violations as added grounds for dismissing him is doubly unfair to private respondent. Significantly enough, no document or any other piece of evidence was adduced by petitioner showing previous absences of Pepito, whether with or without official leave. Disposition Petition dismissed SANTOS V NLRC (HAGONOY INSTITUTE ET AL) 287 SCRA 117 ROMERO; March 6, 1998 NATURE Petition for certiorari FACTS - Mrs. Martin and Petitioner Santos were both teachers at the Hagonoy Institute. Both were married to different people. During the course of their employment, they fell in love, and rumors about their relationship spread. Private respondent advised Mrs. Martin to take a leave of absence, which she ignored. A week later, she was barred from reporting for work and was not allowed to enter Hagonoys premises, effectively dismissing her from employment - Mrs. Martins case for illegal dismissal was successful because the private respondent failed to accord her the necessary due process in her dismissal. - Meanwhile, HI set up a committee to investigate the veracity of the rumors. After 2 weeks, the committee confirmed the illicit relationship - in view of this finding, petitioner was charged administratively for immorality and was required to present his side of the controversy. 5 months later, he was informed of his dismissal. He thus filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. - After a full blown trial was conducted, the Labor Arbiter

dismissed his complaint, but awarded him money as financial assistance. - petitioner filed an appeal with the NLRC which was dismissed for lack of merit ISSUE WON the illicit relationship between the petitioner and Mrs. Martin could be considered immoral as to constitute just cause to terminate an employee under Article 282 of the Labor Code HELD YES Reasoning - Section 94 10 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools: Causes of Terminating Employment. In addition to the just cases enumerated in the Labor Code, the employment of school personnels, including faculty, may be terminated for any of the following causes:xxx xxx xxx E. Disgraceful or immoral conduct. - To constitute immorality, the circumstances of each particular case must be holistically considered and evaluated in light of the prevailing norms of conduct and applicable laws. America jurisprudence has defined immorality as a course of conduct which offends the morals of the community and is a bad example to the youth whose ideals a teacher is supposed to foster and to elevate, the same including sexual misconduct. Thus, in petitioner's case, the gravity and seriousness of the charges against him stem from his being a married man and at the same time a teacher. - Having an extra-marital affair is an affront to the sanctity of marriage, which is a basic institution of society. Even our Family Code provides that husband and wife must live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Our laws, in implementing this constitutional edict on marriage and the family underscore their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

- As a teacher, petitioner serves as an example to his pupils, especially during their formative years and stands in loco parentis to them. To stress their importance in our society, teachers are given substitute and special parental authority under our laws. - Teachers must adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency. He must freely and willingly accept restrictions on his conduct that might be viewed irksome by ordinary citizens. The personal behavior of teachers, in and outside the classroom, must be beyond reproach. - Accordingly, teachers must abide by a standard of personal conduct which not only proscribes the commission of immoral acts, but also prohibits behavior creating a suspicion of immorality because of the harmful impression it might have on the students. - Likewise, they must observe a high standard of integrity and honesty. - From the foregoing, it seems obvious that when a teacher engages in extramarital relationship, especially when the parties are both married, such behavior amounts to immorality, justifying his termination from employment. Disposition Petition DISMISSED APARENTE SR V NLRC (COCACOLA BOTTLERS PHIL) 331 SCRA 82 DE LEON JR; April 27, 2000 FACTS - Rolando Aparante, Sr. was first employed by private respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc. (CCBPI), General Santos City Plant as assistant mechanic in April 1970. He rose through the ranks to eventually hold the position of advertising foreman until his termination on May 12, 1988 for alleged violation of company rules and regulations. His monthly salary at the time of his termination was P5,600. - On November 9, 1987, Aparante drove CCBPI's advertising truck to install a panel sign. He sideswiped Marilyn Tejero, a ten-year old girl. He brought Tejero to Heramil Clinic for

first aid treatment. As the girl suffered a 2 cm fracture on her skull which was attributed to the protruding bolt on the truck's door, she was subsequently transferred to the General Santos City Doctor's Hospital where she underwent surgical operation. She stayed in the hospital for about a month. - Five days after the accident, he reported the incident to CCBPI. At about the same time, he submitted himself to the police authorities at Polomolok, South Cotabato for investigation where it was discovered that he had no driver's license at the time of the accident. In view thereof, FGU Insurance Corporation, an insurer of CCBPI's vehicles, did not reimburse the latter for the expenses it incurred in connection with Tejero's hospitalization a total amount of P19,534.45. - CCBPI conducted an investigation of the incident where Aparente was given the opportunity to explain his side and to defend himself. On May 12, 1988, Aparente was dismissed for having violated the company rules and regulations particularly Sec. 12 of Rule 005-858 for blatant disregard of established control procedures resulting in company damages. - The Labor Arbiter ordered his reinstatement without back wages. The NLRC affirmed but reversed its ruling upon motion of CCBPI. It declared the dismissal as one for just cause and effected after observance of due process. ISSUES 1. WON the NLRC erred in holding that CCBPI afforded petitioner due process 2. WON the NLRC erred in upholding the dismissal despite its initial finding that the CCBPI had implicitly tolerated petitioners driving without a license 3. WON the infraction committed by petitioner warrants the penalty of dismissal despite the fact that it was his first offense during his 18 long years of satisfactory and unblemished service HELD 1. NO

Ratio The essence of due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing but simply a reasonable opportunity or a right to be heard or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side. In labor cases, the filing of position papers and supporting documents fulfill the requirements of due process. Reasoning - Aparente was fully aware that he was being investigated for his involvement in the vehicular accident that took place on November 9, 1987. It was also known to him that as a result of the accident, the victim suffered a 2 cm fracture on her skull which led to the latter's surgical operation and confinement in the hospital for which CCBPI incurred expenses amounting to P19,534.45 which FGU Insurance Corporation refused to reimburse upon finding that he was driving without a valid driver's license. Thus, being aware of all these circumstances and the imposable sanctions under CCBPI's Code of Disciplinary Rules and Regulations, he should have taken it upon himself to present evidence to lessen his culpability. 2. NO Reasoning - According to Aparente, he informed the company that he had lost his license five months before the accident. Notwithstanding such fact, the company allowed him to continue driving the vehicle assigned to him. Thus, he shifts the blame to the company, claiming that it should have simply ordered him to desist from driving the vehicle once it was informed of the loss of his license. His contention is belied by his very own admission in his position papers filed before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that the company had in fact prohibited him from driving immediately after he lost his license, and had requested him to secure a new license. However, through misrepresentations, he led CCBPI to believe that he had procured another driver's license. Thus, he was permitted to drive again. 3. YES

Ratio The law warrants the dismissal of an employee without making any distinction between a first offender and a habitual delinquent where the totality of the evidence was sufficient to warrant his dismissal. In protecting the rights of the laborer, the law authorizes neither oppression nor selfdestruction of the employer. Reasoning - Company policies and regulations, unless shown to be grossly oppressive or contrary to law, are generally valid and binding on the parties and must be complied with until finally revised or amended, unilaterally or preferably through negotiation, by competent authority. The Court has upheld a company's management prerogatives so long as they are exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer's interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid agreements. - First, Aparente's dismissal is justified by Company rules and regulations. It is true that his violation of company rules is his first offense. Nonetheless, the damage caused to private respondent amounted to more than P5,000, thus, the penalty of discharge is properly imposable as provided by CCBPI's Code of Disciplinary Rules and Regulations. - Second, Article 282, in order that an employer may dismiss an employee on the ground of willful disobedience, there must be concurrence of at least two requisites: The employee's assailed conduct must have been willful or intentional, the willfulness being characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. We have found these requisites to be present in the case at bar. The evidence clearly reveals the willful act of Aparente in driving without a valid driver's license, a fact that he even tried to conceal during the investigation conducted by CCBPI. Such misconduct should not be rewarded with re-employment and back wages, for to do so would wreak

havoc on the disciplinary rules that employees are required to observe. - In the instant case, we find the award to petitioner of separation pay by way of financial assistance equivalent to 1/2 month's pay for every year of service equitable. Although meriting termination of employment, petitioner's infraction is not as reprehensible or unscrupulous as to warrant complete disregard for the fact that this is his first offense in an employment that has spanned 18 long years. Disposition Decision of the NLRC is AFFIRMED. EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILS INC V DIAMSE 491 SCRA 239 YNAREZ-SANTIAGO; June 16, 2006 FACTS - Maria Charina Damse is the Head of Building Services of ETPI. She requested a cash advance of P150k for the renewal of ETPIs business permits. The companys policy is cash advances should be liquidated 15 days from the completion of the project or activity, or else it will be deducted from the employees salary, benefits or receivables. - She was able to use a total of P97,151. The last payment was made on Feb 26, 2001. She wasnt able to liquidate the cash advance within 15 days. - On July 13, 2001, ETPIs Finance Dept advised her to liquidate the amount. She submitted a liquidation report on August 13, 2001. This report was refused by the Fin Dept for being late. She was told that the entire amount would just be deducted from her monthly salary starting Sept 2001. By Dec 2001, a total of P23k had been deducted from her salary. She then requested for reimbursement for P97,151. This was reviewed by her supervisor and approved by HR and Fin Dept, and the amt was credited to her ATM payroll acct. - The Internal Audit Dept (IAD) apparently didnt know what was going on. In Jan 2002, IAD found that her payroll acct had P86k. They required her to withdraw P52,533 for

the unliquidated amt minus the deductions. She complied. The next day, they asked her again for P74,462.82, which is the difference bet the P97k++ credited to her acct minus the P23k deductions. She complied again. (I dont understand how the computations were made.) - The next day, ETPI required Diamse to explain why she should not be disciplined for unauthorized diversion or application of company funds, and for acts of dishonesty, fraud, deceit and willful breach of trust. She explained what that the liquidation report wasnt accepted by the Fin Dept and she was instead advised to do as she did. A month later, she was dismissed. - LA ruled in her favor. NLRC reversed. CA reversed NLRC and ordered separation pay etc instead of reinstatement because of the strained relations bet the parties. ISSUE WON Diamse was illegally terminated HELD NO - Employer wasnt able to prove that the employee was terminated for valid and just cause. LOSS OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE v. SUSPICION - To be a valid cause for dismissal, the loss of trust and confidence must be based on a willful breach and founded on clearly established facts. A breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly and purposely, without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. Loss of trust and confidence must rest on substantial grounds and not on the employer's arbitrariness, whims, caprices or suspicion, otherwise, the employee would eternally remain at the mercy of the employer. - The SC held that the mere delay in the liquidation of the cash advance cannot sustain a finding of loss of trust and confidence. It was based on mere suspicion, without evidence to show that Diamse misappropriated funds. In fact, all documents submitted were found to be authentic.

The evidence on record shows that Diamse was able to liquidate the cash advance and that the ensuing delay in its liquidation was attributable to ETPI. - It cannot be presumed that Diamse misappropriated the funds because to do so would do violence to her right to security of tenure and the well-settled rule that the burden of proof is on the employer to establish the ground for dismissal. Suspicion has never been a valid ground for dismissal and the employee's fate cannot, in justice, be hinged upon conjectures and surmises. - More suspicion with regard to the P86k in her ATM acct: The company suspected that it came from the P97k erroneously credited to her acct. They didnt bother to prove it. They werent able to show any bank statements to that effect. Disposition Petition denied. CA decision affirmed and modified in that this case be REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for the sole purpose of computing Diamse's full backwages, etc. GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP V NLRC (SALAZAR) 206 SCRA 702 ROMERO; March 3, 1992 NATURE Appeal from a decision of NLRC FACTS - Imelda L. Salazar was employed by Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation (GMCR) as general systems analyst. Also employed by petitioner as manager for technical operations' support was Delfin Saldivar with whom private respondent was allegedly very close. - GMCR, prompted by reports that company equipment and spare parts worth thousands of dollars under the custody of Saldivar were missing, caused the investigation of the latter's activities. - The report prepared by the company's internal auditor indicated that Saldivar had entered into a partnership styled Concave Commercial and Industrial Company with Richard A. Yambao, owner and

manager of Elecon Engineering Services (Elecon), a supplier of petitioner often recommended by Saldivar; that Saldivar had taken petitioner's missing Fedders airconditioning unit for his own personal use without authorization and also connived with Yambao to defraud petitioner of its property; that Imelda Salazar violated company regulations by involving herself in transactions conflicting with the company's interests. Evidence showed that she signed as a witness to the articles of partnership between Yambao and Saldivar. It also appeared that she had full knowledge of the loss and whereabouts of the Fedders airconditioner but failed to inform her employer. GMCR placed Salazar under preventive suspension for 1 month, thus giving her 30 days within which to, explain her side. But instead of submitting an explanation, private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for illegal suspension, which she subsequently amended to include illegal dismissal, vacation and sick leave benefits, 13th month pay and damages, after petitioner notified her in writing that she was considered dismissed in view of her inability to refute and disprove the findings. - Labor Arbiter ordered petitioner company to reinstate private respondent to her former or equivalent position and to pay her full backwages and other benefits - NLRC affirmed the aforesaid decision ISSUES 1. WON the suspension was illegal 2. WON Art.2791 of the Labor Code should apply HELD
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The following provision on security of tenure is embodied in Article 279 reproduced herein but with the amendments inserted by RA 6715: In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of-an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights AND OTHER PRIVILEGES and to his FULL backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his ACTUAL reinstatement.

1. NO Ratio By itself, preventive suspension does, not signify that the company has adjudged the employee guilty of the charges she was asked to answer and explain. Such disciplinary measure is resorted to for the protection of the company's property pending investigation any alleged malfeasance or misfeasance committed by the employee. Reasoning - The investigative findings of GMCR which pointed to Saldivar's acts in conflict with his position as technical operations manager, necessitated immediate and decisive action on any employee closely, associated with Saldivar. The suspension of Salazar was further impelled by the discovery of the missing Fedders airconditioning unit inside the apartment private respondent shared with Saldivar. Under such circumstances, preventive suspension was the proper remedial recourse available to the company pending Salazar's investigation. - If at all, the fault, lay with Salazar when she ignored petitioner's memo giving her ample opportunity to present her side. Instead, she filed her complaint for illegal suspension without giving her employer a chance to evaluate her side of the controversy. 2. YES Ratio Where a case of unlawful or unauthorized dismissal has been proved by the aggrieved employee, or on the other hand, the employer whose duty it is to prove the lawfulness or justness of his act of dismissal has failed to do so, then the remedies provided in Article 279 should find, application. Reasoning - It must be recalled that the present Constitution has gone further than the 1973 Charter in guaranteeing vital social and economic rights to marginalized groups of society, including labor. To be sure, both Charters recognize "security of tenure" as one of the rights of labor which the State is mandated to protect. But there is no gainsaying the fact that the intent of the framers of the present Constitution was to give

primacy to the rights of labor and afford the sector "full protection," at least greater protection than heretofore accorded them, regardless of the geographical location of the workers and whether they are organized or not. - that the right of an employee not to be dismissed from his job except for a just or authorized cause provided by law has assumed greater importance under the 1987 Constitution with the singular prominence labor enjoys under the article on Social Justice. And this transcendent policy has been translated into law in the Labor Code - The intendment of the law in prescribing the twin remedies of reinstatement and payment of backwages is, in the former, to restore the dismissed employee to her status before she lost her job, for the dictionary meaning of the word "reinstate" is "to restore to a state from which one had been removed" and in the latter, to give her back the income lost during the period of unemployment. - Over time, the following reasons have been advanced by the Court for denying reinstatement under the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto; that reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of the long passage of time or because of the realities of the situation; or that it would be "inimical to the employer's interest; " or that reinstatement may no longer be feasible; or that it will not serve the best interests of the parties involved; or that the company would be prejudiced by the workers' continued employment; or that it will not serve any prudent purpose as when supervening facts have transpired which make execution on that score unjust or inequitable or, to an increasing extent, due to the resultant atmosphere of "antipathy and antagonism" or "strained relations" or "irretrievable estrangement" between the employer and the employee. In lieu of reinstatement, the Court has variously ordered the payment of backwages and separation pay or solely separation pay. - If in the wisdom of the Court, there may be a ground or grounds for non-

application of the Art.279, this should be by way of exception, such as when the reinstatement may be inadmissible due to ensuing strained relations between the employer and the employee. - Here, it has not been proved that the position of private respondent as systems analyst is one that may be characterized as a position of trust and confidence such that if reinstated, it may well lead to strained relations between employer and employee. Hence, this does not constitute an exception to the general rule mandating reinstatement for an employee who has been unlawfully dismissed. - To rely on the Maramara report as a basis for Salazar's dismissal would be most inequitous because the bulk of the findings centered principally oh her friend's alleged thievery and anomalous transactions as technical operations' support manager. Said report merely insinuated that in view of Salazar's special relationship with Saldivar, Salazar might have had direct knowledge of Saldivar's questionable activities. Direct evidence implicating private respondent is wanting from the records. Disposition The assailed resolution of NLRC is AFFIRMED. Petitioner GMCR is ordered to REINSTATE Salazar and to pay her backwages equivalent to her salary for a period of 2 years only. The decision is immediately executory.

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