Академический Документы
Профессиональный Документы
Культура Документы
PEREZ (SALAZAR)
DOCTRINE: Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former's employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers. FACTS Rogelio Corachea was a passenger in a taxicab owned and operated by Pascual Perez when he was stabbed and killed by the driver, Simeon Valenzuela. Valenzuela was prosecuted for homicide and found guilty. During the pendency of the appeal for the criminal case, Antonia Maranan, Rogelio's mother, filed an action CFI of Batangas to recover damages from Perez and Valenzuela for the death of her son. Defendants asserted that the deceased was killed in selfdefense, since he first assaulted the driver by stabbing him from behind. Defendant Perez further claimed that the death was a caso fortuito for which the carrier was not liable. CA found for the plaintiff and awarded her P3,000 as damages against defendant Perez. The claim against defendant Valenzuela was dismissed. Subsequently, the conviction of Valenzuela in the criminal case was affirmed during the pendency of the civil case. Defendant-appellant appealed the decision, relying solely on the ruling enunciated in Gillaco v. Manila Railroad Co., that the carrier is under no absolute liability for assaults of its employees upon the passengers. ISSUE Whether defendant (employer) is liable for assaults of its employees upon the passenger YES RATIO The attendant facts and controlling law of that case and the one at bar are very different however. In the Gillaco case, the passenger was killed outside the scope and the course of duty of the guilty employee. As this Court there found: x x x when the crime took place, the guard Devesa had no duties to discharge in connection with the transportation of the deceased from Calamba to Manila. When Devesa shot and killed Gillaco, Devesa was assigned to guard the Manila-San Fernando (La Union) trains, and he was at Paco Station awaiting transportation to Tutuban, the starting point of the train that he was engaged to guard. In fact, his tour of duty was to Week 2 start at 9:00 two hours after the commission of the crime. Devesa was therefore under no obligation to safeguard the passengers of the Calamba-Manila train, where the deceased was riding; and the killing of Gillaco was not done in line of duty. The position of Devesa at the time was that of another would be passenger, a stranger also awaiting transportation, and not that of an employee assigned to discharge any of the duties that the Railroad had assumed by its contract with the deceased. Here, the killing was perpetrated by the driver of the very cab transporting the passenger, in whose hands the carrier had entrusted the duty of executing the contract of carriage. In other words, unlike the Gillaco case, the killing of the passenger here took place in the course of duty of the guilty employee and when the employee was acting within the scope of his duties. The Gillaco case was decided under the provisions of the Civil Code of 1889 which, unlike the present Civil Code, did not impose upon common carriers absolute liability for the safety of passengers against wilful assaults or negligent acts committed by their employees. The death of the passenger in the Gillaco case was truly a fortuitous event which exempted the carrier from liability. It is true that Art. 1105 of the old Civil Code on fortuitous events has been substantially reproduced in Art. 1174 of the Civil Code of the Philippines but both articles clearly remove from their exempting effect the case where the law expressly provides for liability in spite of the occurrence of force majeure. Unlike the old Civil Code, the new Civil Code of the Philippines expressly makes the common carrier liable for intentional assaults committed by its employees upon its passengers, by the wording of Art. 1759 which categorically states that: Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former's employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers. The Civil Code provisions on the subject of Common Carriers are new and were taken from Anglo-American Law. There, the basis of the carrier's liability for assaults on passengers committed by its drivers rests either on (1) the doctrine of respondeat superior or (2) the principle that it is the carrier's implied duty to transport the passenger safely. Under the first, which is the minority view, the carrier is liable only when the act of the employee is within the scope of his authority and duty. It is not sufficient that the act be within the course of employment only. Under the second view, upheld by the majority and also by the later cases, it is enough that the assault happens within the course of the Page 1
the
RATIO We agree with the trial court that the case involves a breach of contract of transportation for hire, the Medina Transportation having undertaken to carry Bataclan safely to his destination, Pasay City. We also agree with the trial court that there was negligence on the part of the defendant, through his agent, the driver Saylon. There is evidence to show that at the time of the blow out, the bus was speeding, as testified to by one of the passengers, and as shown by the fact that according to the testimony of the witnesses, including that of the defense, from the point where one of the front tires burst up to the canal where the bus overturned after zig-zaging, there was a distance of about 150 meters. The chauffeur, after the blow-out, must have applied the brakes in order to stop the bus, but because of the velocity at which the bus must have been running, its momentum carried it over a distance of 150 meters before it fell into the canal and turned turtle. Our new Civil Code amply provides for the responsibility of common carrier to its passengers and their goods. For purposes of reference, we are reproducing the pertinent codal provisions: ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case. Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed Week 2
Week 2
Week 2
Page 6
44 . Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. IAC DOCTRINE: (1) The principle of "the last clear" chance is applicable in a suit between the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence. (2)In culpa contractual, the moment a passenger dies or is injured, the carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, and this disputable presumption may only be overcome by evidence that he had observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733, 1755 and 1756 of the New Civil Code or that the death or injury of the passenger was due to a fortuitous event. (3) The driver cannot be held jointly and severally liable with the carrier in case of breach of the contract of carriage. Firstly, the contract of carriage is between the carrier and the passenger, and in the event of contractual liability, the carrier is exclusively responsible to the passenger, even if such breach be due to the negligence of his driver. In other words, the carrier can neither shift his liability on the contract to his driver nor share it with him, for his driver's negligence is his. Secondly, that would make the carrier's liability personal instead of merely vicarious and consequently, entitled to recover only the share which corresponds to the driver contradictory to the explicit provision of Article 2181 of the New Civil Code. FACTS: At 11am on December 24, 1966, Catalina Pascua, Caridad Pascua, Adelaida Estomo, Erlinda Meriales, Mercedes Lorenzo, Alejandro Morales and Zenaida Parejas boarded the jeepney owned by spouses Isidro Mangune and Guillerma Carreon and driven by Tranquilino Manalo at Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga bound for Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan to spend Christmas with their families for P 24.00. Upon reaching barrio Sinayoan, San Manuel, Tarlac, the right rear wheel of the jeepney detached causing it to run in an unbalanced position. Week 2
Page 7
Week 2
Page 9
Page 10
After the arrival of the boats at Manila, this order was indorsed by the consignees with a direction for their delivery to the plaintiff. However, upon seeking them under this order, the plaintiff Dela Riva found them in the possession of the sheriff under an attachment in favor of the defendants.
ISSUE Whether Dela Riva could validly contest the attachment made my the sheriff HELD: No, Dela Riva failed to establish his title as against the sheriff under the attachment and must fail in this action. RATIO: Teodoro Carranza built these boats, not as a mandatory, of the plaintiff but on his own account, retaining the ownership of them until their legal transfer. This was not affected by reason of the payments advanced by Gutierrez Hermanos through the unjusted accounts of the parties, nor by the shipment of the boats or the remittance of the bill of lading of Behn, Meyer & Co., who were merely the consignees of the builder and represented him, nor yet by the indorsement of the consignees. Had the bill of lading run to their order, then title would have passed by the indorsement of it, or had it been payable to the bearer, then in that case by the mere delivery of it. (Code of Commerce, art. 708.) By terms, however, the freight was deliverable to the consignees by name and their interest could be transferred only by document purporting to convey the property. Therefore Dela Riva failed to establish his title as against the sheriff under the attachment and must fail in this action.
FACTS Ailmail handed Macondray two cases of sweaters, stockings, and handbags for delivery. Macondray was supposed to load it to S/S Tamesis to be shipped to Hong Kong. The items were consigned to Oriental Silk Store in Hong Kong. Macondray accepted the merchandise and, the freightage having been paid, issued the corresponding bill of lading. However, the Oriental Silk Store did not receive the merchandise nor was it returned to Ailmail. Action was brought against Macondray. The ship captain said that it did not load any cargo at Manila for any other port although it is bound tor Hong Kong. Macondray argues that the issuance of the bill of lading is evidence that the goods were placed on board the ship. ISSUE Whether the cargo was loaded and taken abroad NO RATIO The vessel S/S Tamesis did not load any cargo from the Manila port for Hong Kong. Thus, the goods were not taken abroad which would mean that it was impossible that the goods were delivered to the Hong Kong consignee. The complex processes of modern trade have reduced the bill of lading to nothing more than the contract between the parties and prima facie evidence of the receipt of the merchandise by the carrier or his agent. In the instant case, it is Macondrays own witness who proved that the goods were not taken abroad, and he must be considered concluded by his own evidence.
A bill of lading operates both as a receipt and as a contract. It is a receipt for the goods shipped and a contract to transport and deliver the same as therein stipulated. As a contract, it names the parties, which includes the consignee, fixes the route, destination, and freight rates or charges, and stipulates the rights and obligations assumed by the parties. Being a contract, it is the law between the parties who are bound by its terms and conditions provided that these are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and public policy. A bill of lading usually becomes effective upon its delivery to and acceptance by the shipper. It is presumed that the stipulations of the bill were, in the absence of fraud, concealment or improper conduct, known to the shipper, and he is generally bound by his acceptance whether he reads the bill or not. The claim that there was a mistake in documentation on the part of OOCL and FE Zuellig militates against the conclusiveness of the bill of lading insofar as it reflects the terms of the contract between the parties, as an exception to the parol evidence rule, and would therefore permit it to explain or present evidence to vary or contradict the terms of the written agreement, that is, the bill of lading involved. A shipper who receives a bill of lading without objection after an opportunity to inspect it, and permits the carrier to act on it by proceeding with the shipment is presumed to have accepted it as correctly stating the contract and to have assented to its terms. The acceptance of the bill without dissent raises the presumption that all the terms therein were brought to the knowledge of the shipper and agreed to by him and, in the absence of fraud or mistake, he is estopped from thereafter denying that he assented to such terms. This rule applies with particular force where a shipper accepts a bill of lading with full knowledge of its contents and acceptance under such circumstances makes it a binding contract. Under the parol evidence rule, the terms of a contract are rendered conclusive upon the parties, and evidence aliunde is not admissible to vary or contradict a complete and enforceable agreement embodied in a document, subject to well defined exceptions which do not obtain in this case. The parol evidence rule is based on the consideration that when the parties have reduced their agreement on a particular matter into writing, all their previous and contemporaneous agreements on the matter are merged therein. Accordingly, evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid instrument. The mistake contemplated as an exception to the parol evidence rule is one which is a mistake of fact mutual to the parties. Furthermore, the rules on evidence, as amended, require that in order that parol evidence may be admitted, said mistake must be put in issue by the pleadings, such that if not raised inceptively in the
Week 2
Week 2
(2) Even granting, for the sake of argument, that the subject cargo was already
in a damaged condition at the time it was accepted for transportation, the carrier is not relieved from its responsibility to exercise due care in handling the merchandise and in employing the necessary precautions to prevent the cargo from further deteriorating. It is settled that the extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods tendered for shipment requires the common carrier to know and to follow the required precaution for avoiding damage to, or destruction of the goods entrusted to it for safe carriage and delivery. It requires common carriers to render service with the greatest skill and foresight and to use all reasonable means to ascertain the nature and characteristic of goods tendered for shipment, and to exercise due care in the handling and stowage, including such methods as their nature requires. Under Article 1742 of the Civil Code, even if the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods should be caused, among others, by the character of the goods, the common carrier must exercise due diligence to forestall or lessen the loss. This extraordinary responsibility lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by the carrier for transportation until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them. In the instant case, if the carrier indeed found the steel sheets to have been covered by rust at the time that it accepted the same for transportation, such finding should have prompted it to apply additional safety measures to make sure that the cargo is protected from corrosion. This, the carrier failed to do.
(1) Whether the CA erred in relying on the pro forma Bills of Lading
to establish the condition of the cargo upon loading.
(1) No. The Court found no error in the findings of the appellate court that
the questioned bill of lading is a clean bill of lading, i.e., it does not indicate any defect in the goods covered by it, as shown by the notation, CLEAN ON BOARD and Shipped at the Port of Loading in apparent good condition on board the vessel for carriage to Port of Discharge.
(1) A bill of lading operates both as a receipt and as a contract. It is a receipt for
the goods shipped and a contract to transport and deliver the same as therein stipulated. Petitioner presented evidence to prove that, contrary to the recitals contained in the subject bill of lading, the cargo therein described as clean on board is actually wet and covered with rust. Indeed, having the nature of a receipt, or an acknowledgement of the quantity and condition of the goods delivered, the bill of lading, like any other receipts, may be explained, varied or even contradicted. However, the Court agreed with the CA that far from contradicting the recitals contained in the said bill, Week 2
Page 17
b)
The total number of cases in the two containers was the same, however, to wit, 78 cases. US Lines amended, with the consent of the customs authorities, the Manifest to reflect the actual quantity of the cases in the containers. But, the collector of customs still instituted proceedings against US Lines for alleged violation of the Tariff and Customs Code, and ordered US Lines to pay a fine. US Lines appealed to the commissioner to no avail. CTA also affirmed the decision of the commissioner. ISSUE Whether a carrier of containerized cargo should be liable for a fine upon a clerical error imputable to the Shipper alone and not discoverable by the carrier until after examination by the Customs NO. RATIO Sec. 1124 of Customs Administrative Order No. 8-75 reads as follows: Shipper's 'Load and Count' a container packed with cargo by one shipper where the quantity, description and conditions of the cargo is the sole responsibility of the shipper. Section 1005 of the Tariff and Customs Code: SEC. 1005. Every vessel from a foreign port must have on board a complete manifest of all her cargo. Each manifest shall include the port of departure and the port of delivery with the marks, numbers, quantity and description of the packages and the names of the consignee thereof. A cargo manifest shall in no case be changed or altered after entry of the vessel except by means of an amendment by the master, consignee or agent thereof, under oath, and attached to the original manifest: Provided, however, that after the invoice and/or entry covering an importation have been received and recorded in the office of the Appraiser, no amendment of the Manifest shall be allowed, except when it is obvious that a clerical error or any other discrepancy has been committed in the preparation of the manifest without any fraudulent intent, discovery of which could not have been made until after examination of the importation has been completed.
a)
Container No. USLU-2020984 contained 34 cases of cotton denim instead of 38 cases and
Week 2
Page 18
57. PHIL CHARTER INSURANCE CORPORATION VS UNKNOWN OWNER OF THE VESSEL MV NATIONAL HONOR (DELOS REYES)
DOCTRINE: Common carriers are mandated to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them. It requires the common carrier to know and to follow the required precaution for avoiding damages to or destruction of the goods entrusted to it for sale, carriage and delivery. The duty to observe such diligence lasts from the time the articles are surrendered to or unconditionally placed in the possession of and received by the carrier for transportation until delivered to or until the lapse of a reasonable time for their acceptance but the person entitled to receive them. When damage results, the carrier is presumed negligent and must prove that they exercised extraordinary diligence in order to escape liability. This is subject to certain exceptions such as: (1) storm, flood earthquake lightning or other natural disaster, (2) act of public enemy in war whether international or civil, (3) act or omission of the shipper or owner of goods, (4) the character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers, (5) order or act of competent public authority. FACTS J. Trading Co. Ltd of Seoul Korea loaded a shipment of four (4) units of parts and accessories in the port of Pusan, Korea. It was boarded on the vessel of MV National Honor represented by its agent National Shipping Corporation of the Philippines (NSCP). The shipment was for delivery in Manila Philippines. Freight forwarder, Samhwa Inter-Trans Co issued Bills of Lading in the name of the shipper consigned to the order of MBTC with arrival notice to ultimate consigned Blue Mono International Company Incorporated (BMICI). The Bill of Lading stated that the goods were received by the carrier in apparent good order and conditions and that the shipper warrants that the goods are properly described, marked and secured and packed and may be handled in ordinary course without damage to the goods.
Week 2
Page 19
In the case at bar, the damaged was cause by the defective packaging and container of the cargo. The crate should have three solid and strong wooden battens placed side by side underneath or on the flooring of the crate to support weight of its contents. However, in this case, although there were wooden battens placed side by side, the mid section, which carried substantial weight of the crates contents. Had a knothole or bukong bukong, which affected its strength. The petitioner also failed to rebut the testimony of Dauz that the crates were sealed and that the contents could not be seen from the outside. Thus, it cannot be concluded that the respondents should have known that the middle wooden batten had a hole or that it was not strong enough to bear the weight of the shipment.
Page 20
RATIO The Supreme Court affirmed the assailed Decision with the modification that the legal interest of 6% per annum shall be computed from 28 September 1990 until its full payment before finality of judgment. The rate of interest shall be adjusted to 12% per annum, computed from the time said judgment became final and executory until full satisfaction. The award of attorneys fees is deleted. Keng Huas letter proved refusal to pick up cargo and not rejection of bill of lading; Implied acceptance Keng Hua received the bill of lading immediately after the arrival of the shipment on 8 July 1982.Having been afforded an opportunity to examine the said document, it did not immediately object to or dissent from any term or stipulation therein. It was only six months later, on 24 January 1983, that it sent a letter to private respondent saying that it could not accept the shipment. Its inaction for such a long period conveys the clear inference that it accepted the terms and conditions of the bill of lading. Moreover, said letter spoke only of petitioners inability to use the delivery permit, i.e. to pick up the cargo, due to the shippers failure to comply with the terms and conditions of the letter of credit, for which reason the bill of lading and other shipping documents were returned by the banks to the shipper. The letter merely proved its refusal to pick up the cargo, not its rejection of the bill of lading. Apprehension of violating laws cannot defeat contractual obligation and liability Keng Huas attempt to evade its obligation to receive the shipment on the pretext that this may cause it to violate customs, tariff and central bank laws must fail. Mere apprehension of violating said laws, without a clear demonstration that taking delivery of the shipment has become legally impossible, cannot defeat thepetitioners contractual obligation and liability under the bill of lading. Contract of carriage in bill of lading to be treated independently of contract of sale and thecontract for the issuance of credit
Page 21
62. DSR-SENATOR LINES AND C.F. SHARP COMPANY INC. V. FEDERAL PHOENIX ASSURANCE CO. INC. (IBARRA)
FACTS: DSR-Senator Lines is a foreign shipping company. It has a general ship agent in the Philippines C.F. Sharp Company Inc. Berde Plants Inc. delivered artificial trees to C.F. Sharp, which will be shipped to the Khor Fakkan Port. From there, DSR-Senator Lines will pick up the artificial trees and deliver the same to Saudi Arabia to the consignee of Berde Plants Inc., Al-Mohr International Group. Federal Phoenix Assurance Company Inc. insured the cargo against all risks for P941,000 plus. The vessel carrying the cargo was gutted by fire and sank. All of its cargo were burned. DSR-Senator Lines informed Berde Plants Inc. The latter claimed against Federal Phoenix. Federal Phoenix paid the full amount insured while Berde Plants Inc. issued a subrogation receipt to allow Federal Phoenix Assurance Company to claim against the carrier of the cargo. C.F. Sharp denied liability. Federal
Page 23
63. SEA LAND SERVICE, INC. VS. IAC AND CUE (INOTURAN) OR (GUTIERREZ)? BOTH MADE (INOTURAN)
FACTS: On 8 January 1981, Sea-Land Service, Inc., a foreign shipping and forwarding company licensed to do business in the Philippines, received from Seaborne Trading Company in Oakland, California a shipment consigned to Sen Hiap Hing, the business name used by Paulino Cue in the wholesale and retail trade which he operated out of an establishment located on Borromeo and Plaridel Streets, Cebu City. The shipper not having declared the value of the shipment, no value was indicated in the bill of lading. Based on volume measurements Sea-land charged the shipper the total amount of US$209.28 for freightage and other charges. The shipment was loaded on board the MS Patriot, a vessel owned and operated by Sea-Land, for discharge at the Port of Cebu. The shipment arrived in Manila and there discharged into the custody of the arrastre contractor and the customs and port authorities. Sometime, after the shipment had been transferred, along with other cargoes awaiting trans-shipment to Cebu, it was stolen by pilferers and has never been recovered. Paulino Cue, the consignee, made formal claim upon Sea-Land for the valueof the lost shipment allegedly amounting to P179,643.48. Sea-Land offered to settle for P30,600.00 asserting that said amount represented its maximum liability for the Page 24
Week 2
(GUTIERREZ)
DOCTRINE: A stipulation that the common carrier's liability is limited to the value of the goods appearing in the bill of lading, unless the shipper or owner declares a greater value, is binding. A contract fixing the sum that may be recovered by the owner or shipper for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods is valid, if it is reasonable and just under the circumstances, and has been fairly and freely agreed upon FACTS On or about January 8, 1981, Sea-Land Service, Inc. (Sea-Land), a foreign shipping and forwarding company licensed to do business in the Philippines, received from Seaborne Trading Company in Oakland, California, a shipment consisted of eight (8) cartons or packages, which was consigned to Sen Hiap Hing (business name used by Paulino Cue in the wholesale and retail trade located in Cebu City). Seaborne Trading Company, shipper, not declared the value of the shipment, thus, no value was indicated in the bill of lading. The bill described the shipment only as "8 CTNS on 2 SKIDS-FILES. Based on volume measurements Sea-land charged the shipper for freightage and other charges. Bill of lading limits to a fixed amount of US$500.00 per package the liability of the carrier for loss or damage to the cargo. The shipment was loaded on board the MS Patriot, a vessel owned and operated by Sea-Land, for discharge at the Port of Cebu. The shipment arrived in Manila on February 12, 1981, and there discharged in Container No. 310996 into the custody of the arrastre contractor and the customs and port authorities. Sometime between February 13 and 16, 1981, after the Page 25
Week 2
Page 27
Page 28
On appeal, one of petitioners claims is that under the Warsaw Convention, its liability if any, cannot exceed U.S. $20.00 based on weight as plaintiff did not declare the contents of her baggage nor pay additional charges before the flight. ISSUE Whether the Warsaw Convetions provisions on limited liability are applicable to the instant case. RATIO There is no absolute obligation on the part of a carrier to accept a cargo. Where a common carrier accepts a cargo for shipment for valuable consideration, it takes the risk of delivering it in good condition as when it was loaded. And if the fact of improper packing is known to the carrier or its personnel, or apparent upon observation but it accepts the goods notwithstanding such condition, it is not relieved of liability for loss or injury resulting therefrom. The acceptance in due course by PAL of private respondents cargo as packed and its advice against the need for declaration of its actual value operated as an assurance to private respondent that in fact there was no need for such a declaration. Petitioner can hardly be faulted for relying on the representations of PALs own personnel. In other words, private respondent Mejia could and would have complied with the conditions stated in the air waybill, i.e., declaration of a higher value and payment of supplemental transportation charges, entitling her to recovery of damages beyond the stipulated limit of US$20 per kilogram of cargo in the event of loss or damage, had she not been effectively prevented from doing so upon the advice of PALs personnel for reasons best known to themselves. Petitioner, therefore, is estopped from blaming private respondent for not declaring the value of the cargo shipped and which would have otherwise entitled her to recover a higher amount of damages. We likewise uphold the lower courts finding that private respondent complied with the requirement for the immediate filing of a formal claim for damages as required in the air waybill or, at least, we find that there was substantial compliance therewith. All told, therefore, respondent appellate court did not err in ruling that the provision on limited liability is not applicable in this case. We, however, note in passing that while the facts and circumstances of this case do not call for the direct application of the provisions of the Warsaw Convention, it should be stressed that, indeed, recognition of the Warsaw Convention does not preclude the operation of the Civil Code and other pertinent laws in the determination of the extent of liability of the common carrier.
Page 29
68. PHILIPPINE AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY INSURANCE CO., INC. VS. CA AND TRANSPACIFIC (MANGAHAS)
FACTS Davao Union shipped on board the vessel M/V "Crazy Horse" operated by the Transpacific Towage, Inc. cargo consisting of 9,750 sheets of union brand GI sheets and 86,860 bags of cement. The cargo was consigned to the Bicol Union Center with a certain Pedro Olivan as the "Notify-Party." The cargo was insured by the Philamgen Insurance Co. The vessel arrived as scheduled at the port of Pasacao, Camarines Sur. Upon arrival the shipmaster notified the consignee's "Notify-Party" that the vessel was ready to discharge the cargo. The discharging of the cargo had to be suspended due to the heavy downpour, strong winds, and turbulent sea brought by typhoon Saling. According to the shipmaster plotting the typhoon's path in a chart, the radius was so wide that there was no way the typhoon could be evaded. The shipmaster had no choice but to order the ship to be abandoned. The cargocarrying vessel was wrecked and partially sank due to typhoon "Saling". A the time said vessel sank, the remaining undischarged cargo, consisting of 26,424 cement bags and 4,000 pieces of G.I. sheets, were still on board the vessel. As a result of the incident the cargo of cement was damaged while the GI sheets were looted and nothing was left of the undischarged pieces. Insurer Philamgen paid the shipper Davao Union. Thereafter, the said insurer made demands upon the Transpacific for the payment of said amount as subrogee of the insured, claiming that the loss of the cargo was directly and exclusively brought about by the fault and negligence of the shipmaster and the crew of M/V "Crazy Horse". Because the latter refused to pay the amount demanded, the Philamgen filed a complaint against Transpacific.
RATIO Transpacific is exempt from liability for the loss of the cargo, pursuant to Article 1740 of the Civil Code and because the shipmaster exercised diligence required pursuant to Article 1739 of the Civil Code. It was undisputed that the carrier was a common carrier and that typhoon Saling was a fortuitous event. The Court of Appeals summarized the reasons which adversely affected the completion of the unloading of the cargo from the time the vessel arrived at the Pasacao area on 7 September 1985, namely: first, the buoys were installed only on 11 September 1985; second, the consignee secured the discharge permit only on 13 September 1985; third, a wooden catwalk had to be installed and the extension of the wharf had to be made, which was completed only on 16 September 1985; fourth, there were intermittent rains and the stevedores supplied by the consignee did not work during the town fiesta of the Virgin of Penafrancia, hence, the unloading was not continuous. The Court agreed with the above-mentioned factual findings of the appellate court as to the natural conditions of the port of Pasacao were the vessel was docked, and several other factors which harshly affected the completion of the discharge of the cargo, as these findings of fact are substantially supported by evidence. While it is true that there was indeed delay in discharging the cargo from the vessel, the Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that neither of the parties herein could be faulted for such delay, for the same (delay) was due not to negligence, but to several factors earlier discussed. The cargo having been lost due to typhoon "Saling", and the delay incurred in its unloading not being due to negligence, Transpacific is exempt from liability for the loss of the cargo, pursuant to Article 1740 of the Civil Code. Page 30
Week 2
The records also show that before, during and after the occurrence of typhoon "Saling", private respondent through its shipmaster exercised due negligence to prevent or minimize the loss of the cargo, as shown by the following facts: (1) at 5:20 a.m. of 18 October 1985, as typhoon "Saling" continued to batter the Pasacao area, the shipmaster tried to maneuver the vessel amidst strong winds and rough seas; (2) when water started to enter the engine room and later the engine broke down, the shipmaster ordered the ship to be abandoned, but he sought police assistance to prevent pilferage of the vessel and its cargo; (3) after the vessel broke into two (2) parts and sank partially, the shipmaster reported th eincident to the Philippine Coast Guard, but unfortunately, despite the presence of three (3) coast guards, nothing could be done to stop the pilferage as almost the entire barrio folk came to loot the vessel and its cargo, including the G.I. sheets. The diligence exercised by the shipmaster further supports the exemption of private respondent from liability for the loss of the cargo, in accordance with Article 1739 of the Civil Code.
69. PHOENIX ASSURANCE CO., LTD VS. UNITED STATES LINES (MANLICLIC)
DOCTRINE: A bill of lading operates both as a receipt and as a contract. It is a receipt for the goods shipped and a contract to transport and deliver the same as therein stipulated. FACTS General Motors shipped and consigned on a CIF basis destined to Davao Parts and Service, Inc. at Davao City from New York aboard the United States Lines' vessel SS "Pioneer Moor" a cargo of truck spare parts in 25 cases and 4 crates (2 pieces unboxed), for which United States Lines issued a short form bill of lading and which shipment was insured against loss and damage with Phoenix Assurance Co., Ltd. The short form bill of lading indicated Manila as the port of discharge and Davao City as the place where the goods were to be transshipped, and expressly incorporated by reference the provisions contained in the carrier's regular long form bill of lading. On July 28, 1962, the SS "Pioneer Moor" discharged the cargo at Manila to the custody of the Manila Port Service (the arrastre service at the Port of Manila). Said cargo was complete but with the exception of two crates valued at 1.4k.
Week 2
No reply having been received by it from the United States Lines, the Phoenix Assurance Co., Ltd. on July 29, 1963 filed a suit praying that judgment be rendered against US Lines for the sum of P552. ISSUE Whether US Lines is liable for the 2 crates that was lost in the custody of the Manila Port Service? -NO
RATIO A bill of lading operates both as a receipt and as a contract. It is a receipt for the goods shipped and a contract to transport and deliver the same as therein stipulated. As a receipt, it recites the date and place of shipment, describes the goods as to quantity, weight, dimensions, identification marks and condition, quality, and value. As a contract, it names the contracting parties, which include the consignee, fixes the route, destination, and weight rate or charges, and stipulates the rights and obligations assumed by the parties. The crates were lost while in the possession and custody of the Manila Port Service. Since the long form of Bill of Lading provides that The carrier shall not be liable in any capacity whatsoever for any loss or damage to the goods while the goods are NOT in its actual custody, US Lines cannot be held responsible for the loss of said crates. It is hardly fair to make US Lines accountable for a loss not due to its acts or omissions or over which it had no control. US Lines did not undertake to carry and deliver safely the cargo to the consignee in Davao City. The short form Bill of Lading states in no uncertain terms that the port of discharge of the cargo is Manila, but that the same was to be transshipped beyond the port of discharge to Davao City. Pursuant to the terms of the long form Bill of Lading, US Lines responsibility as a common carrier ceased the moment the goods were unloaded in Manila; and in the matter of transshipment, US Lines acted merely as an agent of the shipper and consignee. Further, the cargo was not transshipped with the use of transportation used or operated by US Lines. Although the vessel used for transshipment is owned and operated by US Lines Davao agent, Columbian Rope, but there is no proof that said vessel is owned or operated by US Lines. The filing of a claim by US Lines with the Manila Port Service for the value of the losses cannot be considered as an indication that it is answerable for cargo losses Week 2 Page 32
Week 2
Page 33