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Canonizado vs.

Aguirre, 351 SCRA 659 FACTS:Respondents are seeking a reconsideration of the Courts 25 January 2000 decision, wherein it declares Section 8 of R.A. No. 8551 to be violative of petitioners constitutionally mandated right to security of tenure. The Court holds the petitioners removal as NAPOLCOMs Commissioners and the appointment of new Commissioners in their stead were nullities, and ordering their reinstatement and payment of full back wages. Respondents point out that Canonizado was appointed by the Pres. Estrada to the position of Inspector General of the Internal Affairs Service (IAS) of the PNP in the interim. According to the respondents, by virtue of the fact, Canonizado is deemed to have to have abandoned his claim for reinstatement, since the offices of the NAPOLCOM Commissioner and the Inspector General of IAS are incompatible. ISSUE: Whether Canonizados appointment to and acceptance of the position of Inspector General should result is an abandonment of his claim for reinstatement to the NAPOLCOM. HELD: NO. It is a well-settled rule that he who, while occupying one office, accept another incompatible with the first, ipso facto vacates the first office and his title is thereby terminated without any other act or proceeding. Public policy considerations dictate against allowing the same individual to perform inconsistent and incompatible duties. The incompatibility contemplated is not the mere physical impossibility of one persons performing the duties of the two offices due to a lack of time or the inability to be in two places at the same moment, but that which proceeds from the nature and relations of the two positions to each other as to give rise to contrariety and antagonism should one attempt to faithfully and impartially discharge the duties of one toward the incumbent of the other. There is no question that the position of NAPOLCOM Commissioner and Inspector General of the IAS are incompatible with each other. As pointed out by respondents, RA 8551 prohibits any personnel of the IAS from sitting in a committee charge with the task of deliberating on the appointment, promotion or assignment of any PNP personnel, whereas the NAPOLCOM has the power of control and supervision over the PNP. However, the rule on incompatibility of duties will not apply to the case at bar because at no point did Canonizado discharge the functions of the two offices simultaneously. Canonizado was forced out of his first office by the enactment of Section 8 of RA 8551.Thus, when Canonizado was appointed as Inspector General he had ceased to discharge his official functions as NAPOLCOL Commissioner. Thus, to reiterate, the incompatibility of duties rule never had a chance to come into play for petitioner never occupied the two positions, of Commissioner and Inspector General, nor discharged their respective functions, concurrently. As in Tan v. Gimenez and Gonzales v. Hernandez cases, Canonizado was compelled to leave his position as Commissioner, not by an erroneous decision, but by a constitutional provision of law. Canonizado, like the petitioners in the above mentioned cases, held a second office during the period that his appeal was pending. As stated in the comment filed by petitioners, Canonizado was impelled to accept this subsequent position by a desire to the continue serving the country, in whatever capacity. Surely, this selfless and noble aspiration deserves to be placed on at least equal footing with the worthy goal of
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providing for oneself and ones family, either of which are sufficient to justify Canonizados acceptance of the position of Inspector General. A contrary ruling would deprive petitioner of his right to live, which contemplates not only a right to earn a living, as held in previous cases, but also a right to lead a useful and productive life. Furthermore, prohibiting Canonizado from accepting a second position doing the pendency of his petition would be to unjustly compel him to bear the consequences of an unconstitutional act which under no circumstances can be attributed to him. However, before Canonizado can re-assume his post as Commissioner, he should first resign as Inspector General of the IAS-PNP.

Pari-an vs. Civil Service Commisioner, 202 SCRA 772 FACTS: Before the EDSA revolution in February 1986, the 14 petitioners, Inocencio Pari-an, et al. were occupying permanent positions as Municipal Agriculture & Food Officers (MAFO) in the Ministry of Agriculture and Food, Region 6, assigned in different municipalities of Iloilo province. Respondent Alma Blanca, et al. was holding positions, other than MAFOs, in various bureau of the Ministry. President Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O. No. 116 reorganizing the Ministry of Agriculture and Food and renaming it simply as the Department of Agriculture (DA). Pursuant to E.O. No. 116, the Secretary of Agriculture issued a memorandum setting guidelines for the reorganization. Examinations and Evaluations were conducted. A total of 44 employees were listed as Municipal Agriculture Offices and were deployed to their respective places of assignments. However, some of the respondents were displaced and thus made an appeal. Pari-an, et al. were dislodged and were demoted to position much lower in grade and salary scale by the Departments Reorganization Appeals Board (DA-RAB). On appeal to CSC, the Commission upheld the action of DA-RAB on the ground that it was made in pursuant to the bona fide reorganization of the Department of Agriculture. Para-ans motion for reconsideration was denied. ISSUE: Whether or not the reorganization of the Department of Agriculture was valid. HELD: NO. Court sets aside the reorganization of the Department of Agriculture on the ground that it did not comply with the guidelines in E.O. No. 17, the 1987 Constitution and the Republic Act No. 6656. (1) The Presidents E.O. No. 17 dated May 28, 1986 enumerates the following grounds for the separation/replacement of personnel: 1)Existence of a case for summary dismissal pursuant to Section 40 of the Civil Service Law; 2)Existence of a probable cause for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act as determined by the Ministry Head concerned; 3)Gross incompetence or inefficiency in the discharge of functions; 4)Misuse of public Office for partisan political purposes; 5)Any other analogous ground showing that the incumbent is unfit to remain in the service or his separation/replacement is in the interest of the service.
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(2) The 1987 Constitution provides that no officer of the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law Sec. 2[3], Article [B], 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, (3) Republic Act No. 6656 sets clear-cut policies and guidelines on government reorganization to protect the security of tenure of Civil Service employees and officers. As Civil Service employees with permanent appointments, the petitioners could not be removed, suspended or demoted except for cause provided by law. Since the records of this case do not show that they dad been charged and found guilty of any of the infractions listed in E.O. No. 17, their replacement and/or demotion in rank was unjustified and illegal. Petitioners position as MAFOs were not abolished in the reorganization process but were merely rebaptized as MAOs. Their functions, duties and stations remained the same. Even the number of MAFO/MAO positions (44) was not altered. Evidently the so-called reorganization was only an excuse for reshuffling and replacing personnel in violation of the latters right to security of tenure. We had stressed in Dario vs. Mison, 176 SCRA 84, that removal from office as a result of reorganization must pass he test of good faith, xxx a test well established in democratic societies and in this government under democratic charter. However, we noted in the Mendoza and other reorganization cases (186 SCRA 108) that the bona fide rule had been ignored and disobeyed. For that reason, the Court was constrained to set aside the reorganization embodied in these consolidated petitions because the heads of departments and agencies concerned have chosen to rely on their own concepts of unlimited discretion and progressive ideas of reorganization instead of showing that they have faithfully complied with the clear letter and spirit of the Constitutions (The Provisional Constitution and the 1987 Constitution) and the statutes governing reorganization.

Canonizado, et al. vs. Aguirre, 323 SCRA 312 FACTS: Petitioners were incumbent commissioners of the National Police Commission when Republic Act No. 8851, otherwise known as the PNP Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998, took effect. Section 8 of R.A. No. 8851 provided that the terms of office of the incumbent petitioners were deemed expired and thus assailed by petitioners for being unconstitutional for it violates the petitioners security of tenure. In defense of the law, the Solicitor General argues that the law intended to impliedly abolish the NAPOLCOM by means of reorganization by changing the functions and composition of the same. ISSUE: WON there was a valid abolition of the NAPOLCOM. HELD: NONE. R.A. 8551 did not expressly abolish petitioners positions. In order to determine whether there has been an implied abolition, it becomes necessary to examine the
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changes introduced by the new law in the nature, composition and functions of the NAPOLCOM. The powers and duties of the NAPOLCOM remain basically unchanged by the amendments. The NAPOLCOM continues to exercise substantially the same administrative, supervisory, rule-making, advisory and adjudicatory functions. Reorganization takes place when there is alteration of the existing structure of the government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them. In involves a reduction in personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. Naturally, it may result in the loss of ones position through removal or abolition of an office. However, for a reorganization to be valid, it must also pass the test of good faith. No bona fide reorganization of the NAPOLCOM having been mandated by Congress, RA 8851, insofar as it declares the terms of office of the incumbent commissioners, petitioners herein, as expired and resulting in their removal from office, removes civil service employees from office without legal cause and must therefore be struck down for being constitutionally infirm. Petitioners are thus entitled to be reinstated to office. It is of no moment that there are now new appointees to the NAPOLCOM. It is a well-entrenched principle that when a regular government employee is illegally dismissed, his position never becomes vacant under the law and he is considered as not having left his office. The new appointments made in order to replace petitioners are not valid.

Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB vs. Executive Secretary, 360 SCRA 718 FACTS: On June 30, 1987, former President Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O. No. 127 which established EIIB (Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau). EIIB was an agency primarily responsible for anti-smuggling operations. Eleven years later, President Estrada issued E.O. No. 191 which deactivated EIIB on the ground that there was an overlapping of functions with the Bureau of Customs and NBI. He then issued E.O. No. 196 which created the Presidential Anti-Smuggling Task Force Aduana. On March 29, 2000, President Estrada issued E.O. No. 223 providing that all EIIB personnel occupying positions specified therein shall be deemed separated from the service effective April 30, 2000, pursuant to a bona fide reorganization resulting to abolition, redundancy, merger, division, or consolidation of positions. Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB then filed this case alleging that EO 191 and EO 223 are unconstitutional for being violative of their security of tenure and that it was a usurpation of the power of Congress to abolish EIIB. ISSUE: WON E.O. No. 191 and 223 are unconstitutional. HELD: NO. They are constitutional. Farther, the President has the authority to reorganize the executive department. As far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are concerned, the President power of control may justify him to inactivate the functions
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of particular office, or certain laws may grant him the broad authority to carry out reorganization measures. This case reiterates the ruling in Larin vs. Executive Secretary where the Court held that President has the authority to effect organizational changes in the department or agency under the executive structure. E.O. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) also has express grant of such power. Here, EIIB falls under the Office of the President and hence, subjects to the Presidents continuing authority to reorganize which includes the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices or abolition thereof. Reorganizations are valid provided they are pursued in good faith and it is in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. Here, the deactivation of EIIB and creation of Aduana was in good faith. There is no employment of new personnel since the staff will be composed of people who are already in the public service. Further, it was shown that Aduanas allocation of fund is much lesser than that of EIIB.

Department of Education, Culture and Sports vs. Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 558 FACTS: Respondent Gloria V. Navarro was appointed Secondary School Principal II. Her appointment was without reference to any particular school. For some years, however, her station as high school principal had been at Carlos Albert High School. Sometimes in 1982, petitioner Edna B. Azurin in her capacity as School Division Superintendent of Quezon City, effected a reshuffling of all high school principals in Quezon City in the exigencies of the service, as all of the principals had been overstaying in one station for more than 5 years. As a result of said reshuffling, respondent Navarro was reassigned from Carlos Albert High School to Manuel Roxas High School without demotion in rank nor diminution in salary. Respondent resisted the said transfer and without elevating the matter to the CSC for exhaustion of administrative remedies, said respondent immediately filed a petition for certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction against Edna Azurin, Anastacio Ramonte and Honorable Onofre D. Corpuz before the RTC o Quezon City. Judge Tensuan issued an order granting the petition for the issuance of wit of preliminary injunction. Petitioner filed its answer stating that Navarro is not entitled to writ of preliminary injunction and her action deserved outright dismissal since she failed to exhaust administrative remedies; that her reassignment was being made in the exigencies of the service and does not constitute demotion in rank and salary, hence, not in violation of R.A. 4670, otherwise known as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, that her reassignment was in accordance with MEC Circular No. 28, series of 1962, directing transfer or reassignment after service of more than 5 years in one station to avoid the teachers becoming stale or unchallenged and to avoid over fraternization with associates which could be detrimental to the service.
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An appeal by Navarro, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision declaring null and void the Order dated August 27, 1986 which dismissed Civil Case No. Q-37025 and October 17, 1986 decision which had denied Navarros motion for Reconsideration. ISSUE: Whether or not the reassignment of Gloria Navarro as principal from Carlos Albert High School to Manuel Roxas High School, both in Quezon City is valid. HELD: YES. The appointment of Navarro as principal does not refer to any particular station or school. As such, she could be assigned to any station and she is not entitled to stay permanently at any specific school (Bongbong vs. Parado, 57 SCRA 623). When she was assigned to the Carlos Albert High School, it could not have been with the intention to let her stay in said school permanently. Otherwise, her appointment would have so stated. Consequently, she may be assigned to any station or school in Quezon City as the exigencies of public service require even without her consent. As this Court ruled in Brillantes v. Guevarra, 27 SCRA 138,143. It should be here emphasized that Azurins letter of August 12, 1982, clearly stated that Navarros reassignment is in the exigencies of the service. It was explicitly mentioned that her reassignment is recognition of her capabilities as administrator in improving the Carlos Albert High School and that she should look at her new assignment as a challenge to accomplish new and bigger projects for manuel Roxas High School. Moreover, her reassignment was a result of recognition/reshuffling of all principals in the Quezon City high schools in the exigencies of the service pursuant to MEC Circular No. 26, Series of 1972. This circular refers to the policy of the Ministry of Education that principals, district supervisors, academic supervisors, general education supervisors, school administrative officers and superintendents are to be transferred upon completion of five (5) years of service in one station. Such policy was based on the experience that when school officials have stayed long enough in one station, there is a tendency for them to become stale and unchallenged by new situations and conditions, and that some administrative problems accumulate for good number of years. In the case at bar, the reasons given by Azurin in recommending Navarros reassignment were far from whimsical, capricious or arbitrary. Navarro had been assigned as principal of Carlos Albert High School for more than ten years. She was ripe for reassignment so that her management and expertise could be availed of in her new assignment. Apart from the presumption of good faith that Azurin enjoys, We believe that her recommendation for Navarros reassignment - for the latter to share the benefits of her expertise in her new assignment plus the recognizable fact that a relatively long stay in one station tends towards over-fraternization with associates which could be injurious to the service has a substantial factual basis that meets the requirements of the exigencies of the service. With the foregoing, the conclusion is thus inescapable that there can be no violation of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers in this case. Finally, respondent Navarro has not exhausted administrative remedies as she did not elevate the matter of her transfer to the CSC in accordance with Section 24 P.D. No. 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree. By not appealing her case to the Civil Service Commission before filing
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Special Civil Action No. Q-37025, respondent Navarro is indubitably without cause of action.

Garcia vs. Mojica, 314 SCRA 207 FACTS: On May 7, 1998, petitioner in his capacity as Cebu City Mayor, signed a contract with F.E. Zuellig for the supply of asphalt to the city. The contract covers the period 19982001, which period has to commence on September 1998 when the first delivery should have been made by F.E. Zuellig. Sometime in March 1999, news reports came out regarding the alleged anomalous purchase of asphalt by Cebu City, through the contract signed by petitioner. This prompted the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) to conduct an inquiry into the matter. The Office of the Ombudsman issued the questioned preventive suspension order. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said order which motion was denied. Petitioner is now before this Court assailing the validity of said order. ISSUE: Given the purpose of preventive suspension and the circumstances of this case, did respondent Deputy Ombudsman commit a grave abuse of discretion when he set the period of preventive suspension to six months? HELD: YES. We cannot say now that there is no evidence sufficiently strong to justify the imposition of preventive suspension against petitioner. But considering its purpose and circumstances in the case brought before us, it does appear to us that the imposition of the maximum period of six months is unwarranted. We reach the foregoing conclusion, however, without necessarily subscribing to petitioners claim that the Local Government Code, which he averred should apply to this case of an elective local official, has been violated. True, under said code preventive suspension, may only be imposed after the issues are joined, and only for a maximum period of 60 days. Here, petitioner was suspended without having had the chance to refute first the charge against him, and for the maximum period of 6 months provided by the Ombudsman Law. But as respondents argue, administrative complaints commenced under the Ombudsman Law are distinct from those initiated under the Local Government Code. Respondents point out that the short period of suspension under the Local Government Code is intended to limit the period of suspension that may be imposed by a mayor, a governor, or the President, who may be motivated by partisan political considerations. In contrast the Ombudsman, who can impose a longer period of preventive suspension, is not likely to be similarly motivated because it is a constitutional body. The distinction is valid but not decisive, in our view of whether there has been have abuse of discretion in a specific case of preventive suspension. ISSUE: Granting that the Office of the Ombudsman may investigate, for purposes provided by law, the acts of petitioner committed prior to his present term of office; and that it may
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preventively suspend him for reasonable period, can that office hold him administratively liable for the said acts? HELD: NO. Ina a number of cases, we have repeatedly held that a reelected local official may not be held administratively accountable for misconduct committed during his prior term of office. The rationale for this holding is that when the electorate put him back into office, it is presumed that it did so with full knowledge of his life and character, including his past misconduct. If armed with such knowledge, it still reelects him then such reelection is considered a condonation of his past misdeeds. However, respondents argue that the contract, although signed on May 7, 1998, during petitioners prior term, is to be made effective only during his present term. We fail to see any difference in the result. The agreement between petitioner and F.E. Zuellig was perfected on the date the contract was signed, during petitioners prior term. At that moment, petitioner already acceded to the terms of the contract, including stipulations now alleged to be prejudicial to the city government. Thus any culpability petitioner may have in signing the contract already become extant on the day the contract was signed. It hardly matters that the deliveries under the contract are supposed to have been made months later. While petitioner can no longer be held administratively liable for signing the contract with F.E. Zuellid, however, this should not prejudice the filing of any case other than administrative against petitioner. Our ruling in this case, may not be taken to mean the total exoneration of petitioner for whatever wrongdoing, if any, might have been committed in signing the subject contract. The ruling now is limited to the question of whether or not he may be held administratively liable therefore, and it is our considered view that he may not.

Hagad vs. Gozo-Dadole, 251 SCRA 242 FACTS: Criminal and administrative complaints were filed against respondents, Mayor Alfredo Ouano, Vice-Mayor Paterno Caete and Sangguniang Panlungsod Member Rafael Mayol, all public officials of Mandaue City, by Mandaue City Councilors MAgno B. Dionson and Gaudioso O. Berced with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas. The respondents were charged with having violated R.A. No. 3019, as amended; Articles 170 and 171 RPC; and R.A. 6713. Councilors Dionson and Berced averred that respondent officials, acting in conspiracy, had caused the alteration and/or falsification of Ordinance No. 018/92 by increasing the allocated appropriation therein from P3,494,364.57 to P7M without authority from the Sanguguniang Panlungsod of Mandaue City. Aside from opposing the motion for preventive suspension, respondent officials prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the Ombudsman war bereft of jurisdiction to try, hear and decide administrative case filed against them since, under Section 61 of the Local Government Code, the power to investigate and impose administrative sanctions against local officials, as well as to effect their preventive
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suspension had now been vested with the Office of the President. Dionson and Bercede argued that the Local Government Code not have repealed, abrogate or otherwise modified the pertinent provision of the Constitution granting to the Ombudsman the power to investigate local officials under the Ombudsman Act had remained unaffected by the provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991. The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman denied the motion to dismiss and recommend the preventive suspension of respondent officials, except City Budget Officer Pedro N. Guido, until the administrative case would have been finally resolved by the Ombudsman. A petition for prohibition, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order was filed by respondent official with RTC. Acting favorably on the pleas of petitioning officials, respondent judge issued a restraining order directed at petitioner, enjoining him from enforcing and/or implementing the questioned order of preventive suspension issued. ISSUE: Whether the Ombudsman under Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, has been divested of his authority to conduct administrative investigation over local elective officials by virtue of the subsequent enactment of R.A. No. 7160, known as the Local Government Code of 1991? HELD: The general investigatory power of the Ombudsman is decreed by Section 13(1), Article XI, of the 1987 Constitution while his statutory mandate to act on administrative complaints is contained in Section 19 of R.A. No. 6770. Section 21 of the same statute names the officials who could be subject to the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman. Taken in conjunction with Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, petitioner thus contends that the Office of the Ombudsman correspondingly has the authority to decree preventive suspension on any public officer or employee under investigation by it. In his comment, which the Court required considering that any final resolution of the case would be a matter of national concern, the Solicitor General has viewed the Local Government Code of 1991 as having conferred, but not an exclusive basis, on the Office of the President (and various Sanggunians) disciplinary authority over local elective officials. He posits the stand that the code did not withdraw the power of the Ombudsman theretofore vested under R.A. 6770 conformably with a constitutional mandate. In posing the Solicitor General also opined that the appropriate remedy that should have been pursued by respondent officials is a petition for certiorari before this Court rather than their petition for prohibition filed with RTC. There is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other. Well settled is the rule that repeals of laws by implication are not favored and the courts must generally assume their congruent applications.

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The respondent officials claim that petitioner committed grave abuse of discretion when he caused the issuance of the preventive suspension order without any hearing. The records reveal that petitioners issued the order of preventive suspension after the filing (a) by respondent officials of their opposition on the motion for preventive suspension and (b) by Mayor Omano of his memorandum in compliance with the directive of petitioner. Be that, as it may, we have heretofore held that, not being in the nature of penalty, a preventive suspension can be decreed on an official under investigation after charges are brought and even before the charges are heard. Naturally, such a preventive suspension would occur prior to any finding of guilt or innocence. Moreover, respondent officials were, in point of fact, put on preventive suspension only after petitioner had found, in consonance with our ruling in Buenaseda vs. Flavier, that the evidence of guilt was strong.

Civil Service Commission vs. Dacoycoy, 306 SCRA 425 FACTS: George P. Suan, a Citizen Crime Watch Vice-President, Allen Chapter, Northern Samar, filed with the Civil Service Commission, Quezon City, a complaint against Pedro O. Dacoycoy, Vocational School Administrator, Balicuatro College of Arts and Trade, Allen Northern Samar, for habitual drunkenness, misconduct and nepotism. The CSC found Dacoycoy guilty of 2 counts of nepotism because his 2 sons were working as utility man and a driver in the school, and ordered his dismissal. The Court of Appeals said that since there was neither appointment nor recommendation, theres no nepotism. It reversed CSCs decision. The CSC appealed. ISSUE: What is the scope of the ban on nepotism? Was there nepotism? HELD: We agree with the CSC that respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy was guilty of nepotism and correctly meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service. Under the definition of nepotism, one is guilty of nepotism if an appointment is issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following: a) appointing authority; b) recommending authority; c) chief of the bureau; and d) person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee. Clearly, there are four situations covered. In the last two mentioned situations, it is immaterial who the appointing or recommending authority is. To constitute a violation of the law it suffice that an appointment is extended or issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of the chief of the bureau or office, or the person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee. In this case, though Dacoycoy neither appointed nor recommended directly, the ban on nepotism was circumvented when the recommending authority was Dacoycoys subordinate.

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ISSUE: The party adversely affected who may take an appeal from an adverse decision of the appellate court in the administrative Civil Service disciplinary case. Who now may appeal the decision of the CA? HELD: Certainly not respondent, who was declared not guilty of the charge nor the complainant George P. Suan, who was merely a witness for the government. Consequently, the CSC has been the party adversely affected by such ruling, which seriously prejudices the Civil Service System. Hence, as an aggrieved party, it may appeal the decision of the CA to the Supreme Court. By this ruling, we now expressly abandon and overrule extant jurisprudence that the phrase party adversely affected by the decision refers to the government employee against whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office, and not included are cases where the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than 30 days salary or when the respondent is exonerated from charges, there is no occasion for appeal. In other words, we overrule prior decision holding that the Civil Service Law does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges enunciated in Paredes v. CSC; Mendez v. CSC; Magpale v. CSC, Navarro v. CSC & export Processing Zone Authority and more recently Del Castillo v. CSC. Dissents: Law does not contemplate review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges. To allow this would be stocking the stakes too much against our civil servants. CSC is not the aggrieved party; hence it has no legal personality to elevate the case of the appellate authority. The aggrieved party, has long been held, is the government employee against whom an administrative complaint is filed.

Regidor, et al. vs. Chiongbian, et al., 173 SCRA 507 FACTS: Petitioners were duly elected city officials of Tangub City of Misamis Occidenteal in the January 18, 1988 local elections. On November 3, 1988, respondents who are elected Provincial Officials (Governor, Vice-Governor & Sangguniang Panlalawigan), approved Resolution No. 340-88 recommending the suspension of the petitioners who failed to appear at the hearing of a complaint for unspecified misconduct which respondent Roberto O. Taclob field against them in the Office of the Governor and the Sanggunianag Panlalawigan. An order of Preventive Suspension was issued by Governor Chiongbian, suspending petitioners for a period of 60 days and ordering them to cease and desist from performing the functions and duties of their respective offices. On the same day, the suspension order was issued, Chiongbian appointed Taclob, a member of Sangguniang Panglunsod of Tangub City as Officer-In-Charge of Tangub City. Taclub belongs to the governors political faction while Regidor and other petitioners belong to the rival faction of Alfonso Tan, the defeated opponent of respondent Chiongbian for the governorship of
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Misamis Occidental. Petitioners allege that respondent acted without authority and contrary to law, in issuing the Order of Preventive Suspension against the petitioners. ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension of the petitioners is a valid exercise of the Provincial Governors power of general supervision over a component city, and that it was done in pursuance to the provisions of the Local Government Code and the Rules and Regulations implementing said law. HELD: NO. Section 61 of the Local Government Code provides that complaints against elective provincial or city officials should be verified and should be filed before the Minister of Local Government. Section 63 provides that the Minister of Local Government may impose a preventive suspension against the accused elective provincial or city officials. In light of Section 63 of the code, Section 7 of the Rule of the Implementing Rules and Regulations should be interpreted to mean that the Minister of the Local Government may preventively suspend an elective provincial or city official, the Provincial Governor may preventively suspend an elective municipal official, and the city or municipal mayor may preventively suspend an elective barangay official. This is as it should be for complaints against provincial or city officials are supposed to be filed with the Secretary of Local Government; hence, it is he (not the provincial governor) who would know whether or not the charges are serious enough to warrant the suspension of the accused elective provincial or city official.

Deloso vs. Sandiganbayan, 173 SCRA 409 FACTS: Amor D. Deloso, Governor of Zambales was charged with the violation of the AntiGraft Law (R.A. 3019) for having allegedly awarded licenses to operate fish corrals in the municipal waters of Botolan, Zambales during the period 1976 to 1978 and the issuance of five tractors of the municiaplaity to certain individuals allegedly without any agreement as to the payment of rentals (at the time, he was incumbent Mayor of Botolan). After due investigation, Deloso was preventively suspended pursuant to Section 13 of R.A. 3019. The order of suspension does not have a definite period so that the petitioner may be suspended for the rest of his term of office unless his case is terminated sooner. An extended suspension is a distinct possibility considering that the Sandiganbayan denied the petitioners plea for earlier dates of trial of his cases on the ground that there are other cases set earlier which have a right to expect priority. ISSUE: WON Deloso may be suspended indefinitely. HELD: NO. The preventive suspension which initially may be justified becomes unreasonable. The application of the Garcia injunction against preventive suspension for an unreasonable period of time applies with greater force to elective officials and especially to petitioner whose term is a relatively short one. The interest of the sovereign electorate and the province of Zambales cannot be subordinated to heavy case load of the Sandiganbayan and of this Court. It would be most unfair to the people of Zambales who
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elected the petitioner to the highest provincial office in their command if they are deprived of his services for an indefinite period with the termination of his case possibly extending beyond his entire term simply because the big number of sequestration, illgotten wealth, murder, malversation of public funds and other more serious offenses plus incidents and resolutions that may be brought to the Supreme Court prevents the expedited determination of his innocence or guilt. The order dates February 10, 1989 suspending the petitioner without a definite period cannot be sanctioned. We rule that henceforth preventive suspension of an elective public officer under Section 13 of R.A. 3019 should be limited to 90 days under Section 42 of P.D. 807, the Civil Service Decree which period also appears reasonable and appropriate under the circumstances of this case.

Pablico vs. Villapando, 385 SCRA 1 FACTS: A complaint for abuse of authority and culpable violation of the Constitution was filed against respondent Alejandro A. Villapando, then Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan for entering into a consultancy agreement with Orlando M. Tiape, a defeated Mayoralty candidate in the recent elections. They argued that the consultancy agreement amounted to an appointment to a government position within the prohibited 1-year period. The Office of the President affirmed the Sangguniang Panlalawigans penalty of dismissal. Vice Mayor Ramir R. Pablico assumed the Office of the Mayor. The Court of Appeals declared void the decisions and ordered Villapandos reinstatement. ISSUE: May local legislative bodies and/or the Office of the President, on appeal, validly impose the penalty of dismissal from service an erring elective local official? HELD: NO. Section 60 of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides among others that an elective local official maybe removed from office on the grounds enumerated above by order of the proper court. It is clear from the last paragraph of the aforesaid provision that the penalty of dismissal from service upon an erring elective local official may be declared only by a court of law. Thus, in Salalima, et al. vs. Guingona, et al., WE held that the Office of the President is without any power to remove elected officials, since such power is exclusively vested in the proper courts as expressly provided for in the last paragraph of the aforequoted Section 60. The Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code cannot amend or contravene the law. Implementing rules should conform, not clash with the law that the implement, for a regulation which operates to create a rule out of harmony with the statute is nullity. Hence, Article 124(b), Rule XIX, of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, insofar as it vests power on the disciplinary authority to remove from office erring elective local officials, is void being repugnant to the last paragraph of Section 60 of the Local Government Code of 1991.
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Llamas vs.l Orbos, 202 SCRA 844 FACTS: Petitioner Rodolfo D. Llamas is the incumbent Vice-Governor of the Province of Tarlac, and on March 1, 1991, he assumed office by virtue of a decision of the Office of the President, the governorship. Private respondent Mariano Un Ocampo III is the incumbent governor of the Province of Tarlac and was suspended from office for a period of 90 days due to having been found guilty of having violated the Ant-Graft and Corrupt Act. Public respondent Oscar Orbos was the Executive Secretary at the time of the filing of this petition and is being impleaded herein in that official capacity for having issued, by authority of the President, the assailed Resolution granting executive clemency to respondent governor thus, putting him back to his position as the governor of Tarlac. Petitioner contends that executive clemency could only be granted to criminal cases and not administrative cases; that there has been no final judgment to the private respondents motion for reconsideration; and that his constitutional rights to due process were violated. ISSUE: WON the president has the power to grant executive clemency in administrative cases. WON there has been final judgment. WON the petitioners constitutional rights were violated. HELD: 1)YES. The President can grant executive clemency based in Art. VII, Sec 19 of the Constitution. The petitioners contention that the President may only grant executive clemency to criminal cases based on said provision is untenable because the Constitution does not distinguish between cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. Applying the doctrine Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguire debemos, We cannot sustain petitioners view. If the Law does not distinguish, so we must not distinguish. Also a number of laws impliedly or expressly recognize the exercise of executive clemency in administrative cases; the President may commute or remove administrative penalties or disabilities issued upon officers and employees in disciplinary cases. Moreover, this intent of the constitutional commission is to give the President the power to grant executive clemency and is not be limited in terms of coverage, except as already provided in the Constitution. 2)YES. There has been a final judgment because upon the acceptance of the Presidential pardon, the grantee is deemed to have waived any appeal which he may have filed. 3)NO. The Petitioners constitutional rights to due process was not violated because his being not notified of the subject pardon is based on the fact that pardon is the private, though official, act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended and not communicated officially to the court. Thus, said notice is unnecessary.
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