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Colonel von Spohn's "Art of Command"

By S S Fitz-Gibbon From BAR issue 91 April 1989. NATO has in recent years been paying a great deal of attention to two concepts of "manoeuvre war" based largely upon those of the German Army in World War II, which were the culmination of the developing military philosophy the Wehrmacht inherited from Frederick the Great through Scharnhorst and the elder Moltke and which, progressively refined over the years, gave rise to the command concept, now called Auftragstaktik, which made the Blitzkrieg so successful. In the British Army the trend towards "manoeuvre" thinking and its concomitant, the system of "directive command", seems to have begun with General Sir Nigel Bagnall's command of First British Corps, developing through his term as Chief of the General Staff. The latest evidence of progress is the introduction of mission analysis and the professed belief of many officers in the principles of Auftragstaktik. It has, however, been pointed out in US military circles that American moves towards the practice of manoeuvre fighting have been greatly hindered by a lack of understanding of the philosophy underlying the German concept of directive command 1. The philosophy underlying directive command was described most admirably by a German colonel named von Spohn in an article of 1907 entitled "'The Art of Command". Such an explanation is invaluable to any officer attempting to grasp the true meaning of Auftragstaktik, and Spohn's article is considered at length below. First, however, let. us place this command concept in the perspective of the timeless philosophy of manoeuvre war - a philosophy set down in writing well over 2000 years ago by Sun Tzu. Decentralisation and directive command "If the situation is one of victory but the sovereign has issued orders not to engage, the general may decide to fight. If the situation is such that he cannot win, but the sovereign has issued orders. to engage, he need not do so . . . " Sun Tzu What Sun -Tzu wrote about was directive command as it applied between the political leader and his commander-in-chief; directive command really comes into its own within the, units and formations of the, field army, particularly in a fast-moving war, when the principle more obviously applies. Directive command, which may also be described is participatory command, or more simply, but less descriptively as decentralisation, is the means by which some
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It is fair to say that the same is unfortunately true in the British Army. The essential point is that the doctrine of directive command, which relies heavily upon good officer training and maximum use of initiative, is doomed to failure if the environment of genuine encouragement of initiative is not there. 1

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armies seek to reduce friction in the operations of a military machine. Much friction is caused by changes in tactical situations which render earlier orders meaningless in their details, or by acquisition of unexpected information during the battle which, had it been known beforehand, would frame resulted in different orders being given. Since war, particularly mobile war, is fraught with changes, with uncertainty, and often with chaos, the directive command system seeks to prevent uncertainty or changes from interfering with detailed orders, by simply not issuing detailed orders. Instead, the general intention of a commander. is explained to his subordinates two tactical levels below him, and they do whatever appears appropriate in the circumstances immediately confronting them, bearing in mind the higher intention. This takes advantage of the fact that the man on the spot has the most up-to-date knowledge of the engagement as it affects him. and also permits - and indeed requires all commanders to exercise their creative intellect. Therefore a larger number of individuals contribute to the decision-making process - hence the term "participatory command", which does not imply democratic decision-making, but simply recognises the involvement of more brains in making decisions - and such a command system is necessarily decentralised. The Chinese philosophy is worth further consideration. Ho Yen-Hsi explains: In war there may be one hundred changes in each step. When one sees he can, he advances; when he sees that things are difficult, he retires. To say that a general must await commands of the sovereign in such circumstances is like informing a superior that you wish to put out a fire. Before the order to do so arrives the ashes are cold.. This illustrates the need for action on one's own initiative before seeking confirmation from one's superior. Another aspect of the Chinese philosophy is that the commander does not merely delegate responsibility to his subordinates and leave them to their own devices: it is his duty to create favourable situations for them to exploit. In this way, a senior. commander cannot simply pass responsibility on to his subordinates and blame them for any subsequent failure, any more than they can automatically attribute responsibility to their superior; each has his own sphere of responsibility 2. The higher commander's consists of creating winning situations; if he is subsequently let down by his subordinates' failure to exploit these, he cannot reasonably be held to blame. Similarly, the subordinate is totally responsible for his part, and should be free from interference from above; moreover, if he feels that the task given to him is impossible or unwise, it is his duty to say so. The duties of superior and subordinate have been explained thus:'

Whether this should be the case at the political level is not at issue here. The principle should be generally adhered to at all tactical and operational levels of command..

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A skilled commander seeks victory from the situation and does not demand it of his subordinates ... He selects his men and they exploit the situation. " Sun Tzu "Experts in war depend especially on opportunity and expediency. They do not place the burden of accomplishment on their men alone. " Ch'en Hao The ancient Chinese manoeuvre philosophy is more than academically interesting; it demonstrates the timelessness of this aspect of the art of war. We find it rejuvenated in the Prussian-German military mind some two thousand years after Sun Tzu. A remarkably similar philosophy to the Chinese was set down by Colonel von Spohn of the Imperial German Army in his article entitled "The Art of Command". Because this represents a most excellent explanation of the directive command concept, von Spohn must be considered at length. "Every order places the subordinate to whom it is given in a position of constraint, to which he willingly submits without any question he recognises the necessity for it - in such a case obedience is not a servile submission, but the free gift of a free man; but he complies with an order unwillingly if it is dictated merely by the pleasure of giving orders, or by the desire to magnify one's own importance. " The first point of note here is that, for Spohn, an order is not simply a means of directing a subordinate to his task, but is actually a constraint on him. This is a paradox only to the authoritarian commander, who does not realise that the detail he includes in his orders becomes a constraint on the subordinate's ability to carry out the task as the circumstances dictate. The objection to a form of obedience based upon servile submission" - or unthinking discipline - would not be raised by the authoritarian. Von Spohn continues: "We soldiers ... want in the army a cheery and willing, not a slavish servile obedience. It is the first alone which conduces to happiness in the service, ensures a firm unshaken discipline, and inspires men to heroic deeds in action when bullets are whistling around. It is the first kind of obedience alone which acts educationally and forms the character." The Colonel is here describing the difference between internal and external discipline. A soldier or officer must be educated to use his initiative, and to be selfdisciplined. Otherwise, if his "discipline" rests on external enforcement and habit formation, he will be lost without external leadership, and will not use his initiative for fear of making mistakes and being reprimanded. Spohn next addresses the question of detailed orders and over-regulation: "Another serious drawback involved in a mania for giving orders (whether it arises from a spirit of domineering, or is only a result of that anxious care which
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conceives that nothing goes on without an order), is that all independence, all initiative, and all love of responsibility on the part of subordinates are killed. And yet - as...... the introduction Of our German training manuals clearly says modern fighting requires thoughtful leaders trained to be independent, and selfrestrained men, capable from devotion to their officers and to their country of providing their firm will to conquer even when their leaders have fallen. " It is no wonder that authoritarian commanders suffer from that anxious care which conceives that nothing goes on without an order; the external enforcement of discipline inculcates the habit in their men of only acting when ordered to. Thoughtful leaders "trained to be independent" can be expected to be of a critical kind, unaccustomed to mere acceptance of orders from which they see no good reason. Compare this with Major-General JFC Fuller's description in 1935 of the British Army in his time: No criticism is allowed for it might seem to belittle the Army in the eyes of a cynical public. ... This fear of the truth creates a discipline the aim of which is not to foster originality, but a universal damping-down and standardisation, which ends in creating an all pervading mediocrity of spirit, in which genius and talent are the demons to be exorcised. " Liddell Hart also criticised British Army authoritarianism during that period, writing of "the military view that minor mistakes were cardinal sins and capital offences." Von Spohn continues: "Such leaders and such men are not produced by orders, superfluous in themselves, and beside the mark; but we undoubtedly do get them if we give no more orders than are absolutely essential, and if we praise every independent action, even if it be not altogether apt or appropriate. In such a case what is wrong must be reproved, but not severely, not sharply, not in the form of censure, but only in the way of kindly instruction. " This requirement for initiative at even the lowest levels is markedly different from what would have been found in the contemporary British Army, and it must be remembered that even with the new doctrine of mission analysis and its increased emphasis on individual initiative no British Army doctrine exists even today which speaks in such terms. "No man likes to be severely found fault with, but everybody is willing to accept instructions, and does better another time. The man who has cause to fear fault finding, forswears initiative, and says to himself.. 'If I am going to be blamed I had better keep in the background, very likely I shall not be noticed then'. " The drawbacks inherent in an officer career system of authoritarian command, with its implications of getting on by not making mistakes, are obvious and are not new. Suffice it to say that under a directive command system, fear of failure and resulting inactivity, both in peace and in war, are far less likely to take effect. Von Spohn next considers the nature of orders in a directive command system:

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"According to the German 'Field Service Regulations'. . . an order should contain all that the subordinate must know in order to be able to act on his own responsibility for the attainment of the object in view, and no more. Consequently the order must be brief, clear, and definite, and it must also be suited to the recipient's range of view. Orders, during the transmission of which the situation may become changed, or those which may have to be carried out under circumstances which cannot be foreseen, must abstain especially from details. 'Instructions', then, take the place of Orders. These must indicate the object in view, but must leave the method of attaining that object alone .... ...(Infantry Training Regulations state that) "The higher commanders should give only such orders as are unavoidable. They must abstain from any interference in matters of detail, and must leave the choice of means to their subordinates. "' Note that commanders are not merely given recommendations about how much detail they include in their orders, and they are not just advised of the superiority of directive command and above all they are not merely encouraged to give as few orders as possible. They are forbidden to give detailed orders and are clearly. told not to interfere in the job of their subordinates. And, most important, far from being urged to control the action, they are told not to give orders unless it is unavoidable! The tendency in the authoritarian system is for higher commanders - perhaps, at least in peacetime, because their career is at stake, and they wish to make sure that their subordinates get everything right - to pay too close attention to what their subordinates are doing. Von Spohn warns against this: "These are wise regulations, but are they taken to heart by all commanders and on all occasions? Does not a lack of faith in the capabilities of a subordinate, or a wish to see the order carried out exactly in the way conceived by himself, end in many a commander transgressing against this very definite and outspoken regulation? Would that everyone would lay his hand on his heart and examine his conscience. This much is certain, that we can only bring up and train subordinate leaders to have independence, initiative, and fondness of responsibility, we do not crib, cabin, and confine them, but rather give them freedom of action, within their allotted sphere. " Perhaps the greatest difference in approach to command between the directive (typically German) and authoritarian (typically French, American or British) command systems is exemplified in Spohn's next paragraph: ...to deprive the subordinate commander of the independence to which he is entitled, means robbing him of the pleasure of service and the pleasure of action, and, at the very least, diminishing his interest in his work, and with it the germ of all active endeavour. How well would most of today's senior British officers take the suggestion that their subordinate officers are entitled to independence and to be free of interference?
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Von Spohn summarises the German doctrine on directive command and simple orders: "Even if we may confidently assume ... that no competent officer will adhere to the letter of an order in action, but will pursue the object in view with a proper willingness to accept responsibility- still this fact does not absolve superiors from the duty of never ordering more than it is necessary or possible to order. We have, thank, God, no model, no normal form of action, and therefore no superior ought to fall into the mistake of wishing to direct, the course of an engagement upon lines of is own choosing. Troops once engaged are beyond the control of the higher commander, and interference on his part is therefore impossible on active service ... We, learn most from mistakes and misunderstandings, and it is therefore well to let them run their course. Untimely interference, repeated orders, and such like, produce instead of trustworthiness, independence, and initiative which should be our aim, a feeling of insecurity and uncertainty which destroys any willingness to accept responsibility. This much is certain, that superior officers who give their subordinates in action and everywhere else where it is possible to do so - the independence which is their due, and even demand such power of initiative from them, will never be left in the lurch.. They will find their troops, down to the smallest detachment, always in the right place throughout the battle and after its conclusion. " The command doctrine described by Colonel von Spohn - although departed from in the attritionist period, which resulted from complacency over the strength of German arms after 187 1; which produced the Schlieffen Plan and with which the Germans began the Great War - was nevertheless sufficiently strong in the minds of German officers that when the uncharacteristic positional/attritionist methods failed, the German Army reverted to its former philosophy. It was almost definitely, this tradition of manoeuvre-style command which permitted the Germans. in the middle of a more intense war than they had perhaps ever imagined, and when apparently constrained by the positional deadlock, to revive manoeuvre methods; and it was almost certainly the absence of a comparable philosophy in the British Army which prevented the British from adapting to individualised tactics. After Passchendaele, it seems, the British attempted to copy the proven German tactics, but with less success, owing to the different form of discipline. The lesson to be learned . March 1918 saw the British 5th Army shattered in double time, by Germans relying on their renewed manoeuvre philosophy and directive command ideas*, although, due to the intensity of the war with rather less training for this than Von Spohn would have prescribed. But the renewal came too late to prevent the Germans

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being overwhelmed by the numerical, economic and industrial might of three great powers, one of them fresh into the fray. Again, in World War 11, the German directive command philosophy saw the Wehrmacht repeatedly demonstrate its superior military efficiency, usually against great numerical odds. And again the principal deciding factor was the great material superiority of the Allies. At last, in recent years, the US and British Armies have quite correctly realised that in a future European war of such intensity the material superiority necessary to fight a protracted war of attrition would be both unavailable and inappropriate, and that methods must be sought to enhance our ability to win quickly and decisively. This has begun a new and extensive interest in the Prussian-German military philosophy, but unfortunately, due to a considerable amount of misunderstanding of the German system, the US and now British attempts to practise Auftragstaktik have been denied their full potential success. It is submitted that explanations of the art of directive command, like that by von Spohn, are invaluable if we are fully to understand and implement what has proven itself to be a superior concept of command.
The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Michael Elliott Bateman, Head of Military Studies, University of Manchester for his help in the development of these ideas; and also Colonel Mike Dewar, Colonel Defence Studies, Staff College Camberley, and the Staff College librarians, for their invaluable assistance with his research.)

REFERENCES 1. Lt Col (GS) Hans-Joachim Belde, "Forward Defence 83: Reorganisation and rethitikirig in the 1st British Corps". Translated by Richard Simpkin ,BAR No.81, December 1985. 2. See Daniel ' I Hughes, "The Abuses of German Military History" in Military Review, USA), December 1986. 3 See Major R A D Applegate and others, "Problems of developing a manoeuvre army", Staff College Camberley 1987; Captain F A Kerkemayer, "Auftragstaktik" in Infantry (US Army) November-December 1987, Vol 77, No. 6; Lt-Col P Bergmann RACT, "Auftragstaktik or Leading with a Mission" in Defence Force Journal (Australia) No. 63, March-April 1987. 4. 5. 6. 7. Sun Tzu, -The Art of War, translated by Brig-Gen S B Griffith, OUP 1971, p, 128. See Hughes op. cit. Sun Tzu, p. 83. Ibid. p. 93.

8. Colonel von Spohn, "The Art of Command", originally in the Jahrbucher fr die Deutsche Armee und Marine, October 1907; translated for the British General Staff, published by, HMSO. All emphases in quotes from Spohn are mine. 9. J F C Fuller, 7he Army in My Time,, Manchester University, extract, p.4. 10. B H Liddell Hart, The Tanks Vol 1, pp. 120. 1, cit. J. Lus,aas, The education of an army: British military thought 1918.1940, Cassell, London 1965, p. 343.
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11. See '1'. Wintringham, New Ways of War 1940, pp. 20-26; X57. Lind, "Paper For the New York Militia Association Convention 1980" pp. 7-8. 12. See Hughes; Kerkemayer; Michael Elliott-Bateman and Jonathan Moore, "Language: the First Problem of Reform" in Defence Analysis (1988); S S Fitz-Gibbon, "Vocabulary: the second problem of Military Reform". forthcoming.

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