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Redefining Security Author(s): Richard H. Ullman Reviewed work(s): Source: International Security, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Summer, 1983), pp.

129-153 Published by: The MIT Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538489 . Accessed: 04/03/2012 14:16
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H. Security Richard Ullman Redefining

in Cold War in the late 1940s, every administration Washingtonhas defined American national securityin excessively narrow and excessively military of terms.Politicianshave found it easier to focus the attention an inattentive public on militarydangers, real or imagined, than on nonmilitaryones; solutions politicalleaders have founditeasier to build a consensus on military to foreign policy problems than to get agreementon the use (and, therefore, the adequate funding)of the othermeans of influencethatthe United States can bringto bear beyond its frontiers. Even the Carter Administration, which set out self-consciously depart to fromthis pattern,found in its later years that the easiest way to deflectits most potentdomestic critics was to emphasize those aspects of the dilemmas it faced that seemed susceptible to military solutions and to downplay those that did not. Jimmy Carter's failureto win reelectionmay suggest not that his political instinctsin these respects were faultybut merelythat his conversion was neitherearly nor ardent enough. Justas politicians have not found it electorallyrewardingto put forward conceptions of securitythat take account of nonmilitary dangers, analysts have not found it intellectually easy. They have found it especially difficult to compare one type of threat with others, and to measure the relative toward national securityof the various ways in which governcontributions ments mightuse the resources at theirdisposal. The purpose of this paper is to begin to chip away at some of these analyticalproblems. It proceeds fromthe assumption that definingnational in termsconveys a profoundly securitymerely (or even primarily) military false image of reality.That false image is doubly misleading and therefore threats doubly dangerous. First,it causes states to concentrateon military and to ignoreotherand perhaps even more harmful dangers. Thus it reduces theirtotal security.And second, it contributes a pervasive militarization to of international relationsthat in the long run can only increase global insecurity.
Richard Ullman,Professor International H. of at Woodrow WilsonSchool Affairs Princeton University's member theInstitute ofPublicand International Affairs, spentthe1982-83 academic yearas a visiting of forAdvanced Study.

Since theonsetofthe

International Summer 1983 (Vol. 8, No. 1) 0162-2889/83/010129-15 $02.50/0 Secuirity, C) 1983by the Presidentand Fellows of Harvard College and of the Massachusetts Instituteof Technology.


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Security versusWhat? One way of moving toward a more comprehensivedefinition security of may be to ask: what should we be willing to give up in order to obtain more how do we assess the tradeoffs between security and othervalues? security? The question is apposite because, of all the "goods" a state can provide, none is more fundamental than security. Without it, as the 17th-century philosopher Thomas Hobbes observed in a passage oftencited but endlessly worthrecalling: there is no place for Industry,because the fruitthereofis uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth, no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be importedby Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruimentsof moving and removingsuch thingsas requiremuch force,no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters;no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary,poore, nasty,bruitish,and short.' For Hobbes it did not much matterwhether threatsto securitycame from withinor outside one's own nation. A victimis just as dead ifthe bullet that killshim is firedby a neighborattempting seize his property ifit comes to as froman invading army.A citizenlooks to the state,therefore, protection for against both types of threat. Security,forHobbes, was an absolute value. In exchange forprovidingit the state can rightfully anythingfroma citizen save that he sacrificehis ask own life, for preservationof life is the essence of security.In this respect, Hobbes was extreme.For most of us, securityis not an absolute value. We balance securityagainst othervalues. Citizens of the United States and other liberaldemocraticsocietiesroutinely balance security against liberty. Without security,of course, liberty-except forthe strongest-is a sham, as Hobbes recognized. But we are willing to trade some perceptibleincrementsof securityfor the advantages of liberty.Were we willing to make a Hobbesian choice, our streetswould be somewhat safer,and conscriptionwould swell the ranks of our armed forces. But our society would be-and we would ourselves feel-very much more regimented. The tradeoff and security one of the crucialissues of our is between liberty era. In virtuallyevery society,individuals and groups seek securityagainst

1. TheLeviathan (1651), Part I, Ch. XIII.

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the state, just as they ask the state to protectthem against harm fromother states. Human rights and state securityare thus intimatelyrelated. State authoritiesfrequently assume-sometimes with justification-thattheirforeign enemies receive aid and sustenance fromtheirdomesticopponents, and the suppresvice versa. They oftenfindit convenient,in any case, to justify sion of rivals at home by citingtheirlinks to enemies abroad. is, The most profoundof all the choices relatingto national security therefore, the tradeoff with liberty,for at conflictare two quite distinctvalues, each essential to human development. At its starkest,this choice presents itself as: how far must states go, in order to protect themselves against toward adopting totalitarian-like adversaries that they regard as totalitarian, constraintson their own citizens? In the United States it is a tension that arises every day in the pulling and hauling between police and intelligence agencies and the Constitution.At a practicallevel, the choices become: what powers do we concede to local police? to the F.B.I.? to the C.I.A. and the otherarms of the "intelligencecommunity"? Other securitychoices may seem equally vexing if they are not equally profound. One is the familiarchoice between cure and prevention. Should the U.S. spend a (large) sum of money on preparationsformilitary intervention in the Persian Gulf in order to assure the continued flow of oil from fragilestates like Saudi Arabia, or should it be spent instead on nonmilitary measures-conservation, alternateenergy sources, etc.-that promise substantially(although not rapidly) to reduce American dependence upon Persian Gulf oil? A second choice involves collaborationwith regimes whose values are antithetic America's own. Should the United States government to forgea relationshipof greatermilitary cooperationwiththe Republic of South in Africa,and risk racial conflict its cities at home? Or should it continue to treatSouth Africaas an international outlaw and perhaps enhance domestic racial harmony-an importantcharacteristic a secure society-at the cost of of enabling the Soviet navy to pose a greaterpotentialchallenge to the safety of the sea lanes around Africa upon which so much vital cargo flows? A thirdchoice involves military versus economic assistance to poor countries. Third World governmentsagainst Should U.S. policy aim at strengthening the military threatsthat they assert they perceive to come fromthe Soviet Union and its allies, or at helping theircitizens develop greaterself-reliance so as, perhaps, ultimatelyto produce more healthfulsocieties with lower ratesofbirthand thus relievethe risingpressureon global resources?Finally, many choices juxtapose international and domestic priorities.If a stretched

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national budget cannot afford both increased outlays formilitary forcesand for a more effective criminaljustice system at home, programs that create work opportunitiesfor poor inner-city teenagers, or measures to improve the qualityof the air we breatheand the water we drink,which expenditures enhance "security"more? The tradeoffs implied in these and many other, similarquestions are not as profound as that between securityand liberty.But they are nevertheless capable of generatingconflicts values-between alternateways of viewing of national securityand its relationshipto what mightbe called global security. There is, in fact, no necessary conflict between the goal of maintaininga large and powerfulmilitary establishment and othergoals such as developing development independence fromPersian Gulf oil, promotingself-sustaining in poor countries,minimizingmilitary reliance on repressive governments, and promotinggreaterpublic tranquility and a more healthfulenvironment at home. All these objectivescould be achieved ifthe Americanpeople chose to allocate national resources to do so. But it is scarcelylikelythat they-or their Congressional representatives-will choose to make all the perceived sacrificesthat such large governmentalprogramsentail. Indeed, the present Administration, supported by Congressional majorities, has embarked upon a substantialbuildup of military spending while at the same time reducing outlays-and perceptible concern-for the other objectives listed here. Such policies are not merelyneglectfulof what some writers have called the "otherdimensions" of security. They sometimescreate conditions-increased worldwide arms expenditures, heightened intra-regional confrontations, and greater fragility rather than resilience in Third World governments-that make the world a more dangerous ratherthan a saferplace. To use an image fromthe theoryof games, thereis a real danger will place that the policy choices of present and futureU.S. administrations us on a square on the game board in which all the players are worse off.In other words, the game may well not be "zero-sum," making the United States and some other nations more secure, or richer,while yet others are leftless well off.Instead, it mightbe "negative-sum,"making all the nations perceptiblyless secure, with fewer disposable assets to spend on welfare ratherthan on military forces. To make this point is not to argue thata well-armedSoviet Union increasingly confidentof its abilities to project militarypower at long distances poses no potential threat to American security. Clearly it does. Nor is it necessarily to argue (although I would do so) that much of what appears

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threatening about recent Soviet behavior has its originsin Soviet responses to American policies and force deployments. That is a topic for a separate discussion.2 But it is to argue that the presentU.S. Administration-and, to a substantial degree, its predecessors-has defined national securityin an excessivelynarrow way. It happens also (as will be suggested later) to be a politicallyquite expedient way. A Redefinition Threats of In addition to examining securitytradeoffs, is necessary to recognize that it securitymay be defined not merely as a goal but as a consequence-this means thatwe may not realize what it is or how important is untilwe are it threatenedwith losing it. In some sense, therefore, securityis defined and valorized by the threatswhich challenge it. We are, of course, accustomed to thinking national securityin termsof of military threatsarising frombeyond the borders of one's own country.But that emphasis is doubly misleading. It draws attentionaway fromthe nonmilitarythreats that promise to undermine the stabilityof many nations duringthe years ahead. And it presupposes thatthreatsarisingfromoutside a state are somehow more dangerous to its securitythan threatsthat arise withinit. A more useful (although certainly not conventional)definition mightbe: a threat national security an action or sequence of events that(1) threatens to is drastically and over a relativelybriefspan of time to degrade the quality of lifeforthe inhabitantsof a state, or (2) threatenssignificantly narrow the to range of policy choices available to the governmentof a state or to private, nongovernmentalentities (persons, groups, corporations)within the state. Withinthe first categorymightcome the spectrumof disturbancesand disruptionsranging fromexternalwars to internalrebellions, fromblockades and boycottsto raw material shortages and devastating "natural" disasters such as decimatingepidemics, catastrophic floods, or massive and pervasive droughts. These are for the most part fairlyobvious: in theirpresence any observerwould recognize thatthe well-beingof a societyhad been drastically impaired. The second categoryis perhaps less obviously apposite. In consideringit,
2. There is no betterplace to begin thatdiscussion than RobertJervis, Perception Misperception and in International Politics(Princeton,N.J.: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1976), chapter3.

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itmay be helpfulto reflect the way in which the threat on from Nazi Germany to the United States was discussed in the yearsimmediately precedingAmerican entryinto World War II-or, indeed, the way the threatfromthe Soviet Union has been viewed throughoutmost of the postwar era. Death and physical destructionare, of course, one realizationof the threat.They represent"degradation of the quality of life"in its most extremeform,and they would be an inevitable result of war-even a war fromwhich the United States emerged victorious. But suppose war had not come. Suppose Hitler's Germany or Stalin's Russia had asserted domination over Western Europe and, perhaps, other parts of the globe as well. The conquerors would have organized those would substantially have closed. societies in a manner that almost certainly them to the United States. That, of course, would have meant feweropportunitiesforAmerican tradersand investors. But so, also, would there have been fewer opportunitiesfor unfettered intellectual,cultural,and scientific in of exchange. And the extinction civil and politicalliberty countrieswhich to shared our devotion to those values would have made it more difficult assure theirpreservationin an isolated and even besieged United States. In a verylarge number of ways, the range of options open to the United States government,and to persons and groups within American society, would have been importantly diminished. It is easy to thinkof degradation of the quality of life or a diminutionof the range of policy choices as "national security"problemswhen the source of these undesirable conditions is a large, powerful,antagonisticstate such as Nazi Germany or Stalin's U.S.S.R. And it is even (relatively)easy to organize responses to such clear and present dangers. But it is much more difficult portrayas threats to national security,or to organize effective to within a action against, the myriads of other phenomena, some originating national society, many coming fromoutside it, which also kill, injure, or impoverish persons, or substantiallyreduce opportunitiesfor autonomous action, but do so on a smaller scale and come fromsources less generally in needed perceived as evil incarnate. Interruptions the flow of critically resources or, indeed, a dwindling of the available global supply; terrorist attacksor restrictions the liberty citizensin order to combat terrorism; on of a drasticdeterioration environmental of qualitycaused by sources fromeither within or outside a territorial state; continuingviolence in a major Third World state chronicallyunable to meet the basic human needs of large numbers of its citizens; urban conflictat home perhaps (or perhaps not)

Security 135 | Redefiniing

fomentedby the presence of large numbers of poor immigrants frompoor nations-all these eitherdegrade the quality of life and/orreduce the range of policy options available to governmentsand privatepersons. to For a leader trying instilthe politicalwill necessaryfora national society to respond effectively a threatto its security, military a threatis especially to can not convenient.The "public good" is much more easily defined;sacrifice only be asked but expected; particularinterestsare more easily coopted or, failingthat, overriden; it is easier to demonstratethat "business as usual" must give way to extraordinary measures; dissentis more readilyswept aside in the name of forginga national consensus. A convenientcharacteristic of military threatsto national securityis that theirpossible consequences are relatively apparent and, ifmade actual, theywork theirharmrapidly.Therefore,they are relativelynoncontroversial.3 The less apparent a securitythreatmay be-whether military nonmilior tary-the more that preparations to meet it are likely to be the subject of establishments political controversy.The American and the Soviet military are symbiotically allied in the effort coax resources fromtheirrespective to dramatizes (and surelyexaggerates)the threat politicalchiefs.Each regularly posed by the other. The effectsof such argumentswithin the Kremlin are not easy to document, but the evidence suggests thattheyare oftenpersuasive. So are theygenerallypersuasive forAmericanCongressmen anxious to that they are "pro-" national security.The demonstrateto theirconstituents contrast with the generallyunenthusiastic receptiongiven to programsaimed of at aiding poor countries, amelioratingthe disaffection poor persons at home, haltingenvironmental degradation,stockpiling strategically important but scarcelysurprising.Propomaterials,or other such measures is striking themon the ground that do nents of such programsin factfrequently justify they promote national security.But because theirconnection to securityis oftennot immediatelyapparent, opponents find it easy to reject or simply ignore such arguments,if not to refutethem.4
crises. Indeed, followingwars or military 3. This is not to say that there are not recriminations the governmentsthat lead nations when war is thrustupon them-or when they initiatewar themselves-are oftensubject to pillory.It may be alleged thattheircomplacence allowed their forcesno longer deterredattack. Or nations' defenses to atrophyto a point where theirmilitary theymay be accused of recklessness that broughton a needless and expensive war. But while the war is stillin prospect, or while it is actuallyunderway, thereare too seldom any questions of leaders' abilities,to command the requisite resources from their perceptiblythreatened countrymen. 4. The same is true, it should be noted, about some "ordinary" foreignthreats. In 1975 a

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Preparing Catastrophe for A comparisonbetween Americansociety'spreparationsfortwo events, each carryingrelativelylow risks but each posing the threatof catastrophically high costs, is instructive. One is nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. The other is a large earthquake along the San Andreas fault that runs much of the length of the state of California. Nuclear war would undoubtedly resultin many more casualties and much greaterdamage, but a major earthquake along the San Andreas fault,and the gigantic tidal wave that would likely follow it, might well kill or seriously injure hundreds of thousands of persons and cause billionsof dollars of damage to property.Certainlyit would be devastatingto regional, if not national, se; of curity.Seismologistssay thatthe probability such an earthquakeoccurring withinhalf a centuryis relatively high, from2 to 5 percentin any one year.5 The odds that large-scale nuclear war will occur cannot be so confidently calculated, but they are surelymuch smaller. Every year the United States governmentspends many billions of dollars to build up nuclear forces whose purpose, at least according to strategic theory,is to make nuclear war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. less likely. of Americansregardthatas a properfunction government.So, also, do most Americans probably regard the constructionof shelters and other facilities that might reduce the damage caused by nuclear war should it occur. But administrationsin Washington or in likely targetstates and municipalities habituallyspend very much less-indeed, quite small sums-on such measures, and they spend even less on measures thatmightreduce the damage froma catastrophicearthquake.6

majorityof Senators and members of Congress did not believe that the presence of Sovietsupported Cuban troops in Angola posed a significant threatto U.S. security,and legislated limits on potential American involvement.Three years earlier they imposed a cutoffon U.S. bombing of targetsin Cambodia and NorthVietnamon the supposition thatcontinuedbombing would no longer (if it ever did) promoteU.S. security.For a discussion of these Congressional curbs on the President's abilityto commitAmerican military resources, see Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband, Foreign PolicyBy Congress (New York: Oxford UniversityPress, 1979), esp. pp. 13-23 and 46-57. 5. For a recent authoritativestudy, see An Assessment theConsequences Preparations a of and for Catastrophic California Earthquake: Findingsand ActionsTaken (Washington: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1980). For a summaryof currentestimates,see Richard A. Kerr, "California'sShaking Next Time," Science, Vol. 215 (January22, 1982), pp. 385-387. 6. The Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) fiscal year 1983 appropriationfor civil defense was $147,407,000; for "comprehensive emergency preparedness planning" for

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How can we explain these discrepancies? Regarding so-called "passive" defenses against nuclear weapons (shelters and the like, as distinguished from"active" defenses such as missiles to shoot down missiles), one explagiven the size of nation is that the task seems too daunting, a quixoticeffort the attackthe Soviet Union could launch. When scores of millionsmightbe killed,the prospect of saving tens of millions-as, indeed, a large-scaleeffort at civil defense might make possible-seems hearteningonly to the most zealous student of what has come to be called "comparativerecoveryrates" between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. And the cost of such a shelterprogram would be enormous, very expensive insurance against a catastrophicbut veryunlikelyrisk.Yet thereis littledoubt thatit could (withinthese macabre limits)be made effective.7 Against earthquakes, of course, shelters can offerlittle protection. The along the San Andreas faultcomes because many danger to lifeand property hundreds of thousands of Californiaresidentshave individuallymade decisions to locate theirhomes and businesses there. In theirview, the advantages of cost or location outweigh the disadvantages of exposure to the risk of major catastrophe. They might increase their own and their families' existingbuildings or replacing them chances for survival by strengthening with more resistant structures.But the probabilityis that, owing to the geologic propertiesof the San Andreas fault,an earthquake therewould be In so severe that for many structuressuch measures would be ineffective. can do littlebut monitor,warn, such a situation governmentalauthorities and make sure that emergencyfacilitiesare on hand forthe moment when
earthquakesit was $3,120,000. California'stotalbudgeted expenditureforearthquake safetyfor fiscal year 1983 was $13,391,000. For a detailed breakdown, see State of California, Seismic for and the Legislature July1981-June1982 Safety Commission, Annual Reportto the Governor (Sacramento:August 1982), pp. 16-21. 7. The "classic" appeal fora large U.S. civil defense program,based upon hypothesized comparative U.S. and Soviet recoveryrates, is T.K. Jones and W. Scott Thompson, "Central War and Civil Defense," Orbis,Vol. 22, No. 3 (Fall 1978), pp. 681-712. For a more recentdiscussion, see Robert Scheer, With Enough Shovels:Reagan, Bush and Nuclear War (New York: Random House, 1982), pp. 104-119. The enormous cost is one principalargumentagainst a large-scaleU.S. civil defense program. effective doctrine.A civil defense programthatpromises to offer But anotherrelates to strategic attack.The adversary,so this reasoning protection mightin a crisis invitean enemy first-strike runs, would read large-scale civil defenses as indicatingthat we ourselves were prepared to sign that we were beginning to move strikeat the first initiatenuclear war. It would therefore crisis. Thus we our population into shelters,as we surely would during a severe international enhance stability not opting forcivildefenses: the otherside knows thatsince our population by to is exposed, we would not be likelyto initiatenuclear war, and the incentivesforthem strike are preemptively therebyreduced.

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a devastatingquake occurs. Alas, while federaland state agencies currently monitorseismic events, they have done relativelylittleactually to prepare for the predicted disaster. Yet there is no doubt that, should it occur, the dire.8 consequences would be extraordinarily between the threats It scarcelyneeds statingthatthereare vast differences to "national security"posed by nuclear weapons and those posed by catastrophicnatural disasters. Nuclear wars, afterall, originatein human minds: other minds may therefore initiateactions to affectthe adversary's calculations of costs and benefit, of risks and reward. Behind earthquakes and floods are no minds. They cannot be deterred. But-theirpotential damage and the expencan be substantiallyreduced by the application of foresight diture of resources. Indeed, the probability that an incrementalexpenditure on protectionagainst earthquakes or floods will be effective surely very is much greaterthan the probability expenditure thata comparableincremental will enhance deterrenceagainst nuclearwar. Yet Americansand theirelected representatives prepared to acquiesce in-indeed, in some instances they are show enthusiasm for-vast programs of weapons acquisition which, in the name of forestalling nuclear war, have given the United States enough nuclear weapons to exterminate world's population several times over. But the the polityis ill-equipped to make resource allocations that, dollar fordollar, would contributeat least as much to "security"as would the acquisition of seeks the additional nuclearweapons upon which the presentAdministration to spend many billions of dollars. The example of protection against earthquakes raises other interesting points of comparison. While some communitymeasures are useful, risk aversion against such disasters is very largelyin the hands of individuals. at Individuals can also affect least to some limitedextentthe degree to which they will be at risk in the event of nuclear war. They can choose not to live in the vicinity likelynuclear targets,and householders can provide themof selves with substantialprotection against falloutand at least some protection against blast effects.But the patternof a Soviet nuclear attack-and, thereto fore, the location of likely danger-is very much more difficult predict than the danger zone of a major earthquake. And the opportunity costs to a citizen of choosing to live in a place so remote that injury from nuclear
8. The FEMA study cited above (note 5) estimatesthatthe likelydamage fromthe most probable (but far fromthe most destructiye)major earthquake on the San Andreas fault mightbe $17 billion,but it indicates that the figuremightbe low by a factoras high as three (p. 22).

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are weapons effects likelyto be minimalare verymuch greaterthan the costs of choosing not to live near the San Andreas faultor anotherarea of similarly great seismic instability, whose locations are all well known. In addition, protection against nuclear weapons effects much more a community is matter than is protectionagainst earthquakes. Particularly this true forresidents is ofmultiple-family urban dwellings. Only communities can afford construct to the deep, strongsheltersthatwould offer cityresidentseven a remotechance of survivinga nearby nuclear explosion.9 The other nonmilitary securitymeasures discussed thus farin this paper are almost all considerably farther than protectionagainst earthquakes toward the communityend of a spectrumrunningfromthe individual to the national community.10 Economic assistance to poor countries,programs to reduce dependence upon Persian Gulf oil, military relationswith repressive regimes, effortsto combat air and water pollution, stockpiling of scarce resources, all require eithergovernmentalallocation of resources or governmentallyframed policies and regulations. Like the acquisition and deployin ment of military forces,theyall depend upon organizationto be effective; a politylike the United States, the impetus forsuch organizationmust come fromgovernment,the ultimatewielder of carrotsand sticks. Indirect Threats: overTerritory Resources and Conflicts At the root of most of the violent conflicts historyhas been competition in forterritory resources. The comingdecades are likelyto see a diminution and in the incidence of overt conflictover territory: the enshrinementof the principle of national self-determination made the conquest of peoples has distinctly unfashionable. But conflictover resources is likely to grow more intense as demand for some essential commoditiesincreases and supplies
9. The most authoritativegenerally available projectionof the effectsof a varietyof types of Soviet nuclear attacks on the United States is The Effects Nuclear War (Washington, D.C.: of Congress of the United States, Officeof Technology Assessment, 1979). 10. It should be noted thatthe currently preferred mode ofavoiding nuclearwar (as distinguished from diminishing the likely effectsof nuclear war) is at the far end of this spectrum: the maintenanceof a deterrent nuclear striking forceis preeminently national responsibility-one, a incidentally, beyond the grasp of all but the wealthiestnation-states.Other modes of avoiding war, such as negotiation and disarmament, are also endeavors which only duly legitimate national authorities,as distinguished fromsub-national groupings or private individuals, can undertake. Earthquakes differfrom nuclear war in that they cannot be either deterred or forestalled.But societies can protectagainst theireffects.That is why, despite obvious differences, the comparison with nuclear war as a threatto societal securityseems instructive.

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appear more precarious. These conflicts will also have theirterritorial aspects, of course, but the territory contentionis likelyeitherto be unpopulated in or only sparsely populated. Much of it will be under water-oil-rich portions of the continentalshelves. Those parts above water will be the ostensible prizes, oftenisolated or barrenislands whose titlescarrywiththem exclusive rightsto exploit the riches in and under the surroundingseas. Such struggles over resources will often take the formof overt military confrontations whose violent phases will more likelybe short,sharp shocks ratherthan protractedwars. In most instances theywill involve neighboring states-Chile and Argentina, Iraq and Iran, Greece and Turkey, Morocco and Algeria, China and Vietnam,and many others.Most will be in the Third World. None is likely to involve the United States, although American firms-oil companies and otherresource-extracting enterprises-may well be caught up on eitherside of a particulardispute. Thus, if national securityis defined in conventionalways this country'snational securityis not likelyto be directly affected such disputes.1" by Their indirectimpact upon Americannational security likelyto be large, is however. Supplies of essential commoditieswill be at least temporarily disrupted. Local regimes may fall, theirplaces taken by successors often less friendly the United States. Outside powers hostile to American interests, to such as the Soviet Union or Cuba, may interveneto support local clients, placing pressure on Washington to launch (or at least organize) counterIn interventions. some quite plausible scenarios Washingtonmightintervene to protect local clients whether or not Moscow or Havana were involved. of Those circumstancesthat mightlead to a directconfrontation Soviet and American forces are, of course, the ones most dangerous to U.S. national security.Luckily,they are also the least likely. in "Resource wars" (as some call them) have figuredprominently doomsday forecastsformore than a decade. But they are only one way-and not the most importantway-in which resource issues will impinge upon nain for tional security coming years. It will not requireviolentconflict resource scarcities affect well-being-and the security-of nations on everyrung to the of the development ladder. In considering ways in which such scarcities

11. For a discussion of the kinds and scope of disputes that are likely to arise, see Ruth W. Arad and Uzi B. Arad, "Scarce Natural Resources and PotentialConflict,"in Arad et al., Sharing GlobalResources,1980s Project/Council Foreign Relations (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), on pp. 25-104.

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might affectnational security,analysts should distinguishthose that arise on fromexpansion of demand fromthose arisingfromrestrictions supply.

Behind expanding demand, of course, lies the continuingrapid growth in the world's population. Specialists note that the rate of population growth has not yet overtaken that of the globe's capacity to feed, house, and care forits people.12But that capacity is sorely strained. Moreover, global mechenough or anisms for distributing formanaging resources are not effective to preventlocal catastrophicfailuresor to preventthe consumptionof some rates. Those recrucial renewable resources at greater-than-replacement sources include tropical forestsand other sources of fuelwood, fish stocks, the ozone layer surrounding the earth, and the global supply of clean air and water. Moreover, these problems are interconnected.Here is but one example: As Third World villagerscut down more and more forestsin their search forfuelwood, the denuded land leftbehind is prey to erosion. Rains The topsoil, in turn, for carrytopsoil away, makingthe land unfit cultivation. villagers substitute silts up streams in its path. Meanwhile, the fuel-short for dung (which otherwise they would use forfertilizer) the wood they can and bringingon crop robbingthe soil of nutrients no longer obtain, further to sustain themselveson the land, many join the worldwide failures.Unable migrationfromthe countrysideinto the cities.13 That migration-caused by many factors-has given rise to an explosive growth in the population of most Third World cities. Many are ringed by shantytowns containing millions of squatters, a high proportion of them unemployed, malnourished,and livingin squalor. Under the weightof these enormous numbers municipal servicesbreak down and the qualityof lifefor all but the very rich suffersdrastically.Such cities are forcinggrounds for authority a and criminality violence. Some suffer breakdown ofgovernmental and become virtually unmanageable. Others are governableonly by increasingly repressive means that lead, in turn, to a decline in the perceived legitimacy the regime in power. Especially is this the case in nations that of
12. See the tables in the statisticalannexes to Roger D. Hansen et al., U.S. Foreign Policyand theThirdWorld:Agenda 1982, Overseas Development Council (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), esp. tables B-8 and C-1. 13. For a discussion that brings out the seamless nature of this problem, see Lester R. Brown, "World Population Growth, Soil Erosion, and Food Security,"Science,Vol. 214 (November 27, 1981), pp. 995-1002.

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are marked by ethnic or religious divisions. When the resources of a nation are severely strained, those at the bottom of a social hierarchyare quick to imagine-often with justification-thatthose who govern distribute benthe efits at their disposal in ways that favor some groups at the expense of others. There is a widespread assumption that these are the circumstancesfrom which revolutions are born. In fact,there is littleevidence that any recent revolution except perhaps the one in Iran has had urban roots. Although rapid population growthand its attendantmiserieshave certainly given rise to conflicts, particularly along communal lines, the governingauthoritiesin most Third World countries have been able to contain them. Rather than forging links among urban (and rural) dispossessed persons, recentarrivals in Third World cities have tended to be overwhelmingly preoccupied with retaining(and, if possible, expanding) whatever economic niches they have been able to carve forthemselves. They have thus farprovided few recruits forthose who would organize revolutions,nor much in the way of troubled waters in which outside powers mightfish.14 First World governmentsand peoples might be advised not to take too much comfortfrom this record. Although the consequences of explosive Third World population growth and rapid urbanizationhave not yet been felt much beyond their countries of origin, the strains on fragilepolitical structures will not ease beforethe end of the century,if then: the would-be workerswho will seek employmentin the swollen cities of the Third World during the 1990s have already been born. Even if these strainsdo not give rise to revolutions(and, perhaps, to foreign interventions), theyare likelyto in confrontational theirremake Third World governmentsmore militantly lations with the advanced, industrialized states. And they will produce multifold otherpressures on the richnations. For the United States, the most some coming through directly feltpressure is that of would-be immigrants, lawful channels, most coming illegally. The pressure is especially severeand probablyincreasing-from Mexico, but it comes fromall over the Caribbean and Central American region and fromother continentsas well. As population growthin the poor countrieshobbles economic development,the
14. For a thorough survey of extantsocial science research on Third World urban growthand its relationshipto politicalinstability, the unpublished paper by HenryBienen, "Urbanization see and Third World Stability," Research Program in Development Studies, Woodrow Wilson School, PrincetonUniversity,December 1982.

Security143 Redefining 1

gap in living standards between them and the rich countries is likely to continue to widen, and resentmentof the rich-rich nations and rich perThe image sons-will continue to grow. So will pressures forimmigration. of islands of affluenceamidst a sea of povertyis not inaccurate. This image has given rise to doomsday scenarios in which, several decades fromnow, the poor will threatenthe rich with nuclear war unless the rich agree to a massive redistribution wealth.15But even if these scenarios do not evenof tuate (and the superior destructive capabilitiesof the richmake such denouements unlikely),the pressure engendered by population growthin the Third World is bound to degrade the quality of life, and diminish the range of options available, to governmentsand persons in the rich countries. This paper is not the place fordetailed discussion of ways to slow population growthin the ThirdWorld, to help ThirdWorld countriesabsorb their multitudes of new citizens, and to introduce order into their processes of urban development. It is sufficient say thatmost such ways involve transto fersof resources and expertiseto Third World countries.The record of the United States in these areas is generallyabysmal: among the O.E.C.D. nations it is near the bottom of the league tables with regard to official development aid calculated on a per capita basis. Only in population programs But has the U.S. made a respectable effort.16 U.S. programsto assist other nations to solve their population problems are increasinglycoming under attack from the "right-to-life" movement in this country,many of whose of supportersare in the forefront those pressingforlarge increases in military spending. They, and the opponents of economic assistance in general, may narrow definitionof someday pay a significantprice for their arbitrarily national security.

Population growthdominates the problem of risingworldwide demand for resources. Moreover, overall demand is risingeven more rapidly than population growth figures alone would indicate. Many developing countries
15. For a prototypicalexample, see Robert L. Heilbroner,An Inquiryinto theHuman Condition (New York: W.W. Norton, 1975), esp. pp. 42-45. For a provocative variation, see McGeorge Bundy, "Afterthe Deluge, the Covenant," Saturday ReviewlWorld, August 24, 1975, pp. 18-20, 112-114. 16. For the O.E.C.D. rankings,see Hansen, Agenda1982, table F-8 and figureF-18. For population programs,see Dana Lewison, "Sources of Population and Family Planning Assistance," Population Reports, Vol. 11, No. 1 (January-February 1983).

International Security 144 1

contain growing "modern" sectors, enclaves of affluenceand higher living standards that enjoy the same wasteful consumptionpatternsof the industrialized world. That imposes yet additional strainson world resources. By contrast,no single factordominates the problem of constraintson resource supplies. A crucial distinction whetherthe resource in question is renewis able, like forestsor fish stocks or feedgrains,or nonrenewable, like (preeminently)oil. A second crucial distinction whetherthe resourceis becoming is increasinglyscarce through "normal" depletion or through efforts govby ernments (or, indeed, private persons) artificially restrictsupplies by to means of boycotts,embargoes, cartelagreements,recoverylimitations, and the like. Supply constraintsare most injurious when they are sudden. For virtually every raw materialthereare substituteswith propertiessufficiently similarso that replacementis possible. But whetheror not replacementcan take place without painful disruptiondepends upon whether the shortage in supply of the original item was foreseen adequately far in advance to make possible smooth adjustment. The United States is in a particularly fortunate position. Study afterstudy in recentyears has concluded that oil is the only commoditywhose sudden cutoff would have a drasticeffect national welfareor on economic activity. on Indeed, the same applies in large measure to all of the advanced industrialized market-economystates. Since most produce a considerably smaller proportionof theirdomestic oil consumption than the United States, most But would findan oil cutoff even more disruptive.17 otheressential imported materialsforthem, as forthe United States, eithercome fromhighlyreliable diverse range of supsuppliers-like-minded states-or froma sufficiently pliers so that a boycott by one or more would not impose really serious harm.18 Regarding foodstuffs, O.E.C.D. countriesare forthe most part the well provided for. Collectivelythey produce large agricultural surplusses.19
17. See David A. Deese and Joseph S. Nye, eds., Energyand Security(Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger,1981), esp. pp. 131-228 and appendix B, "Worldwide Production and Use of Crude Oil." 18. See the well-documented discussion in Arad, "Scarce Natural Resources," pp. 32-59. For a widely cited earlier statement,see Stephen D. Krasner, "Oil is the Exception," Foreign Policy, No. 14 (Spring 1974), pp. 68-84. JohnE. Tilton,TheFutureofNonfuel Minerals(Washington:The BrookingsInstitution,1977), reaches the same conclusions. 19. A concise survey of global patterns of food production and consumption is in Paul R. Ehrlich, Anne H. Ehrlich, and John P. Holdren, Ecoscience: Population, Environment Resources, (San Francisco:W.H. Freeman, 1977), pp. 284-297. For a current accountingby a U.S. Agriculture Departmentofficial, TerryN. Barr,"The World Food Situationand Global Grain Prospects," see Science,Vol. 214 (November 27, 1981), pp. 1087-1095.

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Individual O.E.C.D. states that importa high proportionof theirdomestic food consumption-Japan is the most important-need not worry about major disruptionsof supply because theirpurchasingpower will give them first claim on world markets. The problem is much more serious forThird World states. Many are not able to feed themselves and find it difficult pay forimportedfoodstuffs, to a difficulty compounded since 1973 by the rising cost of the oil they also must import.20 Food is indeed a weapon thatcan be wielded against themalthough the industrializedstates are most unlikelyto employ it. The much more serious danger theyface is theiracute vulnerability naturaldisasters to thatmay crippletheirown food productionor substantially reduce the supply (and therefore raise the price) of foodstuffs the world market.As popuon lation growth brings more mouths to feed, the situations of many Third World states are likelyto grow more and more precarious. Demand and supply are always related, of course. One approach to the resource problem is slowing the growthof demand by slowing the growth of population. But supply-side measures are equally necessary. When the too-rapidexploitationof renewable resourcesis viewed as a supply problem, the solution seems to lie in creatingmechanisms for effective regulationof the rate at which fish are caught, forestsare cut, seed crops are harvested for food, and effluentsare released into streams and emissions into the atmosphere. Sometimes the nation-stateis the appropriate arena for such regulatory activity.In otherinstances, international mechanisms ("regimes," in the currentacademic jargon) are required. Such measures are likelyto be reallyeffective, however, only when they are combined with efforts slow to the growth of demand. Moreover, as noted earlier,increasing demand for many commodities is a product not merely of population growth, but of rising affluence. And rising affluenceis often not accompanied by rising sensitivity the need forresource management, and the appropriate techto nical and political skills to make managementpossible. As indicated above, one way to cope with depleting supplies of any commodity is to find substitutesfor it. That applies even to some renewable resources-although not, of course, to clean air and water. It applies more obviously to nonrenewable resources. For minerals and fuels, a sensible strategyis to create stockpiles that make it possible to cope with short-run

pp. and Secuirity, 229-58. 20. See Deese and Nye, Energy

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interruptions supply while developing substitutesto cope with long-run of inevitabledepletion. These are scarcelydifficult principlesto grasp. What is difficult to peris suade governments to allocate funds to put the principles into practice. Especially for powerful countries like the United States that are used to gettingtheirway in the world, it seems easier to arouse the politicalwill to respond to a supply disruption with militarymeans than to forestallthe disruptionin the firstplace by fostering alternatesources of supply, or by developing substitutesforthe resource whose supply is threatened. AssessingVulnerability In every sphere of policy and action, securityincreases as vulnerability decreases.21 the most basic level ofindividualsurvival,thisis a law of nature, At seeminglyas well understood by animals as by humans. At thatlevel it is a reflexive response. Reducing vulnerability becomes a matterof policy,rather than of reflexaction, when it seems necessary to calculate the costs and benefitsinvolved. How much securitydo we buy when we expend a given That is a difficult incrementof resources to reduce vulnerability? question even in relativelysimple situations, such as a householder stockpilinga commodityagainst the possibilityof a disruptionin accustomed channels of ratherthan the individual,itbecomes supply. At the level of the community, and very much more difficult: different members assess risks differently, theymay well be differently damaged by a disruptingevent. An investment in redundancy that seems worthwhileto one familymay seem excessively costly to another. Neither will know which is correctunless the crunch actually comes. And even then they mightdisagree. They mightexperience distress differently.

nuclear relationshipbetween the 21. Some mightargue that this is not the case in the strategic United States and the Soviet Union, and thatit is the knowledge withineach governmentthat its societyis highlyvulnerable to nuclear attacksby the otherthatkeeps it fromever launching This argumenthas considerable such an attackitself.Securityis thus a productof vulnerability. neithersuperpower is contentto act upon it. forceas a logical construct.Yet, not surprisingly, As technological developments seem to make possible the limitationof damage fromat least some formsof nuclear attack,each pursues themforfearthatthe otherwill secure a momentary faced with the worst of situations,in which one or the other may advantage. We are therefore be unduly optimisticregardingthe degree to which it mightlimitdamage to its own societyif even assessed may well enhance security accurately Decreased vulnerability it were to strikefirst. in strategicnuclear relations;misleadinglyassessed it may bringdisaster.

| Redefiniing Secuirity147

At the level discussed in this paper, where states are the communities involved and where the problems are forthe most part considerablymore complicated than a simple disruptionin an accustomed channel of supply, and increased securityis the relationshipbetween decreased vulnerability difficult measure. Consider even the relatively to simple measure formidably of adding crude oil to the U.S. Strategic PetroleumReserve, the (forthe most part) underground stockpile whose purpose is to make it possible for the in nation to ride out a cutoff deliveries fromone or more major foreignoil suppliers. We know, of course, the cost of buying and storing a given incrementof crude oil. But until mid-1981the governmentof Saudi Arabia (the world's major exporterof oil) took the position that U.S. stockpilingof oil was an unfriendlyact. It claimed that it maintained high levels of oil production to provide immediate benefits-"moderate" prices-to Western (and other) consumers, not to make it possible forWashingtonto buy insurance against the day when the Saudi leadershipmightwant to cut production so as, say, to influenceU.S. policy toward Israel. Successive administrations in Washingtonhave regarded the retentionof Saudi good will as something close to a vital American interest,on both economic and strategicgrounds. the PetroleumReserve.22 They therefore dragged theirfeeton filling Strategic were wrong? Who Who can say with assurance thatthose administrations of could measure-before the event-the effects puttingSaudi noses out of joint? It may well have been that even so seeminglymodest a measure as adding to the oil stockpilewould ripple throughSaudi and Middle Eastern politics in such a manner as ultimatelyto bring about just that calamity insulation,thatis, a producagainst which the stockpileis intended to offer tion cutback. Moreover, being finitein size, the stockpile may not offer sufficient insulation against a protracteddeep cutback. But, by the same token, who can be sure that even if the reserveremains unfilled(its level is still farbelow the total originallyplanned23),and even if the United States the takes otheradditional measures to mollify Saudis, an event will not occur
22. See, e.g., Walter S. Mossberg, "Kowtowing on the Oil Reserve," The Wall Street Journal, May 14, 1980, p. 20, and Sheilah Kast, "Filling Our StrategicOil Reserve," Washington Star, February 9, 1981, the latter quoting Secretary-of-State-designate Alexander M. Haig, Jr., as calling the Saudi position "oil blackmail." 23. The EnergyInformation Administration's Monthly Eniergy Review(Washington:U.S. Department of Energy) presents a running tally of the size of the StrategicPetroleum Reserve. For a technical account of how the reserve is maintained, see Ruth M. Davis, "National Strategic Petroleum Reserve," Science,Vol. 213 (August 7, 1981), pp. 618-622. See also Deese and Nye, Energy and Security, 326-328, 399-403. pp.

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a that will trigger supply disruptionin any case? If that occurs, the nation would clearlybe betteroffifit possessed a healthyreserveof stored oil, even to one insufficient cushion the entireemergency. Ever since the OPEC embargoes of 1973-74, Western governmentshave been extremelysensitive to any hint of a further cutoffof oil or, for that matter,of other, less critically needed resources. It is not surprisingthat many analysts both in Washington and in other NATO capitals interpreted the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the end of 1979 not simplyas Moscow's at ruthlesseffort handle a local politicaldilemma but as the startof a Soviet to march toward the Persian Gulf. Since then, both the Carterand the Reagan Administrations have regardedraisinga robustcombined-arms military force earmarkedforGulf contingencies-the so-called Rapid Deployment Forceas the most appropriate and, not so coincidentally, also the politicallymost saleable response to the threatof instability the Gulf. in Yet thereis wide agreementamong specialiststhatadditional overtSoviet border-crossing aggression in the Middle East is an unlikely contingency. Far more likely is the coming to power in a major oil-producingstate like Saudi Arabia of a militantly anti-Western regimethat mightrestrict production. Against such an eventualitythe Rapid Deployment Force offerslittle insurance, fortherewould be greatresistancein Congress and in the public in at large to any Presidential use of American forces for intervention the turbulent internalpoliticsof the region. It requires a long and more relaxed view to deemphasize militaryintervention as an instrumentof policy, however. And a longer view is much more possible under conditionsof reduced vulnerability. Then the occupant of the Oval Officewould be more likelyto feel thathe reallyhas the option of allowing the politics of regions like the Middle East to run theircourse. in Were the United States less vulnerable to interruptions the supply of the region's oil, administrations might find they had a wider range of options forpursuing otherinterests, communication routes or the such as protecting independence of Israel. Communications routes, for instance, can be proto tected at many points. And the American commitment Israel would cost less if the U.S. were not simultaneouslysupplying some of Israel's enemies with the most potent weapons in its inventory and then giving the Israelis additional weapons to offset them. As this paper has suggested, many of the conditionsthatmay most affect U.S. securityhave theirorigins in circumstancesthat have littleor nothing to do with the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. Yet

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many of them, if not managed, have the potential to give rise to crises between the superpowers as one or the otherintervenesto secure resources in or to support its clientsin a domestic or regional conflict the ThirdWorld. For crisis prevention, if for no other reasons, political leaders in Washington-and in Moscow, too-should pay heed to these conditions.24 There are, of course, otherreasons. To the extentthatthe quality of lifein the United States is degraded by resource scarcitiesand by the deterioration in the quality of life beyond its borders, Americans should be concerned. That is but the counsel of prudence. Focussing attentionon these "other dimensions of security"will require politicalleadership of the highestorder, however. Morever, it will require far greater consensus than now exists regardingwhat is to be done. The absence of consensus is, indeed, a formidableobstacle. There is no regardingways of coping agreementwithinthe Americanpolicy community with resource scarcitiesor with the problems of povertyand explosive popin currently Washulation growth in the Third World. The Administration everysphere ingtonis ideologicallycommitedto marketsolutionsin virtually of policy. Thus, ratherthan develop governmentstockpilesof oil and other scarce resources it prefersto leave the task to private entities. Indeed, so directed resource opposed is the Reagan Adminstrationto governmentally management that it has even encouraged the depletion of the largest oil stockpileit itselfowns, the oilfieldsset aside as so-called Naval Petroleum

The same is true forinvestmentsin alternateenergysources. The Adminstrationhas drasticallyreduced federal allocations for energy research and developmentof all sorts. Nuclear fusion,solar energy,unconventionaloilsall have had their appropriations sliced. (Only the Clinch River breeder leader, reactor,a projectin the home state of the Republican Senate majority in has been spared.)26Not surprisingly, an economic climatemarkedby both recessionand high interest rates,the privatesectorshows few signs of acting upon the Administration's preferences,ideologicallycongenial though they
24. For an excellent discussion of the genesis and preventionof superpower crises, see Alexander L. George, Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry:Problems Crisis Prevention of (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983). 25. Richard Corrigan, "Three Bowls of Oil," NationalJournal, December 5, 1981, p. 2167. 26. See these articles by Richard Corrigan, the NationalJournal's energy correspondent:"The Next Energy Crisis: A Job for the Governmentor the Free Market?," June 20, 1981, pp. 11061109; "On Energy Policy, the Administratign Prefersto Duck, Defer and Deliberate," July18, 1981, pp. 1280-1283; and "Down forthe Count," May 22, 1982, p. 919.

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of may be. Despite bargain prices, therehas been littlestockpiling commodities. And, with a worldwide oil glut, the private sector has shown no inclinationto invest in energyalternatives. Opponents of the Administration's position assert that, regardless of the economic climate, the marketplace is incapable of adequately discounting of scarcity.Therefore,they argue, the intervention a single, authoritative actor-by definition, the federalgovernment-is required to build up stockpiles and to fund research and development activitiesthat are not likelyto pay offwithincommercially acceptable timeframes.27 MeasuringSecurity That intervention will necessarilygive rise to what appear to be inefficiencies. They will appear so because it will be possible to compare the costs of resources stockpiled,or developed by new productiontechniques, with the costs forthe same or similarcommoditiesbought on the market.Usuallyunless therehas been an intervention a different of sort,such as an embargo by suppliers-the costs of stockpilesor substituteswill be higher. It is easy to quantifythese so-called inefficiencies. And once quantified,theyare easy to decry. On the other hand, it is much more difficult assign a weight to to the securitythat the communitymay have purchased by sustainingthem. It is at least as difficult, however, to assign a weight to the quantityof securitythat the communitypurchases by a given investmentin military battalionthat hardware or in manpower. A missile or a tank or an infantry never entercombat are like commoditiespurchased fora stockpile.They also are inefficiencies. we less oftenlook at military Yet purchases thatway. We in do, of course, incessantlydecry "waste and inefficiency" the armed services and in the defense industries. But we usually mean that bettermanfor agementcould have purchased comparablemilitary capability less money. Rarely do we ask whether the possession of that particularcapablity is in " itself"efficient. with nonmilitary That is not to say thatwe do not oftencompare military expenditures. Indeed, such comparisons are a staple of political discourse. it Someone points out thatforthe price of, say, one Navy F-14 fighter would be possible to build a certainnumberof daycare centersor black-lungclinics

July18, 1981, p. 1283. 27. Corrigan, "Energy Policy," NationalJournal,

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forthe miningtowns of Appalachia. And we know that,unlike the F-14, the centersor clinicswould be "used" (indeed, we hope the F-14will never enter combat). Moreover,we know quite preciselyhow much welfarewe purchase with a childcare center or a clinic. We can quantifyit in terms of children attending (and mothers working) or patients treated. But at that point the comparison between guns and butterends. We can weigh American forces against Soviet forces,and we can compare the capabilitiesof one weapons system against another. But we cannot really quantifythe securitywe buy with the funds we spend on an F-14 or, indeed, on an entire carriertask group. We assume thatthe task group will deterhostileactionsby unfriendly nations. But it may be thata smallerAmericanNavy will deter them equally well, and a carrierair wing minus one F-14 may be fullycapable of meeting all the threatsthat ever come against it.28 This discussion has sought to show that we generallythinkabout-and, as a polity,dispose of-resource allocations formilitary and fornonmilitary dimensions of securityin quite different ways. Regarding militaryforces, although analysts and interestgroups may have theirown ideas about such issues as the appropriatesize of the Americanfleetor the compositionof its air wings, thereis general agreementon the principlethattheremust in the end be a single, authoritative and that such a determination determination, can come only fromthe central governmentof the polity. Because we acknowledge that there is no marketplacein which we can purchase military security(as distinguishedfromsome of its components),we would not look to privateindividuals or firms legislatorsor regionalgovernments make or to such a determination, even thoughwe mightdisagreewiththe determination thatthe federalgovernmentmakes. By contrast,as indicated above, there is no consensus about the need for
28. Part of the difficulty comparing guns and buttermay arise fromthe fact that polities of demand different ordersof satisfaction fromthe evaluationof the two. Regardingdaycare centers thatservices of a given quality have or clinics,officials oftenfeel satisfiedwhen theycan certify in factbeen delivered. They seldom feel it necessary to ask whether theirdelivery has really enhanced the welfareof the community,the nation, or the world: they regard the question as either self-evidentor as impossible to answer. But publics have come to demand more of accountings for militaryexpenditures. AfterIsrael's sweeping victoriesin Lebanon in 1982 it was not enough to ascertainthat the American-armed Israeli forceshad decisivelydefeated the Soviet-armedSyriansand Palestinians, nor even thatthe campaign had vastlyenhanced Israel's short-runsecurity. Observers asked-and regarded the question as entirely appropriatewhetherit had reallyenhanced Israel's long-runsecurity. For a discussion of assessing the benefitsof welfareprograms,see Alice M. Rivlin,Systematic Thinking Social Action(Washington:The BrookingsInstitution, for 1971), pp. 46-63.

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a single, authoritativedetermination regardingthe nonmilitary dimensions of security. The polity as a whole is thereforemuch more responsive to allegations that a given investmentin, say, a commoditystockpileis "inefficient"than it is responsive to the same allegationregardinga given investment in military forces.Moreover, the alleged inefficiency farmore easily is demonstrated. The situation is similarregardingmeasures for coping with the other problems mentioned in this paper: rapid population growth, explosive urbanization, deforestation,and the like. Here, also, the current American Adminstration-and much of the public-is committedto "efficient" marketplacesolutions ratherthan to solutions involvinginternational regimes or governmentally sponsored transfers resources. of the Changing Consensus Because of these preconceptions regardingthe appropriate role of governmental authority both in definingproblems and in proposing solutions, the tendencyof American politicalleaders to define security problems and their solutions in military termsis deeply ingrained. The image of the President as Commander in Chief is powerful.When in thisrole he requests additional funds forAmericanmilitary forcesthe Congress and the public are reluctant to gainsay him. When he requests funds for economic assistance to Third World governments,he is much more likelyto be disputed even though he may contend that such expenditures also provide the United States with security. Alteringthat patternwill require a sustained effort public education. It at is not an effort that administrations themselves are likelyto undertakewith in any real commitment, particularly timeswhen the economyis straightened and when they find it difficult enough to find funds forthe military goals they have set forthemselves. The agents forany change in public attitudes are therefore likelyto be nongovernmental. Over the past decade or so a vast array of public interestorganizations have begun to put forwardalternateconceptionsof national security.Nearly all are devoted to particularissues-limiting population growth,enhancing environmentalquality, eradicatingworld hunger, protectinghuman rights, and the like. Some are overt lobbies expresslyseeking to alter political outcomes. Others devote themselves to research and educational activities,but are equally concerned with changing governmentalbehavior. Jointly they have succeeded in substantially raisingpublic awareness of the vulnerability

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in of the societyto a varietyof harms nonmilitary nature, and of the limitations of military instrumentsfor coping with many types of political problems. One should not overestimatethe achievementsof these nongovernmental organizations, however. Awareness on the part of a substantial informed is minority one thing. Embodying it in public policy is a very much larger step. A society's consciousness changes only gradually-usually with the change of generations. The likelihood is that for the foreseeable futurethe American polity will continue to be much more willing to expend scarce resources on military forces than on measures to prevent or ameliorate the myriad profoundly dislocating effectsof global demographic change. Yet those effectsare likely to intensify with the passage of time. Problems that are manageable today may prove farless tractablein the future.And while on solutions to politicalwill and energyare focussed predominately military tasks are likely to grow the problems of national security,the nonmilitary ever more difficult accomplish and dangerous to neglect. to