Addison vs Felix

MAY

38 SCRA 404, No. 12342 August 3, 1918 FACTS: By a public instrument, plaintiff Addison sold to the defendant Marciana Felix and husband Balbino Tioco, 4 parcels of land. Defendants paid, at the time of the execution of the deed, the sum of P3,000.00 on account of the purchase price, and bound herself to pay the remainder in installments. It was further stipulated that the purchaser was to deliver to the vendor 25 per centum of the value of the products that she might obtain from the 4 parcels from the moment she takes possession of them until the Torrens certificate of title be issued in her favor. It was likewise covenanted that within I year from the date of the certificate of title in favor of Felix, she may rescind the contract of sale in which she shall be obliged to return to Addison the net value of all the products of the 4 parcels sold, and Addison shall be obliged to return to her all the sums that she may have paid, together with interest at the rate of I 0 percent per annum. However, Addison was able to designate only 2 of the 4 parcels and more than twothirds of these two were found to be in the possession of one Juan Villafuerte, who claimed to be the owner of the parts so occupied by him. Addison filed suit in CFI to compel Felix to make payment of the first installment, in accordance with the terms of the contract and of the interest at the stipulated rate. Defendant answered and alleged that the plaintiff had failed to deliver the lands that were the subject matter of the sale. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the delivery had been effected by reason of the issuance of the Torrens Certificate of title, notwithstanding the fact that the thing sold was not subject to the control of the vendor. 2. Whether or not the purchaser can rescind the contract. HELD: 1. No. The record shows that the plaintiff did not deliver the thing sold. With respect to

two of the parcels of land, he was not even able to show them to the purchaser; and as regards the other two, more than two-thirds of their area was in the hostile and adverse possession of a third person. The Code imposes upon the vendor the obligation to deliver the thing sold. The thing is considered to be delivered when it is placed in the hands and possession of the vendee. It is true that the same article declares that the execution of a public instrument is equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, but, in order that this symbolic delivery may produce the effect of tradition, I t is necessary that the vendor shall have control over the thing sold that, at the moment of sale, it its material delivery could have been made. It is not enough to confer upon the purchaser the ownership and the right of possession. The thing sold must be placed in his control. When there is no impediment whatever to prevent the thing sold passing into the tenancy of the purchaser by the sole will of the vendor, symbolic delivery through the execution of the public instrument is sufficient. But if, notwithstanding the execution of the instrument, the purchaser cannot have the enjoyment and material tenancy of the thing and make use of it himself or through another in his name, because such tenancy and enjoyment are opposed by the interposition of another will, then fiction yields to reality the delivery has not been effected. 2. Yes. It is evident in the case at bar, that the mere execution of the instrument was not a fulfillment of the vendors obligation to deliver the thing sold, and that from such nonfulfillment arises the purchasers right to demand, as she has demanded, the rescission of the sale and the return of the price.

PASAGUI V. VILLABLANCA (November 10, 1975)

FACTS: Plaintiffs Calixto Pasagui and Fausta Mosar bought a property in Leyte from Estaquia and Catalina Bocar for P2,800. Before they could take possession of the property, defendant spouses Ester T. Villablanca and Zosimo Villablanca took possession of it and harvested from the coconut plantation thereon. Plaintiffs demanded the return of the property but the defendants refused.

Plaintiffs filed a case in the CFI but respondents contend that the case is a forcible entry and as such, CFI has no jurisdiction.

ISSUE: WON the case is of forcible entry.

HELD: In order that an action may be considered as one for forcible entry, it is not only necessary that the plaintiff should allege his prior physical possession of the property but also that he was deprived of his possession by any of the means provided in section 1, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court.

It is true that the execution of the deed of absolute sale in a public instrument is equivalent to delivery of the land subject of the sale. This presumptive delivery only holds true when there is no impediment that may prevent the passing of the property from the hands of the vendor into those of the vendee. It can be negated by the reality that the vendees actually failed to obtain material possession of the land subject of the sale.

Posted by Chrism at 5:59 PM No comments: Labels: Sales Digest

DANGUILAN V. AIC (November 28, 1988)

FACTS:

A residential and farm lot in Cagayan owned by Dominggo Melad were being claimed by petitioner Felix Danguilan and respondent Apolonia Melad.

Apolonia contends that she acquired the property when Dominggo Melad sold it to her when she was just three years old in which her mother paid the consideration. She contends that she just moved out of the farm only when in 1946 Felix Danguilan approached her and asked permission to cultivate the land and to stay therein.

Dangguilan presented for his part 2 documents to prove his claim that the properties were given to him by Dominggo Melad through an onerous donation. The onerous part of the donation includes the taking care of the farm and the arrangement of the burial of Dominggo.

HELD: The ruling should be in favor of Danguilan. The contention of Apolonia that the deed of donation is void because it was not made through a public document is of no merit. The deed was an onerous one and hence, it was not covered by the rule in Article 749 requiring donations of real properties to be effected through a public instrument. An onerous donation is effective and valid if it embraces the conditions that the law requires. Since it has been proven that Danguilan did the conditions in the onerous donation particularly the arrangement of Dominggos burial, the deed is deemed valid.

On the other hand, the deed of sale made in favor of Apolonia is suspicious. One may well wonder why the transfer was not made to the mother herself, who was after all the one paying for the lands. The averment was also made that the contract was simulated and prepared after Domingo Melad's death in 1945.

Even assuming the validity of the deed of sale, the record shows that the private respondent did not take possession of the disputed properties and indeed waited until 1962 to file this action for recovery of the lands from the petitioner. If she did have possession, she transferred the same to the petitioner in 1946, by her own sworn admission, and moved out to another lot belonging to her step-brother. In short, she failed to show that she consummated the contract of sale by actual delivery of the properties to her and her actual possession thereof in concept of purchaser-owner. Ownership does not pass by mere stipulation but only by delivery.

POWER COMMERCIAL V. CA (June 20, 1997)

FACTS: Petitioner asbestos manufacturer Power Commercial and industrial corporation bought the property of spouses Reynaldo and Angelita Quiambao located in Makati City.

Since there are lessees occupying the subject land, part of the deed of sale is a warranty of respondents that will defend its title and peaceful possession in favor of the petitioners.

The property is mortgage to PNP and as such, petitioners filed a request to assume responsibility of the mortgage. Because of petitioners failure to produce the required papers, their petition was denied.

Petitioners allege that the contract should be rescinded because of failure of delivery.

ISSUE: WON the contract is recissible due to breach of contract.

HELD: There is no breach of contact in this case since there is no provision in the contract that imposes the obligation to the respondents to eject the people occupying the property.

There was also a constructive delivery because the deed of sale was made in a public document. The contention of the petitioners that there could be no constructive delivery because the respondents is not in possession of the property is of no merit. What matters in a constructive delivery is control and not possession. Control was placed in the hands of the petitioners that is why they were able to file an ejectment case. Prior physical delivery or possession is not legally required and the execution of the deed of sale is deemed equivalent to delivery.