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Philosophical Papers
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Van Inwagen on the Cosmological Argument

Anthony Brueckner
a a

University of California, Santa Barbara

Available online: 02 Sep 2009

To cite this article: Anthony Brueckner (2001): Van Inwagen on the Cosmological Argument, Philosophical Papers, 30:1, 31-40 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/05568640109485075

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Philosophical Papers Vol. 30, No. 1 (March 2001): 31-40

Van Inwagen on the Cosmological Argument

Anthony Brueckner
Abstract: In his book Metaphysics, Peter van Inwagen constructs a version of the Cosmological Argument which does not depend on the Principle of Sufficient Reason. He goes on to reject the argument. In this paper, I construct an alternative version of the Cosmological Argument that uses some of van Inwagens insights and yet is immune to his criticisms. If we suppose that for each contingent truth, there is some at least partial explanation, then it follows that there is some necessary truth that explains the conjunction of all the contingent truths.

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Peter van Inwagens interesting discussion of the Cosmological Argument in his Metaphysics has not, I think, received adequate attention outside the classroom. 1 In this paper, I would like to critically examine van Inwagens case against a version of the Cosmological Argument that does not depend upon the Principle of Sufficient Reason. I will then propose an alternative version. 1. Refuting the Principle of Sufficient Reason Van Inwagen states the Leibnizian principle as follows: (PSR) For every truth, for everything that is so, there is a sufficient reason for its being true or being so. 2 (p. 100) According to van Inwagen, no Cosmological Argument based on PSR can succeed, since PSR is false. In order to refute PSR, van Inwagen assumes that a sufficient reason for Ps truth must be a complete explanation E for P, such that E entails P. From this it follows that no necessary truth can constitute a sufficient
1 See chapter 6 of Metaphysics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993). This is an introductory text that is filled with arguments that are of interest to specialists. All page references in the text are to this work. 2 If P is a necessary truth, then its modal status constitutes a sufficient reason for its truth.

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reason for a contingent truth. If the explanans E for P is both necessary and entailing, then P, like E, will be true in all possible worlds and so not contingently true. 3 Now let us generate a counterexample to PSR. Form the conjunction C of all the contingent truths.4 C is itself contingent. So by the foregoing reasoning, no necessary truth can constitute a sufficient reason for C. But neither can a contingent truth constitute a sufficient reason for C. This is because no truth can explain itself. Suppose that some contingent truth T were a sufficient reason for C. Then T would be a conjunct in C, and in the course of explaining C, T would need to explain itself, which it cannot do. So no contingent truth can be a sufficient reason for C, and no necessary truth can be either. So no truth can. So PSR is false. 5 2. A PSR-free Cosmological Argument In the aftermath of this refutation of PSR, van Inwagen considers a PSRfree version of the Cosmological Argument. He goes on to ultimately reject it. A crucial concept in the argument is that of an independent beinga being that depends on no being outside itself for its existence. A being that is not independent is dependent; it does depend for its existence upon some being outside itself. Here it is crucial to note that if Y depends upon X for its existence, then it does not follow that the fact that X exists constitutes a sufficient reason for the fact that Y exists. That X exists may well only provide a partial, incomplete explanation for the existence of Y. Van Inwagen raises the question whether a contingently existing independent being is possible. Call such a being a contingent indy. Van Inwagen discusses two candidates for such a status. The first I will

3 This is a simpler version of the reasoning found on pp. 105-106 of Metaphysics. See Christopher S. Hill, On a Revised Version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, July 1982) for similar reasoning. 4 Here I depart from van Inwagens discussion on pp. 106-107, in which he considers the set of contingent truths. His compressed discussion does not straightforwardly yield a truth that violates PSR. 5 Here I am drawing upon some ideas in the excellent paper by Hill cited earlier.

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call Pop: it is a being that simply popped into existence in empty space. Van Inwagen further describes the case as follows: there was no reason whatsoever for [Pops popping]: it just did. And let us suppose that no other being was in any way causally connected in the slightest, most remote degree with the coming into existence of [Pop]. Since there was no reason whatever for this beings coming into existence, it can plausibly be maintained that it might just as well not have come into existence; it can plausibly be maintained, that is, that it is a contingent being. (p. 109) The second candidate for a contingent indy is Sphere: it is a translucent sphere two meters in diameter that has always existed.6 Sphere could have failed to exist (is a contingent being) but depends upon nothing outside it f its existence. (Suppose that nothing else has always existed or and that Sphere at no moment comes to depend upon any temporary being for its existence.) Van Inwagen is inclined to deny the possibility of Pop and Sphere and to hold that no contingent indy is possible. In rejecting Pop, he appeals to Ex nihil nihil fit: nothing comes from nothing. He says, Isnt there something strange about the idea of somethings just popping into existence without anythings being even partly responsible for this event? (p. 109) He worries that his denial of Pops possibility might seem to depend upon accepting the discredited PSR. However, as the foregoing quote indicates, van Inwagens denial rests instead upon the weaker requirement that if a thing comes into existence at t, then there must be at least some partial explanation for this event that adverts to beings other than the new one. There must be some sort of explanatory connection between the new thing and prior states of affairs, though not necessarily an entailing connection. With regard to Sphere, van Inwagen says:

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6 This example is from Richard Taylor, Metaphysics, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1992).

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Even if we cannot accept the thesis that everything has a complete explanation, we may be convinced that many kinds of thingsthe existence of two-meter translucent spheres among themhave at least partial explanations. And such an explanation would not be provided by the assertion that the ball has always existed. (p. 110)

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Van Inwagen concludes that it is at least somewhat plausible that no contingent indy is possible. Thus it is at least somewhat plausible to hold that any indy will be a necessary being. He says: We may sum up the intuition that underlies the plausibility of this [No Contingent Indy] thesis as follows: for every being that exists, there must be at least a partial explanation for the fact of its existence, and if a being was truly independent, then there could be only one explanation of any sort for its existence: that its nonexistence was impossible. (p. 111) We are now in a position to state a PSR-free version of the Cosmological Argument, aimed at proving the existence of a necessary being and incorporating the foregoing considerations.7 (1) (2) (3) The World (that is, everything) is an indy (since nothing exists outside it upon which it could depend). [Premise] No contingent indy is possible. [Lemma] The World is a necessary being. [1,2]

This is certainly a peculiar argument. Supposing that I am a part of the World, are we then to say that a necessary being has some contingent parts? Could it have only contingent parts? Maybe the arguments conclusion forces us to countenance some necessary parts of the World, along with the contingent ones. Van Inwagens view is that we need not trouble ourselves with such questions, since the argument has a false premise. (1) requires that the World is a being, an individual thing. But
7 I have simplified van Inwagens own argument, given on p. 111 of Metaphysics.

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the World is more plausibly viewed as a mere collection of individual things: If the world is a mere collection, then any use of the phrase the World is a mere manner of speaking; use of this phrase is no more than a device for speaking collectively about all individuals. If every individual thing was, say, an elementary particle like an electron or a quark, then the words the World would simply be a linguistic deviceno doubt one that could be dispensed with in principlefor making general statements about the distributions of all the elementary particles. (p. 112) Van Inwagens objection to the foregoing Cosmological Argument, then, rests upon his denial that the mere collection of all contingent individuals is itself a real being to which the No Contingent Indy Lemma can sensibly apply. The objection continues along familiar Humean lines: If the World is a mere collection, then perhaps it is possible that there are only contingent beings and that none of t em is an independent h being. Perhaps it is possible that the World is a collection that contains infinitely many individuals, and perhaps it is possible that the individual thing A depends for its existence upon the individual thing B, and that B depends u pon C, and that C depends upon D, and so on forever (or that A depends upon B and C, and that B depends upon D and E, and that C depends upon D, F and G, ). (p. 112) It appears, then, that van Inwagen can plausibly reject the proposed Cosmological Argument based upon the No contingent Indy Lemma. 8
8 Van Inwagens Humean suggestion presupposes that there is no first individual (such as a singularity S). Ss existence seemingly could not be partially explained by any other contingent being, and thus, by the No Contingent Indy Lemma, S would turn out to be a necessary being. Two replies to these remarks about a first beings necessary status are suggested by Quentin Smith in a recent paper, The Reason that the Universe Exists is that it Caused Itself to Exist (Philosophy, October 1999). The first depends upon an interpretation of Bells theorem, according to which it is possible for a state A of particle 1 to instantaneously cause state B of particle 2 to exist, state B instantaneously to cause state C of particle 3 to exist, and state C to instantaneously cause state A to exist, this causal loop

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3. A Final PSR-free Version of the Cosmological Argument I would like to conclude by constructing a final PSR-free version of the Cosmological Argument that avoids van Inwagens objections and incorporates the spirit of the No Contingent Indy Lemma. That Lemma concerns the dependence of one being upon another, where the existence of one at least partially, though not necessarily completely, explains the existence of another. The idea behind the Lemma could be naturally generalized to truths, yielding the following Principle of Partial Reason: (PPR) For every contingent truth, there is at least a partial, insufficient reason or explanation for its being true. This is obviously weaker than PSR, and it is not susceptible to van Inwagens refutation of that Leibnizian principle. PPR is supported by the same sorts of considerations that van Inwagen adduced in favor of the No Contingent Indy Lemma: for example, if it is a contingent truth that Pop exists (and similarly f r Sphere), then there must be at least a o partial explanation for that truth, given in terms of other beings. My alternative argument runs as follows. Again, form the conjunction C of all contingent truths. C is itself contingent. So by PPR, there is at least a partial, insufficient reason or explanation E for Cs truth. E cannot be contingent. This is because by the earlier reasoning deployed against PSR, E, if contingent, would in that case have to constitute a partial explanation for itself, since Es contingency would imply that it is a conjunct in C. But no proposition can partially or completely explain its own truth.9 Since E is thus not contingent, it must be necessary. So we

obtaining at the first instant of time. Each state exists contingently, and each state gets at least partially explained by some other simultaneous state. The second reply involves backwards causation of the sort envisaged in Gdels discussion of the General Theory of Relativity, in which a contingent thing existing later than S causes and therefore partially explains the existence of S. 9 It would be no good to object that if E partially explains the conjuncts in C other than itself, then E partially explains C. This is because it would seem that a partial explanation of C would need to provide a partial explanation of each of its conjuncts.

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have established that there is some necessary truth which at least partially explains the truth of C, the conjunction of all contingent truths. By the earlier reasoning, we know that the necessary truth E does not completely explain (does not constitute a sufficient reason for) C, for no necessary truth can play that role vis--vis a contingent truth. This version of the Cosmological Argument does not provide any information as to the character of the necessary truth E that partially explains the truth of the conjunction C of all contingent truths. E might have the form: Individual thing G exists. In this case, the argument would demonstrate the existence of a necessary being G (whose existence partially explains the truth of C). Then again, E might have the form: Some individual thing of kind K exists. In this case, the arguments conclusion would be compatible with various different K -things playing the key explanatory role in different possible worlds. The argument, then, would not establish the existence of a necessary being. 10 Would this diminish the significance of the proposed Cosmological Argument? Suppose that we could indeed show that every possible world contains some or other thing of a kind K such that being of that kind is sufficient to partially explain every contingent truth regarding the world. For example, suppose that we could show that every possible world contains some or other singularity which is thus and so (whose existence partially explains every contingent truth). It seems to me that this would be a very surprising metaphysical result, even if no necessary being is delivered by the argument.

10 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.

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4. Conclusion I conclude that even if van Inwagen is right to reject his own PSR-free version of the Cosmological Argument based on the No Contingent Indy Lemma, there is a different Cosmological Argument based upon PPR (inspired by the Lemma) that is not open to his criticisms. Of course, my argument can also be rejected if the Lemma and PPR are found wanting. Further, the argument might disappoint those who demand that a Cosmological Argument demonstrate the existence of a necessary being. On the positive side, however, we may note that PPR has a good deal of intuitive plausibility, as emerged in van Inwagens discussion of Pop and Sphere. My version of the Cosmological Argument shows that if one does accept PPR, then one must also accept the existence of some necessary truth that partially explains the conjunction of all contingent truths. One might seek to avoid this result by impugning PPR in a Humean manner. Hume argued that one cannot know a priori that every event has a cause. His reasons for this denial, if cogent, would equally show that one cannot know a priori that every event has at least a partial causal explanation. So for the Humean, PPR is not knowable a priori. Further, PPR is clearly not the sort of principle that can be given an a posteriori, experiential justification. Thus it looks as if PPR is not something that is knowable at all.11 Let us briefly consider Humes worries about the causal maxim: every event has a cause. Since experience does not yield knowledge of the causal maxim, Hume argues, knowledge of the maxim would instead require the sort of intuitive, demonstrative certainty that comes from the comparison of ideas. According to Hume, the idea of Xs beginning to exist is distinct from the idea of the cause of Xs beginning to exist (one can frame the first idea without framing the second). It then seems to follow that it is possible for that which is represented by the first idea to exist without that which is represented by the second. Thus the causal maxim cannot
11 Thanks to Ward Jones for suggesting this difficulty.

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be known to hold of necessity, with the required demonstrative certainty.12 This Humean reasoning is problematic. First, we may question whether all a priori, non-experiential knowledge must be grounded in relations between the pertinent ideas. It is very plausible to suppose that some a priori knowledge is not analytic knowledge that is somehow generated entirely by a grasp of concepts or meanings.13 Second, even granting Humes method of the comparison of ideas, it is far from clear that our ability to carefully and clearly conceive of Xs beginning to exist without a cause is sufficient to establish the genuine possibility of such an exception to the causal maxim. Such conceivability arguments in philosophy are extremely controversial. A typical example is found in recent philosophy of mind: David Chalmers, reviving Cartesian notions, holds that since it is conceivable that there should be zombies (physical duplicates of us who lack consciousness), it follows that it is genuinely possible for physically indistinguishable creatures to differ in respect of their mental states (thereby controverting the thesis of the supervenience of the mental upon the physical). 14 But whether conceivability is sufficient for possibility in this case is far from clear: the dualistic refutation of supervenience is not such an easy matter. 15 It is one thing, though, to defend the causal maxim and its cousin PPRfrom Humes attack, and yet another to make a convincing case

12 See A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958), Book 1, part 3, section 3. 13 For a recent defense of this conception of a priori knowledge, see Laurence BonJours In Defense of Pure Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 14 See The Conscious Mind (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). 15 See, for example, Christopher S. Hill and Brian McLaughlin, There Are Fewer Things in Reality Than Are Dreamt of in Chalmerss Philosophy, Brian Loar, David Chalmerss The Conscious Mind, and Stephen Yablo, Consciousness and Concepts, all in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (1999). See also my Chalmers Conceivability Argument for Dualism, forthcoming in Analysis. For further criticism of Humes objection to the causal maxim, see Barry Strouds Hume (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977).

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for PPR. Something like a Kantian transcendental argument is probably needed for the purpose, and this is beyond the scope of this paper. 16 University of California, Santa Barbara

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16 I would like to thank Francis Williamson for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.