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(Article 26) G.R. No. 171365 October 6, 2010 Petitioner: ERMELINDA C.

MANALOTO Respondents: ISMAEL VELOSO III Ponente: LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. FACTS: This was a petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court Appeals of an unlawful detainer case in favor of respondent. The cause of action was for damages because the respondent supposedly suffered embarrassment and humiliation when petitioners distributed copies of the abovementioned MTC decision to the homeowners of Horseshoe Village while respondent's appeal was still pending before the RTC. That from the time the said decision was distributed to said homeowners, the respondent became the subject of conversation or talk of the town and by virtue of which, greatly damaged respondent's good name within the community; his reputation was besmirched; suffered sleepless night and serious anxiety; and was deprived of his political career. Petitioners reason that respondent has no cause of action against them since the MTC decision in the unlawful detainer case was part of public records. On appeal, the CA decreed that although court decisions are public documents, distribution of the same during the pendency of an appeal was clearly intended to cause respondent some form of harassment and/or humiliation so that respondent would be ostracized by his neighbors. ISSUE: Whether or not the act imputed to petitioner constitutes any of those enumerated in Arts. 26. HELD: Yes. The philosophy behind Art. 26 underscores the necessity for its inclusion in our civil law. The Code Commission stressed in no uncertain terms that the human personality must be exalted. Under this article, the rights of persons are amply protected, and damages are provided for violations of a person's dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind. It is already settled that the public has a right to see and copy judicial records and documents. However, this is not a case of the public seeking and being denied access to judicial records and documents. The controversy is rooted in the dissemination by petitioner of the MTC judgment against respondent to Horseshoe Village homeowners, who were not involved at all in the unlawful detainer case, thus, purportedly affecting negatively respondent's good name and reputation among said homeowners. While petitioners were free to

copy and distribute such copies of the MTC judgment to the public, the question is whether they did so with the intent of humiliating respondent and destroying the latter's good name and reputation in the community. (Article 26) Zenaida Gregorio, petitioner, v. Court of Appeals, Sansio Philippines, Inc. and Emma J. Datuin, respondents GR No. 179799, September 11, 2009 FACTS: Respondents Emma J. Datuin (Datuin) and Sansio Philippines, Inc. (Sansio) filed an affidavit of complaint for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) against petitioner Zenaida R. Gregorio (Gregorio), a proprietor of Alvi Marketing. Datuin and Sansio claimed that Gregorio delivered insufficiently funded bank checks as payment for appliances Alvi Marketing bought from Sansio. Gregorio was then indicted for three counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 3, Manila. The MTC issued a warrant of arrest and she was subsequently arrested by armed operatives while visiting her family house in Quezon City. On December 5, 1997, Gregorio filed before the MTC a Motion for Deferment of Arraignment and Reinvestigation. She alleged that she could not have issued the bounced checks as she did not have a checking account with the bank on which the checks were drawn. This was certified by the manager of the said bank. Gregorio also alleged that the signature on the bounced checks were radically and patently different from her own signature. The MTC granted the motion, and a reinvestigation was conducted. Subsequently, the MTC ordered the B.P. Blg. 22 cases dismissed. On August 18, 2000, Gregorio filed a complaint for damages against Sansio and Datuin before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Ligao, Albay. Part of her complaint was that as a result of her wrongful arrest and arraignment, she suffered helplessness, hunger and humiliation and being distraught. Datuin and Sansio meanwhile filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds that Gregorios complaint arose from grounds of compensation arising from malicious prosecution. On October 10, 2000, the RTC denied this Motion to Dismiss. Sansio and Datuin then filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was again denied in January 5, 2001. They went to the Court of Appeals alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the presiding judge of the RTC in denying their motions to dismiss and for reconsideration. On January 31, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision granting the petition and ordering Gregorios damage suit to be dismissed. ISSUE: Are Sansio and Datuin liable for damages to Gregorio?

HELD: Yes. Among other reasons, the Supreme Court decided that Gregorios rights to personal dignity, personal security, privacy, and peace of mind were infringed by Sansio and Datuin when they failed to exercise the requisite diligence in determining the identity of the person they should rightfully accuse of tendering insufficiently funded checks. . . . Because she was not able to refute the charges against her, petitioner was falsely indicted for three (3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Gregorio was conveniently at her city residence while visiting her family. She suffered embarrassment and humiliation over her sudden arrest and detention and she had to spend time, effort, and money to clear her tarnished name and reputation, considering that she had held several honorable positions in different organizations and offices in the public service, particularly her being a Kagawad in Oas, Albay at the time of her arrest. (Article 31) HEIRS OF PEDRO TAYAG, SR., Petitioners, vs. HONORABLE FERNANDO S. ALCANTARA, PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. and ROMEO VILLA Y CUNANAN, Respondents (G.R. No. L-50959, dated 23 July 1980) FACTS: Pedro Tayag, Sr., while riding on a bicycle, was hit by Philippine Rabbit Bus bearing Body No. 1107 and Plate No. YL 604 PUB '74 driven in faster than prescribed speed by Romeo Villa Y Cunanan on 02 September 1974 in Tarlac, Tarlac along MacArthur Highway. The occurrence had him sustain physical injuries that caused his immediate death and damages to his bicycle. The complaint filed by the petitioners against the respondents on 25 September 1976, docketed as Civil Case No. 5114, was suspended when the respondent Judge granted the motion of the respondents to suspend the trial on the ground that the criminal case against the driver of the bus Romeo Villa Y Cunanan was still pending in the same court, supported by Section 3, Rule III of the Revised Rules of Court. In Criminal Case No. 836, accused Romeo Villa Y Cunanan was acquitted of the crime of homicide on 25 October 1977. The respondent Judge ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 5114, acting upon the motions of the respondents, to dismiss the case on the ground that the petitioners have no valid cause of action against them given that the driver of the bus was acquitted in the criminal action and of the petitioners, opposing with the argument that cause of action is not based on crime, but on quasi-delict. Thereafter, the petitioners move to reconsider was denied by the respondent Judge on 30 May 1979. The petitioners presented the petition of certiorari, to annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge. The respondents filed their comments afterwards. ISSUE: Whether or not to consider the petition of certiorari introduced by the petitioners.

HELD: The court rendered the order of dismissal by respondent Judge set aside, with the lower court to pursue proceedings of Civil Case No. 5114. It was decided that respondent Judge acted with abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing Civil Case No. 5114. To underline the provisions of Article 31 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and in reference to the case Elcano vs. Hill (GR. No. L24803), the court held that the extinction of civil liability referred to in par. (e), Section 3, Rule III, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only (or from other source) and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. The court also confirmed that all essential factors for the cause of action as quasidelict, are present, i.e. no pre-existing contract between the two parties. The abovementioned rationale was then applied to this case. The petitioners' cause of action being based on a quasi-delict, the acquittal of the driver, private respondent Romeo Villa Y Cunanan, of the crime charged in Criminal Case No. 836, is not a bar to the prosecution of Civil Case No. 5114 for damages based on quasidelict. Hence, allowing the civil action to continue, regardless of the result of the criminal proceeding. (Article 28) Case Digest PHILIP S. YU, Petitioner vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC OF MANILA, BRANCH XXXIV (34) and UNISIA MERCHANDISING CO., INC., Respondent G.R. No. 86683 January 21, 1993 FACTS: Unfair competition in commercial enterprises is the reason that Mr. Yu filed a case in RTC stating that he was practically bypassed and that private respondent acted in concert with FNF Trading in misleading Mayfair into believing that the goods ordered by the trading firm were intended for shipment to Nigeria although they were actually shipped to and sold in the Philippines. Resolving plaintiff's motion embodied in the complaint for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction after hearing, but without prejudging the merits of the case, and finding from the evidences adduced by the plaintiff, that the terms and conditions of the agency agreement between the plaintiff and The House of Mayfair of England for the exclusive distributorship by the

plaintiff of the latter's goods, apertain to them; that there is no privity of contract between the plaintiff and the defendant; that the controversy in this case arose from a breach of contract by the FNF Trading of Germany, for having shipped goods it had purchased from The House of Mayfair to the Philippines: that the House of Mayfair was demanding payment of 4,500.00 from the FNF Trading for restitution of plaintiff's alleged loss on account of the shipment of the goods in question here in the Philippines and now in the possession of the defendant; it appears to the Court that to restrain the defendant from selling the goods it has ordered from the FNF Trading of Germany, would be without legal justification. Having the issuance of writ of injunction denied, petitioners plea was brought to the filing of a petition for review on certiorari with the Court of Appeals. But according to the appellate court, petitioner was not able to demonstrate the unequivocal right which he sought to protect and that private respondent is a complete stranger vis-a-vis the covenant between petitioner and Mayfair. Apart from these considerations, the reviewing authority noted that petitioner could be fully compensated for the prejudice he suffered. But the petitioner anchors his plea for redress on his view that private respondent has distributed and continues to sell Mayfair covering products in contravention of petitioner's exclusive right granted by the covenant with the House of Mayfair. Temporary restraining order was issued to last until further notice from this Court directed against private respondent. Notwithstanding such, private respondent persisted in the distribution which triggered petitioner's motion to cite private respondent's manager in contempt of court. ISSUE: Whether the appellate court correctly agree with the lower court in disallowing the writ solicited by herein petitioner due to reason that petitioner was not able to demonstrate the unequivocal right which he sought to protect and that private respondent is a complete stranger (or is it unfair competition that gave rise to such which should be stressed upon so as to issue writ of injunction). HELD: The circumstance which respondent court overlooked was petitioner's suggestion, which was not disputed by herein private respondent in its comment, that the House of Mayfair in England was duped into believing that the goods ordered through the FNF Trading were to be shipped to Nigeria only, but the goods were actually sent to and sold in the Philippines. A ploy of this character is akin to the scenario of a third person who induces a party to renege on or violate his undertaking under a contract, thereby entitling the other contracting

party to relief therefrom. The breach caused by private respondent was even aggravated by the consequent diversion of trade from the business of petitioner to that of private respondent caused by the latter's species of unfair competition as demonstrated no less by the sales effected inspite of this Court's restraining order. This brought the irreparable mischief which respondent court overlooked when it refused to grant the relief simply because of the observation that petitioner can be fully compensated for the damage. With this, SC issued the writ of preliminary injunction. (Article 27) Zulueta vs Nicolas G.R. No. L-8252 January 31, 1958 Facts: Plaintiff instituted the present action on May 19, 1954 against the defendant to recover moral pecuniary damages in the sum of P10,000 from the complaint for libel filed by plaintiff against the provincial governor of Rizal and the staff members of the Philippine Free Press. The defendant fiscal after conducting an investigation rendered an opinion that there was no prima facie case, that the alleged libelous statements were made in good faith. As a consequence the fiscal absolved the said governor and the Free Press staff from crime of libel. Issue: Whether the plaintiffs complaint states a cause of action Held: The Supreme Court held that the refusal of the fiscal to prosecute when after the investigation he finds no sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case is not a refusal, without just cause, to perform an official duty. As a general rule, a public prosecutor, being a quasi-judicial officer empowered to exercise discretion or judgment, is not personally liable for resulting injuries when acting within the scope of his authority, and in the line of his official duty. (Article )

YAP VS. PARAS AND BARCELONA, SR. GR. NO. 101236 January 30, 1992 Petitioner: Juliana P. Yap Respondents: Martin Paras and Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr., Judge of the 3rd MTC of Glan Malapatan, South Cotabato Ponente: J. Cruz FACTS: On October 31, 1971, according to Yap, Paras sold to her his share in the intestate estate for P300.00. The sale was evidenced by a private

document. Nineteen years later, on May 2, 1990, Paras sold the same property to Santiago Saya-ang for P5,000.00. This was evidenced by a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale. When Yap learned of the second sale, she filed a complaint for estafa against Paras and Saya-ang and filed a complaint for the nullification of the said sale with the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City. On April 17, 1991, before the arraignment, the trial judge motu proporio issued an order dismissing the criminal case on the ground that there is a prejudicial question, citing Ras vs. Rasul, 100 SCRA 125. The petitioner came to the Supeme Court for relief in this special civil action for certiorari. Her contention is that where there is a prejudicial question in a civil case, the criminal action may not be dismissed but not dismissed.

ISSUES: Whether there was a motion for suspension of the case by reason of prejudicial question. Whether the judge had a misconception of a prejudicial question. Whether the defense involved an issue similar or intimately related to the same issue raised in the criminal action and its resolution to determine if the latter action may proceed. HELD: The petition is granted therefore Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr.s dismissal of Criminal Case No. 1902-G dated April 17, 1991 and the Order dated April 30, 1991, denying the motion for reconsideration, are all reversed and set aside. Criminal Case No. 1902-G is ordered reinstated for further proceedings, but to be assigned to a different judge.

validity of the awarded contract as a result of the bidding process issued and duly published by the District Engineer of Pampanga dated January 27, 1992. The contract awarded was the concreting of Sitio 5 Bahay Pare and the Contract Agreement was executed by the respondent and petitioner on September 25, 1992. The respondent assumed the works and made advances for the procurement of materials and payment for labor costs as well. The project had been completed in accordance with the approved layout and specifications, thus, the Office of the District Engineer issued Certificate of Final Inspection and Final Acceptance to the respondent. Consequently, the respondent sought for the payment of completed project. However, the District Auditor of Commission on Audit (COA) disapproved the release of the particular funds on the ground that the contractors license of the respondent has expired at the time the contract was executedthe DPWH based their decision to defer the same. ISSUES: Whether the contractor (respondent) who entered into Contract Agreement be denied of the payment he is being sought for the completed project or be paid of the same although its license has expired at the time of the execution of its contract. HELD: Different legal bases have been cited to support the decision for this argument. Nonetheless, the court ruled that the petitioner is compelled to pay the respondent for the completed project. Under Article 22: Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him. It explicitly suggests that the issuance of the Certificate of Final Inspection and Final Acceptance by the Office of the District Engineer to the respondent, the government arguably gained from the said Contract Agreement. Also, the argument of the petitioner did not suffice his claim that the respondent should not grant him the payment on the ground that he secures expired contracts license in violation of the law. It is true that the contractor (respondent) violates the law. Section 35 of R.A. No. 4566, it explicitly provides: SEC. 35. Penalties. Any contractor who, for a price, commission, fee or wage, submits or attempts to submit a bid to construct, or contracts to or undertakes to construct, or assumes change in a supervisory capacity of a construction work within the purview of this Act, without first securing a license to engage in the business of contracting in this country; or who shall present or file the license certificate of another, give false evidence of any kind to the Board, or any member thereof in obtaining a certificate or license, impersonate another, or use an

(Article 22) Republic v Lacap G.R. No. 158253 March 2, 2007 Ponente: Justice Austria-Martinez FACTS: The respondent, Carlito Lacap, doing business under the name and style CARWIN CONSTRUCTION AND CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY had entered into contract with the Philippine Government through the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH) on the

expired or revoked certificate or license, shall be deemed guilty of misdemeanor, and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than five hundred pesos but not more than five thousand pesos (Emphasis supplied) Based on Section 35 of R.A. No. 4566 the contractor (respondent) is subject to penalties violating the same, but it does not mean that the respondent would deprive him of the payment due him. The Contract Agreement between the petitioner and respondent fully satisfied both of them in terms of acceptance on the part of the former and rendition of the particular service of the latter. (Article 26) People of the Philippines vs. Isauro Santiago G. R. No. L-17663 May 30, 1962 Facts: The case relates to the exposure of Arsenio H. Lacson, then Mayor of the City of Manila, to public hatred and ridicule by one Isauro Santiago, in the course of a political speech in Quiapo, Manila on the 5th of October 1959. Defendant, through an amplifier system and in the presence of a crowd of around a hundred persons called out Arsenio Hayop Lacson, pinakawalang hiyang Alkalde, Mayor Lacson raped a woman at the Aroma Cafe and another City Hall employee in Shellborne Hotel" in which the plaintiff filed an information for libel against the defendant on August 11, 1960. Defendant, through his Motion to Quash Information, claimed that the charge is not libel, but oral defamation, and the filing of information of the latter has already prescribed. Issue: Whether or not the crime charged in the information is oral defamation, under Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code, or libel, under Article 355, in relation to Article 353, of the same Code. Held: The Supreme Court, En Banc, held that the facts alleged in the information constitute the crime of oral defamation, under Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code. The grounds by which the information for libel was filed is the erroneous comparison of the media radio and amplifier system. According to Summit Hotel Co. vs. National Broadcasting Co. (PA-124 A.L.R. 963), the rules governing such offense were declared inapplicable to extemporaneous remarks of scurrilous nature, made ad libitum in the course of a radio broadcast by a person hired to read a prepared text, but not appearing thereon. The statements, which were heard through an amplifier

system, though defamatory, are extemporaneous such that no manuscript or prepared text was read. (Article 29) 129 SCRA 558, 565-566 (May 31, 1984) Petitioners: ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGO and JOSE FARLEY BEDENIA Respondent: COURT OF APPEALS Ponente: GUTIERREZ, JR., J. FACTS: The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment of conviction and acquitted the petitioners of the crime of grave coercion on the ground of reasonable doubt but inspite of the acquittal ordered them to pay jointly and severally the amount of P9,000.00 to the complainants as actual damages. The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the acquittal of the defendants-appellants as to criminal liability results in the extinction of their civil liability. The Court of Appeals denied the motion. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent court committed a reversible error in requiring the petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them from the criminal charge. HELD: No. The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the criminal case refers exclusively to civil liability ex delicto founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. In other words, the civil liability which is also extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime. The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature.

(Article 28) Calamba Medical Center, INC. vs National Labor Relations Commission, Ronaldo Lanzanas and Merceditha Lanzanas G.R. No. 176484 November 25, 2008 Facts: Dr. Ronaldo and Merceditha Lanzanas are both former employees of Calamba Medical Center INC. Circumstances led to the termination of their employment hospital. It was also found that a watchlist or watch out list containing the names of the couple was in circulation among the local hospitals, and was allegedly distributed by a stockholder of the petitioner. The couple filed complaints for illegal dismissal before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Regional Arbitration Board which were consolidated and docketed as NLRC CASE NO. RAB-IV-39879-98-L. The NLRC, on appeal, awarded full backwages, separation pay, 500, 000 pesos in moral damages each, exemplary damages of 250,000 pesos each, and 10% of the total award for attorneys fees to the doctors on May 3, 2002. The case was brought to the Court of Appeals on certiorari and on June 30, 2004, the appellate court reinstated the NLRC decision, however the award to each of the spouses no longer included the attorney fees and the moral and exemplary damages were tempered to 100,000 pesos and 50,000 pesos. Issue: Can the respondents, Doctor Ronaldo and Merceditha Lanzanas, claim more in damages for the actions against them? Held: The distribution of the watchlist constitutes as an unfair labor practice, due to its intent to prevent further gainful employment of those listed. As such, Dr. Ronaldo and Merceditha Lanzanas have a right to action for damages by Calamba Medical Center, INC. On November 25, 2008, the Court of Appeals reinstated the 10% of the total judgement award as attorney fees as action for damages of unfair labor practices by Calamba Medical Center, INC. (Article 31) G & S Transport Corporation, petitioner vs. Heirs of Jose Marcial K. Ochoa namely Ruby B. Ochoa, Micaela B. Ochoa and Jomar B. Ochoa, respondents (G.R. No. 170125 March 9, 2011) FACTS: Jose Marcial K. Ochoa, husband of respondent Ruby B. Ochoa, died on the night of March 10, 1995 while on board an Avis taxicab owned and operated by G & S Transport Corporation, petitionercommon carrier. Ruby Ochoa and her children, Micaela and Jomar, through counsel, filed a complaint against G & S for damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City which was raffled to Branch 164 of said court. On December 27, 2001, the trial court rendered a Decision finding the vehicular mishap caused by the negligence of Bibiano Padilla, the driver. It likewise found the evidence adduced by G & S to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees as insufficient. Hence, the trial court declared G & S civilly liable to the heirs. However, for lack of receipts or any proof of funeral expenses and other actual damages, the trial court denied the heirs claim for actual damages, moral and exemplary damages for lack of legal basis. G & S filed a Notice of Appeal while the heirs filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration. After G & S filed its Opposition (To Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Reconsideration), the trial court favored the heirs Motion for Partial Reconsideration and thus declared them entitled to moral and exemplary damages. Padilla was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide in an MTC Decision but was later on acquitted in the RTC Decision. Before the CA, G & S continued to insist that it exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its employees. G & S also argued that the proximate cause of Jose Marcials death is a fortuitous event and/or the fault or negligence of another and not of its employee. On the other hand, the heirs maintained that Padilla was grossly negligent in driving the Avis taxicab on the night of March 10,

1995. In a Decision dated June 29, 2005, the CA ruled in favor of the heirs. With respect to the award of P6,537,244.96 for Jose Marcials loss of earning capacity, the CA declared the same unwarranted. It found the Certification issued by Jose Marcials employer as selfserving, unreliable, and biased. Anent moral damages, the CA reduced it to P200,000.00 as to make it proportionate to the award of exemplary damages which is P50,000.00. CA denied both parties respective motions for reconsideration. Hence, G & S and the heirs filed their respective Petitions for Review on Certiorari before the Supreme Court. The heirs petition was docketed as G.R. No. 170071 and that of G & S as G.R. No. 170125. These petitions were later consolidated pursuant to this Courts Resolution of November 21, 2005. One of the grounds in the petition of G & S is that CA gravely erred in not taking note of the fact that the petitioners employee had been acquitted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting (in) homicide. Issue: Did the Court of Appeals made an error by not taking note of the fact that Padilla, an employee of the petitioner, has been acquitted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide? Held: NO. According to Article 31 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. The Supreme Court decided that in this case, the action filed by the heirs is primarily for the recovery of damages arising from breach of contract of carriage allegedly committed by G & S. The Court further said that As a common carrier, G & S is bound to carry [Jose Marcial] safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances. However, Jose Marcial did not reach his destination due to the accident and G & S failed to prove that it exercised diligence, thereby making it liable to the heirs of Jose Marcial for breach of contract of carriage. Clearly, it is an independent civil action arising from contract which is separate and distinct from the criminal action for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide filed by the heirs against Padilla by reason of the same incident. Hence, regardless of Padillas acquittal or conviction in said criminal case, same has no bearing in the resolution of the present case. There was therefore no error on the part of the CA when it resolved this case without regard to the fact that Padilla has already been acquitted by the RTC in the

criminal case. Moreover, while the CA quoted some portions of the MTC Decision in said criminal case, we however find that those quoted portions were only meant to belie G & S claim that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the driver of the delivery van which allegedly hit the Avis taxicab. Even without those quoted portions, the appellate courts ultimate finding that it was Padillas negligence which was the proximate cause of the mishap would still be the same. This is because the CA has, in fact, already made this declaration in the earlier part of its assailed Decision. The fact that the MTC Decision from which the subject quoted portions were lifted has already been reversed by the RTC is therefore immaterial.

(Article 20) Sonny Romero Y Dominguez VS People of the Philippines, Isabel Padua, Regina Breis, Minerva Montes and Ofelia Belando Breis G.R. No. 167546 Promulgated: July 7, 2009 FACTS: On April 1, 1999 a JC Liner bus driven by the petition, Sonny Romero, and an Apego taxi driven by Jimmy Padua figured in a head on collision that resulted in the death of Gerardo Breis Sr., Arnaldo Breis, Gerardo Breis Jr., Rene Montes, Erwin Breis and Jimmy Padua. The incident also injured Edwin and Edmund Breis. Petition was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide and multiple serious physical injuries with damage to property in the Camarines Sur MTC. The trial acquitted the petitioner on November 9, 2000 of the crimes charged but was held civilly liable and was ordered to pay the heirs of the victims the amount of P3,541,900 for actual damages, civil indemnity for death, moral damages, temperate damages and loss of earning capacity. Petitioner appealed to both the RTC and CA and argued that the MTC made a mistake in making him civilly liable. Both the RTC and CA affirmed the MTC decision. ISSUE: Whether the petitioner can be held civilly liable for damages due to negligence.

HELD: The court affirmed the MTC decision. Although the evidence failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the negligence of the petitioner, thus absolving him of criminal liability, preponderant evidence is enough to hold him civilly liable for damages.

The creditors agreed to have a working group composed of three parties to come up with an agreement to distribute the assets, and that a representative must be appointed; and that all creditors should refrain from claiming their assets, and appearing before an insolvency court unless no agreement was met. Mr. Fitzgerald was appointed representative. On 9 August 1948, the working committees first meeting took place. The members tried to agree on the equal distribution of assets. At the same time, the defendant assigned its credit against CALI to Shell Oil Company, Inc., an American venture, for $79,440.00. On 10 August 1948, the amount was raised to $85,081.29. On 12 August 1948, Shell Oil Company, Inc. filed a formal complaint against CALI before the Superior Court of California, for the collection of said credit. A writ of attachment was also applied for and issued against the C-54 plane. The writ meant that Shell Oil Company, Inc. alone would benefit from selling the plane. The stockholders of CALI, unaware of the settlement between the two companies, decided to discuss the sale of CALI's properties to PAL. On 7 October 1948, CALI learned about the defendants move thus, filed a petition for insolvency. Mr. Velayo was appointed Assignee of CALI in the legal proceedings, and sought a writ of injunction to hold back the complaint filed in the U.S. The court denied the petition. A Philippine court would not be in a position to enforce its orders against the Shell Oil Company which happened to be an American corporation outside the Philippine jurisdiction. Mr. Velayo eventually confined his action to recover damages against the defendant. The court dismissed the complaint, and an appeal was made. ISSUE: Whether the defendant committed a betrayal of trust and confidence HELD: Yes. Section 37 of the insolvency law was violated. The defendant transferred the credit at the time of CALIs unstable financial situation without other creditors knowledge and despite an agreement that a fair distribution must be met first prior to making a legal move. Legal bases were cited including Article 23 of the Civil Code which states that, Even when an act or event causing damage to anothers property was not due to the fault or negligence of the defendant, the latter shall be liable for indemnity if through the act or event he was benefited.


Velayo vs. Shell Company of the Philippine Islands, Ltd. G.R. No. L-7817, 31 October 1956 Ponente: Justice Felix FACTS: The Commercial Air Lines, Inc. a.k.a. CALI and a corporation duly enlisted in the Philippines was previously engaged in the air transport business. The Shell Company of the Philippine Islands, Limited (defendant), a corporation enlisted in England, was authorized to do business in the country. The defendant supplied the fuel needs of CALI. On 6 August 1948, CALI set a meeting to inform all its creditors that the company was in grave debt; the operation would be halted. Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald represented the Shell Company of P.I., Ltd. in the meeting. CALI owed the defendant P152,641.68. During the meeting, CALI's board of directors raised the proposal to sell CALIs assets to Philippine Air Lines (PAL). The corporations balance sheet was also presented to the assembled parties; part of it was a C-54 plane in the United States.

The court ordered the defendant to pay Mr. Velayo twice the amount of the value of the plane for compensatory and exemplary damages.

HELD: Yes. The Court ruled that the petitioner should have reserved his right to separately institute the civil action for damages. Due to this failure, the civil case was deemed impliedly instituted with the Criminal Case No. 2049 which was then previously dismissed by the Court. In effect, Civil Case No. 1761-R for damages subsequently filed by him without prior reservation should be dismissed.

(Article 34) G.R. No. 122150 March 17, 2003 HAMBON vs. COURT OF APPEALS Petitioner: GEORGE (CULHI) HAMBON Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS AND VALENTINO U. CARANTES Ponente: AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. FACTS: On June 6, 1989, the petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio, a complaint for damages for the injuries and expenses he incurred last December 9, 1985. However, the Criminal Case No. 2049 for Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence filed on January 8, 1986 was already dismissed by the Municipal Trial Court of Tuba, Benguet due to lack of petitioners interest and that the dismissal was with respect to both the criminal and civil case. After the trial, the RTC of Baguio ruled that the petitioner is entitled to damages. However, the Court of Appeals, in its decision on March 8, 1995, refused to affirm the decision of the Regional Trial Court and dismissed the petitioners claim for damages based on Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended in 1988, which is the prevailing and governing law in this case, viz.: SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Article 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused. ISSUE: Whether or not a civil case for damages based on an independent civil action be duly dismissed for failure to make reservation to file a separate civil action in a criminal case filed arising from the same act or omission of the accused?

(Article 21) Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. CA 219 SCRA 115 Facts: The petitioner, Gashem Shookat Baksh is an Iranian National studying medicine at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; while the private respondent name is Marilou Gonzales who works in the cafeteria of the said school. She is 22 years old, single, Filipina of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her community. Gashem courted and proposed to marry her which she accepted on the premise that they would be married. The petitioner even went to the province of the private respondent to ask the approval of her parents. The petitioner forced her to live with him in his apartment in which she allowed herself to be deflowered by him. After about two months, the petitioner began to change and started to maltreated her even threatened to kill her and later repudiated their marriage agreement. No marriage came hence an action for breach of promise to marry. Issue: Whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code is applicable in the case and whether or not a breach of promise to marry an actionable wrong. Held: The existing rule is that breach of promise to marry per se is not actionable wrong. Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so. Where a mans promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or perceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept his and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry

but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and wilful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential however, that such injury should have been committed in manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. (Article 36) Berbari vs. Concepcion G.R. No. L-16189 February 26, 1920 Ponente: Justice Torres Facts: Petitioner filed a complaint against the respondent, judge of the first court of first instance, praying that the criminal cause for estafa found against him be declared null and void due to a prejudicial question; wherein, petitioner received a sum arising from an agreement of capital subscription from a debtor-third party and is still awaiting further payment. Issue: Whether the civil action sought after by the petitioner to settle the pending prejudicial question is apt and correct, thereby removing any criminal liability. Held: The fact that the petitioner appropriated himself a sum of money from the foregoing agreement goes to show that a contract have been entered into. The debtor-third partys future payment as demanded by the petitioner that resulted into his filed civil action cannot be construed as a prejudicial question. Prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which must precede the criminal action that requires a decision before a final judgment is rendered in the principal action with which said question is closely connected. Petitioners civil action that asks for settlement of payment is a prejudicial question. However, it does not ascertain whether or not he committed the crime of estafa filed against him by the debtor-third party. If any action at all must be suspended, it would be the civil action and in no way the criminal action once reason for the latter has been found against the petitioner. (Article 19) G.R. No. L 19313January 19, 1962

DOMINADOR R. AYTONA, Petitioner, vs. ANDRES V. CASTILLO, ET AL., Respondents FACTS: While the Commission on Appointments was not in session, then President Carlos P. Garcia made appointments, on December 29, 1961 including Dominador R. Aytona, as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank, who on the same day, took the corresponding oath. At noon on December 30, 1961, President elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office and on December 31, 1961, he issued Administrative Order No. 2 recalling, withdrawing, and cancelling all ad interim appointments made by President Garcia after Macapagal had been proclaimed elected by Congress on December 13, 1961. President Macapagal then appointed Andres V. Castillo as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank on January 1, 1962 and the latter qualified immediately. Both ad interim appointees exercised the powers of their office on January 2, 1962. Castillo informed Aytona of his title and the latter was prevented from holding office in the Central Bank the next day and thereafter, prompting a proceeding which is practically a quo warranto, challenging the formers right to exercise the powers of Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona Claims he was validly appointed, had qualified for the post, making Castillos appointment void. Castillo replies that the appointment of Aytona had been revoked by Administrative Order No. 2 as issued by President Macapagal. ISSUE: Whether President Macapagal had the power to issue the order of cancellation of the ad interim appointments made by President Garcia, even after the appointees had already qualified. HELD: The Court, exercising its judgment and discretion dismissed the action as instituted by Aytona. With the separation of powers, it resolves that it must not disregard the Presidential Administrative Order No. 2, cancelling the midnight or last minute appointments. Customarily, when a president makes appointments, he has the benefit of the advice of the Commission on Appointments. In ad interim appointments, he exercises a special prerogative and is bound to be prudent to insure approval of his selection either previous consultation with the members of the Commission or by thereafter explaining to them the reason for selection. In this case, where the Commission that will consider the appointees is different from that existing at the time of the appointment, and where the names are to

be submitted by successor who may not wholly approve of the selections, the President should be doubly careful in extending such appointments. It is difficult to believe that in signing several appointments in one night, President Garcia exercised such caution which was required and expected of him. The underlying reason for denying the power to revoke after the appointee has qualified is the latters equitable rights. Yet, it is uncertain if such equity is present in the situation, considering the circumstances detracting from that degree of good faith, morality and propriety which form the basic foundation of claims to equitable relief. It might be argued that the appointees, wittingly or unwittingly cooperated with the maneuver to beat the deadline. Occasions wherein not only strict legality, but also fairness, justice and righteousness should be taken into account. (Article 24) TERESITA DIO versus ST. FERDINAND MEMORIAL PARK, INC. and MILDRED F. TANTOCO G.R. No. 169578 November 30, 2006 FACTS: On December 11, 1973, Teresita Dio agreed to buy, on instalment basis, a memorial lot from the St. Ferdinand Memorial Park, Inc. (SFMPI) in Lucena City. The 36-square-meter memorial lot is particularly described as Block 2, Section F, Lot 15. The purchase was evidenced by a Pre-Need Purchase Agreement dated December 11, 1973 and denominated as Contract No. 384. She obliged herself to abide by all such rules and regulations governing the SFMPI dated May 25, 1972. SFMPI issued a Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care dated April 1, 1974 denominated as Contract No. 284. The ownership of Dio over the property was made subject to the rules and regulations of SFMPI, as well as the government, including all amendments, additions and modifications that may later be adopted. Rule 69 of the Rules reads: Rule 69. Mausoleum building and memorials should be constructed by the Park Personnel. Lot Owners cannot contract other contractors for the construction of the said buildings and memorial,

however, the lot owner is free to give their own design for the mausoleum to be constructed, as long as it is in accordance with the park standards. The construction shall be under the close supervision of the Park Superintendent. In the early part of October 1986, Dio informed SFMPI, through its president and controlling stockholder, Mildred F. Tantoco, that she was planning to build a mausoleum on her lot and sought the approval thereof. On December 23, 1986, Dio filed a Complaint for Injunction with Damages against SFMPI and Tantoco before the RTC of Lucena City. She averred that she was not aware of Rule 69 of the SFMPI Rules and Regulations; the amount of P100, 000.00 as construction cost of the mausoleum was unconscionable and oppressive. In addition Plaintiff was initially surprised by Tantocos statement because she knew that their contract did not provide for such stipulation. On August 3, 1995, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of defendants. Upon appeal the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not petitioner had knowledge of Rule 69 of SFMPI Rules and Regulations for memorial works in the mausoleum areas of the park when the Pre-Need Purchase Agreement and the Deed of Sale was executed. HELD: The supreme courts declared that Basic is the principle that contracts, once perfected, bind both contracting parties. The parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided these are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. It follows that obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith. Petitioner is an experienced businesswoman. She doubtlessly dealt with numerous documents, and is therefore presumed to know the import thereof.

We are not persuaded by petitioners claim that Rule 69 of respondents rules and regulations is unreasonable and oppressive because the provision unduly restricts her right of ownership over the property. The validity or enforceability of the impugned contracts will have to be determined by the peculiar circumstances obtaining in each case and the situation of the parties concerned. Indeed, Article 24 of the New Civil Code provides that [in] all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age, or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection. In this case, however, there is no reason for the Court to apply the rule on stringent treatment towards contracts of adhesion. To reiterate, not only is petitioner educated, she is likewise a well-known and experienced businesswoman; thus, she cannot claim to be the weaker or disadvantaged party in the subject contracts so as to call for a strict interpretation against respondents. Moreover, she executed the Pre-Need Purchase Agreement and Deed of Sale without any complaint or protest. She assailed Rule 69 of the Rules and Regulations of respondent SFMPI only when respondents rejected her request to cause the construction of the mausoleum. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52311 dated May 10, 2005, and the Resolution dated September 6, 2005, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

relayed to the plaintiff's secretary who shared the information to the owners. The owners were advised that defendant will bring the meter for laboratory testing and if the meter did turn out to be tampered, electrical services of the plaintiffs will be disconnected. After an hour, the inspectors informed the plaintiffs that meted had been indeed tampered and they need to pay P178,875.01 so that their electric would not be disconnected. The electric service was immediately reconnected. Still, the plaintiffs filed a complaint for damages with prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and also alleging the defendant of acted maliciously and disconnecting the electricity without due process and without regard with the plaintiff's rights, feelings, peace of mind, social and business reputation . ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner and the respondent are entitled to damages. HELD: The petitioners are entitled to moral damages although in a reduced amount only, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. Moral damages are recovered when the rights of individuals, including the right against deprivation of property without due process of law, are violated. Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. In this case, the requisites of law must be complied with before the disconnection of electrical supply can be effected. The petitioners' claim for actual damages, however, was not granted due to failure to provide proof. On the other hand, the petitioners were ordered to pay the respondent the billing differential of P193,332.96. The respondents were able to present sufficient evidences regarding the amount differential.

(Article 20) Spouses ANTONIO and LORNA ELECTRIC COMPANY (MERALCO) G.R. No. 142943. April 3, 2002 QUISUMBING vs. MANILA

(Article 19) University of the East vs. Jader G.R. No. 132344 February 17, 2000 Ponente: Justice Ynares-Santiago FACTS: Romeo A. Jader, respondent, in his first semester of his last school year (School Year 1987-1988) at the University of the East College of Law, failed to take the regular final examination in Practice Court I for which he received an incomplete grade. He filed an application in the second semester, for the removal of the incomplete grade given by his professor in the aforementioned subject. The

FACTS: Spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing are owners of a house and lot located at Greenmeadows Avenue, Quezon City. Both also engaged in the export of furniture. The defendant-appellant Manila Electric Company's (MERALCO) inspectors headed by Emmanuel Orlino conducted an inspection on the said avenue. The house of the Quisumbings were inspected by the defendant after observing a standard operated procedure. After the inspection, it was found out that the meter has been tampered. The results were

application was approved by the Dean after payment of the required fee. The respondent took the examination. After which, his grade was submitted by the professor. It was a failing grade of 5. On the other hand, after deliberation of the Dean and Faculty members of the College, respondent's name appeared in the Tentative List of Candidates for graduation for the Degree of Bachelor of Laws (LL.B) as of Second Semester (1987-1988). He was among the students who were given invitations to participate in the commencement exercises for the candidates of Bachelor of Laws. The respondent attended the said ceremonies, during the program of which he went up the stage when his name was called, with her mother and his eldest brother who assisted in placing the Hood, and his Tassel was turned from left to right, and he was thereafter handed by the Dean a rolled white sheet of paper symbolical of the Law Diploma. During his review for the bar examinations, he learned of the deficiency in his grade and was not able to take the bar examination. He sued his college for moral and exemplary damages arising from the latters negligence of not urgently informing his deficiency. ISSUE: Whether or not an educational institution may be held to have acted in bad faith for misleading a student into believing that the latter had satisfied all requirements for graduation when such is not. HELD: The court held that the Petitioner, in belatedly informing respondent of the result of the removal examination, particularly at a time when he had already commenced preparing for the bar exams, cannot be said to have acted in good faith. Absence of good faith must be sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another, even though the forms and technicalities of the law, together with the absence of all information or belief of facts, would render the transaction unconscientious. It is the school that has access to those information and it is only the school that can compel its professors to act and comply with its rules, regulations and policies with respect to the computation and the prompt submission of grades. Students do not exercise control, much less influence, over the way an educational institution should run its affairs, particularly in disciplining its professors and teachers and ensuring their compliance with the school's rules and orders. Being the party that hired them, it is the school that exercises general supervision and exclusive control over the professors with respect to the submission of reports involving the students' standing. Exclusive control means that no other person

or entity had any control over the instrumentality which caused the damage or injury.

(Article 21) G.R. No. 154259. February 28, 2005 NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM vs. ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. AMAY BISAYA Facts: On 13 October 1994, Roberto Reyes alleged that he was invited by Dr. Violeta Filart to join her in the party of Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka, the former general manager of Nikko Hotel. The said party was organized by Ruby Lim, the Executive Secretary of the hotel for the past twenty (20) years. The guest list was limited to approximately sixty (60) of Mr. Tsuruokas closest friends and some hotel employees. Knowing that Mr. Reyes was not one of those invited, Ms. Lim asked the former to leave the party. Mr. Reyes claimed that he was asked to leave the party in a scandalous manner. On the other hand, Ms. Lim claimed that she asked Mr. Reyes politely and discreetly. The lower court ruled that Ms. Lim did not abuse her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party as she talked to him politely and discreetly. The appellate court, on the other hand, held that Ms. Lim is liable for damages as she needlessly embarrassed Mr. Reyes by telling him not to finish his food and to leave the place within hearing distance of the other guests. Issue: Whether or not Ruby Lim is liable under Article 21 of the Civil Code.

Ruling: No. Ms. Ruby Lim is not liable under Article 21. Article 21 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) it is done with intent to injure.

In the determination of the manner in which Mr. Reyes was asked to leave, the court reviewed the findings of fact. Mr. Reyes himself admitted that when Ms. Lim asked him to leave she was so close to him to a point that they almost kissed. This suggested that Ms. Lim did not intend herself to be heard by other people to the embarrassment of Mr. Reyes. The fact that these two did not personally know each other prior to the party, fails to show that the act of Ms. Lim was driven by animosity against Mr. Reyes. The attribution of the alleged misconduct of Ms. Lim to her age and working environment is a lame argument that cannot be considered. The absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose him to ridicule and shame, makes it highly unlikely that she would shout at him from a very close distance. Ms. Lim having been in the hotel business for twenty years wherein being polite and discreet are virtues to be emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary does not inspire belief and is indeed incredible. Under Article 21 the nature of the act to be able to claim damages must be intentional. In this case, it was not proven that Ms. Ruby Lim has a motive to intentionally embarrass Mr. Reyes in asking him to leave the party wherein he was not invited. Thus, Ms. Lim is not liable under Article 21 of the Civil Code.

Facts: The case relates to the exposure of Arsenio H. Lacson, then Mayor of the City of Manila, to public hatred and ridicule by one Isauro Santiago, in the course of a political speech in Quiapo, Manila on the 5th of October 1959. Defendant, through an amplifier system and in the presence of a crowd of around a hundred persons called out Arsenio Hayop Lacson, pinakawalang hiyang Alkalde, Mayor Lacson raped a woman at the Aroma Cafe and another City Hall employee in Shellborne Hotel" in which the plaintiff filed an information for libel against the defendant on August 11, 1960. Defendant, through his Motion to Quash Information, claimed that the charge is not libel, but oral defamation, and the filing of information of the latter has already prescribed. Issue: Whether or not the crime charged in the information is oral defamation, under Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code, or libel, under Article 355, in relation to Article 353, of the same Code. Held: The Supreme Court, En Banc, held that the facts alleged in the information constitute the crime of oral defamation, under Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code. The grounds by which the information for libel was filed is the erroneous comparison of the media radio and amplifier system. According to Summit Hotel Co. vs. National Broadcasting Co. (PA-124 A.L.R. 963), the rules governing such offense were declared inapplicable to extemporaneous remarks of scurrilous nature, made ad libitum in the course of a radio broadcast by a person hired to read a prepared text, but not appearing thereon. The statements, which were heard through an amplifier system, though defamatory, are extemporaneous such that no manuscript or prepared text was read.

(Article 26) People of the Philippines vs. Isauro Santiago G. R. No. L-17663 May 30, 1962 (Article 36) ABUNADO V. PEOPLE (G.R. No. 159218. March 30, 2004)

Facts On September 18, 1967, Salvador Abunado married Narcisa Arceo at the Manila City Hall before Rev. Pedro Tiangco. In 1988, Narcisa left for Japan to work but returned to the Philippines in 1992, when she learned that her husband was having an extra-marital affair and has left their conjugal home. Narcisa found that Salvador is cohabiting with Fe Corazon Plato. She also found out that Salvador contracted a second marriage with certain a Zenaida Bias before Judge Lilian Dinulos Panontongan in San Mateo, Rizal. On January 19, 1995, an annulment case was filed by Salvador against Narcisa. On May 18, 1995, a case for bigamy was filed by Narcisa against Salvador and Zenaida. Salvador admitted that he first married Zenaida on December 24, 1955 before a municipal trial court judge in Concepcion, Iloilo and has four children with her prior to their separation in 1966. It appeared however that there was no evidence of their 1955 marriage so he and Zenaida remarried on January 10, 1989, upon the request of their son for the purpose of complying with the requirements for his commission in the military. Salvador was convicted for bigamy by the trial court. Salvador petitioned for a review and claims that his petition for annulment/declaration of nullity of marriage was a prejudicial question, hence, the proceedings in the bigamy case should have been suspended during the pendency of the annulment case. Issue Whether the petition for annulment or nullity of marriage was a prejudicial question, hence the proceedings in the bigamy case should be suspended. Held No. A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. The declaration of the judicial declaration of nullity is immaterial to the prosecution of the criminal case of bigamy because such crime has been consummated during the period wherein the marriage is supposedly subsisting. The innocence or guilt of the petitioner is not determined by the

annulment case. A marriage is deemed valid until the declaration of its nullity or a judicial declaration of annulment.

(Article 27) G.R. No. L-30745 January 18, 1978 PHILIPPINE MATCH CO., LTD. VS. THE CITY OF CEBU and JESUS E. ZABATE, Acting City Treasurer FACTS: This case is about the legality of the tax collected by the City of Cebu on sales of matches stored by the Philippine Match Co., Ltd. in Cebu City but delivered to customers outside of the City. Ordinance No. 279 of Cebu City (approved by the mayor on March 10, 1960 and also approved by the provincial board) is "an ordinance imposing a quarterly tax on gross sales or receipts of merchants, dealers, importers and manufacturers of any commodity doing business" in Cebu City. It imposes a sales tax of one percent (1%) on the gross sales, receipts or value of commodities sold, bartered, exchanged or manufactured in the city in excess of P2,000 a quarter. Section 9 of the ordinance provides that, for purposes of the tax, "all deliveries of goods or commodities stored in the City of Cebu, or if not stored are sold" in that city, "shall be considered as sales" in the city and shall be taxable. It assails the legality of the tax which the city treasurer collected on out-of- town deliveries of matches, to wit: (1) sales of matches booked and paid for in Cebu City but shipped directly to customers outside of the city; (2) transfers of matches to newsmen assigned to different agencies outside of the city and (3) shipments of matches to provincial customers pursuant to salesmen's instructions. The company in its letter of April 15, 1961 to the city treasurer sought the refund of the sales tax paid for out-of-town deliveries of matches. It invoked Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd. vs. Municipality of Sipocot, Camarines Sur, 105 Phil. 1263. In that case sales of oil and petroleum products effected outside the territorial limits of Sipocot, were held not to be subject to the tax imposed by an ordinance of that municipality. The city treasurer denied the request. His stand is that under section 9 of the ordinance all out-of-town deliveries of latches stored in the city are subject to the sales tax imposed by the ordinance.

On August 12, 1963 the company filed the complaint herein, praying that the ordinance be d void insofar as it taxed the deliveries of matches outside of Cebu City, that the city be ordered to refund to the company the said sum of P12,844.61 as excess sales tax paid, and that the city treasurer be ordered to pay damages. After hearing, the trial court sustained the tax on the sales of matches booked and paid for in Cebu City although the matches were shipped directly to customers outside of the city. The lower court held that the said sales were consummated in Cebu City because delivery to the carrier in the city is deemed to be a delivery to the customers outside of the city. But the trial court invalidated the tax on transfers of matches to salesmen assigned to different agencies outside of the city and on shipments of matches to provincial customers pursuant to the instructions of the newsmen It ordered the defendants to refund to the plaintiff the sum of P8,923.55 as taxes paid out the said out-oftown deliveries with legal rate of interest from the respective dates of payment. The city did not appeal from that decision. The company appealed from that portion of the decision upholding the tax on sales of matches to customers outside of the city but which sales were booked and paid for in Cebu City, and also from the dismissal of its claim for damages against the city treasurer. ISSUE: Whether or not the City of Cebu erred in imposing tax sales on matches which were perfected and paid for in Cebu City but the matches were delivered to customers outside of the City. HELD: We hold that the appeal is devoid of merit bemuse the city can validly tax the sales of matches to customers outside of the city as long as the orders were booked and paid for in the company's branch office in the city. Those matches can be regarded as sold in the city, as contemplated in the ordinance, because the matches were delivered to the carrier in Cebu City. Generally, delivery to the carrier is delivery to the buyer (Art. 1523, Civil Code; Behn, Meyer & Co. vs. Yangco, 38 Phil. 602). The sales in the instant case were in the city and the matches sold were stored in the city. The fact that the matches were delivered to customers, whose places of business were outside of the city, would not place those sales beyond the city's taxing power. Those sales formed part of the merchandising business being assigned on by the

company in the city. In essence, they are the same as sales of matches fully consummated in the city. Furthermore, because the sellers place of business is in Cebu City, it cannot be sensibly argued that such sales should be considered as transactions subject to the taxing power of the political subdivisions where the customers resided and accepted delivery of the matches sold. The company in its second assignment of error contends that the trial court erred in not ordering defendant acting city treasurer to pay exemplary damages of P20,000 and attorney's fees. Article 27 presupposes that the refuse or omission of a public official is attributable to malice or inexcusable negligence. In this case, it cannot be said that the city treasurer acted wilfully or was grossly t in not refunding to the plaintiff the taxes which it paid under protest on out-of-town sales of matches. The record clearly reveals that the city treasurer honestly believed that he was justified under section 9 of the tax ordinance in collecting the sales tax on out-of-town deliveries, considering that the company's branch office was located in Cebu City and that all out-oftown purchase order for matches were filled up by the branch office and the sales were duly reported to it. The city treasurer acted within the scope of his authority and in consonance with his bona fide interpretation of the tax ordinance. The fact that his action was not completely sustained by the courts would not him liable for We have upheld his act of taxing sales of matches booked and paid for in the city.

(Article 24) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. GUILLERMO CASIPIT Y RADAM G.R. NO.88229 May 31, 1994 FACTS: Guillermo Casipit yRadam, 22 at the time of the incident, appeals to insist on his innocence after being found guilty of raping Myra Reynaldo, 14 years old and a sixth grader back then. The two are neighbors in Victoria, Alaminos, Pangasinan. On 19 September 1986, Myra was invited by Guillermo to the town of Alaminos to buy rice and bananas but went to Dagupan instead because of cheaper prices. The

two watched a movie and had dinner before proceeding to Victoria. It rained hard on their way home so they decided to stay in a hut in the open field of Barangay Talbang. Inside the hut, Guillermo forced himself into Myra and Myra could not stop him as he was big and strong. After arriving at their respective homes, Myra narrated to her aunt NenitaRabadon everything that took place inside the hut. The two then reported the incident to the authorities and headed to the Western Pangasinan General Hospital for a medical examination the following afternoon. Guillermo denied all the charges and contested that he and Myra were sweethearts long before the incident. According to him, Myra gave her consent to the sexual intercourse that took place in the hut since they are lovers. Guillermo contended that Myra was probably induced by her aunt Nenitato file the case. Further, the accused argued that their movie date and stay in the hut until morning are indicative of Myras attraction to Guillermo, thereby nullifying her claim of being forced into having sexual intercourse with him. ISSUE: Which should the court believe Guillermos or Myras version of the incident? HELD: The court found Guillermo Casipit y Radam guilty of raping Myra Reynaldo and affirmed his sentence of reclusion perpetua. Further, the indemnity in favor of Myra was increased to P50,000.00 from P30,000. According to the court, Myra, at that time, was only 14 years old, an innocent barrio lass who placed her trust on appellant that day. Her immediate disclosure of the incident to her family and to the authorities and submission to medical examination augments the truthfulness of her case. Further, records showed that she was not a woman of a flirtatious nature to provoke Guillermo to have sex with her. The ruling was based on the States role as parenspatriae having the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of their minority, are not yet able to fully protect themselves.The court placed more weight on Myras testimony because of its marked receptivityto lend credence to the testimonies of victims who are tender years regarding their versions of what transpired. (Article 22) VIRGILIO C. CRYSTAL and GLYNNA F. CRYSTAL, petitioners vs. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, respondent

Facts: On September 5, 1995 Virgilio C. Crystal and Glynna F. Crystal obtained a P3,000,000 loan from Citytrust Banking Corporation secured by a mortgage of land. In 1996, Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) merged with and absorbed Citytrust. Due to the failure of the petitioners to settle the loan, the mortgaged land was foreclosed and sold in a public auction on July 21, 1997, to the highest bidder, BPI, amounting to P5,604,000. The respondent subsequently filed on March 19, 2001, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu a complaint against the petitioners for the collection of the deficiency of mortgage obligation and damages alleging that the total mortgage obligation amounted to P6,490,623.18resulting to a deficiency of P886,623.18 to earn 27% interest from the date of the auction sale to January 1, 2001 and 20% per annum for January 1, 2001 to March 15, 2001. In addition to the claim are the incidental expenses incurred after the bidding amounting to P1,665,946.69, thus, a total claim of P3,425,386.27. The petitioners argued that they were not informed of the interest rates per annum, thus, the foreclosure should be null and void due to BPIs violation of the Truth in Lending Act. RTC reduced the petitioners obligation to P5,248,888.65 due to the excessive charges for interests, penalty charges, liquidated damages and attorneys fees. Thus, RTC ordered BPI to pay the petitioners P319,111.35 plus interest of 12% per annum from July 21, 1997 until the debt is fully paid. On BPIs appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision, but deleted the award of interest. Both parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration, which were denied. Thereupon, both parties filed their petitions to the Supreme Court.The respondents petitionwas denied in G.R. 180129 for failure to sufficiently show that the appellate court committed any reversible error in the challenged decision and resolution. The subject of the petitioners petition is the deletion of RTCs decision of imposing of interest on the amount to be returned by the respondents. Issue: Should interest be imposed on the surplus to be returned by the respondents? Held: Yes, hence, the petition is granted.The decision of the Court of Appeals is modified in that the respondent, Bank of the Philippine Islands will return P319,111.35 representing the excess amount from the foreclosure sale, to bear interest at 6% per annum starting from the time the trial court rendered its judgment on September 27, 2004, not after the filing of the complaint, until the finality of this decision. Legal interest of 12% per annum shall be imposed on the

judgment award inclusive of interest from the finality of this decision until fully paid.

(Article 33) DIONG BI CHU, alias PATRICK CHANG, CHANG KA HEE and LU LIONG CORPORATION, Petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. GREGORIO G. PINEDA, as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXI; JAIME NAVOA and MILAGROS DE LEOS, Respondents. G.R. No. 49588 : December 21, 1990 FACTS: Private respondents Jaime Navoa and Milagros de Leos filed a criminal case against petitioners Diong Bi Chu alias "Patrick Chang" and Chang Ka Hi alias "Chang Ka Hee" with estafa. The charge against Chang Ka Hee was dismissed on the ground that he had nothing to do with the transaction. Military Commission No. 3 rendered judgment acquitting petitioner Diong Bi Chu alias "Patrick Chang", holding that the transaction between the parties was a joint venture, requiring each party to contribute to a common fund. As an offshoot of the criminal case, private respondents filed a civil action against Diong Bi Chu, Chang Ka Hee and Lu Liong Corporation for recovery of damages arising from guaranty and fraud, before the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the civil action for damages filed against them, on the ground that the same is barred by the prior judgment of Military Commission No. 3 and by private respondents' failure to reserve their right to file a separate civil action. The court denied said motion to dismiss. A petition was then filed by herein petitioners before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court dismissed said petition, holding that the civil action for damages under Art. 33 of the Civil Code is independent of the criminal case and that the dismissal of the criminal case against petitioner Chang Ka Hee and the acquittal of petitioner Diong Bi Chu do not constitute a bar to the prosecution of the civil action for damages against them. ISSUE: Whether or not a civil action for damages based on fraud under Art. 33 of the Civil Code is barred by a prior judgment of acquittal in a criminal case.

HELD: Art. 33 of the Civil Code provides that "(I)n cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence." To hold a person liable for damages under the foregoing provision, only a preponderance of evidence is required. An acquittal in a criminal case is not a bar to the filing of an action for civil damages, for one may not be criminally liable and still be civilly liable. Thus, the outcome or result of the criminal case, whether an acquittal or conviction, is really inconsequential and will be of no moment in the civil action. The civil action under Art. 33 need not be reserved because the law itself already makes the reservation. Applying the foregoing principles, despite the validity of the acquittal of Diong Bi Chu and the dismissal of the criminal case against Chang Ka Hee by Military Commission No. 3, such fact does not deprive private respondents of their right to recover civil damages against said persons based on fraud under Art. 33 of the Civil Code.

(Article 24) ELADlA DE LIMA vs. LAGUNA TAYABAS CO. G.R. No. L-35697-99 April 15, 1988 FACTS: On June 3, 1958, an accident between a Laguna Tayabas Co. (LTB) bus and Seven-up Bottlers Co. delivery truck resulted to the death of an LTB passenger named Petra dela Cruz. Two other LTB passengers namely Eladia de Lima and Nemesio Flores also incurred physical

injuries. De Lima, Flores and the heir of dela Cruz filed suits to the bus company. In December 29, 1971, the petitioners requested to expedite the decision of the case with the hope that the legal interest is to be given immediately from the date of the decision. By January 31, 1972, the decision was given. Again, the petitioners reiterated their request for the modification of the decision in such a way that the effectivity is to be rolled back to December 27, 1963. Furthermore, the heir of dela Cruz filed a reconsideration for the increase of indemnity from P3,000 to P12,000. With this pending motion for reconsideration, LTB filed an appeal for the case. The appellate court turned down the motion for reconsideration of the plaintiffs indicating that an appeal should have been filed for the awarding of the legal interest. The petition was reviewed in 1988, thirty years after the actual incident. ISSUES: a. Whether the effectivity of the decision is to be rolled back as requested by the plaintiffs. b. Whether the lower court was erroneous in the delay of the decision for the increase in the claim of the heir of Petra dela Cruz. HELD: The court granted the petition noting that the plaintiffs were unable to make an appeal in the lower court due to the fact that the petitioners are seeking judicial remedy as impoverished individuals. They were hopeful that the adjudged amount will be provided to them by the transportation company. With the case pending for thirty years, the court aptly found this as a sufficient justification to grant the legal interest as well as the increase in indemnity. It was found that the rolling back of the effectivity date was necessary to compensate for the monetary loss the plaintiffs incurred from the accident, death and court proceedings. Moreover, the claim for Petra dela Cruz was increased from P3,000.00 to P30,000.00. The decision was immediately executory in response to the identified urgent need of the plaintiffs. (Article 23) DEL MONTE CORPORATION-USA, PAUL E. DERBY, JR., DANIEL COLLINS and LUIS HIDALGO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE BIENVENIDO L. REYES in his capacity as Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 74, Malabon, Metro Manila, MONTEBUENO MARKETING, INC., LIONG LIONG C. SY and

SABROSA FOODS, INC., respondents. FACTS: On July 1, 1994, Del Monte Corporation-USA (DMC-USA) and Montebueno Marketing, Inc. (MMI) entered in a Distributorship Agreement, the latter being as exclusive distributor of products in the Philippines for a period of five (5) years, renewable for two (2) consecutive five (5) year periods The Agreement provided, among others, for an arbitration clause which states 12. GOVERNING LAW AND ARBITRATION This Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of California and/or, if applicable, the United States of America. All disputes arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the parties relationship, including the termination thereof, shall be resolved by arbitration in the City of San Francisco, State of California, under the Rules of the American Arbitration Association. The arbitration panel shall consist of three members, one of whom shall be selected by DMC-USA, one of whom shall be selected by MMI, and third of whom shall be selected by the other two members and shall have relevant experience in the industry x x x x MMI appointed Sabrosa Foods, Inc. (SFI), with the approval of petitioner DMC-USA, as MMI's marketing arm to concentrate on its marketing and selling function as well as to manage its critical relationship with the trade. On 3 October 1996, MMI, SFI and MMI's Managing Director Liong Liong C. Sy filed a Complaint against petitioners DMC-USA, Paul E. Derby, Jr., Daniel Collins and Luis Hidalgo, and Dewey Ltd. before the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Metro Manila, their complaint is on the alleged violations by petitioners of Arts. 20, 21, and 23 of the Civil Code. The complainant claimed, DMC-USA products continued to be brought into the country by parallel importers despite the appointment of private respondent MMI as the sole and exclusive distributor of Del Monte products thereby causing them great embarrassment and substantial damage. They alleged that the products brought into the country by these importers were aged, damaged, fake or counterfeit. The complainant had exhausted all possible avenues for the resolution and settlement of their grievances and that as a result of the fraud, bad faith and malice they should be held responsible for all the actual expenses incurred by private respondents in the delayed shipment of orders which resulted in the extra handling thereof, the actual expenses and cost of money for the unused Letters of Credit (LCs) and the substantial opportunity losses due to created out-of-stock

situations and unauthorized shipments of Del Monte-USA products to the Philippine Duty Free Area and Economic Zone; that the bad faith, fraudulent acts and willful negligence of petitioners, motivated by their determination to squeeze private respondents out of the outstanding and ongoing Distributorship Agreement in favor of another party. On 21 October 1996 petitioners filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings invoking the arbitration clause in their Agreement. In a Resolutioni dated 23 December 1996 the trial court deferred consideration of petitioners. On 15 January 1997 petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration. On 11 November 1997 the Motion to Suspend Proceedings was denied by the trial court ISSUE: Petitioners Motion to suspend proceedings on complaint filed at Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Metro Manila, invoking the arbitration clause in their Agreement. HELD: The petition is DENIED There is no doubt that arbitration is valid and constitutional in our jurisdiction. Even before the enactment of RA 876, this Court has countenanced the settlement of disputes through arbitration. The Agreement between petitioner DMC-USA and private respondent MMI is a contract. As a rule, contracts are respected as the law between the contracting parties and produce effect as between them, their assigns and heirs. Clearly, only parties to the Agreement, i.e., petitioners DMC-USA and its Managing Director for Export Sales Paul E. Derby, Jr., and private respondents MMI and its Managing Director LILY SY are bound by the Agreement and its arbitration clause as they are the only signatories thereto. Petitioners Daniel Collins and Luis Hidalgo, and private respondent SFI, not parties to the Agreement and cannot even be considered assigns or heirs of the parties, are not bound by the Agreement and the arbitration clause therein. Consequently, referral to arbitration in the State of California pursuant to the arbitration clause and the suspension of the proceedings in Civil Case No. 2637-MN pending the return of the arbitral award could be called for but only as to petitioners DMC-USA and Paul E. Derby, Jr., and private respondents MMI and LILY SY, and not as to the other parties in this case thus, Daniel Collins and Luis Hidalgo, and private respondent SFI, not parties to the Agreement and cannot even be considered assigns or heirs of the parties, are not bound by the Agreement and the arbitration clause therein.

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