http://impunemex.wordpress.

com/2012/06/15/ideologia-un-mapade-la-cuestion-zizek-2/ Ideologa: un mapa de la cuestin (Zizek) Filed under: Chorizo con Huevo by Ttua Nia Deja un comentario junio 15, 2012 Artculo del controvertido filsofo esloveno Slavo Zizek, autor de porque no saben lo que hacen Ideologa: el anlisis espectral de un concepto En todos estos anlisis ad hoc, sin embargo, ya hemos ejercido la crtica de la ideologa, mientras que nuestra pregunta inicial concerna al concepto de ideologa presupuesto en este ejercicio. Hasta ahora, nos hemos guiado por una precomprensin espontnea que, aunque nos llev a resultados contradictorios, no debe ser subestimada sino, por el contrario, desarrollada. Por ejemplo, implcitamente parecera que, de algn modo, sabemos lo que ya no es ideologa: mientras la Escuela de Francfort acept la crtica de la economa poltica como su base, permaneci dentro de las coordenadas de la crtica de la ideologa. En cambio, la nocin de razn instrumental ya no pertenece al horizonte de la crtica de la ideologa: la razn instrumental designa una actitud que no es simplemente funcional en relacin con la dominacin social sino, ms bien, acta como el fundamento mismo de la relacin de dominacin. [1] Una ideologa, entonces, no es necesariamente falsa: en cuanto a su contenido positivo, puede ser cierta, bastante precisa, puesto que lo que realmente importa no es el contenido afirmado como tal, sino el modo como este contenido se relaciona con la posicin subjetiva supuesta por su propio proceso de enunciacin. Estamos dentro del espacio ideolgico en sentido estricto desde el momento en que este contenido verdadero o falso (si es verdadero, mucho mejor para el efecto ideolgico)- es funcional respecto de alguna relacin de dominacin social (poder, explotacin) de un modo no transparente: la lgica misma de la legitimacin de la relacin de dominacin debe permanecer oculta para ser efectiva. En otras palabras, el punto de partida de la

crtica de la ideologa debe ser el reconocimiento pleno del hecho de que es muy fcil mentir con el ropaje de la verdad. Cuando, por ejemplo, una potencia occidental interviene en un pas del Tercer Mundo porque se conocen en ste violaciones de los derechos humanos, puede ser cierto que en este pas no se respetaron los derechos humanos ms elementales y que la intervencin occidental puede ser eficaz en mejorar la situacin de los derechos humanos, y sin embargo, esa legitimacin sigue siendo ideolgica en la medida en que no menciona los verdaderos motivos de la intervencin (intereses econmicos, etc.). La forma ms notable de mentir con el ropaje de la verdad hoy es el cinismo: con una franqueza cautivadora, uno admite todo sin que este pleno reconocimiento de nuestros intereses de poder nos impida en absoluto continuar detrs de estos intereses. La frmula del cinismo ya no es la marxiana clsica ellos no lo saben, pero lo estn haciendo; es, en cambio, ellos saben muy bien lo que estn haciendo, y lo hacen de todos modos. Pero entonces, cmo podemos desarrollar nuestra precomprensin implcita? Cmo pasamos de la doxa a la verdad? El primer abordaje que se ofrece es, por supuesto, la transposicin histrico-dialctica hegeliana del problema en su propia solucin: en lugar de evaluar directamente la adecuacin o la verdad de las diferentes nociones de ideologa, uno debera leer esta multiplicidad misma de determinaciones de la ideologa como una seal de diferentes situaciones histricas concretas; es decir, uno debera considerar lo que Althusser, en su fase autocrtica, llamaba la topicalidad del pensamiento, la manera en que un pensamiento se inscribe en su objeto; o, como lo habra expresado Derrida, la manera en que el marco mismo es parte del contenido enmarcado. Cuando, por ejemplo, el leninismo-estalinismo adopt sbitamente el trmino ideologa proletaria a fines de la dcada de 1920, con el fin de designar no la distorsin de la conciencia proletaria bajo la presin de la ideologa burguesa, sino la propia fuerza subjetiva impulsora de la actividad revolucionaria del proletariado, este

desplazamiento en la nocin de ideologa era estrictamente correlativo de la reinterpretacin del propio marxismo como una ciencia objetiva imparcial, como una ciencia que no contiene en s misma la posicin subjetiva proletaria: el marxismo primero, desde la distancia neutral del metalenguaje, se cerciora de la tendencia objetiva de la historia hacia el comunismo; luego, elabora la ideologa proletaria para inducir a la clase obrera a cumplir su misin histrica. Otro ejemplo de tal desplazamiento es el ya mencionado pasaje del marxismo occidental desde la crtica de la economa poltica hacia la crtica de la razn instrumental: desde Historia y conciencia de clase de Lukcs y la primera Escuela de Francfort, en la que la distorsin ideolgica se deriva de la forma de la mercanca, hasta la nocin de razn instrumental, que ya no se basa en una realidad social concreta sino que, en cambio, es concebida como una especie de constante primordial antropolgica, incluso cuasi trascendental, que nos permite explicar la realidad social de la dominacin y la explotacin. Este pasaje est enmarcado por la transicin desde el universo de la primera posguerra, en el que la esperanza en el resultado revolucionario de la crisis del capitalismo todava estaba viva, hacia el doble trauma de fines de la dcada de 1930 y la dcada de 1940: la regresin de las sociedades capitalistas hacia el fascismo y el giro totalitario del movimiento comunista. [2] Sin embargo, un abordaje como se, aunque adecuado en su propio nivel, puede hacernos caer fcilmente en la trampa del relativismo historicista que suspende el valor cognitivo inherente del trmino ideologa y lo transforma en una mera expresin de las circunstancias sociales. Por esa razn, parece preferible comenzar con un abordaje diferente, sincrnico. En relacin con la religin (que, para Marx, era la ideologa por excelencia), Hegel distingua tres momentos: la doctrina, la creencia y el ritual; resulta tentador disponer la multitud de nociones asociadas al trmino ideologa alrededor de estos tres ejes: la ideologa como complejo de ideas (teoras, convicciones, creencias,

procedimientos argumentativos); la ideologa en su apariencia externa, es decir, la materialidad de la ideologa, los Aparatos Ideolgicos de Estado (AIE); y, finalmente, el terreno ms elusivo, la ideologa espontnea que opera en el centro de la realidad social en s (es altamente cuestionable si el trmino ideologa es en alguna medida apropiado para designar este terreno: un buen ejemplo de esto es el hecho de que, en relacin con el fetichismo de la mercanca, Marx nunca haya utilizado el trmino ideologa). [3] Recordemos el caso del liberalismo: el liberalismo es una doctrina (desarrollada desde Locke hasta Hayek) materializada en rituales y aparatos (la prensa libre, las elecciones, el mercado, etc.) y activa en la experiencia espontnea (de s mismos) que los sujetos tienen como individuos libres. El orden de las contribuciones de esta compilacin sigue esta lnea que, grosso modo, se adecua a la trada hegeliana en s-para s-en y para s. [4] Esta reconstruccin lgiconarrativa de la nocin de ideologa se centrar en el acontecimiento repetido de la transformacin de la no ideologa en ideologa: es decir, de la conciencia sbita de cmo el gesto mismo de apartarse de la ideologa nos arrastra nuevamente a su interior. Entonces, para comenzar, tenemos a la ideologa en s: la nocin inmanente de la ideologa como una doctrina, un conjunto de ideas, creencias, conceptos y dems, destinado a convencernos de su verdad, y sin embargo al servicio de algn inters de poder inconfeso. El modo de la crtica de la ideologa que corresponde a esta nocin es el de lectura de sntomas: el objetivo de la crtica es descubrir la tendencia no confesada del texto oficial a travs de sus rupturas, sus espacios en blanco y sus deslices; descubrir en igualdad y libertad la igualdad y la libertad de los participantes del intercambio en el mercado que, por supuesto, privilegia al dueo de los medios de produccin, y as sucesivamente. Habermas, quizs el ltimo gran representante de esta tradicin, mide la distorsin y/o falsedad de una estructura ideolgica con el criterio de la argumentacin racional no coercitiva, una suerte de ideal regulador que, de acuerdo

con l, es inherente al orden simblico como tal. La ideologa es una comunicacin distorsionada sistemticamente: un texto cuyo significado pblico oficial, bajo la influencia de intereses sociales (de dominacin, etc.) inconfesos, est abruptamente separado de su intencin real, es decir, un texto en el que nos enfrentamos a una tensin, sobre la que no se reflexiona, entre el contenido del texto explcitamente enunciado y sus presuposiciones pragmticas. [5] Hoy, sin embargo, la tendencia probablemente ms prestigiosa en la crtica de la ideologa, la que surgi del anlisis del discurso, invierte esta relacin: lo que la tradicin del Iluminismo descarta como una mera perturbacin de la comunicacin normal resulta ser su condicin positiva. El espacio intersubjetivo concreto de la comunicacin simblica est siempre estructurado por diversos dispositivos textuales (inconscientes) que no pueden reducirse a una retrica secundaria. Aqu no nos enfrentamos con un movimiento complementario del Iluminismo tradicional o del abordaje habermasiano, sino con su inversin inherente: lo que Habermas percibe como el apartamiento de la ideologa es denunciado aqu como ideologa por excelencia. En la tradicin iluminista, la ideologa representa la nocin velada (falsa) de la realidad surgida de diversos intereses patolgicos (el miedo a la muerte y a las fuerzas naturales, los intereses de poder, etc.); para el anlisis del discurso, la nocin misma de un acceso a la realidad sin el sesgo de dispositivos discursivos o conjunciones con el poder es ideolgica. El grado cero de la ideologa consiste en percibir (errneamente) una formacin discursiva como un hecho extradiscursivo. Ya en la dcada de 1950, en Mitologas, Roland Barthes propuso la nocin de ideologa como naturalizacin del orden simblico; esto es, como la percepcin que reifica los resultados de los procedimientos discursivos en propiedades de la cosa en s. La nocin de Paul de Man de la resistencia a la teora (deconstructivista) corre por los mismos carriles: la deconstruccin se encontr con esa

resistencia porque desnaturaliza el contenido enunciado al sacar a la luz los procedimientos discursivos que engendran la evidencia del Sentido. Se puede argumentar que la versin ms elaborada de este abordaje es la teora de la argumentacin de Oswald Ducrot; aunque no emplea el trmino ideologa, su potencial ideolgico-crtico es enorme. [6] La nocin bsica de Ducrot es que no se puede trazar una clara lnea de separacin entre los niveles descriptivo y argumentativo del lenguaje: no existe el contenido descriptivo neutral; toda descripcin (designacin) ya es un momento de algn esquema argumentativo; los predicados descriptivos mismos son, en definitiva, gestos argumentativos reificados/naturalizados. Esta arremetida argumentativa descansa en los topoi, en los lugares comunes que operan slo como naturalizados nicamente en la medida en que los aplicamos de un modo automtico, inconsciente; una argumentacin exitosa presupone la invisibilidad de los mecanismos que regulan su eficacia. Aqu tambin deberamos mencionar a Michel Pcheux, quien le imprimi un giro lingstico estricto a la teora althusseriana de la interpelacin. Su obra se centra en los mecanismos discursivos que generan la evidencia del Sentido. Es decir, una de las estratagemas fundamentales de la ideologa es la referencia a alguna certeza manifiesta: Mira, puedes ver por ti mismo cmo son las cosas!. Dejemos que los hechos hablen por s mismos es quizs el archienunciado de la ideologa: la cuestin es, precisamente, que los hechos nunca hablan por s mismos, sino que una red de dispositivos discursivos los hace hablar. Basta recordar la conocida pelcula antiabortista The Silent Scream (El grito silencioso): all vemos a un feto que se defiende, que grita, etc.; y, sin embargo, lo que no vemos en este acto mismo de ver es que vemos todo esto contra el fondo de un espacio preconstruido discursivamente. La mayor fortaleza del anlisis del discurso reside, quiz, precisamente en la respuesta a esta pregunta: cuando un ingls racista dice Hay demasiados paquistanes en nuestras calles!, cmo desde qu lugar- ve esto? Es decir, qu hay en la

estructuracin de su espacio simblico que lo haga percibir como un exceso perturbador el hecho de que un paquistan camine por una calle de Londres? En otras palabras, aqu debemos tener presente el lema de Lacan de que nada falta en lo real: toda percepcin de una falta o un exceso (demasiado poco de esto, demasiado de aqullo) siempre supone un universo simblico. [7] Mencionemos, finalmente, a Ernesto Laclau y su abordaje innovador del fascismo y el populismo, cuyo resultado terico principal es que el significado no es inherente a los elementos de una ideologa como tal, sino que estos elementos funcionan, ms bien, como significantes flotantes cuyo significado es fijado por el modo de su articulacin hegemnica. [8] La ecologa, por ejemplo, no es nunca la ecologa como tal; siempre est incluida en una cadena especfica de equivalencias: puede ser conservadora (cuando aboga por el retorno a las comunidades rurales equilibradas y a modos tradicionales de vida), estatista (slo una fuerte regulacin del Estado nos salvar de la catstrofe que se cierne sobre nosotros), socialista (la causa ltima de los problemas ecolgicos reside en la explotacin capitalista de los recursos naturales, orientada hacia el lucro), capitalista liberal (deberamos incluir en el precio del producto el dao provocado contra el ambiente, y dejar as que el mercado regule el equilibrio ecolgico), feminista (la explotacin de la naturaleza se deriva de la actitud masculina de dominacin), anarquista autogestiva (la humanidad podr sobrevivir slo si se reorganiza en pequeas comunidades autosuficientes que vivan en equilibrio con la naturaleza), y as sucesivamente. La cuestin, por supuesto, es que ninguna de estas cadenas de equivalencias es, en s misma, verdadera, ninguna est inscrita en la naturaleza misma de la problemtica ecolgica: cul de los discursos logre apropiarse de la ecologa depender de la lucha por la hegemona discursiva, cuyo resultado no est garantizado por ninguna necesidad subyacente o alianza natural. La otra consecuencia inevitable de la nocin de articulacin hegemnica es que ya sea estatista, conservadora, socialista,

etc., la inscripcin de la ecologa no designa una connotacin secundaria que complemente su significado literal primario; como lo habra formulado Derrida, este complemento (re)define retroactivamente la naturaleza misma de la identidad literal: 12 una cadena conservadora, por ejemplo, arroja luz especficamente sobre la problemtica ecolgica en s (debido a su falsa arrogancia, el hombre abandon sus races en el orden natural, etc.). 2. Lo que sigue es el paso del en s al para s, a la ideologa en su exteriorizacin/otredad: el momento sintetizado por la nocin althusseriana de AIE que designa la existencia material de la ideologa en prcticas ideolgicas, rituales e instituciones. [9] La creencia religiosa, por ejemplo, no es meramente -ni siquiera principalmente- una conviccin interna, pero la Iglesia como institucin y sus rituales (la oracin, el bautismo, la confirmacin, la confesin) lejos de ser una mera exteriorizacin secundaria de la creencia interna, corresponden a los mecanismos mismos que la generan. Cuando Althusser repite, citando a Pascal, acta como si creyeras, ora, arrodllate, y creers, la fe vendr por s sola, delinea un mecanismo reflexivo intrincado de fundamentacin autopoitica retroactiva que excede de lejos la afirmacin reduccionista de que la creencia interna depende de la conducta externa. Es decir, la lgica implcita de su argumento es la siguiente: arrodllate y creers que te arrodillaste a causa de tu creencia; o sea, respetar el ritual es una expresin/efecto de tu creencia interna; en resumen, el ritual externo genera performativamente su propio fundamento ideolgico. [10] Aqu volvemos a encontrar la regresin hacia la ideologa en el momento mismo en que nos hemos alejado aparentemente de ella. Con respecto a este punto, la relacin entre Althusser y Foucault presenta un inters especial. Los equivalentes foucaultianos de los AIE son los procedimientos disciplinarios que operan en el nivel del micropoder y designan el punto en el que el poder se inscribe directamente en el cuerpo, pasando por alto la ideologa: por esa precisa razn, Foucault nunca utiliza el trmino ideologa para

referirse a estos mecanismos de micropoder. Este abandono de la problemtica de la ideologa produce una debilidad fatal en la teora de Foucault. Foucault nunca se cansa de repetir cmo el poder se constituye a s mismo desde abajo, cmo no emana de una nica cspide: esta apariencia misma de una Cspide (el Monarca u otra encarnacin de la Soberana) emerge como el efecto secundario de la pluralidad de microprcticas, de la compleja red de sus interrelaciones. Sin embargo, cuando se ve obligado a exponer el mecanismo concreto de esta emergencia, Foucault recurre a la muy sospechosa retrica de la complejidad, evocando la intrincada red de vnculos laterales, izquierda y derecha, arriba y abajo Est claro que Foucault est tratando de tapar agujeros, ya que nunca se puede llegar al Poder de esta manera; el abismo que separa los microprocedimientos del espectro del Poder no puede ser franqueado. La ventaja de Althusser sobre Foucault parece evidente; Althusser avanza exactamente en la direccin contraria: desde el principio, concibe estos microprocedimientos como parte de los AIE; es decir, como mecanismos que, para ser operativos, para apropiarse del individuo, suponen siempre-ya la presencia masiva del Estado, la relacin transferencial del individuo con el poder del Estado, o -en trminos de Althusser- con el gran Otro ideolgico en el que se origina la interpelacin. Este desplazamiento althusseriano del nfasis de la ideologa en s a su existencia material en los AIE mostr su fecundidad en un nuevo abordaje del fascismo: la crtica que Wolfgang Fritz Haug le hace a Adorno es un buen ejemplo de esto. Adorno se niega a tratar el fascismo como una ideologa en el sentido propio del trmino, esto es, como legitimacin racional del orden existente. La llamada ideologa fascista ya no posee la coherencia de una construccin racional que requiere el anlisis conceptual y la refutacin ideolgico-crtica; es decir, ya no funciona como una mentira experimentada necesariamente como la verdad (el signo de reconocimiento de una verdadera ideologa). La ideologa fascista no es tomada en serio siquiera por sus promotores; su estatuto es puramente instrumental, y en

definitiva, depende de la coercin externa. [11] En su respuesta a Adorno, sin embargo, Haug demuestra en forma triunfal cmo esta capitulacin ante la primaca de la doctrina, lejos de implicar el fin de la ideologa, afirma el gesto fundador de lo ideolgico como tal: el llamado a la subordinacin incondicional y al sacrificio irracional. [12] Lo que la crtica liberal percibe (errneamente) como la debilidad del fascismo es el recurso mismo de su fortaleza: dentro del horizonte fascista, incluso el reclamo de una argumentacin racional que proporcionara las bases para nuestra aceptacin de la autoridad es denunciado de antemano como una seal de degeneracin liberal del verdadero espritu de sacrificio tico; como lo formula Haug, al hojear los textos de Mussolini, no se puede evitar el extrao sentimiento de que Mussolini haba ledo a Althusser! La denuncia directa de la nocin fascista de la comunidad del pueblo [Volksgemeinschaft] como un seuelo engaoso que oculta la realidad de la dominacin y la explotacin no tiene en cuenta el hecho crucial de que esta Volksgemeinschaft se materializaba en una serie de rituales y prcticas (no slo concentraciones y desfiles masivos, sino tambin campaas de gran escala para ayudar a los hambrientos, deportes organizados y actividades culturales para los trabajadores, etc.) que produjeron performativamente el efecto de Volksgemeinschaft. [13] 3. En el paso siguiente de nuestra reconstruccin, esta exteriorizacin parece reflejarse sobre s misma: lo que se produce es la desintegracin, la autolimitacin y la autodispersin de la nocin de ideologa. La ideologa ya no se concibe como un mecanismo homogneo que garantiza la reproduccin social, como el cemento de la sociedad; se transforma en una familia wittgensteiniana de procedimientos heterogneos y relacionados vagamente unos con otros cuyo alcance es estrictamente localizado. En esta lnea, los crticos de la llamada Tesis de la Ideologa Dominante (TID) intentan demostrar que una ideologa o bien ejerce una influencia crucial pero restringida a algn estrato social limitado, o bien su papel en la reproduccin

social es marginal. En los inicios del capitalismo, por ejemplo, el papel de la tica protestante del trabajo duro como un fin en s mismo y dems se limitaba al estrato de los capitalistas emergentes, mientras que los trabajadores y los campesinos, as como las clases altas, continuaban obedeciendo a otras actitudes ticas, ms tradicionales, de modo que de ninguna manera se le puede atribuir a la tica protestante la funcin de cemento de toda la estructura social. Hoy, en el capitalismo tardo, cuando la expansin de los nuevos medios masivos, en principio al menos, permite que la ideologa penetre eficazmente en cada poro del cuerpo social, el peso de la ideologa como tal ha disminuido: los individuos no actan como lo hacen a causa fundamentalmente de sus creencias o convicciones ideolgicas; es decir, el sistema, en su mayor parte, prescinde de la ideologa para su reproduccin y se sostiene, en cambio, en la coercin econmica, las regulaciones legales y estatales, y otros mecanismos. [14] Aqu, sin embargo, las cosas vuelven a confundirse, porque en el momento en que miramos ms de cerca estos mecanismos supuestamente extraideolgicos que regulan la reproduccin social, nos encontramos hundidos hasta las rodillas en ese oscuro terreno que mencionamos, en el que la realidad es indistinguible de la ideologa. Lo que encontramos aqu, entonces, es el tercer trastrocamiento de no ideologa en ideologa: de repente, tomamos conciencia de un para s de la ideologa que opera en el propio en s de la realidad extraideolgica. En primer lugar, los mecanismos de coercin econmica y regulacin legal siempre materializan algunas proposiciones o creencias que son inherentemente ideolgicas (la ley penal, por ejemplo, supone una creencia en la responsabilidad personal del individuo o la conviccin de que los delitos son un producto de las circunstancias sociales). En segundo lugar, la forma de conciencia que se adecua a la sociedad postideolgica capitalista tarda -la actitud sobria, cnica, que aboga por la apertura liberal en cuestin de opiniones (todos somos libres de creer lo que queramos; esto nicamente incumbe a nuestra privacidad)- pasa

por alto las frases ideolgicas emocionantes y slo sigue motivaciones utilitarias y/o hedonsticas. En sentido estricto, sigue siendo una actitud ideolgica: implica una serie de presupuestos ideolgicos (sobre la relacin entre los valores y la vida real, sobre la libertad personal, etc.) que son necesarios para la reproduccin de las relaciones sociales existentes. Lo que se presenta entonces a nuestra vista es un tercer continente de fenmenos ideolgicos: ni la ideologa en tanto doctrina explcita (las convicciones articuladas sobre la naturaleza del hombre, la sociedad y el universo), ni la ideologa en su existencia material (las instituciones, los rituales y las prcticas que le dan cuerpo), sino la elusiva red de actitudes y presupuestos implcitos, cuasi espontneos, que constituyen un momento irreductible de la reproduccin de las prcticas no ideolgicas (econmicas, legales, polticas, sexuales). [15] La nocin marxiana de fetichismo de la mercanca es un buen ejemplo de esto: designa no una teora (burguesa) de la economa poltica, sino una serie de presupuestos que determinan la estructura de la prctica econmica muy real del intercambio en el mercado; en teora, un capitalista se aferra al nominalismo utilitario, y sin embargo, en su propia prctica (de intercambio, etc.) sigue caprichos teolgicos y acta como un idealista contemplativo [16] Por esa razn, una referencia directa a la coercin extraideolgica (del mercado, por ejemplo) es un gesto ideolgico por excelencia: el mercado y los medios (masivos) estn interrelacionados dialcticamente; vivimos en una sociedad del espectculo (Guy Debord) en la que los medios estructuran de antemano nuestra percepcin de la realidad y hacen la realidad indistinguible de su imagen estetizada. [17] Notas 1. Por esa razn, los horizontes epocales de la precomprensin (el gran tema de la hermenutica) no pueden ser designados como ideologa. 2. Para una resea concisa de las consecuencias tericas de este doble trauma, vase Theodor W. Adorno, Mensajes en una

botella, en este volumen. En cuanto a la forma en que la crtica del pensamiento identitario realizado por Adorno anuncia el deconstructivismo postestructuralista, vase Peter Dews, Adorno, el postestructuralismo y la crtica de la identidad, en este volumen. 3. En su libro La Philosophie de Marx (Pars, La Dcouverte, 1993; trad. esp. La filosofa de Marx, Buenos Aires, Nueva Visin, 2000), tienne Balibar llam la atencin sobre el enigma que supone la completa desaparicin de la nocin de ideologa en los textos de Marx posteriores a 1850. En La ideologa alemana, la nocin (omnipresente) de ideologa se concibe como la quimera que complementa la produccin y la reproduccin sociales; la oposicin conceptual que funciona como su antecedente es la que distingue el proceso vital real y su reflejo distorsionado en las cabezas de los idelogos. Las cosas se complican, sin embargo, en el momento en que Marx aborda la crtica de la economa poltica: lo que encuentra aqu en la forma del fetichismo de la mercanca ya no es una ilusin que refleja la realidad, sino una extraa quimera que opera en el centro mismo del proceso real de produccin social. Un eclipse enigmtico similar puede ser detectado en muchos autores posmarxistas: Ernesto Laclau, por ejemplo, despus del uso casi inflacionario de ideologa en su Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory: Capitalism, Fascism, Populism. (Londres, Verso, 1977; trad. esp. Poltica e ideologa en la teora marxista. Capitalismo, fascismo, populismo, Madrid, Siglo XXI, 1978), renuncia por completo a l en Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (en coautora con Chantal Mouffe, Londres, Verso, 1985; trad. esp. Hegemona y estrategia socialista. Hacia una radicalizacin de la democracia, Madrid, Siglo XXI, 1985). 4. Para evitar un fatal malentendido, debemos insistir en que esta lnea de sucesin no debe leerse como un progreso jerrquico, como una negacin o supresin del modo precedente. Cuando, por ejemplo, abordamos la ideologa bajo el aspecto de los AIE, esto no implica de ninguna manera la obsolescencia o la irrelevancia del nivel de la

argumentacin. Hoy, cuando la ideologa oficial se muestra cada vez ms indiferente hacia su propia coherencia, un anlisis de sus inconsistencias inherentes y constitutivas es crucial si queremos penetrar su autntico modo de funcionamiento. 5. Una presentacin ejemplar de la posicin habermasiana puede leerse en Seyla Benhabib, La crtica de la razn instrumental, en este volumen. 6. Vase Oswald Ducrot, Le dire et le dit, Pars, Minuit, 1986 [trad. esp. El decir y lo dicho, Madrid, 1998]. 7. Vase Michel Pcheux, El mecanismo del reconocimiento ideolgico, en este volumen. Aqu debe recordarse que la fuente clave de la crtica de las evidencias ideolgicas en el anlisis del discurso es El estadio del espejo como formador de la funcin del yo (je) tal como se nos revela en la experiencia psicoanaltica de Jacques Lacan (en este volumen), texto que introdujo el concepto de reconocimiento (reconnaissance) como desconocimiento (mconnaissance). 8. Vase E. Laclau, Politics and Ideology, ob. cit. 9. Vase Louis Althusser, Ideologa y Aparatos Ideolgicos de Estado, en este volumen. 10. Aqu reside la interrelacin entre el ritual que corresponde a los AIE y el acto de interpelacin: cuando creo que me he arrodillado a causa de mi creencia, nsimultneamente me reconozco en el llamado del Dios-Otro que me orden arrodillarme. Este punto fue desarrollado por Isolde Charim en su intervencin Dressur und Verneinung, en el coloquio Der Althusser-Effekt, Viena, 17 al 20 de marzo de 1994. 11. Vase Theodor W. Adorno, Beitrag zur Ideologienlehre, en Gesammelte Schriften: Ideologie, Francfort, Suhrkamp, 1972. 12. Vase Wolfgang Fritz Haug, Annherung an die faschistische Modalitt des Ideologischen, en Faschismus und Ideologie 1, Argument-Sonderband 60, Berln, Argument Verlag, 1980. 13. El anlisis del discurso y la reconceptualizacin althusseriana de la ideologa tambin habilitaron un nuevo

abordaje de los estudios feministas. Sus dos casos representativos son el anlisis del discurso posmarxista de Michle Barrett (vase su trabajo Ideologa, poltica, hegemona: de Gramsci a Laclau y Mouffe, en este volumen) y el deconstructivismo pragmtico de Richard Rorty (vase su trabajo Feminismo, ideologa y deconstruccin: una perspectiva pragmatista, en este volumen). 14. Vanse Nicholas Abercrombie, Stephen Hill y Bryan S. Turner, Determinacin e indeterminacin en la teora de la ideologa, y la respuesta crtica de Gran Therborn, Las nuevas cuestiones de la subjetividad, ambos en este volumen. Para una visin general del desarrollo histrico del concepto de ideologa que condujo a esta autodispersin, vase Terry Eagleton, La ideologa y sus vicisitudes en el marxismo occidental, en este volumen. 15. Para un abordaje de esta ideologa implcita, vase Pierre Bourdieu y Terry Eagleton, Doxa y vida cotidiana: una entrevista, en este volumen. 16. Para la nocin de ideologa que estructura la realidad (social), vase Slavoj Zizek Cmo invent Marx el sntoma?, en este volumen. 17. Vase Fredric Jameson, La posmodernidad y el mercado, en este volumen.

http://www.nakedpunch.com/articles/21 Gayatri Spivak, Interviwed by Oscar Guardiola-Rivera by Gayatri Spivak First Posted: 08-28-09 07:05 PM PM

Updated: 08-28-09 07:05

Oscar Guardiola-Rivera: At this point in your life, in your career, how would you cast yourself? Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak: I have always had great difficulty casting myself, surely it is others who cast me. I think what I really do is teach. I dont ever have a sense that I do anything other than teach. I think its very important to teach, to try to change minds. Rearrangement of desires, as I say, you know, at the two ends of the spectrum. At one end, its a very hard thing, trying to develop habits and rituals of democracy, in the largest sector of the electorate, which is the poorest of the rural poor, whose votes are bought, in what is called the worlds largest democracy, India. So Im a teacher there, and Im a teacher at the other end of the spectrum, in the most powerful university in the most powerful city in the world. And there I think its extremely necessary to dislodge, again rearrangement of desires, you dont change minds so easily, to dislodge the conviction that one can help, to dislodge the conviction that lasting help is so easy. The American habit of helping which leads only to a reputation of generosity on the part of the helper, you know this is a scary thing. The help involves political and economic transformations of kinds which are not very salutary. And in Columbia University students do not always know this. They are eager to step into the International Civil Society. Im just going to Bangalore to talk about Law and Social movements, and I see, like you, a very good person who has prepared some questions for me, and Im interested. This is an Indian city, Ive written about this city in a piece called Megacity. Bangalore

is one of the software capitals of India, its hardly India anymore, its face is turned towards elsewhere. So Im interested in saying something there. As it is, Im amused that they brought me, because Im a non-resident Indian, which is the Indian shortening for people of my sort. Why have they asked me to come I cant take myself seriously there. But on the other hand, what I was thinking was, these social movements, they are out of touch, because these social movements that began wonderfully, you know the new social movements from the end of the sixties, really in the seventies, they were taken over, they have become the International Civil Society, a completely different kind of thing. And you know social movements were in the old days defined as extra-state collective actions. What is called terrorism is armed social movements, extra state collective action. So Im going to tackle the question of social movements which is a totally absurd expression today given the International Civil Society. Given the definition of social movements, Im going to tackle the question of the War on Terror. Now how would you cast me? One does what one can. I dont know how I would cast myself. OGR: Well let me try two possible representations of you in that context. Some people say that you are just a provocateur, that you are trying to provoke a certain reaction. Much in the same way in which people think about philosophers like Nietzsche or others GS: Thats not bad is it? To be compared to Nietzsche Both laugh OGR: But then others would say that the intellectual is acceptable only as a provocateur. These argue that whenever the intellectual succeeds, when her words are taken seriously and become, so to speak, a guideline for practice, then there is trouble because if the intellectual succeeds in her call to action she would be bringing catastrophe and/or tyranny,

and if not is just another frustration. So there are nowadays these two ideas about the public intellectual, either she is too out of touch, too theoretical, too playful, or else, if taken seriously she is the underlabourer of tyranny GS: As I said Im a teacher. What I try to do, my work, is long term. But in the field of ecological agriculture, trafficking women, living with HIV/Aids, there I'm a short term activist. I join in changing laws and I move people from one place to another so they can now learn not to use chemical fertilisers. So there is a large part of what I do which would not fall into what you are talking about, but in the arena of thinking, my work is long term. I use the shorthand change minds. But I prefer the phrase rearranging desires because changing minds, my god, I havent seen anyone who has changed anyones mind, and so, there what I want is that these people wouldnt follow. My activities in the classroom would not follow some guidelines given by me, I agree there, Im like Kant writing to the Jacobins, saying you dont follow I mean this is some of the problem with international communism, you dont take Marx and bring it in as a system of government, so to an extent, my role as I said in the case of the young Indians, the children, is to produce a different kind of mind. I think that is a very important thing to do. I said, didnt I, that Im not a leader: you said dont they want you to become a political leader and I explained why not, and I remain I get the results in unexpected ways and I feel if change really takes hold, then there will be change in general practice. Its a very different kind of work from giving formulas, giving Leninist Universalisms like my friend Zizek, thats not my way.

OGR: Let us move onto your work as a theorist, as an intellectual. Your work seems to move between Europeanoriented theory (youre well-known as a translator of Jacques Derrida, indeed as a deconstructivist of sorts, but also

because of your interest in the work of Karl Marx) and the sort of non-Eurocentric position that some identify with the stance of, say, the South-East Asian Subalternist Group, Latin American Subalternists or Post-colonial Critique in general. People in both camps find this trans-cultural position disorienting, even untenable. They say you either take the side of European (or Euro-American) thinking or else, you denounce it from the position of the global southern subaltern. How does your work relate to this sort of criticism? GS: You see the thing is I like European stuff. I find Europe interesting, and I chose Europe as an object of investigation. My mother had a masters degree in Bengali literature, I chose to study English. You know, I dont see what the problem is with having Europe as an object of investigation, as you were saying before, why are we, nonEuropeans, not allowed to do that? I found that in the 80s, and everybody has forgotten this statement of mine, I found in the very early eighties that in order to study Europe, since Im basically a modernist, one must also study Europes colonial adventures very carefully. So Im just being a good Europeanist in looking at all this colonial stuff. OGR: But in that sense, if you allow me to intervene, I would say you have been a better European than most Europe-based theorists GS: I would hope so. OGR: Because the case is that actually very few European theorists, you just mentioned Slavoj Zizek who many of us consider a friend, very few of them actually engage with this other point/countepoint of European history. GS: No, they dont, except colonial historians. I was once and I wont mention names, but because I have friends all over the world, but I was somewhere at a very famous centre

and I had been invited as a fellow and there were colonial historians. Now, they know everything about colonialism, thats not a problem. The problem with me was that although they know all about colonial history, they really, in spite of the fact that they had many friends in many of those colonies, they could not imagine those folks as really subjects of knowledge, they had some colleagues who were almost as good, indistinguishable from the whites, you know at Oxford and all that, thats a very different thing, but in terms of and if I started naming names I would name names who have become quite famous in anti-colonial war, you know they are close friends, and this is a problem. So you know they were the colonial historians and so I would at once stand for high theory and I would say: look, think of these people as producers of knowledge and not just as objects of study. In my case Europe is my object of study but I certainly do think of them as subjects of knowledge as well. I dont see that as a huge problem, that doesnt make me Eurocentric, what I dont particularly want to do is sort of anthropologise myself, you know, give little, I mean I could if I wanted to be in bad faith. I could very easily, You dont need an awful lot of learning to persuade a group of European foreigners who want me to be really culturally authentic, to persuade them that Im culturally authentic, because they are not specialists in the material of India. I talk, or give talks in Bengali on Indian material in India where I can be and I am questioned and judged, where I can be rejected, so that it doesnt just become a union ticket to authenticity. To say in front of whites, look, look no hands, Im an Indian! thats disgraceful. And then I come to Karl Marx. Who told you Karl Marx is a European? I come from West Bengal, so I should know. It is amusing, I once refused to go to a German meeting, they were doing some kind of What is communism in the future? type thing and they had all the usual suspects: Axel Honneth, Nancy Fraser, you name it, Balibar, they are all in the central section, with nobody from Cuba or China, I would have been the only person from an actually existing left-front government, right, but I was put in a session with

one of my former students, an immigrant in Germany of Spanish origin who is in fact doing work interviewing migrant women. I have nothing against her, I like her very much but I really minded that they didnt think I was good enough to be with the big people talking about new communisms. OGR: Why do you think that is the case? GS: Because they didnt think I would have anything to say except like you have asked me, about immigrant experience. Im not an immigrant, as I said before, my postcolonial work is not about that, although I think its good to look at issues like non-access to citizenship, this business about undocumented immigrants, domestic violence these are issues that Im very interested in, but I myself dont identify as a minority in the metropolis. They were actually defining me as only that, and so I thought Im not going to go, because they dont have anybody there. They forget about knowing about Marxist theory, where it actually comes from. Bengali communism is actually pre-Bolshevik, you know in fact it was a Bengali communist who established the first communist party of Mexico, so in what way would this be considered? And of course there is Mao who is a different thing, and of course Mao has influenced the and Michael Hardt thinks I must be a Maoist because I am interested in the rural area. Nonetheless, you know, it is important to see that the various traditions, despite what Benedict Anderson has written, and it is a fine book, in Imagined Communities, for instance the tradition of Asian communism has worked very hard at wrenching Marx from his European provenance. I grew up in this place with a very strong intellectual left tradition, so am I supposed to think I am being Eurocentric if I apply Marxist analysis? OGR: I can think of similar experiences, obviously being Latin American and being brought up at the time when liberation theology and sociology were at their peak, of course, one becomes very familiar with a certain leftist

tradition. But then, when one comes here, here being Britain, Europe, America, its as if that experience of Marxism, of leftism or emancipatory thought never actually existed. If one tries to find a good book on it, that would be very difficult, here in Britain perhaps Youngs Postcolonialism: A Historical Introduction or Aric and Lowith and thats that. There is no consideration that this practice and thought of Marxism and Leftism is part of the tradition of worldwide struggle, much less that it could have something to teach to the mainstream tradition of liberatory struggle, why is that? GS: Well, Why, because Europe has always been in power. In the detritus of the Soviet experiment, the entire Balkan area wants to be European. I moderated a session called Are We Postcolonial? set up by the teachers of Slavic and EastEuropean literatures and so on, and I was just in Bulgaria: post communism and post colonialism, post socialism and post colonialism so that particular stuff is actually a longing. I on the other hand have never been taken seriously within the tradition of western Marxism, the only person who has at all taken me seriously is Antonio Negri, but Negris own work is very different from mine, so in fact I speak as a certain kind of Marxist , I come from that intellectual left tradition. Its an old tradition. I was first handed Das Kapital by my mothers brother, a member of the legislative assembly from the old Communist Party of India. So, I speak as a Marxist. Ill tell you a funny story which many people have heard but never gotten into print. When I published the translation of De La Grammatologie, my mother read the introduction because I had written it, and although she was an MA in Bengali, and obviously found it difficult to read, she never complained of the fact that it was difficult, she tried to understand as much as she could. But then she asks me a very difficult question: but dear, how are you going to reconcile your communism with this? and of course the word in our part of the world is not Marxism but communism, and so I told Derrida this story and Derrida says to me, Gayatri, you should listen to your mother.

Both Laugh GS: To an extent this exchange between mother and daughter tells you something about how we think we are being Eurocentric or doing European theory, when we actually are within communism. Im not a kind of romantically bedazzled person from the communist party at home, thats not what Im talking about, thats another story which Ill tell another day. On the other hand, you have the feminist impulse. I have learnt that it has to interrupt Marxism not because of these sterile fights between men and women on both the British and the US New Left. That has left me quite cold, because its really true that in spite of all their victories, the Euro-US is not the whole world, even New York is not the whole world! (laughter) OGR: The ethical common sense these days seems to be a thinking of relation as embrace, an act of love in which one learns from the other. But, as you have pointed out, that is not at all the same thing as wanting to speak for an oppressed community. Ethics is not a problem of knowledge but something like a call of relationship without relationship. This means that the goal of ethics is not to step into the others shoes, to become the spokesperson for the oppressed, nor worse yet, to pretend to let them speak for themselves. Rather, the goal of ethics and politics is that the subaltern, the universal exception as such, might cease to exist. This entails a revolutionary change, but apparently not the kind of change that will be brought about by traditional means. If so, what kind of revolution are we talking about? Does it make any sense at all to keep talking about revolution in this context?

GS: Ethics is a big word. I have learned to think that ethics is not just the name of doing the right thing, or being good to others. Now, there is one kind of ethical thinking which

actually thinks that, I mean very developed theories, which think thats what ethics is: doing the correct thing, telling the truth, thinking of the greatest good for the greatest number, all of this kind of stuff. Then you get into virtue, which has an idea of the mental theatre which is uncomplicated, so thats certainly a good way of thinking, and thats certainly the stronger way of thinking. Folks who think like that sometimes take the pedagogical part of ethical training for granted, they believe that what they have as a result of their liberal educational gains, is more or less what everybody has, so they are obliged to cut corners. Especially today. In the old days you could always talk about savages and raw men but today, you know thats not politically correct, so you have to cut corners, you have to talk about political liberalism rather than philosophical liberalism. Take Charles Taylor; in a horrifying essay called Rationality he in fact gives Europe rationality and says everyone else has consistency. But thats not what Im talking about. Another way of thinking would say that what we call the ethical, that is to say, being slanted toward the other, is just a description of being human. In that area if one says that, that is just the event of the ethical. Event is perhaps not the best word but I havent thought of another one so lets just use it as a bad word thats filling in the place for some word. So lets just say that I am using this stop-gap word. If we think of this as event, there is no guarantee that it will be directed towards doing right doing the good thing, etc, some kind of result. It can even be, that you know, literature sometimes gives us a sense, and remember Im a literary critic, it can be the relationship between Capt. Ahab and Moby Dick, to kill the other person, to the extent that you can completely identify with it/her/him Carl Schmitt but you know I would rather go to Herman Melville it can be all kinds of relationships, not necessarily vectored towards truth telling, good doing, like virtuous, utilitarian or consequentialist versions of the ethical situation. In that situation, in that event, there is a second step which is ethics as task, so that, in fact, you

can only think the ethical because the other thing is almost like, its not ontological but its almost like, what happens. You can only think the ethical in terms of accountability, responsibility, task. Let me explain that in relation to the work I do with some schools in India. Thats an intellectual challenge, because after reading a good deal of Rawls I said to myself one day, will I be able to, because I was disaffected from that kind of stuff, and I mean although Levinas has deep political problems, and very poor gender politics, but nonetheless thats the stuff that appealed to me, so with all of these provisos, but they were so confined to their own community, I mean, in terms of Levinas support of Israel on the one hand, and this Eros whatever its called, the chapter which I know very well it is clear that I am not saying anything insulting by saying that Levinas sexual experience was probably confined to a very affectionate and fine exercise of sexuality called the missionary position, I cant learn anything about sexuality from such a persons lucubrations about the role of woman in the household. I found myself in these tribal areas, it wasnt so clear, but I'm just narrativising it. A thought came: would I recognise the ethical subject if indeed they were shitting under the trees, if they were killing people, because the parents and elder brothers of my students are murderers, bus looters? Im with them. If I started telling you these grizzly stories you would be appalled, so they have so little confidence in the whole vote business or even education, So what happens is that they are Nietzscheans in a sense. Remember Nietzsches description of academic freedom: a whole room where everyone is moving their right hands mostly, and one person is doing the talking, and that is called academic freedom, they are like pre-critical Nietzscheans. What the hell happens: they say lets loot a bus, theres at least some money in that. So I asked myself: will I be able to recognise the ethical subject if it didnt come dressed like you and me? So from that point of view I would say ethics as task is a very different kind of thing because what happens is, you know

this, this is why you have formed this question in such a way, like who killed who at what battle, you know and what century is part of which war, but your question is exactly that, its very nice, because I can see you know exactly what it is and so you are just turning it into questions, so I will give you back your question in answer form. What happens here is that you prepare, like I was saying, habits and rituals of democracy, you prepare the subject to respond to the reflex which is the interruption of the ethical in a situation where knowing and knowing about the problem is not going to lead necessarily to the ethical decision. It may lead you to the correct decision, the sustainable decision, the prudent decision, even the decision that maximises the possibilities of peace, but those are very different kinds of things, they dont lead to a lastingly just situation, nothing lasts, but nonetheless some things last longer than others. Changes have taken place, I mean the fact that you and I are sitting here talking to each other is the result of extraordinary changes, and not just technological changes. I quite often think of my village grandmother who was quite a managerial person, she could read a little but not write, or write a little, but not read, or whichever, I often think, what she would think of her granddaughter, dressed in these kinds of foreign clothes, speaking to a foreign man to whom she is not married, with everything in view (gesturing to her head and neck), what kind of sinful situation this would be coded as. Changes have taken place, we have to have this in our heads, some changes do take place and those are the kind of changes one thinks of and prepares for in response to the reflex, thats the ethical interruption. Ethical things are not like the proposition how are we going to solve the problem of Iraq? Thats not the ethical situation. The ethical problems are what trouble shall we take in order for us to be able to enter the space of those who produce the reflex? If the reflex is not produced, then its not really worth doing. You know, Im just going to my schools in India and there is someone going with me who is a white Englishman, who, he is

still not going to go to the actual schools but some of these children have graduated and they are in high-school where this guy is, the former landlord, and so they need to be coached constantly, now how did this happen? He came to study at Columbia and he didnt tell me anything about his plans, that was also part of the project, he had taken seriously what I had written about needing to learn the language if you want, to study the colonial adventure, so he had decided, OK I want to do 19th century Britain, I need to learn Bengali, this is very unusual, because the British came in through Bengal, so he was learning Bengali, so he got fellowships in Bengali as the historians or anthropologists sometimes do, but literature critics hardly ever do. He went to the American Academy of Indian Studies and got fellowships, and did very well, etc, etc, etc, and since I wont direct a dissertation if a person is not reading the texts in the original, Im in comparative literature, right, he wrote one chapter on a Bengali novel, interesting stuff, communism and the agrarian problem, so I know the ways in which the reflex came to him although we had not discussed it, I picked up the signs, OK, the Bengali which is good enough to write a chapter is not good enough to teach these Bengali children who are completely disenfranchised, alright, but I'm taking a chance. I said you are going to have to insert yourself into that normality. There is no way you are going to come, and this is not like American students being taken and having a good experience, there is no way they are going to think of you as someone who is constantly going to talk about his home country, thats not why you are going there. No gadgets, no nothing, either you insert yourself into that normality and become just a teacher, or it wont work, and you know we were talking, and I had earned the right to become a little racist, see because they have never seen white people these kids and not necessarily going to like many of the teachers. And I said to him, later I thought this was a racist remark, its good that youre not blonde because it would have created a very bad kind of distance situation. He has to be

completely not noticeable to succeed there because its not like international civil society with interpreters and OGR: And Flags GS: and smilingly wearing hijabs because you need to cover your head if you go to Afghanistan, and the next week they are going to Kosovo. Its not like that. Its that long term change for the ethical reflex and while they are a student, they may be Indian tribals its a different kind of thing, so thats how much trouble you have to take in order to enter that sort of space. Im not talking about the political, the juridical, the economic, those are crucially important, and we are involved in that, thats why I talked about the agriculture stuff and trafficking in women stuff, but without this one no change will last. Thats what Can the subaltern speak was about: that neither the British nor the Hindus involved themselves with the actual subjectship of the women, though the British were unquestionably good in criminalising the widow burning, it became class dependant, so a certain class of women became colonial subjects. OGR: So, what you are saying is that ethics has a lot to do with unlearning ones own privilege? GS: Not only that Unlearning ones own privilege was a phrase I used before I knew any of this. Unlearning ones own privilege is a narcissistic undertaking. I would now say, learning to learn from below. Forget about the other one. I mean, you cant unlearn privilege. Back then I had an inadequate concept of the mental theatre. You know this privilege has become millenary, how am I going to unlearn it? On the other hand, I am so different from these other Indian citizens, these tribals, for me to be able to enter into the space where I can, as a teacher, not as a psychoanalyst, thats a very different thing, Im not talking about transference, I dont know how to do such a thing, and there your friend Zizek should halt a little before he talks so

much about psychoanalysis. You can see he hasnt a clue about the extraordinary struggle of transference. We all think that transference is like an analyst/analysand, but in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, the way Freud describes transference is like wrestling with an angel. Im not talking about psychoanalysis, Im talking about rough and ready, not in the area of the psyche or the metapsychological but in the classroom. In a general way, in order to teach, becoming acquainted with the mental furniture which I am calling desires in the folks you are teaching, that is an excruciating labour, when the cultural class and historical difference and even religious difference (remember they are animists) although Im an atheist it doesnt matter, produced culture in a certain way. So that is a much harder labour than remaining focused on oneself and unlearning privilege, that was before I knew anything, The tempo of ethics is extremely slow. Remember how much importance I assign to politics, to law, to ecology, all of these I want to be involved in as much as a contentious citizen is, I join in things as much as I can, but this project, and moving towards a relatively lasting just world, that tempo is excruciatingly slow. I mean Im as practical as I can be. If I want anything thats what I want, you see. OGR: Thats beautiful. GS: Let me say about deconstruction one thing. See you quoted before The post-colonial Critic which came out in 87 or 90 or something. And those are interviews, and you know what I have said about interviews at the beginning of Can the Subaltern Speak? and also you know that most of those interviews are given after lectures and things like that when people have found me in various kinds of places, and after lectures is a moment of incredible excitement. I mean you must have given enough lectures to know, incredible lowering of tension, so I wouldnt actually take the statements uttered in Postcolonial Critic as those which describe what I think of deconstruction. Deconstruction cant found a

programme, thats what I said in there. I think what is more interesting is this, which I found out much later. Im talking about the book Voyous a much later work of Derridas. I have the picture of the page in front of me, but I certainly dont have the page number, its in the second section, where he is talking about how you can do constative definitions of democracy, because he is interested in democracy. I am interested in socialism. His interest, since he was not interested in Marxist analysis of industrial capitalism but rather commercial capital and communism as messianic and so on, his interest was more in democracy, my interest is more in a welfare state model of socialism, in other words when I was talking about ethics, the way you plug in this stuff is the generation of the redistributive impulse. I was talking about other kinds of things, the habits and rituals of democracy but if you shift the focus and you think about generating a redistributive impulse, the impulse to change the politics of ones economics: Everybody talks about immigration, but if you change the politics of the economics of globalisation just slightly so many people wouldnt leave, think of that. Who would think of that, first of all, its too complicated for those interviewers brains to think, and, in order for such a change to take place, a change in desires has to take place, and thats not happening. And I remain at work to make that change through the ethical; I'm not uninterested in democracy but I'm more interested in socialism. On that page, Derrida is talking about the way you can make constative definitions of democracy, where you would look at all the different theories that have come forth and see what would apply or what would not apply, and then he comments, and I know this page well, and he comments, as I have been doing in this book. Or, he says you can give the definition and say Hey you must really do this, you must really sign up, Im going to really do this, etc In other words, and he is not going to say performative, because this is not performative. This one is given in this way, like sign up!. Its all We, there, in the second statement. And then he

says and also have the patience to, and his word is messianic: have the patience for a messianic waiting. So first of all short term, must do the: sign up!, join!, do it!. I didnt come to what I just told you before by reading this, but I'm influenced by him, I dont know how these things happen, but you can see the similarity there, so then the idea of doing the double bind of the short term and the long term, the waiting, the unexpected, as well as sign up!, join up!, we must do this!, thats much more the model, the double bind of the short term juridical- political, and the long term waiting. Oxford, June 2006