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ATTACHMENT 2 Safety and Durability of NGV Fuel Storage Systems Norman L. Newhouse, Ph.D., P.E. * William E.

Dick Michael P. Sheridan GENERAL DYNAMICS Armament and Technical Products Lincoln Operations

ABSTRACT Natural Gas Vehicle (NGV) fuel containers have been in service in North America for over 20 years, and worldwide for over 50 years. Safety is the first concern in the design and use of these fuel containers. Standards for composite fuel containers have been developed, including ANSI/CSA NGV2 and ISO 11439. Fuel containers qualified to these standards have been in service for nearly 10 years. These standards have test requirements that improve the safety of NGV fuel containers, as demonstrated by field service history. Requirements of these standards are reviewed, with an explanation of how they affect safety and durability. Historical field service events involving NGV fuel containers that relate to safety and durability are reviewed. General Dynamics Armament and Technical Products (GDATP), formerly Lincoln Composites, began delivery of NGV2 fuel containers in 1993, and now has over 45,000 Type 4 (all-composite) NGV fuel containers in service worldwide. Results of qualification tests and design verification tests are discussed. Field performance results for these fuel containers are discussed, including incidents involving severe impacts and fires. The GDATP Type 4 NGV fuel containers have an excellent safety record, despite a number of significant field incidents. This paper was prepared for presentation at NGV2002, the 8th International and 20th National Conference and Exhibition on Natural Gas Vehicles, Washington, DC, USA, October 8-10, 2002 INTRODUCTION Natural Gas Vehicles (NGVs) have been in use for over 50 years. The first tanks used for these vehicles were made of steel. The use of NGVs has been growing since the 1970s due to environmental and financial benefits. With growth in use of NGVs came a need for technology developments. One of those developments was in the use of structural composites for the compressed natural gas (CNG) fuel containers. The use of composite tanks began in the 1980s. Currently, over 2,000,000 vehicles globally have been manufactured or converted to use natural gas fuels, with over 100,000 in North America

[1]. These NGVs and their fuel tanks have demonstrated an excellent overall safety record. While steel tanks remain the most common globally, the North American market is dominated by composite tanks. BACKGROUND The Lincoln plant was founded in 1963 as part of the Brunswick Corporation. The plant initially manufactured filament-wound composite rocket motor cases, but quickly included composite pressure vessels in its product offerings. It became the Lincoln Composites Division of Technical Products Group, Incorporated, (TPG) in May 1995 following divestiture of Brunswicks Defense Division. Technical Products Group merged with Lunn Industries in October, 1997 to become Advanced Technical Products, Incorporated (ATP). General Dynamics acquired Advanced Technical Products on June 14, 2002, at which time the plant became the Lincoln Operations of General Dynamics Armament and Technical Products (GDATP). GDATPs Lincoln Operations continues to offer its broad line of filament-wound composite structures, including fuel tanks for NGVs. GDATPS NGV EXPERIENCE GDATP began development of its Type 4 (all-composite) tank in 1990. This tank used a High Density Polyethylene (HDPE) liner, aluminum bosses, and a structural hybrid composite reinforcement using carbon and glass fiber in an epoxy resin matrix [2,3]. The tank was certified to ANSI/AGA NGV2 in 1993. It has also been certified to B51 Part 2 in 1995, and to ISO 11439 and METI/KHK Technical Standard #9 in 1998. Full or conditional approvals have been given in 16 countries, including Australia, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, South Africa, Sweden, Trinidad, United Kingdom, and United States. GDATPs tank diameters range from 231 to 538 mm (9.1 to 21.2 inches), with lengths from 0.6 to 3 meters (23.5 to 120 inches). Larger sizes can be produced. Over 45,000 of GDATPs NGV tanks are currently in service. These tanks have also been used as hydrogen fuel tanks, hydraulic accumulators for automotive use, hydraulic accumulators qualified under ASME Section X for use on offshore oil platforms [4], and for aerospace applications. Service pressures for the NGV application are 200 and 240 bar at 15C (3000 and 3600 psi at 70F). Pressures for the hydrogen fuel tanks are generally 250 and 350 bar (3600 and 5000 psi), with development activity looking at 700 bar (10,000 psi). Accumulator applications use pressures from 35 to 350 bar (500 to 5000 psi). NGV CONTAINER STANDARDS The growth of the NGV industry, coupled with a requirement for safety and need for improved technology, brought about the development of fuel tank standards. There are several national and international standards that have been developed. In the U.S., the Department of Transportations National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

(DOT/NHTSA) developed Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 304 (FMVSS 304) [5]. The NGV industry, under the auspices of the Natural Gas Vehicle Coalition (NGVC) and with CSA International (formerly American Gas Association Laboratories) as the Secretariat, developed ANSI/CSA NGV2 [6]. In Canada, CSA B51 Part 2 [7] was developed. METI/KHK Technical Standard #9 was developed in Japan. The International Association for Natural Gas Vehicles (IANGV) began development of an international standard, which was completed by ISO Technical Committee 58, Subcommittee 3, and published as ISO 11439 [8]. This standard was parallel voted and approved as a CEN standard. GDATP tanks have been certified to each of the above standards. The above standards are reasonably harmonized and their technical requirements are consistent. A tank that can pass the requirements of one will most likely be able to pass the requirements of the others, although FMVSS 304 contains a subset of the requirements in the other named standards. These standards are performance based. This allows new technology to enter the market while maintaining safety and reliability. The qualification tests of these standards represent requirements for field service, addressing damage tolerance, environmental resistance, and durability over a 20-year service life. Meeting these qualification test requirements assures safety over the life of the fuel containers. Augmenting the cylinder standards are component standards such as ANSI/IAS PRD1 [9] for pressure relief devices, ANSI/AGA NGV3.1 [10] for system components, and NFPA 52 [11] for systems. DAMAGE TOLERANCE TESTING Damage tolerance tests typically used in tank standards includes penetration (gunfire) testing, drop testing, and flaw tolerance. DOT/NHTSA also requires crash testing in accordance with FMVSS 303 [12]. Penetration tests address non-shatterability of the tanks when impacted or penetrated. The test procedure involves being impacted by a 7.62 mm (30 caliber) round. The tank must not fragment when hit. GDATP tanks routinely pass this test, as do tanks from other manufacturers. Hybridizing glass fiber with the carbon structural fiber increases damage tolerance. As composite walls get thicker, which occurs with increasing diameters and pressures, the tanks become more resistant to impact damage. Drop testing addresses shipping damage and general durability. Once the tanks are pressurized, they are more tolerant of nominal impact damage, as the pressure prevents some of the deflection that causes damage within the wall. Testing includes horizontal, vertical, and 45-degree drops, followed by pressure cycling. GDATP tanks routinely pass this test, being protected by the Tuffshell and hybridized reinforcement. Other manufacturers tanks also routinely pass this test. However, the incrementally higher local strain resulting from damaged fiber might cause early fatigue and leakage from aluminum-lined Type 3 tanks.

Flaw tolerance testing addresses cuts and abrasions that may occur during service. Cuts up to 1.25 mm (0.050 inch) deep and up to 200 mm (8 inches) long are placed into the laminate. The tanks must then pass pressure cycling tests. GDATP tanks routinely pass this test, being protected by the Tuffshell overwrap, which is sacrificial and thicker than the flaws that are cut into the laminate. Other manufacturers tanks also routinely pass this test. However, the incrementally higher local strain resulting from damaged fiber might cause early fatigue and leakage from aluminum-lined Type 3 tanks. Vehicle impact testing must be conducted under FMVSS 303 to simulate crashes. The container must not leak or rupture when impacted. GDATP has passed NHTSA tests with a tank mounted in the trunk of an automobile subjected to a rear impact, and with a tank mounted underneath a bus subjected to a side impact. ENVIRONMENTAL TESTING Environmental testing required in standards includes exposure to corrosive fluids, extreme temperatures, accelerated stress rupture, and bonfires. The environmental test exposes the tank to corrosive fluids that are found in the automotive environment. Fluids include sulfuric acid, sodium hydroxide, methanol/gasoline, ammonium nitrate, windshield washer fluid, and acid rain. The tank must then undergo pressure cycling and pass a reduced burst pressure test. GDATP tanks routinely pass this test, as the carbon fiber reinforcement is virtually unaffected by corrosive fluids [13]. Other tanks made using carbon fiber would be equally resistant to attack by corrosive fluids. Conventional glass fibers are affected by exposure to acids and bases, although new corrosion resistant glass fibers have significantly better resistance to corrosive fluids. The extreme temperature test addresses exposure to extreme environmental temperatures found in the automotive environment. The low temperature extreme is -40C (-40F), while the high temperature extreme is +82C (+180F). This high temperature extreme, which applies everywhere outside of the engine compartment, may occur as a result of operating conditions or from high solar heating input. Testing includes pressure cycling during exposure to the temperature extremes. The tank must not leak or rupture. GDATP tanks routinely pass this test, as the materials are not affected by these temperature extremes. Other tanks also pass this test easily, although it could screen out liner or resin materials that lacked sufficient high or low temperature properties. The accelerated stress rupture test addresses fiber and/or resin strength loss with time and temperature while under load. The test is conducted at maximum fill pressure and an elevated temperature, +65C (+149F) over a period of 1000 hours. Using an Arrhenius rate equation, the elevated temperature accelerates time at test by an equivalent factor of about 32, in addition to strength changes associated with elevated temperature. Combined with the elevated pressure, this test has screened out tanks having known problems with environmental stability. GDATP tanks routinely pass this test, as the materials of construction are not affected by the extremes of the test conditions.

The bonfire test addresses fires involving vehicles. The tank is placed in a fire of fixed size, and must vent its contents through a pressure relief device (PRD) without rupturing. For long tanks, this may require the use of two or three PRDs. GDATP tanks routinely pass this test, as they use PRDs that are thermally activated, quick acting, and have a high flow rate. Use of a thermally activated PRD allows the tank to be protected regardless of the pressure in the tank at the time of fire exposure. LIFE CYCLE TESTING Life cycle testing addresses the ability of the tank to perform its function over its full lifetime. Related tests include burst, ambient cycling/leak before burst, natural gas cycling, and cold fast fill and blowdown. Burst testing addresses minimum strength considerations for the tank and stress rupture considerations for the reinforcing fibers. The tanks need a minimum burst pressure to provide some margin against possible overfilling, exposure to higher than expected temperatures after being filled to capacity, and other unexpected events. The minimum burst ratio used is 2.25 based on settled pressure at +21C (+70F), which equals a ratio of 2.35 based on settled pressure at +15C (+59F). Stress rupture is a phenomenon by which the fiber reinforcement will fail over time when continuously loaded to a given level. The standards have different stress ratios (fiber strength at rupture divided by fiber stress at operating pressure) for different fibers, reflecting differences in the ability of the fiber to resist stress rupture. Carbon fiber has the best properties, followed by aramid fiber, with glass fiber having the poorest properties. At a settled pressure of +21C (+70F), carbon has a stress ratio requirement of 2.25, aramid 3.0, and glass 3.5. At a settled pressure of +15C (+59F), the respective requirements are equal to 2.35, 3.1, and 3.65. GDATP tanks routinely pass this test, and have sufficient margin to address normal scatter of results. Ambient cycling addresses the ability of the tank to be filled multiple times during its life without failure of the liner by leakage. Leak-before-burst (LBB) addresses the ability for the liner or tank to leak before the fiber fails in cycling, causing a rupture. The cycling requirement without leakage is typically from 15,000 to 20,000 cycles to maximum fill pressure. Leak-before-burst extends to 45,000 cycles without rupture, and is generally conducted at proof pressure. GDATP tanks routinely pass these tests, as the plastic liner is in compression through most of the pressure range, so that cracks are unlikely to form or propagate, and because the cyclic fatigue properties of the reinforcing fibers are excellent. GDATP tanks have been cycled up to 200,000 times without liner failure. Steel liners also have good cyclic fatigue properties. Cycle life can be a design driver for aluminum-lined Type 3 tanks. Natural gas cycling addresses potential static buildup and discharge that occurs during filling and venting. The tank is subjected to 1000 fill and vent cycles, and must not show degradation as a result. Metal or metal-lined tanks inherently have no problem, as static is bled off through the valve and tubing. In a plastic-lined tank, static buildup must be

bled off or avoided. In the GDATP design, the plastic is not in the flow stream, as it is connected to the metal end boss well away for the threaded opening. As a result, the boss collects static charges and bleeds them off as in a metal-lined tank, so the GDATP tank has no problem passing this test. Cold fast fill and blowdown testing is not required by standards, but is conducted by GDATP to confirm that there are no problems with very high flow rates that can cause transient temperature extremes. Some Type 4 tank suppliers have limited fill and vent rates so that their liner does not experience transient cold temperatures. GDATPs tank has no problem passing fast fill and blowdown tests conducted within the temperature ranges given in the various standards. GDATP tanks have been operating in very cold climates, including on Alaskas North Slope, with no problem. However, plastic lined tanks are generally not intended for use at cryogenic temperatures. FIELD FAILURES IN NORTH AMERICA There have been a limited number of field failures in North America, where FMVSS 304, NGV2, B-51 Part 2, and/or ISO 11439 standards have been required for use. Eight field failures (ruptures) have occurred since 1993. All tank types have been involved, although no GDATP tanks have ruptured. Stress corrosion cracking of glass fiber caused by exposure to acid was involved in three of the ruptures. Four tanks ruptured due to physical damage to the tank, although excess pressure may have been a factor in two of the cases. One tank failed due to being overpressurized. No tanks have ruptured on impact or in a fire. Standards were modified in response to the above failures. In particular, the environmental test was added to address exposure to corrosive fluids. Much of the research into cause of the stress corrosion failures was coordinated and/or funded by the Gas Research Institute (now Gas Technology Institute). The use of carbon fiber reinforcement and corrosion resistant glass fiber reinforcement has increased as a result of these failures. Periodic inspection has also been emphasized as a result of the field failures. In all cases where damage was known to have existed, the damage could have been identified by visual examination, if conducted in a timely manner. This applies to stress corrosion cracking, impacts, cuts, and abrasions that were involved in the failures. The Natural Gas Vehicle Coalition, Gas Technology Institute, and others have taken lead roles in promoting timely inspection and providing guidelines for inspection. The National Alternative Fuels Training Consortium, headquartered at West Virginia University, and working cooperatively with CSA International, has developed a training and certification program for tank inspectors, and the Compressed Gas Association has published guidelines for tank inspection [14]. GDATP provides an inspection manual for its tanks and training for inspectors of its tanks. The efforts noted above, along with the efforts of NGV owners, has improved safety in that the last field failure involving tank rupture was in 1997.

GDATP FIELD INCIDENTS GDATP tanks have been involved in a number of field incidents, including impacts and fires, without tank ruptures occurring. This reflects favorably on both the durability of the GDATP tank and on the value of the performance based standards discussed above in identifying tests that reflect real-world durability requirements. Field events involving other manufacturers also support the value of these durability requirements. Some of the more significant field incidents involving GDATP tanks are discussed below: BRIDGE HIT GDATP tanks were mounted transversely on a bus that impacted a bridge at about 75 km/hr (45 mph) with 150 mm (6 inches) of interference. The tanks were designed for 250 bar (3600 psi) service pressure, and contained about 210 bar (3000 psi) at the time of the incident. The impact on the front tank sheared off a length of the Tuffshell overwrap, and parts of three to four structural layers (Figures 1 and 2). The tank was condemned and returned to GDATP for evaluation and burst testing. Even with this severe impact, the tank strength was only degraded about five percent, and it still met burst pressure requirements for a new tank. CURB HIT GDATP tanks were mounted beneath a shuttle van. During a routine maintenance inspection, it was noted that the tank had been impacted, likely by hitting a curb. The bracket was moved out of position, and there was a visible impact on the dome region (Figure 3). The tank was condemned and returned to GDATP for evaluation. A burst test was conducted, and the tank still met burst pressure requirements for a new tank. TANK DROP A GDATP tank mounted below a heavy duty vehicle dropped from the vehicle, was dragged by the vehicle, and eventually run over by the vehicle (Figure 4). The tank was condemned and returned to GDATP for evaluation. A burst test was conducted, and the tanks still met burst pressure requirements for a new tank. DEBRIS IMPACT A GDATP tank mounted below a vehicle was inspected and found to have debris, believed to be part of a steel shelf support, lodged in the dome region (Figure 5). The tank did not rupture as a result of the impact. The tank was condemned and removed from service. BUS CRASH A bus equipped with GDATP tanks mounted below the floor was hijacked, driven away from its intended route, collided with a delivery vehicle, ran through a fence, and came to rest atop parked cars (Figure 6). No damage was reported to the tanks. ENGINE FIRE A bus equipped with GDATP tanks below the floor and above the engine compartment developed a fire in the engine compartment which was unrelated to the CNG system. The fire was hot enough to melt ceramic elements in the engines catalytic converter. However, the PRD on a tank mounted above the engine activated as

intended, and vented that tank and the others in the fuel system without incident (Figure 7). BUS FIRE A bus equipped with GDATP tanks on the roof was engulfed in fire. The PRDs activated and all tanks vented safely (Figure 8). SUMMARY GDATP has been involved in the design and manufacture of filament wound composite structures for nearly 40 years, with extensive experience in aerospace, defense, and commercial applications. GDATP brought this experience and new technology developments into the market with a safe and durable NGV fuel tank which now has 10 years of field experience. The NGV industry has over 50 years experience, and has compiled an excellent safety record. The development of performance based standards for the NGV fuel containers has allowed new technology to be introduced while maintaining safety by reflecting realworld durability requirements. GDATP fuel tanks meet the qualification test requirements of many national and international standards, including FMVSS 304, NGV2, B51 Part 2, and ISO 11439. The result is an excellent safety record for GDATP tanks, with no ruptures in service, even when exposed to severe field incidents. CONTACT INFORMATION Norm Newhouse is Manager of Design Engineering for GDATPs NGV fuel container group. He has been with the company since 1975, and has supported the development of standards for NGV and other products extensively since 1990. He can be reached by phone at (+1) 402 465 6505, or by email at nnewhouse@gdatp.com. REFERENCES [1] International Association for Natural Gas Vehicles website, Latest International NGV Statistics, July 2002. [2] Dale B. Tiller, Norman L. Newhouse, and Ronald B. Veys, Design and Qualification of an All-Composite Natural Gas Vehicle Fuel Cylinder, 7th Annual ASM/ESD Advanced Composites Conference, Detroit, Michigan, September 30-October 3, 1991. [3] Norman L. Newhouse and Dale B. Tiller, Development of All-Composite NGV Fuel Containers, paper presented at the NGV98 International Conference and Exhibition for Natural Gas Vehicles sponsored by the International Association for Natural Gas Vehicles and the European Natural Gas Vehicle Coalition in Cologne, Germany, May 1998. [4] Norman L. Newhouse, Douglas B. Johnson, and Donald D. Baldwin, Design and Qualification of Advanced Composites for Marine Applications, paper OTC 8568 presented at the 1997 Offshore Technology Conference, Houston, Texas, 5-8 May 1997.

[5] Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, 49 CFR Part 571.304 (FMVSS 304), Compressed Natural Gas Fuel Container Integrity, U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. [6] Basic Requirements for Compressed Natural Gas Vehicle (NGV) Fuel Containers, ANSI/CSA NGV2-2000, CSA International, 8501 East Pleasant Valley Road, Cleveland, OH 44131. [7] High Pressure Cylinders for the On-Board Storage of Natural Gas as a Fuel for Automotive Vehicles, B51 Part 2, Canadian Standards Association, 178 Rexdale Boulevard, Rexdale (Toronto), Ontario, Canada M9W 1R3. [8] Gas Cylinders High pressure cylinders for the on-board storage of natural gas as a fuel for automotive vehicles, ISO 11439, International Organization for Standardization, 1 rue de Varemb, Case postale 56, CH-1211 Genve 20, Switzerland. [9] Pressure Relief Devices for Natural Gas Vehicle (NGV) Fuel Containers, ANSI/IAS PRD1-1998, CSA International, 8501 East Pleasant Valley Road, Cleveland, OH 44131. [10] Fuel System Components for Natural Gas Powered Vehicles, ANSI/AGA NGV3.1-1995, CSA International, 8501 East Pleasant Valley Road, Cleveland, OH 44131. [11] Standard for Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) Vehicular Fuel Systems, NFPA 52, National Fire Protection Association, 1 Batterymarch Park, P.O. Box 9101, Quincy, MA 02269-9101. [12] Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, 49 CFR Part 571.303 (FMVSS 303), Fuel System Integrity of Compressed Natural Gas Vehicles, U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. [13] Norman L. Newhouse and William E. Glaesemann, Testing of NGV Fuel Containers in Corrosive Environments, NGV96 Conference & Exposition, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 30 September 4 October 1996. [14] Methods for Visual Inspection of Natural Gas Vehicle (NGV) Fuel Containers and Their Installations, CGA C-6.4, Compressed Gas Association, 4221 Walney Road, 5th Floor, Chantilly, VA 20151. FIGURES

Figure 1. All-composite fuel tank impacted by bridge (front view)

Figure 2. All-composite fuel tank impacted by bridge (top view)

Figure 3. All-composite fuel tank impacted by curb

Figure 6. Hijacked NGV bus

Figure 4. All-composite fuel tank dropped from vehicle

Figure 7. Bus with fire in engine compartment

Figure 8. NGV Bus with fire damage Figure 5. All-composite tank with embedded debris

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