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10 .

. 3.5.3." "

Salanie 3.1.3 The insurer as a monopolist(pp.47-52);

M.Rothschild, J. Stiglitz Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets; An essay on the economics of


imperfect information. Quart. Journal of economics, 1976. Vol.80.Nov., pp.629-649. ( ,
);

Ines Macho-Stadler, J.David Perez-Castrillo An introduction to the economics of information: incentives and
contracts. 4B.1 "Competition between insurance companies", .142-149;

Ray Rees Uncertainty, information and insurance. Current issues in microeconomics. Edited by John D.
Hey. Macmillan edication LTD,1991.
h.3.4.: c. 62- 70 ( )

Robert Puelz, Arthur Snow Equilibruim Signaling and Cross-Subsidization in the insurance Market Journal
of Political Economy. Vol.102. Issue 2(April 1994), 236-257.

Pierre-AndreChiappori, Bernard Salanie"esting for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets",


Journal of Political Economy.Vol.108. Issue 1(Feb 2000), 56-78.(
, ,
).

Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: Policyholder Evidence from the U.K.


Annuity Market
James Poterba and Amy Finkelstein, Journal of Political Economy 112
(February 2004), 183-208..

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1. Rasmusen Eric Games and Information. Fourth Edition, 2006.


http://www.rasmusen.org/GI/download.htm Chapter 9: Adverse Selection
9.1. Insurance with Equations and Diagrams (easy)
Let u (W) = ln W.
(a) Give the numeric values (Wg, Wb) for the full-information separating contracts CL and CH (
). What are the coordinates for CL and CH?
(b) Why is it not necessary to use the u (W) = ln W function to find the values?
(c) At the separating contract ( ) under incomplete
information -C5 , Wg = 2,01. What is Wb?
(d) What is a pooling contract C6 that might be profitable and that would lure both
types away from C3 and C5 ( -
) ? ( )
9.5. Insurance and State-Space Diagrams (medium)
Two types of risk-averse people, clean-living and dissolute, would like to buy
health insurance.
Clean-living people become sick with probability 0.3, and dissolute people with
probability 0.9.
In state-space diagrams with the persons wealth if he is healthy on the vertical
axis and if he is
sick on the horizontal, every persons initial endowment is (5,10), because his
initial wealth is 10
and the cost of medical treatment is 5.
(a) What is the expected wealth of each type of person?
(b) Draw a state-space diagram with the indifference curves for a risk-neutral
insurance company
that insures each type of person separately. Draw in the post-insurance allocations
C1 for the dissolute and C2 for the clean-living under the assumption that a
persons type
is contractible.
(c) Draw a new state-space diagram with the initial endowment and the
indifference curves for
the two types of people that go through that point.
(d) Explain why, under asymmetric information, no pooling contract can be part of
a Nash
equilibrium.
(e) If the insurance company is a monopoly, can a pooling contract be part of a
Nash equilibrium?